§ IV. On the Just Price

Preliminary matters. - On the nature of the just price and its division.

961. Nature. - Commutative justice demands that in an onerous contract, such as especially is the contract of purchase-sale, equality be entirely preserved between that which is handed over and that which is acquired; for in an onerous contract the contracting parties do not wish to donate, but to exchange and to acquire the equivalent of that which is ceded.

Therefore the just price in buying and selling will be: that sum of money which constitutes the equivalent of the vendible thing, or: that sum of money which adequately corresponds to the value of the vendible thing.

But the value of a vendible thing is not something merely subjective, as if it depended on the arbitrary will of the buyer and seller; rather it is something objective, so that it must principally be taken from the nature itself of the vendible thing, insofar as this is considered, not precisely in its physical being, i.e. according to its substance or physical perfection, but in its usual being, i.e. according to its necessity, utility, or pleasurableness in the common use and society of men. For temporal things have been made by God for the use of men, and to the same end they also are bought and sold by men; so that of themselves they must be said to be worth as much as, with attention to the diversity of times, places, etc., they serve the common use of men.¹ But how much these things serve human use, and how much therefore they are worth, this is left to be defined, not again by the private prudence of the seller and buyer, but either by the judgment of legitimate authority, or by the common opinion of men; so that finally it is permitted to establish briefly thus: The just value of a vendible thing is that which, with attention both to the usual nature of the thing and to the diversity of circumstances of time, place, etc., is defined either by legitimate authority, or, this failing, by the common opinion of men; and consequently: The just price of a vendible thing will be that sum of money which, with attention to the nature of the thing, etc., is taxed either by legitimate authority, or, this failing, by the common estimation, as the equivalent of the vendible thing. From this there now spontaneously flows the following very well-known division of the just price.

962. Division. - The just price is divided into legal and vulgar, or natural. The legal price is that which is established by legitimate authority for the common good of some region, province, or place. The vulgar price is that which is taxed by the common estimation of the inhabitants of the place where the vendible thing exists, (not however where the contract is made, unless the seller agrees that the thing be transferred thither. St. Alphonsus.)² But a twofold very notable difference is usually assigned between these prices, namely:

The first difference. - The legal price is defined punctually or arithmetically; but the vulgar price admits a certain latitude, since the common estimation of men is not wont to agree precisely in one point.² Whence also deservedly Authors subdivide the vulgar price, while remaining within the limits of the just, into the highest or rigorous vulgar price, the middle or moderate, and the lowest or pious. The highest is that above which, the lowest that below which, the thing is not commonly estimated; the middle is that which consists between the highest and the lowest. But how great is the distance or latitude between the highest vulgar price and the lowest, this can be judged rather from the usage of the market and the common sense of negotiators than defined by a fixed measure. Yet regularly the doctrine must be admitted which Moralists are wont to hand down here, namely: That in necessary things and those of more frequent sale, for example: in bread, oil, salt, etc., the lowest vulgar price is little distant from the highest, and thus, for example, if the middle price is 5, the highest will be 6 and the lowest 4, so that only the latitude of two degrees, 6-4, is to be admitted; if the middle price is 10, the highest will be 12 and the lowest 8, so that only the latitude of four degrees, 12-8, is to be admitted; if the middle price is 100, the highest will be 105 and the lowest 95, so that only the latitude of ten degrees, 105-95, is to be admitted; and likewise, with proportion observed, one must judge concerning the rest, yet always attending to the usage of the market or the common sense of negotiators, and moreover observing that the latitude of price is greater in superfluous and more precious things, for example: palaces, villas, etc., whose purchase-sale is infrequent, and greater still in things altogether rare and precious, such as singular gems, ancient pictures or statues, etc., whose value is held as estimated neither from law nor from common opinion. See St. Alphonsus,³ and the things to be said below.

The second difference. - The legal price is stable, so that of itself it remains and is in no way varied unless the law itself ceases, or unless there is given a just reason here and now excusing from the law; but the vulgar price with its latitude is variable, so that at any time it is subject to change, i.e. to increase or decrease, according to the diversity of circumstances which continually tend to vary the common estimation of men; and thus (to assign here the principal circumstances):

1° Price is accustomed to increase from common sense:

a) By reason of the multitude of buyers or the abundance of money, and the scarcity of merchandise; for that is commonly esteemed more which is sought by more persons and found with more difficulty.

b) By reason of the manner of selling goods by retail (retail); for that is appraised higher for whose conservation greater labors, cares, and expenses must of themselves be expended by merchants.

2° On the contrary the price is accustomed to decrease:

a) By reason of the scarcity of buyers or of money, and the abundance of merchandise; for what is less sought and is everywhere found is also estimated at less.

b) By reason of the manner of selling goods together in great quantity (wholesale); for that which of itself demands lesser cares, expenses, etc., of merchants is also commonly judged to be of lesser price.

Therefore, practically speaking, you will say most rightly that the vulgar price is that which, when the legal price is lacking, commonly runs in the present circumstances = the price running here and now (the current price).

With these things premised concerning the nature and division of the just price, now let us inquire a little more accurately, 1° by what price one must of itself stand from justice; 2° what are the titles on account of which sometimes accidentally it is licit to sell above the common highest price, or to buy below the common lowest price.

I. By what price PER SE must one stand from justice?

Let the following three rules serve for the solution of this question:

963. First Rule. - If a vendible thing has a legal price, that must be observed punctually from justice; so that the seller who exceeds the legal price acts unjustly and is held to restitution of the excess.

But for the right understanding and application of this rule, it must be carefully observed:

1° Taxation by law is made for merchandise of common goodness and quality; and therefore the rule concerning the legal price does not obtain if it is a question of merchandise which is notably more precious or worse than usual; but in the former hypothesis the seller can licitly increase the price, and in the latter he must decrease the price.

2° The legal tax must be just and still in force; and hence the rule concerning the legal price again will not obtain, a) if the tax of the law is no longer observed by the greater part of the citizens, with the magistrate silent; and b) if, circumstances having changed, for example on account of sterility, etc., the tax becomes unjust. Cf. St. Alphonsus.¹

3° The legal tax is ordinarily constituted in favor of buyers, so that ordinarily even the seller alone is bound by that tax, and the buyer consequently can licitly buy below that tax, provided he remains within the limits of the vulgar price.

4° The legal tax in these our times is very rare, and scarcely occurs, except in certain places as to bread, or in a city, besieged in time of war, as to things necessary for life. For many political writers judge that nowadays, when there is so great a facility of transporting merchandise by railroad, etc., and so great a competition of merchants is found, it is regularly no longer expedient that the prices of things be taxed legally. Whence also the resolutions of Moralists concerning the legal price will more rarely come into use in our time.

964. Second Rule. - If a vendible thing does not have a legal price, from justice one must stand by the vulgar price running here and now; so that it is not licit to sell above the highest vulgar price, nor to buy below the lowest.² Whence he who sells above the highest vulgar price sins against justice and is held to restitution of the excess; he who buys below the lowest sins against justice and is held to restitution of the defect. Yet, fraud excluded, of itself it is licit to sell at the highest vulgar price, or to buy at the lowest.

It is said: Fraud excluded; for although of itself it is licit to sell at the highest or to buy at the lowest, nevertheless each one has the right not to be deceived by fraud; and therefore one will offend against justice and be held to restitution, even if the highest price has not been exceeded: a) if, once an agreement has been made concerning the middle or lowest price, he secretly obtains the highest for himself by deceiving the buyer in the counting of money, in weight, or in measure; and b) if before the agreement has been made he deceitfully induces the buyer to pay a greater price than otherwise he would justly have given.

Here however observe for practice: commonly faith is not given to the lies or perjuries of sellers, by which they affirm that they procured the vendible thing for themselves at so much, or sold it to others at so much, so as thus to draw the buyer to the highest price; nor to the lies or perjuries of buyers, by which they affirm that they bought the thing from others at so much, or that others offered it to them at so much, so as thus to draw the seller to the lowest price. For it is sufficiently known that sayings of this kind are common stratagems of negotiators, which do not deserve faith, and therefore do not constitute deception properly so called. Whence sellers or buyers of this kind indeed sin by lying or perjuring; but, since in reality by such lies they do not deceive the other, they do not on account of them offend against justice, and therefore will not be held to restitution, always supposing that they do not sell above the highest, or buy below the lowest. Yet if in a particular case it were clear to the aforesaid sellers or buyers that faith was being given to their lies, etc., and that these were truly the cause of a greater or lesser price, then they would not be excused from the fault of deception and injustice. - But as to the manner of acting of many merchants, who ask something above the highest price, so that they may bring buyers, who are accustomed to offer less, to the just price, it seems it must be said: such a manner of acting, as being commonly received, and of itself not mendacious, cannot be condemned of fault; provided however those merchants, where perhaps they obtained what they ask, remit to the buyer that which exceeded the just price.

965. Third Rule. - If it is a question of extraordinary things, whose price is taxed neither by law nor by the estimation of the common people, such as extraordinary gems or stones; singular ancient pictures or statues; rare and precious books; horses eminently beautiful; foreign birds, etc. (so-called rarities), which do not pertain to common human use and society, but to luxury, splendor, and the pleasantness of men, and among which dances, songs, the abuse of a woman, etc., can also be reckoned; the solution of the question concerning the just price is very often quite ambiguous. Indeed I, that I may openly profess what I think concerning this matter, think, saving a better judgment, that this can be established:

Such very rare things can justly be sold and bought at that price concerning which the contracting parties themselves, without fraud and freely, agree, in the following cases:

1° If the purchase-sale is made between parties who both wholly ignore the greater or lesser preciousness of such a singular thing; because in this hypothesis the contract entered is not a simple contract of purchase-sale, but at the same time a quasi-aleatory contract, in which each party commits himself to fortune. Thus, for example, Titius would not be accused of injustice who bought an illustrious ancient picture at a cheaper price from Caius, where both, ignorant of the preciousness of this picture, without fraud and freely agreed concerning such a price.¹

2° If the purchase-sale is made under the spear, i.e. in public auction; because public auction is an extraordinary title (as will be said below), on account of which whatever price, with fraud excluded, is determined by the bidders can be judged just.

Likewise I think it can be resolved relatively to the buyer, namely: that the buyer can justly buy such a thing, although precious and known by him as such, at a cheap price (for a trifle):

a) In the case in which that thing, for example an ancient and precious book, is publicly exposed for sale in the market among antiquarians, i.e. among those who are accustomed to sell antiquated things; because by this very fact that the thing is exposed in the market, it has as it were lost its ancient price, and receives its price from the judgment of buyers who come together to that market, in almost the same manner as we said above concerning things sold in a public auction.

b) In the case in which that thing is now actually destined to a vile use, for example if an ancient book now is being carried to be sold for tearing up, or some picture is now handed over to children for play and soon perhaps will be torn up; for in these circumstances that thing is judged again to have lost its price, and consequently to be able to be bought at that price for which it is commonly worth for that vile use. Thus also it is everywhere asserted by Authors that a buyer, when among common things destined to vulgar use he finds a thing which by chance he knows to be precious, for example a medicinal herb among common herbs destined for the fodder of horses and cows, can justly buy those common things at the price for which they would vulgarly be bought by others for such a use.

c) In the case in which that thing, for example a singular picture, from the common judgment of experts is vile, and the buyer from private study recognizes in it a certain preciousness; for in this hypothesis, since the thing is not accustomed to be esteemed at more by the experts themselves of such a region, it must be ascribed to the fortune and industry of the buyer alone that from this he has known how to procure an advantage for himself.

d) In the case in which that thing, even from the judgment of experts, does not have a stable and real value, such as, for example, a picture of a celebrated master, Raphael, Rubens, etc., is judged to have; but only an altogether volatile and relative value, or the value, as they say, of affection, founded namely in the particular affection of one or another buyer seeking that thing to complete, for example, his singular Museum of such rarities; for no reason appears why the buyer must bring his particular affection into the reckoning for determining the price.

966. • But with the cases assigned thus far excluded, the question concerning the just price of singular things which have neither legal nor vulgar price is greatly controverted among Moralists:

St. Alphonsus¹ with Lugo, Lessius, and others defends as more probable: that in the purchase-sale of a singular thing that price must be observed from justice which is taxed by the persons of such a region skilled in that matter; because justice seems to require that even in these things equality be observed, if it can be observed; but it can be observed where there are experts able to appraise these things. Whence in the purchase-sale, for example, of some singular gem, the judgment would have to be investigated from the jewelers of such a place; in the purchase-sale of a rare picture the judgment of painters, etc. Yet the patrons themselves of this opinion admit that the just price of things of this kind suffers a very great latitude, since a picture has been seen to be taxed by many experts at $500 for which 100 would not be given if it were sold; so that the price of the thing which is here and now to be sold must be taxed, with all concurrent circumstances.

On the contrary Card. Toletus¹ with Navarro, Valentia, Medina, and others defends: that singular things pertaining to the adornment or delight of life, since they do not have a legal or vulgar price, have only the price which they call conventional, i.e. that concerning which the contracting parties, apart from fraud, freely agree; and thus there would not be injustice if someone, for example, received $4000 for an ancient statue, or another similar thing, provided the thing is such as it is sold; in other words: provided there is not error concerning the substance, so that, for example, that which is sold as a gem is not glass. And to this opinion, as to the substance, there also adheres the more recent Anonymous Author in the Book whose title is: Examen Raisonne,² etc. Indeed St. Alphonsus himself³ asserts concerning this opinion that it is rightly called probable by the Salmanticenses.

Therefore, with the described diversity of opinions standing, it will be permitted for practice to say that those are not to be disturbed who in good faith and freely agree according to their own judgment in such things.

II. What are the titles on account of which accidentally it is licit to sell above the highest vulgar price, or to buy below the lowest vulgar price?

Where there will be added a threefold special question: a) concerning goods voluntarily offered; b) concerning anticipated or delayed payment; and c) concerning particular knowledge of a price soon to be diminished or increased.

967. • The titles, extrinsic to sale, on account of which accidentally it is licit to sell above the highest vulgar price, principally are:

1° Damage emerging from the present sale: namely if the seller, from the fact that he sells his thing to the buyer, suffers a damage which he would not suffer if he did not sell the same; for example, if you sell to another an instrument necessary or very useful for the exercise of your art, which afterwards you will not be able to buy except at a higher price.¹

2° Profit ceasing from the present sale: namely if the seller, from the fact that he sells his thing to the buyer, loses profit which he would obtain if he did not sell the same; for example, if now you sell grain to another which you were going to reserve for the time in which grain will be worth more.

3° Peril or some other inconvenience, estimable by price, arising from the present sale; namely if the seller, from the fact that he sells his thing to such a buyer, is truly exposed to the peril of never receiving the price from the same, either in whole or in part; or to the peril of not receiving the price from the buyer except with extraordinary expenses.

But for the just practical use of these titles it must be carefully observed that Moralists commonly require: a) that the seller forewarn the buyer concerning titles of this kind, insofar as he can, if he wishes, procure that thing for himself by another way; and b) that the seller, by force of such titles, not sell the thing for more than the titles themselves are worth by prudent estimation. Indeed not a few still require, c) that the seller sell the thing at the instance or in favor of the buyer; and hence, according to them, the seller could not justly sell for more if he sells only to provide for his own necessities, although from this sale he would suffer emergent damage or ceasing profit; because in the case the seller himself, and not the buyer, seems to be the cause of such emergent damage, etc. "But," says St. Alphonsus,² "the opposite seems more probable to me; ... because the buyer, by accepting the contract, now himself is the true cause of the seller's damage."

4° Special affection of the seller toward the thing itself sold; for the privation of a thing toward which the owner is singularly affected, for example because he received it from a Prince or from his ancestors, is deservedly judged estimable by price; and therefore in the case the seller will licitly be able to exceed the vulgar price by as much as that affection is reasonably estimated. Yet here again, as we noted above concerning other titles, it is required that the seller forewarn the buyer concerning his special affection, etc.

Moreover, it is necessary that you by no means confuse with the aforesaid title of the special affection of the seller the special affection of the buyer; for according to the opinion very common among Theologians, especially the older ones, the special affection (I do not say of many buyers, but) of the present buyer as an individual is not a title by which alone it is licit to sell a thing dearer; because on this title alone the seller would unjustly exact a price for that which is not his.¹ "If someone," says St. Thomas,² "is helped much by the thing of another which he has received, but he who sells is not damaged by being without that thing, he ought not to sell it at a higher price; because the utility which accrues to the other is not from the seller, but from the condition of the buyer. But no one ought to sell to another what is not his, although he can sell to him the damage which he suffers." - And indeed this opinion is admitted as certain by any Theologian even more recent, indeed also by any fearful seller, whenever the discussion is about the case in which the present buyer is specially affected toward the thing sold by reason of necessity or want (on account of necessity or present embarrassment); since everyone understands how injurious it is to wish to grow rich precisely from the head of the necessity or want of one's neighbor. But whenever it is a question of a case in which the buyer is specially affected toward the thing, not by reason of necessity, but only by reason of utility, convenience, or delight, which the thing will procure for him, the same opinion scarcely seems to harmonize with the usage, sufficiently common nowadays, by force of which sellers commonly in such a case exact an increase of price from the buyer. Whence a doubt arises: whether this usage can be tolerated, or rather, with prudence leading, must be reproved as an abuse and corruption? Indeed I judge, with some more recent Doctors, that this sufficiently common usage can be tolerated, at least in the hypothesis that the thing toward which the buyer is specially affected by reason of utility, etc., is judged from today's vulgar estimation to have a certain greater real value, although relative, for example that the field of Titius has a greater real value relative to the neighboring estate of Caius. Indeed I would think that this usage in this hypothesis cannot be said to be diametrically opposed to the opinion of St. Thomas related above, since it supposes that the utility accruing to the buyer arises from the singular condition of the buyer; and therefore also grounded, it seems to me, is the resolution which the learned Kenrick,¹ having first alleged and admitted the opinion of St. Thomas, hands down in these words: "if from the circumstances it is clear that the thing is commonly esteemed at more on account of that special utility which it will bring to the buyer, it will be licit to ask a greater price. Thus sometimes a small field, which of itself is worth little, and provides almost no utility to the owner, is of great value to the owner of the neighboring estate: and therefore it is justly sold for that price which seems fair to most, that matter being considered."

Besides, in general it will still be useful to have noted that nowadays, on account of the changed circumstances of the times, the special affection of the buyer by reason of utility, etc., occurs more rarely, one or another singular case excepted, at least nakedly and simply, i.e. without another accompanying title. For now there is so great a competition in commerce, so great a facility of acquiring merchandise of any species, so frequent and variable an alienation of the same things, for example of the same fields or houses, that either special affection toward such a determined thing is scarcely given, or at least there is a plurality of buyers.

5° Finally, the fifth title for justly exceeding in sale the highest vulgar price is the manner of selling under the spear, or public auction; for in such an auction whatever price is freely and without fraud determined by bidders is judged just, as will be explained more broadly in Art. II, where sale in species is treated.

968. • Besides the five titles assigned thus far, by many Authors there are still assigned: scarcity of things, multitude of buyers, abundance of money, manner of selling in small quantity, etc. But circumstances of this kind, strictly speaking, are not titles of exceeding the vulgar price; rather they are only causes on account of which the vulgar price increases from common estimation, without ceasing to be vulgar. Whence the seller, demanding a greater price in the aforesaid circumstances, in reality does not sell above the vulgar price; but observes the price here and now vulgar, or here and now running. See above n. 962.

969. • The titles on account of which accidentally it is licit to buy below the lowest vulgar price especially are:

1° Damage emerging from the present purchase. 2° Profit ceasing from the present purchase. 3° Peril or some other inconvenience, estimable by price, arising from the present purchase, for example the peril of never receiving from the seller the thing sold, for which the price has already been paid by the buyer. 4° Sale under the spear, or public auction; to which here sale made by dealers in old things seems able to be assimilated, since things exposed among them are judged to have lost their ancient price, and to receive another price from custom or the agreement of the contracting parties.

The further explanation of the aforesaid titles will be open by itself to anyone from those things which were noted in Point I concerning the same titles, considered relatively to the seller.

970. • But with the titles assigned on account of which accidentally it is licit to buy below the lowest vulgar price, there are again joined by various Authors: scarcity of buyers, abundance of merchandise, manner of selling in great quantity, etc.; but these or similar circumstances indeed cause the vulgar price to decrease from common estimation, but by no means constitute a title of buying below the lowest price running in the aforesaid circumstances. See above n. 962.

Note. - For the completion of the doctrine concerning the just price there remains for us a threefold question to be solved, already indicated at the beginning of this section, namely:

971. • Query 1° Whether it is licit to buy more cheaply voluntary goods, i.e. goods voluntarily offered by the seller seeking buyers?

Resp. Since a voluntary offering of merchandise, from things commonly occurring, argues either scarcity of buyers and abundance of merchandise, or danger of a latent defect or of a cloaked excellence, etc.; hence the common opinion has prevailed that the common proverb is just: Goods voluntarily offered become cheap; and this more probably, says St. Alphonsus,¹ by a third part. - But this resolution is valid not only in the case in which the voluntary offering of merchandise is made by the seller by reason of acquiring profit, as is wont to be done by sellers going through the streets and houses with their merchandise; but probably also, with strict justice considered, it seems able to be admitted (although it ought not to be advised) in the case in which a voluntary offering is made by the seller by reason of poverty by which he is pressed (provided it is not a question of such things which are commonly bought and offered, as grain, oil, and similar things); for the want of the seller does not effect that the price is changed. Yet we said notably: with strict justice considered; for, as St. Alphonsus¹ deservedly observes, the buyer will easily sin against charity if he buys more cheaply a thing voluntarily offered by a poor man pressed by necessity, not solely in favor of the poor man, but for his own utility, for example because he himself needs that thing, etc. The Lydian stone, by which it is necessary to examine the honesty of such contracts, is not, as the most wise Pontiff Benedict XIV insinuates, rigorous justice alone, but in addition Christian charity.

972. • Query 2° Whether because of delayed payment a THING CAN BE SOLD ABOVE THE HIGHEST VULGAR PRICE, - OR because of anticipated payment BOUGHT BELOW the lowest?

Resp. Delayed or anticipated payment is considered by very many Theologians as a virtual loan; so that one selling on credit or with delayed payment (on credit) can by this very fact be judged as it were to lend money to the buyer for the time of credit or delayed payment; and similarly, one buying with anticipated payment can by this very fact be judged as it were to lend money to the seller for the time of anticipation. And therefore the doctrine concerning a loan is usually applied by the same Theologians to delayed or anticipated payment, which is reduced here to a few points:

a) It is illicit to receive an increase of the principal, i.e. more than was given in loan, immediately from the loan, or by force of the loan alone. Consequently it will also be illicit to receive profit, or to sell more dearly precisely on account of delayed payment, or to buy more cheaply precisely on account of anticipated payment.

b) On the contrary it is licit to receive some proportionate increase on the occasion of a loan on account of a just title extrinsic to the loan, namely on account of emergent damage, ceasing profit, or peril of the principal. Consequently it will also be licit, proportion being observed, to sell a thing more dearly on the occasion of delayed payment, or to buy more cheaply on the occasion of anticipated payment, on account of emergent damage, ceasing profit, or some other peril estimable by price, provided the buyer is warned of these in the first hypothesis, and the seller in the second hypothesis, according to the things said above in n. 967. - Moreover many¹ still defend as probable relatively to delayed or anticipated payment, that it is also licit on the occasion of delayed payment to sell more dearly, and on the occasion of anticipated payment to buy more cheaply by the title of custom and vulgar estimation of the place, namely: if in such a place there is in force the custom of selling on credit, and, this custom standing, goods are commonly estimated at more, since for buying thus a plurality of buyers is wont to come together, and in that plurality there is the peril lest the price more often be lost; or similarly, if in such a place there is in force the custom (rare indeed) of buying with anticipated payment, and, this custom standing, goods are commonly estimated at less, since then regularly there occurs a scarcity of buyers and a plurality of sellers. - But observe that this resolution of many, strictly speaking, turns outside the question proposed above; since in the supposition of this resolution the price of the merchandise increases or decreases from vulgar estimation; so that in the proper sense it is not sold above the highest vulgar price, or bought below the lowest, as is understood of itself from the things handed down above, n. 962.

c) Finally, by some more recent authors there is defended a thesis, formerly more rarely heard in the schools, but nowadays, as they say, on account of so great a change (comparatively to former times) of the use of money in commercial and industrial business, becoming more prevalent, namely: that, the titles assigned thus far excluded, neither does it seem illicit, on the occasion of a loan of money, and therefore also on the occasion of delayed or anticipated payment, to receive some proportionate increase by the title of the use of money granted to another; since the very use of money, according to them, in the present state of commerce and industry, can be judged estimable by price, except only the case in which it is a question of the poor, to whom money is lent for consumption and to relieve their want. - But whatever may be the case concerning the value of this opinion, it will surely be permitted without hesitation to defend as probable: that, the titles alleged above excluded, on the occasion of a loan of money, and therefore also on the occasion of delayed or anticipated payment, some proportionate increase can justly be received from the non-poor according to the rate of civil law, or, this failing, according to the vulgar rate.

973. • Query 3° Whether he who by PRIVATE knowledge knows that the price of merchandise is shortly to be increased or diminished can nevertheless sell or buy at the price running here and now?

With the warning premised that here it is not a question of the case in which someone secretly knows that the price of a thing is soon to be diminished on account of an intrinsic defect of it already existing, for example, the price of some debt soon to be diminished because the debtor is already unable to pay; but only of the case in which someone privately knows that the price of a thing is soon to be diminished or increased on account of some extrinsic cause, for example, that the price of public securities (bonds) is soon to be diminished or increased by reason of certain events certainly or probably future:

Resp. Affirmatively, provided fraud is absent and injury to charity. For, as St. Thomas rightly notes,¹ "The seller who sells a thing according to the price which he finds does not seem to act against justice if he does not disclose what is future." For one must regard not the future value, but the present value; and the present value is not varied by some particular knowledge. For the same reason it will also be licit for the buyer to buy merchandise at the current price, although he privately knows that the price is soon to be increased; and thus, for example, according to the testimony of Genesis,² Joseph, knowing the future sterility on account of which the value of grain was to be increased, bought a great abundance of it at the current price and stored it away.

I said: a) provided fraud is absent; for it cannot be doubted that such sale or purchase is unjust if it is caused by fraud or deceit, for example by spreading through public newspapers or a telegraphic report false rumors of a price soon to be diminished or increased, etc., as nowadays, alas, is practiced rather frequently, especially relatively to public securities.

I said: b) provided injury to charity is absent; for sometimes it would more or less be repugnant to charity to buy or sell in such a way, namely: if the other party were thereby thrown into grave necessity, or even if the thing could easily be sold to many or bought from many, and is sold to one or bought from one, who therefore alone will suffer the whole damage. Nevertheless, excepting singular cases of this kind, charity does not seem to urge. Indeed it is of more abundant virtue, says St. Thomas,¹ if the price is diminished; but, strictly speaking, he who uses his right, justly providing for his own affairs, does not injure charity, although another by accident suffers damage from this.²

974. Practical observation. - Finally concerning the matter of the just price it is useful still to note that regularly, unless I am mistaken, the confessor will not wander from the right way who, in so manifold a variety of cases pertaining here, attends chiefly to that which, according to the judgment of prudent men, is wont to be done in contracts in which no fraud and bad faith intervenes.