CHAPTER I: ON THE OBLIGATION OF RESTITUTION

Restitution, as to the name, sounds the same as the placing of a thing into its former state. As to the thing, it is the reparation of injured strict right.

713. Principles. - I. Restitution in reality, or at least in vow, in grave matter is necessary for salvation by necessity of precept.

1° It is established from the principles set out above, n. 587. For commutative justice necessarily requires that violation of another's right cease; but it cannot cease except through restitution. Therefore.

2° It is established also from Sacred Scripture. Thus: But if you say to the wicked man: You shall surely die; and he does penance for his sin and does judgment and justice, and that wicked man restores the pledge and gives back the robbery, ... he shall live and shall not die.¹ - And: Behold the wages of the laborers who have reaped your fields, which has been kept back by you, cries out; and their cry has entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.²

3° It is established from the unanimous consent of the Holy Fathers. Thus S. Aug.³: "The sin will not be forgiven unless the thing taken is restored, when it can be restored." - These words of the Holy Doctor are inserted into the Canon Law;⁴ and from this comes rule 4 of law in the Sixth: Sin is not dismissed unless the thing taken is restored.

I said: in reality or in vow; for restitution is not necessary for salvation in reality by necessity of means. Therefore if it is impossible in reality, it does not stand in the way of salvation; but no one can be excused from restitution in vow. And whoever has injured another's right must always have a firm purpose of restoring when he can; otherwise he would retain affection for an evil thing, and thus would be situated in habitual sin. - Thus all. - Hence S. Augustine in the text just cited says: "when it can be restored."

714. • II. The precept of restitution is radically negative, in execution affirmative. The first reason is that the precept of restitution is immediately founded in the obligation of not violating another's right, or in the obligation neither of taking nor of retaining another's thing. But this obligation is radically negative, as is clear, and therefore it presses always and for always, that is, it presses at every moment until restitution has been made. The second reason is that the obligation of not taking or retaining another's thing, in which the precept of restitution is radically founded, cannot be fulfilled without therefrom being made a positive action by which that which is his own is returned to the owner.

III. There is no obligation of restitution except on account of violation of strict right, or of commutative justice; otherwise, however, on account of violation of the right of uprightness simply. The reason is that restitution effects that the thing owed to the neighbor equal the right of him unjustly violated. But now this cannot be done when the discussion is of violation of the right of uprightness. For if someone injures the right of his Superior or neighbor, by denying obedience to the former and the offices of charity to the latter, that violation cannot be strictly repaired, because a new act of obedience or charity would not repair the violated right, but would only satisfy the precept which always presses: namely, of obeying a Superior and of relieving one's neighbor in straits.

715. Questions. - Query 1° Is one unable to restore from goods of the same order bound to restore from goods of a diverse order?

Resp. More probably negatively. The reason is that no comparison is given between goods of a diverse order; therefore neither can compensation be given. And indeed it could never be determined how much arithmetically would have to be restored, since between goods of a diverse order there is no common measure. - S. Alph.,¹ Lacroix, etc., ... and others more commonly.

Nevertheless some others affirm it, because, they say, one who cannot repair the whole damage is bound at least to compensate the part which he can. - S. Th.²

Yet by vindicative justice it can be imposed by a judge or by a Superior that for injury concerning one genus of goods, for example concerning the good of reputation, someone furnish something in goods of another order, for example money. More probably, however, this is only by reason of penalty, not by reason of justice, unless this also has been voluntarily injured at the same time, as if damages in goods of fortune were foreseen from defamation. The injured party, moreover, has a right of denouncing before the judge the one from whom he has received injury, and so of accepting money from that man in order to omit denunciation. Thus, for example, a woman violently oppressed by someone can summon the violator before the judge, or exact money from the worthless man in order to renounce her right.

716. • Query 2° Is an obligation of restitution induced from an action injurious only affectively, but not effectively, to another's right?

Resp. Absolutely negatively, because no real injury is inflicted upon the neighbor, although the agent sins by an internal act against justice. Hence the malevolent judge pronouncing a sentence which he thinks unjust, if in reality it is just, must be exempted from the burden of restitution; or one who seizes a thing which he thinks another's, while it is his own.³ Recall what was said above n. 692.

Query 3° Are sins multiplied by delay of restitution?

Resp. More probably negatively, if the evil will of not restoring perseveres habitually, or is not morally interrupted.⁴ Recall what was said n. 224. B.

717. • Query 4° Do little thefts committed from diverse persons oblige to restitution UNDER GRAVE SIN if they have arrived at grave matter, and must restitution be made to the owners themselves also UNDER GRAVE SIN?

Resp. to the 1st. Affirmatively, because the precept of not stealing not only forbids damage to be inflicted upon another, but also forbids that someone unjustly become richer from another's thing. - Thus commonly. See n. 721. 4°.

Resp. to the 2nd. More probably negatively. The reason is that by hypothesis no owner has suffered grave injury. - Therefore, even if the owners are known, restitution can be made, without grave injury to anyone, to the poor or to pious places; indeed, if a reasonable cause comes in, for example the urgent necessity of the poor, etc., even venial sin will also be absent.¹ But if the owners are unknown, restitution must be made under grave sin to the poor or to pious places.²

Query 5° Is he bound UNDER GRAVE SIN to restore who in small thefts did not sin gravely, but from inadvertence arrived at grave matter?

Resp. Affirmatively; because although he did not sin gravely by stealing, he is nevertheless an unjust possessor of grave matter, and therefore will sin gravely by retaining the stolen thing. This is valid even if the thefts were committed from diverse persons; otherwise that man could become rich unjustly from another's thing without grave sin, which from what has been said is not licit.

718. • Query 6° Is a thief who stole a grave sum of money bound to restore it entire under grave sin?

Resp. Negatively. For he is bound under grave sin to restore only that which completes grave matter, because when this has been restored, the matter retained is no longer grave. Hence someone can be bound under grave sin to restore light matter; but then the obligation arises not from the light thing, but from the grave quantity.³

719. Resolutions. - 1° He who is situated in inability to restore another's thing or its value must always have a firm purpose of restoring when he can, and meanwhile procure, if he can, something by which he may satisfy his obligation as soon as possible.

2° If someone cannot restore the whole, and it is a question of a divisible thing, he is bound to the part which he can. For the injured person has a right to the individual parts, just as to the whole.

3° He who has inflicted light damage upon the neighbor is bound to restitution toward the injured owner under light sin and with inconvenience proportionate to the thing; for a light injustice must be repaired under light sin, just as a grave one under grave sin. Yet more easily then there can be a reason excusing from restitution, especially from that to be made to the owner himself. But if it is a question of a very slight thing, any difficulty whatever will suffice so that restitution can be made to the poor.⁴

4° He is deservedly held unworthy of absolution who refuses to promise restitution; who leaves to his heirs the care of restoring, while he can do it by himself; who, burdened with debt, incurs expenses of this kind in food, clothing, servants, ... on account of which he foresees that afterward he will be unable to pay his debts. - The same must be said of him who, enjoying good fortune, does not wish gradually to diminish his state in order to satisfy creditors. - Indeed, regularly that man is not to be absolved, to whom restitution before absolution is morally possible, before he has restored; for experience teaches that after absolution restitution is very rarely made.

5° The confessor must act cautiously with the dying who are bound to restitution. But he will be able to proceed thus: 1° If the penitent seems to be in good faith, and there is not time left for prudently warning him concerning his obligation, or it is foreseen that the warning will not be useful, the warning being omitted, he is to be absolved. 2° But if fruit from warning is hoped for, or if the penitent is not in good faith, he will have to be admonished firmly and gently at the same time concerning the obligation of restitution, and helped to carry it out immediately. 3° If the obligation is hidden and cannot be fulfilled immediately, the sick man will have to be induced to commit a sum of money to the confessor, or rather, if it can be done, to a faithful man, so that afterward it may be secretly entrusted to the creditor; or to leave that sum in a will to him, or, where prudence does not dissuade it, or law does not render it void (as it renders it void in Louisiana²), to the confessor, mention of restitution being omitted. 4° If the obligation is not hidden, nor can it be fulfilled immediately, let the confessor cause it to be certainly done by the heirs, whether by a schedule to be handed to the creditor, etc.