§ IV. On Force, or Violence

18. Definition. - Force or violence is coercion which is brought upon someone by an extrinsic and free cause, while his will is resisting.

Division. - A twofold violence is distinguished, namely absolute and in a qualified respect, according as coercion is brought upon someone resisting in every way, or only in some measure. Moreover it happens in two ways that someone resists only in some measure, namely: 1° when the force is not of such a kind that it cannot be broken or weakened by stubborn resistance; or 2° when someone does not unwillingly suffer the force brought upon him, whatever finally it may be.

Observe that, in a moral matter, absolute violence is that to which, on the part of the one who suffers it, that resistance is opposed which can be opposed to it according to one's power. I say: according to one's power; this intimates two things: one, that the resistance to be applied must be not only internal, but also external; for internal resistance cannot be sincere and efficacious unless there is also external resistance which can be applied. The other, that that external resistance must be as great as, according to the circumstances, can and ought to be applied. See the examples in n. 20 under 2° and 3°.

19. Principles. - I. Elicited acts of the will can in no way be coerced, because force cannot be brought upon the will. Therefore St. Anselm:¹ "No one can will unwillingly," he says, "because no one can will while not willing."

II. Other acts, placed from absolute violence, are in no way voluntary or free, and therefore are not sinful or demeritorious; but external acts which are placed from violence only in a qualified respect are more or less free according to the greater or lesser difficulty of resisting, or according to the greater or lesser affection by which someone suffers the force.² Moreover, not only the exterior members of the body, but also the interior faculties, such as phantasy, the sensitive appetite, etc., can be moved to some acts by some extrinsic force, for example of an angel, whether good or bad, or of another natural cause, while the will resists in vain; for instance, to distractions, to obscene imaginations, etc.

20. Resolutions. - 1° A woman who resists in every way the violence which is brought upon her sins in no way, even if she suffers violation; for no one sins wholly unwillingly.

2° Women suffering force sin gravely if, through pusillanimity or vain fear, for example of offending the aggressor, etc., they do not resist as much as they can, even with the danger of consent set aside; because although they do not consent to sensual delight, nevertheless, while they resist less than is fitting, they equivalently consent to the violation of themselves and cooperate in the crime of another. - Whether a woman oppressed by force sins if, on account of fear of death, she omits to cry out, is disputed. - It seems probably to be denied, with danger of consent set aside. Indeed, very probably, with the aforesaid danger set aside, the woman is not bound to cry out when there stands a danger of any notable harm, whether of infamy or of excessive shame; for if otherwise she already resists as much as she can, she is not bound to repel force with so great an inconvenience. Thus expressly St. Alphonsus.¹ In practice, however, the opposite manner of acting is to be advised, because of the danger of consent.²

3° Sometimes resistance altogether absolute and continuous to the coercion brought upon one is not required, namely when, on the one hand, it would be useless, and, on the other hand, the matter at issue is less dangerous. Thus martyrs led to the temples of the pagans were not sinning, although they walked. But in every case resistance must be made as much as is required for averting danger of scandal or injury to Religion.

Note. - From what has been said it is clear that force and fear, although in Law they are sometimes used promiscuously, differ very much from each other. "For 1° force is an impulse brought upon one from without, and does not act upon the mind; but fear is an affection of the mind arising from the apprehension of an evil, whether to be brought on by force, or to happen in any other way; 2° force does not act except insofar as it is brought upon one as actually present; fear arises from the apprehension of an evil either present or to happen afterwards; 3° the things which are done under one compelling are altogether involuntary; the things which are done from fear are more often voluntary." Walsh, n. 348.