Chapter VI: On the Danger of Sinning

St. Alphonsus, V, 63; VI, 452-453; H. Ap., tr. III, n. 69 and tr. ult. n. 2; Croix, l. V, n. 257; Aertnys, I, 232; VI, 299, 300; Lehmkuhl, II, n. 617; Berardi, Prax. Conf.; de Recidivis et Occas.; Gury-Ferreres, II, n. 628; Konings, n. 1429; Instr. past. Eystettensis, ed. V, n. 331; Card. G. Van Rossum, Commentarius de Judicio Sacramentali, a. 2-3.

373. DEFINITION. Danger is the likelihood of an imminent evil. Therefore the danger of sin can be called everything which disposes or impels to sin, for example, grave temptation, a depraved habit, an external occasion.

DIVISION. The danger of sin can be:

1. By reason of cause, intrinsic or extrinsic. It is intrinsic if it proceeds from an internal cause, for example, from a bad disposition of the subject; extrinsic, if it proceeds from an external cause, for example, from a circumstance enticing to sin.

2. By reason of conjunction with a fall, proximate or remote. It is proximate if it is frequently joined with sin, or if the fall is very probable; "then," as St. Alphonsus says (H. Ap., tr. III, n. 69), "although the fall is uncertain, nevertheless the danger is certain"; in other words, the causal connection with sin is morally certain, although the event of sin is probable or uncertain, because concerning free contingents more cannot be had. It is remote if it rarely draws sin with itself, or if the fall is little probable. Each is estimated either from things commonly happening, or from the peculiar circumstances in which the subject is placed (cf. n. 357, 2).

The PROXIMATE danger is such either per se or per accidens. It is proximate PER SE, or absolutely, if frequently from its very nature it induces into sin, namely in such a way that men constituted in it commonly sin for the most part. It is proximate PER ACCIDENS or respectively, if it belongs to it, according to the various condition of men, with respect to one person to have, and with respect to another not to have, a frequent connection with sin. Now this connection is judged to be had if someone constituted in it either has already fallen frequently, or prudently ought to fear lest on account of his known frailty he is going to fall (VI, 452; H. Ap., tr. ult., n. 2).

374. PRINCIPLES. I. Freely to offer oneself to the proximate danger of sinning, or voluntarily to remain in it, is never lawful. This is gathered from Scripture (Ecclus. 3:27): He who loves danger will perish in it. And the reason is: 1. because he who loves, or who, with no necessity compelling, wills the cause of some evil, by that very fact is judged to will the evil which is joined with it; 2. because any law, just as it forbids the violation of itself, so also forbids that which of itself induces to this violation. Therefore he who freely undergoes danger of this kind sins both against charity toward himself and against the virtue to the danger of whose wounding he exposes himself, although in reality the wounding does not follow. And in confession the species of the sin whose danger was induced must be explained.

Nor does it stand in the way to say that in danger, even proximate, the fall is not certain but only probable, and non-fall is equally probable. For it is answered that in that case, although the fall is uncertain, nevertheless the danger of the fall is certain, since it is constituted in the very probability of the fall. Now, if it is wrong to use a probable opinion, without just cause, with danger of another's harm, spiritual or temporal (as is certain among all), how much more where danger threatens one's own soul (V, 13; VI, 453; H. Ap., tr. III, n. 69). Cf. n. 83.

375. II. From a just cause, it is lawful to offer oneself to the proximate danger of sin, and to remain in it; provided that the necessary cautions are interposed, by which the fall is averted. "The reason is because a danger proximate of itself then becomes remote, both by reason of the circumstance of necessity and by reason at the same time of the preventative means which the person proposes (as he is bound) to employ, namely by diligently turning the mind away from base delectation or another passion; and besides, by fortifying himself with pious thoughts, prayers, and frequency of the sacraments. These means indeed, although they do not suffice for excusing where just cause is lacking, because God does not help those rashly exposing themselves to danger; nevertheless he well furnishes his help to him who from just cause does not leave the occasion, since in that case he remains in that occasion not from affection to sin, but from a certain necessity" (V, 63 p. med.).

Hence it is inferred: "1. Surgeons are excused if they expose themselves to danger in treating women, although at times in the past they have already fallen on account of such an occasion; so pastors who in receiving confessions have experienced the same misery; so also others are excused who cannot leave their own office, say of courtier, soldier, innkeeper, or merchant, without grave detriment ... But otherwise it must be said of simple confessors who have several times fallen in hearing confessions: because these are bound to abstain from such exercise, if they can without grave detriment of reputation or faculties" (ibid.).

2. In the extreme necessity of the neighbor, for example, if an infant is certainly going to die without Baptism, not only can you, but you are bound to succor him with a danger of sinning per se probable; because then necessity causes the danger to become remote; whence if you can, you are bound. "Nevertheless the continuator of Tournely with Sylvius says that if the danger is such that the fall is more probable, then in no way can you or ought you expose yourself to it; because each one ought to regard his own salvation more than that of others. But to this it could be answered that in such a case of extreme necessity, provided the fall is not morally certain, although it is more probable, you are bound to fortify yourself more strongly with prayers and pious works, and then to trust concerning a greater help of God: for then it would reasonably be hoped that God will increase help where greater necessity urges" (II, 26; VI, 453).

3. When the danger of formally sinning is so proximate that the fall is foreseen with moral certitude, it must absolutely be avoided, nor does any cause then excuse; because none can be proportionate to danger of this kind, since the supreme law is the salvation of the soul. Hence that saying of the Lord Savior: If thy right eye scandalizes thee, pluck it out and cast it from thee (Matt. 5:29).

376. Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether we are bound to avoid a LIGHT and remote danger of sinning?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If the danger is so light and remote that it can be equated to the mere possibility of sinning, we are not bound to avoid it; otherwise, says the Apostle (1 Cor. 5:10), you would have had to go out of this world. And the reason is because a danger of this kind, properly and morally speaking, is not a danger; and he who judged otherwise would act rashly and imprudently, as the scrupulous do, who often increase danger through their vain fears.

2. If the danger is light in this sense, that on account of a special reason there is had a slight probability of sinning mortally, we are bound to avoid it under venial sin, unless some necessity of acting excuses. And the reason is because, just cause lacking, to approach such danger without due caution is not without some rashness and disorder. Fault can become mortal if, with the danger increasing, the probability of sinning becomes grave (III, 484; Berardi, de Recid. et Occas., n. 6).

QUAER. 2. Whether he committed two sins who exposed himself to danger of sinning, and then consented into the thing itself?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. If the danger to which he exposed himself was light and remote, and afterwards he consented to grave sin, he certainly committed two sins: one, namely, and this light, by positing the cause; but the other, and this grave, by positing the effect. The reason is because the second sin must be ascribed more to a new determination of the will than to the cause previously posited.

2. But if the danger to which he exposed himself was proximate, that is, if he posited a cause gravely influencing, and then, the same depraved influence persevering, came into the effect, he does not seem to have committed two sins, nor to be bound to confess the cause separately from the completed work. For the first consent persevered in the effect, that is, in the influence of the cause, and was of the same species and of the same gravity as the very consummation of the sin. But otherwise it must be said if the danger is judged to have ceased for some time, or at least to have been removed through an act of the will. Otherwise also, if someone approached the danger through acts distinct in malice, for example, through base touches, and then, with concupiscence increasing, had fallen into something worse (cf. n. 328, Reg. 3, I).

377. TEMPTATION, taken generally, is an incitement to sin proposed to our will, either by the demon, or by the world, or by our own concupiscence.

Now: 1. The demon for the most part tempts by moving our fantasy and our sensitive appetite. 2. The world tempts us either through fears which it casts into souls, or through the enticements of the senses. 3. Concupiscence finally tempts by drawing the consent of the will to illicit things. It is threefold: concupiscence of the flesh, concupiscence of the eyes, and pride of life (1 John 2:16).

The movements of concupiscence are PASSIONS. These cloud reason and entice the will, both through distraction; and through the contrariety of inclination which the inferior part induces; and finally through a certain bodily alteration, from which reason is in some way bound, lest it freely go forth into act (1.2, q. 77, a. 1 and 2).

378. God permits temptations chiefly on account of the following reasons: 1. Temptations give man knowledge of himself, and teach him both how much he ought to distrust himself and how much he ought to trust in God; 2. they render him more fervent in the service of God; 3. they induce into love of the heavenly Fatherland, where there are no snares, nor struggles; 4. they cause virtues to put down deeper roots; 5. they increase merits and future glory; 6. they instruct man not only for himself, but also for others, etc. (St. Greg., Moral., l. 23, c. 27; St. Bernard, Serm. 64, in Cant.; St. Alph., Vera Sposa, c. 13, § 3).

The REMEDIES against temptations are: 1. Watchfulness; whence Christ the Lord: What I say to you, I say to all: watch (Mark 13:37). 2. Flight from idleness; whence St. Jerome: "Let the devil always find you occupied." 3. Prayer: and this is the most powerful means by which victory can be obtained. Whence in temptation let no one trust himself, but let him immediately have recourse to the most powerful names of Jesus and Mary, invoke the holy Guardian Angel, sign himself with the cross, etc...., nor cease to pray until the danger is removed. 4. Thought concerning the Passion of Jesus Christ, or concerning the punishments of hell, or concerning death, etc...., or concerning the torment of remorse which the soul suffers after the sin has been perpetrated, or also concerning the fruit going to come to us through resistance. 5. A fervent act of love toward God, with the purpose of undergoing death rather than sinning (cf. n. 322 and 367, etc., Remedies).

Note. In temptations against faith and chastity, it is expedient not to resist the temptation by acts directly opposed to it, but to divert the mind to other things, to despise the tempter, and rather to elicit acts of love, confidence, and contrition (cf. n. 800). If temptations continue to molest, it is expedient (ordinarily speaking) to open them to the moderator of conscience, because the devil, entirely dark, fears the light. No one is more insolent than a robber so long as he lies hidden; and no one more timid than he when he has been manifested; such is the devil, says St. Gregory (ap. Scavini, t. 1, 718).

See several things apud St. Alphonsus, Homo Ap., App. II, § 2, where motives or remedies are suggested against various temptations, especially for the dying; Regol. di vita comp., n. IX; Pratica di amar G. C., c. ult. and elsewhere.