Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article Second. On the Danger of Sin.
325. Notions. 1. The danger of sinning is constituted by everything which induces to sin, as temptation and an occasion of sin.
This danger is internal if it comes from an internal cause, as a base imagination; it is external if it comes from an external cause, as a thing alluring to sin.
This danger is called grave, or proximate, if it is morally certainly connected with sin; it is called light, or remote, if the connection with sin is not morally certain.
Grave danger is absolutely or of itself grave if it is such commonly for all; relatively or accidentally grave if it is such only for some on account of a peculiar disposition.
Note. If now it is asked whether and what sin he commits who exposes himself to the danger of sinning, the discussion is about sin considered objectively. Hence, for sin to be committed subjectively, it is required that he who exposes himself to the danger apprehend that this is prohibited by law.
326. Principles. 1. We are held under grave obligation to avoid grave or proximate danger of sinning gravely. And indeed by the same precept by which we are held to avoid mortal sin, we are also held to avoid its proximate danger: for he who does not avoid it when he can is convicted of loving the sin whose danger he loves.1
a. The sin which is committed by him who without necessity exposes himself to grave danger of sinning is of the same gravity and species as the sin itself whose danger he approaches.
b. He who exposes himself to the danger of sinning commits sin, even if he does not sin in the danger; yet he who afterward, placed in the danger, actually sins, commits only one sin: for the depraved consent by which he exposes himself to the danger and by which afterward he consents to the sin is the same.
c. He also exposes himself to grave danger of sinning who approaches a danger which indeed at the beginning is light, yet in such a way that he foresees that it will afterward become grave, as is accustomed to happen in danger of sinning against chastity, because in the danger itself lust burns more.
- From a just cause it is licit to expose oneself even to the proximate danger of sinning, provided that apt precautions are applied, by which the danger becomes remote. For he who from a just cause exposes himself to danger does not love the sin, but the good cause on account of which he undergoes the danger; therefore he can rightly and deservedly hope for the help of God, lest he fall in the danger.
a. The cause of necessity for undergoing the danger of sin ought to be greater in proportion as the sin about which there is question is greater, and in proportion as the danger of committing the sin itself is greater.
b. Apt precautions by which a fall into sin may be excluded are: to retain a firm purpose of not sinning; to pray to God; to foster a pious thought; if the danger lasts rather long, the use of the sacraments and the exercise of pious reading.
c. Without a just cause, even with the purpose of not sinning and of applying apt precautions, it is not licit to expose oneself to the danger of sinning, because we are proximately obliged to avoid the danger unless a just cause excuses. Therefore God does not aid by his help those who, by rashly exposing themselves to danger, fail in their obligation. But if someone is found in danger from a just cause, God does not desert him by his help.2
d. If it is certainly foreseen that sin will be committed in the danger, it is never licit to offer oneself to it spontaneously; for this to be licit, it is altogether required that there be a founded hope that the sin will be avoided with the help of God: for certain sin must be avoided absolutely.
- We are held under light obligation to avoid light or remote danger of sinning gravely, and proximate danger of sinning lightly; wherefore it is licit to approach danger of this kind only from a reasonable cause. For some disorder against reason is had in this, that someone without cause places a useless action, with which moreover a danger of sinning is joined.
a. By light danger is understood a true danger of sinning, although small, which is founded in some special reason; a danger which morally is none and is equivalent to the mere possibility of sinning we are not held to avoid, because we cannot avoid danger of this kind, since it is found in almost every human action. Otherwise, as the Apostle says, we would have to go out of this world.3
b. Concerning both light danger of sinning gravely and grave danger of sinning venially, that must be noted which Lehmkuhl has (n. 486, IV): "If that from which the danger arises is an action honorable and useful in itself, from this goodness itself there is had a sufficient reason for acting, so that we ought not to attend to that slight danger, but rather fortify ourselves by applying remedies; for otherwise innumerable useful actions would be impeded by fear of sinning."
Note. The question is controverted whether it is a grave sin to expose oneself to probable danger, not morally certain danger, of sinning gravely. Very many authors indeed with St. Alphonsus4 affirm that it is a grave sin; but it is scarcely credible that one offering himself to the danger of sinning gravely with a serious and reasonable hope that he will not fall sins gravely, since it cannot be affirmed that he wills the sin, since the sin is not necessarily joined with the danger to which he exposes himself. For the rest, several authors who are cited for the affirmative sentence seem to adhere to it more in words than in reality.5
2 Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5, n. 63.
3 1 Cor. 5, 10.
4 Cf. l. 5, n. 63; l. 6, n. 453.
5 Cf. Lacroix, Theologia moralis, l. 5, n. 252 ff. Berardi, De recidivis et occasionariis^3 (Faenza: Novelli, 1897), II, pr. 4 ff., who defend the affirmative sentence, which Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 692 ff., and Genicot II, n. 372, think must be abandoned.