Occasions of Sin

325. Notions. 1. The danger of sinning is constituted by everything which induces to sin, as temptation and an occasion of sin.

2. This danger is internal if it comes from an internal cause, as a base imagination; it is external if it comes from an external cause, as a thing alluring to sin.

3. This danger is called grave, or proximate, if it is morally certainly connected with sin; it is called light, or remote, if the connection with sin is not morally certain.

4. Grave danger is absolutely or of itself grave if it is such commonly for all; relatively or accidentally grave if it is such only for some on account of a peculiar disposition.

Note. If now it is asked whether and what sin he commits who exposes himself to the danger of sinning, the discussion is about sin considered objectively. Hence, for sin to be committed subjectively, it is required that he who exposes himself to the danger apprehend that this is prohibited by law.

326. Principles. 1. We are held under grave obligation to avoid grave or proximate danger of sinning gravely. And indeed by the same precept by which we are held to avoid mortal sin, we are also held to avoid its proximate danger: for he who does not avoid it when he can is convicted of loving the sin whose danger he loves.¹

a. The sin which is committed by him who without necessity exposes himself to grave danger of sinning is of the same gravity and species as the sin itself whose danger he approaches.

b. He who exposes himself to the danger of sinning commits sin, even if he does not sin in the danger; yet he who afterward, placed in the danger, actually sins, commits only one sin: for the depraved consent by which he exposes himself to the danger and by which afterward he consents to the sin is the same.

c. He also exposes himself to grave danger of sinning who approaches a danger which indeed at the beginning is light, yet in such a way that he foresees that it will afterward become grave, as is accustomed to happen in danger of sinning against chastity, because in the danger itself lust burns more.

2. From a just cause it is licit to expose oneself even to the proximate danger of sinning, provided that apt precautions are applied, by which the danger becomes remote. For he who from a just cause exposes himself to danger does not love the sin, but the good cause on account of which he undergoes the danger; therefore he can rightly and deservedly hope for the help of God, lest he fall in the danger.

a. The cause of necessity for undergoing the danger of sin ought to be greater in proportion as the sin about which there is question is greater, and in proportion as the danger of committing the sin itself is greater.

b. Apt precautions by which a fall into sin may be excluded are: to retain a firm purpose of not sinning; to pray to God; to foster a pious thought; if the danger lasts rather long, the use of the sacraments and the exercise of pious reading.

c. Without a just cause, even with the purpose of not sinning and of applying apt precautions, it is not licit to expose oneself to the danger of sinning, because we are proximately obliged to avoid the danger unless a just cause excuses. Therefore God does not aid by his help those who, by rashly exposing themselves to danger, fail in their obligation. But if someone is found in danger from a just cause, God does not desert him by his help.²

d. If it is certainly foreseen that sin will be committed in the danger, it is never licit to offer oneself to it spontaneously; for this to be licit, it is altogether required that there be a founded hope that the sin will be avoided with the help of God: for certain sin must be avoided absolutely.

3. We are held under light obligation to avoid light or remote danger of sinning gravely, and proximate danger of sinning lightly; wherefore it is licit to approach danger of this kind only from a reasonable cause. For some disorder against reason is had in this, that someone without cause places a useless action, with which moreover a danger of sinning is joined.

a. By light danger is understood a true danger of sinning, although small, which is founded in some special reason; a danger which morally is none and is equivalent to the mere possibility of sinning we are not held to avoid, because we cannot avoid danger of this kind, since it is found in almost every human action. Otherwise, as the Apostle says, we would have to go out of this world.³

b. Concerning both light danger of sinning gravely and grave danger of sinning venially, that must be noted which Lehmkuhl has (n. 486, IV): "If that from which the danger arises is an action honorable and useful in itself, from this goodness itself there is had a sufficient reason for acting, so that we ought not to attend to that slight danger, but rather fortify ourselves by applying remedies; for otherwise innumerable useful actions would be impeded by fear of sinning."

Note. The question is controverted whether it is a grave sin to expose oneself to probable danger, not morally certain danger, of sinning gravely. Very many authors indeed with St. Alphonsus⁴ affirm that it is a grave sin; but it is scarcely credible that one offering himself to the danger of sinning gravely with a serious and reasonable hope that he will not fall sins gravely, since it cannot be affirmed that he wills the sin, since the sin is not necessarily joined with the danger to which he exposes himself. For the rest, several authors who are cited for the affirmative sentence seem to adhere to it more in words than in reality.⁵

¹ Ecclus. 3, 27.

² Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5, n. 63.

³ 1 Cor. 5, 10.

⁴ Cf. l. 5, n. 63; l. 6, n. 453.

⁵ Cf. Lacroix, Theologia moralis, l. 5, n. 252 ff. Berardi, De recidivis et occasionariis^3 (Faenza: Novelli, 1897), II, pr. 4 ff., who defend the affirmative sentence, which Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 692 ff., and Genicot II, n. 372, think must be abandoned.

A law imposes in the first place an obligation on those subject to it to inform themselves of its existence and provisions, for it imposes the duty of observing it, and this cannot be done unless the terms are known; knowledge of the law is the necessary means to the end. A law also forbids us to put ourselves in the proximate occasion of transgressing it, for the avoidance of such proximate occasions is also a necessary means for the observance of the law.

An occasion of sin is an external circumstance which leads one to commit sin. It is a proximate occasion if, when a person is placed in it, it leads him to commit sin oftener than not; otherwise it is remote. It is a necessary occasion if he cannot avoid it by using ordinary diligence; otherwise it is voluntary.

(a) There is no necessity to avoid remote occasions of sin, for it is not possible to do so, and in spite of them sin may be avoided by using the proper means.

(b) We are bound to avoid proximate and voluntary occasions of sin, for we cannot remain in them without exposing ourselves to the proximate danger of committing sin, and if we voluntarily choose to remain in a proximate occasion we voluntarily choose the sin. As we are bound to avoid sin we are bound to take the necessary means for that end. This doctrine is confirmed by the 61st, 62nd, and 63rd propositions, condemned by Innocent XI.

(c) A necessary occasion is one which we cannot avoid. It is physically necessary if we cannot physically get away from it; it is morally necessary if it is more difficult to avoid it than to keep from sin while in it by using proper means and precautions.

There is no obligation to avoid necessary occasions of sin, for we cannot be obliged to do what is impossible; but we are bound to take the necessary means to avoid sin in spite of being in the occasion, and such means are always at hand if we have the good will to use them, for God’s goodness will never permit us to be tried above our strength. By using the means to avoid sin while placed in an occasion of sin, we make the proximate occasion remote, as theologians say.

It follows from this that one who finds his ordinary avocation in life, which is supposed to be an honest one, a proximate occasion of sin to him is seldom bound to give it up; he is only bound to make the occasion remote, which is generally possible with a good will and the help of God’s grace.

I. Notion of occasion. An occasion is a person or external thing which creates for a person a danger of sinning.

II. Division of occasion.

1. Occasion is distinguished into remote and proximate. Remote is that which creates a light danger; proximate is that which creates a grave danger, that is, such a danger in which someone is certainly, more probably, or probably going to fall. Such are, for example, a tavern for a drunkard, a master for a maidservant seduced by him. For the rest, the presence of a proximate occasion can be gathered both a priori and a posteriori. It is gathered a priori when, considering the enticement of the object and the disposition of the subject, it is at least probable that someone is going to fall. It is gathered a posteriori through experience or frequency of falls, namely if someone in a certain occasion, considering the times in which he was exposed to the occasion, has fallen so frequently that it is probable that, with the occasion present, he is going to fall again (St. Alphonsus, VI, 452).

Many call a proximate occasion that in which someone is certainly, or almost certainly, or very probably going to fall. Hence, in order to gather from experience whether an occasion is proximate, they require that someone always, or almost always, or altogether more frequently, has sinned in it. But that the definition of St. Alphonsus handed down by us is right will be clear from what is to be said, since an occasion is already rightly called proximate when there is of itself an obligation of avoiding it physically. But, as we shall prove, there is of itself an obligation of avoiding even that occasion in which someone is only probably going to fall.

2. Proximate occasion is subdivided into:

a) Absolute and relative, according as it creates a danger for people commonly or for a certain person.

b) Continuous and interrupted, according as it occurs habitually or at intervals.

c) Voluntary and necessary. Voluntary is that which can be avoided without grave inconvenience. Necessary is that which either physically cannot be avoided or cannot be avoided without grave inconvenience. But in order that an occasion can be called necessary, an inconvenience is required the graver in proportion as the danger of damnation, the danger of sinning, the sin to be feared, and the scandal to arise from the occasion are greater. Wherefore note two condemned propositions, namely proposition 62 proscribed by Innocent XI: "A proximate occasion of sinning is not to be fled when some useful or honest cause for not fleeing occurs";² and proposition 41 condemned by Alexander VII: "A concubinary is not to be obliged to cast out the concubine if she would be too useful for the pleasure of the concubinary, commonly regalo, since, with her lacking, he would live life too bitterly, and other banquets would affect the concubinary with great weariness, and another female servant would be too difficult to find."³ Therefore an occasion should not easily be held as necessary. In addition note that the difficulty of renouncing the occasion is commonly exaggerated by penitents (St. Alphonsus, 452, 454).

¹ Cf. Ter Haar, De occasionariis et recidivis.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1212.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1141.

III. Obligation of avoiding occasions. First it must be noted that an occasion of sinning can be avoided physically or morally: physically, that is, by removing or abandoning it; morally, that is, by bringing it about in another way that the danger of sinning ceases to persist. Next it must be observed that we are speaking expressly of occasions of sinning gravely. Now:

1. There is no obligation of avoiding remote occasions of sinning gravely. The reason is that such an obligation would bring with it an intolerable burden to be borne through one's whole life and continual anxieties; for occasions of this kind continually occur to a person. But it cannot be admitted that a burden of this kind has been imposed on people. Some indeed think that of itself there is a venial obligation; but the argument seems also to exclude that obligation.

IV. Absolution of those in occasions. As regards the absolution of those in occasions, these things especially come to be noted:

1. One who is in a proximate, voluntary, and continuous occasion to which he is strongly attached should not be absolved before he has physically or quasi-physically¹ abandoned the occasion, unless there is a special reason for granting absolution at once. This is deduced first from the fact that "such a penitent is indisposed for absolution if he asks for it before he removes the occasion" (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 66). Moreover, he is indisposed because he exposes himself to a grave danger of breaking his purpose, that is, of not removing the proximate occasion. St. Alphonsus explains this in this way: "Removal of the occasion is a greatly arduous thing, and does not happen unless one inflicts great force on himself, so that he may be torn away from that occasion to which, because of the past adhesion of his mind, he remains strongly inclined. And therefore, if the occasion is not removed before absolution, the penitent will easily deceive himself after absolution, falsely persuading himself that he will resist temptations; and thus, with the occasion not dismissed, he will certainly return to his vomit" (VI, 454; III, 436). But if the penitent does not notice the danger, of itself he must be admonished by the confessor; and once admonished he becomes indisposed if nevertheless he wills to receive absolution immediately. There is added that the confessor as physician is of himself held to use a means without which the penitent is exposed to grave danger of breaking his purpose (St. Alphonsus, cited place). Finally, theologians by far more commonly admit the proposition stated. Thus, for example, St. Charles Borromeo, St. Thomas of Villanova, St. Francis Xavier, St. Leonard of Port Maurice, Venerable Paul Segneri, Lehmkuhl, Bucceroni, Prummer, and others, whose testimonies Ter Haar brings forward.²

What the special reasons are for departing from the rule, or granting absolution at once, see n. 407.

Objection 1. The opinion of St. Alphonsus rests on a doubtful foundation, namely that he sins gravely who exposes himself only to probable sin.

Response. By referring to the proof of that doctrine and the refutation of those things which are opposed to it (n. 468).

Objection 2. The earlier theologians only counsel, and do not prescribe, the opinion which St. Alphonsus defends.

Response. An interpretation of this kind is opposed to the obvious and clear sense of the testimonies of which there was discussion above.

¹ For instance, if the matter concerns a maidservant, by renouncing service, even if she does not depart immediately.

² Ter Haar, cited work, n. 117 sq.

The Occasions of Sin are external circumstances—persons, places or things—which tempt one to sin. Examples: Persons who invite others to defraud and show how it can be accomplished, theatres where irreligious plays are staged, books that aim to depreciate virtue, etc.

Does every law forbid one to expose oneself to an occasion of transgressing it? - A law which commands or prohibits something also implicitly commands one to avoid proximate occasions, and prohibits one from exposing oneself to proximate occasions of transgressing the law. The reason is that otherwise the law would already be altogether frustrated. For if it does not oblige to the means, neither does it oblige to the end. - Wherefore, one who seeks these occasions, or voluntarily exposes himself to them, or remains in them, with no excusing cause, sins against the law and the virtue with which the matter is concerned: against faith, chastity, piety, etc.; and besides he sins against charity toward himself by reason of the spiritual harm to himself which he voluntarily undergoes.

Now, in the present matter, an occasion is called whatever externally offers us danger of transgressing the law. Externally, because the very frailty of nature, interior passions, and intrinsic habits, although they bring danger with them, do not constitute an occasion at all. Danger extends more broadly than occasion, and is whatever can induce us to sin, whether it is from without or from within. Danger is much graver when the occasion is present or in being, than when absent or not in being, as if a woman is at home, or outside. Of transgressing the law, and thus of consenting to sin, and not of mere temptation. Moreover a proximate occasion is that in which a man placed there, for the most part, sins, whether this is verified with respect to all who are found in the same circumstances, from the nature itself of the thing, or is verified only with respect to such a person, given attention to his peculiar circumstances. But an occasion is remote if a man placed in it for the most part does not sin; and we are not bound to avoid this, since the thing would be impossible. Between proximate and remote occasion various degrees are given, as is clear. For the danger of sinning can be morally certain and probable, more or less probable. For the most part; and thus in the former there is moral certainty of sinning; in the latter no solid probability of sinning.

If the proximate occasion is simply necessary, that is, one which cannot be removed, one must make it remote, by employing suitable means: prayer, frequenting of the sacraments, custody of the senses, etc. But if it is morally necessary, i.e., one which cannot be taken away without grave detriment, it is not illicit to be engaged in it from a just and proportionate cause; provided nevertheless that consent to sin is not morally certainly foreseen. This can easily be removed by fortifying oneself with custody of the senses, prayers, pious works, and by trusting in the greater help of God. Thus the occasion becomes remote from proximate. Morally certainly; what if only probably? And if consent is probably foreseen, it is illicit; for sin must certainly be avoided, as eternal damnation must certainly be avoided. There are not lacking those who, in the case, do not acknowledge a grave obligation, because, with moral certainty of sinning removed, he does not choose sin. But this is nothing; for since the will then chooses at least probable formal sin, the will is at least equally disposed toward either, and thus evil and gravely sinful. L. 1. 5. n. 63; l. 6. n. 452-456.

In what ways does venial sin become mortal per accidens? 1. By reason of erroneous conscience, as is clear. 2. By reason of an attached end gravely evil, as if someone lies lightly in order to commit fornication. But it suffices in confession to confess the fornication; it is not necessary also to explain the lie. - 3. By reason of the last end, which someone constitutes even in a light thing, e.g., in a game, in a person inordinately loved, etc. "If someone, from love of gaming, were prepared to commit any mortal sin whatever, it would be a sin of rashness, and indeed most grave, but without species." L. 60. 4. By reason of absolute and formal contempt, "namely when therefore formally and absolutely the precept is violated because you refuse to be subject to it or to the superior, which is a sin of consummate pride; or when therefore you do not wish to obey the precept because it is a precept, and this is a sin of formal disobedience; both of these gravely fight against the charity owed to the superior. Therefore it is one thing to contemn the law or the legislator, even human, not as such a person, but as legislator, which is mortal; another thing to contemn the thing commanded, which is venial if the matter is light." L. 61; l. 4, n. 161; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 2; q. 186, a. 9 ad 3; a. 10 ad 3. 5. By reason of the grave scandal of others, which gravely repugns to charity. 6. By reason of grave harm to others, which gravely repugns to justice. 7. By reason of the proximate occasion and proximate danger of sinning.

"In this matter it is most certain that a work venial in itself or indifferent passes into mortal sin, if the one acting exposes himself to an occasion so proximate that it places him in a moral and proximate danger of sinning mortally. But this moral proximate occasion, or this moral proximate danger, occurs when from its genus the occasion is such that it frequently induces men of similar condition to mortal sin, or it is established by experience that it has such an effect in this man.... just as he is exposed to the danger of incurring temporal harm who undertakes a work at such a time and place and with such circumstances that he can scarcely avoid that harm.... And in this probable danger of sinning mortally, the circumstances of that sin to whose danger he exposed himself must be confessed.... Since it is of the same malice to place oneself in moral danger of committing some crime as to commit it.

For by the same precept by which one is bound to avoid a crime, he is also obliged to avoid its proximate danger." Sanch., in Dec., l. 1, c. 8, nn. 1, 4. - Except: 1. unless such caution is used that the danger ceases; 2. unless a grave cause is present; for then the danger is not morally voluntary, but one is compelled unwillingly by that necessity to undergo it. Sanch., l. c., nn. 2, 3; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 10, a. 9; L. 63; E. M.

Is it licit to induce someone to drunkenness, so that he may be impeded from a graver evil, e.g., from committing sacrilege or homicide? - The first opinion affirms it, because this is to diminish an evil which otherwise cannot be impeded. "That which is contrary to reason has more of the account of evil than that which removes the use of reason for an hour."

S. Th. 2. 2. q. 150, a. 3 ad 2. The second opinion distinguishes, and says that it is licit to induce another to material drunkenness, i.e., when the other becomes drunk without sin, for instance by setting before him very strong or medicated wine, because then on the one hand he does not sin, and on the other the harm of drunkenness is permitted in order to avoid a graver harm of others. But they say it is not licit to induce him to formal drunkenness, namely with his own sin, since this is intrinsically evil, and therefore never to be permitted. But the third opinion grants neither, because, since such a person is in no way thinking about wine, to induce him positively to drunkenness is accordingly evil. "Nevertheless, these things notwithstanding," St. Alphonsus, 77, concludes, "the first opinion seems sufficiently probable to me and to other learned men consulted by me, whether the drunkenness is material or formal, on account of the reason already brought forward, because it is licit to induce another to a lesser evil, so that he may be impeded from a greater." Namely then it is not to counsel evil, but good, that is, the choice of the lesser evil.

Is it licit to permit an occasion of sinning, so that the guilty person may be corrected, and even to set it up? - R. Affirmatively, when the other is judged probably to be ready from another source to continue the sin. The reason is that to permit is not to induce to sinning, and there is a sufficient reason for permitting; because the permission is then impeditive of a greater evil, for one sin is permitted lest several be done. Likewise even to set up the occasion of sin is not from its nature to induce to sin, but is an act of itself indifferent, from which a twofold effect follows, one good, which is intended, the other evil, beside the intention of the agent and from the malice of the sinner; and besides there is a sufficient reason for positing that act. Thus more probably, and it can be confirmed by the example of Judith, who, when she saw that the permission of lust in Holofernes would be an impediment of very many evils for the whole Israelite people, voluntarily set before him an occasion, namely her adornment; and nevertheless in this they commonly judge that she did not sin. Judith 10. - Struggl, q. 5, n. 34; L. 58.

Resolves: It is lawful for a father and master not to remove an occasion of stealing from sons or servants, when they know them nevertheless to be inclined and ready to steal, so that thus, being caught, they may be punished and come to their senses. It is licit for a keeper of fields to hide himself, so that he may catch those causing damage and keep himself safe from the danger of damage to come. L. l. c.; S. Th. S. q. 62, a. 3 ad 4.

What of those habituated to sin, those in occasions of sin, and recidivists? What of absolution to be given, denied, or deferred to them? - The diseases of the soul are sins, and their causes are contracted habits, occasions, and relapses; whence come those habituated or customary sinners, those in occasions, and recidivists. Those habituated or customary sinners are those who have contracted a habit of sinning or a custom of sin, into which however they have not yet fallen after Confession. But they are said to have contracted a habit or custom if regularly five times in a month, indeed even once, they are accustomed to relapse into the same sins. A recidivist is one who after Confession, although admonished, relapses into the same sins with no or almost no amendment. One in an occasion is one who is found in some external circumstance which, either from its own nature or from the frailty of the man who is found in it, entices or induces to sinning. One occasion is necessary, another voluntary; one is present or in esse, which someone has with himself, e.g., if someone keeps a concubine at home; another is absent or not in esse, which someone does not have, but finds when seeking it, e.g., if the concubine is in a neighboring or distant house; one is absolute with respect to all, another relative with respect to such a person; finally one is proximate, in which men commonly for the most part sin, another remote, in which men commonly for the most part do not sin. Therefore that occasion is certainly to be judged proximate in which there is no true probability of not sinning; on the contrary, that is remote in which there is no true probability of sinning. It is clear that various degrees exist between the two.

Neither habit, nor relapse, nor occasions import necessity of sinning, but they contain only danger of sinning. Hence the question is raised whether they can and should be absolved, and when and how often, before they have amended the habit, prevented relapse, or removed the occasion. The reason for the difficulty is the doubt about the sincerity of sorrow and purpose, which arises from the habit itself, relapse, or occasion. - The rigid wish them not to be absolved before the habit has been amended, relapse avoided, and the occasion removed. The lax wish them to be able to be absolved whenever they say that they are sorry from the heart. The moderate walk a middle way, which is broad. Several of these establish turns almost mathematically, namely once, twice, three times, four times, but not beyond, if they bring only ordinary signs of penance; otherwise, if they bring extraordinary signs. But all agree that absolution can be given the first time, and that those are more easily to be absolved who sin from the very frailty of nature, and who are found in a necessary occasion. But others, and we adhere to these, say that the whole matter is in the prudent estimation of the confessor, and is to be weighed and judged from the various circumstances of sins, persons, places, times, and causes. The following rules can be established. Salm., C. 5, n. 68; L. 452 ff., 459 ff.

The confessor can safely give absolution whenever he prudently judges the penitent to be sufficiently disposed, i.e., that "neither diligence in enumerating sins, nor sorrow in detesting them, was altogether lacking to the penitent." Roman Catechism, p. 2, n. 60. It is the certain doctrine of Catholic schools that any penitent can be absolved if he presents sufficient indications of true penance. A prudent judgment about sufficient disposition does not necessarily have to be a certain judgment, but only a probable one suffices. The reason is that the sacrament of penance scarcely admits a more certain judgment of this kind. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, a. 3; II-II, q. 47, a. 9 ad 2; III, q. 68, a. 4 ad 2. But this prudent judgment about the sufficient disposition of the penitent must be formed from the assertion of the penitent himself, from his Confession, from the manner of the Confession, and from the other circumstances of the same Confession; nor indeed can it be taken from elsewhere. - St. Thomas, 4, dist. 17, q. 5, a. 3, q. 6 ad 2; Opusc. 12; Quodl. 1, a. 12; L. 459, 460, 461.

The confessor can safely defer absolution when the penitent, although he is sufficiently disposed, is nevertheless not unwilling, and the delay would be more useful to him than absolution immediately given. The first reason is that on the one hand a sufficiently disposed penitent has a right to absolution; but on the other hand, if he is unwilling, delay, speaking of itself, will either in no way profit him, or certainly will not profit him more than absolution immediately given. For if the penitent has a desire of receiving absolution, he is offended by delay, and it is greatly to be feared that he will not return any more. Likewise, if he has a desire of receiving absolution, since this is a very good will, better hope indeed will be had from such a will aided by sacramental grace than if he is deprived of this. The second reason is that otherwise the penitent would be deprived without any sufficient reason of sacramental grace, which is effective both for remitting and for preventing sins.

But that absolution can absolutely be deferred to a penitent, although sufficiently disposed, and even without his consent, is clear first by reason: namely because, although a sufficiently disposed penitent has a right to absolution, nevertheless he does not have a right to obtain it immediately; especially if delay seems useful for fulfilling some obligation, e.g., of restitution, for conceiving a greater horror concerning committed sins, and for strengthening more and more the constancy of a serious will not to sin any more. For it belongs to the confessor as judge to determine when and how the sentence of absolution is to be pronounced. But the confessor is not only judge, but father, teacher, and physician. And therefore, as father, he can before absolution put forward an admonition and spiritual exhortation, by which he may instruct and arm the penitent against temptations. Likewise, as teacher, before absolution he can teach the penitent whom he sees wrapped in much ignorance, which otherwise could lead him into many sins. Similarly, as physician, he can defer absolution when he rightly fears that the penitent now absolved will easily not fulfill some grave obligation, or will easily relapse immediately into the same crimes, unless by the very difficulty and delay of absolution the penitent better recognizes the gravity of sin and the necessity of amendment, becomes more cautious, and is confirmed in the purpose of not sinning. The experience of many weak penitents supports this, who, by this remedy prudently applied, are usually cured in a short time; and for recidivists and for those in occasions it seems more necessary and useful, because in this way they better conceive the necessity of perseverance in the purpose of not sinning. The authority of theologians is added; for very many and grave theologians teach the utility of sometimes deferring absolution.

The utility required for deferring absolution to a penitent otherwise sufficiently disposed must be notable; and consequently absolution must be deferred only for a short time. The reason is that it is altogether grave to remain in the state of mortal sin even for a few days; and, speaking of itself, absolution immediately given is more profitable than its delay. - For a short time, i.e., for some hours, for a day, for two or three days, for a week, at most for fifteen days. But this remedy of deferring absolution is not only useful, but simply necessary, and the confessor not only can but also must apply it when it is necessary for testing the sincere sorrow and purpose of the penitent, about which there is not sufficient evidence, and about whose sufficient disposition there is doubt. - Salm., c. 5, p. 4, n. 68; L. 461-464; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 25, a. 1 ad 4.

Whenever the penitent is sufficiently disposed, and no notable utility is present from delay of absolution, the confessor is absolutely bound to give it immediately. Whenever grave harm will follow for the penitent from absolution denied or delayed, absolution is to be given to him conditionally, if he is doubtfully disposed. The first reason is that absolution must be granted from justice, and under grave obligation, to every penitent duly confessed and disposed. Nor indeed is there any reason for delay, which could be no other than the utility of the penitent himself, which in this case is had rather from absolution immediately given. "Suarez, Sanchez, etc., say that to deny absolution in light matter does not exceed venial sin." L., H. A., tr. 16, n. 118. The second reason is the common axiom: Sacraments are for men. When necessity stands, provision is made for the salvation of man in the best way in which it can be done; nor from this would there be any irreverence toward the sacrament or other inconvenience. - L. 431, 432, 462; l. 3, n. 682; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 18, a. 4.

When the penitent does not wish to fulfill a grave obligation which he has, when he does not have sincere sorrow for committed sins, nor a purpose of not sinning henceforth, the confessor is then bound to deny absolution. To these indeed, and to these alone, absolution is to be denied absolutely. The reason is clear, because these, and these alone, are unworthy of absolution. Sin cannot be remitted to him who wishes to persevere in sin. Leo XII, Encyclical Letter Caritate Christi; Roman Ritual, de Sacram. poenit.

As regards recidivists, there is no other special doctrine, different from the preceding, which is general and comprehends all cases. Therefore, if the confessor from all the circumstances of the Confession prudently judges the penitent to be duly disposed, he can absolve him; nor here and now is it necessary that he judge that he will not relapse any more, otherwise very many could not be absolved, concerning whom certainly the confessor, while he absolves them, cannot form this judgment, that henceforth, namely for the whole time of future life, they will no longer sin gravely. Not future amendment, but present sorrow and purpose, are the necessary dispositions for absolution. If thus far the penitent has broken faith, this is not a reason why at present he cannot be absolved, if he is prudently judged to be duly disposed; it can only be a sufficient reason why the confessor either doubts the legitimate disposition of the penitent, or even is persuaded that he truly lacks the aforesaid disposition. And in this case of recidivists, although they appear disposed, delay of absolution can certainly at times be especially useful, as has already been said; to whom, moreover, frequent approach to the sacraments is also in itself especially useful, if indeed they are duly disposed for them. And thus in the Roman Ritual, de Sacram. poenit., it is said: "For those easily falling back into sins it will be most useful to counsel them to confess often, and, if it is expedient, TO COMMUNICATE." But whenever the penitent exhibits extraordinary signs of sorrow even after relapse, he can safely be absolved. The reason is that then, ordinarily at least speaking, it is more expedient that absolution not be deferred. Likewise he can safely be absolved if absolution cannot easily be deferred, lest he remain long in the state of mortal sin.

But before the confessor absolves such a one, he will take care to dispose him more certainly and fruitfully for receiving absolution. But if he appears only doubtfully disposed, then it will be not only useful, but necessary to defer absolution, unless a grave reason presses, in which case absolution can be given only conditionally. Toletus, l. 5, c. 13; Suarez, d. 32, s. 2; L. 459-464; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 25, a. 1 ad 4.

The same must consequently be said about those in occasions. The common and universal rule is that he who is only in a remote occasion can be absolved, if indeed he is otherwise duly disposed, but not he who is in a free proximate occasion which he does not wish to leave. The first reason is that otherwise we would all have to leave the world. The second reason is that he who wishes to remain in that moral danger of falling does not seem to have an efficacious purpose of not sinning, unless he has extraordinary sorrow and purpose, or proposes to apply other remedies by which the occasion from proximate becomes remote. Lugo, d. 14, n. 151. - When the occasion is necessary and cannot be left without scandal, grave infamy, or great spiritual or temporal detriment, then he licitly remains in the danger which is necessary, provided that meanwhile he is prepared to use the prescribed means, and can hope for divine help in resisting. The reason is that no one is bound to the impossible, whether physically or morally, and besides an occasion of sin is not of itself sin, nor does it place a man in the necessity of sinning; and, in the case, the will of using the prescribed means makes it remote. So the doctors commonly, L. 455, and St. Alphonsus 456 calls this opinion most probable. Suarez, d. 32, s. 2, n. 4; Lugo, d. 13, n. 160.

If one who was absolved in a voluntary occasion, because he sincerely promised that he would remove it, or in a necessary occasion, because he sincerely promised that he would apply the remedies prescribed by the confessor, afterward falls back into the same sins, practically speaking he is not again to be absolved before he actually exercises an effort both of removing the occasion in the former case and of actually applying in the latter the remedies prescribed by the confessor; not because he absolutely cannot even at present have sincere sorrow and purpose, but because from this the confessor can easily prudently come into suspicion about the sincerity of the sorrow and purpose, L. 505 at the end; and because prudence requires that, although the sorrow is sincere and the purpose sincere, the weak will of the penitent, especially if the occasion is in esse, be aided also by this means of delaying absolution, which in the case can be very useful, and in fact often is. Except, unless the penitent gives extraordinary signs of sorrow, or there is an urgent cause, e.g., the mark of infamy in omitting Communion, if he cannot return to the same confessor, or only after a long time. And in this, if the present disposition appears morally certain, absolution is to be given absolutely; but if doubtful, it can be given only conditionally. - Suarez, d. 32, s. 2; L. 452-458; Elbel, de Actib. human., 193 ff.; E. M.

“62. A proximate occasion of sin is not to be fled when some useful or honorable cause for not fleeing it occurs. — 63. It is lawful directly to seek a proximate occasion of sin for our own spiritual or temporal good, or that of our neighbor.” Propositions condemned by Innocent XI.

16. From those things which were said in the two preceding articles, judgment can be borne concerning theaters, namely whether those who are present at theaters sin. For if they sin, they can sin only on account of base looks, or base things heard. Now then, theaters of themselves are not evil, but indifferent, since they can be had well and badly. Yet ordinarily speaking, it cannot be denied that they are full of dangers, especially for adolescents, whose blood is already sufficiently boiling of itself; for they foster luxury, feed the sight basely, enervate the soul, and sharpen passions. - Wherefore there is no sin either to be present at comedies, or to act them, if they are honorable. "The office of actors, which is ordained to exhibiting solace to men, is not according to itself illicit," says the Angelic Doctor, 2.2, q. 168, a. 3. - But if they are somewhat base, the hearer will sin only venially, unless perhaps he knows by experience that he is moved vehemently by entertainments of this kind toward lust, with proximate danger of consent, so that the spectacle is for him a proximate occasion of sinning. - If finally the comedy is notably base, either in itself or in manner, he sins mortally per se. Per se; for it would be venial to view it only on account of curiosity, or on account of empty solace, with all danger of base delectation excluded; nevertheless, practically speaking, this danger will easily be present in adolescents, or in others of little timorous conscience; and unless scandal is present, which plainly would be present if clerics and religious were present at base comedies, as Benedict XIV observes. - L. 427, 428; Hom. Apost., tract. 9, n. 10; G. 247.

34. That we may proceed in order, we shall set forth three things: 1. we shall explain the general doctrine; 2. we shall speak of dances in particular customary in our time; 3. we shall indicate the practice of the confessor.

35. 1. There are three classes of dances. The first is per se modest, the second per se gravely immodest, the third per se lightly immodest.

Dances per se modest are those which, without any wholly base end or immodest external act, while musical instruments are sounding, are performed among persons of the same sex or even of different sex; although the hands of a man and woman mutually grasp one another, yet lightly, according to the manner customary among honorable persons and in honorable dances. For this "is per se no fault, or at most is venial, because generally in this there is no danger of lust, or only a light one." Gury, 234. Now then dances of this kind are in no way per se illicit, because they are indifferent in themselves and are prohibited by no law. Nevertheless they are often immodest per accidens by reason of the danger which can easily be found even in those modest dances. St. Thomas, on Isaias, c. 3; and 2.2, q. 168, a. 2; L., l. 3, n. 429.

36. Corollaries. 1. Those who are so weak that they undergo grave danger of sinning in dances must abstain from them under mortal sin, unless perhaps at some time a certain necessity urges and means are applied so that the proximate danger of consent is absent. On the contrary, says Tamburini, l. c., c. 8, de Chor., n. 3, if from experience you have known that danger of this kind is not present to you, I think that you are in no way guilty of mortal sin by dancing in this way or by looking at those dancing.

2. To dance modestly or to be present at honorable dances from some necessity, or from the decorum of one's state, without probable danger of sinning, is no sin; because a sufficient reason is given for permitting the sins of others, if there are any. Hence marriageable girls are excused from sin by dancing decently when they cannot be absent from dances held in the father's house, or among neighbors or relatives, or cannot refuse dancing without being mocked, or without displeasing parents or betrothed men requiring them.

3. Indeed, to be present at honorable dances, even without necessity, yet with danger and notable scandal excluded, and to dance decently in them, not only is not mortal, but can easily also be free from every sin. For sometimes men are found, and not rarely women, to whom even in dances among persons of different sex no danger, or a very remote danger, threatens. But although these are to be dissuaded from dances, nevertheless a promise of avoiding dances would be demanded from them imprudently and unjustly under denial of absolution. - G. 243.

37. Dances per se gravely immodest are those which, with men and women mixed, or indeed even separated, are undertaken with obscene gestures, immodest touches, dishonorable songs, indecent nakednesses, and those things gravely repugnant to modesty. There is no one who denies that these dances are altogether illicit. Cf. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3. - To these dances per se immodest belong dances which take place in taverns, to which dissolute men and dissolute women of every kind come together. But in no way is it lawful for an innkeeper, for attracting more guests, ordinarily to admit gravely base dances in his buildings, just as neither is it lawful to set before them for reading public newspapers which evidently and ordinarily are opposed to good morals. G. 256. To this also, generally speaking, are referred dances with masks among persons of different sex. For experience establishes that games of this kind are allurements to lust and an efficacious cause of immodesty. G. 244.

38. Finally, dances per se lightly immodest are those in which lightly dishonorable gestures, touches, songs, and adornments are had. These dances, as is clear, per se speaking, are not gravely illicit, but only lightly, because they are only lightly dishonorable. Nevertheless per accidens they can very easily be gravely illicit by reason of the danger of lethal fault which can very easily be found in them.

39. Corollary. 1. The threefold corollary established above regarding dances per se modest also has place, yet with due proportion, regarding these dances that are per se only lightly immodest.

40. 2. The dances customary in our time, concerning which the controversy is greatest, are those which in French are called valse, polka, galop, and others similar to them; to all of which this is special, that a man and a woman clasp one another in mutual embrace, and thus, held together, proceed by dancing in a circle. - Now then there are many indeed who universally hold these dances as per se immodest, both because that excessive proximity of bodies proceeds all the way to the very compression of bodies, with the greatest danger, as is clear of itself, of venereal delectation, and because those dancing, clinging together and separated from others, so that it is as if one man alone with one woman alone, are also in great danger of speaking obscene things. Hence they say that those cannot be absolved who indulge in the aforesaid dances and do not wish to renounce them. "Nevertheless there are not lacking upright men who say that these very dances can be done in a manner not so indecorous, although commonly they are very dangerous." Gury-Dumas, Cas. 233. Wherefore also as regards these more recent dances, it will belong to the confessor to judge concerning particular cases, from the manner, circumstances, gravity of the motive, gravity of the danger, etc. G. 242.

41. 3. As regards practice, these things generally can be at hand for the confessor. 1. "The confessor ought especially to attend to these two things, namely to the danger of the person of the penitent, that he may restrain it, and to the reasons which he can have for assisting at dances, that he may indulge him or at least not act so rigidly. For the faithful occur not rarely who, from a grave cause or moral necessity, are impelled to take part in dances." Gury-Dumas, Cas. 234. - 2. "If no hope is given of removing dances from the midst, as most frequently happens, excessive severity will harm the salvation of souls; for many, thinking these amusements to be lawful or not gravely illicit, are unwilling to abstain entirely from them; they desert confession, the Eucharist, and sacred sermons." Bouvier, l. c., de chor., 8. - 3. "He, on the contrary, who treats penitents assisting at dances kindly, by persuasion and prayers turns them away from dangers of this kind, furnishes them salutary counsels that they not expose themselves to danger; if they have fallen, he rebukes them paternally, defers absolution for them, and finally, when they are contrite for grave things admitted, although he does not judge them immune from every sin, absolves them, admits them to communion at least at Easter, consults much more efficaciously for their salvation and profits the good of religion." Bouvier, l. c. - 4. Generally speaking, "dances, as they are accustomed to be done, are always dangerous; therefore confessors... ought to turn young persons of either sex away from them as much as they can," Bouvier, l. c., although they have not yet gravely relapsed. But then let the confessor proceed with due charity, and rather by way of counsel. Let him commend to his penitents certain spiritual exercises, pious reading, prayer, etc.; and, with the grace of God helping, he certainly will not be frustrated in the very best outcome of the matter. Cf. St. Francis de Sales, Introduction to the Devout Life, part 3, ch. 23.

45. Proposition. Concubinage and prostitution is not a special sin, but only a circumstance of sin, not per se necessarily to be declared in confession. - It is proved. For concubinage properly is frequented intercourse of an unmarried man with an unmarried woman. But prostitution is intercourse with a woman ready for every man who comes. Therefore, although concubinage and prostitution are a graver sin on account of the will persevering in sin, it is neither a special sin nor a circumstance of sin per se changing the species. Nevertheless that circumstance must be manifested per accidens: 1. by reason of scandal, when the concubinage or prostitution would be public; 2. for manifesting the state and kind of occasions, and it must always be opened to the confessor asking, as is clear from proposition 58 condemned by Innocent XI. L. 432; G. 421.

46. Note. 1. Prostitution per se does not impede generation, nor does it procure sterility, if no injury of the organs is had from frequent acts of lasciviousness. For prostitutes not rarely conceive, and even sometimes experience abortion, which they scarcely care about, a little mass of matter having been cast out. And this ordinarily has place in the earlier days of conception. Commonly, however, conception of offspring is not had; but a circumstance of this kind does not change the nature of the sin, since it is per accidens, just as if someone were to fornicate with a sterile woman or with an old woman. But that, if offspring is born, it is uncertain of what father it is, and from this is badly educated, this is a circumstance not specifically proper to prostitution, but to fornication, and therefore it is not essentially distinguished from it. Cf. here n. 43. But if uncertainty of offspring of this kind perhaps is greater in prostitution, nevertheless it is known that more and less do not change the species. - Billuart, diss. 6, art. 2, You ask first.

2. Men going to prostitutes use a certain means, lest they be affected by them with syphilitic disease. But by this means an impediment of generation is had, although intercourse on each side remains in species and externally normal, without any withdrawal of the man or woman. An obstacle of this kind is sometimes presented on the part of the woman, who intends only the impediment of conception, since she can in no way avert contagion by this mode. If, therefore, either by intention only, or also in reality itself, an obstacle is placed to generation, then indeed there will be a special circumstance, but an extrinsic one, necessarily to be declared in confession. Debreyne, Moechialogie, part 1, ch. 1, art. 2, Sect. 1.

47. Is it also a sin of scandal to seek fornication from a prostitute ready to sin?

R. "There are not lacking several doctors who say that it is not a sin of scandal, because since such a woman is always in actual or virtual will of sinning, he who furnishes to her an occasion of executing that sin is not judged to cooperate gravely but lightly. Thus Soto, etc. I venerate the authority of such doctors, but I would not dare to depart from the contrary opinion, which I judge must be followed, and which Sanchez, etc., hold. The reason seems to me very powerful, because although the prostitute is in actual will of sinning, nevertheless she certainly brings upon herself a ruin gravely greater by completing that particular sin of fornication. Therefore he who cooperates with her for consummating the sin sins gravely in two ways, both against charity and against chastity." L., l. 2, n. 47.

48. Can prostitutes be permitted?

R. "The first probable opinion affirms; and the Salmanticenses and St. Thomas hold it, and St. Augustine clearly adheres to it. The reason is that, prostitutes removed, worse sins would happen, namely sodomies, bestialities, softnesses, besides the corruption of honorable women. But the second opinion, more probable practically, denies; and Roncaglia, Navarrus, etc., hold this. The reason is that through prostitutes these graver evils are not avoided, because in lustful men, from easy and frequent congress with prostitutes, lust fixes deeper roots; and therefore, since this vice is increased more by frequency, they do not cease to commit pollutions and unspeakable sins, at least with the prostitutes themselves, nor for this reason do they abstain from soliciting honorable women. Conversely, by the permission of prostitutes innumerable other evils are superadded, namely, more girls are prostituted; adolescents esteem their parents lightly; they dissipate goods, neglect studies of the sciences, stir up quarrels, and reject honorable nuptials. For the rest, Father Sarnelli well observes that although in vast cities prostitutes can be permitted, nevertheless in other places they are in no way to be permitted." L. 434.

49. Corollary. In cities in which, for the sake of avoiding a greater evil, it is permitted that prostitutes live, it is lawful to rent a house to them, especially if other tenants are lacking or it would be easy for them to rent other buildings, unless nevertheless the prostitutes would gravely harm honorable neighbors, or because of the site would give greater occasion for sins. G., t. 1, n. 250; L., l. 2, n. 70; Ithurriaga, Cas. 26; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 10, art. 11.

50. Is it lawful to serve prostitutes or concubinaries?

R. Negatively, per se and ordinarily speaking, both on account of scandal and also on account of the greatest danger of lapse. Therefore those cases which in practice must be excepted will have to be judged from the degree of necessity and from the circumstances of persons removing scandal and proximate danger of sinning.

51. Note. 1. It is lawful for a servant to open the door to a concubine or prostitute, especially when, if he did not open it, there would be another who would open it. L., l. 2, n. 66; Roncaglia, tr. 6, cap. 6, reg. in prax. observ. IV.

2. Laymann, l. 2, tr. 3, cap. 13, n. 5, has these things: "It is lawful for a servant to admit through the door a woman with whom his master is going to sin, to carry a torch before him, to prepare the bed, as Sanchez, Navarrus, Rodriguez, Azor teach, because material cooperation of this kind is sufficiently remote, and without it the sin would nevertheless be committed." Cf. also Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 37, and Tamburini, Expl. Decal., l. 5, cap. 1, par. 4, n. 18, where he has these things: "The very common reason of service and attendance is a proportionate cause why a servant, son, in one word a subject, doing the following works indifferent in themselves, is excused. First... Second, if by command of the same master, whom he knows is going to commit adultery, he saddles the horse, merely accompanies him, and merely waits before the doors (merely, I say, that is, not so that he may keep watch and render him bolder for sinning), prepares the bed, seasons foods and serves the concubine, and merely accompanies her, leading her to the place where the master is going to sin, and opens the door for her as she is about to enter. Third, if he adorns his mistress, a prostitute, if he carries writings and messages full only of urbanity, if he carries small gifts and foods, and performs other offices which another servant would perform equally." Sporer, de 8 praecepto, c. 1, n. 99, also excuses the servant carrying gifts to a prostitute, "because," he says, "on the one hand they are bound by office and condition to serve and obey their masters; but on the other hand cooperation with sin is merely material and only remote."

Yet others require another very grave reason, because since these gifts are apt for fostering lust, the cooperation seems sufficiently proximate. And because of this very reason it is not lawful for a servant to carry amorous letters to the concubine of his master, unless besides the common reason of service there is present a graver and proportionate reason. For the rest, the servant is not bound to inquire what is contained in the letters.

St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 64, 65, 66, 67, for a servant accompanying his master to a brothel or saddling the horse, in order that he be excused, requires fear of grave harm; for a servant opening the door to a prostitute, in order that he be excused, he requires that, if he himself does not open, there be another who would open. But he judges that carrying gifts to a prostitute is intrinsically evil, and that it is never lawful to carry amorous letters to the master's concubine.

3. But it would be altogether illicit for a servant to put his shoulders under, or to carry a ladder for, a master climbing to fornicate, to open the door by force, and similar things; for the cooperation is altogether proximate, and makes the sin easier with the gravest harm of a third party. Yet since these actions are not intrinsically evil, they would still not be illicit if fear of death or mutilation were added. St. Alphonsus, l. 2, n. 66, adds that no other fear excuses the one cooperating, except death. For otherwise, because of fear of loss of resources or of infamy alone, it is not lawful to concur in the dishonoring of a girl to be deflowered. Cf. L., l. 3, n. 571.

52. Is it lawful to have a concubinary maidservant?

R. If the maidservant is publicly concubinary, it is not lawful to retain her by reason of scandal and most evil example. But if she is secretly concubinary, then a distinction must be made. For either her lover also is retained at home, or not. In the first case it is not lawful to retain her, even if other male and female servants cannot easily be found. For thus the master would be receiving sinners, and sinners more safely and conveniently, and consequently he himself would foster the sin of his servants. But in the other case the master is also bound to cast out the maidservant, if it can prudently be hoped that from such expulsion she will return to good fruit. But if it were likely that, expelled from the house, she would become worse (which certainly could easily be presumed), then it is lawful for him to retain such a maidservant, provided she is not pernicious to the family, which can easily happen. The reason is that in the former case he seems to favor the sin of the maidservant, but not likewise in the latter. And this would be all the more lawful if notable harm to the master would follow from that expulsion, if, for example, he would lack due and necessary service. Cf. Tamburini, Expl. Decal., l. 5, cap. 1, par. 4, nn. 21, 22; Elbel, de Act. hum., Conf. 1, Cas. 3.

53. Can a concubinary be absolved before he has dismissed the concubine?

R. 1. If the concubinage has been public, neither the concubinary nor the concubine regularly can be absolved, however much they appear contrite, before public separation, because besides the danger to be fled, satisfaction proportionate to the scandal is necessary; moreover this satisfaction commonly can be obtained by separation alone. It is said regularly, because one placed in extremis, having no one except the concubine who may minister necessary things to him, can be absolved and fortified with the other sacraments, provided he is truly contrite and promises, before those standing by, if the intercourse was public, that he will cast out the concubine as soon as he is able. The same must be said of the concubine placed in the same necessity.

For in such necessity scandal is repaired in the mode in which it can be repaired; for no one is held to the impossible. Bouvier, l. c., art. 2. Indeed, with necessity pressing, not even that promise before those standing by seems necessary, because in these circumstances scandal will easily cease on account of the evident necessity of the matter itself. And this has place a fortiori if there would only be question of absolution to be given secretly, and not also, because of shortness of time, of administering Extreme Unction and Viaticum. And here the doctors observe that the Holy Eucharist is not to be carried to a prostitute dying in a public brothel, on account of public decency and because it is not absolutely necessary. Gury-Dumas, Cas., t. 2, n. 721-723.

R. 2. If the concubinage has been occult, either the concubine can be dismissed without scandal or another grave harm of reputation or fortune, or not. If the first, some apud St. Alphonsus affirm for the first or second time, provided he sincerely grieves and promises that he will cast her out; the reason is that the penitent is sufficiently disposed. Others altogether deny even for the first time, because he is in proximate occasion, and until he removes it, one cannot prudently be certain of his sufficient disposition. St. Alphonsus also affirms, but when it is morally impossible that the concubine can be dismissed shortly before absolution. "For otherwise absolution must always be deferred, because experience too clearly establishes that, once absolution has been obtained, the occasion is afterwards with difficulty removed, and thus one most easily returns to the vomit." L. 436 and l. 3, n. 682; Billuart, Diss. 6, art. 2, App. 2, You ask third. If the second, he certainly can be absolved, if he sincerely grieves and promises to apply the means which are suggested to him; but it is altogether expedient, says St. Alphonsus, "that absolution at least be deferred until the continence of the penitent is proved by experiment; unless the case were that the penitent (otherwise sufficiently disposed, as is supposed) could no longer return to confess sins; or if there were imminent necessity of communicating, for avoiding positive infamy." L. 435.

54. Corollaries. 1. In the article of death, "if the concubinage is occult, separation will not per se have to be urged under denial of absolution, on account of the scandal which would ordinarily follow if the concubine were dismissed in these circumstances. For thus the intercourse, which is occult, would be publicly manifested. But a promise must be obtained from the dying man of dismissing the maidservant if he recovers; and meanwhile care must be taken that there be at least separation from the dwelling, and that the maidservant not approach him except under urgent necessity." Gury-Dumas, Cas., t. 2, n. 724. - But there will be no further difficulty, whether the concubinage is occult or public, if, as can easily be done at present, marriage is legitimately celebrated.

2. Those who by occasion of exercising a lawful art are in the proximate occasion of sin, if they show signs of true penitence with a purpose of guarding against the occasion as much as they can, by applying due means, are not bound to abandon their art, which cannot be done without grave inconvenience. Hence surgeons are to be absolved who by healing women are in an occasion of sinning. The same must be said of a pastor who in hearing the confessions of women voluntarily pollutes himself. A woman also can be absolved who lives by lodging guests, and sins by occasion of lodging, and therefore falls with different persons, and also falls with some particular person, provided she proposes thereafter to avoid conversing alone with one alone. L. 438, 483; d. 6, n. 455. - "A maidservant vividly solicited by her master is bound to leave his house; for one who freely dwells where he is so dangerously enticed to evil cannot reasonably hope for victory over temptation, except by extraordinary helps of grace, which cannot be hoped for without temerity by him who can freely avoid danger and does not avoid it. Yet these things must be understood if a person of this kind is frail and little devout; for if she were devoted to piety, and cautious, and applied fitting remedies for repelling temptations and resisting passion, then I would not bind her to removing the occasion." L. ibid., 452.

55. Note. "Remedies for those who are found in the proximate occasion especially of base sin are greater prayer, more frequent use of the Sacraments, daily renewal before an image of the Crucified of the promise of sinning no more and of avoiding being alone with one alone, fleeing from the sight of the accomplice, and similar things." L., l. 6, n. 455, 464.

56. What are the penalties laid down by law against concubinaries?

R. As regards Italian and French Civil Law, there is no special penalty. As regards Canon Law, there are none latae sententiae; but all are ferendae sententiae, except suspension incurred ipso facto by bishops if, after they have been admonished by a Provincial Synod, they have not amended. Trent, sess. 24, c. 8, de Ref. Matr.; sess. 25, c. 14, de Reg.; Bouix, l. c., n. 44; L. 442; Billuart, Diss. 6, art. 2, You ask fifth.

242. • Dances or saltations, as they are commonly made, are full of danger and scandal, and entangle innumerable souls in the snares of the devil; and the holy Fathers unanimously inveigh against this kind of play. Yet not all dances equally carry the same evil or danger.

Principles. - I. Dances per se, even among persons of different sex, are not illicit, if they are done in an honorable manner, that is, with every impure touch, gesture, or act removed. The reason is, because dances per se are indifferent, nor are they prohibited by any law. - Thus commonly ¹⁷. - St. Lig. l. 3. n. 429.

¹⁷ Compare the doctrine of St. Thomas, which we brought forward above in the notes to n. 32. Q. 7.

II. Dances which are dishonorable by reason of nudities, the manner of dancing, words, gestures, songs, can be gravely illicit, as is clear. But among these many count the more recent dances, which in French are called la Walse, la Polka, le Galop, and others similar to these. But it will belong to the Confessor to judge concerning particular cases from the manner, circumstances, gravity of motive, etc.

III. In practice, generally any dances whatever among persons of different sex are to be impeded as much as can be done, because as they are usually held they are for the most part dangerous. Hence Pastors and Confessors ought to turn subjects and penitents away from them as much as can be done. - Thus commonly the Doctors of our age, and directors of souls.

243. Resolves. - 1º Those who are so infirm that they incur grave danger of sinning in dances ought to abstain from them under mortal sin; unless perhaps sometimes a certain necessity urges, and at least probably the danger of consent is absent.

2º To dance modestly or to be present at honorable dances from a certain necessity, or from the decency of one's state, without probable danger of sinning, is no sin; because there is given a sufficient reason for permitting the sins of others, if any there are. Hence girls destined for marriage are excused from sin by dancing becomingly, who cannot be absent from dances held in the paternal home, or among neighbors or relatives, or cannot refuse dancing, without being derided, or displeasing parents or suitors requiring them.

3º Indeed to be present at honorable dances, even without necessity, danger and notable scandal nevertheless being excluded, and in them to dance becomingly, is not only not mortal, but can also easily be free from every sin. For sometimes men, and not rarely women, are found to whom even in dances among persons of different sex, no danger or a very remote danger threatens. But these, although they are to be dissuaded from dances, nevertheless a promise of avoiding dances would imprudently be exacted from them under denial of absolution ¹⁸. - Bouvier.

¹⁸ In circumstances of this kind, not only imprudently, but also unjustly and therefore not without grave sin would absolution be denied; for absolution, when the penitent is present rightly disposed, is not an act of liberality, which the Confessor may either grant or refuse according to his whim.

419. Principles. - I. To speak, sing, write, or hear base things for the sake of venereal delight or with proximate danger of consent into it is a grave sin. But if wicked intention and danger of consent are absent, and at the same time a legitimate cause is present of uttering, writing, or hearing such things, there is no sin.

II. To read books altogether obscene without a just cause is a mortal sin, even if this seems to be done from curiosity or for the sake of recreation; because per se this reading very much provokes to lust. Except perhaps unless those reading, from curiosity alone, on account of advanced age and cold temperament or the custom of treating venereal matters, do not incur grave danger of lust. - St. Lig., n. 426.

III. To read amorous and lightly obscene books per se is not mortal, although in practice it is very dangerous especially for younger persons. But to read books in some measure obscene, otherwise treating of the sciences, from the sole view of science or one's own or another's utility, per se is not a sin, yet with danger of venereal consent removed, which otherwise in younger persons will rarely be absent.

420. Resolves. - 1. Generally they sin gravely who mix in conversations, even from levity, concerning the conjugal act, concerning things licit and illicit between spouses, concerning ways of impeding generation, of procuring pollution..., especially if this happens among young persons of different sex.

2. They sin gravely who utter even only base words, if they do this on account of delight taken from the very thought of base things. Nor are they excused from grave sin who, under the pretext of joking, express the same things on account of that delight by equivocal but sufficiently known words. - St. Lig., n. 426.

3. They also sin gravely who because of boastfulness narrate their own base sins, and indeed ordinarily in a threefold way: namely by the sin of complacency, of scandal, and of boastfulness concerning a sin committed.

4. It is not per se mortal to utter things indeed base, but not gravely obscene, if it is done briefly, through joke or vain solace, unless those hearing are so weak in spirit that they suffer grave scandal. Hence commonly base witticisms which are uttered by harvesters, grape-gatherers, muleteers are not grave, because ordinarily they are said and heard for mere joke. - St. Lig., n. 426.

5. Tender conversations with persons of a different sex are not always to be held as mortal sins, although they are full of dangers, especially if they are lengthy, often repeated, or happen in solitary places. - St. Lig., n. 422, 426. What therefore must be judged concerning loves, as they call them, especially among younger persons? - Not all indiscriminately are faults, mortal to be condemned; although often the proximate occasion of sinning lethally will with difficulty be absent, at least in the progress and when certain adjuncts approach, as if lovers meet wholly alone, especially for a longer time or at night, etc. - St. Lig., Praxis Conf., n. 63.

6. They do not sin gravely who from mere curiosity read witty books, because they do not gravely excite to lust, nor expose to great danger, such as many comedies or poems. - But if they do this on account of a legitimate cause, for example for learning or for acquiring eloquence, they do not sin in any way.

63. 2. Flight from occasions. Since many fall into shameful vices because of the occasions of sinning by which they are surrounded, a few things must be noted concerning these.

(A) First, idleness is to be diligently avoided, even and especially by those who are rich. For idleness has taught much malice, especially as regards vices of the flesh. When the mind is held by no useful occupation, shameful thoughts often arise, especially in the young, and carnal movements, from which danger of pollution is imminent.

This indeed is more proximate when someone lies long in a soft bed after he has already awakened: for then the warmth of the dorsal region excites the genitals, and therefore grave temptations. - Some drive away leisure by reading; but if amorous books are read, as often happens, the temptation increases. - Likewise let young persons flee solitude: for generally those who remain long alone, without assiduous work or study, indulge in the solitary vice.

Therefore all, whether poor or rich, girls as well as boys, ought energetically to devote themselves to some honorable occupation; even when they need rest, let them avoid idleness, and let them occupy their mind by some useful recreation, games, physical exercise, and other ways.¹

¹ Concerning girls who remain idle, Payot writes, Education de la volonte, p. 198: "A more serious thing, the absolute idleness in which they pass the years which follow their leaving school, the excellent nourishment which they receive, the absence of all fatigue, the exciting evenings to which they are taken, the opera, the reading of sentimental novels which is permitted to them and which the fashion or young ladies' journals serve them - this complex of causes makes it impossible that their imagination not be perverted. People do not know how terrible are the hidden sufferings of idle young girls."

64. (B) Gluttony also, as the mother of luxury, is altogether to be moderated; for by abundant use of meats and wine, by frequent and sumptuous banquets and feasts, concupiscence blazes up. Many remain chaste as long as they are sober; but as soon as they indulge in banquets, and especially in wine and alcoholic liquors, they miserably slide into vices of the flesh. In reality sensuality and pleasure are akin; moreover, from abundant food and drink the mind is weighed down and begins to think about carnal things; soon concupiscence blazes up, the genitals are excited, and venereal delectation is ardently sought. Wherefore St. Paul says:² "Be not drunk with wine, wherein is luxury." - Concerning the means of overcoming gluttony and drunkenness, however, it was said above, nn. 540, 552.

² Eph. 5:18.

65. (C) Vain and unlawful loves are likewise to be fled, which do not tend to chaste matrimony.

Chaste love, which is ordered to honorable marriage, is by no means prohibited, provided it stands within the limits of pudicity; indeed it is often joined to carnal love, which is very dangerous; and therefore future spouses ought to take care lest, conquered by lust, they proceed further in this matter, as was said in the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 162. Nay more, since matrimony, instituted chiefly for the creation of offspring, is also a remedy of concupiscence, chaste love is to be fostered among persons able to marry, at the time when they seriously wish and are able to marry. But where there is no hope of legitimate matrimony, carnal love must be diligently avoided, for it tends to nothing else than copulation. Certain persons are deceived, thinking that there is no evil in tender love toward persons of the other sex. Concerning these friendships St. Francis writes:¹ "All these friendships are evil, foolish, and vain: evil indeed, because at last they end in carnal sin, and they steal away the love owed to God, to a wife, or to a husband; foolish, because they rest on no solid foundation or reason; vain finally, because no advantage, honor, or true delectation follows from them. On the contrary, they cause a notable loss of time, and bring a stain upon honor." Loves of this sort are the cause of almost innumerable sins, because they fill the mind with impure thoughts and desires. Often also they end in shameful concubinage, especially in cities, both among workmen and among young men who study in the Universities.² Not rarely even Christian parents tacitly approve or easily tolerate this manner of acting, and mothers do not hesitate to hand innocent girls over to impure men. These morals are truly pagan, and unless Catholics reprove and strive to change them, not only by words, but by examples, at length someday they will pay the penalties of their sins.

¹ St. Francis de Sales, Introduction, P. III, c. 18.

² Payot describes the miserable state of young men who give themselves to mistresses, op. cit., pp. 217-220; likewise he suggests natural means for avoiding these loves, p. 215: "One must avoid the reading of novels, and especially of indecent books or journals. There is such a page of Diderot which is equivalent to the absorption of a violently aphrodisiac substance. One must avoid the sight of obscene engravings, still more dangerous for the calm of the mind than descriptions. One must avoid the company of libidinous companions; one must foresee occasions down to the small details, never allow oneself to be surprised by temptation. At the beginning it is a simple thought, still without strength, which insinuates itself. If at this moment one is on guard, nothing is easier than to drive away the importunate thing. But if one lets the images become precise, if one takes pleasure in evoking them and complacently dwells upon them, it is too late. This is why the sovereign remedy is the work of the mind. When thought is strongly occupied, the timid solicitations of passion are stopped, powerless, at the threshold of consciousness." To these, however, must be joined the supernatural means explained below.

66. Sometimes also among persons of the same sex truly sensual friendships are formed, which are full of dangers. True and supernatural friendship, by which we love certain persons before others, so that we may do good to them and receive help from them, is certainly legitimate; but when it is sensual, and seeks sensual embraces, it preoccupies the mind with vain thoughts, and excites depraved movements; it easily becomes carnal and soon tends to lust: therefore this must be diligently fled. Likewise it must be noted that from spiritual love there is an easy passage to sensual love, and afterward to carnal love, especially among persons of different sex.

There are other occasions to be avoided, such as shameful readings, depraved conversations, spectacles, dances less honorable: but concerning these it was already said above.

The cause of personal sin (causa deficiens),¹ as we have seen, is free-will. "If any one saith," defines the Tridentine Council, "that it is not in man's power to make his ways evil, but that the works that are evil God worketh as well as those that are good, not permissibly only, but properly and of Himself, in such wise that the treason of Judas is no less His own proper work than the vocation of Paul; let him be anathema."² —"Man's will alone/' says St. Thomas, "is directly the cause of his sin."³ And St. Augustine:

¹ Cfr. St. Augustine, De Civit. Dei, XII, c. 7: "Let no one seek an efficient cause of an evil will; for it is not efficient but deficient, because that is not an effecting but a defecting. For to fall away from that which supremely is toward that which is less is to begin to have an evil will." (Migne, P. L., XLI, 355).

² Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 6: "If anyone says that it is not in man’s power to make his ways evil, but that God works evil works as well as good, not merely permissively but also properly and of Himself, so that the treason of Judas is no less His own work than the vocation of Paul, let him be anathema."

³ Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 80, art. 1: "A man’s will alone is directly the cause of his sin." —Cfr. De Malo, qu. 3, art. 3: "An act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination of the will toward what is willed, just as natural appetite is nothing other than an inclination of nature toward something. The inclination of nature is both from the natural form and from Him who gave the form; hence the upward motion of fire is said to be from its lightness and from the generator that produced such a form. Thus the motion of the will proceeds directly from the will and from God, who is the cause of the will, who alone works in the will and can incline it to whatever He wills. But God is not the cause of sin. It remains, therefore, that nothing other than the will is the direct cause of human sin."

"It is written into every heart by the hand of God that sin is impossible without the cooperation of the will." ⁴ The will can excite concupiscence and proceed from desire to act, thus producing sin, as it were, out of itself. The will may also be seduced by outside influences (causae occasionales). Of these there are chiefly two, viz.: temptation and occasion.

⁴ De Duab. Anim. c. Manich., c. n, n. 15: "Every mind reads within itself, divinely inscribed, that sin cannot exist without the will." (Migne, P. L., XLII, 105.)

I. TEMPTATIONS. —Temptation, broadly speaking, is a testing or trial of the will. Defined more narrowly, it is a direct incitement to evil which stirs up concupiscence and thereby causes a struggle between the good and the evil forces of nature.

A temptation may be either internal or external, and it may proceed from God (tentatio probationis), or from the devil, or from the world, or from concupiscence.⁵ i. Christ exhorts all men to pray, "Lead us not into temptation." ⁶ St. Paul says that God suffers all to be tempted.⁷ Hence there are temptations that come from God. Not, of course, as if God seduced His creatures to sin. "Let no man, when he is tempted, say that he is tempted by God, for God is not a tempter of evils, and he tempteth no man." ⁸ "When He 'tempts' a man/' says Dr. Pohle, "He simply 'tries his faith/ as in the case of Adam and Abraham; which is quite compatible with His infinite holiness." ⁹ God tries man's faith, not merely in a passive manner, by allowing him to be tempted, but sometimes actively, by sending him trials and worries which may become a source of temptation and thereby a means of probing his character. But St. Paul tells us that God never allows man to be tempted beyond his strength.¹⁰ And St. James assures us: "Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life which God hath promised to them that love him.”¹¹ Hence Au- gustine's exhortation: "It is not good for us to be without temptations, nor should we ask God that we be not tempted, but rather that we be not led into temptation." ¹² 2. THE DEVIL. —Sin originated with the Devil. He “sinneth from the beginning.”¹³ He is "the prince," ¹⁴ " the god of this world,"¹⁵ a murderer and a liar,¹⁶ "the tempter" par excellence,¹⁷ who seduced our first parents,¹⁸ and tempted Job,¹⁹ Ananias and Saphira,²⁰ Judas,²¹ nay our Lord Jesus Christ Himself.²² The Apostles repeatedly warn the faithful against this sinister foe, who is the more dangerous because, according to St. Paul, he transforms himself into an angel of light.²³ In view of the plain scriptural teaching on the subject no Christian needs to be assured that belief in the evil one is not a "remnant of medieval superstition," or that the Devil is not merely a "symbol of evil." ²⁴ On the other hand, we must not lose sight of the fact that Satan is a creature dependent upon God and limited in power. He is a dangerous tempter, but he can compel no man to do wrong. His power amounts to nothing unless he can get man to consent to his evil suggestions. "It is our will, not his power that delivers us into his hands/' says St. Bernard.²⁵ "However great the power and pertinacity of Satan," says the Roman Catechism, "he cannot, in his deadly hatred of our race, tempt or torment us as much or as long as he pleases; but all his power is governed by the control and permission of God." ²⁶ There is an apt comparison of the devil to a chained dog in a sermon attributed to St. Augustine. ²⁷

⁵ Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 13: "The struggle that remains is with the flesh, with the world, and with the devil." — Cfr. St. Augustine, Serm., 344 (a/. 31), n. 1: "This contest is set before us: this struggle with the flesh, this struggle with the devil, this struggle with the world." (P. L., XXXIX, 1512).

⁶ Matth. VI, 13.

⁷ 1 Cor. X, 13. —Cfr. Gen. XXII, 1; Deut. XIII, 3; Tob. XII, 13.

⁸ Jas. I, 13: "God is not a tempter of evils, and He Himself tempts no one."

⁹ Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, 2nd ed., St. Louis 1916, p. 345.

¹⁰ 1 Cor. X, 13.

¹¹ Jas. I, 12. —St. Ambrose, De Abraham, 1. i, c. 8, n. 66: "God tempts in one way, the devil in another. The devil tempts in order to overthrow; God tempts in order to crown. Indeed, He tempts those whom He has approved for Himself. Hence David also says: Prove me, O God, and try me. And He first approved holy Abraham and then tempted him, lest, if He tempted him before approving him, He should burden him. For God did not will the son to be sacrificed by his father, nor did He will this duty to be fulfilled, for He offered a ram to be sacrificed in place of the son; but He tested the father’s affection, whether he would prefer God’s precepts to his son and would not bend the force of devotion through consideration of paternal affection." (Migne;, P. L., XIV, 445). —IDEM, ibid., n. 76: "I inquired into your affection; I did not exact the deed. I tested your mind, whether for My sake you would not spare even your dearest son. I do not take away what I Myself gave, nor do I begrudge the heir whom I bestowed upon one who had none." (P. L., XIV, 448).—Epist., 51, n. 11: “You are a man, and temptation comes to you; overcome it.” (P. L., XVI, 1162). Expos. Evang. sec. Luc., 1. 4. n. 41: "He who wishes to give a crown proposes trials. And if ever you are tempted, know that a crown is being prepared. Take away the martyrs’ struggles, and you have taken away their crowns; take away their torments, and you have taken away their beatitudes." (P. L., XV, 1625).

¹² Enarr. in Ps., 63, n. 1: "It is not expedient for us to be without temptations, nor should we ask God that we not be tempted, but that we not be led into temptation." (P. L., XXXVI, 761).

¹³ 1 John III, 8.

¹⁴ John XIV, 30.

¹⁵ 2 Cor. XI, 3; John XII, 31.

¹⁶ Gen. III, 1-6.

¹⁷ Matth. IV, 3.

¹⁸ John VIII, 44.

¹⁹ Job I, 12.

²⁰ Acts III, 5.

²¹ Luke XXII, 31; John XIII, 2.

²² 2 Cor. XI, 3.

²³ 1 Cor. VII, 5. Cfr. 2 Cor. XI, 14; Eph. VI, 11-17; 1 Pet. V, 8-9.

²⁴ Cfr. M. Hagen, S.J., Der Teufel $m Lichte der Glaubensquellen, Freiburg 1899.—Th. H. Simar, Die Theologie des hl. Paulut, and ed., pp. 67 sqq.; J. G. Raupert, Hell and its Problems, pp. 82 iqq.

²⁵ De Gratia et Lib. Arbitrio, 6, n. 18: "Our will, not the devil’s power, delivers us into bondage to him." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, ion).— Cfr. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 63, n. 1: "The devil is indeed bound so that he may not do as much as he can or as much as he wishes; nevertheless he is permitted to tempt only so much as is expedient for those making progress." (P. L., XXXVI, 761). —IDEM, ibid., 103, s. 3, n. 22: "No one can be tempted by the devil unless God permits it, either for condemning the wicked or for proving the devout." (P. L., XXXVII, 1375).— St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 80, art. 3: "The devil by his own power, unless restrained by God, can compel a man to perform an act which in its kind is a sin; but he cannot impose the necessity of sinning. This is evident because man resists an inducement to sin only through reason, the use of which the devil can totally impede by moving the imagination and sensitive appetite, as is evident in those who are possessed. But when reason is thus bound, whatever a man does is not imputed to him as sin. If reason is not totally bound, however, insofar as it is free it can resist sin. Hence it is manifest that the devil can in no way impose the necessity of sinning."

²⁶ Catech. Rom., P. 4, c. 15, qu. 8: "Even with such power and persistence, and with mortal hatred of our race, Satan can tempt or vex us neither as much nor as long as he wishes; rather, all his power is governed by God’s will and permission." —Cfr. J. Wirtz, Die Lehre von der Apolytro* sis, Treves 1906, pp. 31 sqq.

²⁷ Cfr. Pseudo-Augustine, Append. Serm., 37 (al. 197 de tempore), n. 6: "He is bound like a dog fastened with chains and can bite no one except him who joins himself to him in deadly security. Now see, brethren, how foolish is the man whom a dog placed on a chain bites. Do not join yourself to him through the wills and desires of the world, and he will not presume to approach you. He can bark and harass; he cannot bite anyone except one who wills it. For he harms not by compelling but by persuading, and he does not extort our consent but asks for it."—The last sentence is taken from the Epistula Pelagii ad Demetriadem, c. 25 (ibid., XXXIII, 1117).—Cfr. Brev. Rom., Dom. IV post Pent., Lect. II Noct.

As regards the manner in which the devil proceeds, note that he is himself a creature, and therefore cannot read the souls of men, but judges their state by the natural manifestations of their thoughts and purposes.²⁸ Nor can he exercise a direct influence upon the human will. His methods are necessarily indirect and circuitous, though for that reason no less effective. He works upon the imagination, blindfolds reason, stirs up the passions, etc. "The devil," says St. Thomas, is a cause of sin, not directly or sufficiently, but only by persuasion, or by proposing the object of appetite."²⁹ He is "the enemy" who came and "sowed cockle among the wheat while men were asleep."³⁰ While it must be admitted that the devil, "the prince of this world," has a share in every sin, it would be wrong to assume that all temptations come from him. Sacred Scripture points to concupiscence as the principal source of sin. "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence."³¹ The fact that sin is often inspired by the devil, does not, of course, render it less culpable. Not to speak of concupiscence, which exercises a powerful influence over every human heart, man himself is but too often the tempter and seducer of his fellowmen.³²

²⁸ Cfr. St. Jerome, In Ps., 6, 20: "The devil does not know inwardly in the soul what a man thinks unless he understands it through outward movements."

²⁹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 80, art. 1: “The devil is not the cause of sin directly or sufficiently, but only by way of persuading or proposing something desirable. Since the human will is moved necessarily by no object, but by itself, the devil is not in himself the cause of sin, but only by way of persuading or proposing a desirable object. Although the devil, according to the condition of his nature, could persuade something by illuminating a person’s intellect, as a good angel does, he nevertheless does not do this, because the more the intellect is illuminated, the more it can guard itself against the deception which the devil intends. Hence it follows that the devil’s inward persuasion and any revelation by him do not occur through illumination of the intellect, but only through a certain impression upon the interior or exterior sensitive powers. By way of disposing, however, he can be a cause of sin insofar as by moving the spirits and humors he makes some persons more disposed to anger, concupiscence, or something of this kind. For it is manifest that when the body is disposed in a certain way, man is more prone to concupiscence, anger, and passions of this kind; and when these arise, man is disposed toward consent. Thus it is evident that the devil inwardly incites to sin by persuading and disposing, but not by completing the sin.”

³⁰ Matth. XIII, 25. —On the temptation of Job St. Ambrose remarks: "The woman, the enticement of the first deceit, is employed; friends are employed to overcome the one who resists by wicked counsels." (Expos. Evang. sec. Luc., IV, n. 39; Migne, P. L., XV, 1624).

³¹ Jas, I, 14 sa; cfr, Rom. VII, 20; Gal. V, 17.

³² Cfr. the Catechism of the Council of Trent, P. IV, c. 15, qu. 10.

3. THE WORLD. —"This present wicked world,"³³ which is full of sin and impiety,³⁴ and hates God and His servants,³⁵ is another prolific source of sin. The term world, as used in the Scriptures, denotes either the physical universe or the human race. In the former sense, i. e., as the aggregate of material things, "the world" deceives and lures man away from His Creator. Taken in the latter sense, i. e., as humanity, especially in the state of original sin and estranged from the true Church, "the world" is full of direct and indirect temptations —seduction, denial of truth, scandal, heresies and perverted ideals, a corrupt civilization, a mendacious press, debased arts, etc. This sad state of affairs accounts for St. John's warning: "Love not the world, nor the things which are in the world; if any man love the world, the charity of the Father is not in him." ³⁶ 4. CONCUPISCENCE. —Concupiscence is the inordinate leaning of human nature towards evil. It results from the fall of our first parents ³⁷ and is the most prolific source of temptations. St. James says: "Every man is tempted by his own concupiscence, being drawn away and allured. Then when concupiscence hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin. But sin, when it is completed, begetteth death." ³⁸ Concupiscence manifests itself through the eyes and the flesh, and also in the form of pride. Though not a sin in itself, it is "of sin and inclines to sin." ³⁹ It is "an incentive" to sin, and becomes sinful only when freely consented to.⁴⁰

³³ Gal. I, 4.

³⁴ John VII, 7; XIV, 17.

³⁵ John XV, 18 sq.; XVI, 20, 33; XVII, 9, 14, 25. —Cfr. Simar, Die Theologie des hl. Paulus, 2nd ed., pp. 72 sqq.; Tillmann, Die Wiederkunft Christi, Freiburg 1909, pp. 25 sqq.

³⁶ 1 John II, 15; cfr. Matth. XVIII, 7; Rom. XII, 2; Col. III, 2. —St. Augustine, Serm., 80 (a/. 23 de Divers.), n. 8: "The world is evil; behold, it is evil and yet is loved as though it were good. But what is the evil world? Heaven and earth and the waters and the things in them—fish, birds, and trees—are not evil. All these things are good, but evil men make the world evil." (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 498).

³⁷ Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God the Author of Nature and the Supernatural, pp. 203, 217.

³⁸ Jas. I, 14-15; cfr. Jas. IV, 1; Gen. II, 6; IV, 7. —Supra, Vol. I, pp. 116 sqq.

³⁹ Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 5. —Cfr. 1 John II, 16; Rom. XIII, 23. —Prop. Damnat. Baii, n. 50 sq., 74-76 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1050 sq., 1073 sqq.). —Denifle, Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 438 sqq.

⁴⁰ Conc. Trident., Sess. V, can. 5.

Concupiscence is in all human beings (with the exception of the Blessed Virgin Mary,⁴¹41), but manifests itself differently,⁴² according to temperament, age, sex, disposition, heredity, education, training, association, manner of life, and other factors. Every man has his own temptations according to his peculiar constitution of body and soul. But each also has his own means of fighting temptation. Hence, while no man is free from concupiscence and temptation, no one is tempted beyond his strength. Every man is able, with the aid of grace, to overcome temptations. Nay, more, he can and should convert them into means of spiritual progress. "Blessed is the man that endureth temptation; for when he hath been proved, he shall receive the crown of life, which God hath promised to them that love him." ⁴³ Temptation, therefore, is designed to test and steel the character.⁴⁴

⁴¹ Pius IX, Bull "Ineffab. Deus" (Dec. 13, 1854).—St. Augustine, De Nat. et Grat., c. 36, n. 42: "Excepting the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom, for the honor of the Lord, I wish no question whatever to be raised when sins are being discussed." (Migne, P. L., XLIV, 267). Cfr. Pohle- Preuss, Mariology, pp. 72 sqq.

⁴² Cfr. St. Ambrose, Expos, in Evang. sec. Luc., IV, n. 39: "The very diversity of temptations corresponds to the diversity of those who contend." (Migne, P. L., XV, 1624).—Cfr. Pius IX, Bull "Ineffabilis Deus."

⁴³ Jas. I, 12; cfr. Gen. IV, 7; Cor. X, 13; Heb. II, 18; 1 Pet. V, 9.

⁴⁴ Cfr. H'ense, Die Versuchungen, 3rd ed., pp. 114 sqq.

Christ allowed the devil to tempt Him in order to show by His example how temptation should be withstood. Moreover, He expressly designated the most effective means of combatting it, viz.: watchfulness and prayer,⁴⁵ the practice of the theological virtues, conscientious fidelity to duty, faithful perseverance in one's vocation, mortification, in short, imitating Him in all things. "If any man will come after me," He says, "let him deny himself, take up his cross, and follow me." ⁴⁶ In many temptations, especially those against chastity, salvation lies in flight.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Matth. XXVI, 41.—Cfr. St. Ambrose, De Cain et Abel, 1. i, c. 5, n. 16: "The Lord Jesus has certainly taught you how to resist temptations of this kind." (Migne, P. L., XIV, 325)-—IDEM, Expos. Evang. sec. Lucam, IV, n. 17: "We are taught that there are especially three weapons of the devil with which he is accustomed to arm himself to wound the mind of man: one of gluttony, another of vainglory, a third of ambition. He began from the point where he had already conquered. And therefore in Christ I begin to conquer from the point where I was conquered in Adam, provided that Christ is for me the image of the Father and an example of virtue. Let us therefore learn to beware of gluttony and to beware of lust, because it is a weapon of the devil. You have learned the devil’s weapon; take up the shield of faith and the breastplate of abstinence." (P. L., XV, 1617).

⁴⁶ Matth. XVI, 24; cfr. Luke XIV, 27; 1 Cor. IX, 27.

⁴⁷ Cfr. Gen. XXXIX, 12; 1 Cor. VI, 18; Pseudo-Augustine, Append. Serm. 293 (a/. 250 de Temp.), n. 1: "Against the assault of lust take hold of flight, if you wish to obtain victory." (P. L., XXXIX, 2301).— Cfr. Homer's Odyssey, XII, 120.

"Brethren," admonishes St. Paul, "be strong in the Lord and in the might of his power. Put ye on the full armor of God, that ye may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil. For our wrestling is not against flesh and blood, but against principalities and powers, against the rulers of this world of darkness, against the spirits of wickedness in regions above. Therefore take ye up the full armor of God, that ye may be able to resist in the evil day, and to stand in all things perfect. Stand, therefore, with your loins girt about with truth, and having on the breastplate of justice, and your feet shod with the preparation [to carry] the gospel of peace: taking up withal the shield of faith, wherewith ye shall be able to extinguish all the fiery darts of the evil one. And take unto you the helmet of salvation, and the sword of the Spirit (which is the word of God). With all prayer and supplication pray at all times in the spirit ; and in the same watching with all instance and supplication..." ⁴⁸ " When you are tempted," says the Venerable Don Bosco, "shake off the thought of evil and do not wait until temptation has gained possession of your heart, but ward it off by work or prayer."

⁴⁸ Eph. VI, 10-18.—Cfr. St. Au- in gustine, Enarr. in Ps., 136, n. 22: XXXVII, "If you wish to be armed against temptations in the world, let desire for the eternal Jerusalem grow and be strengthened in your hearts." (P. L., 1774).

II. OCCASIONS OF SIN. —An occasion is an external circumstance which leads one to commit sin. An occasion, therefore, is not a temptation; but it may become a temptation by causing evil thoughts to arise in the mind and thus inciting concupiscence. However, not every occasion necessarily entails temptation, and many temptations arise without any external incitement whatever. It is important for the confessor to keep this fact in mind, because habitual and occasional sinners must be treated differently.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ Cfr. Pighi, De ludicio Sacrapp. 39 sqq., 59 sqq.; E. Be- De Recidivis et Occasionariis, 3rd ed., Faventiae 1882; Aertnys, C.SS.R., Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 7th ed., pp. 192 sqq.; Reuter-Lehmkuhl, S.J., Neo-Confessarius, pp. 274 sqq.

Occasions, like temptations, are an indispensable test of virtue. "Who hath been tried... and made perfect," says Holy Scripture, "he shall have glory everlasting: he that could have transgressed and could do evil things, and hath not done them." ⁵⁰ i. All men are in duty bound to avoid, or, if they cannot avoid, to overcome or resist the occasions of sin.⁵¹ To determine this duty more definitely, the Scholastics have evolved the following distinctions:

⁵⁰ Ecclus. XXXI, 10; cfr. 1 Cor. V, 10.

⁵¹ Ecclus. III, 27; XXXI, 10; Matth. V, 29-30; Mark IX, 41-46.

a) PROXIMATE AND REMOTE OCCASIONS. —An occasion is proximate (occasio proximo) if it leads a person to commit sin oftener than not. It is remote (occasio remota) if it leads to the commission of sin only once in a while.

A proximate occasion of sin may be either absolute or relative. It is absolute or proximate in itself (occasio absolute sive per se proximo) if it constitutes a danger for every man and in all circumstances. It is relative (occasio per accidens sive relative proximo) if the danger it involves differs according to individual character or disposition. Relatively proximate occasions are, e. g., strong drink, the theatre, a certain class of books, plays, etc.

b) VOLUNTARY AND NECESSARY OCCASIONS. — An occasion is voluntary (occasio voluntaria) if sought or wilfully persisted in after one has gotten into it involuntarily. A necessary occasion (occasio necessaria) is one that can be avoided only by the use of extraordinary diligence or not at all. In the latter case it is called physically necessary (occasio physice necessaria). Such temptations may grow out of the mutual intercourse of parents and children, married persons, soldiers, prisoners, etc. If it is more difficult to avoid an occasion than to keep from sinning by the use of proper precautions, an occasion is called morally necessary (occasio moraliter necessaria). Occasions of this kind cannot, as a rule, be avoided without great inconvenience or injury. They invariably involve a grave conflict of duties.⁵² On the one side there is the duty of avoiding the proximate occasion of sin; on the other are such unavoidable professional obligations as, e. g., hearing confession, practicing medicine, etc.

⁵² See Vol. I, pp. 211 sqq.

Hence the further distinction between occasio quae est in esse and occasio quae non est in esse. Occasions of the former class entail immediate danger of sin, whereas those of the latter leave an opportunity of escaping the danger. As an example of the former kind we may mention a woman being an inmate of a brothel.⁵³

⁵³ Cfr. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 50, n. 3: “Mulier longe, libido prope. Alibi erat quod [David] videret, in illo unde caderet." (P. L., XXXVI, 587)-

2. PRACTICAL HINTS. —As a general rule it is forbidden to seek an occasion of sin, even though it be only remote, for "He that loveth danger shall perish in it." ⁵⁴ On the other hand no man is bound to avoid all remote occasions, for this is impossible.⁵⁵ But every man is strictly bound: a) To avoid all proximate and voluntary occasions of (grievous) sin, and also those morally necessary occasions that entail immediate danger (occasiones in esse).⁵⁶°° It is a mortal sin to expose oneself voluntarily and without necessity to the danger of committing a mortal sin or to remain inactive towards such danger in a case of necessity, even though the sin be not committed, for to remain voluntarily in the proximate occasion of sin is deliberately to choose evil. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that it is licit to absolve a man who remains in the proximate occasion of mortal sin, though able to get away from it.⁵⁷ b) If a man finds himself in a morally neces- sary proximate occasion of sin, which does not involve immediate danger (quae non est in esse), he is in duty bound to convert the same into a remote occasion by fervent prayer, devout reception of the Sacraments, frequent renewal of the firm purpose of not consenting to sin, and especially by avoiding the company of those with whom he has sinned before or of whom he has reason to apprehend that they will tempt him. Should these means prove ineffective, all other considerations must be set aside and the occasion strictly shunned, even at the risk of life. c) A physically necessary occasion which cannot be gotten away from, must be neutralized by the use of extreme caution and other available means. If a man is a proximate occasion of sin to himself, he should mortify his body and try to the best of his power to control his passions. "I chastise my body/' says St. Paul, "and bring it into subjection, lest perhaps, when I have preached to others, I myself should become a castaway."⁵⁸ A warning example to all is Peter' s denial of Christ.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Ecclus. III, 27.

⁵⁵ Cfr. 1 Cor. V, 9-10; John XVII, 15.

⁵⁶ Cfr. Prov. VI, 27-28; XVIII, 6-10; Matth, V, 29-30; Mark IX, 41-46.

⁵⁷ Prop. Dainnat. sub Innocentio XI, n. 61: "One who remains in a proximate occasion of sin which he can but does not wish to abandon may sometimes be absolved, even though he directly and deliberately seeks it or thrusts himself into it." No. 62: "A proximate occasion of sin need not be fled when some useful or honorable reason for not fleeing it occurs." No. 63: "It is lawful directly to seek a proximate occasion of sin for our own or our neighbor’s spiritual or temporal good." (Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion, n. 1078-1080).

⁵⁸ 1 Cor. IX, 27.

⁵⁹ Matth. XXVI, 69 sqq.

READINGS. —F. Hense, Die Versuchungen und ihre Gegenmittel, 3rd ed., Freiburg 1902. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. II, pp. 220 sq. —St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a, qu. 114, art. 1-5. —Th. H. Simar, Die Theologie des hl. Paulus, 2nd ed., pp. 67 sqq. —M. Hagen, S J., Der Teufel im Lichte der Glaubensquellen, Freiburg 1899.—W. H. Kent, art. "Devil" in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. IV, pp. 766 sq.—J. J. Ming, S.J., art. "Concupiscence," ibid., Vol. IV, p. 208. —J. F. Delany, art. "Temptation," ibid., Vol. XIV, p. 504. —IDEM, art. "Occasions of Sin," ibid., Vol. XI, pp. 196 sq. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Past., Vol. II, pp. 248 sqq. —H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 322 sqq., 360 sqq. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 11th ed., pp. 358 sqq., 364 sqq. —Sabetti-Barrett, S. J., Comp. Theol. Mor., 22nd ed., pp. 751 sq. —A. Konings, CSS.R., Theol. Mor., 2nd ed., New York, 1876, Vol. II, pp. 161 sqq. —St. Francis de Sales, Introduction a la Vie Devote, Part II, Ch. 18, Part IV, Ch. 3-6.—A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 403 sqq.—F. Ter Haar, CSS.R., De Occasionariis et Recidivis, Turin 1927.

The usefulness of this title, in which we treat of the proximate and remote occasion of sinning, is very great in the use, both active and passive, of the sacrament of penance, so much so that not a few writers defer the question of the occasion of sin to the treatise on the sacrament of penance. Yet it is a general question, whose proper place is here. Nor can moral solutions be understood unless you know the reason and measure of the obligation of fleeing sins and their dangers.

— The obligation of fleeing sins. 1. The negative part of Christian justice: turn away from evil, obliges us to abhor moral evil with the hatred of which it is worthy, that is, with supreme or absolute hatred. Violation of this obligation, according to the gravity of that moral evil, will be mortal or venial.

Nor can we today, when so many men and philosophers deny absolute moral obligations, indeed so easily prefer human advantages, whether their own or common, to moral duties, insist enough on this severity of true religion, and make this persuasion familiar to the faithful: that the laws of morals, like the laws of faith, must be honored with the fortitude of martyrs.

But moral evil properly such is nothing except formal sin. For moral evil is the evil of the will, which by choosing evil becomes itself evil. But material sin is not imputed to the will. Therefore it is not an evil of the will, nor therefore true moral evil.

2. And so that obligation, as we warned in the treatise on conscience, cannot be transferred to material sin. Otherwise absolute rigorism would have to be professed, nor could we reprove the condemned proposition: "It is not lawful to follow an opinion (probable) or, among probable opinions, the most probable" ¹. But the reason of the diverse rule is easily given, because the evil (not moral) of a particular law not observed is compensated by the good of human action not too much impeded, which, as we have explained before, being loosed from the particular law, is always held by the general norms of honorable action.

And so the obligation of fleeing material sin is converted into the positive obligation of taking care for the observance of the law in a human manner. That necessary diligence varies according to the moment of the law and the capacity of the subject. Lugo discusses the evil of material sin, Paen. d. 16, n. 389.

There remains the question of the obligation of fleeing the danger of consent into sin, or rather the temptation of sin, that is, the question concerning the occasion of sin to be fled.

¹ Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII through decree of the Holy Office, 7 Dec. 1690, n. 3. (Denz. 1293).

— The obligation of fleeing the occasion of sin. In order we shall set forth: I. Received judgments with notions; II. The cause of the obligation with our conclusion; III. Various corollaries; IV. The rule of perfection.

I. Notions and received judgments. 1. Notion. The occasion of sin is an exterior circumstance for a man which induces the danger of sinning. And so under this name there does not properly come the danger which a man can find in his nature, in his fragility, in his passions, in an interior act, although the norms concerning fleeing the occasion must altogether be transferred to certain interior acts. Thus he who knows that he is certainly drawn by a certain kind of phantasms to taking illicit pleasure is prohibited, because of that danger, from deliberately turning over those phantasms.

2. Divisions. a) The occasion is further divided into proximate and remote. But writers do not plainly agree concerning the notion of proximate occasion. Cf. Ballerini, V, n. 105.

From Lugo, Paenit. (1): "They call it proximate when it is such from its kind that it frequently induces men of like condition to mortal sin, or experience shows that in this man it has such an effect." Suarez has almost the same thing word for word (2). And, giving the reason of the notion, Lugo adds: "It must be said that an occasion is not called proximate because nothing mediates between it and actual sin, but because nothing mediates between it and the moral certainty of future sin" (d. 14, n. 164).

At n. 149 he thinks the definition must be moderated which some ascribe to St. Gregory because of c. 7, De Paenitentia, Dist. 5: that the proximate occasion is one "which we cannot, or certainly cannot without difficulty, use without sin." For then military service and business would have to be abandoned. "Others therefore add," so Lugo himself proceeds, "that an occasion is proximate which a man never or almost never uses, with the circumstances considered, without a new sin, as one who keeps a concubine."

This latter definition does not please St. Alphonsus (3), and he prefers to it this other one: that a proximate occasion per se (or with respect to men in general) is that in which men commonly for the most part sin. But immediately he calls a proximate occasion per accidens or respectively one in which someone, "although not almost always, nor more frequently, nevertheless has frequently fallen; or because, with his past fragility considered, his fall is prudently feared. For, as we have said, to constitute a proximate occasion, it suffices that a man frequently fall in it." St. Alphonsus therefore describes the proximate occasion special to certain persons more severely than the general proximate occasion. Ballerini abstains from giving his own definition.

d'Annibale (1) reports this mathematical estimate from Gobat: if from ten occasions, seven or more have induced sin. Lehmkuhl (2) says that a proximate occasion is one which brings a grave and instant danger of falling; which is gathered either from sad experience, if a man, "when he was living in those circumstances, more frequently or at least rather frequently sinned in fact: but if he sinned notably more rarely than he remained victor, the occasion cannot be called proximate from the experience of falls"; or from a vehement temptation to which a man is exposed in those circumstances. Genicot (3) approves this definition: "one in which a man always or at least altogether more frequently sins. Whence, also for the future, sin is morally certain or at least very probable." What a proximate occasion is for us will appear after the conclusion.

b) An occasion is called present, continuous, or in being, which is accustomed to surround someone, for example in his own house, in the place to which he goes daily for business; or disjoined, not continuous, not in being, which, at separated intervals, either offers itself or is sought: for example, by visiting an inn. The former is removed, repelled; the latter rather is declined by abstaining, by not seeking;

c) Free is that which a man can abandon without great inconvenience: scandal, infamy, grave detriment. Necessary is that which cannot be left either simply or without great difficulty; whence this can be either physically or morally necessary.

And observe that an occasion can be necessary which at first sight you would have called free. Thus one sinning with a maidservant, or in a workshop, who can dismiss the maidservant or leave the workshop, nevertheless is living in a necessary occasion, if the temptation flows not from such a maidservant or such a workshop, but from a maidservant or workshop as such, and the sinner morally cannot lack every maidservant or workshop. Cf. Lugo, d. 14, n. 150; d. 15, n. 50;

d) It is called absolutely proximate or remote when attention is paid to the common reason of men of such condition and age; relatively such when attention is paid to the peculiar fragility or firmness of some person.

e) An occasion can be proximate in individual meetings, or become so because of frequency, as not rarely happens to betrothed persons;

f) An occasion can be of various sins or of one definite sin (Lugo, Paenit. d. 14, n. 163, 164).

3. Flight from a proximate occasion is of a twofold kind: one material, when the thing or person which is the occasion is removed or is not approached; the other formal, when, whether by caution employed or by the will strengthened, the force of the temptation is diminished enough that it can be said to have been converted from proximate into remote.

The means to be employed, concerning which there will be speech in the treatise on Penance, return to this: that the hostile attack be weakened, or that the defensive powers be increased.

4. Norms of acting. There is no special obligation of avoiding a remote occasion, provided one has a firm will not to sin in it. - But under grave obligation a proximate and free occasion of sinning gravely is commanded to be fled, unless, without temerity, you prefer to render it remote by suitable means. - Because of the frequency of occasions, which would make the matter most burdensome, and because of the lesser moment of the matter, flight from the proximate occasion of venial sin does not seem to be commanded under venial obligation, unless nevertheless, as Lehmkuhl II, 621 wills, you undergo the danger rashly, or without utility. This especially holds concerning those venial sins which prepare mortal sins. Besides, at least venial will it be to approach, without relative necessity, occasions not yet strictly proximate of graver sin. But he who is living in a necessary proximate occasion of sinning even gravely, or who is compelled to approach such an occasion, is obliged to do this one thing: that he seek remedies by which there is hope that the occasion will become remote. The reason is that, even in a proximate occasion, one does not sin except freely; and because the difficulty of declining the occasion excuses him from admitting the danger, in which he can demand the special help of God.

— II. The reason of the obligation and conclusion. Therefore the genuine reason why a proximate occasion must morally be declined is not that the will of approaching it is repugnant to a serious will not to sin; otherwise we could not remain even in a necessary occasion of sinning. Besides, in a proximate occasion sin is indeed foreseen, but from the will freely then changed, of him who now elicits a firm purpose, so that flight from the occasion cannot be called a means without which the end can in no way be obtained. But the reason is that the general virtue of prudence imposes on us sufficient positive diligence of taking care that at least the grave duties of any virtue whatever not be derogated. That positive precept is violated by him who remains in a free proximate occasion; it is not violated by him who tolerates a necessary occasion. Therefore he who refuses to abandon a free proximate occasion materially or formally actually sins gravely against the virtue whose duties he thus neglects, in whose sin the general malice against prudence also is contained. And because he actually sins gravely, therefore his purpose of fleeing mortal sins is not universal, as it ought to have been.

In estimating that positive care, the relative gravity of the danger and of the inconvenience to be undergone is to be weighed; therefore the whole doctrine concerning flight from a proximate occasion seems able to be contracted more distinctly into a few points thus.

Conclusion. - A proximate occasion formally is an exterior circumstance which induces a relatively grave danger of sinning. We must decline such a danger, unless we are excused by a proportionate inconvenience, and then we must employ the possible cautions. The variety of opinions makes it that we cannot say the grave obligation to be certain unless the danger is so great that in it fault truly more frequent than victory is to be foreseen.

— III. Corollaries. 1. Before experience of the thing, the gravity of the danger must be measured from what commonly happens, but afterward from the relative effect.

2. He who approaches an occasion of sin does not strictly actively permit sin, which would be intrinsically evil, but temptation, to which afterward he himself will freely resist or yield. Observe, however, that although we ought to hate sin above all things, it has not been imposed on us that above all things we abhor temptation in which we may sin. If it should be revealed to someone that in America he will commit a sin from which in Europe he will abstain, not for that reason will he have to abstain from the American journey. He would certainly have to abstain if it were revealed to him that in America he would lose his soul eternally. For then he also has foreseen the conjunction of death with the state of sin: which has not been placed in his free power, and which from charity toward himself he must altogether avoid.

3. In him who neglects the proximate occasion of sin, the universality of purpose is lacking rather than its efficacy. Yet it can be said that this man lacks the mediate efficacy of purpose, since the positive precept of fleeing occasions has been given for avoiding formal sins.

— What if, in an occasion not strictly physically but morally necessary, the use of remedies seems fruitless, nor are better remedies at hand in the concrete?

Doctors go off into various opinions. Ballerini-Palmieri ¹ think that the supposition should rather be denied. Others then deny the obligation of abandoning the occasion by their very silence, indeed in explicit words. For if, so they say, the penitent "could be absolved the first time, he will be able also the second" (2), since sorrow and purpose are no more lacking in the second case than in the first; and because, in a physically necessary occasion, all ought to be content with this present disposition. Almost thus Lugo (3), who inclines to this opinion. Others, not few, then oblige one to abandon the occasion, because formal flight alone from the occasion then gives hope of amendment, and Christ said: "If your eye scandalizes you, pluck it out and cast it from you," etc. Others, as Suarez (4) and St. Charles (5), deny that a general rule can be given. Gury (6) distinguishes thus: flight from the occasion is to be commanded if it seems practically easier to abandon the occasion than to remain in it without sin. Berardi, in some rare case in which the Confessor, having known the moral (7) fortitude of the penitent, indicates a means proportioned to his strength, thinks that flight from the occasion must be imposed, notwithstanding great inconvenience.

And so we think it must be said thus. As often as the thing seems in some way possible, flight itself from the occasion, or the safer parts, are to be urged to be followed by every effort. And unless a very grave inconvenience stands in the way, this flight seems of itself to have to be imposed: for, with attention to the gravity of spiritual ruin, the occasion now cannot be called necessary but relatively free. Yet with very grave inconvenience of life, fortune, etc., the confessor does not seem able strictly to prescribe material flight from the occasion, since, because of disagreement among authors, the obligation cannot be called certain. Cf. Lugo, Paen. d. 25, n. 115. For the rest, cf. tr. De sacramento Paenitentiae.

¹ Opus theol. V, n. 119. - (2) Tamburini, Praxis expeditae confessionis, III, 3, 10. - (3) Paen. d. 14, n. 156. - (4) In 3 Part. De Poenitentia, d. 32, s. 2. (5) Instr. Confess. - (6) Theol. mor. II, 631. - (7) De occasionariis et recidivis.

— IV. Rule of perfection. Thus far concerning obligation. But Christian charity of its own accord raises the soul to better pursuits. Just as, in the special matter of venereal delectation, there is preached a certain angelic chastity, which keeps every affection loosed from carnal pleasure, then, so far as is fitting and possibility is had, avoids carnal movements even involuntary ones, and keeps itself immune from the contagion of the corruption of the age, so there is had a certain general intention of chastity of mind, which cultivates perfect purity of affection and, yielding nevertheless to no pusillanimity, and refusing no ministry of charity, indeed renders itself, with the help of God's grace, stronger than every temptation; yet again refuses to undergo any temptation for the sake of its own satisfaction; indeed by the sublimity of its own wills and by command over the lower powers, acquired even painfully or through mortification, it strives to diminish the tinder of temptations in the virtuous man himself.

— I. We are held by an absolute and indispensable obligation of abhorring above all evils moral evil, which is formal sin; but not material evil, since it is not imputed to the will. Wherefore the obligation of fleeing material sin is the very obligation of taking care, in a human manner, for the observance of the law.

II. Concerning the occasion of sin. The occasion of sin is an exterior circumstance which formally induces the danger of sinning. It is divided into proximate and remote. Concerning that notion authors do not plainly agree. For some call proximate that in which a man almost always sins, while for others that is already proximate in which a man frequently sins; others say that a proximate occasion is one in which a man always or at least altogether more frequently sins. Nor are there lacking those who estimate these things mathematically. One occasion is present, continuous, or in being; another disjoined, not continuous, not in being: the former is removed, the latter is not sought. Another is free, which a man can morally abandon; another is that which cannot be abandoned either simply or without great difficulty.

It can be proximate or remote absolutely or relatively, according as it is such when attention is paid to the common reason of men of a definite condition and age, or when attention is paid to the special fragility or firmness of the person. An occasion can be in individual meetings or become such because of frequency; it can regard various sins or only one. But flight from an occasion is distinguished as material, by which the occasion is impeded, or formal, by which the force of temptation is diminished so that from proximate it becomes remote.

Under grave obligation there is commanded flight, at least formal, from a proximate and free occasion of sinning gravely. Under venial obligation free occasions less proximate, or occasions of venial sin itself, are to be warded off when without utility the danger is incurred of sinning venially. In a necessary occasion, there remains only the obligation of seeking remedies for converting the occasion into a remote one.

The true reason of the obligation is the obligation of prudence, which imposes on us sufficient diligence of taking care that at least we do not derogate from the grave duties of virtue. In estimating that positive care, the relative gravity of the sin and of the inconvenience to be undergone is to be weighed.

Wherefore a proximate occasion formally is an exterior circumstance which induces a relatively grave danger of sinning: we must decline this unless we are excused by a proportionate inconvenience, and then we must employ the possible cautions. Because of the various opinions, we cannot say the grave obligation to be certain unless the danger is so great that, in a free occasion, habitual fault, or fault truly more frequent than victory, is to be foreseen.

Corollaries. Before experience, the gravity of the danger will be estimated from what commonly happens. He who approaches an occasion does not actively permit sin but temptation. And in him who does not will to abandon a proximate occasion, rather than an efficacious purpose, a universal one is lacking, since he refuses to fulfill the grave obligation of fleeing the occasion.

408. - 1. Those who perform base theatrical works sin mortally, because they are the ruin of their neighbor. A proportionate necessity, according to the general principles, can excuse material cooperation. Yet no profit regularly excuses from the performance of a very base play. At most, it can be tolerated that, in order to avoid the gravest necessity and with the danger of impure pleasure remote, someone take part in it once or twice, until another manner of living, diligently sought, is found ¹. Cf. what was said above, no. 394.

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, book 2, no. 56; and Tamburini, In Decalogum, book 5, chapter 1, § 4, no. 28, to be compared with book 7, chapter 8, § 5, no. 1.

But if someone must - as happens not rarely - illustrate the obscene signification itself by tone or gesture and thus excite applause, this seems to us to be a direct provocation of evil, which can never be excused.

2. Magistrates themselves who permit these things sin gravely of themselves. Nevertheless, they can sometimes be excused if, in order to prevent a greater evil, they do not punish them and merely tolerate them. In large cities, it can scarcely happen that, according to received custom, they do not permit certain things to be performed. But they never ought or are able to admit things properly base if they have the authority to prevent them.

Therefore, a Catholic magistrate will endeavor so to diminish the evil that he avoids ridicule harmful to his authority; yet on the other hand it cannot be said that good morals make no progress under Catholic magistrates.

409. - To attend very base plays without necessity and to watch those things which of themselves move one greatly is judged grave of itself, unless someone has learned by experience that he is little moved by these things.

To attend plays which are not very base from curiosity will be venial, unless grave scandal or one's own danger should prohibit the matter more gravely for you. All guilt will be absent, with precautions employed, if there was a just cause for attending: as if servants, children, or wives, unless they accompanied them, would suffer the grave indignation of their master, father, or husband; or if one were compelled, as it were, to attend by a public office; or if there were a true usefulness for a Catholic man in knowing these things sufficiently, lest, to the detriment of his activity, he seem too much a stranger in his own region.

But you should observe that the senses are excited more by lascivious dances which are often inserted than by the plays themselves; and that in frequenting theaters it often happens that the danger proceeds, more than from the things performed, from other persons attending or from the companions with whom they are approached. Therefore, it is to be counseled of itself that a wife accompany her husband, rather than that he go alone to watch theatrical performances.

This genus of lascivious dances is also accustomed to be exhibited in "circuses." Nor do the girls who take part in equestrian performances use modest clothing. Wherefore these spectacles must often be judged no more mildly than theaters: they are not rarely more stimulating to the spectators.

410. - One who favors plays of this kind with money, but not insofar as they are base, furnishes material cooperation which is to be estimated according to the general rules. Cf. Palmieri, Opus theologicum, vol. 2, treatise 6, no. 994.

N.B. Concerning counsels on attending or not attending theaters, cf. above, no. 204.

411. - 1. Dances in themselves are neither evil nor acts of lust, but of gladness. Cf. St. Thomas on chapter 3 of Isaiah.

2. In the concrete, however, they are dangerous and cannot be praised.

Therefore, for a just cause, such as custom, the decorum of one's own state, or the command of parents, to lead them or attend them, unless there is a probable danger of sin, will not be unlawful. Cf. Palmieri, Opus theologicum, vol. 2, treatise 6, no. 995.

Nevertheless, care must be taken that those dances in which the impure signification is sufficiently manifest not be participated in. We would speak more severely of these than of certain dances, such as the waltz, which some rigorously prohibit. For although in these women are, as it were, excessively in the hands of men, custom, and also the necessity of attending to rhythmic movements, diminish the force of exciting lust, so that they can be exercised honorably. Cf. what was said above, no. 203.

3. Dances which are proposed indiscriminately to all are more to be disapproved than those which are reserved for selected persons. But whether more sins are committed at the "popular" dances of the public squares than at the dances of the rich can be doubted. The clothing of the people is more modest; the license of words and actions is more audacious.

Indeed, in the country annual dances are sometimes conducted sufficiently innocently; and where there is such a custom, it is to be feared that, if they are suppressed, graver excesses will be committed on that day. Wherefore Berardi in no way disapproves of them in his region.

4. In masked dances, the occasion of ruin is easier. Nevertheless, even here the circumstances and the condition of the person must be weighed. Cf. Palmieri, vol. 2, treatise 6, no. 995.

Berardi treats this argument extensively, De occasionariis, nos. 165-170.

5. In certain places dances of children

of both sexes are instituted. These are not to be praised. For they are foreign to a genuine education, and, although venereal concupiscence may be presumed absent from them, they serve only to foster the worldly spirit of vanity.

But concerning what is to be counseled, cf. above, no. 203.

3. Others are external occasions which move the soul. They are sensual, vain, and illicit loves, founded in organic sympathy alone, which are nourished by readings, spectacles, and dances. Such love can exist toward persons of different sex, as are flirts, or toward persons of the same sex, whether from petulance for the sake of laughing, or from sensual or carnal affection. But if it is toward a person of different sex or toward a young man, it will easily be an occasion of grave scandal in a clerical or religious person; likewise, even platonic love of a married person toward an unmarried person of different sex.

b. Proximate ones are either negative: flight from occasions, namely to avoid vain loves, frivolous readings, spectacles, excessive contact and immoderate frequentations with persons of the other sex, and dances;

or positive: to strengthen the will so that, pleasure having been despised, apt remedies are strenuously employed; frequently to renew the resolution of living chastely; with firm and tranquil soul to propose the rejection of temptation and flight from every relapse; to trust in the divine help of grace; to resist immediately and strongly. Sometimes marriage is an efficacious remedy.³

³ Compare Saint Francis de Sales, Introduction a la Vie Devote, p. III, c. XVI and XVIII.

I. An occasion of sin is an external circumstance of a thing or person furnishing facility for sinning and thus inviting to sin, which constitutes one in danger of sinning.¹ Hence it is distinguished a) from internal principles which incline to sin, such as bodily constitution, passions, concupiscence, and evil habits; b) from the danger of sinning, which can be both internal and external and extends more broadly: namely, it is an impulse to sinning which, if it proceeds from a person or an external thing, is called an occasion; if it is from within, it is called simple danger; so that every occasion is a danger, but not every danger is an occasion. Therefore this is constituted at once from two things: 1) on the part of the external object, from the impulse and opportunity alluring to sin; 2) on the part of the subject, from the propensity or internal inclination to sinning.

¹ Concerning those in occasions of sin, St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, nn. 452-458; and Praxis conf., nn. 63-69; Billuart, de Poen., diss. 6, a. 10, § 5; Reuter, o. c., nn. 168-174; Berardi, opusc. de Recidivis et Occasionariis; Marc, o. c., nn. 1819-1831; Aertnijs, Th. M., II, nn. 299-309; Theol. Mechl., de Poen. (4), nn. 81-84; Ballerini, de Poen., nn. 167-203; Lehmkuhl, Th. M., II, nn. 617-628; Tanquerey, o. c., nn. 524-536; Noldin, Th. M., III, nn. 401-409; Genicot, Th. M., II, nn. 369-374; Prummer, Th. M., III, nn. 449-451; Ter Haar, de Occasionariis et Recidivis, can be compared.

II. The occasion is divided:

A. By reason of influence, it is remote or proximate, according as it has only some power of alluring to sin, or also a great power; or according as it constitutes a light danger of sinning, or a grave one, so that one who exposes himself, if not more often, at least frequently or several times, is going to sin. The gravity of the danger can be discerned by the confessor in a threefold way:

1. from the experience of the penitent, or frequency of relapse, if someone previously placed in the same circumstances has usually or at least frequently sinned, e.g., if he has sinned ten times in a month with a maidservant, or even if he rarely visits a person and each time sins with that person;

2. from things commonly occurring, namely when experience is lacking and other special indications from the person of that penitent cannot be had; for then the rule is to be applied: what commonly is an occasion of sin to others in the same circumstances is presumed also to be such for this person until the contrary is proved; e.g., if a young man prone to lust enters a brothel, if a younger girl, light in soul and infirm in will, for a long time lives alone with a master who vividly solicits her;

3. from the circumstances and disposition of the penitent, especially from his known fragility, although he himself has rarely been in the occasion, or has once been in it and has not sinned.

But since the danger can be more or less grave and certain, the rules will have to be applied more strictly or more mildly according to the diverse case.

B. By reason of the person, it is absolute and according to itself, or relative and by accident, according as, human fragility being considered, it constitutes danger for all, or only for a determinate person by reason of his own fragility and particular disposition. Proximate per se is that in which men commonly for the most part sin; proximate by accident is that which, although generally it is not proximate with respect to others, nevertheless is proximate with respect to some person because he has frequently fallen in it, or because his fall is prudently feared.

An absolutely proximate occasion is the reading of a very obscene book, concubinage, lying in bed with a person of the other sex, fixed looking at a very obscene thing, a very shameful theatre or cinematograph, assiduous reading of a very anti-religious newspaper or periodical, a book professedly attacking the faith, enrollment in a Masonic sect. On the contrary, entry into a tavern is relative for a drunkard, trade for the unjust man, conversation with a woman for the lustful man, prolonged conversation with a beautiful girl for an impure young man, dances for a fragile young man, the office of surgeon or confessor by reason of special weakness, etc. Hence not only can an absolutely light occasion be relatively grave, but also an absolutely grave occasion can be relatively light for someone, if he is little moved by reason of a special circumstance, coldness, habituation, piety, or if he has specially fortified himself with cautions and an efficacious protection.

C. By reason of duration, it is continuous or in being, which is present and always or habitually accompanies a man (continuously present without being sought), e.g., detention of another's goods or of a benefice accepted simoniacally, retention of a depraved book or obscene pictures or of an instrument for sinning, a daily anti-religious newspaper, a concubine or dwelling with a maidservant with whom you are accustomed to sin, assiduous frequenting of a person at your home, an office or business which is often the cause of sinning, etc.; and interrupted or in becoming (not in being), which is absent, and occurs or is sought only at intervals, e.g., entry into a brothel, into a tavern for the drunkard, access to a banquet, depraved association, conversation with a mistress who does not live under the same roof, games for one who is accustomed to blaspheme when playing, frequenting a girl, eating-houses, dances, etc.

D. On the part of the cause, the occasion is either voluntary or necessary, according as it can easily be avoided without grave inconvenience, or cannot be removed either physically or morally. Physically, if in no way it can be left behind, as if someone is in prison or on a ship with an occasion of sinning, or is at the point of death and does not have time to cast it out. Morally, if the occasion cannot be left behind without sin, or grave scandal, or grave danger of falling into an equal or worse evil (as if an irascible servant quarrels with peaceful companions such as he would scarcely find in another service), or great detriment of the goods of life, reputation, or fortune (even for a rich person), such as the loss of office (e.g., of physician, advocate), function, state, or fortune. Thus, for example, a husband with respect to his wife; a son or daughter of the family who has the occasion at home; parents to whom offspring furnish an occasion of anger; a pupil who cannot leave school or college; the office of physician, merchant, soldier; conversation with a girl for entering marriage, etc.

III. The principal occasions of sin can be enumerated as the following, with Tanquerey, de Poen., n. 527:

a) Against faith: the reading of non-Catholic newspapers, periodicals, or books; more intimate and frequent association with non-Catholics; frequenting schools and colleges in which no religion, or a false religion, is taught; service under heretical or irreligious masters; attendance at non-Catholic sermons; mixed marriages, etc.

b) Against chastity: concubinage; cohabitation of persons of different sex who are not joined in legitimate marriage; conversations with depraved companions; certain dances which, because of the persons, the kind of dancing, and the circumstances of place and time, are more dangerous; frequenting theatres, especially those which, both by the things exhibited and by stage dances (ballets), inflame lust; reading obscene or erotic books; retention of statues, images, and photographs which today easily corrupt morals among young people; certain less honorable games among persons of different sex; more frequent and protracted visits of lovers, especially when one alone with one alone remains for long hours, as more often happens in certain regions, with great detriment of souls; domestic dangers, which arise either from members of the family, or from servants or masters; certain arts which are dangerous because of depraved conversations or more intimate relations between persons of different sex (poseuse, actrice), etc.

c) Against temperance: taverns and eating-houses; frequenting those who indulge drunkenness, especially on Saturday or other days on which workers are accustomed to receive wages; certain festivities, whether religious or civil; sometimes wedding banquets, and in certain regions vigils by the bodies of the dead; drinking in equal draughts, etc.

d) Against justice: certain public and political offices, which easily furnish a means of becoming unjustly rich; certain trades and stock-exchange speculations, which are not immune from fraud, etc.

IV. Principle: By its nature there is a grave obligation for each one, as far as lies in him, of removing the proximate occasion of sin.

It is proved: He who knowingly and willingly, without sufficient reason, remains in a proximate occasion freely wills the occasion in which he will likely sin, and by that very fact implicitly wills sin (and thus sins and is unworthy of absolution); for he does not have an efficacious will or purpose of not sinning any more, but because he does not avoid grave danger, when he can, he is convicted of loving the sin whose danger he loves. Or, on the contrary: he who must absolutely will the end must also will the means morally necessary for it, not indeed doubtful but certain or more certain means. Therefore man, who must absolutely will to avoid sin, is also bound to avoid its grave danger, or to remove the proximate occasion, which is a means morally necessary and more certain for this.

Hence a) Scripture admonishes, Ecclus. III, 27: "He who loves danger will perish in it," that is, he who knowingly and without necessity exposes himself to the danger of sinning cannot hope that he is not going to sin. And Mt. V, 29: "If your right eye scandalizes you, pluck it out and cast it from you... and if your right hand scandalizes you, cut it off and cast it from you: for it is expedient for you that one of your members perish, rather than that your whole body go into Gehenna."

b) The Church condemned the opposite doctrine, which was reprobated by Innocent XI, prop. 61, 62, and 63, and by Alexander VII, prop. 41.

Hence one who is in a proximate occasion of sinning is bound under grave obligation to remove either physically the external object alluring to mortal sin, or, if this cannot be done, at least morally, namely by opportune remedies by which the proclivity to evil is healed. Otherwise he is incapable of absolution, because he does not wish to fulfill a grave obligation and lacks the purpose of not sinning hereafter. And he commits a sin of the same species as that to which he knows he exposes himself, and so much graver as that sin is graver and its danger more proximate.

V. Opinion not to be approved. - A few authors have said that the proximate occasion to be deserted is only that which constitutes a more probable or morally certain danger of sinning, or in which men more frequently or almost certainly sin. This is evidently demonstrated, they say, by the argument brought above. But it does not appear, they say, why at least he sins gravely who has even a solid reason for estimating that in this occasion which he approaches he is not going to sin gravely: for he does not choose a thing which by moral necessity carries sin with it. Thus, for example, Genicot² (Th. M., II, n. 372), after Ballerini (de Pecc., n. 343 sq.) and Noldin (Th. M., III, n. 413).

² These seem to confuse the definition, and to apply what is commonly handed down concerning an absolutely proximate occasion to a relatively proximate occasion. In the newest edition of Genicot's work, this has already been changed by the editor.

Falsely, however. For 1) when it is a question not only of the liceity and illicitness of acting, but of an end absolutely to be obtained, we cannot choose a merely probable part, indeed not even a more probable but less safe one, but that which is safer must be done. Now to avoid formal sin is an end to be attained absolutely. Therefore we cannot expose ourselves to grave danger, even merely probable, of sinning mortally, but we must do what is safer and leave behind an occasion which includes probable danger. The danger of formal sin must absolutely be fled before all things.

2. He who exposes himself to the probable danger of sinning, even if perhaps only in individual acts, nevertheless sometime likely, indeed certainly, will fall, which must by absolute necessity be avoided; and therefore as often as he exposes himself to that probable danger, so often he fails against the end to be obtained, because each time he rashly exposes himself to grave danger of sinning. But this is a sin grave from its genus; whence he sins mortally.

3. He who without reason exposes himself to a merely probable danger of bodily death sins gravely; so also he who exposes himself to a merely probable danger of the death of the soul, or mortal sin. Nor can he expect the special help of grace which he would need for overcoming the danger to which he rashly exposes himself.

Hence for a proximate occasion there is not required an absolute frequency of falls, or a number notable in itself, but a relative frequency suffices for the number of times in which someone has been exposed to the occasion, e.g., if in 12 visits someone is accustomed to sin six or five times; likewise if someone visiting a girl daily sins ten times in a month; or if they meet each Sunday and fall twelve times in a year or somewhat more; likewise if for two years someone visited a woman only three or four times in a year and almost always sinned with her; indeed if for three years he visited only once in a year and sinned each time.

VII. Means to be used against proximate occasions. - The principal means by which a necessary occasion can from proximate become morally remote³ are of three kinds:

³ Cf. Aertnijs, Th. M., II, n. 308; Tanquerey, o. c., n. 535.

1. Some lessen the force of the occasion, such as words said seriously and firmly to the accomplice to express horror for the sin committed; opening the mouth to shout; relation of the matter made to someone who can apply a remedy (e.g., to a superior, parents, master), or threat of this relation; avoidance of all familiarity or solitary conversation with the accomplice; indeed, to flee that person's sight, to speak and think nothing of that person insofar as can be done. If some circumstances generate the occasion, e.g., evening conversation with a maidservant, conversation in secret with a person cohabiting, they are to be diligently taken away. Likewise if the danger arises from the fact that the accomplice enters the bedroom, let the door be closed and barred; if the danger is from drinking in a tavern, let it be altogether established that nothing is to be drunk there, etc.

2. Others lessen the force of concupiscence, by furnishing it no fuel through idleness, liberty of the senses, depraved thoughts, readings, intemperance, etc.; e.g., assiduous labor, so that thus the evils which idleness teaches may be avoided; modesty of the senses, especially of the eyes; mortification of curiosity and of other passions, by which one accustomed to resist licit inclinations may more easily resist illicit ones; diligent avoidance of depraved thought, especially concerning the loved person; flight from dangerous reading; abstinence from excessive drinking; moderate bodily exercise for restraining concupiscence, etc.

3. Others increase spiritual strength: to pray fervently every morning and evening and when temptation presses; daily before an image of the Crucified to renew the purpose of sinning no more; to have frequent recourse to the Blessed Virgin; often to think of the last things, or before sleep to say to oneself: if I continue to live thus, I shall be devoted to eternal punishments; to read pious books; to recite pious aspirations and to walk in the sight of God; to give alms, receive the sacraments assiduously, and immediately after a fall approach the confessor, etc.

These means are not all to be used at once, but now these, now those, according to the disposition of the person, the nature of the occasion, and other circumstances.

III. Concerning dangers to be warded off. - The principal dangers from which they are to be kept are enumerated:

a) harmful readings, both to faith and to morals; b) likewise shameful or impious conversations; c) worldly amusements which in our age are so dangerous, e.g., dances, spectacles, cinema, more frequent pleasure trips which weaken the religious sense; d) excessive familiarity with the other sex: it is generally to be inculcated upon girls that, as far as can be done, they abstain from the society and conversation of males; e) corrupted companions who allure to immodesty, or manifest themselves indifferent in religion, impious, or unbelieving, who are found even in institutes of Catholic youth, and are to be fled as emissaries of the devil and denounced to superiors;³ f) excessive friendly familiarity with one companion, which, even if begun for a good end, frequently degenerates into a friendship not pure.

³ Concerning this case see Revue Eccl. de Liege, t. IX, p. 410 sq. (May 1914).

I. By the worldly are not understood here those who bid farewell to honorable and Christian life, being totally given to the age, but those who, wishing to lead the Christian life at least as to substance, nevertheless indulge the worldly spirit and delight in the pleasures of the age, if they are not altogether depraved. In one word, those who so attempt to worship God that nevertheless they do not offend the world. Such are those who desire to see, taste, and read all things, and rather often lead a comfortable, idle, and pleasure-loving life. For these, special attention must be given to festivities, specifically dances, in whose pleasure they delight; to spectacles which they frequent to see; to books and periodicals which they read.¹

¹ Concerning these, St. Francis de Sales, Introduction a la Vie devote, 2nd p., ch. 32; St. Alphonsus, Th. M., III, tr. 4, nn. 426-429; Aertnijs, Th. M., II, nn. 322-324; 325-327; 328-331; Marc, Th. M., I, nn. 829-893; 834-836; 451 sqq.; Haine, Th. M., I, de Pecc., qq. 103 and 104; Th. Mechl., de Poen. (4), n. 85, III and IV; Ballerini, de Sexto, nn. 47-61; Genicot, Th. M., I, nn. 241, 242, 240; Noldin, Th. M., III, nn. 435 and 436; II, n. 698 sqq., can be compared.

II. Dances among persons even of different sex, according to themselves, that is, depraved circumstances excluded, are not dishonorable but indifferent things, because of themselves they are acts not of lust but of joy and art; in practice, however, they are dangerous and rather often an occasion of sinning. From three especially important circumstances they can become gravely dishonorable:

a) From a depraved end, for instance of indulging lust, e.g., for procuring venereal delights for oneself, exercising malicious or base touches, or having base conversations; this especially happens in masked dances, bals masques, in which, no longer restrained by the rein of shame, they do what they would not dare to do if known.

b) From grave danger of sinning mortally, e.g., by reason of dress, words, gestures, contact, songs, and other circumstances, even before or after the dances, when young men lead girls home; especially by reason of the manner of dancing, e.g., with the breast of the woman pressed closely opposite the breast of the man, so that the woman is as if in the hands of the man. All these things dispose to carnal commotions; nevertheless this is not necessarily dishonorable, as is established from the testimony of those dancing and is understood from the fact that the mind is distracted to many other things and has need of attending to rhythmic motions, waltz, galop, schottische, mazurka, cotillion, etc.²

² Cf. Dict. de Theol., art. Danse.

St. Alphonsus, V, 63; VI, 452-453; H. Ap., tr. III, n. 69 and tr. ult. n. 2; Croix, l. V, n. 257; Aertnys, I, 232; VI, 299, 300; Lehmkuhl, II, n. 617; Berardi, Prax. Conf.; de Recidivis et Occas.; Gury-Ferreres, II, n. 628; Konings, n. 1429; Instr. past. Eystettensis, ed. V, n. 331; Card. G. Van Rossum, Commentarius de Judicio Sacramentali, a. 2-3.

373. DEFINITION. Danger is the likelihood of an imminent evil. Therefore the danger of sin can be called everything which disposes or impels to sin, for example, grave temptation, a depraved habit, an external occasion.

DIVISION. The danger of sin can be:

1. By reason of cause, intrinsic or extrinsic. It is intrinsic if it proceeds from an internal cause, for example, from a bad disposition of the subject; extrinsic, if it proceeds from an external cause, for example, from a circumstance enticing to sin.

2. By reason of conjunction with a fall, proximate or remote. It is proximate if it is frequently joined with sin, or if the fall is very probable; "then," as St. Alphonsus says (H. Ap., tr. III, n. 69), "although the fall is uncertain, nevertheless the danger is certain"; in other words, the causal connection with sin is morally certain, although the event of sin is probable or uncertain, because concerning free contingents more cannot be had. It is remote if it rarely draws sin with itself, or if the fall is little probable. Each is estimated either from things commonly happening, or from the peculiar circumstances in which the subject is placed (cf. n. 357, 2).

The PROXIMATE danger is such either per se or per accidens. It is proximate PER SE, or absolutely, if frequently from its very nature it induces into sin, namely in such a way that men constituted in it commonly sin for the most part. It is proximate PER ACCIDENS or respectively, if it belongs to it, according to the various condition of men, with respect to one person to have, and with respect to another not to have, a frequent connection with sin. Now this connection is judged to be had if someone constituted in it either has already fallen frequently, or prudently ought to fear lest on account of his known frailty he is going to fall (VI, 452; H. Ap., tr. ult., n. 2).

374. PRINCIPLES. I. Freely to offer oneself to the proximate danger of sinning, or voluntarily to remain in it, is never lawful. This is gathered from Scripture (Ecclus. 3:27): He who loves danger will perish in it. And the reason is: 1. because he who loves, or who, with no necessity compelling, wills the cause of some evil, by that very fact is judged to will the evil which is joined with it; 2. because any law, just as it forbids the violation of itself, so also forbids that which of itself induces to this violation. Therefore he who freely undergoes danger of this kind sins both against charity toward himself and against the virtue to the danger of whose wounding he exposes himself, although in reality the wounding does not follow. And in confession the species of the sin whose danger was induced must be explained.

Nor does it stand in the way to say that in danger, even proximate, the fall is not certain but only probable, and non-fall is equally probable. For it is answered that in that case, although the fall is uncertain, nevertheless the danger of the fall is certain, since it is constituted in the very probability of the fall. Now, if it is wrong to use a probable opinion, without just cause, with danger of another's harm, spiritual or temporal (as is certain among all), how much more where danger threatens one's own soul (V, 13; VI, 453; H. Ap., tr. III, n. 69). Cf. n. 83.

375. II. From a just cause, it is lawful to offer oneself to the proximate danger of sin, and to remain in it; provided that the necessary cautions are interposed, by which the fall is averted. "The reason is because a danger proximate of itself then becomes remote, both by reason of the circumstance of necessity and by reason at the same time of the preventative means which the person proposes (as he is bound) to employ, namely by diligently turning the mind away from base delectation or another passion; and besides, by fortifying himself with pious thoughts, prayers, and frequency of the sacraments. These means indeed, although they do not suffice for excusing where just cause is lacking, because God does not help those rashly exposing themselves to danger; nevertheless he well furnishes his help to him who from just cause does not leave the occasion, since in that case he remains in that occasion not from affection to sin, but from a certain necessity" (V, 63 p. med.).

Hence it is inferred: "1. Surgeons are excused if they expose themselves to danger in treating women, although at times in the past they have already fallen on account of such an occasion; so pastors who in receiving confessions have experienced the same misery; so also others are excused who cannot leave their own office, say of courtier, soldier, innkeeper, or merchant, without grave detriment ... But otherwise it must be said of simple confessors who have several times fallen in hearing confessions: because these are bound to abstain from such exercise, if they can without grave detriment of reputation or faculties" (ibid.).

2. In the extreme necessity of the neighbor, for example, if an infant is certainly going to die without Baptism, not only can you, but you are bound to succor him with a danger of sinning per se probable; because then necessity causes the danger to become remote; whence if you can, you are bound. "Nevertheless the continuator of Tournely with Sylvius says that if the danger is such that the fall is more probable, then in no way can you or ought you expose yourself to it; because each one ought to regard his own salvation more than that of others. But to this it could be answered that in such a case of extreme necessity, provided the fall is not morally certain, although it is more probable, you are bound to fortify yourself more strongly with prayers and pious works, and then to trust concerning a greater help of God: for then it would reasonably be hoped that God will increase help where greater necessity urges" (II, 26; VI, 453).

3. When the danger of formally sinning is so proximate that the fall is foreseen with moral certitude, it must absolutely be avoided, nor does any cause then excuse; because none can be proportionate to danger of this kind, since the supreme law is the salvation of the soul. Hence that saying of the Lord Savior: If thy right eye scandalizes thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee (Matt. 5:29).

376. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether we are bound to avoid a LIGHT and remote danger of sinning?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If the danger is so light and remote that it can be equated to the mere possibility of sinning, we are not bound to avoid it; otherwise, says the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:10), you would have had to go out of this world. And the reason is because a danger of this kind, properly and morally speaking, is not a danger; and he who judged otherwise would act rashly and imprudently, as the scrupulous do, who often increase danger through their vain fears.

2. If the danger is light in this sense, that on account of a special reason there is had a slight probability of sinning mortally, we are bound to avoid it under venial sin, unless some necessity of acting excuses. And the reason is because, just cause lacking, to approach such danger without due caution is not without some rashness and disorder. Fault can become mortal if, with the danger increasing, the probability of sinning becomes grave (III, 484; Berardi, de Recid. et Occas., n. 6).

QUAER. 2. Whether he committed two sins who exposed himself to danger of sinning, and then consented into the thing itself?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If the danger to which he exposed himself was light and remote, and afterwards he consented to grave sin, he certainly committed two sins: one, namely, and this light, by positing the cause; but the other, and this grave, by positing the effect. The reason is because the second sin must be ascribed more to a new determination of the will than to the cause previously posited.

2. But if the danger to which he exposed himself was proximate, that is, if he posited a cause gravely influencing, and then, the same depraved influence persevering, came into the effect, he does not seem to have committed two sins, nor to be bound to confess the cause separately from the completed work. For the first consent persevered in the effect, that is, in the influence of the cause, and was of the same species and of the same gravity as the very consummation of the sin. But otherwise it must be said if the danger is judged to have ceased for some time, or at least to have been removed through an act of the will. Otherwise also, if someone approached the danger through acts distinct in malice, for example, through base touches, and then, with concupiscence increasing, had fallen into something worse (cf. n. 328, Reg. 3, I).

377. TEMPTATION, taken generally, is an incitement to sin proposed to our will, either by the demon, or by the world, or by our own concupiscence.

Now: 1. The demon for the most part tempts by moving our fantasy and our sensitive appetite. 2. The world tempts us either through fears which it casts into souls, or through the enticements of the senses. 3. Concupiscence finally tempts by drawing the consent of the will to illicit things. It is threefold: concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life (1 John 2:16).

The movements of concupiscence are PASSIONS. These cloud reason and entice the will, both through distraction; and through the contrariety of inclination which the inferior part induces; and finally through a certain bodily alteration, from which reason is in some way bound, lest it freely go forth into act (1.2, q. 77, a. 1 and 2).

378. God permits temptations chiefly on account of the following reasons: 1. Temptations give man knowledge of himself, and teach him both how much he ought to distrust himself and how much he ought to trust in God; 2. they render him more fervent in the service of God; 3. they induce into love of the heavenly Fatherland, where there are no snares, nor struggles; 4. they cause virtues to put down deeper roots; 5. they increase merits and future glory; 6. they instruct man not only for himself, but also for others, etc. (St. Greg., Moral., l. 23, c. 27; St. Bernard, Serm. 64, in Cant.; St. Alph., Vera Sposa, c. 13, § 3).

The REMEDIES against temptations are: 1. Watchfulness; whence Christ the Lord: What I say to you, I say to all: watch (Mark 13:37). 2. Flight from idleness; whence St. Jerome: "Let the devil always find you occupied." 3. Prayer: and this is the most powerful means by which victory can be obtained. Whence in temptation let no one trust himself, but let him immediately have recourse to the most powerful names of Jesus and Mary, invoke the holy Guardian Angel, sign himself with the cross, etc...., nor cease to pray until the danger is removed. 4. Thought concerning the Passion of Jesus Christ, or concerning the punishments of hell, or concerning death, etc...., or concerning the torment of remorse which the soul suffers after the sin has been perpetrated, or also concerning the fruit going to come to us through resistance. 5. A fervent act of love toward God, with the purpose of undergoing death rather than sinning (cf. n. 322 and 367, etc., Remedies).

Note. In temptations against faith and chastity, it is expedient not to resist the temptation by acts directly opposed to it, but to divert the mind to other things, to despise the tempter, and rather to elicit acts of love, confidence, and contrition (cf. n. 800). If temptations continue to molest, it is expedient (ordinarily speaking) to open them to the moderator of conscience, because the devil, entirely dark, fears the light. No one is more insolent than a robber so long as he lies hidden; and no one more timid than he when he has been manifested; such is the devil, says St. Gregory (ap. Scavini, t. 1, 718).

See several things apud St. Alphonsus, Homo Ap., App. II, § 2, where motives or remedies are suggested against various temptations, especially for the dying; Regol. di vita comp., n. IX; Pratica di amar G. C., c. ult. and elsewhere.

St. Alphonsus, III, 427; ed. G., I, p. 674 seqq.; VI, 452; ed. G., III, p. 457; H. Ap., App., IV, Monit. ad par.; Prax. conf., n. 62 seqq.; Aertnys, Theol. mor., II, p. 210 seqq.; Berardi, de Occas. (1909), P. II, p. 286 seqq.

824. Things to be noted beforehand. Chastity is exposed to many dangers, from many occasions of sinning, but especially: in visits of betrothed persons and lovers; - in dances; - in spectacles and in bacchanalian games; - in profane vigils (veillees); - in baths; - in schools and gymnasia (St. Alphonsus, Regol. per i semin., § 1, n. 4); - in taverns (Praxis, n. 205); - in workshops of various arts (ibid.); - in the barracks of soldiers; - in pastures, in fields at harvest time, and in vineyards at vintage time; - in certain feasts, which are called by St. Alphonsus (Instr. Cat., P. I, c. 6, n. 23) "feasts of the demon, in which indulgence is given to dances, loves, songs little honorable, jests, and wicked conversations"; - in various conversations or cohabitation of men with women, for example if a woman meets alone with a physician, surgeon, or hairdresser (Praxis, n. 62), if a girl is taught letters or art by a man; if a man lives with a younger servant girl or kinswoman; if boys and girls sleep in the same bed, etc. (Instr. Cat., P. I, c. 4, n. 22).

We shall treat in particular: 1. concerning the familiarity of betrothed persons and lovers; - 2. concerning dances; - 3. concerning spectacles. The other cases you will judge both from the general principles handed down (n. 373 seqq.) and from those things which we shall now expound.

825. Principles. I. Visits and conversations that are had between a young man and a girl with the intention of contracting marriage are not illicit of themselves. "For no one," says Roncaglia, "is held to marry an unknown person; but for some time he can test by what

morals the other is endowed. This assertion," St. Alphonsus adds, "speaking speculatively, seems reasonable" (VI, 452). - Therefore betrothed persons are to be equated with those who are in a morally necessary occasion.

826. II. Visits among those loving one another are very dangerous and cannot be permitted unless they have been undertaken for a good end, are moderate, and furnished with due safeguards. Thus all; and the reason is evident.

Hence St. Alphonsus: "Generally speaking concerning adolescents and girls who love one another, not all these are indiscriminately to be condemned for grave fault; but ordinarily I think that they are with difficulty outside the proximate occasion of sinning lethally.1 This is exceedingly clear from experience; for out of a hundred adolescents scarcely two or three will be found immune from mortal sins in that occasion; and if not in the beginning, at least in the progress: for such lovers first converse with one another on account of inclination, then inclination becomes passion; and passion, after it has fixed roots in the heart, darkens the mind and makes them rush into a thousand crimes" (H. Ap., final treatise, n. 3).

1. These things are valid as regards youths who are capable of marriage. With relation to the impubescent, to younger persons who pursue one another with tender love, proximate danger very often arises from a special disposition: let a prudent confessor oppose beginnings. - As regards that mode of courtship which they call flirt, it must be said that there a good intention is lacking, and often the sexual appetite rules all things, although it manifests itself less uncouthly. Cf. Forel, Quest. sex., c. 4, § 3.

We said: 1. Undertaken for a good end, that is, from the intention of entering marriage soon.

Hence they are not to be permitted to those who cannot or will not celebrate marriage within a reasonable time (for example young men before military service), which indeed is to be determined by the judgment of prudent persons according to the practice of the God-fearing. Generally speaking, if marriage is contracted within six months, or at least within a year, the time does not exceed measure. Sometimes, however, it can happen that the suitor is compelled to prolong the courtship longer, because he could not quickly obtain a home, office, etc.

2. Moderate, i.e. not too frequent, nor too protracted. Moreover, generally they seem moderate if within the year that precedes marriage they are had once or twice in single months, and then, as the time of marriage approaches, once in a week for one or another hour.

But certainly they would be immoderate if for months the girl were visited daily or almost daily, or for years every week.

3. Furnished with due safeguards, namely so that the danger becomes remote.

Therefore: a) let lovers not converse among themselves without the knowledge, or at least against the will, of parents; - b) let them never remain alone, especially at night; - c) let them permit themselves no touches on the less honorable parts, none except those held decently, nor approach one another in an unusual manner; - d) let them fortify themselves with spiritual helps, namely frequenting of the sacraments, or at least prayer (Berardi, l.c., n. 222).

Note. It sometimes happens that lovers cannot converse except alone, for example if the betrothed girl is a maidservant or widow. Necessary visits are not forbidden to these. Yet let the confessor take care that these happen in a public place, and that safeguards for strengthening the will be more severe (Aertnys, II, n. 344).

827. III. After betrothal has been entered, safeguards ought to increase. The reason is that the betrothed are now certain concerning future copulation; hence, morally speaking, it is impossible, St. Alphonsus testifying, for them to converse with one another and not to feel stimulants toward those shameful acts that afterward must follow in the time of marriage (H. Ap., XXII, n. 3). - The danger also grows because the fear of shameful pregnancy vanishes; since the marriage soon to follow will cover all things. Thus rightly Aertnys, l.c., n. 342.

Hence thus the holy Doctor (VI, 452): 1. "I, taught by experience, would scarcely once or twice permit the betrothed man to approach the house of the betrothed woman, or the betrothed woman or parents to receive him in the house. For rarely have I found one who in such access did not sin by words or thoughts, since all looks and conversations between betrothed persons of this kind are incentives to sinning." - 2. "Let the parish priest take care not to receive the words of betrothal much time before marriage; because, once betrothal has been entered, all that time which intervenes before the nuptials will be passed in sin both by the betrothed and by their parents" (H. Ap., App., IV, n. 5).

For the rest, as to the rarity of visits, if the betrothed until now have conversed honorably in courtship, let the confessor have regard for the practice of the God-fearing; for in this case the danger appears remote, and it would be useless to require from the betrothed that they recede from the received custom of the God-fearing (Aertnys, n. 48).

828. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether kisses are licit for the betrothed for capturing sensible delectation or in manifestation of love?

Resp. St. Alphonsus: "Scarcely can those kisses or embraces be permitted to the betrothed, as Lacroix, Viva, and others say, which the custom of the country permits (for example on arrival or departure), provided they are not pressed, nor protracted for a notable time. - Nor is the opinion of those authors practically probable who say that modest touches are licit for the betrothed, if they themselves do not intend venereal delectation, but only sensible delectation; for in this there is ordinarily danger of falling into venereal delectation, so near to the sensible, or at least of progressing into wicked desires toward venereal delectation" (H. Ap., XVIII, n. 7; cf. Vind. Alph., P. III, q. 14).

QUAER. 2. Whether a girl sometimes can consent to the immoderate visits of a suitor?

Resp. It seems that sometimes she can consent, provided: a) a true hope of marriage is present; - b) the circumstances render these visits necessary, for example if the girl would incur danger of remaining unmarried, especially if this would be with some disgrace, infamy, poverty, temptation, etc.; - c) special safeguards are opposed to the special danger.

Note. 1. Little gifts among the betrothed (or even among suitors led by honorable love) do not seem to be prohibited when, by the custom of the country, they are signs of benevolence. - 2. But letters among those who can licitly visit one another at certain times do not seem to have a sufficient end, especially if they are frequent. They are gravely or lightly illicit according as, without just cause, they prepare grave or light danger of excitation (cf. n. 375, 376).

829. Principles. I. Dances are licit of themselves, provided they are done by secular persons with honorable persons and in an honorable mode. Thus St. Alphonsus, with St. Antoninus and others commonly; the reason is that to dance is not of itself an act of lust, but of joy (III, 429; cf. Benedict XIV, Inst. 76).

Therefore dances are illicit: 1. If they are led by clerics or religious, against the prohibition of the Council of Trent (Sess. 24, c. 12), even if scandal were absent. - 2. If they are had with dishonorable persons, for example with prostitutes, with women dishonorably dressed, or also with suitors concerning whose lustful affection there is certainty. - 3. If they happen in a dishonorable mode, as happens in dances that provoke to lust, by reason of dishonorable gesticulation (the dances called Tango, or belly-dancing), by reason of total nudity (angelic dances), by reason of partial nudity and dangerous gesticulation (dances in the theater, ballet), etc. Cf. Berardi, II, n. 142 (de Occas.); and the Letter of the Bishops of Belgium, 1914.

830. II. Dances that are not in themselves dishonorable often become illicit by reason of danger or scandal; especially if they are frequent. And hence it is that the holy Fathers unanimously inveigh against dances (Benedict XIV, l.c.).

It was said 1. By reason of danger, which is greater or lesser; but it is never absolutely present for all. But the acts whose danger dances can induce are: a) close and lascivious embraces, for which certain dances called modern provide occasion first of all, such as Waltz, Polka, Mazurka, Scottish, etc.; likewise dances with masks: for there are not lacking those who cover the face for this reason, that, no longer held back by the bridle of modesty, unknown they may do things which, known, they would not dare to do. - b) Malicious pressings of the hands, namely with immodest affection (nevertheless the simple taking of hands, which the dance requires, is not a sin, or certainly does not exceed venial sin). - c) Obscene touches, which are accustomed to happen outside the act of dancing, whether before or after, or in intervals, when youths from time to time rest from dancing, or finally on the road, when young men lead girls home. - d) Amorous and shameful speech. - e) Malicious looks, especially when women come with the breast too much uncovered; or when the women themselves fix their eyes upon young men shamefully moved. - f) Lingering delectations and shameful desires, which are accustomed to happen not only in the act of dancing but also afterward. - Yet let the confessor advert that external sins happen more rarely in honorable society, and that malice is more often found in men than in women, who seek praise and admiration rather than pleasure.

2. By reason of scandal, which can be direct or indirect. - Direct scandal happens, for example, when young men by conversations, embraces, touches, etc., openly solicit girls to shameful things. - Indirect scandal occurs, for example, when the mode of dancing is indecent, or the dress of the female dancers is immodest (cf. n. 516, 3).

3. Especially if they are frequent; for danger (and likewise scandal) grows from frequency. - And indeed, if danger is not always grave for a girl sufficiently formed in morals, who sometimes, on account of some honorable reason, attends dances (because attention to dancing well in some manner blocks the way to lust), the same cannot be said of girls and youths mad with love of dances. For in these, as experience teaches, modesty is gradually taken away, every sense of piety perishes, prayer is neglected and lust burns; whence there are accustomed to arise wicked friendships, rash loves, jealousies, quarrels, disobedience, a hard heart toward parents, etc. Cf. Aertnys, II, n. 322; Berardi, de Occas. (6th ed.), n. 142 seqq.; Ami du Cl., 1911, pp. 104, 439, 503.

831. III. Dances in which the danger becomes proximate, and no grave cause excuses undergoing it, must be avoided under mortal sin; but those in which the danger is remote, or a grave cause excuses, are free from fault, or certainly do not exceed venial sin. The reason is sought from the obligation of avoiding the danger of sin (cf. n. 374 seqq.).

832. Questions. QUAER. 1. When are dances to be judged as inducing proximate danger of sinning?

Resp. The judgment must be taken: a) From experience: if someone on other occasions has been present at dances, and because of them has sinned frequently, and now the circumstances are not so different that it must be presumed he will not sin this time, the gravity of the danger is openly certain.

b) From the other adjuncts, namely from the character or education of the dancing person, from the corruption or forwardness of others dancing with that person, from the mode of dancing (as was said n. 829), from the circumstances of place and time; for in villages, in the suburbs of cities, and in small taverns, especially at night, occasion is given to sins more than elsewhere and in daytime; from the frequency of dances, as above n. 830, 3.

QUAER. 2. What are judged just and excusing causes?

Resp. a) If the danger is remote, a reasonable cause can excuse from every fault. Causes of this kind are accustomed to be, for example, the end of relaxing the mind once or twice in a year, of more easily finding an occasion of marriage, of not displeasing a lover, of satisfying neighbors inviting to dances, of not exposing oneself to some censure or mockery, etc.

b) If the danger were proximate, only a grave cause can excuse, for example grave offense of husband, parents, brothers. But it is necessary that no other means be present by which disturbances of the family of this kind can be avoided, and that the person undergoing such necessity fortify himself against the danger with due safeguards, namely pious thoughts, prayers, right intention, and firm purpose of preserving modesty (Aertnys, II, n. 323).

833. Practical Rules. 1. The confessor: a) Let him not absolve those who without grave cause and caution indulge in dances commonly dishonorable or dangerous, whether in themselves or by reason of circumstances, which he must diligently weigh. But with young men and girls of higher condition, let him see by what necessity, with what ornament, how often, and with what mind they are present at dances. - b) Let him remember also that the obligation of deserting dances can also arise from the prohibition of cooperating with the sins of others; yet in that case, if good faith is present, and fruit is not hoped for from the denial of absolution, let him proceed only by way of exhortation and admonition. - c) Universally, insofar as he prudently can, let him turn penitents away from dances, or, if he cannot do that, by admonitions and opportune means let him strive to lessen the danger, according to the things said in n. 832, q. 2. See Aertnys, II, 324.

2. Let the parish priest strive with all diligence to take dances entirely out of the midst, or at least to diminish their frequency. Yet in practice let him use great prudence. - First indeed, in every way that is fitting, let him seek to infuse into souls the fear of God and benevolence and esteem toward himself. - Then, in this matter he will make the greatest progress if he fosters piety in girls and promotes frequenting of the sacraments. - Thirdly, in preaching let him not expressly propose the question concerning the liceity of dances, but let him directly inveigh against the sins that are accustomed to be committed in them or on their occasion. - But if finally he must prudently tolerate certain dances, for example in feasts of the place, let him labor with all his strength that they happen honorably, that they not be prolonged into the night, that girls return home separately from young men; especially, that civil prescriptions be observed, which perhaps have been established for moderating dances (Berardi, l.c., n. 167; Gousset, I, n. 651).

Concerning the cooperation of tavern-keepers and others in dances, we have already spoken in n. 522 and 525.

834. Principles. I. Spectacles, of themselves, are not illicit. "Play," says St. Thomas, "is necessary for the conversation of human life. But to all things that are useful for human conversation certain licit offices can be assigned. And therefore also the office of actors, which is ordained to exhibiting solace to men, is not of itself illicit; nor are they in a state of sin, provided they use play moderately, that is, not using any illicit words or deeds for play, and not applying play to undue affairs and times" (2. 2, q. 168, a. 3, ad 3). Indeed, by reason of matter and end, spectacles can be commendable, because they can powerfully incite to good.

835. II. Spectacles, as they are had at the present time, are commonly harmful and gravely dangerous. For very many, as Aertnys says, are either 1. notably shameful, whether on account of the obscene matters that are represented and acted out in obscene ways; or on account of women with breasts and arms immoderately bared, either acting or present in the spectacle, especially if, as is customary, they are contemplated with opera glasses; or on account of the quasi-nudity and shamelessness of female dancers in scenic dances that are intermingled; - or 2. moreover contrary to religion, which they traduce as tyrannical, bloody, now as hostile to science and progress, now as ridiculous, contemptible, now as false, superstitious, impious; they expose sacred rites and the sacraments themselves to mockery; they exhibit priests,

pontiffs, religious men and nuns as given over to shameful dealings; they teach, extol, or excuse crimes, for example vengeance, suicide, adultery, divorce, vices of the flesh, etc. Cf. also Berardi, l.c., n. 169.

836. From these things you will resolve: 1. Today it is licit for no one to go to the theater for the sake of solace unless beforehand he has knowledge concerning the quality of the performance, i.e. unless beforehand he has certainty concerning the absence of obscenities and impieties; for from the reasons adduced the presumption stands against public theaters, especially if they are not destined for cultivated society, but for the common people (Aertnys, II, 326).

2. That someone may licitly be present at a spectacle commonly gravely dangerous for men, or specially dangerous for himself, there is required both a grave cause and prudence or caution for removing danger and scandal. Thus, for example, soldiers can be excused, who are held to be present in order to keep watch; servants, who would suffer grave indignation from their masters, children from parents, wives from husbands, if they refused to be present. - Nevertheless they are held to oppose safeguards to the danger, for example by closing the eyes, by thinking about other things, by fortifying themselves with ejaculatory prayers, by remembering the last things, etc. (Scavini, I, 799).

Nevertheless St. Alphonsus notes (H. Ap., IX, 10): "Those who hear shameful comedies on account of curiosity alone, or on account of vain solace, can sometimes be excused from mortal sin, if namely there is absent: a) shameful delectation; - b) the danger of that delectation (which will easily always be present in adolescents, or others of a conscience little fearing God); - c) scandal of others."

3. By reason of scandal the following sin gravely: a) clerics and religious who attend shameful comedies; - b) those who by money or applause cooperate in notably shameful (or impious) comedies, although they are secondary spectators, i.e. without whom the comedy would still be represented (l. El. qq. ref.); - c) those who are held to impede them, or conveniently can do so and do not impede them; - d) a fortiori, those who represent them.

It is asked: Whether a woman sins by using male clothing, for example in carnivals?

Resp. St. Alphonsus (III, 425): "A woman using male clothing does not of itself sin gravely; but not rarely it will be mortal," namely on account of the danger of lust or scandal. - There is no sin if it should happen from a just cause, for example for hiding herself, as St. Thomas teaches (2. 2, q. 169, a. 2, ad 3).

837. "It must here be diligently noted," says St. Alphonsus (H. Ap., IX, 34, end), "that in the matter of the sixth precept it is necessary, insofar as is possible, to employ every severity, since in so slippery a matter no caution should ever be judged excessive; and many opinions which, speaking speculatively, are probable, become improbable in practice. Hence, where the confessor sees the danger of penitents, although he cannot condemn as certainly a mortal sin the action which they would wish to perpetrate, nevertheless let him in no way permit it. This belongs to the physician of souls, especially with respect to those who in the past have had a habit in the shameful vice; for for these it will be necessary not only to avoid proximate occasions, but also remote ones (i.e. those that are commonly such). Otherwise, because of contracted frailty, they will always fall back into the same thing; since in this matter, to which men are naturally prone, they themselves easily progress from lesser things to further evils" (cf. n. 376). - He repeats the same in Instr., n. 36 and Praxis, n. 16.

1429. Definition. - An occasion of sin is generally defined: an external circumstance which, whether from its own nature, or from the frailty of the man who is found in it, allures, or induces, to sinning. Hence it differs from the danger of sinning, by which name comes whatever impels to sin, whether that be intrinsic or extrinsic.

Division. - A manifold occasion is distinguished, namely proximate or remote; absolute or relative; present or not present; voluntary or necessary.

1° A proximate occasion is that which induces a probable danger of sinning; remote, however, that which induces a slight [danger], or in which commonly men, for the most part, do not sin.

2° An absolute occasion, or occasion per se, is that which of itself induces to sin, and therefore is such with respect to men taken commonly; but a relative occasion, or occasion per accidens, is that which, although it is not an occasion with respect to others, is nevertheless such with respect to someone, his frailty being considered, or because he has frequently fallen in it. Wherefore, just as an absolute proximate occasion can be a relative remote one for one who is very pious and cautious, so on the contrary an absolute remote occasion can be a relative proximate one for one who is weak and prone to vice, especially shameful vice.

3° A present occasion, or occasion in esse, is that which is continually present to someone, without its being sought, e.g. if he keeps a concubine at home, or is accustomed to sin with a maidservant; but a not-present occasion, or one not in esse, is that which is absent, and at intervals either is sought or occurs, as a tavern is relative to a drunkard, a mistress with respect to her lover.

4° A voluntary occasion is that which can easily be dismissed; but a necessary one is that which cannot be removed physically or morally.

Moreover the causes which truly render some occasion necessary are nearly these:

1° Complete impossibility of avoiding the occasion, e.g. if a concubine were shut up in a prison of which her concubinary were the guard.

2° If the occasion cannot be avoided without sin, suppose of injustice, or without true and grave scandal, as if a wife were in occasion on account of cohabitation with her husband, and from separation there would follow spiritual ruin in the children or scandal among the people.

I said: a) without TRUE scandal; for fictitious or imaginary scandal is not scandal. Of this kind would be that which a concubinary would invent, alleging that the people, if he cast out the concubine, would be confirmed in the suspicion which it already has concerning his concubinage; for that very suspicion itself is already the scandal, which cannot be removed except by the casting out of the concubine.

I said: b) without scandal ... GRAVE; for a light one is not proportioned to the grave danger of one's own ruin.

3° If the occasion cannot be deserted without grave temporal harm in goods, whether of fortune, of reputation, or of life, or without another grave difficulty.

4° According to Berardi and others. When the person in occasion cannot withdraw himself from one occasion without certainly falling into another equal or worse occasion, or into another equal or worse spiritual danger. The reason is that no one can be obliged to something useless or to something worse. Hence Gury wrote: "A maidservant would not have to be obliged to depart at once from the house ... for the case in which ... she could not depart except so as to fall into an equal danger and perhaps into a greater one." Yet one must beware of hallucination, which in this matter is very easy; for it is too easy to be deceived, where it is sweet to believe. Thus it is very easy for a concubinary to believe, e.g., that he will sin in an equal way even with a new maidservant, and nevertheless to delude himself; concerning which matter Viva wrote: "Certainly the danger, considered in itself, of sinning with a new maidservant is not the same ... as of sinning with a concubine."

1430. - Principle I. In order that a right judgment may be made concerning the probability of the danger which makes some occasion proximate, according to the mind of St. Alphonsus a distinction must be made between an occasion in which someone has already been placed for some time, and an occasion which is now to be approached for the first time.

In the former case the occasion will have to be held proximate if someone has frequently sinned in it; nor is it required that he always or almost always have sinned in it, or even more often than not. But it makes no difference whether the frequency is relative or absolute. Relative frequency is computed according to the number of times in which someone was exposed to the occasion, and it will be present, e.g. if someone in twelve visits is accustomed to sin five or six times. But absolute frequency will be present when the number of falls, considered in itself, is notable, as if two persons who meet on single Sundays fall ten or twelve times in a year, or if for several years you have always sinned in a house which you visit only once in the year.

In the latter case, one must stand by the presumption taken from things which commonly happen: namely, it must be presumed that probable danger of sinning will be present for someone if that very occasion commonly brings that probable danger to other persons placed in the same circumstances. - I said: placed in the same circumstances; for diversity of circumstances, whether on the part of the subject, or on the part of the occasion itself, or on the part of the manner in which the same occasion is approached, induces a difference in the degree of danger.

On the part indeed of the subject, a difference of age, state, sex, temperament, virtue, education, instruction, affections, etc., can have great influence. Thus some things are very dangerous to children and not to adults; to youths and not to old men; to the lustful and not to the cold; to those leading a celibate life and not to the married; to men and not to women, or conversely to women and not to men. Thus some things are very dangerous to common people, but not to persons of distinguished condition and well educated. Thus frail persons and those lacking the fear of God will find grave dangers where persons endowed with virtue and piety will be in slight or no danger. Thus a prolonged conversation with a woman ordinarily exposes those who pursue her with disordered love to grave danger; but not those who do not have such an affection. Thus books of impious men or heretics, which ordinarily would expose secular persons to very grave danger, expose a Religious man, very grounded in Theology, to slight or no danger. It must also be adverted that habituation produces great differences. For on one side many things are more dangerous to the accustomed than to the unaccustomed, insofar as custom renders consent and fall easier; and on the other side some things are more dangerous to the unaccustomed than to the accustomed, insofar as some things from long use (or from use of worse things) no longer make any impression; whence St. Alphonsus wrote: "Habituation causes that men are less moved to concupiscence from such a sight" (of women showing their breasts), "as is clear from experience."

But on the part of the occasion itself, many circumstances can induce a great difference in the degree of danger. Thus it is one thing to converse with a young, beautiful, adorned, immodest woman, full of allurements; and another thing to converse with an old, deformed, grave, modest, pious woman, etc. Thus it is one thing to be present at a comedy represented with sufficient honesty and sufficient decency; and another thing to be present at a comedy very shameful or represented very shamefully.

Finally, on the part of the manner in which the occasion is approached, many circumstances can likewise induce a difference in danger. Thus it is one thing to speak with a girl secretly, witnesses being removed, frequently, for a long time, and without any caution; and another thing to speak with her in the presence of others, rarely, for a brief time, and with opportune cautions.

1431. - Principle II. In order that someone may be treated as constituted in a proximate occasion, it is required that the occasion from proximate has not become remote. But that it has become remote is known from nearly these indications:

1st If from sufficient experience it is clear that the gravity of the danger has vanished; as, for instance, if someone was accustomed almost daily to become drunk in a tavern, and now already for a long time indeed frequents the tavern daily, but, on account of the purpose made, has never become drunk. But a much longer experience is required in chastity.

2nd If some cause has supervened which evidently destroys the gravity of the danger, as if someone had had a custom of sinning with a woman near him, not on account of affection toward her, but on account of the mere discharge of lust; but now has taken as wife her sister, whom he very much loves. I say: evidently or sufficiently certainly, so as to exclude the case, e.g., of one promising amendment yesterday.

3rd According nevertheless to only some Theologians. If the penitent shows extraordinary sorrow and purpose. But I would admit this third indication only if the occasion, which I suppose to be voluntary, a) is not present, nor going to last long; or b) is not very alluring, as if, e.g., there is question of an associate with whom the penitent himself was accustomed first to introduce depraved conversations.

4th If other means sufficient for rendering the occasion remote without separation are present, and it can be presumed that the penitent will in fact employ them.

1432. - Principle III. Absolution is not to be denied to a penitent constituted in a remote occasion, even if he does not wish to desert it. The reason is: 1° because it does not induce a proximate danger of sinning mortally; 2° because too hard an obligation would be imposed on the penitent, since such occasions generally cannot be morally avoided. Yet make an exception, and that per accidens, if the occasion, although remote, unless it is deserted at once, is going shortly to be proximate, as if with the occasion there is joined a vicious habit, or a great temptation or vehement passion.

1433. - Principle IV. A penitent is never to be absolved who refuses to desert a voluntary proximate occasion, whether that occasion is proximate per se or per accidens; whether in esse, or not in esse. This is clear from propositions 61, 62, 63, condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVII; likewise from the 41st condemned by Alexander VII, p. XIV.

1434. - Principle V. But to a penitent who is placed in a necessary proximate occasion, absolution cannot be denied on account of that occasion, if from elsewhere he is found disposed, and is willing to use the prescribed remedies. The reason is that no one is bound to that which is either physically or morally impossible; and from elsewhere the occasion of sinning is not of itself a sin, nor does it cast a man into the necessity of sinning. And this sentence indeed, according to St. Alphonsus, is most probable; "but," he adds, "in practice all agree that it is expedient that absolution ... be deferred. Indeed ... I would never absolve," thus the holy Doctor continues, "one who is in an extrinsic proximate occasion, ... especially if the occasion is concerning shameful matter, whenever absolution could conveniently be deferred. For I judge that the confessor, as physician, is held to fit to his penitent the more opportune remedies, so that he may work out his salvation; and I think that no other more apt antidote can be ministered to him who is in a proximate occasion than the delay of absolution; since experience teaches that penitents, after they depart absolved, for the most part neglect to employ the prescribed means, and thus very easily relapse." - Note that the holy Doctor says: whenever absolution could conveniently be deferred ... as physician, etc. For which reason, if there is question of a penitent whom the confessor prudently and before God judges not going to return, or not except after a long time, the delay of absolution will no longer have the character of medicine.

I said: is willing to use the prescribed remedies. Here it is asked, what remedies are to be assigned to the penitent who is placed in a necessary occasion? Resp. They are of a threefold kind: 1° some are directed to diminishing the force of the occasion; 2° some to diminishing the force of passion; 3° finally some to increasing spiritual strength.

First indeed it is necessary to diminish the force of the occasion. Not rarely a few words spoken with a strong soul; - not rarely some serious threat or reproach; - not rarely even one opening of the mouth for crying out; - not rarely even once to report the matter to someone who can apply a remedy, - suffice so that the treacherous plotter is cast down in spirit and ceases from every annoyance. The Salmanticenses wrote that such a person in occasion ought "not to mingle long conversations with that woman, and not even to joke lightly." He will also have to avoid looking at her with delay, and, as far as possible, not to speak about her, not to think about her, etc. But especially, says Scavini, "it must be inquired ... whether some circumstances generate the proximate occasion, in which case, by removing the circumstances, the occasion will be removed; e.g. sin is never committed except while in the evening he converses in the kitchen with the maidservant; then entrance into the kitchen at that time should be prohibited, and the occasion will be removed." Moreover these and similar things will be able, if not to destroy the force of the occasion, at least to diminish it not a little.

Secondly it is necessary to diminish the force of passion, by providing it no foment through idleness, through freedom of the senses, through depraved thoughts, through depraved readings, through intemperance, etc.; likewise by subjecting it through labor, through fasts and other macerations, if this is possible.

Thirdly it is necessary to increase spiritual strength. This is done chiefly by prayer, frequency of the Sacraments, and meditation on eternal truths.

As to prayer, care must be taken that the penitent, every morning and evening, and also when temptation comes, earnestly implores God and the Blessed Virgin for grace so necessary to him. But everyone knows how great is the usefulness of novendial prayers, devout assistance at the Sacrifice of the Mass, visitation of the Most Holy [Sacrament], renewal of purpose before the Crucifix, etc. Moreover prayers have greater force if they are joined with alms.

As to frequency of the Sacraments, care must be taken that the penitent choose for himself a stable confessor, learned and pious, as far as possible, and that he confess to him with the greatest frequency with which he can. But especially care must be taken that the penitent return to Confession immediately after a fall.

Finally, as to meditation on eternal truths, care must be taken that the penitent every day seriously think again about death, divine judgment, and eternal torments. But if for the penitent there were an opportune occasion of making spiritual exercises (even privately in his own home), as if he were a priest, or a rich person, or a Religious, then the confessor would have to employ every effort with him, that he may undertake them and perform them rightly; indeed, when possibility is given, there can be a true obligation of recurring to extraordinary means of this kind, namely when the evil and danger of the soul is great and extraordinary.

1435. - Principle VI. Never, i.e. not even the first time, can he be absolved who is placed in an occasion, necessary indeed, but such that, while it stands, amendment cannot be hoped for, or no hope exists that the remedies will be going to profit. The reason is that to wish to remain in such an occasion is to wish the sin, and the removal of the occasion is here the sole means of salvation. Except the occasion which it is altogether impossible to remove. See n. 1429. 4°. 1°. Cf. n. 1436, q. 2°.

1436. Questions. - Query 1° Can a penitent who sincerely promises that he will abandon a voluntary proximate occasion of sin be absolved before he has abandoned it?

Resp. 1° Affirm., and that not only once or twice, but even three times, if a) there is question of an occasion not in esse; b) the purpose of avoiding the occasion is firm; for if the habituated person otherwise betrays indications of indisposition, as if after the first or second absolution he falls back in the same way and with no effort employed for avoiding the occasion, he will have to be treated as formally a recidivist, and therefore neither the second nor third time will he be absolved without some extraordinary sign, as will be clear from the things to be said n. 1473 sq. - But it must be noted that here only whether he can be absolved is asked; for although the confessor, as judge, can absolve this penitent, as sufficiently disposed, nevertheless he can also, as physician, delay absolution, so that he may see whether the penitent in truth avoids the occasion or at least begins to amend himself; indeed it will be expedient to act thus, even the first time, if the custom of sinning in the occasion is already inveterate. I said: and that not only once, etc. For several times before the real execution of the purpose he cannot be absolved.

Resp. 2° Neg., if there is question of a present occasion or one in esse, not even the first time. If however the penitent either a) gives extraordinary signs of sorrow AND absolution cannot conveniently be deferred; or b) cannot return to the same confessor, or at least not except after a long time, NOR has been unfaithful to a promise already made before concerning removing the occasion (in which case he is to be treated as a recidivist, i.e. not absolved unless he brings extraordinary signs), he not only can be absolved, but has a right to receive absolution.

The reason of the rule is that "the taking away of the present occasion" is "a greatly arduous matter; ... and therefore, if the occasion is not taken away before absolution, the penitent will easily after absolution deceive himself, falsely persuading himself that he will resist temptations.... For which reason, if such a one wished to be absolved before he deserts the occasion, he would be indisposed, because he would constitute himself," and that voluntarily, as is supposed in the question, "in a probable danger of breaking his purpose; and therefore the confessor" absolving him "would sin both against the office of judge and of physician." And indeed against the office of judge, because he would absolve one indisposed; but against the office of physician, because he would not apply to him the remedy necessary to his salvation.

The reason of the 1st exception is that those extraordinary signs indicate that the penitent has been endowed with more abundant grace, from which he can be hoped to be more constant in removing the occasion. But that absolution even in this case is to be deferred, if it can conveniently be deferred, is from this, that the little cord of occasion is broken with difficulty. - The reason of the 2nd exception is that then the occasion here and now is necessary, since it cannot conveniently be taken away before absolution. But that absolution even in this case is to be deferred, if the penitent has not stood by the promise previously made concerning removing it, will be clear from the principles which we shall hand down concerning recidivists n. 1473 sq.

Query 2° Can he be absolved who, existing in a necessary occasion, after remedies have been employed, always relapses in the same way?

Resp. Neg., if there is no hope of amendment, whatever finally must happen. Thus St. Alphonsus, as the truer [opinion]. The reason is that, although on account of a just cause the danger of sin can be permitted, nevertheless the formal sin itself can never be permitted; but, when no hope of amendment appears, danger and sin become one single thing. - Hence a woman ought rather to perish from poverty than to frequent a house where she receives large alms, but which always degenerate into the wage of prostitutes. I said: if there is no hope of amendment. But this is judged to be present "if in the present [case] the penitent brings extraordinary signs of sorrow."

1437. Resolves. - 1° "A maidservant vividly solicited by her master, ... if ... she is frail and little devout ... is held to depart from his house," although she has not yet sinned. The reason is that the occasion here, although still remote, is shortly going to be proximate. See n. 1432. - But if "she were given to piety, and cautious, and employed opportune remedies for repelling temptations and opposing passion, then I would not bind her to taking away the occasion." St. Alphonsus. The reason is that then the occasion cannot be presumed shortly going to be proximate.

2° Paul has often sinned with his maidservant, and can dismiss her without grave inconvenience. On occasion of spiritual exercises, to which he applies himself far from his own home, he confesses. It is asked whether he can be absolved before he has in fact dismissed the maidservant. Resp. distinguish. Either he has promised others that he will dismiss the maidservant, or not. If the former, he will not be able to be absolved unless he offers extraordinary signs, such as spiritual exercises are not when they have been performed perfunctorily and for this reason only, because the Superior or diocesan statutes compelled him to them. If the latter, he will be able to be absolved. See the reason of this resolution n. 1436. q. 1°. R. 2°.

3° Peter, on account of his business, or because otherwise he would be judged, not without manifest danger of enmities, to disregard those laws of relationship which are accustomed to be observed among relatives, goes two or three times in the year to a house which for him is a proximate occasion of the sin of lust, or to a certain city in which he is accustomed to sin with prostitutes. It is asked, 1° whether Peter must be obliged no longer to approach that house or city; 2° whether he can be absolved if he has promised to employ the prescribed remedies?

Resp. to the 1st Neg., if he is prepared to use the prescribed remedies.

Resp. to the 2nd Neg., if (which nevertheless will be rare in the case) absolution can conveniently be deferred, or if he is a recidivist and does not bring extraordinary signs of sorrow. The reason of each response is clear from the things said n. 1434.

4° Those who are not sui juris, as a son or daughter of a family and a wife, and are placed in a proximate occasion in esse with a male servant, a maidservant, a relative, or a husband, can be absolved if they seriously promise to employ the remedies prescribed by the confessor, and absolution cannot conveniently be deferred; otherwise, if either a) absolution can conveniently be deferred, or b) after remedies have been employed in vain, they always fall back in the same way and do not give extraordinary signs of sorrow. This follows from the things said n. 1436.

5° Caia, deprived of parents and destitute of every human hope, lives in concubinage with Peter, to be expelled from his house and to perish from hunger unless she continues to obey Peter's lust. It is asked whether she can be absolved before she has left Peter's house? - Neg. This follows from the things said n. 1436.

Of these some, for the most part, are voluntary; others, for the most part or frequently, are necessary; concerning each kind separately there must be treated.

Note. - While in those things which I hand down in this Section II, I teach that some occasion does not necessarily have to be abandoned, do not understand this as if in no event, and not even in the cases concerning which I treated n. 1435; 1436. q. 2; 1437. 3°. 4°. 5°, it had to be abandoned; but these things must be taken in the sense indicated n. 1434; i.e. it will be lawful to try the remedies concerning which in the same n. 1434, until hope of amendment has vanished.

There must be treated: 1° of concubinage; 2° of dances; 3° of theatres; 4° of conversations; 5° of depraved companions; 6° of depraved books; 7° of dice-play; 8° of taverns.

There must be treated: 1° of visits of lovers for contracting Matrimony; 2° of a woman who, on account of violence inflicted or fear struck into her, suffers her own violation; 3° of some domestic occasions; 4° of dangers on account of service; 5° of dangers in schools, colleges, and workshops; 6° of dangers in arts and offices.

1454. - I say I. In any hypothesis a woman is held not to consent by the will, and therefore to abstain from every act of positive cooperation. The reason is clear of itself. - Hence in no hypothesis will it be lawful for her in any way to compose or accommodate herself to the shameful act, by removing, e.g., clothes, etc. - Hence also, if she foresees that violence will be inflicted on her, in the case, e.g., in which she would approach such a house alone, she must, if she can, not approach the same house alone.

I say II. The cases of this violation can be reduced to three.

The first case is when the violence is total and absolute, so that the woman physically cannot either cry out, or move herself, or in any way impede copula; and in this case she is held only to resist by the will; for no one is held to the impossible.

The second case is when without danger of notable damage, or infamy, or excessive shame she can cry out or resist extrinsically. The resolution of this case we gave n. 20. under 2°. § Women sin gravely, etc.

The third case is when she would indeed have hope of avoiding the foul congress by crying out or otherwise resisting extrinsically, but only with danger of notable damage to herself (e.g. of death), or of infamy, or of excessive shame.

Concerning this case I note the following:

1) As regards the danger of infamy to be feared from crying out, it is necessary that there be question of true infamy, e.g. of the danger lest a girl be held as corrupted; for often not infamy, but rather honor and praise comes to a woman crying out that she may preserve her honesty.

2) Let the things said n. 462. q. 2° and q. 3° and n. 20 under 2° be recalled, where we hand down the doctrine of St. Alphonsus concerning this case.

3) Lugo notes: "In practice violent oppression, and without fault on the part of the woman, must be believed with difficulty. For it is very rare that, if she wishes, she cannot in some way resist and impede violation; but on account of ... weakness of soul, and sometimes also on account of a hidden affection of lust, which they are altogether ashamed to manifest, they consent."

Nevertheless it can be believed with less difficulty that the oppression of white women by Black men, such as sometimes happens in this region, was altogether unwilling; for they are accustomed to abhor Black men.

From the things said you resolve: 1° If a woman were shamefully touched by a man with whom she is making a journey in a carriage, certainly she is held to resist in the better way in which she can; but, outside the case of proximate danger of consent, she would not be held to throw herself down from the carriage, while it is moving swiftly, with very grave danger of breaking her bones.

2° A woman permitting herself to be touched by another with a touch which commonly is judged modest, as taking, handling of the hand, embrace and kisses according to the custom of the country, does not sin, unless it is established to her that it is done from a depraved affection; indeed even in this case she will be able to bear herself permissively, if otherwise she would inject suspicion of infamy, or others would be scandalized, which nevertheless certainly is not to be feared when those touches are done openly.

1464. - Some arts are not only dangerous, but altogether iniquitous. Such are all superstitious arts, e.g. the art of healings, magical art, divinatory art, etc., to which modern animal magnetism and spiritism are reduced. Such also are the usurious art, shameful pimping, etc. No one does not see that arts of this kind can be made honorable by no reason, and must altogether be deserted. But other arts are not iniquitous per se, but only dangerous. Thus soldiers are exposed to many dangers of sinning because of blasphemies and fornications which are very common to them; likewise merchants and brokers because of frauds, perjuries, etc.; likewise physicians and surgeons because of the treatment of women; likewise farmers because of shameful conversations, bestialities, etc.; likewise carriage-drivers because of blasphemies, drunkennesses, etc.; likewise almost all artisans because of immodest or impious conversations, etc. Say the same concerning various offices in which many dangers are found, as happens, e.g., in the office of Confessor, Advocate, Judge, Magistrate, etc.

1465. - Query. Is someone held to desert an art not iniquitous per se, but gravely dangerous for himself?

Resp. Neg., if either 1) the gravity of the danger can easily be destroyed by the penitent through other means, e.g. by changing not the art, but the workshop; or 2) there is a grave reason for not deserting the art, and the penitent is prepared for rendering the danger remote, and for undergoing sacrifices the more grave in proportion as the ruin is greater to the danger of which he is exposed.

Such are:

1466. - I. Certain occasions of drunkenness. The principal are: taverns and drinking-houses; - companions and friends given to this vice; - certain special days, whether of the week or of the year, as the day on which the weekly wage is accustomed to be paid to workers; the Fourth of July; the day designated annually by the Government for public giving of thanks; the first of the year; Carnival; Easter; Monday of Easter and Pentecost; the feast of St. Patrick; days fixed for political elections; - certain fairs; - festivities which come under the name of picnics, excursions, etc.; - the day on which Baptism is conferred on an infant; - banquets or nuptial feasts; - vigils beside the bodies of the dead (wakes); - funerals.

1467. - II. Certain occasions of lust, whether internal or external. Besides those enumerated above under A and B, here must be noted: a) games called kissing plays. b) Many of those which we enumerated n. 1466 among occasions of drunkenness, as excursions, picnics, wakes, etc. c) If one alone with one alone is carried by carriage, or walks through solitary places, such as in the country, especially among us, are most frequent.

1468. - III. Occasions of injustice. Such are: 1° several public offices which either easily offer a means of becoming rich unjustly, or scarcely can be obtained, carried on, or retained, without indulgence being shown to the unjust cupidity of others (cf. n. 453. 456. 458). 2° Certain trades, e.g. those which are exercised by those who in English are called pedlers. 3° Administration of another's property by those who are over workers (foremen), by clerks of bankers or other businessmen (clerks, book-keepers), by conductors of public carriages, etc.

1469. - IV. Occasions of heresy or apostasy. These can be or become of this kind: 1° Service among heretics, apostates, or infidels. 2° Reading of certain heretical newspapers or books. 3° More intimate association with non-Catholics. 4° Public schools, or those of higher instruction (high schools). 5° To approach the sermons of non-Catholics. 6° Mixed marriages and courtship previous to them, etc.

663. An occasion of sin is an external circumstance of a thing or person, furnishing facility for sinning and thus inviting to sin, which constitutes a danger of sinning. Hence it is distinguished a) from internal principles which incline to sin, such as bodily complexion, passions, concupiscence, and bad habits; b) from the danger of sinning, which can be both internal and external and is broader: namely, it is an impulse toward sinning which, if it comes from a person or from an external thing, is called an occasion; if it is from within, it is called a simple danger, so that every occasion is a danger, but not every danger is an occasion; c) from scandal, which denotes an occasion of sin from the external action or word or deed of another; hence, although an occasion of sin is present in every scandal, nevertheless not every occasion is scandal.

Therefore this is constituted at the same time from two things: 1) on the part of the external object, from the impulse and opportunity alluring to sin; 2) on the part of the subject, from the propensity or internal inclination toward sinning.

664. Occasion is divided: A. By reason of influence, it is remote or proximate, according as it has only a certain force of alluring to sin, or also a great force; or according as it constitutes a slight danger of sinning, or a grave danger, so that one who exposes himself, if not more often, at least frequently or several times, will sin.

The gravity of the danger can be recognized by the confessor in a threefold way:

1. from the experience of the penitent or frequency of relapse, if someone previously placed in the same circumstances has for the most part, or at least frequently, sinned; for example, if he sinned ten times in a month with a maidservant, or even if he rarely visits a person and sins with her each time;

2. from what commonly happens, namely when experience is lacking and other special indications cannot be had from the person of the penitent himself; then the rule is to be applied: that which is commonly an occasion of sin for others in the same circumstances is presumed to be such also for this person until the contrary is proved; for example, if a young man prone to lust enters a brothel, or if a younger girl, light in mind and weak in will, dwells for a long time alone with a master vividly soliciting her;

3. from the circumstances and character of the penitent, especially from his known fragility, although he himself has rarely been in the occasion, or has once been in it and has not sinned.

But since the danger can be more or less grave and certain, the rules for the different case will have to be applied more strictly or more mildly.

B. By reason of the person, it is absolute and according to itself, or relative and by accident, according as, considering the fragility of men, it constitutes danger for all, - or only for a determined person, by reason of his own fragility and particular disposition.

Namely, an occasion proximate per se is that in which men commonly sin more often; - by accident it is that which, although it is not proximate with respect to others, nevertheless is proximate with respect to some person, because he has frequently fallen in it, or because his fall is prudently feared. Thus the reading of a very obscene book is absolutely proximate, as are concubinage, lying down with a person of the other sex, a fixed gaze upon a very obscene thing; - on the contrary, entering a tavern is relatively proximate for a drunkard, commerce for an unjust man, conversation with a woman for a lustful man, a lengthy conversation with a beautiful girl for an impure young man, dances for a fragile young man, the office of surgeon or confessor by reason of special weakness, etc. Hence not only can an occasion absolutely slight be relatively grave, but also an occasion absolutely grave can be relatively slight for someone, if he is little moved by reason of some special circumstance, frigidity, habituation, piety, or if he has specially fortified himself with cautions and efficacious aid.

C. By reason of duration, it is continuous and in being, which is present and always or habitually accompanies a man, or which at least morally is continuously present without being sought; - and interrupted and in becoming, not in being, which is absent, and only at intervals occurs or is sought.

Thus continuous is the detention of another's goods or of a benefice accepted simoniacally, retention of a bad book or obscene picture, concubinage or dwelling with a maidservant with whom you are accustomed to sin, assiduous frequenting of a person at your home, etc.; on the contrary, interrupted is entrance into a brothel, or into a tavern for a drunkard, access to a banquet, bad companionship, conversation with a mistress who does not live under the same roof, play for one who is accustomed to blaspheme while playing, frequenting a girl, taverns, dances, etc.

D. On the part of the cause, an occasion is either voluntary or necessary, according as it can easily be avoided without grave inconvenience, or cannot be removed either physically or morally.

Physically, indeed, if in no way it can be dismissed, as if someone is in prison or on a ship with an occasion of sinning, or in the moment of death and does not have time to cast it out; morally, if the occasion cannot be dismissed without sin, or grave scandal, or grave danger of falling into an equal or worse evil (as if a servant would quarrel with peaceful companions such as he would scarcely find in service), or great detriment to the goods of life, reputation, or fortune (even for a rich man), such as loss of office (for example of a physician, advocate), employment, state, fortune. Thus, for example, a husband with respect to his wife; a son or daughter of the family who has an occasion at home; parents for whom offspring furnish an occasion of anger; a student who cannot leave a school or college; the office of physician, merchant, military service; conversation with a girl for entering marriage.

665. Principle. There is by its nature a grave obligation upon each one, as far as lies in him, of removing the proximate occasion of sin.

It is proved: One who knowingly and willingly remains without sufficient reason in a proximate occasion freely wills the occasion in which he will probably sin, and by that very fact implicitly wills sin, and consequently sins and is unworthy of absolution: for he does not have an efficacious will or purpose of sinning no more, but by the fact that he does not avoid a grave danger when he can, he is convicted of loving the sin whose danger he loves. - Or, on the contrary: One who must absolutely will the end must also will the means morally necessary for that end; not indeed doubtful means, but certain or more certain ones. Therefore a man who must absolutely will to avoid sins is bound to avoid grave danger or to remove the proximate occasion, which is the morally necessary and more certain means for this.

Hence a) the Church has condemned the opposite doctrine, namely Innocent XI, propositions 61, 62, and 63, and Alexander VII, proposition 41;

b) the Scriptures also generally warn: "He who loves danger will perish in it" (Ecclus. 3:27); "If thy right eye scandalize thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee: for it is expedient for thee that one of thy members should perish, rather than thy whole body be cast into hell" (Mt. 5:29).

Hence one who remains in a proximate occasion is bound under grave obligation to remove physically the external object alluring to mortal sin; or, if this cannot be done, at least morally, namely by opportune remedies by which the proclivity to evil is healed; - otherwise he is incapable of absolution, because he does not wish to fulfill a grave obligation and lacks the purpose of not sinning for the future. And he commits a sin of the same species as that to which he knows he exposes himself, and so much the graver as that sin is graver and its danger more proximate (I, n. 177).

666. An opinion not to be approved. - A few authors have said that the only proximate occasion to be abandoned is that which constitutes a more probable or morally certain danger of sinning, or in which men sin more frequently or almost certainly; that this must be left behind is evidently demonstrated by the argument brought above. It does not appear, they say, why one sins at least gravely who also has a solid reason for thinking that he will not sin gravely in this occasion which he approaches: for he does not choose a thing which by moral necessity carries sin with it. Thus, for example, Genicot, Theol. Mor. II, p. 372, after Ballerini, De Pecc., n. 434 ff., and Noldin, Theol. Mor. III, n. 399.

Falsely, however. For:

1. When there is question not of the mere licitness and illicitness of acting, but of an end absolutely to be obtained, we cannot choose a merely probable part, indeed not even a more probable, less safe part, but that which is safer must be done. Now, to avoid formal sin is an end absolutely to be attained. Therefore we cannot expose ourselves to a grave danger, even a merely probable one, of sinning mortally, but we must do the safer thing and leave behind the occasion which includes probable danger. The danger of formal sin before all things is absolutely to be fled.

2. One who exposes himself to a probable danger of sinning, although perhaps only in individual acts, nevertheless at some time probably, indeed certainly, will fall, which must be avoided by absolute necessity; and therefore as often as he exposes himself to that probable danger, so often he fails against the end to be obtained, of avoiding sin, because on each occasion he rashly exposes himself to grave danger of sinning. But this is a mortal sin from its kind; hence he sins mortally.

3. One who without reason exposes himself to a merely probable danger of bodily death sins gravely; so also one who exposes himself to a merely probable danger of death of the soul, or of mortal sin. Nor can he expect the special help of grace which he needs, who rashly and without cause exposes himself to the danger of sinning.

Hence for a relatively proximate occasion there is not required an absolute frequency of falls, or a number notable in itself, but a relative frequency suffices according to the number of times in which someone has been exposed to the occasion. Thus if in twelve visits someone is accustomed to sin six or five times; likewise if someone, visiting a girl daily, sins ten times in a month; or if they meet every Sunday and fall twelve times in a year or somewhat more; likewise if for two years someone visited a woman only three or four times in a year and almost always sinned with her; indeed if for three years he visited only once in a year and sinned as often as he visited.

667. Practical rules can therefore be established:

A. One who remains in a voluntary and continuous proximate occasion regularly cannot be absolved unless he first proposes to remove the occasion and also removes it.

For since removal of the occasion ordinarily is arduous, there is a proximate danger of breaking the purpose; and therefore if the occasion is not taken away before absolution, the penitent will easily deceive himself (falsely persuading himself that he will resist temptations), so that the purpose is rendered inefficacious and the occasion is not removed. Hence a penitent who, knowing this, would expose himself to this danger would be at least suspected concerning disposition, concerning which therefore moral certitude could often not be had. For why does this man make confession if he does not remove the occasion? And then the confessor, who would expose him to such danger, would sin against his office of physician.

Except, when public scandal is lacking:

1. if the penitent from ignorance or lightness of mind is not conscious that he remains in a proximate occasion, or that the obligation of removing it is grave, and the confessor foresees that admonition will be useless or harmful: then provisionally he is to be left in good faith, and gradually instructed concerning the occasion to be fled, which he will understand better if by experience of his own fragility he has learned that he frequently sins because of it;

2. or the occasion can easily be dismissed, for example, a bad book, a thing of another detained, provided restitution is spontaneously promised;

3. or the penitent manifests extraordinary signs of sorrow and purpose, for example, he has already sent a message to the maidservant that she is to leave the house, or has hired a new maidservant;

4. or a grave cause urges, so that a previous removal of the occasion would do more harm; for example, an imminent danger of death, great difficulty of returning for a long time and of approaching another confessor, as easily happens if the penitent comes from a distant place, danger of infamy or scandal, as easily happens if a sacrament is to be received, grave danger of spiritual harm, for example alienation from the sacrament.

In these last cases the penitent must be admonished that he will not obtain absolution any more unless he has stood by his promises; but if he has been admonished uselessly, he is to be held as a relapser.

B. One who remains in a voluntary and interrupted proximate occasion, for example by frequenting games, taverns, bad societies, can be absolved several times, provided he firmly proposes to beware of it; - but if he has promised several times and no amendment appears, he is to be held and treated as a relapser, and generally, unless perhaps he furnishes extraordinary signs of disposition, absolution is to be deferred until he has actually left behind the occasion.

For he is judged disposed and therefore is to be absolved, unless a) contrary signs are present, as easily happens if he has promised several times and is already habituated, and generally this is gathered from the absence of all amendment; - or b) unless it is better to send him away, with his own consent, so that he may remove the occasion more promptly and firmly.

C. One who remains in a necessary proximate occasion regularly can be absolved, provided he is truly disposed by opportune and efficacious remedies to render the occasion remote; - but if he has promised several times and no amendment appears, he is to be dismissed until he has amended himself, unless perhaps he shows altogether extraordinary signs of disposition.

For on the one hand an occasion is not sin nor does it induce a necessity of sinning, but it can be overcome, although with difficulty, especially with the grace of God; on the other hand no one is held to the impossible, and therefore one who is in a necessary occasion undergoes the danger unwillingly rather than loves and seeks it and exposes himself to the occasion. Hence, if he applies opportune means and humbly asks the grace of victory, he can hope for it from God, of whom the Apostle says: "He will not suffer you to be tempted above that which you are able" (1 Cor. 10:13).

Hence: 1) He can be absolved, provided that a) the occasion is not evil in itself; b) a just cause is present, such as physical inability, or a sin otherwise to be committed, or the danger of an equal or greater sin, or the spiritual good of himself or of his neighbor, or great loss in the temporal goods of life, reputation, or fortune; this cause is required to be the greater, the greater the danger is; c) there is hope of a good outcome, namely, of overcoming the temptation; and d) the penitent is prepared to apply sufficient means.

2. On the contrary, one who after several admonitions always relapses in the same way, even when means have been applied, so that there is no amendment nor probable hope of amendment, cannot be absolved, but is to be treated as a relapser; unless perhaps he furnishes very extraordinary signs, or is also prepared to apply new special means, or, if the occasion can physically be removed, first leaves it behind, according to Mt. 5:29; 16:26; and 18:9; otherwise he is morally certain to sin. For whenever someone is morally certain to sin in some occasion, he is bound to flee it even with danger to life.

In our times the school is a most fertile field both for good morals and sound religious doctrine and for the corruption of all morality and religion. All the enemies of the Church, plainly recognizing this most powerful efficacy of the school, with united forces strive that the Catholic faith and religion be rooted out from the minds of adolescents. Hence it is plainly evident what vehement dangers arise for adolescents from attendance at bad schools.

Non-Catholic schools are of diverse kinds: 1. positively non-Catholic and harmful, in which heresy or infidelity is openly and deliberately taught. Such are the so-called confessional schools of Protestants and unbelievers; 2. neutral (simultaneous, parity, mixed), which in instruction abstract from every positive religion and provide only profane instruction.⁷⁴

⁷⁴ Proposition (48) of the Syllabus, condemned by Pius IX, must be attended to: "To Catholic men that plan of educating youth can be approved which is separated from the Catholic faith and from the power of the Church, and which regards only the knowledge of natural things and the ends of earthly social life alone, or at least primarily" (Denz. n. 1748).

528. Principle. It is never licit to attend schools in which the proximate danger of perversion cannot be removed.⁷⁵

The reason is obvious; for it is not licit to expose oneself to the proximate danger of perversion. - Almost always positively non-Catholic schools introduce such proximate danger of perversion, because in them heresy is deliberately defended, pupils are compelled to recite heretical prayers and to be present at false rites. Hence it is not licit except in great necessity to attend such non-Catholic schools, and indeed with necessary cautions having been posited.

Nor are neutral schools always free from proximate danger of perverting adolescents. For in those schools almost necessarily indifferentism is fostered in the hearts of the pupils, who see teachers and fellow-pupils not caring much about religion or even openly attacking it. Besides, the dignity of religion is diminished in the minds of adolescents if they see it, as lacking public honor, relegated within domestic walls. Then not rarely also the good morals of the pupils are placed in great danger, since it is most difficult without the help of religion to restrain disordered passions so vehement in youth. From this it is clear that even in neutral schools proximate danger of perversion is often present, and therefore attendance at them is evil. Hence deservedly the Plenary Council of Latin America, celebrated in the year 1899, decreed:⁷⁶ "Therefore Catholic parents and guardians of pupils, with every authority by which we have power, we not only exhort but command, to keep away the offspring committed to them from schools in which the authority of the Church and the salutary influence of our religion are excluded, unless perhaps the circumstances are such that, for a sufficient cause approved by the bishop and with opportune cautions and remedies, attendance at schools of this kind in particular cases and for a time can be tolerated." Similar things the Roman Curia established on repeated occasions.⁷⁷ - From these things it is clear that judgment concerning the quality of a school and concerning the sufficiency of causes pertains to the Ordinary of the place, and not to anyone else. Thus also the Code of Canon Law, c. 1374, expressly decreed.

It can scarcely be said in which neutral schools the dangers of perversion are greater: whether in primary and secondary schools, or in Academies and Universities. Nevertheless, since today there are few Catholic Academies and Universities, more easily because of dire necessity are young men excused who attend neutral Universities and Academies. Parents who without sufficient reason send their children into neutral schools sin gravely and are not worthy of absolution. The reason is that they expose their children without sufficient reason to danger of perversion.

The means by which the proximate danger of perversion can be removed are: a) diligently to watch lest Catholic pupils suffer harm from bad books, bad fellow-pupils, irreligious teachers; b) to instruct Catholic pupils sufficiently from elsewhere in religion and good morals; c) to induce Catholic pupils to frequent reception of the sacraments and to a pious life.

⁷⁵ In almost the same words the Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide to the bishops of the United States of North America, November 24, 1875, approved by Pius IX, speaks about this matter: "But unless this danger of perversion is made remotely proximate, such schools cannot be attended with a safe conscience. This even the natural and divine law itself proclaims."

⁷⁶ n. 667.

⁷⁷ The cited Instruction of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide; Instruction of the Holy Office to the bishops of Switzerland, March 21, 1866; Cod. iur. can. c. 1374.

529. Offices in non-Catholic schools. Here the question arises whether a Catholic can licitly undertake the office of teacher or inspector in schools of this kind, non-Catholic or neutral. - In every case a proportionately grave cause is required so that a Catholic can cooperate in those schools so dangerous. In higher schools and in Academies and Universities today in mixed regions a sufficient cause can quite easily be present for a Catholic to assume the office of teacher. Hence in Germany, England, Switzerland, Holland, America, etc., we see distinguished Catholic men as teachers in neutral Gymnasia and Universities. But in Catholic regions, if scandal arises from undertaking such a function, it is not licit for a Catholic to be a teacher in schools of this kind. But in positively non-Catholic schools and in neutral primary schools a Catholic very rarely and not except from a very grave cause can licitly assume the office of teacher, since he is accustomed to cause grave scandal, to furnish cooperation to evil, and to cast himself into danger of his own perversion.

"Whether it is licit for a priest to hand down specially the documents of Christian faith to Catholic pupils of [neutral] schools, whether within their enclosures or elsewhere, as when they have been called together in a church for this, or to perform for them any function of chaplain (aumonier)?" The Holy Office on March 21, 1866, responded: "Affirmatively, and according to the mind: the mind is that care is to be taken that not only priests but also honest laymen of known religion, so far as this can be done, be placed over the schools for handing down Christian faith and also other disciplines; but so that every fear of scandal may cease, the people must be admonished that this is done so that the evils which flow from schools of this kind may be averted as far as can be done; and that this consequently ought not be an excuse to anyone for not sending their children to purely Catholic schools, in which their faith and morals are in no way endangered."⁷⁸

⁷⁸ Collect. de Prop. Fide n. 1286.

615. 3. Dances and spectacles, although in themselves they are something indifferent, are nevertheless very frequently accustomed to produce grave scandals and to be proximate occasions of sinning gravely. Certainly it is never licit to institute dances in which, by reason of nudity, gestures, etc., something notably dishonorable is externally done; but if these things do not occur, although the sins of many to be committed on the occasion of dances are feared, those who institute them from a reasonable cause, or who are present at them, cannot in themselves be said to be liable to grave sin. A cause is required that is the graver in proportion as the occasion of sinning is more proximate. In our times it is often most difficult to turn the faithful away from instituting and frequenting all dances. Therefore let the parish priest and confessor strive according to their powers that young persons be present at dances more rarely, that nothing dishonorable be perpetrated there, and that a proximate occasion of sinning be absent. - Almost the same thing ought to be said of spectacles and cinematographic exhibitions. But in our times not a few spectacles are wicked, both on account of things represented against religion or good morals, and on account of the immodest dress of those representing. Since in ordinary cases someone can more easily exempt himself from the obligation of assisting at these spectacles than from the moral compulsion of assisting at dances, it seems that a stricter practice with respect to spectacles than with respect to dances should ordinarily be observed.

Since marriages with persons of the lowest rank were prohibited to Roman matrons of a certain more eminent dignity, so that those unions were not reckoned by the law except as concubinage, Callistus, that he might provide for their salvation, conceded that marriages of women of this sort were valid, whomever they had chosen as husband, whether slave or free, although they were not married according to Roman laws. You see here the independent right of the Church putting itself forth.

Canon XVII. If someone having a faithful wife also has a concubine, let him not communicate. But he who does not have a wife and has a concubine in place of a wife is not to be repelled from communion, only that he be content with the union of one woman, either wife or concubine, as it shall please him. But living otherwise, let him be cast out until he ceases and returns through penance.

Concubine here is to be taken in the more honorable sense, namely a true wife, although held in a less worthy place. Cf. Canon XV of the Convention of Mainz in the year 851 below, and Thesis XV, IX.

Decree IV. Not every woman joined to a man is the wife of the man, because neither is every son heir of the father. Now the covenants of nuptials are legitimate among freeborn women and among equals, the Lord Himself establishing this very thing much earlier than the beginning of Roman right existed. Therefore a wife is one thing, a concubine another, just as a maidservant is one thing, a free woman another. For this reason also the Apostle, for manifesting the distinction of these persons, places testimony from Genesis, where it is said to Abraham: "Cast out the maidservant," etc. Hence, since the society of nuptials was so constituted from the beginning that, besides the conjunction of the sexes, it had in itself the sacrament of Christ and the Church, there is no doubt that that woman does not pertain to marriage in whom it is taught that there was no nuptial mystery. Therefore if a cleric of any place has given his daughter in marriage to one having a concubine, it is not to be received as if he had given her to a married man, unless perhaps that woman is seen both to have been made freeborn, and legitimately endowed, and honored with public nuptials.

The opinion of Leo in this place, which can seem difficult, depends wholly on the principle to which he himself appeals, namely, that the society of nuptials was so instituted from the beginning by God that it had in itself the sacrament of Christ and the Church. But the society of a man with a concubine does not have this sacrament, that is, it does not represent the union of Christ with the Church. For the union of Christ with the Church is a perpetual union, elevating the Church to participation in the dignity and goods of Christ; on the contrary, the union of a man with a concubine is a dissoluble union, because the man uses the woman for pleasure alone, having her as a maidservant and generally choosing her from his maidservants left in their own condition of servitude. Such a society surely is not marriage. But historically the union of a man with a maidservant, who had not been made freeborn and legitimately endowed and honored with public nuptials, returned to this, or seemed to Leo to return to this: namely, pure concubinage was presumed. The same was the opinion of Ambrose on Luke VIII, 8, saying, "Where there is an unequal union, there the law of God (enacted, that is, in the institution of marriage, Gen. II, 24, of which he made mention in the preceding number) is not." Cf. Hincmar of Rheims, Letter XXII. Now since the doctrine handed down above was sufficient for Leo for dispatching the singular question proposed to him, he did not wish to turn aside elsewhere and linger in solving questions which could arise, for example, whether the union of a free man with a female slave can ever be a legitimate marriage and sacrament; for the question proposed to him had been about a concubine, not about the marriage of a free man with a female slave or maidservant. Cf. Thesis XV, IX.

Decree V. Women joined to men by paternal judgment are without fault, if the women who were held by the men were not in marriage (if, namely, the men to whom daughters are joined by paternal judgment had indeed had another woman, but not associated by the covenant of marriage), because a married woman is one thing, a concubine another.

Canon XIV. At the suggestion of the council, our most glorious Lord (King Reccared) ordered this to be inserted in the canons, that it is not lawful for Jews to have Christian wives or concubines.

For he responded to the inquiry "concerning those who after penance take wives or join concubines to themselves." Rather they could have appealed to Canon XXI of the second Council of Arles, A.D. 451, above.

Canon VII. If a slave has had his own female slave as concubine, if it so pleases, he can, after dismissing her, accept his peer, a female slave of his lord; but it is better to keep his own female slave.

The discourse is about a slave who has female slaves (concerning slaves among the Germans or Franks, cf. Du Cange, Lexicon, at the word servus): if he has his own female slave, not as wife but as concubine, he can indeed cast her away; but the Fathers advise that he keep her, of course as wife. If we take concubine as distinguished from wife, all things stand correctly. Cf. Response IV of Leo to Rusticus, above.

Canon XXXVII. It is lawful for no one to have two wives at one time, or a wife and a concubine ... For just as Christ observes the Church chaste, so the husband ought to guard chaste marriage.

From the fourth Sylloge of Canons. Canon XXXIV. If anyone, having obtained a concubine, does not wish either to dismiss her or to have her blessed and to have her rightly with the sacrament, it is not fitting that those things which are offered by him to the Church be received.

Capitulum XII. If anyone has had a concubine who was not legitimately betrothed, and afterward has led a girl duly betrothed, after the concubine has been cast aside, let him have her whom he legitimately betrothed. Concerning this Pope Leo defined thus in his decrees, saying: "There is no doubt that that woman does not pertain to matrimony," etc.

Capitulum XV. Concerning him who has a wife: if he has had a concubine, let him not communicate. But as to him who does not have a wife and has a concubine in place of a wife, let him not be driven from communion; only let him be content with the conjunction of one woman, either wife or concubine, as it shall have pleased him. But if he lives otherwise, let him be cast out until he ceases or returns to penance.

It is Canon XVII of the Council of Toledo, A.D. 400 (see above), to be understood in the same manner in which we have interpreted it. Indeed, from the repetition of this canon made in the ninth century, the interpretation handed down of the Spanish canon is confirmed. But it is clear that in this century in Germany, as formerly in Spain, women joined by legitimate marriage were distinguished into wives and concubines.

Response I. You ask whether, after a wife has been dismissed whom someone had led after legitimate betrothal, because afterward he imposed an evil name on her, it is lawful for him, without a decree of a general synod, either to accept another against the evangelical authority, or, while she survives, to have a concubine in place of a wife. To these things, supported by apostolic authority, we resist altogether according to the evangelical sanction, and we neither concede the coupling of another wife to those who do such things while the one dismissed survives, nor do we grant license of having a concubine.

Response II. Concerning this: if a betrothed woman, with the betrothed man not knowing, is corrupted, and afterward, a dowry having been made, that same betrothed man has lain with the same woman in marital fashion: whether, after no time has been intercepted (other reading: interposed), it is lawful for him to dismiss her as corrupted by another and thus lead another, as if that woman had not been a wife, or to hold a concubine in place of her. We do not consent to this either, that those who are joined by the legitimate covenant of nuptials and are made one body through some space of time should make a divorce. But what before, at the beginning of the conjunction, they voluntarily kept silent by receiving the corrupted woman, afterward, with time intercepted, by enduring it, even if not voluntarily, let them unwillingly preserve; also let them in every way abstain from concubines.

He adds after a few words. This also, together with them (namely, with the Fathers), we likewise command: that no one leave his own wife and, while she is living, presume to associate another to himself; nor is it lawful for him to have two wives at one time, or a wife and a concubine.

Canon IV. Concerning married priests or concubinaries, unless they have ceased, we command by prescribing that they be moved from the altar and at the same time segregated from the choir. But if even then they have not ceased, let them be kept far from the thresholds of the church, and let them not enjoy even that lay communion. We establish the same also concerning deacons.

Married priests are called concubinaries because the discourse is about marriage which they entered after sacred order had been received, and no marriage of this sort was any longer held valid. For this reason they are commanded to cease, that is, to separate themselves from the concubines. Already here it appears clearly enough that marriages of this sort were held to be null. Cf. Canon X of the Council of Toledo, A.D. 655, and Canon VII of Orleans, A.D. 538, and Canon II of Carthage, A.D. 390.

Canon VII. From presbyter down to subdeacon, if they have led a wife or retained a concubine, let them go out from the clergy and lose every ecclesiastical benefice, and remain in the Church with the laity. But if they have been disobedient, let them incur the sentence concerning the incestuous.

Canon XXI. We utterly forbid priests, deacons, subdeacons, and monks to have concubines or to contract marriages; we also judge that marriages contracted by persons of this sort are to be disjoined and that the persons ought to be reduced to penance, according to the definition of the sacred canons.

You see that the Fathers of this ecumenical Council appeal to preceding canons, not establish a new matter. Cf. Canon VII of the Council of Girona and the Fourth Council of Troyes, and the places cited there. Certainly the decrees of the Pontiffs of the eleventh century had regard to this, especially those of Gregory VII against concubinary clerics, who were so called because they were unequal to contracting legitimate nuptials. Therefore although in this First Lateran Council, and also more clearly in the Second, a universal law was enacted invalidating these nuptials, nevertheless that law was not simply new. Hence it is clear how ineptly it was said that Boniface VIII was the first to assert that a vow of chastity emitted in ordination renders nuptials null (from the Syllabus of Pius IX, prop. 22). For, 1. long before Boniface the nuptials of bishops, priests, deacons, and subdeacons were null by the constitution of the Church; 2. what seems more probable to Sanchez (Book VII, disp. 27, n. 10), this obligation of continence was and is from a vow, either expressed or tacit, in the very reception of the order, which the Church annexed to the order; 3. but although someone freely receiving an order should not wish actually to emit a vow, nevertheless he would be obliged to continence, and his subsequent nuptials would be null. These things also held good before Boniface. Of what matter, therefore, is Boniface the author? He first authentically declared that "the solemnity of a vow was introduced by the sole constitution of the Church (c. un. de Voto in 6)." With this principle supposed, the same Pontiff, to the question proposed to him, namely what vow ought to be called solemn and efficacious for diriming marriage, answers (ibid.): "that vow alone ought to be called solemn, as regards diriming a marriage after it has been contracted, which shall have been solemnized by reception of sacred order or by an express or tacit profession made to one of the religions approved by the Apostolic See." In this response the law of this impediment diriming the nuptials of those who are bound by such vows is not affirmed for the first time, nor first established; but it is only affirmed that these vows alone are solemn with regard to the effect of diriming a subsequent marriage. But all these things are ineptly confused in that proposition.

I say. To speak, hear, or read base things for the sake of venereal pleasure or with proximate danger of consent to it is a grave sin, as is evident of itself. But if the danger is not proximate, or indeed is proximate but at the same time there is a just cause of speaking, hearing, or reading those base things, the sin will be either none or only venial. But what is said here about the base is not to be applied to speech simply obscene.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. Generally they sin gravely who mingle conversations, even from levity, concerning the conjugal act, concerning licit and illicit things between spouses, concerning modes of impeding generation, of procuring pollution ... especially if this happens among young persons of diverse sex. Likewise those who from boasting narrate their own base sins.

2nd. It is not of itself mortal to utter things that are indeed base but not gravely such, if this is done briefly, through jest or vain solace, unless the hearers are so weak in spirit that they suffer grave scandal. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 426.

3rd. Tender conversations with persons of diverse sex are not always to be held as mortal, although they are full of dangers, especially if they are long-lasting, often repeated, or happen in solitary places. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 422 and following.

4th. They do not sin gravely who from mere curiosity read entertaining books, because they do not excite gravely to lust, nor expose to great danger, as many comedies or poems are. But if they do this for a legitimate cause, e.g., to learn style, they do not sin at all.

XVII. QUESTION VII. What is a near occasion, and ought a penitent to have a purpose of avoiding it? ANSWER. That is called a near occasion which, the whole complex of circumstances being regarded, gravely allures to fault, so that without great difficulty and caution men are not wont to abstain from fault. These occasions, which by very many are called near, are more often occasions proximate relatively.

THIS is the concubinage of a man with an unmarried woman, whom one keeps at home as his own. So commonly the Doctors, cited by Farinaccius, tom. 4. quaest. 138. For concubinage in civil law these conditions are required. First, that the woman and the man cohabit together: Second, that it be in his own house: Third, that they consort frequently: Fourth, that the woman be unmarried: Fifth, that she be one only: Sixth, that she be kept as a wife.

But in canon law it is thus described: It is the concubinage of a man with an unmarried woman, whom one retains either in his own house or elsewhere; and to whom he has recourse frequently and by custom, whether he keeps her as a concubine, or as a servant, or in any other manner whatsoever.

IT is however a grave sin, or rather a state of sin. Whence such men are not to be absolved before they have cast the woman out of the house; or if they keep her elsewhere, one must first see whether they have withdrawn from that state, as Fagundez notes, lib. 6. cap. 2.

PENALTIES are imposed by the Council of Trent, sess. 24. de reform. cap. 8. decreeing a threefold admonition, after which they are to be excommunicated, and if they persist obstinately for a year, they are to be punished at the judgment of the Bishop: But the woman, if admonished and not departing, is to be expelled from the city, or even from the diocese.

THESE penalties are imposed on public concubinaries. These are they whose concubinage is notorious, either by sentence, or by confession lawfully made, or by the evidence of the fact, which cannot be concealed by any evasion, as Fagundez notes, num. 7. with D. Bonaventure in 4. dist. 13. quaest. 4. ad argumenta.

NOTORIOUS also is that concubinary whom Farinaccius calls, num. 8. loco cit. who keeps in his house a woman suspected and defamed of incontinence, and, when admonished, does not cast her out; but the Saintly Doctor wills that of itself this is not enough; however the Holy Council of Trent, sess. 25. de reform. cap. 14. declares as public concubinaries those Clerics who keep women of this kind suspected of incontinence, and condemns them to penalties.

IT is asked, moreover, what penalties are due in canon law to Clerics who are public concubinaries.

THE FIRST opinion is, that they are suspended by the very fact by law, and become irregular, if while under the same suspension they celebrate, or exercise an act of sacred Order. So Toletus, lib. 1. sum. cap. 47. Sylvester, verb. Concubinarius, Navarrus, man. cap. 25. Julius Clarus, §. fornicatio, Azor, lib. 6. cap. 7. quaestio 5. and others, cited by Fagundez, in 6. praecept. lib. 6. cap. 2. num. 9.

THE SECOND opinion denies that they are suspended by the law itself, nor become irregular, if etc.; yet they can be suspended by the Bishop, if thrice admonished they do not withdraw. So Suarez, de censuris, disp. 31. sect. 4. and Tom. 3. de sacram. disp. 18. sect. 1. Sayrus, de censur. lib. 4. cap. 16. Rodriguez, tom. 1. cap. 67. Medina, lib. 1. cap. 11. Enriquez, lib. 9. de excom. cap. 25. §. 13. ad marg. litt. P. and others, whom Fagundez follows, n. 10. and Bassaeus, V. Concubin. num. 5.

THE opinion of D. Bonaventure, in confessionali, c. 5. particul. 50. et 52. is, that they are suspended by the law itself, until they do penance. He proves it from cap. Vestra de cohabit. Cler. and from cap. Quaesitum, under the same title. He holds the same more clearly in 4. dist. 13. quaest. 4.

AND indeed in cap. Vestra, it is concluded: Without doubt hold it certain, that from Clerics and Priests, even though fornicators, as long as they are tolerated and have not the evidence of the deed, the divine mysteries may lawfully be heard, and the Sacraments received. This text the Saintly Doctor urges, in 4. dist. 13. quaest. 4. ad argumenta, and other Doctors of our opinion, among whom add Maiolus, de irregul. lib. 5. cap. 37. Firminus, V. Concubinarius, num. 5. and V. Clericus, num. 13. Vivaldus, in candelabro, tit. de suspen. num. 19. Vega, in sum. 2. part. cap. 108. casu 3. Rebuffus, in concordatis, tit. de public. concubinariis, in the first, third, and ninth penalty, Villadiego, de irregul. cap. 3. Guido Papa, decis. 558. Farinaccius, in 4. quaest. 138. de delictis carnis, num. 55. Innocent, Hostiensis, Butrio, the Archdeacon, in cap. Vestra, in cohabit. Clericorum, et mulierum, where with D. Bonaventure they understand the text of the Decree in the same way, Decianus, in tract. crim. lib. 5. cap. 21. n. 10. Vivius, opin. 123. Ludovicus Lopez, 2. part. Instruct. cap. 23.

Fagundez answers, that these are condemned in cap. Vestra in the same way as in cap. Clerici, where they are not suspended, but it is commanded that suspension be imposed by the Bishops, and as in cap. Quaesitum, where they are not suspended, but the faithful are only charged not to receive the Sacraments from them, because they are scandalous; for the Pontiff says: It has been asked concerning clerics fallen into fornication, whether their offices are to be attended. Truly, although anyone is held to be suspended on account of a mortal sin as regards himself, he ought nevertheless not to be shunned in the divine offices: unless a sin of this kind be notorious, by sentence, or by confession made in law, or by the evidence of the fact, which cannot be concealed by any evasion.

Therefore Fagundez says, that no suspension is imposed on these; for, he says, public concubinaries are equated with occult ones, and as the occult one is improperly suspended, insofar as he is unworthy, so also the public one.

BUT these are trifles, as the Saintly Doctor saw; for the law does not equate them, but lays down an exclusive rule of true suspension, unless they are notorious.

SECONDLY, from the Concil. Trid. sess. 25. cap. 14. where concerning these it says: As regards the ordinaries, and also delegates of the Apostolic See, it shall be at their judgment whether they be suspended, and if, being thus suspended, they do not expel them, etc. let them be deprived of whatsoever ecclesiastical benefices, portions, pensions, and offices, etc.

Fagundez says, num. 10. that these words serve his purpose excellently, as if the Council commanded the Bishops to suspend them, but not to declare them suspended. But the words of the Council have another sense, namely, that they remain suspended, according to the ancient laws, until they be absolved by the Bishops, by the Bishops, etc.; which words are clear. It is confirmed, for in sess. 24. cap. 14. the Council confirms the ancient laws, saying: The other penalties of the law remain in their force. Nor let Fagundez say that these are to be imposed by mandate in those words, sess. 25. cap. 14. otherwise, let them be punished with the penalties imposed by the sacred Canons, or the statutes of the Churches. For these words speak of temporal penalties, deprivations of distributions, etc. as I said.

Fagundez answers, n. 12. that those laws have been abrogated by custom.

But on the contrary, for they are confirmed by the Holy Council, notwithstanding any custom whatever. It is confirmed evidently from the declaration of the Most Eminent Cardinals, the Interpreters of the Holy Council, to whom alone it is permitted to interpret the Council, but not to Fagundez or other Doctors of the opposing opinion; there, however, they decide: Concubinary Clerics are even today, if they be notorious, suspended by the law itself from the divine offices, just as they are also in the old law.

This declaration utterly overturns every solution of the adversaries.

What the Canons understand concerning public concubinaries, they understand also concerning public fornicators, as the Saintly Doctor notes, in the places cited, and it is had in the canons alleged, as Toletus notes, lib. 1. cap. 47. Sylvester, V. concubinarius, Fagundez, num. 15. Now a public fornicator is one who, wandering about, abuses now this woman, now that.

The difficulty is: whether in our opinion, which Fagundez confesses to be very probable, numero 9. under the name of Cleric there are also understood those constituted in Minor Orders; and indeed the Canon Vestra names Clerics separately from priests: Therefore it includes all, as the Saintly Doctor relates, loco cit. in 4. Farinaccius agrees, loco cit. Diaz, cap. 79. and others. They seem, however, not to be included, because it speaks in relation to the exercise of solemn Order, and this is not in the Minor Orders, and accordingly irregularity is not incurred. So Fagundez, num. 16.

Fagundez also notes, num. 17. that these are not excommunicated by the law itself, for in those laws no mention is made of excommunication.

In civil law no certain penalty is established for these, as Fagundez notes, num. 19. yet the administration of their goods may be interdicted to them by secular judges, just as the same faculty is impeded to women living luxuriously; it is clear from the leg mulier, ff. de curatore furioso. The reason is, because one who lives luxuriously is called a prodigal in morals, the Gloss, in leg. si quis cum iure, ff. de usucap.

Hence many have said that it is a crime of the spiritual forum only. So Clarus, quaest. 37. Portius, consil. 21. Tuschus, de visitatione, lib. 2. cap. 21. Ancharanus, ad cap. Cum sit, de foro compet. the Abbot, ibi num. 25. Soncinus, num. 24. Aretinus, num. 15.

Others, however, distinguish: as regards penalties, at present, the secular judge alone is Judge for secular persons; but for future amendment, Bishops and others can discharge that function.

It is proved from cap. penult. de cohabit. cler. et mulier. and the Council of Trent, sess. 24. cap. 8. and sess. 25. cap. 14. and in the former place it speaks of secular persons, and for their emendation it commands that a threefold admonition be prefixed, which is called the competent admonition, as the Saintly Doctor observes, in Confess. loco cit. See Fagundez, num. 20.

Some have said falsely, that the concubines of Clerics cannot be punished by the secular forum. For why should these secular women not be punished for a secular crime, or enjoy a forum?

There are some saying that concubines are not forbidden, but approved by civil law, leg. 3. ff. de concubinis, from Genes. 21. et 22. Iud. 19. 3. Reg. 11. where holy men kept concubines.

But these were wives, though they had a lesser dignity than the others, as the Saintly Doctor proves, 4. dist. 33. q. 1. and I shall show in the 3. part. Tract. de matrim. see what I have said of these, tom. 4. disp. 17. quaest. 10. sect. 30.

Caius, a Catholic merchant in a certain large city of England, sends his son daily to a neighboring non-Catholic school. There is indeed a Catholic school almost equally near, in which an almost equally good education in letters and sciences can be had, as successful results in public examinations attest; nevertheless Caius, although asked by Julius, the parish priest, does not wish to send his son to it, because the non-Catholic school is more distinguished in fame and name, and also more celebrated for the number and condition of its pupils. In these circumstances Julius doubts whether he ought to keep Caius from the sacraments of the Church. Hence it is asked:

1. What are the obligations of parents toward their children?

2. What power does the Church have concerning the education of the faithful, and whence does she have it?

3. What does the Church teach concerning education in non-Catholic or mixed or neutral schools?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. See answer to this question in “Manual of Moral Theology,” vol. i, p. 274.

2. See this question answered above, p. 212.

3. What does the Church teach about education in non-

Catholic or neutral schools?

The Church teaches that such education is in the highest degree dangerous to faith and morals; that, as a rule, it is gravely sinful to send a child to such schools for education, and that only necessity can make it lawful, provided always that the dangers be made remote and the defective religious training otherwise supplied. The declaration of the English bishops, Sept. 17, 1905, was given above, p. 213. In answer to a question put by Cardinal Vaughan concerning secondary non-Catholic schools in England, the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda, Jan. 23, 1899, wrote: “The frequentation of public schools of this kind can not be without a grave danger to faith and morals, or be held consistent with the use of those means which the Church properly prescribes for the sanctification of souls; and that therefore an obligation is incumbent on Catholic parents, not to expose their sons to this grave danger.” See “Tablet,” June 22, 1901, p. 991. Other declarations of the Holy See and of the bishops are given in Fourth Council of Westminster, decree 17, and in the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, pp. 99, 279.

4. The case. Caius, a Catholic merchant of a large city in England, sent his son to a non-Catholic day school, though there was an equally good Catholic school as near. Julius, his parish priest, asked him why he did not send his son to the Catholic school. Caius answered that the non-Catholic school had a better reputation and that the number and standing of the boys were higher. These reasons do not justify Caius in his action, all the less because it may give scandal to others. But as was said above (p. 214) Julius should not deny him the sacraments without consulting the bishop.

Titia, of a very nervous temperament, confessed that she had rather often suffered grave movements against chastity. When the confessor asked whether they were voluntary, Titia answered that she had by no means consented to evil pleasure, but nevertheless had given cause to those movements by reading slightly bad romantic books and by not restraining her eyes from looking at animals mating. The confessor doubts whether Titia sinned gravely, whether she is bound to declare the number and lowest species of those sins, and whether she is bound in the future to abstain from similar things under penalty of the denial of absolution. Hence it is asked:

1. What is lust, and in what does its malice consist?

2. Is smallness of matter found in sins of lust?

3. From what is the malice of sins which are voluntary only in their cause to be measured?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is lust, and in what does its malice consist?

Lust is an inordinate appetite for sexual things. Sexual things, however, are ordered to the generation of offspring, which must take place only in marriage. Hence every use of sexual things which takes place outside marriage, or in marriage but contrary to its laws, is inordinate and sinful.

2. Is smallness of matter found in sins of lust?

Lust directly sought or admitted is gravely unlawful and does not admit smallness of matter. Indirect lust, however, admits smallness of matter.

3. From what is the malice of sins which are voluntary only in their cause to be measured?

Sins which are voluntary only in their cause have the malice of that cause, for they are formally evil to the extent that they are voluntary, but by hypothesis they are voluntary only in their cause.

4. What is to be said of the case?

Titia rather often suffered grave movements against chastity from reading slightly bad romantic books and from looking at animals mating. She did not, however, consent to those movements, and it is supposed that Titia did not indulge in the reading and the sights in order to procure those evil movements for herself. The confessor doubted whether Titia had sinned gravely or not. It is not established that Titia sinned gravely, because the immodest movements were voluntary only in their cause, but the causes were only slightly bad; hence Titia sinned only lightly. Therefore she is not bound in confession to declare the number and lowest species, nor to abstain from similar things in the future under penalty of the denial of absolution. Nor did Titia expose herself to the proximate danger of sinning gravely, insofar as, although rather often tempted, she never fell gravely. Nevertheless, she is certainly to be exhorted, and is bound under pain of venial sin, to abstain from such actions, especially since in lust a light indulgence easily declines into grave excesses.¹

1 Bucceroni, Theol. Mor., vol. i, nn. 37, 40, 822.

Caia, a girl sixteen years of age, is accustomed to read romantic books which, although they are not bad, are nevertheless very diffuse in describing love affairs. While she reads, evil thoughts and even impure carnal movements are accustomed to arise, but for the most part she does not consent to them, although she continues to read because other girls read such books and she wishes to pass the time. Once or twice, however, she consented to the pleasure arising from the evil movements, and once she sinned by touching herself immodestly; she afterward confessed these sins by saying that two or three times she had procured immodest pleasure for herself, without adding anything else. Hence it is asked:

1. Is venial sin from smallness of matter to be admitted in sexual matters?

2. Is anyone bound to avoid the cause of evil movements?

3. Are immodest touches and looks distinguished in species from one another and from consummated acts of lust?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. Is venial sin from smallness of matter to be admitted in sexual matters?

No, if sexual pleasure is directly sought or admitted, as was said above, p. 237.

2. Is anyone bound to avoid the cause of evil movements?

It is supposed that consent is not given to those movements. If the cause produces evil movements accidentally and is useful and not dishonorable in itself, then there is no obligation to avoid such a cause. But if it is a cause lightly dishonorable in the genus of lust, it is to be avoided under pain of venial sin; if it is gravely dishonorable in the same genus, it is to be avoided under pain of grave sin, unless there is a just and proportionate honorable reason for positing that cause.

3. Are immodest touches and looks distinguished in species from one another and from consummated acts of lust?

Those imperfect acts are certainly distinct from perfect and consummated acts, just as a building begun is distinguished from the same building completed. Whether those same imperfect acts are distinguished among themselves in the genus of lust is disputed. Several affirm it, because the objects of those acts are diverse and the acts themselves proceed from diverse faculties. Others, however, with St. Thomas, deny it, because those acts are not evil precisely in themselves, but by reason of the evil pleasure which arises from them. But the pleasure which arises from all those acts is the same. Hence the acts also, insofar as they are evil in the genus of lust, have the same specific malice.¹

1 Bucceroni, Theol. Mor., vol. i, n. 783.

4. What is to be said of the case?

The reading in which Caia indulges is not bad, nor by hypothesis is it a proximate occasion of sin; hence, although it is accustomed to produce evil thoughts and evil movements in Caia, she is not strictly bound under sin to avoid it. Nevertheless, by way of counsel, indulgence in such reading should be sparing, since there are very many other books which are more useful and not liable to the same danger, and more suitable for cultivating the mind. Caia, however, at least probably satisfied the obligation by the manner in which she confessed the non-consummated sins of lust, according to what was said above.

Albert, a young Catholic, comes to confession and explains that he is betrothed to Bertha, likewise a Catholic. He visits her often and not rarely then sins by evil thoughts and desires; indeed, three or four times a week he has been accustomed to walk alone with her alone, when, he confesses, it has happened that he kissed her, embraced her, and sometimes touched her shamefully. When the confessor questions him further, he explains that these things have happened in almost the same way for a year. The confessor is placed in the greatest distress about what, finally, is to be done, whether he ought to prohibit the visits themselves, or whether it suffices to give some counsel. Hence it is asked:

1. Is lightness of matter to be admitted in sins of lust?

2. With respect to the unlawfulness of actions, does the same rule apply to those betrothed for future marriage as to unmarried persons in matters of lust?

Titius, a young single lad, has intimate relations with Ursula, a young unmarried person. He has repeatedly at night visited and sinned with her. There is no prospect of marriage. He has promised his confessor time and again to cease this sinful attachment. Coming to Confession again he tells Father Lucas, his confessor, that he has not sinned with Ursula since his last Confession, although he has several times visited her in her room at night. He gives positive assurance that no further impropriety will take place and asks may he not associate with the person as with a sister?

^* By I. J. Braun.

Father Lucas inquires: "Did you not have temptations during those nocturnal visits?" Titius: "I did have very strong temptation, but I would not consent!" Father Lucas: "Is there no possibility of your marrying one another?" Titius replies in the negative, and mentions he does at any rate not care to marry. Father Lucas then directs him to give up the acquaintance with that person, it being the near occasion of sin for Titius as well as for Ursula.

Titius after some argument finally agrees to give up the person, but insists that he must visit her just once more at night in order to take leave of her, and also because he has many things to tell her, and that she has articles belonging to him which he wants to recover. Father Lucas asks: "What good reason is there to visit her only at night-time? Why not by day?" Titius: "It would not do by day, because we should get a bad reputation if seen together. Then, too, I can not arrange matters within the few minutes that I could be with her in day-time." Father Lucas then allows this last visit provided Titius gives his word of honor that this shall be the last visit, that he will make it as brief as possible, and that he will take utmost care not to let anything improper happen. Titius promises all this faithfully and parts with the absolution.

Quaeritur. 1. Was Father Lucas obliged to demand that Titius give up his relations with this person?

2. What is to be held in general of courtships and company-keeping? When are they allowed, when forbidden?

3. Was Father Lucas correct to allow to Titius the taking leave of Ursula in her room alone and at night?

Answer, 1. Father Lucas was strictly bound in conscience to forbid to Titius his nocturnal visiting with the person; for what good purpose can there be in a courtship with no prospect of marriage? Even if Titius for a brief period, since his last Confession, has not had improper relations with the person, it is obvious that due to his passionate and sinful affection for the person, he will fall again into sin, and that then the last state will be worse than the first. No one may expose himself voluntarily to the near occasion without necessity or important reasons. The visits at night to the person were in themselves grievously sinful because without necessity and reason.

Courtship and company-keeping can not be condemned at random; young people must have an opportunity to become acquainted before they become linked together for life.

Courtship and company-keeping is, however, permissible only where there is the intention and the possibility of ultimate marriage. Where one or both of these is lacking, such relation must not be tolerated. In other words the one starting or indulging in a courtship must have the will and the ability to marry the courted person.

The so-called company-keeping (amores, procationes) between persons of opposite sex is in itself not immoral, provided that there exists between such amantes a proper and sincere intention, and a not too remote prospect of marrying, and provided further the relation, the vicaria relatio, appears to be free of impropriety, tam peccata carnis, quam occasionem proximam talium peccatorum excludens.

In fact, in case of contemplated marriage, a previous consociation is judicious, and even necessary, because the young people should get knowledge of each other so as to convince themselves that they can respect and love each other. Gopfert in his Moral Theology writes:

"What is to be thought in general of acquaintanceships, continued association, visits, etc., between young persons of opposite sex? It can not be said that they are in themselves grievously sinful, but as a rule they are hardly anything else but the near occasion of grievous sin. Three conditions may be named under which they may be permitted, namely, that they should be begun for a good purpose, that the intercourse must take place within proper bounds, and that the necessary precautions be employed.

1. They must be begun with a good purpose, in other words, with the intention to contract marriage soon, i. e., within a relatively short time, to be determined by reasonable judgment and according to the usage of conscientious persons. Owing to the danger of mixed marriages, inquiries should be made as to whether the other party is of the Catholic faith, and if not the person should be seriously warned against further intercourse and against a marriage promise.

2. Intercourse shall take place only within proper bounds, i. e., not too frequent and not too long visits. A greater frequency may be allowed if the wedding is to take place in a short while, say in a month or two; a lesser, the farther off the wedding seems to be. A greater frequency may be tolerated if the young girl is never left alone with the young man, but always under vigilant care; a lesser, when the young people are usually left alone, or when the girl is not under the care of parents or relatives who watch over her.

3. At these visits the necessary precautions must be taken: The young people must not be in each other's company without the parents' knowledge, and not without their silent or expressed approval; as far as possible not be left alone, and they must fortify themselves against temptation by spiritual means.

Where these three conditions obtain, such relations and courtships are not unlawful, even if a grave danger were present, because they are morally necessary conditions, for to demand that one should marry a comparatively unknown person would be unreasonable, and if one would not admit this reason the confessor would accomplish nothing else than that the young couple would now ex mala fide surely sin. For these reasons such visits may not be forbidden even if the parties fall into sin on account of them. The confessor will in such cases accomplish more, if he seeks by appropriate means to make the occasion a remote one; if he, for instance, advises that they never be left alone, that some one be always present, even if only a little boy or girl; in their presence grievous exterior sins could not (easily) take place; excessive marks of affection will not easily occur; he will counsel them to restrict demonstrations of affection in their frequency, duration and manner. If he does not improve matters then these people may be considered as in occasione proxima moraliter necessaria absente, and relapsing continually into this same sin. It is to be considered which is more promising, to demand that the couple employ other and more effective means or that they omit entirely their visits, marks of affection, etc., and this is to be imposed upon them in Confession.''

Gopfert has gathered in these directions nearly everything of moment that is to be found in the various standard authors about the lawfulness of courtships, etc. Difficult, yet incalculably important for the priest, is the question: When are courtships prohibited:

Let us quote here, first of all, from the writings of Blessed Leonard of Port Maurice, who teaches on this subject: "It seems that much less severity and more indulgence is indicated in the occasions that are not in esse, as: visits to gambling-houses and places of amusement, of gatherings and inns, love affairs, etc., for according to the instructions of St. Charles, if the penitent promises to give them up, and if this promise comes from the heart, one may give absolution at least twice or three times, but only in the supposition that the confessor perceives such promise proceeds from a sincere and contrite heart. If the penitent has often before promised reform and has not amended his conduct then the saintly archbishop instructs that absolution be refused until the near occasion has been avoided.

Among those occasions that are not in esse, there should be placed in the front ranks, in my opinion, the amorous alliances, which in our days are a stumbling-block for the young. Some are unwilling that there should be such an outcry against this unholy love, because they fear to disseminate wickedness where there is none, or that one might represent as a sin that which in reality is not a sin. They claim that the soul is given thus a false conscience and a false shame, and that it will plunge from sin to sin, at last unavoidably into sacrilege. But alas! the delusion of those perhaps unaware of the true license and wickedness of our days.

I do not deny indeed that it may happen to an imprudent confessor who has asked an innocent girl whether she has a love affair and upon her admission, that he has been too strict with her, without first examining as to the nature of her affection. But this is a very rare case, which strictly speaking does not merit so much consideration. That which causes tears to the servant of God is the spectacle, that in our days depravity has burst its barriers, and overflowed in every direction, sweeping away with it the youth of the tenderest age. Alas, they say in sadness, why censure the few at their excess of zeal, and then be silent, even palliating the forbearance of so many others, who blindly absolve all those enamored who in their love affairs commit sins of all kinds?

It would be wrong to conclude that to be in love is always a sin, but it would be still worse to suppose that it is always innocent. If one is to judge relatively, and according to the things which generally happen, it would be regarded as an incontestable proposition that love-making as it exists in these days is mostly a near occasion of sin. Would to God that this view was not proved by long and sad experience!

It is true that now and then the love of young persons is innocent in the beginning, but it turns evil as it progresses. They begin looking upon one another with pleasure, and affection turns gradually into passion, and passion plunges them into the abyss without bottom. Now give me your attention and answer me this question: Are we physicians of the soul? And if so, how can we tolerate such a baneful abuse, which infects the world by so many marriages consummated in darkness, with so many murders, with so much debauchery, with hatred, scandal and crimes of all kinds? For this reason there must be among us a firm determination to knit the sacred bond more firmly than ever, and to be uniform in postponing and even in refusing absolution to those who, found guilty, will not promise 'to give up their frivolous love affairs. In order to discover positively whether love affairs are innocent or sinful, one has only to ask questions and small indeed will be the number of those where no disgraceful circumstance insinuated itself on part of either one or other, which renders such an abominable courtship absolutely unlawful. In order, however, that you may have an example before you, that will render you cautious in questioning as well as firm in refusing absolution, when this be necessary, I will here repeat word for word, what the learned and devout Cardinal Pikus of Mirandola, Bishop of Albano, wrote in a pastoral letter which deserves to be read by every confessor: His words are:

"We exhort all confessors not to absolve those who live in love affairs, if such are grievous and unlawful and if, after a third warning from their confessors, they actually have not reformed. Give them to understand that if they do not amend, they must not expect to be absolved by you, neither can they ask this of any other confessors.

The general cases in which love affairs may be regarded as absolutely unlawful, we now add here briefly, and for good reasons in Latin, so that on this point, as it should be in all others, your proceeding may be uniform.

I. Whenever it is carried on in such a way, even between persons of equal condition and for the sake of marriage, that kisses, touches, embraces, lingering delights, or the danger of falling into any grave sin intervene.

II. When it takes place between those who are of unequal condition, because of scandal and the danger of sinning mortally.

III. If it takes place with those with whom marriage cannot be contracted, such as married persons, cloistered religious, and those constituted in sacred orders, both because such love cannot be made honorable by the end of marriage and because scandal and the danger of falling into mortal faults intervene.

IV. If it takes place in church, both because of irreverence and because of the danger of hearing Mass without due attention, and also because of scandal.

V. If there is a command of the father or mother or guardian reasonably prohibiting such love, because even if the other circumstances are honorable, children of a household and wards are bound in a grave matter, as this undoubtedly is, to obey parents or guardians under pain of mortal sin.

VI. When it is carried on secretly and in concealment, both because the person is exposed to grave dangers and the proximate occasion of sinning gravely, and because when it is so carried on it is regularly done against the will of parents or guardians, whom children and wards ought to obey.

VII. If it takes place at night, because of scandal and the danger of sinning, etc.

VIII. If it takes place under the pretext of honorable recreation and relaxing the mind, because the danger and proximate occasion of falling always press because of the long delay, during which there are conversations, mutual looks, declarations of love, etc.

IX. If it takes place in such a manner that of itself it involves the proximate danger of kisses, touches, etc., even if from another standpoint that love were lawfully practiced because it is between unmarried persons and for the sake of marriage; if, for example, the lover is admitted into the home or comes so near that everyone sees that there is a proximate occasion of touches, etc.

X. If the male or female lover notices that the partner in love is gravely tempted, or that one urges the other by shameful words or in some other way toward dishonorable things, etc., even if the other partner is not tempted at all and feels no inclination to sin; in that case that love will be unlawful for both because of the proximate danger of delight and active scandal in one, and passive scandal in the other, in which charity toward one’s neighbor will be gravely injured.

XI. Finally, speaking universally, whenever because of the love affair the male or female lover frequently falls into some grave evil, then the love takes on the character of a proximate occasion of evil and is altogether unlawful.

All these instances should be well considered and penitents who are dominated by the passions should be carefully questioned, using due precaution; then I should like to ask whether the above-mentioned proposition is not incontestable, namely, that the love affairs in our day are, for the greater part, the near occasion of sin. And if this is so, how should not that penitent be warned who has been frequently exhorted and yet will not amend; who perhaps even quarrels with the confessor and expects to compel absolution from him?

I summon before God's tribunal all those confessors who seek renown from dangerous complaisance by absolving all without reflection! They are the ruin of youth, indeed, of the world, for a badly brought-up youth is the formation of all evils and of all family disorders." (Instructions for Confessors by L. of P. Maurizio.)

Any one with experience in the confessional knows how true and important these words of Blessed Leonard are for every confessor.

Gopfert in the book quoted above, writes briefly and admirably about this kind of love affairs as follows: When the parties in question do not intend marriage, or if they, on account of circumstances, will never be able to get married, or if only after a long time (this must be left to the prudent judgment of the confessor), then the keeping of such company is occasio proxima voluntaria absens (non in esse~) and if the parties have been warned a few times by their confessors, without result, then they are not to be absolved until they obey. This is to be enforced so much more strictly if they have been sinning grievously one with another, or if their conduct has given scandal. In this regard the parents, too, especially the mothers, should be earnestly exhorted in Confession, so that they will not permit their daughters to be absent from the house at evening and night, to associate with young fellows, in which case sin is often not far off. This strict proceeding is all the more necessary if such acquaintances were already begun with no good intentions. It is sinful to accept presents, given with the purpose to start an illicit love affair, even if the recipient fosters no wrong intention, unless explicit protest is made against any bad purpose, for by accepting the present an impure hope is created in the giver, which imperils the receiver. Indeed, such persons should be induced, in order to avoid all danger for the future, either to return the presents thus received, to destroy them, or to distribute them among the poor (Reuter, Neoconf. n. 113; Lehmkuhl I. 645; S. Alf. I. 6 n. 854).

Ad 2. (After the above discussion the solving of the second question is not difficult.) Was Father Lucas correct in allowing Titius to go and take leave of Ursula, in her room alone and at night? We have learned that Titius declares himself willing to give up his sinful relations on the condition that he may go and say goodbye. He gives as reason that he has much to discuss with her and that he must recover some articles of his. He chooses the night-time that people shall not talk about him. None of these reasons are valid, because whatever he has to tell her he can do by writing, and the articles belonging to him can be sent to him either through the mail, or by some trustworthy person. Why should there be a leave-taking, when there must never be another meeting between them? When saying goodbye people are likely to become wrought up. The passion, strong enough to have caused them to sin, would be powerfully aroused, and instead of a parting there may very likely be the beginning of a new life of sin; at the very least there would be grievous sinning more than probable, and this would be favored by the time, the place, and the circumstances (solus cum sola ultimo). It would really be a miracle if no sin would be committed. God protects only those who venture into danger through necessity. Titius is frail. He has been unsuccessful in combating temptations. Will he not almost certainly be overcome again? Will the tempter or temptress not whisper to him, Just once more, it is the last time! Consequently Father L.ucas had no right to allow Titius this nocturnal farewell visit.

Strange as it may seem, it is a certain undeniable fact that there is not, on the entire continent of Europe, or in the entire world, a single country, Protestant or Catholic, that upholds the Pagan system of education which has been adopted in this free country. In all of them Catholic and Protestant children receive religious instruction, during the school-hours, from their respective pastors. The present system of the Public Schools in the United States professes to exclude all religious exercises. We are often told that this is the American system, and that it is very impertinent for foreigners to wish to bring religion into schools against the American idea. Now the assertion that the exclusion of all religion from the schools is truly American, that it is an essential part of our national system, is utterly false. So far as any system of public schools can be said to have an American idea, the idea will be found to be "education based on religious instruction."

The first schools established in the Union were religious denominational schools. These schools were supported by the churches with which they were connected, and by their patrons. Religious exercises formed a part of the daily duties of the class-room. The early founders of this Republic were not able to understand how they could bring up their children in the knowledge, love, and service of God by banishing the Bible, prayer, and religious exercises of every kind from the school. Hence religion was reverenced, and its duties attended to in all institutions of learning in the country. The American system of education, in its incipiency, and for a long while, was one founded on Bible-teaching and religious exercises. The present system is un-American, anti-American.

Now how did it happen that the primitive Christian system of education became unchristian and anti-American? To make you understand more clearly the origin of the present system of the Public Schools, I must first show you how Secret Societies seek to spread Irreligious Education in Europe.

These societies profess the most irreligious and anti-social doctrines. Among the chief means employed by them for pushing forward their diabolical principles is Education without Religion. The "International," one of the most powerful of these organizations, has lately put forward a programme, in which the following points are laid down as most necessary to be insisted upon in the agitation conducted by the socialist democratic party in Switzerland:

"... Compulsory and gratuitous education up to the completion of the fourteenth year of each child's age.... Separation of the Church from the State, and also of the schools from the Church."

About three short years ago a pamphlet was published in which we find detailed the efforts made in France to spread irreligion by means of bad education. The letters of eighty of the Prelates of France are appended to the pamphlet. Alas! the sad forebodings of that noble episcopate have been too soon and too terribly fulfilled!

The following lengthy extracts are taken from the late Pastoral of the Bishops of Ireland on Christian Education:

"EFFORTS TO SPREAD IRRELIGIOUS EDUCATION IN FRANCE—DISASTROUS RESULTS IN FRANCE.

"'I see,' says the most reverend author, 'that for some time past the most extraordinary efforts are made in France to spread impiety, immorality, the most anti-social theories, under the pretext of spreading education. No longer as formerly, it is in newspapers and books that religion, morality, and the eternal principles of good order are attacked with the most deceitful and formidable weapon of a corrupt system of education. Under cover of an excellent object—and here is the great danger, for we are deluded by this pretext—under the pretext of spreading education and waging war against ignorance, infidelity is spread, war is waged against religion; and thus, whether we will or no, we rush on to the ruin of all order, moral and social. And we, the Bishops, who are as desirous as others, and perhaps more desirous than others, to see spread far and wide the blessings of education, the education of children, female education, the education of our whole people, for this is by excellence a Christian work, we are accused of being enemies of education, because we oppose anti-Christian and anti-social education.'"

The first fact mentioned by the learned writer is the existence of schools, which are called "professional schools for females," into which young girls are received at twelve years of age and upwards, for the purpose of continuing their education and learning a profession. These schools have been founded by women, free-thinkers, who formally and expressly declare it to be their object to train the youth of their own sex in rationalism and infidelity. The following incident shows the impious end for which these schools have been founded: One of the principal teachers died, and over her grave her husband pronounced these words,—"I will tell you, for it is my duty to tell you, that if this funeral is that of a free-thinker" [unaccompanied by any religious ceremony], "it is so not only by my wish, but also and chiefly because such was the desire of my dear wife." He adds that she had devoted herself to "the great work of spreading education and morality without religion, because she had no faith except in learning and in justice; she was of those who, having once seen and comprehended these truths, can have no other beacon to guide them in life, or at the hour of death." Round that grave, whose occupant had rejected religion and its ministrations in life and in death, stood three hundred girls, pupils of those "professional schools," holding bouquets in their hands, and throwing flowers on the coffin of their mistress. The schools are of a piece with the teachers. Ten hours are spent in them, but all religious instruction is strictly forbidden, under the pretext that they are free schools, "open to children of all persuasions, without religious distinction." The founders of these schools propose to give to the girls intrusted to them a moral education without ever speaking to them of religion! And this is the system of education which people are anxious to spread throughout France, and even in this country also. But, though we hope they will not succeed, can we feel fully confident that we shall escape the contagion, when we remember that this system is no other than the "mixed system," and when we bear in mind the untiring efforts which are made to develop and consolidate that system in Ireland in every branch of education, from the university, through the model-school, down to the humblest village-school? Read the description of the schools in France, of which we are speaking, and say, does it not apply to every school, even in Ireland, where the mixed principle is thoroughly carried out?

"The printed prospectus of these schools" [continues the most reverend writer] "clearly explains the advantages of professional education, while it hides the religious danger under vague expressions of an apparent liberality, such as the following: 'The school is open to children of all persuasions, without religious distinction.' The meaning of which words is no other than that in these schools, where children are kept from the twelfth to the eighteenth year of their age, and for ten hours every day (from eight a.m. to six p.m.), God and the Gospel shall be treated as if they never existed; not only religion shall never be mentioned, but these girls shall be taught morality independent of any dogmatic faith, any religion....

"The second engine used by the enemies of religion in France for the maintenance and spread of infidelity, is the Educational League. This League has been introduced from Belgium into France by the Freemasons and the 'Solidaires'—the members of an impious association, the avowed object of which is to prevent persons from receiving the sacraments, or any of the sacred rites of the Church, in life or in death. The Educational League, with a wonderful spirit of propagandism, has established throughout France libraries and courses of instruction for men and for women, and even for girls and young children. On their banner is inscribed 'Spread of Education'; but under this device is hidden the scheme of propagating irreligion. The founder of the 'League' in France^A was a Freemason, and both his declarations and those of the organs of Freemasonry leave no doubt of the Masonic origin of the scheme, and of the spirit which animates it. Now the third article of the statutes of the 'League' declares, when speaking of the education to be given by their association, that 'neither politics nor religion shall have any part in it.' And lest there should be any mistake as to the meaning of this article, one of the leading Masonic journals declares that religion is 'useless as an instrument for forming the minds of children, and that from a certain point of view it is capable of leading them to abandon all moral principles. It is incumbent on us, therefore,' concludes this journal, 'to exclude all religion. We will teach you its rights and duties in the name of liberty, of conscience, of reason, and, in fine, in the name of our society.'^B And again: 'Freemasons must give in their adhesion en masse to the excellent Educational League, and the lodges must in the peace of their temples seek out the best means of making it effectual. Their influence in this way will be most useful. The principles we profess are precisely in accord with those which inspired that project.'^C In April of the same year, the same organ of Freemasonry contained the following paragraph: 'We are happy to announce that the Educational League and the statue of our brother Voltaire meet with the greatest support in all the lodges. There could not be two subscription-lists more in harmony with each other: Voltaire, the representative of the destruction of prejudices and superstition; the Educational League, the engine for building up a new society based solely upon learning and instruction. Our brethren understood it so.' In fine, that there may not remain upon our minds the least doubt as to the identity of the principles of this League with those of Voltaire, we find its founder in France proposing, at a great Masonic dinner, a toast to the memory of that arch-infidel; while the newspaper from which we have quoted so largely, informs its readers that at one of the 'professional schools,' described above, the prize for good conduct (le prix de morale) was awarded to 'the daughters of a free-thinker, who have never attended any place of religious worship.'"

A Jean Macé.

B "La Solidarite." (Le Monde Maconnique, October, 5866 [1866], p. 472.)

C "La Solidarite." (Le Monde Maconnique, February, 5867 [1867].)

We cannot better conclude our remarks on the efforts made in France to destroy religion in the masses by means of education, than in the following words of warning, not less applicable to good and sincere Catholics in Ireland nowadays, than to those to whom they were specially addressed:

"Good and sincere Catholics (continues the author of the pamphlet already quoted), who, deceived by the motto of the association, have given their names to this Educational League, take part, without knowing it, in a Masonic institution, and in building up this new state of society, from which religion is to be banished. Well may the Bishop of Metz say: 'These persons forget that, like Proteus in the fable, Freemasonry knows how to multiply ad infinitum its transformations and its names. Yesterday it called itself 'Les Solidaires,' or 'morality independent of religion,' or 'freedom of thought'; to-day it takes the title of an 'Educational League'; to-morrow it will find some other name by which to deceive the simple."

The efforts to corrupt the youth of unhappy France by means of bad education in its higher branches, have been not less energetic and wide-spread. The lectures of the School of Medicine of Paris were inaugurated in 1865, amid shouts of "Materialism forever,"^D and on the thirtieth of December a candidate for degrees was permitted by the Medical Faculty to advance the following revolutionary doctrine, grounded on the materialistic principles he had been taught: "Who still speaks to us of free-will? As the stone which falls to the ground obeys the laws of weight, man obeys the laws which are proper to him.... Responsibility is the same for all, that is to say, none." And again: "Physicians must not be accomplices of the magistrates and judges, who punish men for acts for which they are not responsible"—pp. 32, 33. Here we have a sample of the teaching of the School of Medicine of Paris, not only the first medical school of France, but among the first schools of Europe. And this sample is, unfortunately, not a solitary one. The Medical Faculty of the University of Paris gave medals in 1866 for two dissertations, in one of which we find a denial of the act of creation and of God the Creator, and a rejection of every metaphysical idea, as useless and dangerous; while human thought is set down as produced by heat! In the other we read the following propositions: "Matter is eternal." "The action of a First Cause is useless and irrational—it is chimerical!" Again: "It is absolutely impossible to explain the existence of a creative power"; and "an immaterial being is not necessary for the production of life." And, "to attribute the phenomena of life to an immaterial soul, is to substitute a chimerical being for the hypothesis of machinists." "Materialists have done good service to physiology by eliminating metaphysical entities from this study. The idea of the soul, as an immaterial power, is a mere abstraction; in fact, nothing of the kind exists."

D Vive le Materialisme.

Unhappily these principles, subversive of all morality, are not advanced by the aspirants only to academical distinctions; most certainly the students would not advance these theories had they not learned them from their masters. Hence we find one of the Professors of the University of France, in Bordeaux, asserting, that "even among civilized nations moral ideas are so relative, contradictory, and dependent on exterior and individual relations, that it is impossible, and will always be impossible, to find an absolute definition of goodness."—p. 38, note. And the "Medical Review" published the discourse pronounced by one of the physicians of the Faculty of Paris, M. Verneuil, over the grave of a member of their learned body, Dr. Foucher, in which we find the following:

"'We are reproached with believing with the sages of old, that Fate is blind, and as such presides over our lot. And why should we not believe it?... Humbling and sad as is this admission, still we must make it: imperceptible elements of the great social organization appearing upon this earth as living beings, fragments of matter agitated by a spirit, we are born, we live, and we die, unconscious of our destiny, playing our part without any precise notion of the end, and in the midst of the darkness which covers our origin and our end, having only one consolation—the love of our fellow-man.

"'This simple philosophy alone,' M. Verneuil continues, 'assuages our grief and ends by drying our tears. By the side of the half-open tomb we ask, whether he whom it contains served the good cause without deceit.... If, by his intelligence or his kindness of heart, he labored in the great work, we say he has paid his part of the common debt, and whether he returns to his original nothing or not, whether he is destroyed or merely changes his form, whether he hears our words or not, we thank him in the name of the past and of the future.'"

Another distinguished Professor published, in 1866, Lectures on the Physiology of the Nervous System, in which we find the following passage:

"We admit,' he says, 'without any restriction, that intellectual phenomena in animals are of the same order as in man....' 'As for free-will, we comprehend a certain kind of free-will in the more intelligent animals; and, on the other hand, we may add, that perhaps man is not so free as he would fain persuade himself he is.' And 'as to feeling the distinction between good and evil, it is a grave question, which we must first study in man himself!'"

Let it not be supposed that these principles are merely announced as abstractions; conclusions are drawn from them which must fill every thinking mind with horror. Eighty students of the Normal School, the great training institution of teachers for the North of France, applauded such conclusions in a public letter. Several of the infidel Professors of the Faculty of Medicine received ovations from crowded class-rooms; millions of immoral and irreligious books were scattered throughout the country. Thus Freemasonry, under the pretext of combating ignorance, wages a deceitful and implacable war against religion. "We too," says the organ of Freemasons,^E "we too expect our Messiah, the true Messiah, of the mind and reason—universal education!"

E Le Monde Maconnique, June, 1866.

"It is scarcely necessary for us to remind you, dearly beloved brethren, that the seeds of irreligion and anarchy thus sown broadcast over the fair face of France, have already produced a too abundant harvest of evils, perhaps the most disastrous recorded on the page of history. All Europe has been horrified by the atrocities perpetrated within the last few months in the name of liberty in that city, which was looked on as the centre of the civilization of the world. National monuments have been destroyed, peaceable citizens robbed and murdered, the venerable Archbishop, many of the clergy, and leading members of the civil and military authorities, massacred in cold blood. In other cities of France, too, we have seen anarchy and irreligion proclaimed—miscreants in arms against the property, and liberty, and lives of their fellow-citizens, often of the helpless and unprotected; and all this at a moment when the country was invaded, and a part of it occupied, by its enemies. The storm had been sown, and in very truth unfortunate France has reaped the whirlwind.

"And unhappily, dearly beloved brethren, the spread of infidel principles by means of bad education is not confined to France. A few years ago a congress of students was held in Liège, in Belgium, where infidel and anti-social principles in their worst form were proclaimed amidst the plaudits of the assembly. In England irreligion and socialism are publicly taught. Even in our own country it is a matter of notoriety, that a Chair in one of the Queen's Colleges has been occupied since their foundation by a gentleman, who, in a published work, extolled the first French revolution, and, in another place of the same book, compared our Saviour, whose name be praised forever, to Luther and to Mahomet! Again: In Trinity College one of the Fellows denies the fundamental truth of Christianity respecting the eternity of the punishment of sin; and others call in question the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures, or of portions of them, and impugn many truths which constitute the foundation of all revealed religion. In the same University, too, the doctrines of Positivism, a late form of infidel philosophy, have a large number of followers. The nature of that philosophy may be gathered from the following passages in the 'Catechism of Positivism, or Summary Exposition of the Universal Religion,' translated from the French of Auguste Comte. The preface begins thus:

"'In the name of the past and of the future, the servants of humanity—both its philosophical and practical servants—come forward to claim, as their due, the general direction of this world. Their object is to constitute at length a real Providence in all departments—moral, intellectual, and material. Consequently they exclude, once for all, from political supremacy, all the different servants of God—Catholic, Protestant, or Deist—as being at once behind-hand and a cause of disturbance.'

"The work consists of 'Thirteen Systematic Conversations between a Woman and a Priest of Humanity,' and the doctrines contained in it are epitomized in the following blasphemous lines:

"'In a word, Humanity definitely occupies the place of God, but she does not forget the services which the idea of God provisionally rendered.'

"Again, during the last two sessions of Parliament, a Select Committee of the House of Lords sat to inquire into the condition of the English Universities. The Marquis of Salisbury was the chairman. The evidence taken before that committee reveals the appalling fact that infidelity, or doubt as to the first principles of the Christian religion, nay, of belief in God, is wide-spread in the Universities of England, and especially among the most intellectual of the students; and that this sad result is due in a great measure to the teaching and examinations. In the first report for the session 1871, pp. 67, 69, and 70, in the evidence of the Rev. Professor Liddon, D.D., Canon of St. Paul's, London, and Professor of Exegesis in the University of Oxford, we find the following passages:

"Quest. 695. Chairman.—'Very strong evidence has been given to us upon the influence of the Final School' (the examination for degrees with honors) 'upon Oxford thought, as tending to produce at least momentary disbelief.'

"Witness.—'I have no doubt whatever it is one of the main causes of our present embarrassments.'

"696.—'That, I suppose, is a comparatively new phenomenon?'

"'Yes; it dates from the last great modification in the system pursued in the Honors School of literæ humaniores. It is mainly the one-sided system, as I should venture to call it, of modern philosophical writers.'

"697.—'Is there any special defect in the management which produces this state of things, or is it essential to the nature of the school?'

"'I fear it is to a great extent essential to the nature of the school, as its subjects are at present distributed.'

"Again, in answer to Question 706, the same witness says:

"'I ought to have stated to the noble Chairman just now that cases have come within my own experience of men who have come up from school as Christians, and have been earnest Christians up to the time of beginning to read philosophy for the Final School, but who, during the year and a half or two years employed in this study, have surrendered first their Christianity, and next their belief in God, and have left the University not believing in a Supreme Being.'"

Now what kind of a being is the infidel, or the man without religion? To have no religion is a crime, and to boast of having none is the height of folly. He that has no religion must necessarily lose the esteem and confidence of his friends. What confidence, I ask, can be placed in a man who has no religion, and, consequently, no knowledge of his duties? What confidence can you place in a man who never feels himself bound by any obligation of conscience, who has no higher motive to direct him than his self-love, his own interests? The pagan Roman, though enlightened only by reason, had yet virtue enough to say: "I live not for myself, but for the Republic"; but the infidel's motto is: "I live only for myself; I care for no one but myself." Oh, what a monster would such a man be in society were he really to think as he speaks, and to act as he thinks!

A man who has no religion, must first prove that he is honest before we can believe him to be so. It is said of kings and rulers, they must prove that they have a heart, and it may also be said of the man who has no religion, that he must prove that he has a conscience. And I fear he would not find it so easy a task.

A man without religion is a man without reason, a man without principle, a man sunk in the grossest ignorance of what religion is. He blasphemes what he does not understand. He rails at the doctrines of Christianity, without really knowing what these doctrines are. He sneers at the doctrines and practices of religion, because he cannot refute them. He speaks with the utmost gravity of the fine arts, the fashions, and even matters the most trivial, and he turns into ridicule the most sacred subjects. In the midst of his own circle of fops and silly women, he utters his shallow conceits with all the pompous assurance of a pedant.

The man without religion is a dishonest plagiarist, who copies from Christian writers all the objections made against the Church by the infidels of former and modern times; but he takes good care to omit all the excellent answers and complete refutations which are contained in these very same writings. His object is not to seek the truth, but to propagate falsehood.

The man without religion is a slave of the most degrading superstition. Instead of worshipping the true, free, living God, who governs all things by His Providence, he bows before the horrid phantom of blind chance or inexorable destiny. He is a man who obstinately refuses to believe the most solidly-established facts in favor of religion, and yet, with blind credulity, greedily swallows the most absurd falsehoods uttered against religion. He is a man whose reason has fled, and whose passions speak, object and decide in the name of reason.