Chapter — Konings, Theologia Moralis
Chapter I: On the Notion of Human Acts
1. Definition. - An act, in general, is the potency of a being placed in exercise. But potency (faculty, power, virtue) is defined by St. Thomas:1 The proximate principle of the operations of the soul; proximate, I say, or immediate; for the mediate and remote principle is the very essence of the soul, which, by means of the potencies, is the principle of actions, in the same way in which the root of a tree brings forth fruit only by means of branches.2
As many as are the genera of potencies3 in the soul, so many are the genera of acts proceeding from those potencies. But man has some potencies common with irrational creatures, and others proper to himself. Wherefore "of the actions which are done by man, those alone are called human which are proper to man, insofar as he is man. But man differs from irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his own acts. Now man is master of his own acts through reason and will.... Therefore" (behold the definition) "actions are properly called human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions belong to man, they can indeed be called actions of man," such as are all acts of man destitute of the use of reason in whatever manner at last, "but not properly human, since they are not of man insofar as he is man."4
(1) q. 78, a. 4. (2) Sansev., Comp. Dignam., n. 2-4. (3) Ibid., n. 7-9. (4) 1. 2, q. 1, a. 1. Yet the object of Moral Theology is not all actions which are of man, insofar as he is man, or insofar as he is distinguished from brutes; for from the actions of these, human actions are distinguished both as to substance, and as to mode, and as to substance and mode together. Acts of the first kind are necessary intellections and volitions; and in this way human is the act by which the Blessed in heaven love God: human, I say, according to the mode of operating which man has, not in this life, but in the other life [Bouquillon, Th. Mor. fund., n. 30 (2)]. In the same way human is the act by which man on earth assents to an evident truth, for example that the whole is greater than its individual parts, or desires beatitude in general, or "not determinately in this or that" (S. Th. 2, D. 25, q. 1, a. 2). Acts of the second kind are, for example, actions of eating and drinking, in which we are distinguished from brutes as to the mode in which they can be placed by us, namely with deliberation. Acts of the third kind are free intellections and volitions, in which we are discerned from brutes both as to substance (to understand and to will), and as to mode (freely to understand and to will). Moralists treat only of acts of the second and third kind, but not of acts of the first kind; for these, since they are produced without counsel, or are not within man's free power, cannot be directed by the laws of Ethics (Signori, Ph. Mor., P. 1, n. 68).
2. Division. - A human act is distinguished in manifold ways:
1° Elicited, namely that which is perfected and consummated in the will itself, without the aid of another faculty, such as purely internal volitions and nolitions; or commanded, which, the will commanding, is perfected by another potency subject to the will, and that either internal, as the act of thinking about some particular thing, or external, as the act of walking, writing. Therefore each proceeds from the will (for otherwise it would not be a human act), yet not in the same manner.1
2° Internal, which is made manifest by no sensible sign, such as an act of thinking, of loving; or external, which is outwardly manifest, for example walking about. All elicited acts are internal; but commanded acts can be either internal or external.
3° Good, which is conformed to right reason; or evil, which is not consonant with it. Good is also called licit; evil, illicit.
4° Valid, which enjoys all the requisites essential for producing its proper effect, for example the transfer of ownership in an act of sale; or invalid, which lacks even some one of the essentials, as, for example, because in an act of sale the thing is not the seller's own, and is as if it had by no means been placed.
(1) S. Th. 3, D. 27, q. 2, a. 3 ad 4; a. 4, quaestiunc. 4, sol. 3.