Section — Konings, Theologia Moralis

§ II. On the Possessor of Bad Faith

¶732.
  1. Principles. - I. A possessor of bad faith must restore the thing itself in individual, if it exists, or in equivalent if it does not exist, and besides, if you except industrial fruits, all that in which he has been made richer, as was said concerning the possessor of good faith.

II. He is bound besides to compensate every damage inflicted upon the neighbor from unjust acceptance, even if he has not been made richer. The reason is that by an acceptance formally unjust and per se efficacious of damage, he violated the neighbor's right. But commutative justice requires that the violated right be repaired integrally. Therefore...

III. He can nevertheless retain all industrial fruits and deduct expenses both necessary and useful; indeed even merely pleasurable ones, where they can be separated with the substance of the thing untouched, unless in penalty of the delict he has been condemned to lose the expenses.2

Notes to n. 732. (1) L. IV. 609. 610. (2) L. IV. 601. 800.

¶733.
  1. Questions. - Query 1° Is a thief who has stolen a thing otherwise certainly about to perish, for example by fire, bound to restitution?

Resp. Affirmatively, the expenses made with the price of the work used to free the thing from danger nevertheless being deducted. The reason is that that thing did not cease to belong to the owner, although it was exposed to the greatest danger. Except, if he destroyed the thing; or even probably, if the thief consumes a thing remaining in certain danger, for example edible or drinkable things already about to perish by fire; because fault alone does not oblige to restitution where damage did not intervene.1 - Lessius.2

¶734.
    • Query 2° Is the thief bound to restitution if the stolen thing perished with him?

Resp. When the thing perishes, the obligation of restoring remains or ceases according as, while it perishes, the theft should still or should not be called the efficacious cause of the damage; for fault alone does not produce an obligation of restitution where in fact damage has not followed from it. Hence:

1° The value of a thing perishing with the thief, whether by his own fault or another's fault, or even by fortuitous event, must be returned whenever, if left with the owner, it either would not have perished, or would not have perished except by the injury of another; for then the cause of the damage truly is the thief, who besides by stealing the thing took upon himself its whole risk.3

2° Resolve the opposite if, without anyone's fault, it perished with the thief, whether from its intrinsic defect or by fortuitous event, whenever it would equally, namely at the same time and by a common danger, have perished with the owner; for then not the theft, but the defect or the fortuitous event itself is the efficacious cause of the damage. - Thus commonly.4 Lugo,5 against Concina, etc.

I said: a) without anyone's fault; for if the thief or another consumed or destroyed the thing, even one certainly about to perish soon in a common danger, before that danger, the theft is again rightly judged the efficacious cause of the damage. Except probably if this common danger, in which the thing, without hope of salvation, would have perished even with the owner, was already previously known to threaten; for the thing, considered in that state and previously known, becomes of no value or certainly of very slight value to the owner. See n. 733.

I said: b) if the thing would have perished at the same time with the owner; because if it would have perished earlier, then it was saved for the owner from the earlier danger, and had to be restored to him. And therefore by not restoring, the thief remained the efficacious cause of the damage. Resolve the same if it would have perished later with the owner, because the personal action of repairing damage is not taken from the owner by a following danger. Nevertheless probable in this case is the opinion of S. Alph.,1 excusing a thief from restitution if the thing would have perished equally with the owner in the same common danger, and in that case holding him bound only, by reason of delay, to restore the fruits which the owner would have perceived from the thing. The reason is that delay was indeed the cause why the owner is deprived of fruits, but not why he is deprived of the thing, of whose loss the danger was the cause.2

I said: c) by the same common danger, because where the danger is diverse, even if simultaneous (fire and inundation), the destruction is rightly attributed to the thief, since without his theft the thing would not have been exposed to this danger.2 (i) p. 481.

Appendix annotation (i), to n. 734. p. 303. col. 2. Where the civil law does not free a thief from the civil obligation in the cases in which we have said in this number that he is freed by natural law, that is, if the civil law obliges him, in whatever way finally the thing perished in his possession, this burden of restitution will have the character of a penalty, which is to be undergone from obedience only after the sentence of a judge. Marres, p. 255. n. 34.

¶735.
    • Query 3° To what is a possessor of bad faith bound when the thing has had various value during the time of detention?

Resp. Let the general rule be: A possessor of bad faith should not become richer from another's thing. - The thing, if it increases, increases for the owner. - Let the damage unjustly inflicted be compensated to the owner. - Hence:

1° A thing made worse with the thief (a younger horse taken, but now growing old) must be restored according to the value which it had when it was taken.

2° If the thing increased with the thief (a lamb into a sheep), it must be restored as it increased, expenses (n. 732. III.) being deducted.

3° If the thing increased with the thief and afterward decreased, the thief is bound to return the whole greater price, even in that case in which the owner would have consumed the thing at the time of lesser price; for the thing increased for the owner, and the thief, by not restoring then, was the cause of that greater damage. H. A. Tr. X. 78.

4° If the thief consumed the thing at the time of lesser price, although it was to be preserved by the owner until the time of greater price, he is not bound to restitution of the increase, provided he restored the price at that time at which the owner could have bought a similar thing for himself at that same price.1 See n. 738, 3°.

5° If the thief sold or consumed, at the time of greater price, a thing not to be preserved by the owner, he is bound to return that price to the owner, although the owner would have done something else with the thing; because the thing increases for its owner.2

In practice, since nearly all the aforesaid circumstances do not become known, for the most part only compensation of the value which the thing had at the time of theft is to be urged.

¶736.
    • Query 4° Besides the stolen money, must the thief also restore INTEREST (the interest)?

Resp. Affirmatively, if it is established or presumed - as today, if the sum of stolen money is sufficiently notable, it almost ought to be presumed - that the owner would have perceived that gain, because this man must be made altogether harmless with respect to the possessor of bad faith. Otherwise, however, probably in the other hypothesis, because it is not established that the owner has a right to that increase.

Query 5° Are they bound to restore who, in order to receive alms, pretend that they are poor; or true paupers who say that they are upright, when they are not?

Resp. to the 1st. Affirmatively. The reason is that these have no right to alms; for those who bestow them intend to assist true paupers only. Therefore restitution must be made either to the giver, or at least to true paupers. More probably it suffices if restitution is made to paupers. Yet restitution does not seem to be urged if it is a question of very modest alms, such as are given door to door; because those bestowing them are less unwilling with regard to them. - Thus commonly.3

Resp. to the 2nd. Negatively, generally, because need alone, not uprightness, is the condition to which the donor attends or is presumed to attend. - Thus commonly.

Notes to n. 736. (1) L. IV. 601. (2) Ibid. (3) L. IV. 607. 608. 609 sub 5.

¶737.
    • Query 6° What if another's thing has passed through the hands of several possessors of bad faith by donation or sale?

Resp. 1° As to the thing, it must be restored by him who still holds it, or has changed it into another value, or has consumed it, or in any way lost it. But if this one is lacking, the robber is bound. But if neither has satisfied his debt, the others must pay the price of the thing by equal portions. Finally, in default of the rest, each one is bound to the whole.

Resp. 2° As to the fruits and damages of the thing, individuals are bound to compensation for the part of the time during which each one detained the thing. But if the others do not compensate for their part of damaging and fruition, reparation of the whole damage lies upon individuals; namely, each one of them is bound to repair the damages, not those which followed before he himself became possessor of another's thing, but those which followed afterward. - Thus commonly.

Query 7° Can he who knowingly buys another's thing from a thief return it to him in order to recover the price?

Resp. It is controverted. S. Alph.1 affirms; because although this man sinned by buying the thing in bad faith, yet after the purchase he has a right, not otherwise than a possessor of good faith, to rescind the contract. Nor does he, by returning the thing to the thief, place it in a worse condition than that in which he himself found it, from which besides he was certainly not bound by justice to free it.

¶738.
  1. Resolutions. - 1° A possessor of bad faith is bound not only to compensate the damage emerging for the owner from the lack of his thing, but also every profit ceasing in confused manner at least foreseen; namely not only that which the owner in reality lost on account of the lack of his thing, but also that which he would have perceived in a licit manner.

2° He who transported stolen grain to another place, where he sold it for more than the owner was going to sell, is not bound to assign the increase of price, as being sought by his own special industry (n. 732. III), to the owner.2 - For the same reason, if he sowed the same grain in his own field, he is bound only to return similar grain, so that the owner be preserved harmless. Likewise he who places another's eggs under his own hen to be brooded over is bound only concerning the value of the eggs.

3° If someone has stolen wheat which the owner was preserving to be sold at a time of greater price, and consumed it at a time of lesser price, he is bound to restore that price which the owner was expecting, unless perhaps restitution is made so early that the owner can buy similar wheat at the lesser price and reserve it without inconvenience until the time of greater price.

4° If someone has killed a stolen lamb, or has consumed another thing of this sort taken by theft, he is bound to pay only that money (at least more probably) which corresponded to the value of these things at the time of killing or consumption, unless perhaps the owner could not at once have bought a thing of the same value with the same money, and at the same time wished to preserve that thing so that he might obtain a greater sum of money from its sale.1

5° The assessment of the quantity to be restored, on account of the cause alleged in this number under 1°, often can be made only according to the judgment of a prudent man. Besides, when it is a question of theft of a small and very common thing, as of a hen, etc., this alone, or its value, must be returned; for there can be no question of damage emerging or profit ceasing, while the owner could easily buy a similar thing. (j) p. 481.

Notes to n. 738. (1) Disp. 17. n. 20. Appendix annotation (j), to n. 738. p. 305. col. 1. "When restitution of another's thing must be imposed, the confessor should not compute with the penitent too anxiously the sometimes very uncertain price both of the thing itself and of its fruits, and the expenses to be deducted, either perhaps spent or perhaps incurred for labor and industry; nor should he scrupulously estimate damage of any kind perhaps brought upon the owner; but, after looking at the circumstances, in the name of the owner whose affair he usefully manages, he should compose the matter from what is equitable and good with the unjust possessor: 1° lest by asking too much and obtaining nothing, he harm rather than favor the owner; 2° because he can reasonably presume that the owner, so that he may recover his thing more certainly, does not demand the last farthing in the restitution owed to him; 3° because unjust possessors are not usually foreseeing every damage inflicted, not even in confused fashion. "Prudence requires that the confessor also attend to the good faith and mind of the penitent, more or less ready to make due restitution; he should also note, as de Lugo warns (D. 17. n. 53), that it can happen that an unjust possessor who was of bad faith by reason of the thing has nevertheless perceived the fruits in good faith and either consumed or destroyed them." Marres, p. 257. n. 39.