The Capital Vices

335. Notions. 1. Capital sins are not called capital or mortal because they would be the greatest sins or always mortal, but because, having arisen from original sin, they are as heads and sources from which many other sins arise. But they are sources of sins not as acts, but rather insofar as they are depraved passions or habitual propensions; therefore they are better called capital vices than capital sins.

According to the doctrine of St. Thomas, other sins arise from the capital vices as from a final cause. For since the object which the capital vices inordinately seek vehemently allures man, as riches, which avarice seeks, in order to attain that object frequently and abundantly he applies many and diverse illicit means, which are so many sins arisen from a capital vice.²

2. After St. Gregory the Great³ and St. Thomas,⁴ the capital vices are commonly numbered as seven: pride, avarice, lust, envy, gluttony, anger, sloth. Concerning each one the treatment must be so made that they are considered both insofar as they are vices and insofar as they are sins.

a. The seven capital vices are not enumerated by all in the same way: for some, considering pride as the root of all vices, still number seven under it, of which the first is ambition; but others, numbering pride among the seven capital vices, place ambition in the first place among its daughters.

b. The seven vices are comprehended in the mnemonic word Saligia, whose individual letters signify the individual vices in order.

§ 1. On Pride.

¹ St. Thomas, De malo, q. 8 ff. Holzmann, Theologia moralis, l. 1, tr. 3, disp. 2, c. 5. Struggl, Theologia moralis, tr. 2, q. 3. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 697-745.

² St. Thomas I-II, q. 84, a. 3.

³ Moralia, l. 31, c. 7.

⁴ Summa I-II, q. 84, a. 4.

336. 1. Pride is defined as an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. Pride is opposed by excess to the virtue of humility.

a. Inordinate: for there is also an ordered love of one's own excellence, when someone does not esteem his own goods more than is fitting, and desires to be preferred to others because he judges that it will be useful for the glory of God and his own salvation or that of others.

b. Pride arises from this, that a man, considering his own excellence and not adverting that he has it from God, values it more than is fitting. This consideration brings it about that he conceives an excessive estimation of himself, is pleased with himself, prefers himself to others, despises others, desires to manifest his own excellence to others, to be honored and praised by them, and to be placed before them.

2. Complete pride is a sin mortal from its whole genus; incomplete pride is a sin venial from its whole genus.

a. Complete pride is that by which someone so wishes to excel and to be placed before others that he wishes to be subject to no one, neither to superiors nor to God himself; such is the pride of the devil. This contains direct, not only indirect and virtual, aversion from God, and on that account belongs to the gravest sins of all.

b. Incomplete pride is that by which someone, while retaining subjection toward God and superiors, values himself more than is fitting and desires to excel above others, whom he despises and contemns as inferiors. Incomplete pride is a venial sin: for the inordinate appetite of a thing indifferent of itself is venial. But accidentally it can be a grave sin, namely if it is joined with grave injury of others, or if it induces one to commit other grave sins.

3. Pride is not undeservedly called the mother of all sins, because inordinate love of one's own excellence can move one to any sins whatever; nevertheless there are certain sins which in a peculiar sense are called daughters of pride, insofar as pride induces to them almost by a natural necessity. These are the following:

a. Presumption, which is the appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. This of itself is venial, unless someone through his lack of skill exposes himself to grave danger of injury to be inflicted on God or neighbor, as if someone without sufficient skill desires to exercise the office of pastor, physician, judge, etc.

b. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of honor and dignity not owed, as if someone ambitiously seeks an office of which he is unworthy. But to seek a dignity or honor suitable to oneself with moderation and from a good end is not a sin, but an act of magnanimity.

c. Vain glory, which is the inordinate appetite of the manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious, as if someone inordinately seeks praise or rejoices concerning the humiliation of others. He does not commit the vice of vain glory who, on account of an honorable end, strives to excel, e.g. that he may become fit for an office to be carried out afterward, that he may please his parents, that he may obtain a prize proposed. It is called vanity if someone seeks praise and honor from goods of lesser moment, e.g. from wealth, from bodily beauty, from garments, etc.

Vain glory manifests itself in a threefold way:

a. boasting, which is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence through words;

b. ostentation, which is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence through deeds or signs;

c. hypocrisy, which is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence through simulated virtues.

§ 2. On Avarice.

337. 1. Avarice is defined as an inordinate appetite of temporal goods, i.e. of goods of fortune. Avarice is opposed by defect to the virtue of liberality.

a. The love of riches is inordinate if it is not ruled by a due and honorable end, such as providing for the necessities of a family, doing good to others, etc.; moreover, if through excessive solicitude for acquiring riches or excessive parsimony the mode prescribed by reason in these matters is injured.

b. The vice of avarice can be found equally in the poor man and in the rich man, since each can adhere with excessive affection to things possessed or desire things to be possessed with excessive desire.

2. Avarice is a sin venial from its whole genus: for excess in a thing otherwise indifferent and licit is venial; but the love of temporal goods is of itself indifferent.

Avarice can become a mortal sin if not only liberality, but also another virtue is injured, e.g. justice or charity toward neighbor, as if a man so inordinately loves riches that on account of them, e.g. by becoming rich from the goods of others, he violates the law of God, or by denying due alms he fails in duties toward neighbor.

3. Avarice is committed in two ways: a. by excess in retaining goods acquired (Geiz); b. by excess in care and solicitude for acquiring new goods (Habsucht).

4. Chiefly five daughters of avarice are numbered:

a. Hardening of heart toward the poor, whom the avaricious man addresses harshly, repels empty-handed without mercy, and with rigor exacts debts from them, even if they are unequal to paying.

b. Disquiet of heart, e.g. vehement and inordinate application of the mind to acquiring and preserving riches with a vain fear lest they not be acquired or lest they be lost.

c. Fraud, which is the deception of another accomplished by deed, as when weights and measures are adulterated in things to be sold.

d. Guile, which is the deception of another accomplished by words.

e. Betrayal, which is the deception of another, against faith given, accomplished to his harm.

§ 3. On Envy.¹

¹ Lust is treated in the fascicle separately edited: De sexto praecepto, etc.

338. 1. Envy is sadness concerning another's good, insofar as this is apprehended as diminishing one's own excellence, e.g. the honor of a companion as a dishonor to the one envying. It is directly opposed to charity, which rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, which good the envious man wishes destroyed and, when it is not destroyed, grieves.

It differs: a. from emulation; for an emulator is not saddened concerning the good of neighbor, but is saddened concerning his own evil because he lacks that good which he sees in another; b. from hatred, by which someone is saddened concerning the good of another insofar as it is his good; c. from that sadness which someone has concerning the good of another insofar as he fears some evil to himself from it, e.g. if someone is saddened concerning the elevation of another because he fears oppression to himself from it; d. from indignation, by which someone is saddened concerning the good of another insofar as this other is unworthy of that good. This of itself is not a sin; but it can become a sin if it is repugnant to divine providence, which for certain ends bestows goods, both temporal and supernatural, even on sinners.

2. Envy arises from pride, insofar as someone so inordinately loves his own excellence in some good, whether true or fictitious, that he is unwilling that a good of this kind be possessed by his neighbor. Envy is accustomed to be in those who are equals or nearly equals, because the glory of those who greatly excel is not accustomed to be apprehended as a diminution of one's own excellence. And although some are by nature more prone to envy than others, nevertheless this vice has been so deeply implanted in all that some first motions of envy are found even in perfect men.

3. Envy is a sin mortal from its genus: for it is repugnant to charity; but sins against charity are grave from their genus. Nevertheless it admits smallness of matter. In order that envy be a grave sin, it is required: a. that it be referred to a great good of the neighbor, whether corporal or spiritual; b. that the envious man seriously will the neighbor to lack that good, lest he himself undergo a fictitious lessening of his own good.

The greater the good is concerning which someone envies another, the greater is the sin of envy; therefore the gravest sin of envy is that by which someone envies his neighbor spiritual goods themselves: the gifts of the Holy Spirit, grace, virtue, sanctity.

4. Five following daughters of envy are numbered: hatred, susurration, detraction, exultation in adversities, affliction in the prosperities of the neighbor.

While the envious man is saddened concerning the good of the neighbor insofar as it is apprehended as a cause of his own evil, there arises in him the desire that the neighbor fall away from that good; therefore he strives to diminish it or utterly destroy it through evil speeches against the neighbor, which, if they are hidden, are called susurration, and if they are manifest, detraction. But if he obtains this end, he exults; if he does not obtain it, he is afflicted and saddened; and this sadness, if it endures, generates hatred.

§ 4. On Gluttony.

339. 1. Gluttony is the inordinate appetite of food and drink.

a. The inordination of gluttony consists in this, that the mode prescribed by reason in the use of food and drink is not preserved.

b. Gluttony taken generically is opposed to two virtues which pertain to temperance: abstinence, which moderates the use of food and non-inebriating drink, and sobriety, which moderates the use of inebriating or alcoholic drink. Therefore there are two species of gluttony: overeating, or gluttony specifically taken, and drunkenness, which are specifically distinct sins.

2. One can sin by gluttony in five ways, which already are comprehended by St. Thomas in this little verse:

Too hastily, sumptuously, too much, ardently, elaborately.¹

For inordination in the use of food and drink can be occupied either about the food itself or about the taking of it, and indeed:

a. About the substance of the food, if foods more costly and more exquisite than befit the state and condition of the determined man are sought: sumptuously.

b. About quantity, if one eats beyond the appetite of nature, i.e. more than is required for good health of body and for a fitting disposition of mind: too much.

c. About quality, if preparation of foods is applied, on account of seasonings and things of this kind, that is too delicate and exquisite: elaborately.

d. About the taking, by reason of the mode, if someone eats too greedily and voraciously: ardently.

e. About the taking, by reason of the time, if someone anticipates the due time or eats and drinks more often than is fitting: too hastily.

3. Gluttony is a sin light from its genus: for from the general rule, excess in a thing otherwise indifferent or licit is of itself nothing but venial. But accidentally gluttony can become mortal, and that in many ways, but especially:

a. By reason of injured charity of God, because a man so inordinately loves the delectations of food and drink that, constituting them as his ultimate end, he is prepared rather to contemn precepts gravely obliging than to renounce these delectations. These are those whose God is the belly.²

b. By reason of grave harm in the body, if someone advertently gravely injures the health of the body through excessive gorging.

c. By reason of grave harm in the soul, if someone advertently renders himself unfit, through excess in food and drink, for carrying out duties obliging under grave obligation.

a. It is not a grave sin to indulge gluttony up to vomiting: for nothing else is had except excess, indeed enormous, in the use of delectation from food and drink; but this excess from its genus is venial, unless a circumstance changing the species is added.

b. Although it is a grave sin without necessity to feed on human flesh, both because this is repugnant to the piety owed to the dead and because it opens the way to human killings, nevertheless in the extreme necessity of hunger this seems to be licit, because in extreme necessity those things sometimes become licit which otherwise are prohibited by the law of nature. But it is never licit to kill a man for this end.³

4. St. Thomas enumerates five daughters of gluttony:

a. Hebetude of mind, or a disordering of reason situated in this, that someone can neither pray nor perform other things of that kind.

b. Inept joy, or an inordination of the appetite.

c. Much-speaking, or an inordination of words.

d. Scurrility, or an inordination of external acts to which inept joy induces.

e. Uncleanness, or an inordination in the body: for from satiety arise emissions of semen, vomiting, and other excretions of superfluous things.

¹ St. Thomas II-II, q. 148, a. 4.

² Phil. 3, 19.

³ Lessius, De iustitia, l. 4, c. 3, n. 9 ff.

340. On temperance to be preserved. In the use of food and drink reason prescribes the mode which the end requires on account of which food and drink were created by the author of nature. But food and drink are ordered to the necessity and sustenance of life, namely that the body may be preserved in integrity and vigor and thus may be able aptly to serve the mind in its functions. Now indeed, not only that is called necessary for the sustenance of life which is required for existence, but also that which is required for fittingness and comfort. In the same way, that is called not necessary for life both which impedes the health of the body and the suitable disposition of the mind, and that which is not required for fitting sustenance of life. He who preserves the virtue of temperance in the use of food and drink eats and drinks as much as is required for fitting sustenance of life, but never takes what he foresees will be harmful to bodily health or to the suitable disposition of the mind for exercising its functions: for this would be the sin of gluttony. It is clear that those things which are required for living suitably and fittingly are not restricted to a definite quantity, but have a certain latitude, so that more or less can be taken, and yet no harm be brought to health and the apt disposition of the mind. Now indeed it is licit to use moderately those things which are not required for fitting sustenance and yet do not impede the apt disposition of mind and body, on account of just causes, e.g. of hospitality, festivity, extraordinary joy, etc.; for by these temperance is not injured nor is the sin of gluttony committed.¹

On Drunkenness.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 6. Lessius, De iustitia, l. 4, c. 1, n. 9 ff.

341. Notions. 1. Drunkenness taken passively signifies the defect of the use of reason induced by excessive drink, whence someone is called drunk; drunkenness taken actively denotes the very drinking which induces this effect, and is defined: voluntary excess in drink from pleasure alone unto violent privation of the use of reason. Active drunkenness is a sin; passive drunkenness is the effect of sin.

a. In drink: namely of wine or of another inebriating liquid, by which words it differs from overeating. From pleasure alone: for if drink were taken from another cause, e.g. by reason of medicine, even unto privation of the use of reason, it would not be drunkenness. Nevertheless it does not therefore cease to be drunkenness because pleasure is not perceived from the drink, provided the drink is not taken from another reasonable end. Violent: for the use of reason is interrupted in a natural manner by sleep and in a violent manner by excessive drink, whereby it happens that the drunk man, not even when awakened from sleep, can use reason.

b. From these things it is clear that the proper malice of drunkenness is not in drinking alone inducing privation of the use of reason, but in drinking which brings on privation of the use of reason in a violent manner, without sufficient cause, on account of the pleasure of drink.¹

2. Drunkenness is called perfect if it entirely takes away the use of reason, and is called imperfect if it does not entirely take away the use of reason.

One is judged to labor under perfect drunkenness: a. who no longer knows how to distinguish between good and evil; b. who on the following day does not remember notable things which he said or did in drunkenness; c. who does utterly unusual things which he was not accustomed to do with an intact mind. Drunkenness will be imperfect if, with the use of reason preserved, or with the power of acting morally preserved, only the phantasy is somewhat disturbed, the tongue stammers, the feet stagger, the eyes see double, objects seem to be turned in a circle, vomiting follows, and things of this kind.

¹ Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, n. 13 f.

342. Its formal malice. 1. The sin of drunkenness consists essentially in inordinate drinking, from pleasure alone, of an inebriating liquid with foresight of the loss of the use of reason. Therefore in the sin of drunkenness, the immoderate delectation of wine is willed of itself; the loss of the use of reason is willed in the cause. Since this loss is admitted without a sufficient motive, only on account of the pleasure of drink, it is morally evil. Since the proper malice of drunkenness consists in drinking unto privation of the use of reason from pleasure alone, without necessity, if the drinking of wine is done from another motive, and that an honorable one, it is not evil, although it causes privation of the use of reason; for it is not done inordinately or against the rule of reason, as that which is done from pleasure is.

2. To indulge the pleasure of drink immoderately, or against the rule of reason, is a venial sin, even if reason is disturbed somewhat; but to indulge the same pleasure unto full loss of the use of reason is a grave sin.

3. For resolving the questions which pertain here, it helps to note that the immediate effect of abundant drinking is relaxation of the nerves and stupor of the senses, from which the loss of the use of reason follows as an effect. Since drinking from an honorable motive, or for obtaining a licit effect, is not morally evil, although disturbance of reason follows from it, in resolving particular questions it must be considered whether the harm of temporary privation of the use of reason is sufficiently compensated by the good on account of which that privation is permitted, and whether privation of the use of reason is not intended.

4. What is said concerning the use of inebriating liquid must be affirmed in the same way concerning the use of opium, ether, chloroform, and similar things: namely, their immediate effect is weakening of the nerves and stupor of the senses, from which privation of the use of reason follows. Now that stupor of the senses is licitly brought on for obtaining a sufficiently grave good effect, even if, besides the intention, the evil effect follows, namely violent disturbance of reason.

a. Therefore it is licit to make oneself drunk for driving away a disease according to the counsel of physicians, e.g. for curing the disease of cholera or for evacuating the force of poison: for temporary disturbance of reason is sufficiently compensated by the good intended.

b. It is licit to make oneself drunk or to use chloroform for lessening pains or not feeling them, e.g. in a surgical operation or in a difficult childbirth: for privation of the use of reason is sufficiently compensated by the good intended, which is the mitigation of sharp pain.

It is asked whether it is licit to use chloroform for mitigating the ordinary pains of childbirth. It is doubtful whether this cause is sufficient both for permitting disturbance of reason and especially for bringing on the danger which arises from the use of chloroform both for the mother and for the offspring.¹

c. It is licit to make oneself drunk for avoiding death which someone threatens to another unless he makes himself drunk, except, however, the case in which someone demands drunkenness in contempt of God or in hatred of virtue: for from abundant drinking it follows immediately that the other desists from the will of inflicting death; but the effect of inebriation is permitted from the sufficiently grave cause of freeing oneself from death.

d. It is licit to make oneself drunk for driving away the trouble of sleeplessness (Schlaflosigkeit) under this condition, that other harmless remedies have been applied in vain, but drunkenness is useful for inducing sleep.

e. It is not licit to make oneself drunk for driving away melancholy or for lightening grief, both because that end is not a sufficient cause for permitting disturbance of reason, and because other means are at hand for obtaining that end. Nevertheless it is licit on account of this cause to drink up to cheerfulness.²

¹ Cf. Capellmann, Medicina pastoralis^7 (Aachen: Barth, 1893), p. 40 f., who judges that in ordinary childbirth this is not licit; nevertheless Olfers, Pastoralmedicin^2 (Freiburg: Herder, 1893), p. 103, contradicts him.

² Gobat apud Lacroix, l. 5, n. 344.

343. Its moral malice. 1. Perfect drunkenness is a mortal sin: a. Sacred Scripture numbers drunkenness among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven;¹ b. it is a grave disorder violently to deprive oneself not only of the use of reason but also of the proximate power of using it, and to cast oneself down to the condition of beasts on account of the pleasure alone taken from drink.

a. Even perfect drunkenness admits smallness of matter: if therefore someone without necessity deprives himself of the use of reason for a brief time, which does not reach an hour, he does not commit a grave sin. Nevertheless for practice this note is scarcely of any moment, because it can scarcely be foreseen that drink will not deprive one of the use of reason for a longer space than an hour.

b. He who drinks so immoderately that perfect drunkenness would certainly follow, even if by committing himself to sleep he does not experience this effect, nevertheless sins gravely: for by the drinking he not only posits the cause of the evil, and indeed the whole cause, but also remains deprived of the proximate power of using reason. Nevertheless he does not sin gravely who by a medicine prevents himself from being deprived of the use of reason from immoderate drink.

2. Imperfect drunkenness of itself does not exceed venial sin; but accidentally it can become grave: a. by reason of scandal, which, for example, a priest would give, even only once, or a father of a family, if he were more often half-drunk; b. by reason of harm which is inflicted either on health or on the family; c. by reason of the end, as if someone were to drink in order to excite stronger lust in himself; d. by reason of grave sadness which is caused thence to a wife, children, or parents.

a. Ballerini prudently notes: "When someone confesses drunkenness, he will have to be asked whether he fully lost the use of reason. For commonly they think, by a false opinion, that grave sin is present if wine has provoked him to vomiting."

b. Therefore without doubt it is a grave sin to induce others to drunkenness; and so: a. to challenge someone to equal draughts with danger of drunkenness; b. to offer drink repeatedly with foresight of drunkenness; c. to urge and, as it were, compel another to drink with danger of drunkenness, even if it is done for the sake of politeness. But it is licit to offer and propose abundant drink to guests who are foreseen to become intoxicated from it, provided a sufficient cause makes honorable this remote cooperation.

c. Whether and to what extent sins committed in drunkenness can be imputed is said elsewhere; in this place let it be noted: a. insults uttered against others are not imputed to a drunk man; for since they are not esteemed even by those whom they affect, they are not apt to injure another's honor. b. There are those who affirm this same thing also concerning blasphemies; nevertheless this sentence is commonly rejected, because the honor of God requires that even material blasphemy be avoided.²

¹ 1 Cor. 6, 10; Gal. 5, 21.

² Lehmkuhl I, n. 745. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 731 ff.

344. On the use of morphine.¹ For lessening pains and for putting the senses to sleep, physicians now frequently use diverse means; and indeed morphine is ordinarily applied for lessening pains, but other "narcotics" also serve for putting the senses to sleep. The question is asked concerning their effects and concerning their liceity.

1. The effects which the use of morphine produces are diverse according to the diverse quantity which is taken. What is said here concerning morphine is also valid concerning opium, cocaine, and other remedies of this kind.

a. Drunk in a great quantity, in the same way as poison, it induces death; taken in a lesser quantity it causes stupor of the senses and privation of the use of reason, which effect indeed differs in nothing from drunkenness; finally, if a very moderate quantity is taken, it serves for quieting the nerves and restoring strength.

b. Injections of morphine, which are made under the skin in small quantity, serve for lessening pains and produce a certain pleasure that is by no means slight. But if those subcutaneous injections are repeated in greater quantity for a notable time, they gravely harm the health of the body, notably shorten life, and moreover provoke a vehement craving for morphine, which can be overcome with greater difficulty than drunkenness itself and can scarcely be cured except in hospitals erected for this end. Nevertheless these malignant effects are not caused except from the use of a greater quantity repeated rather often; a few injections, and those moderate, scarcely harm the body or the soul in any way.

¹ Cf. Olfers, l. c., p. 103 f. Capellmann, l. c., p. 41 ff.

345. 2. From these things, as regards the liceity of this use, the following are now gathered.

a. A use of morphine so slight that it produces no other effect except restoration of strength and quieting of the nerves is manifestly licit.

b. A moderate use of morphine, even without a just cause, applied only for calming the craving for it, does not exceed venial sin, since it does not gravely harm health nor cause a notable shortening of life; but to use morphine in that quantity and frequency such that notable detriment to health and life follows from it is a grave sin.

c. The use of morphine applied in such a quantity that the senses are put to sleep and privation of the use of reason follows:

a. without a just cause is a grave sin, equally as drunkenness arising from the drinking of wine;

b. from a proportionately grave cause of necessity or utility is licit, e.g. that the sick man in a surgical operation may permit himself without resistance to the hands of the surgeon, or that the sick man may not feel sharp pains;

c. in the article of death is illicit not only if the dying man is not yet disposed for dying well, but even if he has been duly disposed for death, because there is not a sufficient reason for depriving a dying man of the use of reason, unless a fall into sin is to be feared; since indeed at that time the use of reason is of such great utility that it cannot be compensated by any temporal advantage. For the dying man would lack the merits which he could gain both from pains patiently tolerated and from acts of perfect conformity with the divine will and of other virtues.

346. On euthanasia. 1. Today the dying frequently demand from physicians, and physicians procure for them, the euthanasia, as they call it, namely a placid and tranquil death without pain, because by means of morphine they induce stupor of the senses and perfect privation of the use of reason. a. If only pains are lessened by morphine, but the use of reason is not taken away, or if the use of reason is taken away only for a time, it is clear that its use is licit even in the dying. b. If by morphine the use of reason is fully taken away for the whole time of agony, its use is illicit, even in those who have already fulfilled their obligations, both because there is not a sufficient reason for admitting privation of the use of reason, unless at the same time there is danger of sinning, and the more so because in the time of agony pains are lessened of themselves; and because privation of the use of reason continuing until death is equivalent to a shortening of spiritual life, which is illicit. c. Less efficacious for demonstrating this is the argument taken from the necessity that the faculty of praying and meriting be preserved for a man. For although the faithful rightly judge it a great gift of grace if they can await death with serene mind, nevertheless no obligation exists of preserving the use of reason in death, as far as can be done, so that the dying man, master of himself, may await death and offer his life to God, nor so that he may be able to acquire merits for himself, since the neglect of this occasion of praying and meriting, if it is done not from contempt but from fear of an evil, even a temporal one, is not a sin.

2. If in the article of death, on account of excessive pains or from other causes, a fall into sin were to be feared, some indeed judge that this can be permitted, but Lehmkuhl rightly denies it (n. 743).¹ Therefore the same author judges that the priest assisting the dying ought to resist the practice of physicians of putting the dying to sleep, not only as regards those who are not yet disposed for death, but also as regards the disposed in whom there is no danger of sinning gravely; only as regards the dying who are in danger of sinning gravely can that practice be not positively permitted, but tolerated in silence. Likewise, if a dying man in good faith demands that the use of reason be taken away from him, and there is no hope that he will obey after being warned, the use of morphine could be tolerated.

¹ Cf. Lacroix, l. 5, n. 341. Villada, Casus conscientiae III, p. 309.

347. On combating drunkenness. Drunkenness (Berauschung), especially if it is committed frequently, produces the most destructive consequences, both individual and social. Individual consequences: it excites and promotes the carnal appetite, lust; it dulls and blunts the sense of morality and religion; it squanders goods of fortune; but especially it brings the greatest harm to the health of mind and body. Social consequences: it disturbs domestic peace and family life, provides occasion for innumerable crimes, and, what tends to the ruin of peoples, leads to the degeneration of offspring. Especially for this reason ebriositas (Trunksucht), which signifies the habit of making oneself drunk, is so monstrous a vice that it must be attacked and overcome in every way. Since manifest signs of degeneration induced by the excessive use of alcohol were already being detected in diverse nations, there arose a zeal for introducing and propagating either total abstinence from any alcoholic drink whatever or at least great temperance in its use; and societies against alcoholism have been erected, which assume for themselves the task of preventing the abuse of alcohol. The things which pastors of souls can contribute toward eradicating this evil, so pernicious and so widely diffused throughout the world, are contained in about the following:

a. To instruct the faithful concerning the malignant effects not only of drunkenness, but also of abundant drinking, which is done beyond a determined measure almost daily; concerning the error of those who think that from the use of alcoholic liquor the organism is nourished or strengthened; concerning drunkenness as the destructive source of offenses and crimes; concerning the sin of those who offer alcoholic liquors to infants.

b. To promote associations which are instituted for this end, that either temperance or even abstinence may be exercised.

c. To disseminate writings and periodical sheets by which the faithful may be suitably taught concerning these matters and excited to exercising temperance or abstinence.¹

¹ Ferstl, Die Alkoholfrage der Gegenwart. Sechs Vortrage (Regensburg: Verlagsanstalt, 1906). Pieper, Die Massigkeitsbestrebungen (M. Gladbach: Zentralstelle, 1906). A. Egger, Der Klerus u. die Alkoholfrage (Freiburg: Herder, 1899). Hoppe, Die Tatsachen uber den Alkohol^3 (Munich: Reinhart, 1904). Bunge, Die Alkoholfrage. In Basel, at the publishing house of the League of Opponents of Alcohol, a whole series of small writings concerning this question has appeared.

348. On Alcoholism. By this name are signified both the abuse of alcohol, which consists in immoderate drink, and the malignant effects which drunkenness produces in the health of man. Alcoholic liquors taken in small quantity indeed do not harm health, but drunk beyond due measure they can harm health very greatly, and this indeed in all organs of the body, but especially in the nervous system. The harm which they bring to health depends not only on the quantity and quality of alcoholic drink, but also on the disposition of the subject; thus in neurasthenics and in the children of parents who are given to drunkenness, they produce much worse effects. The quantity of alcohol which can be drunk without detriment to health is determined in diverse ways by experts.¹ And so drunkenness is morally evil also on account of the harm which it inflicts on the body. When this harm is grave cannot be determined accurately.

a. Assiduous or frequent drunkenness certainly inflicts grave harm on the body and therefore also under this respect is a grave sin.

b. Abundant and assiduous drinking, which nevertheless does not cause drunkenness, harms the body more than drunkenness committed now and then.

c. Whether abundant drinking of this kind ever constitutes a grave sin on account of the harm brought upon the body is difficult to say. Indeed, the consequences of such drinking both in the individual and in the human race are most destructive, nor can there be imagined a cause excusing the drinking and its evil effects; nevertheless, because the evil effects are produced only gradually and in different persons in a different degree, it cannot be determined when a more liberal use of alcohol begins to harm gravely.

d. Frequently to offer or permit alcoholic drinks to infants and to those before puberty cannot be excused from grave fault.

§ 5. On Anger.

¹ Capellmann-Bergman, Pastoralmedizin^15, p. 86 ff. Antonelli, Medicina pastoralis^3, n. 455 ff.

349. 1. Anger is usually defined as an inordinate appetite of vengeance. Anger is opposed by excess to meekness.

a. Anger, therefore, insofar as it is a vice, or irascibility, is a passion of the sensitive appetite, namely the irascible appetite, which consists in the appetite of vengeance.

b. Anger, according to the twofold element which it contains, properly includes a twofold inordination: one on the part of the motion in the irascible appetite, or on the part of the kindling of anger, which is excessive; the other on the part of the object, or on the part of the vengeance which it seeks, greater than is just or on account of an unjust cause. This definition of anger exhibits both elements, by which it is called an inordinate motion of the soul inordinately seeking vengeance.

c. Inordinate: because both the passion or motion of anger and the appetite of vengeance of themselves can be indifferent, honorable, and licit, if, for example, parents are angry on account of the faults of children and vindicate them by punishment.

2. Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate motion of the irascible appetite, is a sin venial from its whole genus: for excess in an indifferent thing of itself does not exceed venial fault.

a. This anger is committed when someone is inflamed with anger concerning a thing which does not deserve anger, or beyond what the thing deserves, or more often than is fitting.

b. Accidentally this anger can become a mortal sin by reason of enormous excess utterly deforming rational nature, when someone deliberately acts so furiously as if he were deprived of reason.

c. Three species, or diverse modes, of this anger are assigned: a. rancor (Groll), which is anger insofar as it causes indignation, aversion, and hatred; b. madness (Tollheit), which is anger insofar as it deprives the mind of the use of reason; c. fury (Wut), which is anger insofar as it breaks forth into enormous external motions.

3. Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate appetite of vengeance, is a sin mortal from its genus: for it is directly repugnant to charity or even to justice, because it inordinately or even unjustly seeks evil for the neighbor; but sins against charity or justice are mortal from their genus.

This anger is committed: a. when someone seeks vengeance against him who does not deserve it; or b. beyond what he deserves; or c. not for the due end, namely not from zeal for justice, but from hatred of the person or for satisfying a malevolent soul or from lust for vengeance, etc.

§ 6. On Sloth.

350. 1. Special sloth, insofar as it is a capital vice, is sadness concerning the divine good, namely concerning the grace and friendship of God, insofar as it is man's proper good.

a. Sloth taken broadly is weariness or sadness concerning labor. It is divided into natural and spiritual, or moral, sloth. Natural sloth is weariness or sadness concerning bodily labor on account of its difficulty. It is clear that this sloth must be carefully distinguished from weariness of body and from lack of strength. Spiritual sloth is divided into general and special, or capital, sloth. General sloth is weariness or sadness concerning spiritual things on account of the labor necessary in exercising them. This sloth is not a special sin distinct from the sin committed through transgression of a precept from sloth, as if someone from sloth omits Sunday Mass. Special sloth is sadness concerning the divine good, i.e. concerning the grace and friendship of God, insofar as they pertain to man.

b. A special vice must be opposed to a special virtue. The virtue to which sloth is opposed is charity toward God. As hatred is opposed to the love of charity, so sadness concerning the divine good is opposed to the joy of charity. For he who loves God, on account of God rejoices concerning his own spiritual good, namely that through grace he is conformed to God and admitted to fellowship in the divine nature. But the slothful man is saddened concerning this spiritual good, unwilling that he be destined by God to such goods.¹

2. Special sloth is a sin mortal from its whole genus, because it is directly repugnant to divine charity, from which the slothful man recedes on account of displeasure with the spiritual goods which God bestows on men. Nevertheless it can be venial from imperfection of the act. For the rest, this worst sloth is not committed so frequently.

A young man who is saddened because he is compelled to perform works of devotion and virtues which are not prescribed does not commit the special sin of sloth, nor does he sin gravely. But he sins gravely by the special sin of sloth who is saddened that he must acquire eternal beatitude for himself, or that he has known the Catholic faith.

3. Its principal daughters are numbered as five:

a. Malice, by which someone has hatred for spiritual goods and would wish them not to exist.

b. Rancor, by which those who induce one to spiritual things are distasteful.

c. Despair concerning salvation.

d. Torpor, by which good things are not done with due fervor.

e. Wandering of mind, by which someone wanders about illicit things in the exercise of spiritual matters.

¹ Cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 35, a. 3.

THEOLOGIANS divide the chief vices to which human nature is subject into seven heads or capital sins, as they are called. The name implies that they are the source and origin of many more, inasmuch as the inordinate love of any temporal good is apt to give rise to many inordinate ways of pursuing it. The seven capital sins are: Pride, Covetousness, Lust, Anger, Envy, Sloth, Gluttony.

Pride is the inordinate love of our own pre-eminence. There is a tendency deeply seated in human nature, which arises from the self-love which is innate in every man, and which leads him to prefer himself to others, to wish to lord it over them, and to bear with impatience the yoke of subjection to authority. Truth requires that we should look upon any qualities and gifts that we possess as coming to us from the bounty and goodness of God, and as giving us no right to exalt ourselves above others who have received similar or even greater benefits from the generosity of our common Father. Pride, on the contrary, would willingly close its eyes to this salutary and humbling truth; it looks upon whatever it possesses as its own, as the fruit of its own labour and merit; it is prone to magnify its gifts, and to consider them to be greater than they really are, while on the other hand it is blind to the good qualities of others. This leads to the growth of a spirit of independence which is impatient of subjection to any authority, human or divine, and to a depreciation and contempt of others. The proud man has no need to ask God for anything; he thanks him that he is not as the rest of men; he is self-sufficient and independent of all the world. This is the pinnacle of pride, the inordinate love of one’s own pre-eminence.

Consummate pride, which refuses to be subject to God and to lawful authority, and which looks down upon other men with profound contempt, is a mortal sin. If it does not go to these lengths, but merely magnifies self without grave insubordination and contempt of others, it is a venial sin.

Pride is so serious an evil because it strikes at the root of the primary obligations of reverent obedience towards our Lord God and love of our neighbour, because it is opposed to the truth, and because of its universality; it is in the heart of every man and quickly grows to fearful dimensions unless corrected and subdued.

To pride is opposed humility, the virtue which occupies the mean between the two extremes of pride and pusillanimity or mean-spiritedness. The mean-spirited man refuses to take the place for which his talents fit him, and which God intends for him. He puts himself beneath his equals and inferiors to the detriment of his dignity and office; he is afraid to exercise the authority entrusted to him, and the public good suffers in consequence. Humility, on the other hand, keeps a man in his place both with respect to God and his fellow-men. It is grounded on the knowledge of God and of self; the humble man knows and acknowledges that he has nothing but what he has received from God, that he is utterly and entirely dependent on God every moment of his life, that if left to himself he will fall into the lowest depths of sin and degradation; and this knowledge causes him to think much of God and little, very little, of self. This is the virtue so much recommended by our divine Lord: “‘ Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart.’’¹

Pride leads to many other vices, among which are: presumption, ambition, vainglory, boasting, and hypocrisy.

(a) Presumption is the inclination and wish to undertake what is above one’s capacity. Ordinarily it is a venial sin, but it will be mortal if it is the occasion of serious harm to the cause of God or our neighbour.

(b) Ambition is the inordinate striving after dignities and honours. The inordinateness consists in striving after honours to which one has no just claim or greater than one’s due, or by unlawful modes and means, or with too great eagerness. Apart from such inordinateness it is not sinful to seek after honours and dignities, as these belong to the class of things that are in themselves indifferent; it is a meritorious act to seek with moderation after dignities and honours in order thereby to be able to do more for God and one’s fellow-men. “If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work.”² Such an act belongs to the virtue of magnanimity. Ambition is commonly a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it is the cause of serious harm, or when the means employed to attain its end are grievously sinful.

(c) Vainglory is the inordinate striving after the esteem and praise of men. It is not wrong but praiseworthy to seek after and preserve a good reputation, which, as Holy Scripture teaches, is better than great riches.³ But inordinateness, vanity, and sin come in when the esteem and praise of those men is sought whose esteem is not worth having, or when esteem is sought for what does not deserve esteem, or not so great as is sought after, or when glory is not referred to the proper end. It is usually a venial sin, but may become mortal in the same way as ambition.

(d) Boasting is the inordinate bragging about one’s own good qualities or gifts, or even about what is sinful. If the inordinate display is in action rather than in word it is called ostentation.

(e) Hypocrisy is the feigning of virtues and qualities that one does not possess.

¹ Matt. xi 29.

² 1 Tim. iii 1.

³ Prov. xxii 1.

Covetousness or avarice is the inordinate love of wealth, It is not sinful to value and seek after money in moderation, but the love of money becomes inordinate when it causes a man to be too close and niggardly in spending it, too eager and absorbed in acquiring it, and ready to do what is wrong in order to come at it.

It is of itself a venial sin, but it becomes mortal when it leads to the transgression of a precept which binds under grievous sin. Although it is of itself only a venial sin, yet it is very dangerous because of man’s proneness to it, and because the vice is apt to grow fast by what it feeds upon, until it becomes mortally sinful. Holy Scripture frequently condemns it and warns us against it.¹

¹ 1 Tim. vi 9, etc.

Covetousness is opposed to liberality by defect, while prodigality is opposed to liberality by excess. Liberality is the virtue which moderates the love of wealth and inclines us to spend it well, according to the dictates of right reason. Prodigality inclines a man to squander his wealth on unworthy objects, or to give more than he should do, so that he is not able to live according to his state of life, or he is unable to fulfil his obligations, or he reduces his family to beggary.

Lust is an inordinate appetite for the pleasure which has its seat in the organs of generation. A wise and provident Creator has taken care that those actions which are most necessary for the individual or for society should be accompanied by great pleasure in order that they may be exercised more certainly and more readily. If there were no pleasure connected with eating and drinking, few men would trouble themselves about those necessary actions. The great pleasure felt in the act of procreation induces men to do what is necessary for the preservation of the race which otherwise would excite only shame and disgust. This, however, can only be done lawfully in wedlock. It is lawful then, according to the rules of married life, for husband and wife to indulge in venereal pleasure; outside marriage it is inordinate and sinful.

Any act of wrongful indulgence in venereal pleasure by those who are not married is grievously sinful if directly sought for or to which deliberate consent is given. But the fuller treatment of this subject must be left till we come to the Sixth and Ninth Commandments.

Anger is the inordinate appetite for revenge.

Revenge is the infliction of pain in satisfaction for an injury. As private individuals we are not allowed to avenge injuries which have been done us: “To no man rendering evil for evil. . . . Not revenging yourselves, my dearly beloved, but give place unto wrath, for it is written: Revenge to me; I will repay, saith the Lord.¹ Sometimes, however, in trivial matters the immediate punishment of an injury is allowed to private persons, in order to prevent a recurrence of the injustice, or under circumstances in which such an action is really an act of self-defence. In other cases private revenge is not allowed, but belongs to those whose duty it is to correct delinquents and to avenge outraged justice. Anger, then, will be inordinate whenever revenge is sought without just cause, or more severe than the cause requires, or when private vengeance is indulged in, or when it is sought merely to satisfy hatred and spite. In these cases anger is of itself a grave sin because it is against justice and charity; if there be merely want of moderation in the manner of seeking or executing lawful vengeance, the sin will be venial.

¹ Rom. xii 17.

To be angry in moderation for a just cause is not sinful: “ Be angry, and sin not.”¹ Sin may even be committed through defect of anger, as when a parent or superior is never moved to anger against the faults of children or subjects, but permits them to go unpunished to their loss and the public inconvenience.

¹ Eph. iv 26.

The daughters of anger, or the sins which spring from the same root, are indignation and the swelling of passion, blasphemy, imprecation, quarrelling, and contumely; fighting, sedition, striking, and wounding; which are for the most part treated of in other chapters, or present no difficulty.

Contumely is an insulting word or gesture said or done in order to dishonour our neighbour. It is against charity, and of itself is a mortal sin except when the matter is trivial. A superior may, however, with moderation and caution treat a subject contumeliously, not in order to dishonour him, but to correct or humble him. Chaffing another about his foibles for the sake of recreation is not sinful unless it goes too far and provokes to anger or cuts too deep.

Envy is sadness on account of another’s good, inasmuch as it is regarded as lessening one’s own. It is directly opposed to charity, which inclines us to rejoice in the good of our neighbour, and is mortally sinful if the matter is serious. We must carefully distinguish envy from various other dispositions which bear some resemblance to it. Thus, if one is sorry because another has obtained something desirable, thereby making it impossible for himself to obtain it, it is not envy but emulation, which in itself is praiseworthy. Sadness because another has obtained a post of influence of which he is unworthy, is not envy nor sinful. In the same way, if one is sad because his enemy has obtained the means of doing him harm, there is no sin in such a disposition. Envy comes in where an equal, or one who is not much more than an equal, rises in position, power, or influence, and his rise is regarded with ill will because it seems to lower one’s self.

The ambitious are usually also envious, inasmuch as they see others enjoying what they wish to have for themselves. The mean-spirited, too, are commonly envious, since they look upon trivialities as matters of great importance, and the promotion of others, especially of the young, as a lowering of themselves.

Spiritual sloth is a sluggishness of the soul in the exercise of virtue. If the reason for the sluggishness is the labour and difficulty which accompany the practice of virtue, sloth will be a mortal sin whenever on account of it a grave precept is violated; otherwise it will be a venial sin. If sloth makes the friendship of God tedious and irksome because of the trouble it takes to preserve it, it is a mortal sin, inasmuch as it is directly against our obligation of loving God with our whole heart.

Gluttony is the inordinate indulgence in food or drink. The use of food and drink should be regulated by temperance according to right reason. As a standard right reason will be guided by the necessities of bodily health and strength, interpreted in a wide sense, and the uses of the society in which one lives. Inordinateness will come in if through appetite we anticipate the proper time for taking refreshment, or demand too exquisite dishes, or indulge in excess, or devour our food voraciously, or require too great care in the preparation of food, paying a chef as much as all the other servants put together.

Gluttony is of itself a venial sin, but it becomes mortal if it leads to violating precepts, such as those of fasting and abstinence, which bind under grave sin, or if it seriously injures health, or if it makes a man unfit to pursue his ordinary avoca- tions, or if eating and drinking become the end for which a man lives, whose God is his belly,¹ or if it causes complete loss of reason through drunkenness.

¹ Phil. iii 19.

Complete drunkenness which deprives a man of the use of reason, so that he cannot distinguish between what is right and wrong, is a mortal sin, for St Paul numbers it among those vices which exclude from the kingdom of God.¹ The malice of this sin does not consist merely in the depriving one’s self of the use of reason, for it is allowed to do that for a good cause, but in the depriving one’s self of the use of reason in such an unnatural way by the inordinate use of drink for a considerable time during which the recovery of the use of reason is out of one’s power, and without any just cause. Theologians more commonly teach that if there were a sufficient cause, it would not be morally wrong to make a man drunk as a substitute for the use of chloroform, or in order to counteract the effect of poison.

To drink to excess but not so as to be perfectly drunk is only a venial sin per se, but it may become mortal on account of the serious harm done thereby to one’s own health, or the spending in drink of money which is required for the support of one’s family or the payment of one’s creditors, or on account of grave scandal caused by such a sin, or on account of other sins to which it gives rise.

¹ Gal. v 21.

If a man could be prevented from committing a more serious sin, as murder, for example, in no other way except by making him drunk, many theologians teach that this would not be unlawful. For very probably I may induce another who is determined to commit some grave crime to be content with doing something which is less bad. Under such circumstances, to persuade another to do what is a less evil is a good action.¹

¹ St Alphonsus, 2, n. 57.

Bad actions committed in drink are imputable to the agent if they were foreseen in some confused way, for they are voluntary in their cause. The same must be said of blasphemy, indecent language, and other sins of word which retain their objective malice even when said by a drunken man. Mere abuse of others, inasmuch as nobody cares what a drunken man says, would not be sinful. However, when sins in word are committed in drink, there is so: nething wanting to them for their full and proper signification, and so, if blasphemy, for example, were punished by ecclesiastical censure or reservation, these would not be incurred for blasphemy uttered while drunk.

Morphia may be given to ease pain, and brandy to strengthen a sick person, even though they cause loss of reason. This follows from what has been said and from the principle of a double effect. It is not lawful to administer such medicines in order to deprive a dying man of the use of reason, so that he may die while unconscious. The time just before death is very precious; a sinner may then be reconciled with God and save his soul; one who is in the state of grace may very much increase his merit by a good use of that time. Euthanasia then, in this sense, is unlawful; it is virtually shortening a man’s life.

The terrible evil of drink should be combated by all the means, spiritual and temporal, which are at the disposal of the Christian. The general means which may be used are especially the frequent reception of the sacraments, the avoiding of dangerous companions and the occasions of sin, the cultivation of modes of taking innocent recreation while not at work either at home or outside, the joining of Catholic temperance societies whose members encourage each other by mutual example, and the taking of the pledge if its nature and obligations be properly understood.

Capital sins are those which before the rest are causes and as it were heads from which other sins proceed. They would more correctly be called capital vices, because capital sins are not sources of sins except insofar as they are vices. Ordinarily seven are enumerated: pride, avarice, lust, envy, anger, sloth, and gluttony. "The reason for this number seven from St. Thomas (I-II, q. 84, a. 4) is this: Man can either pursue or flee that which is good in itself in a manner discordant with reason. Goods of this kind in themselves, which man can pursue in a manner discordant with reason or inordinately, are either honor and glory, and their inordinate pursuit is called pride; or the conservation of the individual through food and drink, and the inordinate pursuit of this is called gluttony; or the conservation of the species through acts destined for the propagation of the human race, and the inordinate use of these acts is lust; or riches, and the inordinate appetite for these is avarice. The good which someone can flee in a manner discordant with reason is either his own good, and thus sloth has place; or another's good, and this is either envy, which by sadness, or anger, which by appetite of vengeance, is hostile to another's good."¹ We shall speak of each one.

¹ Konings, Theologia Moralis, n. 235.

The predominant individual motives for sin are as numerous as the different characters of those addicted to sin, and hence it is impossible to classify them. The predominant general motives for sin, on the contrary, can be assigned according to the principal goods that most often move or repel with wills of all who commit sin, as follows: (a) goods of the soul, such as praise and honor, inordinately pursued (the vice of pride); (b) goods of the body, inordinately desired (the views of lust and gluttony); (c) goods that are external, unduly loved (the vice of avarice); (d) one’s own good, not sufficiently wished (the vice of sloth); (e) the neighbor’s good, not suffiviently desired (the vices of envy and anger).

What are the capital vices? - "Vices are called capital from which others arise, chiefly according to the account of final cause.... Accordingly, therefore, those vices are called capital whose ends have certain primary accounts of moving the appetite; and, according to the distinction of these accounts, the capital vices are distinguished." S. Th. 1. 2. q. 84, a. 4; 2. 2. q. 118, a. 7. "But it is not required that a capital vice always be a mortal sin, because even from a venial sin a mortal one can arise, insofar namely as the venial disposes to the mortal." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 4 ad 3. The capital vices are numbered as seven: Pride, Avarice, Lust, Envy, Gluttony, Anger, Acedia. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 84, a. 4; q. 34, a. 5.

What is pride? "Pride is named from this, that someone by will tends above that which he is." Whence it is clear that it is a sin. Insofar as it is an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence, it is a special sin. But insofar as all vices can arise from it, because to one's own excellence "there can be ordered everything which someone inordinately desires"; and because "man through pride contemns the divine law, by which he is prohibited from sinning," it has a certain generality, or is a general sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 162, aa. 1, 2, 7, 8. - Hence the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 4; q. 162, a. 8, posits pride not as a capital vice, but as the queen of all vices; and he posits vainglory as the capital vice, which arises immediately from it.

Commonly, however, pride is constituted as a capital vice. Pride by its genus is a mortal sin. For "pride is opposed to humility. But humility properly regards the subjection of man to God. Hence, on the contrary, pride properly regards the defect of this subjection, according namely as someone exalts himself above what is fixed for him according to the divine rule or measure.... But it is manifest that this very thing, namely not to be subject to God, has the account of mortal sin; for this is to be turned away from God." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 162, a. 5.

"And therefore to be turned away from God and his precepts, which is as a consequence in other sins, per se pertains to pride, whose act is contempt of God." S. Th. l. c., a. 6. Moreover, when the aforesaid aversion and contempt cease, and there is had only a certain inordinate movement toward one's own excellence, by willing to excel above equals, pride is had only improperly so called, and it is venial, unless it is done with notable contempt of others, by taking pleasure in their abasement before oneself. But there would be no disorder if someone wished from an honorable motive to excel above inferiors. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 77, aa. 4, 5; q. 84, a. 2; L. 65.

What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.

Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.

Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.

Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.

Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.

Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.

Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.

Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.

Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.

What is avarice? Avarice is the inordinate appetite of temporal goods. An inordinate appetite, by being unwilling rather to lose them than God; by denying alms to the poor when the obligation of charity urges; by unjustly desiring others' things; by loving or desiring riches too much, or by taking too much delight in them. Too much, beyond due measure, namely by acquiring or retaining them according as they are necessary for life, according to one's own condition. Avarice, insofar as it is precisely opposed to the virtue of liberality, is from its genus only a venial sin. Nevertheless it can become mortal in three ways: 1. Against charity toward oneself, by constituting the last end in riches, or by transgressing the precepts of God rather than suffer loss in temporal goods. 2. Against charity toward neighbor, by not helping him when constituted in grave necessity, etc. 3. Against justice, by taking what belongs to another, etc. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 84, a. 1; 2. 2. q. 118; L. 68.

Liberality is the virtue by which we use well all those external goods which have been granted to us for our sustenance. There is a twofold use of exterior goods, one toward oneself, another toward others. And therefore it pertains to liberality that on account of immoderate love of money someone not be impeded from fitting expenditures, nor from fitting gifts. But to give pertains most of all to liberality, since this is more perfect than to receive, or to spend upon oneself. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 117, aa. 1, 4. As avarice, so also prodigality is opposed to liberality, both according to excess in giving, and according to defect in retaining and acquiring. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 118, 119.

What are the daughters of avarice? - They are the following: 1. Hardening of heart, against mercy, by not compassionating the needy and poor, by reproaching them, by demanding debts too harshly when the debtor is not able to pay, etc. By this one can sometimes sin mortally, when the precept of almsgiving or charity urges, and nevertheless from such hardness he is not helped. L. 69. 2. Disquiet of heart, i.e., a vehement and inordinate application of the mind to acquiring or conserving riches, with empty and vain fear lest they not be acquired or lest they be lost. It is mortal when it withdraws from spiritual things or other things to which we are obliged by grave precept, or induces superfluous fear, and from this distrust toward God. It is venial if it is concerning a good matter, but at an undue time or place, e.g., concerning family, harvest, vintage, when someone is in church, or should be free for God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 55, a. 6; L. 69.

3. Violence, namely the usurpation of another's thing by force. It is mortal if it concerns a grave thing, or inflicts grave force. L. 69. 4. Fallacy, or deceit in words; it can be mortal by reason of the end or of the means. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 55, a. 4; L. 69. 5. Perjury, if confirmation by oath is added. 6. Fraud, or deceit in deed. It is mortal from its genus; and it occurs in many ways in contracts. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 55, a. 5; L. 69. - 7. Betrayal, which is deception against faith given or owed, to the harm of another. It is mortal from its genus. It occurs in almost three ways: 1. concerning persons, in which way Judas betrayed Christ; 2. concerning things, as if you show to the enemy the manner of taking a fortress, or show to a robber money, clothing, etc., that has been hidden; 3. concerning a secret, either by revealing one committed to oneself, or by reading others' letters. But if this is in a grave matter, it is per se mortal. L. 69; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 118, a. 8; q. 55, a. 8.

What is lust? - Lust, which is opposed to chastity, is the inordinate appetite of a venereal thing. Inordinate; venereal things are ordered to the generation of offspring, and they are had licitly only in marriage. Therefore those things are inordinate which are not ordered either to generation or to this in marriage. Lust is grave by its whole genus if it is deliberate and directly willed. Hence it does not admit smallness of matter. For the use of venereal things by its nature has been instituted for the conservation of the human race, which is a great good of men, and an external good of God; consequently he who abuses it gravely offends God, and injures human society. If it is deliberate and directly willed; for if deliberation and willing are concerned only with its cause, then smallness of matter can be given in this matter. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 153; L. 71. Cf. here 37 seqq.

What are the daughters of lust? - They are eight, four on the part of the intellect, and four on the part of the will. 1. Blindness of mind, when someone is so addicted to shamefulness that he does not think of heavenly things. 2. Precipitation, by which someone from the same cause acts without counsel. - 3. Inconsideration, when he offends in the manner, acting inconsiderately in things which are unbecoming to his state or person. 4. Inconstancy, when someone from the same affection of pleasures quickly falls away from pious purposes. 5. Love of self; for the lascivious man on account of pleasures makes himself, not God, the end of his actions. 6. Hatred of God; for the lascivious man is accustomed to abhor divine things, indeed God himself, as the avenger of sins. - 7.

Affection for the present age; because love of carnal pleasures so affects the mind that at times it would be prepared even to renounce eternal blessedness, if it were permitted always to enjoy present things. - 8. Horror of the future age, when one immersed in pleasures inordinately fears death, and, unwilling to think about it, strives to prolong life by illicit means, etc. - The first four are mortal when some precept of God gravely obliging is omitted. But if they are concerned only with the matter of lust, they are not sins distinct in species; otherwise, however, if other precepts are violated. The latter four, if there is full consent of the will, are per se mortal and distinct in species; from indeliberation or another imperfection of acts they are often venial. L. 71; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 15; q. 46; q. 53, a. 6; q. 153, a. 5.

What is envy? Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is diminutive of one's own glory. - Moreover, in five ways can someone be saddened concerning the good of another: 1. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another absolutely, because it is the good of the neighbor; and properly this is hatred of enmity, or simply hatred or aversion of the person to whom we will evil, insofar as it is his evil; and this indeed from its genus is mortal. 2. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor relatively, because he fears some evil from him; and properly this is fear, which will be licit unless it is inordinate, e.g., if he fears evil is to be inflicted on himself or on others unjustly. 3. When someone is saddened concerning the good of another because he thinks the same person unworthy of such good; and this is indignation or abomination, which is not a sin; nevertheless it will be a sin, and indeed mortal, if it either accuses God's providence, and is blasphemy, or if it so affects that it leads men to imitate evil. 4. When someone is saddened concerning the good of neighbor, not because the neighbor has it, but because he himself lacks the same, and this is not envy, but emulation or zeal, which, if it concerns honorable good, is praiseworthy; but if it concerns temporal goods, sometimes it is venial, as if the good is disproportionate to the one grieving, such as it would be if a peasant grieved that he is not a king. 5. If someone grieves that another equal to himself, or not greatly unequal, grows in glory and excellence, so that thereby he becomes superior to him, and he apprehends the very increase of glory and excellence as an impediment to his own good and as an evil to himself, insofar as it is diminutive of his own glory and excellence; and this is envy properly so called. For he is called envious because he is not seeing, since he cannot see the goods of another without sadness. Equal or not greatly unequal, because the good of those who greatly excel us is not usually apprehended as diminishing our excellence and glory. The goods of another, especially those in which there is glory, and in which men love to be honored and to be in good opinion.

Envy is mortal from its genus, Gal. 5:21. For it is directly against charity, which rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, which envy desires destroyed or grieves is not destroyed. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36; L. 72. "Pride alone and envy are purely spiritual sins, which can belong to demons." S. Th. 1 p., q. 63, a. 2 ad 2.

What are the daughters of envy? - They are hatred of neighbor, whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of neighbor, and affliction in his prosperities. These are mortal from their genus, since directly against charity. Whispering is speech by which, without cause, something is reported to one person concerning another, which indeed of itself is apt to break the friendship of both; and the detractor is therefore bound to restore and reconcile that friendship. It is mortal from its genus both against charity and against justice. Detraction also is both against charity and against justice. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 36, a. 4 ad 3; q. 34, a. 6; q. 74; L. 72.

What is gluttony? - Gluttony is opposed to abstinence, and is the inordinate appetite of food and drink. Inordinate, namely if food and drink harms health; for their proximate end is the conservation of life and health, according to necessity and fittingness. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141, a. 6. According to necessity, of body and mind; according to fittingness, and thus it will not be inordinate to prepare a sumptuous banquet to celebrate a feast, to honor friends. Inordinate furthermore, if it is not taken fittingly. And this disorder is committed in five ways: 1. if you eat before the time; 2. if things are too exquisite; 3. if more than is right; 4. if voraciously; 5. if too delicately.

Gluttony from its genus is a venial sin, because it is not gravely opposed to charity toward God or neighbor. It can become mortal under multiple respects: 1. Against charity toward God, by constituting one's end and blessedness in it. 2. Against charity toward oneself, by reason of grave harm of soul or body, if someone, for example, thereby becomes unfit for functions which he is bound under mortal sin to fulfill, or notably harms health. 3. Against charity toward neighbor, against piety and justice, as happens when nobles given over to gluttony gravely oppress subjects, dissipate goods necessary for the family, contract debts which they are unequal to paying. 4. By reason of scandal, if a cleric, for example, publicly indulges in feasting and drinking bouts. 5. When on account of gluttony someone transgresses the precepts of the Church, e.g., by eating flesh-meat on a day of abstinence, by eating several times in a day to satiety on a fast day, by not hearing Mass on a Sunday because of feasting. 6. By reason of perfect drunkenness, concerning which something will be said immediately. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 148; L. 73; E. M.

Resolves: "To eat or drink up to vomiting is probably only venial from its genus, unless there is scandal (namely grave), or notable harm to health, as they more commonly say.... But those who voluntarily vomit what they have taken, so that they may eat and drink again, are scarcely excused from mortal sin; for this seems to involve great deformity. Thus probably." L. 73. And indeed others probably deny this, because there is had there only avidity of delight in foods, which from its genus is venial, unless another species of sin accedes. But there is scarcely doubt that it is licit by eating or drinking or otherwise to bring about vomiting, if it is judged to be healthful. For then it has the account of medicine. It is judged mortal to feed on human flesh and blood, both because it is against the piety owed to the dead, and because it is against the instinct of nature, unless it is done for the sake of medicine, or another just cause, e.g., extreme hunger. Laymann, l. 3, s. 4, n. 3; Diana, tr. 5, de Scand., r. 76.

What are the daughters of gluttony? - They are the following, which from their genus are venial, but become mortal when they are gravely opposed to another virtue; namely, on the part of the soul: 1. dullness of mind or stupidity, born from crapulence, concerning the consideration of spiritual goods; 2. inept joy, which moves to shameful acts; 3. much-speaking; 4. scurrility in words and gestures; 5. on the part of the body, uncleanness, vomiting, and emission of seed. S. Th. l. c., a. 6; q. 15; L. 74.

What is drunkenness? - The malice of drunkenness is in the voluntary privation, by an artificial, unnatural, and violent mode through immoderate intoxicating drink, of the use of reason, not merely negatively, as in sleep, but contrarily through the disturbance of reason. "Drunkenness is a mortal sin, because according to this man willingly and knowingly deprives himself of the use of reason, by which he operates according to virtue and avoids sins; and thus he sins mortally by committing himself to danger of sinning. Hence drunkenness, speaking per se, is a mortal sin." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 150, a. 2; 1. 2. q. 88, a. 5 ad 1; Gal. 5:21; L. 75. Drunkenness is opposed to the virtue of sobriety, whose office is to apply measure "concerning drink, not any whatsoever, but that which by its smokiness is naturally apt to disturb the head, as wine, and everything which can intoxicate." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 149, a. 1. Alcoholism pertains to drunkenness. By alcoholism is signified drunkenness produced by alcoholic drinks, abuse of alcoholic drinks, and the grave effects produced by abuse of this sort. But since these effects, gravely harmful to health, are produced gradually, it is difficult practically to define when, by this reason, the sin begins to be grave.

332 bis. Note: The promise (the pledge), which is customary in America and other regions, of abstinence from every intoxicating drink, of itself brings no obligation under grave or under light sin. For it is a certain simple purpose, and the declaration made of it, of not drinking wine and other alcoholic drinks. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that it can also be made under sin. But societies which are established for extirpating the vice of drunkenness are greatly to be praised.

Resolves: If someone knowingly and willingly takes so great a draught of wine as is apt to intoxicate, he is in no way excused from mortal sin, although before he is deprived of his senses he gives himself over to sleep, by which he may escape the effect of the wine; because that drink is already intrinsically evil, since of itself it is already apt to deprive man of the use of reason, and it is per accidens that he himself is deprived of the senses through sleep. Nor indeed in sleep does he have the proximate power for the use of reason. He does not sin mortally who from drinking wine does not totally lose the use of reason, although the mind is disturbed, yet so that he is able to discern between good and evil, as theologians commonly say. Theologians also commonly add that drunkenness is not mortal if it deprives one of reason for a little time. But La-Croix says that a long time seems to be one hour, and that it is licit, in order to avert pain, sadness, and melancholy, to drink up to hilarity, as also to propose a toast to someone's health, or to foster the union of friends and charity. La-Croix, l. 5, nn. 314, 317, 327; L. 75, 78.

Is it licit, in order to drive away illness, to take drink, if drunkenness is foreseen to follow from it? R. More probably affirmatively, if the drink is taken to correct depraved qualities; for then the privation of reason follows per accidens and indirectly, and therefore can licitly be permitted. But if the drink is taken in order directly to procure drunkenness or privation of reason, St. Alphonsus and others deny it, because to deprive oneself of the proximate faculty of the use of reason is intrinsically evil; but Busemb. and others affirm it, relying chiefly on the authority of St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 88, a. 5 ad 1, where he says: "For that man, without necessity, should render himself incapable of using reason, by which man is ordered to God and avoids many occurring sins, from the pleasure of wine alone, is expressly contrary to virtue." Note "without necessity, from the pleasure of wine alone." Therefore, if necessity is present, and not from the pleasure of wine, it is not contrary to virtue. Laymann, l. 2, s. 4, n. 5; La-Croix, l. 5, nn. 310, 311, 312, 313; Struggl 25; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 150, a. 2 ad 3; L. 76.

Is it licit for someone to intoxicate himself in order to avoid death, which otherwise is threatened to him unless he becomes drunk? - The first opinion, more probable according to St. Alphonsus, denies it, because to deprive oneself directly of the proximate power of using reason is intrinsically evil. But since here the danger of death is from without, that immoderate drink up to drunkenness cannot here be had as a cause producing two effects. Therefore the intoxication would be directly intended and willed. The second opinion, which Lessius and Pal. hold with Busemb., and which Laymann and others think probable, affirms it, because the privation of reason is not here intended, but only permitted; for the excess of wine is assumed not with the intention of making oneself drunk, nor without necessity, from the pleasure of wine alone, which would certainly be intrinsically evil, but as a means for fleeing death. - La-Croix, l. 5, n. 321; Struggl 25; L. 76.

Is drunkenness licit for undergoing a surgical operation? - The first opinion, which St. Alphonsus, 76, and others hold, denies it, because in this case drunkenness would be directly intended, or the privation of reason, which is intrinsically evil, as a means of removing the pain of the senses. But the second opinion affirms it. 1. Because privation of the use of reason at least for a brief time, and from a grave cause, does not seem intrinsically evil. 2. Because drink is not directly given for causing the privation of reason, but for the sleep of the senses; and therefore drunkenness follows indirectly per accidens. For neither does the sleep of the senses proceed from privation of reason, but from relaxation and dulling of the nerves; and from the sleep of the senses proceeds privation of the use of reason. Gur. Baller. 182.

Therefore in no way is to be condemned the use of other medicines whose primary power is to bring on sleep, or to make the nerves numb, such as opium and the inhalation of ether. Antonelli, vol. 1, p. 2, de 5 Praec., c. 6; La-Croix, l. 5, n. 314. Chloroform: Its use is licit for lessening or preventing pains in a surgical operation, in difficult childbirth, and even in ordinary childbirth, since the danger which some affirm would arise to mother and child does not in reality exist. Morphine: Taken in great quantity it causes death; in small quantity, it produces sleep of the senses and privation of the use of reason; in smallest quantity, it is useful for calming the nerves and for restoring strength. Injections, for lessening pains, if they are done sometimes and in small quantity, are not illicit. In great pains they provide true relief. But if they are used repeatedly, and in greater quantity, they gravely harm bodily health, and consequently are illicit. Cocaine: Insofar as it is used for lessening pains, if it is done with due moderation, and no grave danger afterward is present either to health or even to life, it is licit per se.

Is it licit to induce someone to drunkenness, so that he may be impeded from a graver evil, e.g., from committing sacrilege or homicide? - The first opinion affirms it, because this is to diminish an evil which otherwise cannot be impeded. "That which is contrary to reason has more of the account of evil than that which removes the use of reason for an hour."

S. Th. 2. 2. q. 150, a. 3 ad 2. The second opinion distinguishes, and says that it is licit to induce another to material drunkenness, i.e., when the other becomes drunk without sin, for instance by setting before him very strong or medicated wine, because then on the one hand he does not sin, and on the other the harm of drunkenness is permitted in order to avoid a graver harm of others. But they say it is not licit to induce him to formal drunkenness, namely with his own sin, since this is intrinsically evil, and therefore never to be permitted. But the third opinion grants neither, because, since such a person is in no way thinking about wine, to induce him positively to drunkenness is accordingly evil. "Nevertheless, these things notwithstanding," St. Alphonsus, 77, concludes, "the first opinion seems sufficiently probable to me and to other learned men consulted by me, whether the drunkenness is material or formal, on account of the reason already brought forward, because it is licit to induce another to a lesser evil, so that he may be impeded from a greater." Namely then it is not to counsel evil, but good, that is, the choice of the lesser evil.

Is it licit to intoxicate someone so that he may reveal secrets? Struggl, 25, has these things: "It is licit materially to intoxicate another... for eliciting secrets which the other is bound to manifest; but if this were done to elicit secrets which the other could manifest with a good conscience, yet is not bound to manifest, an injury would be done to him, because he is reasonably unwilling against such intoxication and such a mode of eliciting secrets. This is true a fortiori when the other cannot manifest similar secrets with a good conscience." La-Croix has the same, l. 5, nn. 328, 329.

Does someone sin gravely by inducing a madman into drunkenness? R. Negatively per se, because a fool, as already deprived of the use of reason, cannot any longer be deprived of the use of reason. Per se, because if a fool after excessive drink is accustomed to do shameful things, or to break out into blasphemies, and the one who induces him to drink knows this, the latter will sin gravely against the natural law; because the fool violates it materially, since he is subject to it in first act. Elbel 679-681.

Are evils committed in drunkenness imputable? - R. Negatively, if they were not foreseen at least in confusion, as is clear; affirmatively, if they were foreseen at least in confusion, at least evils of deed, as again is clear from what has been said. At least evils of deed; for injurious words, or even contumelious deeds, probably are not imputable if they are uttered against men, since according to common estimation they are judged to inflict no injury and contumely; otherwise, however, if they are uttered against God, as blasphemies, etc., because even that material utterance alone of blasphemies, voluntary in the cause, tends to the diminution of divine honor. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus, 78, does not dare to call the contrary opinion of the Salmanticenses improbable. - But since blasphemy uttered in drunkenness does not have in itself the true nature of blasphemy, although it was foreseen, it is not subject to reservation and censure, if perhaps there is any. - Likewise obscene words, by reason of the scandal of others, are also imputable as sin if they are foreseen. - L. 2, 78; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 76, a. 4; Ithur., Cas. 30; Sanch., in dec., l. 1, c. 16, n. 42 seqq.; C. B. 827; C. A. 1307; C. I. 1151; C. L. 2361.

What is anger? Anger is an inordinate appetite of revenge.

This disorder can occur in two ways: 1. On the part of the mode of being angry, as, for example, if you are too much inflamed inwardly, or outwardly reveal anger too much through signs. - 2. On the part of the object, as, if you desire revenge for a cause plainly unjust, or greater than is just, e.g., by wishing death to an enemy who has not deserved it, or revenge to be executed by one's own authority, or finally, although the revenge is just, nevertheless you do not desire it as just, but as satisfying your malevolent mind. If revenge is desired in an ordered way, there is no sin of anger, as when superiors are angry at the faults of subjects, and punish them, or avenge them. Anger inordinate in the first way mentioned before is from its genus a venial sin; nevertheless it can become mortal by accident, on account of the violation of another virtue, e.g., religion, piety, charity, etc., as if blasphemy, malediction, or scandal is added; and also, if a movement of the soul of this sort is truly vehement and deliberate. Anger inordinate in the second way is from its genus mortal, because it is directly against charity and justice, Gal. 5:20. - S. Th. 1. 2. q. 88, a. 5 ad 1; 2. 2. q. 108, 158; L. 79.

What are the daughters of anger? - Some are from the heart: 1. Indignation, which is an inordinate affection from the fact that someone reckons himself treated unworthily by such a person. It is commonly venial. Indeed, if it proceeds from a just judgment of reason, it is nothing. Nevertheless it could be mortal if it increased up to deliberate hatred and grave contempt of the person. 2. Swelling of mind, by which someone morosely thinks out diverse ways of revenge, and by those thoughts puffs up his mind. What kind of sin it is must be judged from the quality of the revenge which is thought out. - Some are in the mouth: 1. Shouting, when an angry person raises his voice, pouring forth many things inordinately and confusedly. It is commonly venial, unless something else is added. 2. Blasphemy against God, and it is mortal. 3. Contumely against men, by which someone casts some evil upon his neighbor, with the intention of dishonoring him. 4. Malediction, by which someone wishes and imprecates evil upon another, under the account of evil. - Some are in deed, as quarrels, fights, seditions, wounds. "Quarrels, by which are understood all harms which are inflicted in deed on neighbors from anger." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 158, a. 7. When "someone intends to harm another, with the latter knowing and resisting, this is imported under the name of quarrel." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 42, a. 1. Quarrels, if they do not exceed measure, as also slight fights, are venial; otherwise, if they progress to seditions, wounds, killings. And these are commonly mortal sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense. L. 80, 83; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 40, 41, 42.

Contumely: From its genus it is mortal. It is only venial if it is small, or only material without the mind of dishonoring, provided that no notable injury to the neighbor's honor follows. And thus many parents are excused at least from mortal sin when they call their children asses, etc.; likewise women, children, and men of the lowest sort, burdening one another with insults, because, since credit is not given to them, honor is not gravely injured. Nor indeed is it a sin if it is done with the mind of correcting, humbling, or for another reason. And thus a superior can cast forth some word otherwise contumelious. Yet in this one can sin if the mode of due correction is exceeded, or the subject is more gravely dishonored than he deserved. Likewise, if for the sake of a joke, through fitting recreation, light defects are cast forth, it is pleasantness, according to S. Th. 2. 2. q. 72, a. 2, provided the other is not saddened, nor moved to anger. Contumely is also done by deed, both indirectly, as if you trample or burn the image or letters of another, etc., and directly, as if you beat an honorable man with a club, set horns at his door, or represent something which injures the honor of another.

To this belongs mocking, derision, and ridicule, when it is done by signs, as by wrinkling the nose, stretching out the lips, etc., intending the neighbor's confusion; and if this is grave, or at least the neighbor is gravely saddened by it, they are mortal. - Concerning these things note that one who has injured another's honor by contumely is bound to restore it, even if reputation has not been injured. But this can be done either through an honorable and friendly greeting, or an invitation to table, or a petition for pardon, sometimes even on bended knees and before witnesses, according as the injury was grave. It is not necessary to explain in confession the varied quality of mortal contumely. L. 81, 82. "Malediction, of which we now speak, is that by which evil is pronounced against someone either by commanding or by wishing. But to will, or by command to move toward, the evil of another, according to itself repugns to charity, by which we love our neighbor; and so according to its genus it is a mortal sin, and so much the graver, the more we are bound to love and revere the person whom we curse.... Nevertheless it happens that a word of malediction uttered is a venial sin, either because of the smallness of the evil which one imprecates upon another by cursing, or also because of the affection of the one who utters the words of malediction, while from a light movement, or jest, or from some surreption, he utters such words, because sins of words are weighed especially from the affection." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 76, a. 3; L. 83.

What is acedia? Acedia, or weariness of soul, can be used in two ways: 1. Generally, for every weariness of soul and slackening in the exercise of virtues, because some labor is joined to it. "Acedia is a certain sadness by which man is rendered slow toward spiritual acts because of bodily labor." S. Th. 1 p., q. 63, a. 2 ad 2. 2. Specially, for sadness and weariness concerning divine friendship, because it must be preserved through laborious exercises of virtues; and thus someone does not care for that friendship. Acedia taken in the first way is then finally a mortal sin when therefore a work forbidden under mortal sin is done. Acedia taken in the second way is of itself mortal, because it repugns to the charity of God. "Acedia is not a mental withdrawal from any spiritual good whatsoever, but from the divine good, to which the mind must adhere of necessity. Hence if someone is saddened by this, that someone compels him to fulfill works of virtue which he is not bound to do, it is not the sin of acedia, but when he is saddened in those things which are incumbent upon him to be done for God." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 35, a. 3 ad 2; q. 35; L. 84; E. M.

What are the daughters of acedia? - They are the following: 1. Malice, namely a special malice by which, by reason of sadness to be fled, someone hates and detests spiritual goods, and would wish them not to exist, or by which he is sorry that he has done well or fulfilled that to which he was bound, or by which he contemns a benefit of God, e.g., by desiring not to have been born, or not to have known Christ, etc. It is mortal from its genus. - 2. Pusillanimity, by which someone flees those things which are arduous and which fall under counsels. 3. Torpor, by which someone flees those things which pertain to common justice, or precepts, and does good things without due fervor.

4. Rancor, by which those who induce to spiritual things are wearisome; whence rancor is a certain indignation. 5. Wandering of mind, by which someone in the exercise of spiritual things wanders toward exterior illicit delights, whether by thought, and it is called curiosity; or by speech, and it is called verbosity; or by bodily restlessness, and it is called restlessness, which are commonly venial. 6. Despair of salvation, which is flight from the end itself, and mortal. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 20, a. 4; q. 35; L. 84.

1. Augustus, a veteran soldier, desires to be placed over the remaining fellow-soldiers, because he has firmly persuaded himself that he surpasses all of them both in strength of mind and in skill of war, already proved by deeds many times, or at least is second to none. But since he is a fervent Catholic, he has persuaded himself that no other of his fellow-soldiers will be able to benefit the spiritual good of the soldiers as he himself will, if he is placed over them. Wherefore, by efficacious but honest means, through the intercession of friends, he tries to obtain the aforesaid prefecture.

Q. 1. What is pride and what kind of sin is it? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 321. To the second: that Augustus judges that he excels others in the military art, and is pleased in himself in this his excellence, is not grave sin in itself. Indeed it is not even a light sin if, without contempt of God and of others, he neither extols himself more than is fitting, nor is excessively pleased with his own excellence. - If Augustus in reality is a strong and capable soldier, and worthy of a higher public office, he did not sin by desiring promotion to it moderately. The reason is that to seek one's own promotion to nobler offices, and one's own excellence, is a thing of itself altogether indifferent, free from all fault, and if it is done from a good end and with due moderation, it becomes praiseworthy. For only an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence is vicious. But Augustus, by hypothesis, is in reality worthy of further promotion, procures it by honest and licit means, and is led by the best end; nor from elsewhere does excessive desire of it appear. Wherefore he does not seem to be disturbed. Elbel 611.

2. Angelus, a doctor in philosophy and theology, canon of the cathedral church, famous in the whole diocese both for knowledge and for holiness of life, is agitated by great anguish of conscience. For when he sees that the present bishop does not rightly govern the diocese, whence many detractions and many rumors pervade the whole diocese against the bishop, he is very saddened by this, and prays God for the diocese, that after the death of the bishop, now octogenarian and infirm, a prudent pastor may be placed over it. For there are many discords in the clergy on account of various candidates who are proposed for the episcopal see. Yet often he thinks that, if he himself in reality were chosen, he would govern all things wholly in a holy and just way, would extirpate these or those abuses, would promote these or those pious works. While he turns these things over in his mind, he experiences in himself a desire of the episcopate. But immediately he fears that he has wished for the episcopate by culpable ambition. Meanwhile the bishop dies, and without Angelus doing anything, by unanimous vote of the canons he is named capitular vicar, and then is announced as bishop by the Supreme Pontiff, beyond every opinion and expectation of his. But Angelus is uncertain whether he ought to renounce or accept the episcopate.

Q. Has Angelus sinned in a desire of this sort, and does he sin by not renouncing the episcopate?

R. The desire of Angelus was rather will as nature than will as reason, I. M. 80, and therefore no sin was present. This is clear from all the circumstances of the case; from which it indeed appears that Angelus is not ambitious. But if it is supposed that perhaps that desire was semi-voluntary, or altogether voluntary, then it also does not seem that Angelus sinned by ambition. For "in the episcopate three things can be considered. Of these one is principal and final, namely episcopal operation, by which the utility of neighbors is intended.... Another is the height of the grade, because a bishop is constituted over others.... But the third is what consequently has itself to these, namely reverence and honor, and sufficiency of temporal things. Therefore to seek the episcopate by reason of goods of circumstances of this sort is manifestly illicit and pertains to cupidity or ambition.... But as regards the second, namely the loftiness of grade, to seek the episcopate is presumptuous.... But to seek to benefit neighbors is in itself praiseworthy and virtuous." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 185, a. 1. But Angelus certainly does not seem to seek the episcopate on account of the loftiness of grade, but on account of the utility of his neighbor. Therefore his desire, speaking in itself, is praiseworthy and virtuous. Speaking in itself; for, as the same St. Thomas continues in the cited place, "because, according as it is an episcopal act, it has the loftiness of grade annexed, it seems presumptuous that someone should seek to preside for this, that he may benefit subjects, unless manifest necessity is imminent..., especially when someone by the zeal of charity is divinely urged to this. Yet without presumption anyone can desire to do such works, if it should happen to him to be in such an office, or even that he be worthy of executing such works; so that the good work falls under the desire, but not the primacy of dignity." Moreover Angelus does not seem to desire to benefit subjects without some grave and manifest necessity existing. For since the clergy, and consequently also the seculars, are already being split into various factions, it is certainly to be feared lest by secular protection someone less suitable perhaps be chosen to the still greater harm of the diocese. But Angelus, since in the whole diocese he already enjoys the reputation of a learned and holy priest, seems suitable, as is also gathered from the very fact of the election, who by his authority can restore peace and tranquility and the right order of things. Whence it also is that it now happens that he is in such a dignity, and that Angelus is worthy of it. Nor indeed does Angelus seem in any way to seek anything else than the good work itself, so that it truly seems possible to say of him that, desiring the episcopate, he desires a good work, 1 Tim. 3:1; because in it he desires nothing except the good work. For this reason also, absolutely speaking, it does not seem that Angelus ought to fear concerning presumption of himself. - Lig. l. 6, n. 804.

Finally the doubt of Angelus, whether he ought to renounce the episcopate or accept it, the Angelic Doctor himself resolves thus, in the cited place, a. 2: "It must be said that in the assumption of the episcopate two things are to be considered. First indeed, what it is fitting for a man to seek according to his own will. Second, what it is fitting for a man to do according to the will of another. Therefore, as regards one's own will, it is fitting for a man principally to insist upon his own salvation; but that he attend to the salvation of others, this is fitting for a man from the disposition of another having power. Whence, just as it pertains to the disorder of the will that someone by his own motion be carried into this, that he be placed over the government of others, so also it pertains to the disorder of the will that someone altogether, against the injunction of a superior, finally refuse the aforesaid office of government, for two reasons: first indeed, because this is repugnant to the charity of neighbors, for whose utility someone ought to expose himself according to place and time.... Second, because this is repugnant to humility, by which someone subjects himself to the commands of superiors." Wherefore, since Angelus himself did nothing to obtain the episcopate, of which he himself had no ambition, he is not held to renounce the episcopate. And, if the command of the Supreme Pontiff accedes, on the contrary he is held to accept it. But if no command of the Supreme Pontiff and no injunction accedes, then let Angelus make the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, and according to the most wise rules which St. Ignatius hands down there for the election of a state of life, he himself will be able, under the direction of a spiritual master, better to define what is to be done by him in the case for the greater glory of God, and the salvation of his own soul and of neighbors. - St. Thomas, Quodl. 2, a. 11; Quodl. 3, a. 9; Quodl. 5, a. 22, 24; Quodl. 12, a. 17; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 2, d. 5; M. E. v. 11, p. 74.

3. Maximus, a very rich and most noble man and very pious and religious, seeing the Franciscan Fathers in public ways clothed with rough and coarse clothing, is disturbed in mind. For he thinks that he continually sins venially, because he does not imitate that vileness and roughness of garments. Hence he manifests to the confessor his anxiety and his purpose of changing the garments which he himself wears, proper to a noble man, into cheaper garments. He himself indeed would have done this immediately; but a difficulty occurs to him, that then perhaps he could no longer appear in the company of friends of equal condition, and that from this all his blood relatives would take grave displeasure.

Q. Is it always a sin to use costly garments?

R. To the proposed question St. Thomas responds thus, Quodl. 10, a. 14: "It must be said that here one must speak otherwise concerning a private person. For in a public person both the state of dignity and the condition of the proper person are considered; concerning these two he ought so to bear himself that the authority of the dignity not come into contempt, and that he himself not be carried away into pride. Therefore each can be praiseworthy: both that he use costly things to induce reverence for authority, and that he use cheap things by reason of his own humility; only thus, lest the things which are done for conserving authority degenerate into pride; and lest, while the humility of the ruler is too much preserved, authority be broken.... But in him who is a private person, it is virtuous if, on account of humility, he uses more abject clothing even than his own state requires.... But it is licit that he use costly things according to the measure of his own person; but it is a sin if he exceeds his own measure. And because costly is said relatively, as also great, since that which is costly to one is not costly to another, costliness of garments always sounds in excess of one's own measure. And according to this, it is always a sin to use costly garments."

But since Maximus, from the case, does not seem to exceed this proper measure, let him altogether acquiesce, and persuade himself that he is not for this reason in continual venial sin. Let him avoid every immoderation, with attention to the custom of those who are of equal condition, and with whom he himself must converse. Let him furthermore avoid every inordinate affection of vain glory, delights, excessive solicitude, and then there will be no sin. Indeed, even in this matter disorder can also be from "the negligence of a man who does not apply study or labor to this, that he use exterior adornment according as he ought." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 1.

Nor indeed do the Franciscan Fathers therefore sin, but on the contrary they use more abject garments virtuously and praiseworthily. "Yet he who uses cheaper garments than others does not always sin. For if he does this on account of boasting or pride, so that he may prefer himself to others, it is a vice of superstition. But if he does this on account of maceration of the flesh, or humiliation of the spirit, it pertains to the virtue of temperance.... But especially it befits those to use cheap garments who exhort others both by word and by example to penance." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 1, ad 1.

4. Leopoldus, professor of a certain faculty, seems in a certain way born for contentions. He is accustomed to attack most sharply the opinions of his colleague Modestinus, although he himself holds them as true. He does this so that he may be held by the students in the Lyceum as wiser than Modestinus. And in reality he obtained this shortly and easily, both on account of a certain subtle manner of arguing, and on account of facility of eloquence, and also on account of a clear and sonorous voice, in which he prevails over his colleague not a little.

Q. 1. What are discord and contention? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 322. To the second: Leopoldus without doubt incurs the sin of discord, because he does not consent with his colleague in the good of truth, but rather, from mere forwardness or pride, is accustomed to attack recognized truth for this end, that he may seem more learned. Yet discord of this sort is not a grave sin unless it turns upon the matter of faith and morals, unless it is done with notable injury of honor or some other grave damage of the adversary, and unless it is done with grave scandal of others, which will have to be judged from the various circumstances. - He also incurs the sin of contention, because he attacks truth with confidence of clamor, as also the sin of pride, because he contends for this end, that he may extol his own authority and diminish that of the other. If the truth of which there is question is merely philosophical, it will not be a grave sin by reason of the matter, because then it is precisely against truth, whose violation is not gravely sinful from its own genus. But if there is question of certain theological truth, speaking in itself, it is a grave sin. Likewise the circumstances must be attended to, so that it may be defined whether contention of this sort, by reason of them, is a grave sin. - Elbel 346, 347.

5. Lucretius, a rich man, very solicitous about increasing his little fortune, neglects no occasion of acquiring gain. Hence, with great vigilance and great labor, he attends to the business of his workshop. He rises very early in the morning, goes to bed very late, and very fatigued. Furthermore he repels almost all poor persons who meet him, and gives alms only rather rarely. Likewise, he does not deny to his wife and children the things necessary for food, clothing, habitation, and education, but he uses great parsimony with respect to other less necessary things, and denies them almost every recreation and other honest amusements.

Q. 1. What is avarice and what kind of sin is it? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 323. To the second: Lucretius certainly cannot be excused from venial sin because of his altogether excessive solicitude for temporal things. But whether Lucretius is to be charged with mortal sin or not is not established. For from the case it does not appear that he commits some grave injustice or gravely injures charity. G. 173.

6. Livonius, a physician, is altogether saddened by the knowledge and talents of other physicians, because before others he appears more abject and cannot show his own knowledge and his own talents. Likewise he grieves vehemently when he sees other physicians, his friends and companions, being called by more clients, but himself being summoned only by a few, and by persons of the lowest class.

Q. 1. What is envy and what kind of sin is it? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, I. M. 327. To the second: Livonius, speaking in itself, sins gravely from envy, since he is saddened by the good of others as impeding his own good, excellence, honor, and advantage. Speaking in itself; for perhaps practically he will be able to be excused, at least from grave sin, if either he does not sufficiently attend to the malice of the matter, or in reality is not saddened by the good of others, but only by his own evil, that he is held abject and is deserted by all. G. 168 seqq.

7. Gaudiosus, powerful in sustaining wine, never casts off the use of reason; but he experiences heaviness of the head, and sometimes walks with wavering feet. Hence he is altogether vigorous in emptying cups, and conquers all his companions in taverns, provoking his fellow-drinkers to equal draughts.

8. Gaudentius is made drunk by a moderate cup of wine. Yet he by no means abstains from wine when he is stirred up by companions to drinking in taverns. Otherwise, he says, those companions begin to ridicule me as scrupulous and at the same time ridicule religion and priests.

9. Esculapius, a physician, counsels his client Albinus to drink generous wine, and in sufficient quantity for sustaining and strengthening his weakened powers. But since Albinus is not accustomed to wine, lest he become drunk, he first begins to drink wine in moderate quantity; then, with habit now contracted and the stomach accustomed, he drinks wine also in greater quantity, and very generous wine, without feeling any inconvenience. And now he is so accustomed to drinking wine that he can no longer abstain from it without feeling languor of the stomach and experiencing difficult digestion of food.

Q. 1. What is drunkenness and what kind of sin is it? 2. What as to the various cases?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 352 seqq. To the second: Gaudiosus does not commit mortal sin by reason of drunkenness, although he drinks much. The reason is that in him there is not a voluntary and perfect privation of reason. But he sins gravely by reason of scandal and cooperation, by efficaciously provoking and inducing others to drunkenness. - G. 176.

Gaudentius is not excused from the grave sin of drunkenness. For this is not in the fact that someone drinks much or little; but in the fact that someone voluntarily, without any necessity, by an intoxicating drink deprives himself of the use of reason. Nor can grave fault, in the case, cease from the fact that other companions ridicule him, or even begin to ridicule religion and sacred things; for one must not sin so that another may be removed from sin. The sin is altogether voluntary to the others, and depends only on their malice. Abstaining from drunkenness, Gaudentius commends religion, and on the contrary induces others by his example, so that they also abstain from sin, whether of drunkenness or of blasphemy. - G. 178.

Albinus seems to sin in nothing. For he himself takes precaution against drunkenness, and has a sufficient reason for drinking wine, even generous wine, and in a certain greater quantity. But he has by no means exceeded the limits of temperance, since he feels no inconvenience from this; indeed on the contrary he receives the great advantage of more robust health. - G. 181.

10. Ignatius, of an inflamed mind and incapable of restraining anger, often moved by grave anger, utters blasphemies against God and imprecations against men. But he often rebukes and scolds his wife, children, and other domestics, assailing them with insults and disgraceful names. When he is alone, he also becomes angry at himself, and devotes inanimate things to all the devils.

Q. 1. What is anger and what kind of sin is it? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 341. To the second: Ignatius, as he is often angry, so also often becomes guilty of mortal sin, not only because of blasphemies, and grave imprecations and contumelies against men and blood relatives, but also because of grave inflaming and disturbance of mind, provided sufficient advertence is present. And, although in the act of the grave movement of anger this sometimes is lacking, for that reason he is not excused from grave sin at least in the cause, unless he retracts the evil habit and seriously tries to extinguish it. - G. 175.

11. Robertinus, a son of the family, very obedient to his parents, indeed fulfills all religious duties. But since his parents besides compel him to perform many other works of devotion and virtues to which he is not held, he himself is somewhat saddened by this, and in executing them often experiences this sadness in himself.

Q. 1. What is sloth? 2. Is Robertinus guilty of sloth?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 343. To the second: Robertinus indeed commits sloth, a general vice, fleeing spiritual good insofar as it is laborious and troublesome; since "every vice flees the spiritual good of the opposite virtue." But he by no means commits sloth, the special vice, to which it belongs "to be saddened by divine good." Indeed, "sloth is not a withdrawal of the mind from just any spiritual good, but from divine good, to which the mind must cling by necessity. Whence, if someone is saddened by this, that someone compels him to fulfill works of virtue which he is not held to do, it is not the sin of sloth; but when he is saddened in those things which are incumbent on him to be done on account of God." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 35, a. 2, 3.

Capital sins are so called because they are, as it were, heads or sources of other sins. Whence they are to be called vices rather than properly sins, if they are considered in genus.

Seven are numbered, namely 1. Pride; - 2. Avarice; -

3. Luxury; - 4. Envy; - 5. Anger; - 6. Sloth; - 7. Gluttony. - A few things concerning each ¹.

¹ An accurate notion of this matter must be sought from theologians, and especially from St. Thomas, rather than from ascetical booklets, which not rarely treat things of this kind less exactly.

174. • Pride is the disordered love of one's own excellence.

Pride is distinguished as perfect, or complete and consummated in its own genus, and imperfect pride. - It is indeed called perfect when a man so stands in himself and is complacent in himself that he is in a disposition of gravely transgressing the law rather than obeying the commands of a Superior. But this by that very fact always includes mortal sin in itself. - But in the other cases it is called imperfect, and then of itself it usually induces only venial sin, unless grave injury to the neighbor accedes, for example if he is gravely contemned, etc. - St. Lig., no. 66.

The daughters of pride are ambition, vainglory, presumption, boasting, ostentation, and hypocrisy.

The remedies are consideration of one's own infirmity, of the vanity of human glory, and of the humility of Christ.

175. • Avarice is the disordered appetite of temporal goods. It is opposed to justice or liberality. If the former, it will easily break forth into mortal sin, namely as often as it impels to grave injustice toward the neighbor. - If the latter, of itself it will beget only venial sins. Moreover excessive affection toward earthly things can, and indeed usually does, propel one into other sins, even grave ones.

The daughters of avarice are: hardness of heart toward the miserable, disquiet of mind, or disordered solicitude about earthly things, perfidy, deceit, etc...

Remedies: consideration of the vanity of earthly things, of the baseness, unhappiness, and dangers of this vice. - St. Lig., no. 69.

176. • Luxury is the disordered appetite of a venereal thing. Luxury is grave from its whole genus; but this must be understood if the venereal delectation is deliberate in itself and directly sought; but if indirectly ², it can from some circumstance become light, as in some touches, readings, and similar things less dangerous.

² Venereal delectation, whether sought directly or indirectly, when it is intended or voluntarily admitted, always brings the guilt of grave fault. But the Author speaks here of another matter: namely he treats of acts by which carnal movements can be caused, and the venereal delectation connected with these. Now when effects of this kind are not intended, and a delectation perhaps arisen is not admitted, and moreover the proximate danger of consenting to it is absent, the general principle is that, according to the common opinion of the Doctors, St. Alphonsus also defends (book 3, no. 484), there is as much guilt in these effects, as voluntary only in the cause, as there is in the cause itself. Consequently those effects are judged only lightly culpable if the cause, for example a curious reading or look, is venially evil; and every fault also will be absent if a just cause of placing those acts is present.

The daughters: blindness of mind, inconsideration, inconstancy, hatred of God, languor of faith, indeed also loss of it, etc.

Remedies: frequent and humble prayer, custody of the senses, flight from occasions and idleness, mortification of the flesh, temperance, frequenting of the Sacraments. - See St. Lig., no. 71.

177. • Envy is sadness concerning another's good, insofar as it is esteemed as one's own evil, or at least as a lesser good. Joy concerning another's evil, which is judged an increase of one's own good, is recalled to it. But it is directly against charity, and grave from its genus.

The daughters: detraction, calumny, whispering, contumely, etc.

Remedies: consideration of the evils proceeding from envy, offices of charity toward the neighbor, frequent prayer, exercise of humility. - See St. Lig., no. 72.

178. • Anger is an inflaming of the mind, and a disordered movement against someone or something; or it is a disordered appetite of vengeance. Irascibility is a habit of anger. Anger is mortal from its genus, if it is an appetite of vengeance; but venial if it is only a disordered movement of the mind ³.

³ St. Thomas must by all means be read concerning this matter (2.2, q. 158 throughout), who accurately distinguishes the vice of anger from the passion of anger, which, if it is ruled and tempered by reason, can be not only laudable but also commanded. Nor are those things to be neglected which the same Holy Doctor writes (l. c., q. 157) concerning meekness, which can be excellently composed with the virtue of that severity, whose proper office is to be inflexible concerning the infliction of penalties when right reason demands it. And indeed accurate knowledge of all these things is especially necessary to the Confessor, so that he may know how to teach penitents the difficult boundaries of vice and virtue in this matter; and, to say it once, that Part of the Summa of the Angelic Doctor which is called the Second of the Second, where the reasons of all the virtues and of the opposed vices, and, I might almost say, all their fibers are investigated, is the book which ought never to fall from the hands of the Confessor.

The daughters: indignation, rancor, clamor, insults, blasphemies, etc.

Remedies: consideration of the evils of anger, and of the meekness of Christ. - See St. Lig., no. 80 and following.

179. • Sloth in general sounds the same as laziness; but more strictly it is torpor of mind and weakness of will, from which flows disgust for spiritual things on account of the labor and inconvenience joined to them. If it is so great that grave obligations are omitted from it, it must be held grave; if otherwise, it is to be judged light. - Thus commonly.

The daughters: torpor, wandering of the mind, nausea in prayer, etc.

Remedies: consideration of the labors of Christ, of eternal reward, and of the dangers of sloth; pious reading, frequent confession, etc.

180. • Gluttony is the disordered appetite of food or drink.

The vice is committed chiefly in five ways: 1. if you eat before the time; 2. if things too exquisite; 3. if more than is fair; 4. if voraciously; 5. if things prepared with greater industry. These are contained in the following verse:

Too soon, richly, too much, ardently, studiously.

It is venial sin from its genus. But it becomes grave if it gravely harms health, or if it renders someone inept for duties. He sins who eats or drinks to satiety on account of pleasure alone ⁴, as is established from the 8th proposition condemned by Innocent XI; yet of itself it does not exceed venial. - Thus commonly.

⁴ He eats or drinks on account of pleasure alone who positively excludes the further ends of the operation. For otherwise, from St. Thomas (Contra Gentiles, book 3, ch. 26, nos. 6, 7), delectation which follows a good operation is good and licitly desired; but from the general principle, an operation is good if its intrinsic ends, whether immediate or mediate, are not positively excluded, although there is no need at all expressly to intend them or to think about them while acting.

The daughters of gluttony are drunkenness, concerning which more fully soon, dullness of mind, buffoonery, much-speaking, and uncleanness of any genus.

Remedies: to consider the worst effects of gluttony as to body and soul; - to mortify the flesh, especially in bodily refection; - frequently to remember death, or the soon future corruption of the body. - See St. Lig., no. 74.

1. By the sixth precept of the Decalogue all things are prohibited which are repugnant to the ordered propagation of the human race. For all these, in their own way, are reduced to adultery, as to the primary act repugnant to this ordered propagation. But by the ninth precept all interior concupiscence is prohibited concerning those external works which already had been previously prohibited by the sixth precept. Each of these precepts prohibits lust, which is: the inordinate appetite or use of venereal things. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 154, a. 1; L. 412, 414. Therefore the malice of lust consists in this: that man uses venereal things, that is, the motion of the genital spirits and semen, which by nature and by God as author of nature is ordained to the due propagation of the human race, inordinately for pleasure or for another perverse end.

Inordinately, that is, outside marriage, or contrary to the laws of marriage within marriage.

Now then: 1. Lust, of whatever genus or species, is per se a grave sin. The reason is: 1. Because it fights gravely against nature. For the use of the venereal matter from its nature was instituted and is necessary for the conservation and propagation alone of the human race; therefore it cannot be usurped outside marriage; indeed, not even in marriage except in the due mode, without grave disturbance of right order. 2. Because it is prohibited under grave obligation by God the Author of nature, as is clear from innumerable places of Sacred Scripture. And thus the Apostle Paul, in the Epistle to the Galatians 5:19, says: manifest are the works of the flesh, which are fornication, uncleanness, immodesty, lust... which I foretell to you, as I have foretold: that they who do such things shall not obtain the kingdom of God. - L. 414; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 153, a. 2, 3.

2. Directly voluntary lust in any genus never admits smallness of matter. The reason is that any delectation directly sought necessarily introduces subversion, in a most grave matter, of the natural order established by the Creator. This is clear also from proposition 40 condemned by Alexander VII, which lies thus: It is a probable opinion which says that a kiss had for carnal and sensible delectation, which arises from the kiss, is only venial, the danger of further consent and of pollution being excluded. - Sporer, de Matrim., n. 689-690; L. 475, 476; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 153, a. 2, 3.

3. But indirectly voluntary lust admits smallness of matter, because then there is no consent or intention toward venereal pleasure, but only toward the cause, which is lightly sinful, since it influences venereal delectation only lightly. G. 412 (Gury, Comp. Theol. mor., t. 1, n. 412); L. 482, 483. And indeed, since that cause per se influences that pleasure only lightly, and therefore ineffectively, there is had indeed a permission of it, in no way a willing of it. But if someone not only permits that venereal pleasure, but also actually wills and intends it, in that cause, he will be guilty of grave fault; because in reality he wills and intends a venereal thing, which is gravely illicit.

4. Moreover, lust is directly opposed to chastity, which taken generally is: the moral virtue which moderates the inordinate appetite and use of venereal things. A part of chastity, and indeed the most perfect part, is virginity, which imports two things: namely integrity of body, and integrity of mind, or the purpose of preserving that integrity of body forever. Virginity is lost physically in a girl by the opening or breaking of the virginal cloister, and in a male by the effusion of semen; but morally it is lost, more or less, both by a woman and by a male, through voluntary pollution, or merely venereal delectation, or only through consent to these, although in reality neither pollution nor venereal delectation takes place. Yet as regards the political state and in the face of the Church, a girl remains a virgin so long as the cloister of virginity has not been violated by intercourse, and a male so long as he has not carnally known a woman. Whence "a nun who before profession or consecration voluntarily polluted herself, although she loses, as was said, virginity according to virtue, nevertheless since she does not lose it according to state, because she rejoices in an intact virginal cloister, needs no dispensation for making profession and for receiving the veil granted only to virgins. And for the same reason, the same woman can without scruple accept a legacy left to virgins alone, and pronounce herself a virgin in order to marry, etc. Azor, citing Bonac. and others, teaches that a virgin secretly violated in the cloister cannot put herself forward for requesting the veil of consecration, even if from this she is going to incur infamy; but that she can exercise the offices proper to a virgin, indeed offer herself for them, lest she be defamed; because, he says, ecclesiastical institutes do not oblige with so much rigor. But with peace to Azor, a most learned man, this reason proves that in a similar danger of infamy she can not only put herself forward for the aforesaid offices, but also request the veil of consecration, as he holds, citing Suarez and Pell., because that likewise is from an ecclesiastical institute." Tamburini, Explic. Decal., l. VII, c. 5, n. 2, 3; Sporer, after tr. V, append. ad VI praecept., n. 6; Struggl, tr. 7, q. 4, art. 1, n. 2; Billuart, tr. de Temper., Dissert. 4, de Cast., etc., art. 1, 2, 5; Dissert. 5, de Luxur., art. 1, 2; St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 152.

2. Note 1. In order that the object of lust be rightly understood, in this matter a twofold delectation must be distinguished: one venereal, which is also called carnal, another sensible. Venereal delectation, or delectation concerning a base thing, can be either merely spiritual, namely that which is in the mere will, without any base commotion in the body, or not merely spiritual but at the same time carnal, as if there is present a base commotion in the body. La-Croix, l. 3, n. 890-892. This venereal and carnal delectation is felt in the genital parts through the commotion of the genital spirits and semen; on the contrary, sensible delectation is felt in other senses from their application to their own object, and from the proportion of this object to its proper sense. If venereal delectation is intended either directly in itself, or indirectly in the cause, it is called sought; but if, after it has followed besides the intention, free consent of the will is added, the delectation is called admitted.

Sensible delectation is twofold: one is purely such, the other is sensible-venereal. Purely sensible delectation is that which arises from an object which of itself precisely is not apt to move to venereal delectation; as, for example, the delectation which arises from the touch of silk, the smell of a flower, the hearing of music, the taste of sugar. Sensible-venereal delectation is that which arises from an object which of itself in some way is apt to move to venereal delectation, as, for example, the delectation which arises from touch, from the embrace of a woman, from her kiss, etc. L. 412, 413, 415.

Venereal delectation deliberately voluntary among persons to whom intercourse is illicit properly looks to lust and is a grave sin from its whole genus, not admitting smallness of matter. The reason is that venereal delectation of itself is ordained to the generative act and the propagation of the human race, which is a most grave matter; and if besides it is notable, it contains from its intrinsic nature the proximate danger of pollution, which is directly repugnant to generation. This is confirmed from proposition 40, condemned by Alexander VII, already cited in n. 1, 2. For that condemnation of the proposition is to be understood: 1. of warmer and lingering kisses, which from their nature proximately dispose to venereal delectation; by no means, however, of lighter kisses and those transitorily impressed, which only remotely dispose to venereal delectation; 2. of even lighter kisses, but had for the sake of carnal or venereal delectation. For in that proposition carnal and sensible are joined, so that by the name sensible delectation you understand carnal delectation itself, or delectation which is sensible and at the same time carnal. If, therefore, those kisses are grave on account of the proximate danger and on account of the intended end of venereal delectation, venereal delectation of itself is grave. Hence "he sins gravely who spontaneously consents to light carnal motions spontaneously occurring." L. 415.

Purely sensible delectation, as such, does not properly pertain to lust, but to sensuality, and of itself it is not evil, but indifferent. Nor indeed can another malice be found in it except that which generally is in an act which is not referred to a rational end; such certainly would be the case if someone not only acted with that delectation, but also for the sake of that same delectation, positively excluding a further honest end and resting in it.

Finally, sensible-venereal delectation either from its nature proximately disposes to venereal delectation, or only remotely. If proximately, it is a grave sin on account of the proximate danger of venereal delectation. If remotely, it does not per se exceed venial sin, if it is directly intended, on account of the inordination which is directly intended in it, yet not a grave one, since the proximate danger of venereal delectation is absent. Whence, from some sensuality only, to look at a beautiful woman, to touch her face or hand, or to give her a light kiss, another depraved intention or danger of consent to another grave thing being excluded, is only a venial sin. Struggl, tr. 2, q. 2, n. 15, 4, 5, 6, 7; Tamburini, Expl. decal., l. 7, c. 8, n. 1 et seqq.; Sporer, de Matr., n. 686, 688, 691; Billuart, Dissert. 5, de Luxur., art. 1, 2; Ithurriaga, Cas. 51, n. 3 seqq.; Cas. 18, n. 1 seqq.

The theologians commonly warn, however, as regards practice, that "from sensual delectation to venereal, especially in the sense of touch or sight, the progress is easy." Billuart, de Temp., diss. 5, art. 2; L. l. 3, n. 416; l. 6, n. 854.

3. Note 2. In order that it may also be rightly understood how virginity is a part, and indeed the most perfect part, of chastity taken generally, and is not confused with it, a threefold chastity must be distinguished: conjugal, vidual, virginal. Conjugal chastity is that which in marriage moderately uses lawful pleasures. Vidual chastity is that which, after the death of a spouse or after virginity lost from some other source, thenceforth abstains from the appetite and use of venereal things by a firm purpose. Finally, virginal chastity is that which proposes perpetually to abstain from all carnal pleasures, both illicit and those lawful in marriage. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 151, 153.

4. Note 3. Finally, that what has been said concerning the nature of virginity may be rightly understood, it must be known that some place the virginal cloister in women in a certain membrane, which is called the hymen and is situated at the entrance of the vagina, and this, having been torn by male intercourse or by another extraneous cause, is abolished; but others wish it to be nothing other than the compression or folding together of the orifice of the female vessel, which is dilated by the congress of a man or by another extraneous cause, and thus the vessel is opened. But although the hymen is commonly found in virgins, nevertheless its presence or absence is not indeed a certain sign of virginity; for several cases of virgins are cited who have lacked it. Billuart, Diss. 6, art. 3; Milne Edwards, Lecons sur la Physiologie, Paris 1870, tome 9, pag. 59, 65, 66; Debreyne, Moechialogie, l. P., ch. 1, art. 2, sect. 2; Longet, Physiologie, Paris 1850, t. 2, pag. 139; Ant., p. 113, 115 (Antonelli, Medicina Pastoralis, second edition, pag. 113, 114, 115).

5. Lust is one kind interior, another exterior. The former is the voluntary occupation of fantasy, intellect, and will through joy, morose delectation, or desire concerning a venereal thing for the sake of pleasure. The latter is the very use of venereal things for the sake of pleasure, and it is multiple in species; for one kind is in non-consummated acts, another in consummated acts, which differ in species from the former; and both this kind, which is in consummated acts, and that which is in non-consummated acts, is subdivided into other species according to the specific diversity of objects. - But consummated acts in this matter are those acts which reach all the way to the effusion of prolific humor. Acts which do not reach this term are non-consummated acts, which properly are acts of sensuality and immodesty. - St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 151, a. 4; q. 154, a. 1, ad 5; q. 155, a. 2, 3, 4; L. 412.

We shall explain these various species of lust step by step here in various chapters and articles.

510. 1. Often men are inclined to sins through vicious habits, whether innate or acquired. (a) For there are present in man propensions to evil, which flow from his nature: for since he is composed of soul and body, he tends not only toward spiritual good, but also toward sensible good, sometimes against the order of reason, at least in the present state of fallen nature, as was said in De Deo Creante, n. 171 and 198. Moreover, even when he pursues spiritual good, not rarely he inordinately seeks his own excellence, against the divine will, because naturally his reason wishes to be autonomous. - Sometimes also these propensions are confirmed and increased by heredity, above, n. 116-119. (b) The same grow much by education and by repeated acts, as was said above, n. 108 and 123.

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 2-3; Quaest. disp., De Malo, q. 8-15; Natalis Alexander, De peccatis (Migne, Theol. Curs., XI, 707-1168); Pruner, Theol. Mor., trans. Belet, Paris, 1880, t. I, p. 336-352; Ball. P., n. 697-744; Alibert, Physiologie des Passions, 2nd ed., Paris, 1827; Noldin, n. 301-312; Descuret, La Medecine des Passions, Paris, 1860; Paulhan, Les Caracteres, Paris, Alcan, 1902.

Now these propensions solicit us toward sin, and therefore are, as it were, sources and heads from which many sins arise; hence they are called capital sins, not indeed in the sense that the acts proceeding from them are always gravely sinful, but because propensions of this kind are, as it were, heads of many delicts. Yet they would better be called capital vices, because they are generally considered not as sinful acts, but as inclinations to sinning.

511. 2. Seven sins or capital vices are commonly enumerated, after St. Gregory and St. Thomas.

(A) The former, describing the vices, teaches that their root is pride, from which seven principal ones are brought forth, which themselves also are divided into many others:¹

¹ St. Gregory, Moral., lib. XXXI, c. 45, P. L., LXXVI, 620-622.

"For the root of all evil is pride, concerning which, Scripture bearing witness, it is said: the beginning of every sin is pride.² But its first offspring, namely the seven principal vices, are brought forth from this virulent root, namely vainglory, envy, anger, sadness, avarice, gluttony of the belly, lust." - But each vice has its own army: "For from vainglory arise disobedience, boasting, hypocrisy, contentions, obstinacies, discords, and presumptions of novelties. From envy are born hatred, whispering, detraction, exultation in the adversities of one's neighbor, and affliction in his prosperity." And thus to each capital vice he assigns certain less principal vices. - Afterward he describes their genesis and their connection among themselves in this way: "For the first offspring of pride is vainglory, which, when it has corrupted the oppressed mind, at once begets envy, because, namely, while it seeks the power of a vain name, it pines away lest any other be able to obtain it. Envy also generates anger, because the more the soul is wounded by the inward wound of spite, the more also the gentleness of tranquillity is lost; and because it is touched as though it were a suffering member, therefore the hand of an opposed action is felt as though pressed more heavily. From anger also sadness arises, because the troubled mind, in proportion as it shakes itself inordinately, by so acting confounds itself... Sadness also is drawn down to avarice, because while the confounded heart has lost within itself the good of joy, it seeks outside what may console it; and the more it has no joy to which it may inwardly recur, the more it desires to obtain exterior goods. But after these remain two carnal vices, that is, gluttony of the belly and lust."

² Eccli. 10:15.

512. (B) St. Thomas refined the theory of St. Gregory.¹ He calls those sins capital which are not only principles of others, but also directive and in a certain way leading them. But seven capital vices are fittingly numbered. For the will inordinately pursues good or flees evil. (a) Insofar as it inordinately seeks a good of the soul, namely excellence of praise or honor, it is called vainglory;² by inordinately pursuing a good of the body, it is called gluttony or lust; by seeking external goods, against the order of reason, it is named avarice. (b) It also inordinately flees certain evils: sometimes it is saddened at another's good, insofar as this impedes one's own excellence, and this is envy; if it is saddened at the same with a violent appetite for vengeance, anger blazes up; when it flees labor joined to spiritual good, there arises acedia, or sloth.³

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 3-4.

² The Holy Doctor reckons vainglory among the capital sins; but declares pride to be the beginning of every sin, and therefore the source of the capital sins, while avarice is the root of all evils on the part of execution (q. 84, a. 2).

³ Concerning other divisions of the capital sins, which Cassian and St. John Climacus set forth, see Mangenot, Dict. de Theol., t. II, p. 1689-1690.

But these capital vices take their proximate origin from the threefold concupiscence, and remotely from inordinate love of oneself. Hence by some there is said to be one principle of the vices, namely inordinate love of oneself, - a threefold tinder, namely the concupiscence of the flesh, the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life, - and a sevenfold head, namely the seven capital vices.

513. This division indeed is not adequate, nor opposed in its members, but nevertheless it embraces the principal depraved propensions, to which the others are easily reduced. Therefore we follow it, treating first of pride, and also of envy and anger, which flow more directly from pride; afterward of gluttony and drunkenness, which pursue the sensible goods of the body; then of avarice, which seeks external goods; finally of sloth, which shudders at the difficulty of labor. Of lust in particular there will be discourse in the Treatise on Chastity.

The so-called capital sins (peccata capitalia) must not be conceived as transient acts. They are rather the fundamental vices from which all sins flow, or the bad habits that manifest themselves in actual sins.¹ Hence the capital sins are neither by nature nor in their concrete manifestation always mortal, and it is a mistake to call them "deadly." The specific character and gravity of each may be determined by the presence or absence of certain marks or characteristics.

¹ Cfr. Hugh of St. Victor, Summa Sent., tr. 3, c. 16: "From these, as from seven fountains, all corruptions of souls flow. They are not called capital because they are greater than others, since others are equally great or greater, but capital because all the others arise from them. For there is none which has not arisen from one of these." (Migne, P. L., CLXXVI, 113). — St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, q. 84, art. 3: "A sin is called capital insofar as it metaphorically signifies the beginning or direction of others. Thus a capital vice is one from which other vices arise, especially according to the origin of the final cause, which is the formal origin; and therefore a capital vice is not only the beginning of others but is also directive and in a certain way leading of others. For an art or habit to which the end pertains always exercises primacy and command over those things that are for the end. Hence Saint Gregory compares capital vices of this kind to commanders of armies." (Moral., 1. 31, c. 45, n. 87-88; Migne, P. L., LXXVI, 620 sq.).

The capital sins are usually enumerated in the following order: Pride, covetousness, lust, envy, gluttony, anger, and sloth. From the initials of the Latin words superbia, avaritia, luxuria, invidia, gula, ira, acedia, the Schoolmen formed the catch-word saligia as an aid to the memory.

This septenary number, which may be traced back to St. Gregory the Great, became established at the time of Peter Lombard. Previously, theologians were wont to count eight or even nine capital sins.²

² Cfr. Greg. M., Moral., XXXI, c. 45; O. Zockler, Evagrius Ponticus, Munich 1893, p. 104.

I. PRIDE. —Pride (superbia, cenodoxia) is inordinate self-esteem or love of one's own preeminence, coupled with a desire of inducing others to accept the exaggerated opinion one has formed of oneself. This vice manifests itself in as many different ways as there are objects which man is able to claim as real or supposed excellences or prerogatives.³

³ Cfr. Luke XVIII, 9-14. —St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 93, n. 15: "Who is proud? He who does not do penance by confession of sins, so that he may be healed through humility. Who is proud? He who wishes to claim for himself even those few good things which he appears to possess and detracts from the mercy of God. Who is proud? He who, even if he attributes to God the good things he does, nevertheless insults those who do not do them and exalts himself above them." (Migne, P. L., XXXVII, 1203). —Cfr. S. Haidacher, Des hi. Johannes Chrysostomus Biichlein iiber die Hoffart, pp. 34 sqq.

Pride may take the form of vanity, presumption, ambition, or arrogance.

I. VANITY. —Vanity is pride inspired by an overweening conceit in one's personal appearance, attainments or characteristics, especially when coupled with an excessive desire for notice or approval. This vice makes a man foolish in the eyes of his fellowmen, injures the moral character, favors sensuality and extravagance, and often entails poverty and want. Intentional neglect of one's personal appearance or of the rules of taste and good breeding may also be put down as a kind of vanity.

2. PRESUMPTION. —Presumption is an exaggerated notion of one's intellectual or moral excellence, talents, virtues, etc., attended by the wish to undertake things that are above one's capacity. Intellectual presumption renders a man ridiculous, while moral presumption is destructive of religion and morality and often entails hypocrisy.⁴ 3. AMBITION. —Inordinate ambition (prava ambitio) is an unreasonable striving after dignities, honors, or power. Ambition is commonly only a venial sin, but becomes mortal when it employs grievously sinful means and disregards the distinction between true and false honor.⁵

⁴ Cfr. Matth. VI, 1-6; VII, 1-5; Luke XVIII, 10-14; 1 Tim. VI, 4. —St. Jerome, Epist., 148 (a/. 14), n. 20: "It is one thing to possess virtue, another to possess the likeness of virtue; one thing to follow the shadow of things, another the truth. Far more hideous is that pride which lies hidden under certain signs of humility. For I do not know how it is that vices concealed under the appearance of virtues are more shameful." (Migne, P. L., XXII, 1214).

⁵ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theof., 2a 2ae, qu. 131 sq.

There is a just ambition which moves a man to desire dignities and honors with moderation for the purpose of being able to accomplish more for the glory of God and the welfare of his fellowmen. "If a man desire the office of a bishop, he desireth a good work/' says St. Paul.⁶

⁶ 1 Tim. III, 1. —Cfr. C. Gennari, Consultazioni Morali-Canoniche, Vol. I, 2nd ed., Rome 1902, p. 638. — Homer, Iliad, VI, 208. —It is not honors and titles as such that are forbidden, but the inordinate desire for them.

4. ARROGANCE (superbia completa sive perfecta) is that haughtiness and proud contempt of others which leads a man to despise and transgress human and divine laws. This vice frequently accompanies wealth, high social position, noble birth, etc., and sometimes develops into tyranny, nay rebellion against God and self-deification.⁷

⁷ Cfr. Gen. III, 5; Is. XIV, 14; Judges VII, 2; IX, 38; 1 Mace. VII, 34; 2 Mace. V, 21; Matth. IV, 9. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 162; Ovid, Metamorphoses, VI, 193, sqq.; Horace, Satyrae, I, 6, 5, 10, 64; IDEM, Epod., IV, 5 sq.

Arrogance often leads to boastfulness, which is the habit of bragging inordinately about one's own good qualities or talents, nay, even defects or sins, and to hypocrisy, i. e., feigning virtues that one does not possess.

Pride "is so serious an evil because it strikes at the root of the primary obligations of reverent obedience towards our Lord God and love of our neighbor, because it is opposed to the truth, and because of its universality; it is in the heart of every man and quickly grows to fearful dimensions unless corrected or subdued." ⁸ That there is a legitimate pride appears from I Cor. XV, 10: "By the grace of God I am what I am, and the grace he gave me hath not been fruitless; nay, I have labored more than all of them, yet not I, but the grace of God with me.” Still the Apostle warns against "being more wise than it behooveth," ¹⁰ and "being wise in your own conceits."¹¹ n Opposed to pride is the virtue of humility, which keeps a man in his proper place both with respect to God and his fellowmen. Humility is highly recommended by our Divine Lord as the fundamental virtue of the Christian life, and He has set Himself up as a model thereof. Matth. XI, 29: "Learn of me, because I am meek and humble of heart."¹²

⁸ Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, p. 155. "By the grace of God I am what I am, and His grace toward me was not fruitless; rather, I labored more than all of them—yet not I, but the grace of God with me."

¹⁰ Rom. XII, 3, 16.

¹¹ 1 Tim. VI, 17. —Cfr. Homer, Iliad, I, 244; Odyssey, IX, 20; Horace, Carmina, IV, 2, 40: "Sapere av.de," i. e., boldly strive for wisdom.

¹² Cfr. Ecclus. X, 15; Matth. V, 3; XVIII, 3; Luke XIV, 1; John V, 14; James IV, 6. —St. Bernard, Tract. de Gradibus Humilit. et Superbiae, IV, n. 14 sqq.: "The great and thick beam in the eye (Matt. VII, 5) is pride in the mind, which by a certain vain bulk of self—unhealthy, swollen, and not solid—darkens the eye of the mind and overshadows the truth, so that, if it occupies your mind, you can no longer see yourself or perceive yourself as you are or as you are able to be; rather, as you love yourself, so you think yourself to be or hope that you will be. For what else is pride but love of one’s own excellence? Therefore, one who takes care to know the truth fully in himself must remove the beam of pride that shuts the eye away from the light, arrange ascents in his heart by which he may seek himself within himself, and thus attain the first degree of truth." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 949).

II. COVETOUSNESS. —Covetousness or avarice (avaritia, philargyria) is an inordinate love of earthly things, an immoderate desire to possess, keep, and increase them (tenacitas). With regard to no other sin is it so difficult to draw a line of demarcation between what is licit and what is forbidden as with regard to avarice, which loves to hide under the cloak of duty, frugality, and other virtues. It is sinful to attach one's heart to earthly goods, to serve Mammon instead of God,¹³ to be niggardly toward one's fellowmen and unscrupulous in the satisfy one's greed. Avarice leads to mendacity, deceit, perjury, treason, theft, and every other kind of injustice.¹⁴ St. Paul no doubt had these consequences in mind when he censured avarice as "the root of all evils." ¹⁵ Among the consequences of covetousness are insatiability, discontent, fear of persecution and poverty,¹⁶ and that "infatuation of self-love," as Blair calls it, which so often ends in impenitence.¹⁷

¹³ Cfr. Matth. VI, 21, 24; Eph. V, 5; Col. III, 5. —Cfr. St. Polycarp, Epist. ad Philipp., c. 11: "If anyone does not abstain from avarice, he will be defiled by idolatry and will be reckoned as among the Gentiles, who do not know the judgment of the Lord." (Ed. 2a, F. X. Funk, p. 308).

¹⁴ Cfr. Gen. XXXI, 7; Ecclus. XXXI, 5-7; Is. V, 8; Jer. XXII, 17; Am. VIII, 5-6; John XII, 4-6.

¹⁵ 1 Tim. VI, 10.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 84, art. 1. —Sophocles, Antigone, 221 sq.

¹⁶ Cfr. Matth. XIII, 22.—Ps.-Augustine, Append. Serm., 293 (a/. 250 de Temp.), n. 1: "Avarice, I say, must be despised; like fire, the more it receives, the more it seeks." (Migne, P. L., XXXIX, 2301). —Horace, Carm., Ill, 16, 17: "Crescentem sequitur cura pecuniam." —IDEM, Satyrae, I, i, 28 sqq. —Juvenal, Satyrae, XIV, 28-29. —When these pages were being prepared for the printer, the Fortnightly Review (St. Louis, Mo., Vol. XXIV, No. 9) published the following: "Mrs. Hetty Green, who died not long ago, leaving an estate of about $100,000,000, according to testimony filed in a surrogate's court by her son, lived under at least six assumed names, and probably many others, hoping thus to elude schemers who might be seeking her money, and murderous cranks, such as the one who tried to kill her friend Russell Sage. She never owned in New York so much as a three-legged stool in the way of furnishings for what men call a home, and moved from one $10 to $15 boarding-house to another, in constant fear that her fellow-boarders would learn her identity. This immensely wealthy woman, who possessed the means to gratify her every whim, lived almost like a criminal dreading arrest. She dreaded to lose the very wealth which oppressed her, and the world's richest woman was perhaps more familiar with the fear of poverty than many a penniless clerk on the pay-roll of her estate.... If she had labored to reduce her own fortune by wise and unselfish giving, her journey might have been more cheerful, for thus she might have escaped the limitations of poverty and at the same time divested herself of the heaviest burdens of wealth." VI, 9.

¹⁷ Cfr. Luke XII, 15-21; 1 Tim.

Ordinary sins of covetousness are in themselves venial, but become mortal if they lead to the transgression of precepts that bind under pain of grievous sin. Al- though covetousness is in itself but a venial sin, "yet it is very dangerous because of man's proneness to it, and because the vice is apt to grow fast by what it feeds upon, until it becomes mortally sinful. Holy Scripture frequently condemns it and warns us against it." ¹⁸ III. LUST. —Lust (luxuria)¹⁹ is an inordinate desire for the pleasure which has its seat in the organs of generation. Sins of lust may be internal (thoughts and desires) or external (words and acts). In these sins there is no smallness of matter (parvitas materiae), but every act of wrongful indulgence in venereal pleasure, if directly sought or consented to, is grievously sinful. No sin against chastity is venial except that which remains internally incomplete (actus imperfectus), not on account of outward circumstances, but because the will resists.

¹⁸ Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 157 sq. —Cfr. 1 Tim. VI, 9, etc.

¹⁹ Cfr. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 153 sq.: St. Alphonsus, Theol. Moralis, 1. Ill, n. 412 sqq. (ed. Gaude, Vol. I, pp. 665 sqq.).

Not all sins against the Sixth and Ninth Commandments, therefore, are mortal. If an impure thought, word, or act is freely willed, or, a fortiori, if it is deliberately excited, it is a mortal sin. Not so if it arises in the mind against one's will or without one's deliberate consent. External acts, such as immodest touches, looks, etc., are mortally sinful if due to lust; they are venially sinful if due to curiosity or inadvertence, and transient in character; and they are not sinful at all if performed for some reasonable cause, even though accompanied by venereal pleasure, provided, of course, no consent is given to such pleasure.

1. Some sins of lust or impurity are according to the order of nature, others are against nature. a) Sins according to the order of nature (in or dine naturae) are all acts of sexual intercourse committed by unmarried persons, e. g., fornication, concubinage, etc. b) Sins against the order of nature (contra ordinem naturae) are those which frustrate the divinely ordained purpose of sexual intercourse, é. g., onanism, self-pollution, pederasty, sodomy, etc.²⁰ Certain sins of impurity derive additional gravity from the attending circumstances, e. g., double adultery, incest, fornication committed by persons vowed to celibacy,²¹ seduction practiced by persons in authority upon their subjects, etc.

²⁰ Cfr. Gen. XIX, 5-7; XXXVIII, 9; Ex. XXII, 19; Lev. XVIII, 22 sq.; XX, 13, 15 sq.; Judg. XIX, 22 aqq.; Wisd. XIV, *6; Rom. I, 26 •q.; x Cor. V, x; VI, 9 sq.; 1 Tim. I, 9 gq.

²¹ Cfr. Gen. XIX, 31 sqq.; XXVIII, 13 sqq.; 2 Kings XLI, 4; XIII, n sqq.—Cfr. 1 Cor. VI, 15, 19; St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 154, art. 6-10.

2. Lust or impurity is a sin which ought "not so much as be named" among Christians.²² It involves most serious consequences for the individual as well as for society. a) "Know you not," says St. Paul, "that your bodies are members of Christ? Am I then to take the members of Christ and make them the members of a harlot? God forbid! Or know you not that he that cleaveth to a harlot is one body [with her]? The two/ it is said, 'shall become one flesh/ But he that cleaveth to the Lord is one spirit [with him]. Flee from impurity. Every [other] sin that a man committeth is [a thing] outside the body; but the impure sinneth against his own body. Know you not that your body is the temple of the Holy Spirit who is within you, whom you have from God? And you are not your own, for you have been bought at a price. Glorify God, then, in your body." ²³ With every other sin (avarice, pride, anger, gluttony, etc.) either the object, or the means of its attainment, lie outside of the subject, whereas in the case of impurity the sinner makes his own body the direct means of wrong-doing (materia peccandi). This vice is especially offensive in a Christian whose body has been raised to the supernatural order by Baptism. God has not only redeemed us from the servitude of the devil and ransomed us at a tremendous price (the life of His only begotten Son), but He has made us temples of the Holy Ghost and members of the mystical body of Christ. For this reason impurity in a Christian involves a kind of sacrilege, a desecration of the temple of God and a violation of the property rights of Jesus Christ.²⁴

²² 1 Cor. V, 1; Eph. V, 3.

²³ 1 Cor. VI, 15 sqq. (Westminster Version).

²⁴ Rom. III, 23-25; 1 Cor. III, 16; VI, 13; Eph. V, 30; 1 Thess. IV, 7 sq.; 1 Pet. I, 18 sq.

These considerations will explain why of all the capital sins impurity is most injurious to the body and the moral character. b) Impurity not only causes concupiscence to grow stronger,²⁵ but leads to self-deception, inconstancy in the keeping of good resolutions, indifference toward considerations of honor and property, intemperance in eating and drinking, disgust for spiritual things, dread of eternity, hatred of God, unbelief, and suicide.²⁶ The effects of this vice on the bodily and spiritual health of its victims and the welfare of their descendants are incalculable. "Sexual intercourse outside of marriage/' says a modern penologist, "is the cardinal crime from which, directly or indirectly, most other crimes spring." ²⁷ There is an intimate connection between lust and cruelty, especially rape and murder.²⁸

²⁵ Cfr. St. Jerome, Epist., 123 (al. 11), n. 14: “Lust, when its act is past, always leaves remorse for itself; it is never satisfied, and when extinguished it is rekindled. It grows by use and fails; nor does that which is driven by impulse obey reason.” (Migne, P. L., XXII, 1055).

²⁶ Os. IV, 1 1; 2 Kings XI, 4 sqq.; XIII, 11 sqq.; Prov. V, 1 sqq.; XXIX, 3; Ecclus. XIX, 2 sq.; Luke XV, 13, 30. —St. Ambrose, Epist., 27, n. 2\ "The lustful man detests the work of virtue; the glutton flees it. Thus the Egyptian body, which loves enticements, opposes the virtues of the soul, abominates command, flees the disciplines of the virtues and all works of this kind." (Migne, P. L., XVI, 1047). —IDEM, Epist., 58, n. 16: "When anyone begins to live lustfully, he begins to stray from the true faith. Thus he commits two very great crimes: disgraces of the flesh and sacrileges of the mind." (P. L., XVI, 1182).— St. Bernard, In Cant., s. 39, n. 7: "The chariot of lust likewise rolls on four wheels: gluttony of the belly, lust of intercourse, softness of clothing, and relaxation in idleness and sleep. It is drawn by two horses alike, prosperity of life and abundance of possessions; and two drivers preside over these, the torpor of sloth and faithless security." (P. L., CLXXXIII, 980).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 153, art. 5: "Through the vice of lust the lower appetite, namely the concupiscible, tends most vehemently toward its object, namely the pleasurable, because of the vehemence of passion and delight. Consequently, through lust the higher powers, namely reason and will, are especially disordered." —J. Gerson, De Examinatione Doctr., P, I, consid. 6 (.Opera, I, 18): "Just as no passion is more vehement than lustful desire, so none is more dangerous for falling into error and teaching falsehood."

²⁷ Beneke, Gefängnisstudien, p. 54. —Horace says (Carm., III, 6, 17 sqq.): "The ages fruitful in guilt have polluted marriage, offspring, and homes; the calamity derived from this source has flowed into country and people." Cfr. the same writer's Satyrae, Book III, 3, 107 sq.: "Nam fuit ante Helenam cunnus deterrima belli causa...."

²⁸ Cfr. Ez. XVI, 49; Am. II, 7. — Jos. Müller, Die Keuschheitsideen in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung und praktischen Bedeutung, Mayence 1897, pp. 152 sqq.

"It is vanity to follow the lusts of the flesh and to desire that for which thou must afterwards be grievously punished.... For they who follow sensuality, defile their conscience and lose the grace of God," says Thomas a Kempis.²⁹

²⁹ De Imit. Christi, I, 1. Cfr. S. J. Auer, O. Praem., De Virtute Castitatis, eiusque Laesionibus, Innsbruck 1920; P. Merkelbach, O.P., Quaestiones de Castitate et Luxuria, Paris 1926.

IV. ENVY. —Envy (invidia) is defined as sadness on account of another's good (tristitia de alienis bonis). To be sad because an unworthy man has obtained a post of honor or wealth, of which he is sure to make wrong use, or to which we ourselves have a better claim, or which will be employed to our disadvantage, is not envy. Such sadness generally results from shortsightedness or a mistaken idea of Providence; but it does not exclude charity; in fact there is a species of sadness which is extolled as a virtue. Cfr. Ps.

CXVIII, 136: "My eyes have sent forth springs of water, because they have not kept thy law." Matth. V, 5: "Blessed are they that mourn, for they shall be comforted." 2 Cor. VII, 9 sq.: "Now I am glad, not because you were made sorrowful; but because you were made sorrowful unto penance. For you were made sorrowful according to God...." ³⁰ Sadness combined with selfishness, however, is always sinful because incompatible with, nay directly opposed to, charity. The envious man seeks to injure his neighbor rather than advantage himself, whereas charity inclines us to rejoice in the wellbeing of others. Through the envy of the devil sin and death came into this world.³¹ Envy inspired the first recorded murder and the crucifixion of Christ.³² It is the lowest form of selfishness because it aims solely at destruction. This vice is mortally sinful in itself, but admits of a parvitas materiae.

³⁰ Cfr. St. Augustine, Serm., 254 (al. 151 de Temp.), n. 2; St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 36, art. 1-4.

³¹ Cfr. Gen. III, 1; IV, 5; Wisd. II, 24.

³² Cfr. Matth. XXVII, 18; 1 Cor. X, 24; XIII, 4 sqq.; Gal. V, 26.

Envy engenders hatred, revenge, malignant joy at the misfortunes of others, calumny, slander, and crimes against life and property.³³ More than any other vice envy entails its own punishment, for it destroys peace of mind and sometimes even injures the body.³⁴ Sacred Scripture graphically compares this vice to "rottenness of the bones" ³⁵ and intimates that it consumes its victim body and soul.³⁶

³³ Matth. XXVII, 18-25; cfr. Gen. IV, 8; XXVI, 14 sq.; XXVII, 41; XXXVII, 4, 11.

³⁴ Matth. XXVII, 18-25. Cfr. Gen. IV, 5-6; XXXI, 2-5.

³⁵ Prov. XIV, 30.

³⁶ Wisd. VI, 25.

V. GLUTTONY. —Gluttony (gula) is an inordinate desire for earthly goods in general and food and drink in particular.³⁷ Man is expected to use food and drink according to right reason. Inordinate use of these things (as if they were an end in themselves), degrades him to the level of the brute. Besides this grosser form of gluttony (voracitas, ingluvies, ebrietas), there is a more refined though equally sinful variety, which consists in craving for food and drink solely for the pleasure they give and making them the principal object of one's thoughts and desires (cupedia). This epicurean gourmandise (sybaritism), like the grosser forms of gluttony, confuses the end with the means. Saint Paul says of those addicted to it that their "God is their 38 belly."

³⁷ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 148, art. 1: "Gluttony does not denote every appetite for eating and drinking, but an inordinate one. An appetite is called inordinate because it departs from the order of reason, in which the good of moral virtue consists. But something is called a sin because it is contrary to virtue. Hence it is manifest that gluttony is a sin." 33 Phil. III, 19; cfr. Rom. XVI, 18.

A very common form of gluttony is drunkenness (ebrietas). Complete drunkenness (ebrietas perfecta) temporarily deprives man of the use of his highest prerogatives —reason and free-will. Voluntarily to put one- self into this condition is, as a rule, mortally sinful. Sins committed in the state of drunkenness are morally imputable (voluntarium in causa) unless indeed one could truthfully claim, like Noé, that he knew not the strength of wine. To drink to excess, but not so as to lose the use of reason, is per se a venial sin, but may become mortally sinful per accidens, e. g., on account of serious harm to one's health, grave scandal, neglect of important duties, or when a man knows that excessive drinking is for him a proximate occasion of grievous sin.

The sinful character of intemperance in all its forms is evident from the consequences to which this vice leads. It involves a senseless destruction of food and drink, of which others may stand in need, and injures both body and soul by exciting the animal appetites, especially lust, blunting the moral judgment, warping the finer sensibilities, and ultimately destroying all interest in spiritual things.³⁹

³⁹ Cfr. Gen. XXV, 29-34; Is. V, 11, 22; Am. VI, 6; Prov. XX, 1; XXIII, 29-35; Eph. V, 18. —St. Augustine, Confessiones, X, c. 31, n. 44: "Although health is the reason for eating and drinking, dangerous pleasure attaches itself like a handmaid and often tries to go before, so that what I say or wish to do for the sake of health may be done for its sake. Nor is the measure of each the same, for what is enough for health is too little for pleasure." —Ibid., n. 47: "Placed amid these temptations, therefore, I certainly strive daily against the desire for eating and drinking; for this is not something I can decide to cut off once and never touch again. Thus the reins of the throat must be held with measured relaxation and restraint. And who is there, Lord, who is not carried a little beyond the bounds of necessity? Whoever he is, he is great; let him magnify Your name. But I am not he, because I am a sinful man." (Migne, P. L., XXXII, 798, 799). —Cfr. Ps.- Augustine, Append. Serm., 294 (al. 231 de Temp.), n. 2-3 (P. L., XXXII, 2304). —St. Bernard, Epist., II, n. 10: "How can one who is filled daily with the husks of swine hunger or thirst for Christ? You cannot drink at the same time the chalice of Christ and the chalice of demons. Pride is the chalice of demons; detraction and envy are the chalice of demons; gluttony and drunkenness are the chalice of demons. When these have filled either your mind or your belly, Christ finds no place in you." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 85). — Terence, Eunuch., IV, 5, 6: "Sine Cerere et Libero [Baccho] friget Venus." —Ovid, Rem. Am., 805 sqq. —Seneca, Epist., 95, 23: "Innumerabiles esse morbos non miraberis: coquos numera." 40 Cfr. Gen. XIX, 32 sqq.; Prov. XXXI, 4. —Homer, Odyssey, IX, 360 sqq; Iliad, VI, 258 sqq. —Horace, Carm., Ill, 21, 9 sqq.—A. Egger, Der Klerus und die Alkoholfrage, 4th ed., Freiburg 1909. —Jos. Keating, S.J., The Drink Question, London 1914. —Austin O'Malley, The Cure of Alcoholism, St. Louis 1913.

Drunkenness as a habit (ebriositas) is deserving of the severest censure, because it involves waste, destroys family life, creates dissensions, causes crimes and diseases, and entails the physical and moral ruin of individuals, and sometimes of entire nations. "Drunkenness," says Origen, "seduced him whom Sodom had not seduced." 40 Hence the Apostle's admonition: "Be not drunk with wine, wherein is luxury; but be ye filled with the holy Spirit." ⁴¹ VI. ANGER. —Anger (ira, iracundia), broadly speaking, is a craving for vengeance. It is not necessarily sinful, because, to quote St. Thomas, "vengeance may be sought either well or ill." ⁴² a) There is a righteous anger which inveighs against evil and in favor of goodness. Holy Scripture frequently attributes such anger to God. John the Baptist angrily denounced the Pharisees and Sadducees as a "brood of vipers," who "flee from the wrath to come."⁴³ "With anger" (μετ’ ὀργῆς) and grief "for the blindness of their hearts," ⁴⁴ Christ pronounced woe upon the Pharisees,⁴⁵ drove the money changers from the temple and overthrew their tables.⁴⁶ Filled with righteous indignation St. Peter invoked the judgment of God upon Ananias and Saphira,⁴⁷ St. Stephen rebuked the Jews for resisting the Holy Ghost,⁴⁸ and St. Paul upbraided the Athenians.⁴⁹ Righteous anger is no sin, and parents and superiors are justified in reprehending and punishing their children or subjects for a just cause. "If one is angry according to right reason," says the Angelic Doctor, "then to get angry is praise ⁵⁰ worthy." b) To be angry, even for a just cause, becomes sinful when a man loses control of himself and indulges in feelings of hatred or enmity. This is true a fortiori when anger lacks a just cause. Note, however, that as long as anger remains internal, it is as a rule not sinful, but merely a temptation. Only when it vents itself in oaths or blasphemies, or leads to acts of violence and destruction, is it more or less grievously sinful.

⁴¹ Eph. V, 18; cfr. Luke XXI, 34; 1 Pet. V, 8.

⁴² Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 158, art. 1-7.

⁴³ Matth. III, 7.

⁴⁴ Mark III, 5.

⁴⁵ Matth. XXXIII, 13 sqq.

⁴⁶ Matth. XXI, 12.

⁴⁷ Acts V, 3 sqq.

⁴⁸ Acts VII, 51 sqq.

⁴⁹ Acts XVII, 1 6 sqq.

⁵⁰ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 158, art. 1: "If someone is angry according to right reason, then being angry is praiseworthy." —Cfr. Saint Augustine, Tract, in Epist. loa., VII, n. n: "Love is severe, charity is severe; it is severe in a manner without gall, in the manner of a dove, not of a raven." (Migne, P. L., XXXV, 1235).

Man is bound under pain of mortal sin to keep the mighty passion of anger under control. "Be angry and sin not," says St. Paul, "let not the sun go down upon your anger; give not place to the devil." ⁵¹ The meaning obviously is that man should not permit his anger to ex- ceed the bounds of reason, nor nurse grievances.⁵² St. James says: "Let every man be swift to hear, but slow to speak, and slow to anger ; for the anger of man worketh not the justice of God." ⁵³ VII. SLOTH. —Sloth (acedia) is frequently caused by an abnormal condition of the body. It may be defined as a sluggishness of the soul that makes it dread physical and mental labor in the exercise of virtue. Sloth, as a vice, may be accompanied by great energy of mind and body in matters not pertaining to the spiritual domain. Sloth usually begins with lukewarmness, especially neglect of prayer and religious exercises. It manifests itself:

⁵¹ Eph. IV, 26 sq.

⁵² Cfr. St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 25, s. 2, n. 3 (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 189): "Although anger creeps upon a Christian from the very human condition and the weakness of mortality which we bear, it must not be held for long or allowed to last into the next day. Cast that anger out of your heart before this visible light sets, lest that invisible light forsake you." (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 189).

⁵³ Jas. I, 19 sq.

(1) As indifference to virtue and spiritual things (desidia, inertia), accompanied by distraction and neglect of duty and by pleasure in sentimentalities and day-dreaming. The ordinary symptoms of this form of sloth are: mental unrest, frequent change of work or profession, shiftlessness, inconstancy, etc.

(2) As disgust (taedium) for the moral and religious duties which every man is bound to perform. This disgust may develop into positive aversion for Catholic principles and practices and regret of having been received into the Church. At this stage sloth is generally accompanied by loss of courage and results in spiritual and moral decay.

Sloth is a mortal sin whenever it leads to the neglect of duties to which one is obliged sub gravi. The dire consequences of religious indifference are adumbrated in the Apocalypse: "I know thy works, that thou art neither cold nor hot. I would thou wert cold or hot! But because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will begin to vomit thee out of my mouth." ⁵⁴ "Think not that one who falls deeply, strikes bottom at once. Do you wish to learn the cause? For a long time this man was very lukewarm, and as a consequence his soul lost strength unnoticed, while the evil inclinations grew stronger.”⁵⁵

⁵⁴ Apoc. III, 15 sqq.; cfr. Matth. XXV, 26 sqq.—St. Bernard, De Consideratione, II, c. 13: "Idleness, the mother of trifles and the stepmother of virtues, is to be fled." (Migne, P. L., CLXXXII, 756).

⁵⁵ John Cassian, Collationes, VI, 17*

READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 84, art. 2 sq. —IDEM, De Malo, qu. 8 sqq. —Th. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 154 sqq. —O. Zockler, Das Lehrstilck von den sieben Hauptsunden, Munich 1893. —Ph. G. Laborie, Les Pechcs Capitaux, Paris 1908. —A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Pastor., Vol. II, pp. 287 sqq. —Natalis Alexander, De Peccatis (Migne, Theol. Curs., XI, 707-1168). —Paulhan, Les Caractéres, Paris 1903—H. Noldin, S.J.. Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. I, 11th ed., pp. 375 sqq.—Sabetti-Barrett, Comp. Theol. Mor., 22nd ed., pp. 129 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 418 sqq.

— The abstract notion of imperfection. Imperfection of itself denies further perfection; and therefore, when the moral order is being treated, it denies that perfection in human operation itself, which is the object of moral science.

But it can be merely negative or positive. Negative imperfection signifies a mere defect, a mere lack; positive imperfection, some evil, and therefore some privation or absence of a thing which ought to have been present.

The concrete notion. Moreover, it can be considered from the side of deliberation, or from the side of moral goodness, or of intention or election.

From the side of deliberation, negative imperfection affects indeliberate acts which nevertheless tend objectively toward a good or non-evil thing. For the perfect action of man is a human action, or a deliberate one. Positive imperfection designates disordered movements, whether of the will but first-first, or of other faculties, which the will out of infirmity does not restrain, which it merely suffers: wanderings of the mind in prayer, movements of sensuality. Because the gift of integrity exempted from these, and they betray some tendency into evil, they are positive imperfections: in man, as God created him in justice, they ought not to exist, but they follow original fault.

— Furthermore, according to a sufficiently common opinion today, from the side of goodness, our free elections of an honorable thing, but not of the better thing, to which better thing we are not specially called, are negatively imperfect: for example, by which we do not observe a general counsel contained in Sacred Scripture, or even (according to some) neglect a more remiss inspiration. But positive imperfection is the omission of an act to which one is peculiarly invited, or even (as some will) an act which clearly, all things weighed, is known to be better.

And they are accustomed to add that these positive imperfections, not only from the motive on account of which they are freely admitted, easily become venial sins, but further, according to themselves, dispose one to sinning, and deprive man of greater habitual grace and glory destined for him; indeed that they are causes why God denies more abundant actual graces without which man easily sins, indeed becomes exposed to the danger of losing eternal salvation. They say this of him who, like the young man in the Gospel, specially called to a more perfect state, went away sad. Cf., for example, the things St. Alphonsus has, l. 2, n. 78, or Lehmkuhl I, 662, 663.

But the patrons of another opinion, which today has begun to prevail, remove these latter imperfections from the middle, since they contend that those are venial sins.

These things favor the former opinion: a) sin is not without a precept, and counsel is placed in the option of him to whom it is given ¹; b) in 1 Cor. c. 7, St. Paul, commending virginity, openly declares that he does not sin who chooses matrimony; and c) the Holy Fathers greatly inculcate this freedom of option (2); d) this is added: it pertains to the beauty of the present order, that man even in this matter can imitate God, so that just as divine liberty could create a good but not the best world, so human liberty can choose something honorable indeed, but not more honorable.

The latter opinion can use these arguments. Besides the condition of honesty required in the genus or in the object of an act, our action cannot be honorable unless at the same time it satisfies a certain more general law to which it is subordinated. Now a deliberate neglect of a special divine invitation, or of a good certainly better for the agent himself, cannot satisfy this more general law. For neglect of the benefit of a clear and special divine invitation contains a defect of reverence toward God, of confidence in God, and of ingratitude; and these surely are sinful. Furthermore, since man as a whole is for the end of eternal life, since that end is his proper and intrinsic perfection, how does he not derogate from charity toward himself who has deliberately chosen a lesser eternal glory? It is well understood that by the infinitely perfect Being, to whom no intrinsic good can accrue, so perfect a liberty is possessed that, just as he could abstain from every creation, so also he can choose a world good indeed but not the best; but he who deliberately neglects a certain occasion of greater perfection and beatitude, must he not be called harmful to himself? How could such an election be reasonable? The excuse of excessive difficulty, of an uncertain thing, is removed when there is had a special invitation of God, or when a thing manifestly better for me is present. But if the comparative election of the less good thing cannot be reasonable, it will necessarily be sinful, since God sanctions the whole use of reason. Cf. the laborious evasions of Fr. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 109.

Let this be another form of reasoning. In order that the free will without disorder be able to embrace what it clearly knows to be less perfect, it is necessary that a) it not choose in favor of a lesser intrinsic goodness; b) it not subjectively love the infinite perfection less. God satisfies each condition, for he acquires nothing, he loves all things by loving his own infinite goodness, nor does he love the good less whether he creates nothing, or creates a world good but not best. But in us, when we choose the less good, each condition is lacking. Furthermore, according to St. Thomas, there ought not to be measure in the intention of the end. Cf. 2, 2, q. 184, art. 3 c.

Finally, the patrons of the former opinion connect such consequences with positive imperfection, that it is far better and safer for eternal life to sin venially a hundred times than, for example, not to admit a religious vocation.

The latter opinion is followed by Cajetan, in 2, 2, q. 186, art. 2 ad 2; art. 9; Valencia, t. 3, d. 19, q. 2, p. 1 ad 3 arg.; Passerini, De hominum statibus, t. 2, in 2, 2, q. 184, art. 3, n. 43-45, 70-73; Toletus, Summa casuum conscientiae, l. 3, c. 2, n. 1; and recently Hugueny O.P., "Imperfection et peche veniel" (Rev. Clerge fr., t. 53, p. 641-661); Fonsegrive, "La loi morale et la loi sociale" (Quinzaine, December 1, 1905, p. 322).

¹ Summa, 1, 2, q. 108, art. 4. - (2) Cf. our little work concerning religious and sacerdotal vocation.

— Our conclusion. It is not in our mind to decide this controversy. Yet what is certain is that man ought not to make his elections positively under the aspect of the better good, but it is enough that he direct himself according to the norms of honesty. For a severer obligation, if it were common (for certain select persons prudently assume it by vow), would reduce men to straits which would be dangerous to honesty itself.

Furthermore, as it seems to us, if the former opinion seems truer, that is, if there is no individual obligation of following what is most clearly better or what God clearly inspires to be done, those withdrawals of actual graces, those dangers of eternal life by which the patrons of the former opinion strike minds, are chimerical. But then it must be said in a more general way what Cornelius a Lapide said concerning the election of a state of life (on 1 Cor. 7, 7): "Choose the state which you will, and God will give you the fitting and proper grace that in that state you may live decently and holily." For in what way someone would expose himself to such danger of eternal life without sin, even grave sin, we confess that we do not see.

— I. Imperfection, which denies further perfection, can be simple lack, if it is negative, or privation, if it is positive.

From the side of deliberation, indeliberate movements toward non-evil things are negative imperfection; toward evil things, they are positive imperfection, because they connote privation of integrity.

II. For not a few of the modern age, free elections of a thing honorable but not better are positive or negative imperfections, according as one was or was not specially invited to better things.

But for others, whose opinion today is prevailing, these so-called positive imperfections are venial sins, since deliberate neglect of a divine invitation cannot be altogether honorable.

Yet against this stands the fact that sin is not without a precept, and that freedom of option is greatly inculcated by the Fathers, when evangelical counsels are treated. This at least is established: man ought not to make his elections under the aspect of the better good. And, if no individual obligation of following what is clearly better is established, then the dangers of future life also must be denied which are so urged by some: for to expose oneself to these would be gravely culpable rashness.

— I. Notion of a capital sin. 1. From remote antiquity, Christians were taught to turn their mind not only to passing acts, but especially to consider habitual dispositions and propensities, which break forth into acts or are generated by acts. Did not the Apostle himself exhort the Galatians thus: "Walk in the spirit and you will not fulfill the desires of the flesh" ¹; and the Philippians: "For have this mind in you which also was in Christ Jesus" (2); and give this supreme rule to the Corinthians: "Let all your things be done in charity" (3)? And many other passages can be alleged by which care for habitual disposition as the source of good works is commended with great force.

But there are also inclinations favoring sins and vices. Concerning these ecclesiastical writers and the holy Fathers began to discourse and to indicate them in a greater or lesser number, until the authority of St. Gregory the Great obtained that seven capital sins were commonly numbered.

Therefore nothing revealed or so sacred is to be placed in that sevenfold number: St. Antoninus himself ¹ admitted eight or nine capital sins.

2. Therefore capital vices are special vices, not necessarily graver than others, indeed not necessarily mortal, but whose ends have certain primary reasons of moving the appetite, so that for the sake of pursuing them man does many things, both good and evil, and thus is led into several sins (2).

And so they can be considered in two ways: either as sources of other sins, or as formally capital; or as special sins. Under the former respect alone do they pertain to fundamental or general theology. Yet authors are accustomed to use this as an occasion to add certain useful things concerning the individual sins, considered in themselves, lest afterward they should seem as it were to handle the same argument twice. To this custom we shall accommodate our own treatise.

¹ Gal. 5, 16. - (2) Phil. 2, 5. - (3) 1 Cor. 16, 14.

¹ Summa aurea p. 2, t. 1-9. - (2) Cf. Summa 1, 2, q. 84 art. 4, c.; 2, 2, q. 118 art. 7; q. 132, art. 4, ad 3.

— II. Division. According to St. Thomas ³, capital vices are of a twofold notion:

1. Some are heads, the first origin of all sins, and they are two: cupidity and pride.

Concerning cupidity the Apostle said (4): "The root of all evils is cupidity." This already appears true if you take cupidity for the appetite for riches. For riches are the means of pursuing all temporal goods; but sin arises "from the appetite of a changeable good" (5). And it is more manifest if you oppose cupidity, as the pursuit of one's own good as such or as quasi-separated, to charity by which we love all and ourselves in God. In every sin there lies hidden a certain "egoism."

Concerning pride Sirach 10, 15 says: "The beginning of all sin is pride," because, as St. Thomas teaches ¹, the end which man intends in temporal appetitions is a certain singular perfection and excellence of himself. Or more simply it can be said that pride, as contrary to humility, radically repudiates every subjection to law, and therefore all impediments are removed which could call back or retard the soul from following its own cupidity. But pride is described as an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. Perfect pride, according to Augustine, says love of self even to contempt of God (2).

2. Others, which are manifestations or fruits of those two roots, have the notion of proximate origin with respect to several sins (3). That is, considering less the peculiar disposition of the sinner, which varies too much, than the natural and mutual relation of ends, they have final causality with respect to several sins.

³ 1, 2, q. 84 art. 3, ad 1. - (4) 1 Tim. c. ult. 10. - (5) S. Th. l. c.

¹ Ibid. art. 2. - (2) Cf. De civ. Dei, L. 14, c. 28 (P. L. 41, 436). - (3) 1, 2, q. 84, art. 3, ad 1.

— III. Explanation. St. Thomas, art. 4, hands down this explanation of the sevenfold number, which is sought from the threefold good which man principally seeks, and the twofold yoke of evil with which good is joined. Those three positive and inordinate pursuits are: of honor and praise through vainglory; of bodily delight through gluttony and luxury; of exterior goods through avarice. But through sloth we flee the labor with which one's own good is joined; through envy, however, another's good insofar as it stands in the way of our excellence; but if this is done through insurrection toward revenge, anger is had.

By the indication of these vices we are also taught what dispositions, in the spiritual combat, we have to fight down. They are: love of glory or human praise, which is cultivated by pride; love of exterior goods, which avarice nourishes; love of delights, which luxury and gluttony betray; self-love, which begets envy; love of one's own honor, which excites anger; love of one's own convenience, to which sloth yields.

The individual vices are designated, each by its own first letter, and are numbered in the customary order by the word Saligia (Noldin, Princ., n. 335).

— Notion. 1. An inordinate appetite of one's own excellence, which is the generic definition of pride, can be of one repudiating subjection, and this is pride of perfect reason, mortal from its kind, and the beginning of every sin; or it is of him who does not refuse to be subject, but with too great affection wills to excel, is too complacent in his own merit, true or supposed; it is an inordinate mode of pursuing one's own excellence. This is imperfect pride, venial, and a special capital vice.

2. It is a capital vice insofar as it begets presumption, ambition, vainglory.

Presumption is, in this place - for another presumption is opposed to hope - the appetite of undertaking something beyond one's powers. Venial from its kind, it becomes mortal if it turns out gravely harmful.

Ambition is an inordinate appetite of dignity and honor. It is venial, but becomes mortal by reason of the matter, of the means employed, or of harm effected.

Vainglory inordinately desires and seeks the manifestation of one's own excellence.

Vainglory of this sort is sought from an evil, false, fictitious thing, or one disproportionate to the intention; or among those who do not judge well concerning the thing; or without a due end. Venial of itself, it becomes mortal accidentally, as if it leads to boasting concerning a mortally evil thing. Cf. Sanchez, Decal. l. 1, c. 3, n. 4 ff.

3. Opposite vice. Those excesses are opposed to magnanimity, from which, also, by defect, one recedes through pusillanimity. By this someone, too distrustful of himself, declines honors, glory, or an office of which he is worthy. The fault is venial; it becomes mortal if you decline to assume or carry out what you were bound to furnish under mortal obligation.

— Opposite virtue. Magnanimity raises the soul to doing great things, or things worthy of great honor, yet proportioned to oneself.

— Notion. 1. Avarice is the inordinate appetite of temporal things. Venial from its kind, it becomes mortal if because of it grave violations of the law are committed.

2. It is a capital vice insofar as it begets: hardness of heart, or too great an application to acquiring or conserving riches, with an empty and vain fear lest they not be acquired or be lost; violence; fallacy, which is deceit in words; fraud, which is deceit in deeds; betrayal, which is a harmful deception contrary to faith given. Persons, goods, secrets can be betrayed. Fraud and betrayal are mortal from their kind.

3. The opposite vice of prodigality is defective in conserving goods and excessive in expending them: it is venial from its kind.

— Opposite virtue. Liberality, midway between both vices, uses riches well, especially by expending them for others.

— Notion. 1. Luxury is the inordinate appetite of venereal things, concerning which elsewhere expressly.

2. As a capital vice, it begets in the intellect: blindness of mind, alienated from heavenly thoughts; precipitation of one acting without counsel; inconsideration of one acting, which things disgrace his state or person; inconstancy in good purposes. But in the will of the luxurious person there grows false love of self, because of the custom of referring all things to oneself; hatred of God the avenger of sins is prepared; affection of the present age is fostered from inordinate fear of death. The four latter effects, but not the former, are grave from their kind.

The opposite virtue is chastity.

— Notion. 1. Envy is sadness concerning another's good, insofar as that good is a diminishment of one's own excellence. It is directly opposed to charity, which rejoices concerning the neighbor's good; and it is accustomed to be conceived not toward those who excel us from afar, but toward equals or those a little superior. Mortal from its kind, because of imperfection of the act or the smallness of the good concerning which one is sad, it will be only venial.

Therefore it is not envy if you are sad concerning another's good, a) because from it you fear harm to yourself or to others: this is fear; b) because we lack the good which the other has, so that we do not grieve formally because it belongs to another: this is emulation, zeal; c) because the other is unworthy: this is indignation. These three can be ordered and good, or also inordinate and graver evils.

But it is envy properly so called if you apprehend the very increase of another's excellence as if it were an evil to you, and for this reason are pained that the other grows in excellence and thus becomes superior to you.

The sin of envy is easily committed by the ambitious and by women.

N.B. To curse the day on which someone was born, on which he took a wife, from pain because he was born, can be a simple manifestation of sadness concerning the evils which arose on that occasion: which is no sin or only a slight one. But it would be grave irreverence toward God to carp at the dispositions of divine Providence; and it would be gravely opposed to charity truly to wish grave evil either to oneself or to another.

2. As a capital vice, envy begets hatred, detraction, joy concerning the evil of the neighbor, whispering, that is, evil speaking concerning the neighbor, for the removal of his friendship with others. The whisperer ought to strive to restore that friendship.

The opposite virtue is charity, by which we rejoice concerning another's good as concerning our own.

Besides the general consideration of gluttony, certain things concerning drunkenness occur to be said particularly.

— Notion. 1. Gluttony is the inordinate appetite of food and drink. But inordinateness is committed in five ways: 1. By eating before the time; 2. Things too exquisite; 3. More than is just; 4. Voraciously; 5. Things prepared too elaborately; or more briefly, by eating "too hastily, sumptuously, too much, eagerly, studiously" (2, 2, q. 148 art. 4).

This vice is opposed to abstinence.

Excess in food and in drink is called crapula.

Gluttony from its own kind is a sin only venial, because the glutton sins only in the mode by which he refers food and drink to man's good, which truly have an order to that end. Therefore it will be venial to fill oneself with food or drink even to vomiting; venial, to procure vomiting in order to dine or drink again. Crapula becomes mortal by which the law of the Church is violated; which, in grave matter, impedes the duties of one's state; which gravely harms health.

Already above, where pleasure was treated, the reason was given why, among the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, this is found, n. 8: "To eat and drink even to satiety for pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the appetite can licitly enjoy its own acts."

It is clear to all that one who procures salutary vomiting does not sin at all (2, 2, q. 150 art. 2).

2. As a capital vice, gluttony begets, in the soul: dullness of mind; foolish gladness, that is, which moves one to sing, say, and do dishonorable things; loquacity; buffoonery. Foolish gladness is in the appetite; loquacity in words; buffoonery in words and gestures: from levity, in order to excite laughter, words are said which are little decent, and uncivil things are done.

But in the body, gluttony begets uncleanness, vomiting, emission of semen; this is not imputed, if it was merely foreseen as naturally going to follow after crapula, without danger of consent.

— You ask whether one sins or not who feeds on human flesh or blood?

Without a just cause of medicine or of appeasing hunger, that is repugnant to the piety owed to the dead. Its guilt is revealed to us by the very instinct of nature, which abhors it. To preserve life in this way is permitted, but not commanded.

— I. Notion. Full drunkenness designates the state of him who, because of drink or a similar cause, is immediately deprived of the use of reason with proximate incapacity of recovering that use. Immediately, I say, insofar as natural sleep is not interposed. With this, moreover, whether naturally or accidentally shaken off, morally the use of reason is restored at once.

During the time in which someone is drunk, the superior faculty is morally suppressed, since it can now direct nothing. Physiology itself teaches us that the drunken man is withdrawn from higher associations and placed under the rule of lower ones. Wherefore this privation of the use of reason is to be assimilated to a certain temporary or reparable mutilation.

II. Morality. As such, the intention or choice of drunkenness will be intrinsically illicit, unless it is morally necessary for the good of the whole, for example, for recovering health.

That also will be illicit which is permitted without a proportionate cause.

And of itself, this sin is grave. "For that a man without necessity render himself powerless to use reason, through which man is ordered toward God and avoids many occurring sins, from the mere pleasure of wine, is expressly contrary to virtue" ¹. That is, he perturbs order in himself who takes away from himself the very principle of ordination, or reason, the directive faculty. And therefore it will be grave if material sins are foreseen, if the necessity is foreseen of having the use of the superior faculty unimpeded; or if, because of the time through which it lasts, there has been a notable unnatural interruption of rational life.

Whether by excessive drink or by some other means you deprive yourself of the use of reason and of proximate capacity to recover it, drunkenness remains specifically the same (contrary to what Lacroix thinks, l. 5, n. 316); but, in the former case, there will accede the sin of gluttony, venial according to itself.

But is drunkenness grave in its whole kind, or does it admit smallness of matter? Several, whom St. Alphonsus alleges without censure, think that drunkenness which deprives of reason for a short time, that is, not beyond an hour, is not mortal. Lehmkuhl ¹, Genicot-Salsmans (2), Noldin (3) think the same; but they do not excuse from grave sin him who, before he is deprived of reason, commits himself to sleep, since sleep does not prevent drunkenness. St. Thomas himself seems to admit smallness of matter. For he uses this formula: "Drunkenness, speaking of itself, is a mortal sin"; and he indicates the reason: "He sins mortally, committing himself to the danger of sin" (4). Therefore if that danger is not present, the alleged reason of grave sin also will be absent (5).

Observe that the gravity of the sin flows not from the quantity of drink but from the effect of drunkenness. Wherefore not even a few drinks are licit by which you know that you are going to be drunk. But a proportionate cause will more easily be able to be present here.

Corollary. Therefore it will be licit to make oneself drunk in order to repel disease, according to the counsels of physicians; and in order to lessen or not feel the bitter pains of a surgical operation or of difficult childbirth, especially since that relief may be useful or even necessary to the safety of the patient himself.

Moreover, what, in an intoxicating drink, lessens pain, and what produces drunkenness, has not yet been able to be defined accurately; nevertheless this seems able to be said: that relief is not sought from full drunkenness itself, or from an adequate cause of drunkenness; which is enough for drunkenness to be considered as merely permitted because of a just cause.

¹ 1, 2, q. 88 art. 5 ad 1.

¹ I, 892. - (2) I, 183. - (3) Princ. 343. - (4) Summa, 2, 2, q. 150 art. 2. - (5) Earlier, St. Thomas had classed even frequent drunkenness, according to itself, among sins venial from their own kind. QQ. De Malo, q. 2 art. 8 ad 3 and q. 7, art. 5 ad 1.

— Concerning the use of morphine. When no particular pains are to be soothed, it is not licit, for cutting off the mere anxieties of agony, to deprive the dying man, for example by the aid of morphine, of sense and reason and thus to hasten the end or terminus of rational life. That cause is not sufficient; and that suppression of reason deprives the sick man of many merits. But if he bears a soul not yet prepared for death, and positive hope of preparation is had, necessary penance is impeded by a wicked crime. Witnesses ought to resist that sin as much as they can.

But if at the same time bitter pains are to be soothed, although, even then, theologians are accustomed to answer with the same severity, we incline toward the more benign side whenever no preparation for death is impeded. For then this cannot be objected, that it is wrong to break off rational life before the hour appointed by divine Providence: for this cessation of rational life is not intended but merely permitted. And since the man is prepared, and pains can indeed be an occasion of merit but also of sin, the cause seems proportionate. Lehmkuhl (1), however, does not excuse the very silence of a witness except when the matter concerns a dying man well prepared, and one who from the continued use of reason is situated in danger of grave sin. Noldin (2) speaks with equal severity. Gen.-Sals. (3) speaks more mildly, rightly warning that morphine then cannot be given without at least the presumed consent of the dying man.

— Another's drunkenness. Another can be made drunk in two ways: either in such a way that he himself has sinned formally, or in such a way that without his own fault he is made drunk.

1. The former mode is certainly illicit, if the other is not already determined toward a greater sin: suppose, toward homicide. But if he has been determined toward a greater evil, the question returns whether or not you can persuade another to a lesser sin. This, when the sin is of another kind, with the more probable opinion we have denied to be licit. Wherefore Laymann ¹, consequently, reproves it. But according to St. Alphonsus (2), Lehmkuhl (3), the more benign opinion is probable, which, for example, Lessius defends, l. 4, c. 34, n. 32.

2. But he who by fraud and without knowing it is induced into drunkenness does not even sin materially, but suffers a physical evil. Therefore, one detained in prison, who has the right of escaping from prison, can of itself employ this as a means of just defense; so can an upright citizen, to impede the vote of an unjust law, or to detect a traitor.

Moreover, more easily, from other grave causes, it is right to place an occasion of drunkenness, even formal drunkenness. Lehmk. l. c. after St. Alph. l. 5, n. 58.

¹ L. 3, n. 4, n. G. - (2) Theol. mor. l. 5, n. 77. - (3) I, 894.

— Imperfect drunkenness, which does not substantially deprive of the use of reason, is a venial fault. Wherefore for a lesser cause, varying according to the very degree of drunkenness, it will be able to be permitted, indeed chosen, for repelling a person's evil.

Therefore, to repel sadness and melancholy, they allow that you drink even to cheerfulness.

— Signs of perfect drunkenness (probable but not infallible) are given as these: If someone does not remember what he said, did, how or when he was led home; if he has done altogether unusual things, for example, contrary to custom has spoken shameful things, has disturbed the house, beaten his wife, etc. Cf. Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, n. 30; Lehmk. I, 892.

But as long as he continues to discern between evil and good, a man is not yet judged to be perfectly drunk, although he bears his imagination somewhat disturbed, his tongue stammers, his feet totter, his eyes see double, the house seems to turn around for him, vomiting follows. Since quite many then think that a grave sin has been committed by them, they are prudently to be untaught this.

— Subjective guilt. Quite many are excused from grave sin, because they did not notice the danger of drunkenness, and they were seized by wine, whether, going out into the air, they then first experienced its force, or whether they judged prudently enough that they could still tolerate a little draught without harm. But, after contrary experience, this excuse is taken away from them.

— Evils committed in drunkenness are imputed in their culpable cause, if, as sufficiently connected, they were foreseen and remained evils. Thus insults, in circumstances where they rather move laughter, lack the force of injuring or their own effect, and therefore cease to be true insults.

What is to be said concerning blasphemies! Some excuse drunken persons from the sin of blasphemy, because it is of the nature of blasphemy that it be uttered knowingly. Thus Vasquez ¹, the Salmanticenses (2); and, if the blasphemies are not extraordinary, but middling and common, Gobat (3). Most judge them guilty, because the objective signification is preserved in the words: thus Sanchez; or because drunk persons preserve true concepts in such a way that the whole essence of material blasphemy is preserved: thus Ballerini on Gury, I, 183, note 6.

A distinction seems to us to have to be used. Often drunken persons utter blasphemies almost mechanically and without advertence to the signification: when those standing by observe this, not only subjective but also objective signification seems to perish. But if, having been corrected in this way, they assail God with insults, the insult will remain imputable in the cause, if it was at least confusedly foreseen.

Nevertheless it will always be wrong to provoke drunken persons to blasphemies. For if you have directly provoked them, you seem to blaspheme through them as through an instrument: which is gravely to be blamed; if only indirectly, at least venial irreverence toward God will subsist, whose name is usurped in a vain and rather hateful way. Cf. Laymann, l. 1, tr. 4, c. 9 n. 3, and our Questions concerning Religion, n. 169.

¹ In 1, 2, disp. 76, n. 11. - (2) Tr. 25, c. 2, n. 30.31. - (3) Opera moralia, tr. 5, c. 19, n. 34-39. - (4) Decal. l. 1, c. 16, n. 44.

— Remedies. The healing of a drunken man, or of one who is frequently made drunk, is judged very difficult and laborious. And already St. Augustine inveighs against such persons with very grave words. (Cf. ep. 29, n. 5, P. L. 33,116; sermon 151, P. L. 38, 816). And a resolution of temperance or moderate drinking often remains ineffective for them, so that only complete abstinence from intoxicating liquor establishes hope of health. Wherefore those certainly are to be praised who, for this cause, establish and govern societies called temperance societies, and voluntarily, without any personal necessity, abstain from every alcoholic drink, so that they can draw by their own example others who need such a remedy ¹. Moreover, there exist in various regions, for example in Switzerland, special institutes where drunkards are treated by a scientific method. Concerning the conquering of drunkenness and immoderate drinking of alcohol, cf. Noldin, Princ. 347. 348.

¹ Concerning the reason and opportunity of complete abstinence, cf. writings by P. Lehmkuhl, S.I. in Linzer Quartalschrift, 1917, p. 97 ff. and 1918, p. 13 ff.; and by R. P. Prummer, O. Pr., 1917, p. 322 ff.

— Notion. 1. The vice of anger, to be distinguished from the passion, is an inordinate appetite of revenge. Revenge, however, is made by the infliction of punishment on account of injustice, and toward this it states a proportion (1, 2, q. 46, art. 6).

But that inordinate appetite can be: 1. On the part of the mode of becoming angry, as if you should grow too heated interiorly, or exteriorly reveal that heat too much by signs; 2. On the part of the object, as if you desire revenge without a just cause, or greater than is just, or to be carried out by your own authority, or finally, if you do not desire it as just, that is, for the due end of preserving justice and correction, but for satisfying your malevolent soul.

Inordinateness on the part of the mode is of itself venial; the other is of itself mortal.

2. As a capital vice, anger begets: indignation, by which someone judges that he is being treated unworthily by someone, which of itself is venial; swelling of mind, by which someone morosely thinks out diverse ways of revenge, whence also the soul grows heated: the malice is measured by the quality of the revenge sought; clamor, when the angry man, lifting up his voice, pours forth many things inordinately and confusedly, which is commonly venial; blasphemy; insult, mortal in its kind, by which someone wills to dishonor the neighbor, while he casts some evil at him; malediction, by which someone wishes or imprecates evil to another. This will be mortal: a) if the evil is truly wished: often only anger is manifested; b) if it is wished with perfect deliberation; c) if the evil wished is grave (St. Alph. 5,83). Finally, it begets quarrels. If they do not exceed measure, they are venial, as are light fights. These are properly sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel: for the other can defend himself, with the moderation of blameless defense.

— Concerning just anger. An ordered appetite of revenge, as when superiors are angry at the faults of subjects and punish them with penalties, is not a sin, but is called anger through zeal. "Severity is inflexible concerning the infliction of penalties, when right reason requires this" (2, 2, q. 157 art. 2).

Neither just anger nor severity is contrary to meekness and clemency. For meekness restrains only the excesses of anger; clemency, through a certain epikeia, tempers penalties established by law according to right reason (2, 2, q. 157 art. 2).

— 1. Notion. Sloth denotes weariness of soul, and it can be taken generally for every relaxation of soul in exercising the virtues, because they have labor joined to them; and particularly for sadness and weariness concerning divine friendship, because it must be preserved through laborious works of the virtues; and then it is a special vice. The former becomes mortal when for that reason a grave affirmative or negative precept is violated; the latter directly repugns the charity of God, so that it is grave from its whole kind.

Sometimes they distinguish natural sloth, or weariness concerning bodily labor, and spiritual sloth, or weariness concerning laborious virtues. As is clear, flight from bodily labor, when it is culpable, is referred to spiritual sloth.

Although in common speech general sloth is rather taken for the capital vice, and St. Gregory the Great himself numbers general sadness among the capital vices, theologians nevertheless reserve the name of the capital vice of sloth for the special one.

2. By St. Gregory himself ¹, as daughters of sadness, there were already indicated:

Malice, by which someone has hatred for spiritual goods and would wish them not to exist; or by which he repents of having done well or fulfilled what he owed; or by which he contemns God's benefit, wishing that he had not been born, had not known Christ, etc.: it is mortal from its own kind;

Pusillanimity and despair concerning salvation;

Rancor, by which those are wearisome who induce him toward spiritual things;

Torpor, when good things are done without due fervor;

Wandering of mind in spiritual exercises: when it is done through thought, it is called curiosity; through speech, it is called verbosity; through restlessness, it is called inquietude: these are commonly venial.

N.B. Take care lest you confuse with mortal sloth the rather dangerous indeed, but of itself not mortal, weariness concerning a priesthood undertaken or a religious life entered, while there remains, however, the will of fulfilling the duties of either state.

¹ P. L. 76, 658.

— You ask whether labor is commanded to man?

By the words of Genesis, 3, 17. 18, a hard necessity is proclaimed rather than a true precept is promulgated. And some labor must be undertaken by all in order to flee sins, to exercise commanded acts of virtue, and to meet various necessities.

Therefore various duties indirectly generate for all men some obligation of laboring, and for most a sufficiently burdensome obligation, especially if among the duties you do not omit charity, which, when the matter concerns averting grave common harm, obliges even with notable inconvenience. And today, in our European societies, whether by reason of scandal, or by reason of common harm to be warded off, he who, abounding in goods, exercises charity by no work of his own cannot be excused from every sin.

But a proper and direct duty of laboring is not demonstrated; and social cooperation is generally to be obtained by much exhortation rather than by terror of divine anger. Cf. Gen.-Salsmans, I, 365.

St. Thomas,¹ treating of the causes of sins, and asking whether one sin can be the cause of another, also treats of capital vices. Following the footsteps of the Angelic Doctor, we indeed touch upon this matter here, but briefly, since we are going to treat of each of these vices when we speak of the virtues to which they are opposed.

¹ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 84.

406. Notions. A capital vice is that from which other vices and sins flow forth as from a fountain.

St. Thomas writes to the matter:² "Capital is said from head. But the head, properly indeed, is a certain member of an animal, which is the principle and directive of the whole animal. Hence metaphorically every principle and directive is called a head; and also men who direct and govern others are said to be heads of others. Therefore a capital sin is so called insofar as it metaphorically signifies the principle or directive of others; and thus a capital vice is called that from which other vices arise, and chiefly according to the origin of a final cause, which is the formal origin.... And therefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also directive, and in a certain way leading, of others.... Hence Gregory³ compares capital vices of this kind to leaders of armies."

The Angelic Doctor rather employs the word capital vice than capital sin, to signify that here the matter concerns evil habits or propensities which have arisen from repeated acts. Hence, for example, one who once or a few times has committed the sin of drunkenness is not yet properly to be called entangled in a capital vice. The same Angelic Doctor notes that other vices arise from capital vices chiefly according to the origin of a final cause, that is, other sins are committed for the sake of obtaining the end of the capital vice, or, to use the example of St. Gregory:⁴ a capital vice, for example a hardened propensity of lust, is as it were a tyrant, for whose satisfaction many subjects, that is, many other disordered acts, are forced to serve.

² L. c. a. 3.

³ Moral. l. 31, c. 17 a med.

⁴ Moral. l. 31, c. 45 (Migne, Patr. lat. 76, 620).

407. Number. After St. Gregory the Great seven capital vices are commonly enumerated: vain glory, avarice, lust, envy, gluttony, anger, sloth. By some pride is added, which nevertheless with St. Thomas⁵ is better called the queen and beginning of every sin. For "the end in acquiring all temporal goods is that through them a man may have a certain singular perfection and excellence. And therefore on this side pride, which is the appetite of excellence, is posited as the beginning of every sin." Some, who number pride among the capital vices, establish their number as eight.

The first who seems to have spoken of those eight vices and enumerated them all together is Evagrius Ponticus, died around 400:⁶ "There are eight chief kinds of vicious thoughts, under which every thought is contained: the first is of gluttony, the second of lust, the third of avarice, the fourth of sadness, the fifth of anger, the sixth of sloth, the seventh of vain glory, the eighth of pride."⁷

St. Thomas⁸ skillfully demonstrates that the sevenfold number of capital vices is fitting. There are four kinds of goods which man is wont to seek inordinately, and there are three goods which man flees inordinately on account of some evil joined to them. Therefore there are seven capital vices. The first good inordinately sought is man's own excellence, praise, and honor. From this arises pride and vain glory. Another good, which is very often inordinately desired, is the good of the body. But this good is twofold: the conservation of the individual, which is sought inordinately through gluttony, that is, the disordered use of food and drink; the conservation of the human species, in the appetite of which the vice of lust produces a great disorder. The fourth good which is irrationally coveted is riches, about which the vice of avarice is concerned. - But the goods which are fled inordinately on account of an evil joined to them are: 1. one's own spiritual good, which is abandoned on account of joined bodily labor. Such flight is sloth. 2. Another's good, which causes sadness, because it impedes our own excellence. That sadness is envy. 3. Another's good, insofar as it incites to disordered vengeance, and which produces anger.

⁵ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 84, a. 2 and a. 4 ad 4; 2, 2, q. 163, a. 8. "Pride can be considered in two ways: in one way according to itself, insofar, namely, as it is a certain special sin; in another way, according as it has a certain universal influence upon all sins.... And therefore some, considering pride according as it is a special sin, numbered it with the other capital vices. But Gregory, considering its universal influence, which it has upon all vices, did not number it with the other capital vices, but posited it as queen and mother of all the vices."

⁶ Around the same time Ioan. Cassianus, died around 435, discussed capital vices, De coenob. instit. l. 5, c. 1 (Migne, Patr. lat. 49, 201).

⁷ Περὶ τῶν ὀκτὼ λογισμῶν (Migne, Patr. gr. 40, 1271 sqq.). This author beautifully notes concerning the vice of sloth, which reigns in the monk: "The demon of sloth, who is also called the noonday demon, is the gravest of all demons." He then graphically describes this demon.

⁸ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 84, a. 4.

408. The malice of capital vices does not always exceed the malice of other sins, but on the contrary there exist sins much worse than they, for example hatred of God, blasphemy. Indeed it cannot rightly be said that any act whatever freely produced from a capital vice is a mortal sin. Thus, for example, there is, on account of smallness of matter, a light sin of anger. Nevertheless almost always he is in the state of mortal sin who knowingly and willingly fosters capital vices, that is, those vicious propensities, and does not vigorously fight against them. For he is in proximate voluntary danger of sinning even gravely; and this certainly is not licit and is already a grave sin.

Now each of the capital vices must be treated briefly. At the same time, however, we shall treat of pride and of vain glory, since they are related.

St. Thomas, 1.2, q. 84, a. 2 seqq.; de Malo, q. 8 seqq.; St. Alphonsus, V, n. 65; ed. G., II, p. 752; St. Bonaventure, Breviloq., P. III, c. 9; Natalis Alexander, de Peccatis (Migne, Curs. Theol., XI, 707 seqq.; Cathrein, Phil. mor., 134; Tanquerey, I, n. 510.

359. Sins, or capital vices, are so called, not because they are the greatest (for sins against the Holy Spirit and against the theological virtues are graver), but because they have a certain universal influence into all sins, and are, as it were, roots and causes of other vices, not indeed physical or moral, but impulsive and occasional, namely through ignorance, concupiscence, or malice, which they induce in the soul.

Several capital sins, per se, are only venial, but often become the cause of mortal sins; in which case only these mortal sins are necessarily to be declared in confession.

Seven capital sins are fittingly numbered, namely: pride, avarice, gluttony, lust, envy, anger, sloth. For the will, when it departs from right order, either seeks what is not to be sought, or flees what

is not to be fled. Now: 1. If we seek what is not to be sought, that apparent good either is within us, namely one's own excellence, and pride affects this; or it is outside us, namely goods or riches, and avarice covets these; or it is below us, namely the delectable for the conservation of the individual, that is, food, and gluttony seeks this; or the delectable for the conservation of the species, that is, venereal things, and lust seeks these. 2. But if the will flees what is not to be fled, this can happen in a threefold way, namely: either the good of another embitters the soul, in which case envy is born; or the resistance of another irritates it, and then anger arises; or labor terrifies it, and thence sloth proceeds (St. Bonav., l. c.).

360. DEFINITION. Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence.

It is called 1. appetite, that is, desire and love of complacency; 2. inordinate: in this defect of due order, three grades are distinguished: the first, by which someone wishes to stand out beyond measure among equals; the second, by which someone despises equals or inferiors; the third, by which someone on account of his own excellence despises superiors; 3. of one's own excellence, not another's. Whence if a mother excessively seeks the excellence of her daughter without respect to herself, it is not properly pride, but another vice akin to pride.

Note. Pride is sometimes not numbered among the capital vices, because in the order of intention it is the beginning of all vices.

DIVISION. Pride is perfect or imperfect.

1. Perfect, or consummated, when someone seeks so to excel that he does not wish to be subject to God, to Superiors, and to their laws. 2. Imperfect, when, due subjection being preserved, someone rests in excessive estimation and complacency of himself (V, 65).

361. PRINCIPLES. I. Perfect pride is a mortal sin, and indeed from its whole genus. The reason is because it is directly and absolutely repugnant to charity toward God, who is contemned through pride. Whence the Apostle says (Rom. 1:32), concerning the proud and haughty: Those who do such things are worthy of death (cf. St. Thom., 2.2, q. 162, a. 6).

II. Imperfect pride is from its genus venial. The reason is because to raise oneself beyond what is just, without contempt of God and others, is not a grave disorder. "Nevertheless it would be grave if it were done with notable contempt of others, by taking complacency from the abasement of others" (V, 65).

The DAUGHTERS of pride are three:

1. PRESUMPTION, which is the appetite of undertaking something beyond one's powers. It is commonly only a venial sin; nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings harm to a third party.

2. AMBITION, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not due, or greater than due. It also is per se a venial sin; but it becomes mortal by reason of the means employed, or by reason of harm inflicted upon the neighbor.

3. EMPTY GLORY, namely cupidity of vain glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. And it itself is per se a venial sin; often it becomes mortal per accidens, as was said concerning ambition.

Now through EMPTY GLORY one sins in a twofold way:

1. "DIRECTLY, and this: a) either through words, and it is boasting, which is venial per se; b) or through deeds, which, if they are true and have something of admiration, is called invention of novelties; it is mortal if it notably corrupts youth or morals. But if the deeds are false, it is hypocrisy, for example, if someone does something good so that he may seem good, although he is not; which of itself is venial, unless it is with injury or contempt of God and neighbor."

2. INDIRECTLY, insofar as someone does not wish to be less than another. This happens in a fourfold way: a) Through the intellect, and it is pertinacity. b) Through the will, and it is discord. c) Through words, and it is contention. d) Through deeds, and it is disobedience.

"To these three daughters of pride there corresponds (through defect of magnanimity) pusillanimity." See the Holy Doctor, V, 65-67.

Pride also generates curiosity, ingratitude, human respects, rash judgment, etc., concerning which the matter will be spoken of in its own place.

The REMEDIES of pride are: consideration of one's own infirmity, of the vanity of human glory, and of the humility of Christ; then acts of humility, both external and especially internal; finally assiduous prayer (Selva, P. II, inst. 6).

362. DEFINITION. Avarice is the inordinate appetite of temporal goods, which are also usually called goods of fortune.

Avarice is the first vice in the order of execution. The disorder of this vice does not consist in the actual abundance of things, but in the immoderation of affection by which someone does not refer them to a due and honest end, say, to providing for the family and helping the neighbor. This is clear from the things said by St. Thom., 2.2, q. 118, a. 1.

363. PRINCIPLE. Avarice is sin from its genus venial. The reason is because it indeed imports excess, but in a thing indifferent and per se lawful, as riches are. For the rest, per se it is opposed only to liberality, which does not oblige under grave sin. It is said per se, because per accidens it can be opposed to justice and charity. Sometimes avarice also grows to such a degree that on account of it man does not hesitate to transgress divine laws; then it becomes mortal (V, 68). Hence it is said (Ecclus. 10:9): Nothing is more wicked than the covetous man. And (1 Cor. 6:10): Neither thieves, nor the covetous shall possess the kingdom of God.

Note. To avarice is opposed prodigality, which consists in defect of preserving and excess of spending. "It is from its genus venial, lighter than avarice, because it recedes less from the virtue of liberality." Nevertheless it can become mortal if grave evils follow from it: for example, if by this you render yourself unable to pay debts; if you reduce your own people to poverty; if by too costly banquets and delights you introduce into the city a moral necessity that others, by exceeding their powers, do the same; if from this, deservedly, scandal and harm of the poor are born; if you squander goods bound to pious causes, etc. (ibid., 3).

The DAUGHTERS of avarice are: 1. Disquiet of mind, by which one is drawn away from due offices through excessive love of riches; 2. hardening of heart, or mercilessness; 3. violence; 4. perfidy; 5. betrayal (V, 69).

The REMEDIES of avarice, besides prayer, are: 1. Meditation both of the loftiness of heavenly things and the vanity of earthly things; and of the example of Christ the Lord; and of the baseness, unhappiness, and dangers of this vice; and of death, which will despoil us of all earthly things. 2. The giving of alms, visitation of the miserable, and, in the loss of goods, conformity to the divine will.

364. DEFINITION. Gluttony is the inordinate appetite of food and drink.

It is called inordinate insofar as man takes food and drink not for the support of the body, but on account of pleasure alone (2.2, q. 141, a. 6). Cf. n. 308, q. 1. Nevertheless it is lawful to use delight for taking food, for the health of the body.

Gluttony is opposed to abstinence, and is committed in five ways: 1. if you eat before the time; 2. if things too exquisite; 3. if more than is just; 4. if voraciously; 5. if things too exquisitely prepared (V, n. XLIV, and 73).

365. PRINCIPLE. Gluttony from its genus is a venial sin. The reason is because it is excess in a thing per se lawful; and none of the aforesaid five modes is precisely repugnant to charity toward God or neighbor.

"Meanwhile it is judged mortal from accident, and from excessive disorder, in these cases: 1. If someone on account of gluttony violates the fasts of the Church. 2. If someone from gluttony becomes notably unfit for functions to which he is bound under mortal sin. 3. If someone very gravely harms his health, adverting this; otherwise if only lightly, as for example, if one having fever increases the illness by a drink of water. 4. If banquets and drinking bouts become continual, so that the belly is had for God. 5. If someone drinks to perfect drunkenness (concerning which in the Fifth Precept). 6. If someone, from mere gluttony, feeds on human flesh or blood; both because this is repugnant to piety owed to the dead, and because it is contrary to the instinct of nature abhorring it. But he will have to be excused if it happens from cause, for example, from extreme hunger in a siege: in which case, however, you will not be bound to preserve life thus" (V, 73, 4).

The DAUGHTERS of gluttony are numbered as five by St. Gregory (Moral., l. 31, c. 45, n. 88): 1. dullness of mind; 2. inept joy; 3. foolish speech; 4. buffoonery; which from their genus are venial; 5. incontinence: Be not drunk with wine, wherein is lust (Eph. 5:18).

REMEDIES: 1. To beware the incitements of gluttony, and not to mingle oneself with gluttonous persons. 2. To grow accustomed to common foods, sometimes to fast, or at least at table to subtract something from one's own pleasure. 3. To meditate on the examples of Christ thirsting on the cross, and the miseries which gluttony brings with itself. 4. To pray to God before approaching the table.

366. IT IS ASKED. What is CRAPULA and what kind of sin is it?

Resp. Strictly so called, it is excess in food, even unto vomiting.

Concerning it St. Alphonsus teaches: "To eat or drink even unto vomiting is probably only venial from its genus; unless scandal or notable harm to health is present, as Holzmann, the Salmanticenses, etc., commonly say. But those who voluntarily vomit what they have taken, so that they may eat or drink again, are scarcely excused from mortal sin; for this seems to involve great deformity. Thus probably (against Busenbaum) Holzmann and Wigandt" (V, 73, 2).

367. "Lust is the inordinate appetite of venereal things. The use of these by its nature has been instituted for the conservation of the human race, which is a great good of men and an external [good] of God; accordingly, he who abuses it wounds God and men" (V, 71).

PRINCIPLE. Direct lust is a mortal sin from its whole genus. See the Sixth Precept.

"The DAUGHTERS of lust, which for the most part follow it, are eight: four on the part of the intellect, and four on the part of the will." Thus St. Thom., 2.2, q. 153, a. 5. Cf. n. 377.

Therefore on the part of the INTELLECT the daughters of lust are: 1. blindness of mind; 2. precipitation; 3. inconsideration; 4. inconstancy. These four become mortal when the ultimate end is placed in the creature, or a grave precept is neglected.

On the part of the WILL: 1. love of self; 2. hatred of God; 3. affection for the present age; 4. horror of the future age. These four are per se mortal, unless from imperfection of act they become venial (V, 71).

The REMEDIES of lust are: 1. Flight from occasions and causes, that is, flight from idleness, from readings of depraved books and those which they call novels, from familiarity with persons of diverse sex, etc.; 2. continual prayer (Matt. 17:20); 3. frequent confession, and indeed with the same confessor; for the more the state of the sick person is known, the more aptly can the remedy be applied; likewise frequent and devout reception of the Sacred Eucharist, by which the bread of Angels is eaten, and wine springing forth virgins is drunk; 4. memory of the last things; 5. constant cult and frequent invocation of the Blessed Virgin Mary conceived without stain; 6. custody of the senses, chiefly of the eyes: "let your eyes, even if they are cast upon someone, be fixed on no one" (St. Aug., Ep., 19); 7. mortification of the flesh: "for lust is fed by banquets, nourished by delights, kindled by wine, inflamed by drunkenness" (Scavini, l. I, n. 803).

368. DEFINITION. Envy is sadness concerning another's good, insofar as that is diminutive of one's own excellence. To it is recalled joy concerning another's evil, insofar as that is reputed good to us.

PRINCIPLE. Envy is, from its genus, a mortal sin. The reason is because it is directly opposed to charity, whose proper thing is to rejoice concerning the good of the neighbor, and to grieve concerning his evil as our own. Wherefore the Apostle places the sin of envy in the genus of those things which exclude from the kingdom of God (Gal. 5:21). Yet often envy is a light sin, either on account of smallness of matter, or on account of imperfection of act (V, 72).

369. Hence you will deduce: 1. If someone is saddened concerning the goods of the neighbor because he is his enemy, it is hatred, not envy.

2. If he is saddened concerning the goods of a prodigal dissipating them, or of a miser basely storing them up, it is just indignation, not envy.

3. If he is saddened concerning the temporal goods of a sinner, because he is unworthy of them, it is inordinate zeal; since all things happen according to the decrees of divine Providence, which we ought to adore.

4. If he is saddened concerning another's good, for example, concerning obtained power, not because it is a good to him, but because thence he fears harm to himself or to another, it is just fear, which per se is not sin, unless it is inordinate or immoderate.

5. If he is saddened concerning another's good, not because he possesses the good, but because it is lacking to himself, in such a way, however, that he by no means desires the other to be deprived of it, it is emulation; which, if it is concerning an honest good, is praiseworthy; but if concerning temporal things, it is sometimes venial, say, if the good is disproportionate to the one grieving, such as it would be if a rustic grieved that he was not king.

6. If he grieves that another equal to himself should grow in excellence, and apprehends the very increase of excellence as evil to himself, it is envy properly so called; for an envious man is said as if not seeing, because he cannot see the goods of another without sadness. Thus ambitious persons, the pusillanimous, women, the old with respect to the young, and whoever have with difficulty obtained what others easily attain, are accustomed to sin (V, 72; Vera Sposa, c. 12, § 1, n. 9).

The DAUGHTERS of envy likewise from their genus are mortal, and are numbered as four, namely: 1. hatred; 2. detraction; 3. joy in the evils of the neighbor; 4. whispering, which is evil speech concerning the neighbor, for taking away his friendship with others (cf. n. 1192 seqq., 1195 seq.).

The chief REMEDY: the exercise of charity toward the neighbor.

370. DEFINITION. Anger, not insofar as it is a passion but insofar as it is a vice, is called the inordinate appetite of vengeance. The habit of anger is irascibility.

It is called inordinate; because to seek or take vengeance for evil in an ordered way, that is, with due moderation and order, is not sin, but an act of right reason and virtue.

Thus Christ with anger cast the sellers out of the temple. Thus a judge exercises an act of virtue by taking vengeance on the accused; a father on a delinquent son; a master on a servant. Therefore anger is without vice whenever someone is angry so that reason may more strongly execute justice. Indeed, many sin by defect of due anger.

But the disorder of anger can happen in two ways: 1. On the part of the object, as if you seek unjust vengeance, namely if a legitimate cause is not present, or if the anger is greater than is fitting, or finally if it is exercised privately, when it ought to be exercised publicly through a judge. 2. On the part of the mode, say, if someone is too ardently angry interiorly, or manifests signs of anger too much exteriorly.

371. PRINCIPLES. I. Anger, inordinate on the part of the object, is sin from its genus mortal. For it is directly opposed to charity, and also to justice. Whence (Gal. 5:20, 21) anger is said to exclude from the kingdom of heaven.

II. Anger, inordinate only on the part of the mode, is sin from its genus venial. For it is excess in a lawful thing. Nevertheless it can become mortal per accidens, as if blasphemy, cursing, or scandal is added.

But the movements of anger under the influence of passion are often sudden, and therefore imperfectly deliberate, or even indeliberate; from which heading anger (of either kind) frequently is venial, or no sin (V, 79, 80).

The DAUGHTERS of anger are: 1. in the heart, indignation and swelling of mind; 2. in the mouth, clamor, blasphemy, contumely, cursing; 3. in work, quarrel, fight, seditions, wounds. See St. Alph., V, 80-83.

Concerning these, the discourse will return either in the Fifth or in the Eighth Precept.

REMEDIES: Consideration of the evils of anger, of the meekness of Christ; prayer, especially in the movement of anger.

372. DEFINITION. Sloth, in general, sounds the same as idleness or sluggishness, and is torpor of soul in the exercise of the virtues, on account of the labor joined to it. Sloth, strictly taken, is sadness and weariness concerning divine friendship, because it must be preserved through laborious exercises of the virtues; and thus it does not care for that friendship (V, 84).

PRINCIPLES. I. Sloth, taken in the broad sense, is sin per se venial, but disposing proximately to mortal sin. For the tepid man is a burden to God, not otherwise than food soon to be rejected by vomiting is to man, according to that saying (Apoc. 3:16): But because thou art tepid, I shall begin to vomit thee out of my mouth; and that saying of St. Augustine (ap. St. Alph., Selva, P. I, c. 5, n. 9): "God is accustomed to desert the negligent."

But sloth is per accidens a mortal sin when a precept obliging under grave sin is omitted, for example, the hearing of Mass on a feast day, the recitation of the breviary, etc.; but it constitutes one sin with the omission itself (n. 322, q. 2, Hinc, b). Cf. Ami du Cl., 1898, p. 1084, where the matter concerns the law of labor.

II. Sloth, accepted in the strict sense, is sin from its genus mortal. The reason: it is plainly repugnant to the charity of God, since through it divine friendship and eternal beatitude are little esteemed. Hence that saying (1 Cor. 7:10): The sadness of the world works death (cf. V, 84, 2).

The DAUGHTERS of sloth, according to Blessed Gregory (Moral., l. 8, c. 5-6), are the following:

1. Malice, or hatred of spiritual goods; 2. rancor, by which those who exhort to spiritual things are a source of loathing; 3. pusillanimity toward all spiritual goods, fleeing them as arduous; 4. despair concerning salvation; 5. torpor, when good things are done not with due fervor; 6. wandering of mind, by which someone in the exercise of spiritual things wanders about illicit things. This is mortal sin if the mind voluntarily adheres to gravely illicit things, or is drawn back from attention required under grave sin, for example, in celebrating Mass; otherwise it is venial (cf. n. 549, 2).

The REMEDIES of sloth are: frequent confession, pious readings and meditations, and especially spiritual Exercises to be made in total retreat.

236. • Sins are called capital because they are as it were the heads, or sources, of other sins. Hence they should be called vices rather than properly sins, if they are considered in general.

Seven are numbered, namely: 1° Pride; - 2° Avarice; - 3° Lust; - 4° Envy; - 5° Anger; - 6° Sloth; - 7° Gluttony. - The reason for this number seven from St. Thomas¹ is this. Man can either pursue or flee that which is good according to itself in a mode discordant from reason. Goods, such according to themselves, which man can pursue in a mode discordant from reason, or inordinately, are - either honor and glory, and such pursuit is called pride; - or the preservation of the individual through food and drink, and the inordinate pursuit of this is called gluttony; - or the preservation of the species through acts destined for the propagation of the human race, and the inordinate use of these acts is lust; - or riches, and the inordinate appetite of these is avarice. The good which one can flee in a mode discordant from reason is - either one's own good, and thus sloth has place; - or the good of another, and there is either envy, which through sadness, or anger, which through the appetite of vengeance, is inimical to another's good.

The virtues opposed to the capital vices are: humility, liberality, chastity, benignity, meekness, devotion or diligent piety, temperance.

The things which follow I have taken partly from Haine,¹ partly from St. Alphonsus.²

236. • Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. I say: inordinate; for to will to excel is a meritorious act, if you will it in a due mode and for a due end, for example for the glory of God, the salvation of the neighbor, etc. It is either perfect, by which someone so raises himself in spirit that he refuses to be subject to God and Superiors, or so conducts himself as if he had his things not from God, but from himself or at least from his own merits; and it is a most grave sin, but rarely occurs. Or it is imperfect, by which someone, while preserving subjection to God and Superiors and excluding that mode of conducting himself, esteems himself more than is just; and this of itself is venial, as an excess in an indifferent thing, unless grave contempt of the neighbor is added, for example through contumely, defamation, or damage in goods of fortune.

The daughters are:

1° Ambition, that is, the appetite of an honor not due, for example of an office for which you are unworthy; or of one greater than is due, as of an office for which you are not sufficiently worthy; or indeed of one due, but to be acquired by an undue mode, end, or means, for example through simony.

2° Vain glory, or the inordinate appetite of human estimation, which, if it is sought by words, is called boasting or vain and foolish preaching of oneself; if by deeds, ostentation; if by the undertaking of a work exceeding one's powers, presumption; if by false and fictitious signs, hypocrisy. These of themselves and ordinarily are venial. I say: of themselves, because by accident it will be mortal: - boasting from an evil end; by reason of grave damage to the neighbor; if it concerns a mortally evil thing, the evil species of which thing it also assumes when it is done with internal complacency or joy concerning that thing (n. 229); - ostentation, for example through new opinions, if these notably corrupt morals, etc.; - presumption, by reason of grave damage to the neighbor, as if without due skill you presume to take up the office of physician, confessor, etc.; - hypocrisy, if it is done with grave injury or contempt of God or the neighbor.

3° Pertinacity, by which someone clings excessively to his own judgment, being unwilling to believe one who understands better.

4° Contention, which is an inordinate contrariety of words.

5° Discord, which is a contrariety of wills concerning a good in which from charity we ought to agree.

6° Disobedience, ingratitude, etc. The sins set forth under 3°, 4°, 5°, 6° are grave according to the reason of the mode and end. Thus it will be mortal - pertinacity, if you pertinaciously adhere to an error of great moment, or if it is joined with the danger of grave damage to the neighbor; - contention, if with a spirit of contradicting you quarrel concerning a truth pertaining to the Faith, or to the salvation of soul or body.

237. • Avarice is the immoderate appetite of riches, that is, not of money only, but of all things which can be valued by money. Of itself, or insofar as it is opposed to liberality alone, it is venial, as an excess in a thing otherwise indifferent and licit; by accident it is very often mortal, namely 1° when it is gravely repugnant to charity toward God, for instance if a man inordinately adheres to riches in such a way that he places his whole affection in them, more solicitous about conserving money than grace; 2° when it is gravely repugnant to charity or justice toward the neighbor, for example by not paying debts or by delaying their payment, by not succoring the necessity of the neighbor.

Prodigality, which is opposed to avarice and consists in defect of preserving and excess of expending, of itself is venial; by accident it is mortal, as if you create poverty for your children and wife, if you render yourself incapable of paying debts, etc.

The daughters of avarice are: hardness of heart toward the wretched, by which it happens that one does not have compassion on the poor, rebukes them, exacts debts too harshly when the debtor is not solvent, etc.; oppression of the poor; unrest of mind, that is, a vehement and inordinate application of the mind to acquiring or preserving riches, with empty and vain fear lest they not be acquired or lest they be lost; fraud, for example in contracts; violence; treachery or deception against faith pledged or owed; theft; and very many other things.

238. • Lust will be treated in the Treatise on the Sixth Precept.

239. • Envy is sadness concerning the good of the neighbor insofar as it is apprehended as diminishing one's own excellence; as if you should grieve that someone equal to you, or not much unequal, grows in honor or riches, as though through this something should fall away from you. Hence, if someone is saddened concerning the goods of the neighbor from another motive, it will not be envy.

Hence it differs: 1° From indignation, by which someone is saddened concerning the good of another insofar as he is prudently believed unworthy of such good. It is good if it is conceived on account of God or the common good, which is believed to be injured by the unworthy man; yet it can be evil, as if it concerns goods insofar as they come from God to sinners. 2° From fear, by which you are saddened concerning the good of another because from it you fear some evil to yourself or to another innocent person. This, when evil affection and aversion concerning the person are excluded, is not illicit. Thus we are licitly saddened concerning the power of the impious insofar as, abusing it, they are harmful; thus I prudently grieve that he has been elevated to office who, as my enemy, will now more easily be able to harm me, because such sadness is not so much concerning the neighbor's good as concerning the evil following from it. 3° From zeal or emulation, by which you are saddened concerning the good of the neighbor, not because it is a good to him, but because the good which he has is lacking to you. This of itself is good. Thus, when evil affection concerning the person is excluded, which nevertheless easily intervenes, you are licitly saddened that another has taken from you the office or girl desired in Matrimony. Thus students or those learning an art, when they see the progress of others, rightly are saddened concerning their own defect, by which they themselves are stirred to better things. Similarly the craftsman, seeing his neighbor feed his family well by his industry, rightly grieves that he himself cannot prosper so. Thus finally the merchant or innkeeper, seeing buyers or guests turn aside to a neighbor, licitly grieves concerning that concourse, not insofar as it is profitable to the neighbor, but insofar as it is his own detriment and loss of profit, which otherwise he would justly have had. 4° From hatred, by which you are saddened concerning the good of the neighbor from displeasure with the neighbor himself.

Envy from its kind is mortal, because it is directly opposed to charity toward the neighbor; often it is venial, both from imperfection of the act and from smallness of matter.

The daughters are: 1° hatred (n. 281); 2° whispering (n. 516); 3° detraction (ibid.); 4° joy in the adversities of the neighbor; 5° affliction in his prosperity.

240. • Anger is the inordinate appetite of vengeance or quasi-vengeance. It is said: inordinate; for anger can be without sin, for example when someone becomes angry so that reason may execute justice more strongly; when vengeance is sought only that the other may be corrected, others frightened, the decorum of justice preserved, etc. But from St. Thomas it becomes inordinate in two ways: 1° on the part of the mode of becoming angry, if interiorly you grow hot beyond what reason dictates, or exteriorly make anger too manifest by signs, although just vengeance is sought; 2° on the part of the object, if you seek unjust vengeance, vengeance greater than is just, or indeed just vengeance but to be inflicted outside the order of law, or not for the due end but from hatred, to satisfy a malevolent affection. - There is added: or quasi-vengeance; because when a man is angry with inanimate things, for example an artisan from anger breaks or throws away an instrument, a writer a pen, it is not properly vengeance; yet it is anger, namely on the part of the mode, which of itself is only venial; by accident it is sometimes mortal, if for example notable damage is caused to his own health or that of another, if it breaks out into blasphemies or curses. The second inordination, namely on the part of the object, is from its kind mortal, because it is directly opposed to charity.

The daughters are: indignation and swelling of mind, while anger remains in the heart. Indignation in this place is an inordinate affection arising from this, that someone thinks himself treated unworthily by someone; and it is commonly a venial fault, but none if it is not inordinate, that is, if it proceeds from a just judgment of reason; but mortal if it grows even to deliberate hatred or grave contempt of the person. Swelling of mind is present when someone devises diverse ways of vengeance and with those thoughts swells his soul: how great a sin it is must be judged from the quality of the vengeance which is devised. - Clamor, when the angry man raises his voice, pouring forth many things inordinately and confusedly, is of itself venial. Contumely (n. 533), blasphemy, malediction or imprecation, when it breaks out in the mouth. That a malediction be grave three things are required, namely that the evil imprecated - be grave, - truly be wished, - be wished with perfect deliberation. Quarrels, fights, wounding, when it goes out into deed. Quarrels, if they do not exceed measure, as also small fights, are venial; otherwise if they advance to seditions, wounds, slaughters. And these are commonly sins on the part of the one beginning the quarrel; for the other can defend himself with the moderation of blameless defense (n. 467, II).

241. • Sloth, or weariness of soul, from St. Thomas can be used in two ways. 1° Generally, for every remission of the soul in working well in the exercise of the virtues, on account of the labor joined with this exercise; and taken thus it is not a special vice, but general, because every vice flees the good of the opposite virtue. 2° Specially, for weariness concerning a spiritual good, for example concerning divine friendship apprehended as evil because of the difficulty joined to obtaining and preserving it through laborious exercises of the virtues and flight from illicit pleasures, whence it happens that one does not care for that friendship.

General sloth is venial of itself; as if you are saddened concerning Mass because in cold weather one must rise, yet you hear it, although with some displeasure. I said: of itself; because if the weariness remains in the sensitive appetite alone and the will tries to resist, it is a meritorious act. But it is mortal if acts gravely obliging are therefore omitted, for example from weariness you omit Mass of precept; but it is not a sin distinct from the neglect of Mass, nor consequently to be expressed in Confession. - Special sloth is of itself a most grave sin, unless imperfection of the act excuses, because it is specially repugnant to charity toward God and turns away from God.

The daughters are: 1° malice, by which someone has hatred for spiritual goods according to themselves, as if it displeased him to have acted well; or he contemns the benefit of God, as if he desired not to have been born, to be a brute, etc.; and it is of itself mortal; 2° rancor, by which those who induce one to spiritual things are distasteful to him; this, when hatred and other things are excluded, is only venial; 3° pusillanimity, by which someone shrinks from undertaking something difficult, and, when another mortal transgression is excluded, is only venial; 4° despair of obtaining beatitude, and this is mortal; 5° torpor in the observance of precepts, which is venial if things gravely obliging are performed coldly, but mortal if they are not fulfilled; 6° wandering of the mind, by which someone in the exercise of spiritual things wanders about other matters: of itself it is venial; mortal if it is notable and attention is required under mortal sin, as during sacrificing (n. 1334, 13°). It is free from all fault if someone does not so much intend to pray, as to occupy himself with a pious exercise by reciting the words of prayers; because he prays not formally but materially only, for example when someone working with his hands recites prayers or sings psalms, not with the intention of praying, but of avoiding vain thoughts or recreating himself.

242. • Gluttony is the inordinate appetite of food or drink.

This vice is committed chiefly in five modes: 1° if you eat before the time; 2° if too exquisite things; 3° if more than is just; 4° if voraciously; 5° if things prepared with greater industry. These are contained in the following verse:

Prepropere, laute, nimis, ardenter, studiose.

It is a venial sin from its kind. But it becomes grave if it gravely harms health, or if it renders someone unfit for offices. He sins who eats or drinks to satiety on account of pleasure alone, as is established from proposition 8 condemned by Innocent XI, p. XV; yet of itself it does not exceed venial sin. - Thus commonly.

The daughters of gluttony are drunkenness, concerning which presently more fully; dullness of mind; scurrility; much-speaking; and uncleanness of any kind.

Remedies: to consider the worst effects of gluttony as to body and soul; - to mortify the flesh especially in the refreshment of the body; - frequently to recall death, or the corruption of the body soon to come.

I. How sin has a cause. - Since sin is a disordered human act, it consists of a twofold element: a positive element, which is the material element of sin, namely the act itself tending toward some created good; and a privative element, which in sin is formal, on account of which, namely, sin is sin: it is the disorder or deformity of the act with its rule, that is, with right reason and the eternal law, and an aversion from God, the last end.

Now, on the part of the act, sin has, as every act and every being does, an acting cause per se, namely a power of man, especially the will insofar as it intends some created good; on the part of the disorder it has a cause in that way in which a privation can have a cause, namely a deficient and per accidens cause.

For upon the positing of one effect there follows the absence or privation of another; and thus a cause intending the positing of something is, per accidens, the cause of the privation following, which it does not intend: "as fire, by causing heat by its principal intention, consequently causes the privation of coldness." Thus, therefore, the will, intending some created good which is not conformed to reason but is opposed to the eternal law, and failing from the direction of the rule of reason and of the law of God, causes the act of sin per se; but to this act there is joined the privation of conformity with reason and law, which privation nevertheless the will does not intend; and therefore, together with the act, it causes the privation joined to it, but only consequently, per accidens, and beyond intention.

As is clear from the foregoing declaration, "every per accidens cause is reduced to a per se cause; therefore... it follows that the disorder of sin follows from the very cause of the act." It suffices, therefore, that we consider how one sin can be the cause of another on the part of the act; for in this way it will also consequently be the cause of another on the part of the disorder.¹

¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 1.

II. One sin can be the cause of another sin, just as one human act can be the cause of another. But this happens in three ways:

1. one sin can be the material cause of another, insofar as it supplies and prepares matter for another, as gluttony prepares matter for lust, and avarice for litigation, because it multiplies temporal goods which are the matter of litigation;

2. it can be the efficient cause of another, and indeed in a twofold way, namely per se and per accidens:

a) per accidens, that is, by the removal of what prohibits: "for when by one act of sin a man loses grace, or charity, or shame, or any other thing drawing him back from sin, from this he falls into another sin (because, namely, he no longer has that which drew him back from sin), and thus the first sin is the cause of the second per accidens";

b) per se, insofar as from some sin, for example of lust, a man is disposed, by way of inclination, to others of the same species: "for from acts there are caused dispositions and habits inclining to like acts";

3. and especially it can be the final cause of another, insofar as for the end of one sin someone commits another sin, as if a woman commits fornication for the sake of theft, or, on the contrary, someone commits theft in order to procure fornication for himself. And because the end in moral matters gives form, because it gives species,² thus one sin which is the final cause is also the formal cause of another, because it gives form to the other: "because the end gives form in moral matters... from this it also follows that one sin which is the end of another is the formal cause of the other; for in an act of fornication which is committed for the sake of theft, fornication is as the material element, but theft as the formal element."³

² The end gives species to human acts because it is the object of the act of the will and the terminus to which the motion of the will tends; but an act has species from its object, and a motion from its terminus. The end gives species and consequently form, not only to the interior act of the will, but also to exterior acts commanded by the will; for the act of the will and the exterior act are one moral act, in which the interior act is the formal element, and the exterior act is the material element which is determined and, as it were, informed by the other. The interior act of the will is the formal element, both because it moves and determines the exterior members to acting, for the intended end is the reason for doing those things which are for the end; and because the exterior act is not voluntary except dependently on the interior will. Hence it is universally true that the species of human acts, formally considered, are considered according to the end. Cf. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 1, a. 3, and q. 18, a. 6.

³ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 4.

III. Capital sins are naturally apt, for the most part, to be the cause of several others, especially the final cause. - A capital sin is so called from the head, which is the principle and directive of the whole animal: "whence, metaphorically, every principle and directive is called a head; and also men who direct and govern others are said to be heads of others." Therefore a capital sin is that which is the cause or principle, and at the same time the directive, of others.⁴

⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 3.

But this belongs to those sins which, for the most part and frequently, are the cause of several others, especially the final cause, because they have a very lovable object or a most appetible end, whence for the sake of it other sins are easily committed. For sins of this kind are especially the principle and cause of others, for the end is the principle and form in moral matters; whence in this way "sin is caused by sin actually and formally" and perfectly. They are also directive of others: by the end human acts are directed, because the end commands those things which are for the end.

"For it is manifest," says St. Thomas,⁵ "that a prince orders those subject to himself to his own end, as an army is ordered to the end of the commander... Whence according to Gregory, Morals, book 31, c. 45 (or 17), the capital vices are, as it were, commanders, and the vices which arise from them are, as it were, an army."

⁵ St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 8, a. 1; cf. I-II, q. 84, a. 3.

From these things it is concluded:

A. Not every sin which is the cause of another can be called capital, and indeed:

1. not that which is the material cause of others, because that which ministers matter is not the cause of sin in act, but occasionally and in potency;

2. nor that which is the efficient cause of others per accidens, both because no science considers per accidens causes, and because a head designates a per se cause, which, namely, is naturally apt to cause and rule others, and because in this way any mortal sin can be the cause of any other;

3. nor even that which is the efficient cause of others per se; for every sin inclines to one like itself, and thus again every sin would be capital;

4. indeed, not even that which is the final cause of others but only from the condition of the sinner, because this happens per accidens to the sin itself. For "an origin of this kind can be attended to in a twofold way: in one way, according to the condition of the sinner, who is so disposed that he is most affected toward one end, from which for the most part he proceeds into other sins. But this mode of origin cannot fall under art, because the particular dispositions of men are infinite. In another way, according to the natural relation of the ends themselves to one another; and according to this, as in the majority of cases, one vice arises from another. Whence this mode of origin can fall under art. According to this, therefore, those vices are called capital whose ends have certain primary reasons for moving the appetite."⁶

⁶ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 4.

B. Hence a capital sin is not to be confused with that which they are accustomed to call the dominant vice, or the sin which is wont to be committed more frequently by a determined individual and to whose end he himself orders and commits other sins; for this happens per accidens on the part of the sinner himself, not per se and on the part of the nature of the sin. "One sin is ordered to the end of another in two ways: in one way, on the part of the sinner himself, whose will is more prone to the end of one sin than to that of another, but this is accidental to sins. Whence according to this they are not called capital sins. In another way, from the very relation of the ends, of which one has a certain agreement with another, so that in the majority of cases it is ordered to it... and according to this capital vices must be assumed."⁷ From their own nature, therefore, they have a highly appetible end, and indeed one highly appetible to all; and for this reason they move all men, and frequently, toward other sins.

⁷ St. Thomas, Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 8, a. 1.

C. Nevertheless, capital sins are not the greatest of all, since several others are graver than they, for example those which are directly against God or are directly opposed to the theological virtues; nor are they necessarily grave, even if done deliberately, as is clear concerning anger and gluttony, which often are venial.

D. Nor are the capital sins those which are opposed to the fundamental or cardinal virtues, because "there is not the same account of origin in virtues and in vices. For virtues are caused through the order of the appetite to reason, or also to the immutable good, which is God; but vices arise from the appetite for a mutable good. Whence it is not necessary that the principal vices be opposed to the principal virtues."⁸

⁸ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 4 ad 1.

IV. Seven capital sins are customarily numbered. - A usage has already prevailed from the time of St. Gregory, by whom in the place cited there are enumerated "the principal vices, namely vain-glory, envy, anger, sadness (or acedia), avarice, greediness of the belly (or gluttony), lust."

Nevertheless several place pride first in place of vain-glory; others comprehend both under one word. But St. Thomas, following St. Gregory, has pride as the final cause, the queen and mother of all sins, even capital ones, insofar as all are naturally apt to be done and ordered to the end of pride and thus to arise from pride; but he places vain-glory as a capital sin which is the final cause of several vices:

"Certain men, considering pride according as it is a certain special sin, numbered it with the other capital vices. But Gregory, considering its universal influence, which it has upon all vices,... did not number it with the other capital vices, but posits it as queen of all vices and mother; whence he says...: pride itself, queen of the vices, when it has fully seized the conquered heart, at once hands it over to be devastated by the seven principal vices, as by certain of its commanders, from which multitudes of vices arise."⁹

⁹ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, a. 8. Cf. a. 2.

Rightly indeed: for besides pride there are still seven sins of which the definition of capital sins is verified, namely that they are the cause of several others, especially the final cause, since this is true concerning vain-glory; then, the first opinion arises from this, that some authors did not sufficiently consider the universal causality of pride in all vices; finally, by reckoning pride with vain-glory under one word, neither the universal influence of the former nor the special causality of the latter with respect to certain particular sins is sufficiently seen. "And therefore pride, as a quasi-universal vice, is not numbered with the others, but rather is placed as a certain queen of all the vices."¹⁰ It is indeed mother on the part of the end, because it is the principle of all in the order of intention;¹¹ queen on the part of command, because it directs all to its own end.

¹⁰ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 4 ad 4.

¹¹ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 84, a. 2.

In practice, nevertheless, as regards the direction of souls in avoiding sins or eradicating vices, it does not matter so very much whether pride is distinguished from vain-glory as the cause of all vices, or, on the contrary, is considered together with it as the first capital sin.¹²

¹² By certain persons there has been doubt concerning the opinion of St. Thomas: 1. because after, in I-II, q. 84, a. 2, he taught that pride as a special sin is the beginning of every sin, since it is naturally apt to be the end of all sins, in II-II, q. 162, a. 8, he seems to suggest the contrary, saying that pride as a special sin is capital, and as a general sin is the mother of all vices; 2. because in several places he reckons pride together with vain-glory as one capital vice. Reply to the first: after in I-II he had refuted the opinion of those who asserted that pride is called both a general sin or condition of every sin, and also an inclination to any sin whatsoever from corrupt nature, and thus is the beginning of every sin, and against them had taught that even as a special sin it is the cause of all the others, this now being supposed, in II-II he teaches that that special sin can be viewed in two ways: a) incompletely, that is, solely as a special sin according to its proper species, abstracting from its general influence upon all vices; and thus it still has a special causality upon certain sins which proximately and frequently arise from it, and can be held as a capital sin; b) completely, that is, also in some way as a general sin; for the special sin of pride has a general influence. If this influence is viewed, it is not a capital sin, that is, the cause of several others, but the beginning of every sin. From these things it is clear that the expression "general sin" is not taken by St. Thomas in the same sense in each place; in the first place it signifies any sin whatsoever or the condition of every sin; in the second place it signifies a special sin insofar as, on account of the diffusion of its command, it extends causality to all. This is clear from the very words of St. Thomas, for in the second place he uses the same words to describe the general sin of pride which in the first place he used to describe the special sin of pride. Therefore it is false that St. Thomas ever denied that pride, as a special sin, is the mother of all the others; indeed it is manifest that he constantly taught this. Reply to the second: When the holy Doctor reckons pride together with vain-glory as a capital vice, he speaks not from the opinion which he chose as his own, but as reciting the opinion of others. Thus in Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 8, a. 1: "To the good of the soul, namely the excellence of honor and glory, pride, or vain-glory, is ordered," that is, according to some, pride; according to others, vain-glory. He speaks in the same way in II Sent., d. 42, q. 2, a. 3; and in I-II, q. 84, a. 4, in the other mode of considering the goods which capital sins pursue (see p. 117, in the note). But if once he wrote (II Sent., d. 5, q. 1, a. 3) that pride is a capital vice, he did this in passing, nor did he assert it simply, but with a certain addition and quasi-restriction: "as a special sin, seeking one's own excellence especially in dignity and honor," signifying that he was considering it while abstracting from its general influence, insofar, nevertheless, as in a more special sense it is the cause of certain sins, namely presumption, ambition, and vain-glory, which for this reason are specially called daughters of pride. Besides, St. Thomas is not to be opposed to St. Thomas, but reconciled with himself. Whenever he treats the question expressly, he manifestly inclines to the opinion of Gregory and simply prefers it. Thus he did in I-II, q. 84, a. 2, teaching that pride, as it is a special sin, is the beginning of all the others; likewise in Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 8, a. 1: "Charity, which is love of God, commands all the other virtues. And thus, although it is a special virtue if its proper object is considered, nevertheless, according to a certain diffusion of its command, it is common to all virtues; whence it is called the form and mother of all virtues. And similarly pride, although it is a special sin according to the account of its proper object, nevertheless according to a certain diffusion of its proper command is a common sin with respect to all. Whence also it is called the root and queen of all sins"; likewise in the reply to the fourteenth. Then in I-II, q. 84, a. 4, he proves the statement of Gregory placing vain-glory among the seven capital sins; and to the fourth objection: "As avarice is the root of sin, so pride is the beginning of sin... But avarice is posited as one of the seven capital vices. Therefore pride should be numbered among the capital vices," he replies by denying the consequence, because pride is rather the beginning of all vices than a capital vice: "pride, as a quasi-universal vice, is not numbered with the others, but rather is placed as a certain queen of all the vices." In the same way in Quaestiones disputatae de Malo, 9, a. 3, ad 1: "It must be said that pride ... is placed generally as the mother of all vices, and under it are placed the seven capital vices, among which vain-glory is most akin to it." Similarly in II-II, q. 162, a. 8, although he reports each opinion, he manifestly prefers the opinion of Gregory, as is clear to one reading, and besides it is clear both from the fact that the objections of the article intend to prove that pride is a capital vice, which objections nevertheless he judged should be solved, and from the fact that he says: "but on the contrary is that Gregory does not number pride among the other capital vices," which assertion, since he lets it pass without response, he approves. Still more clearly in II-II, q. 132, a. 4: "I answer that certain persons speak about the capital vices in two ways. For some posit pride as one of the capital vices; and these do not posit vain-glory among the capital vices. But Gregory posits pride as queen of all vices; and vain-glory, which immediately arises from it, he posits as a capital vice. And this reasonably: for pride ... imports an inordinate appetite for excellence. But from every good which someone desires, he obtains a certain perfection and excellence; and therefore the ends of all vices are ordered to the end of pride; and on account of this it seems that it has a certain general causality over the other vices, and should not be counted among the special principles of vices which are the capital vices." Therefore there can be no doubt concerning the mind of St. Thomas.

That there are seven capital vices St. Thomas shows nearly as follows, I-II, q. 84, a. 4: Capital sins are those from which others arise chiefly according to the account of final cause, whose ends, namely, are most appetible and have, as it were, principal reasons for moving the appetite. But something moves the appetite either directly and per se, namely a good to be pursued and an evil to be fled; or indirectly and, as it were, through another, when someone pursues an evil because of a good joined to it, or flees a good because of an evil joined to it.

Now:

a) The good which man most desires is:

1. a good of the soul, namely the excellence of praise and honor, which vain-glory inordinately desires (1);

2. a good of the body by which the individual is conserved, namely food and drink, which gluttony inordinately desires (2);

3. a good of the body by which the human species is conserved, namely the use of venereal things, which lust inordinately desires (3);

4. an external good, namely riches; and avarice is concerned about this (4).¹³

¹³ St. Thomas adds: "Or otherwise. Good chiefly moves the appetite from this, that it participates in something of the property of happiness, which all naturally desire. Of its account, first, is a certain perfection; for happiness is a perfect good, to which excellence or clarity pertains, which pride or vain-glory desires. Secondly, of its account is sufficiency, which avarice desires... Thirdly, delight is of its condition... and gluttony and lust desire this."

b) But the good which man flees because of some evil which he greatly fears is:

1. either a proper spiritual good, which acedia flees because of the bodily labor joined to it (5);

2. or another's good which impedes one's own excellence, from which a man flees by envy (6);

3. or against which anger rises up (7).

The same can also be shown in another way. The principle of every sin on man's part is inordinate love of self, which inordinately desires temporal goods and is the root of the threefold depraved concupiscence: the concupiscence of the flesh tending inordinately toward a good of the body, the concupiscence of the eyes or cupidity inordinately desiring external goods, and the pride of life tending inordinately toward a good of the soul.¹⁴

¹⁴ St. Thomas, I-II, q. 77, a. 4 and 5.

Now inordinate love of self is the cause of sin insofar as man turns himself unduly toward a created good:

In the opening lecture of this course, I remarked to you, gentlemen, that the scope of Medical Jurisprudence is much wider than that of Medical Law. It embraces many subjects of which human laws take no cognizance, and in particular such vicious actions as do not violate the rights of others, but are injurious to those only who practise them. They undermine the health and shorten the lives of the guilty parties, and bring in their train diseases the most destructive and often the most incurable. It is the physician’s beneficent task to lessen the weaknesses and sufferings of the body, and to prolong human life in well-preserved vigor to a green old age. It is not the least important part of his valuable services to provide for the sound and vigorous propagation of the human race to future generations. Of this propagation of our race, of the laws which govern it, and of the criminal abuses by which these laws are violated, I am to treat in this present lecture. My subject is “Venereal Excesses.”

I. If a physician’s purpose were only to make money, his task would then be to multiply diseases and infirmities; he would then be as great a curse to mankind as he is really intended to be a blessing; and an immense blessing he will be to his fellow-men if he studies to remove even the remote causes of diseases and untimely deaths. He can do so in a variety of ways and not the least by providing against sexual excesses and abuses. These are a copious fountain of ill to humanity. A host of diseases, such as tuberculosis, diabetes, cardial and nervous affections, epilepsy, hysteria, general debility, weaknesses of sight, languor and general worthlessness, hypochondria, weakness and total loss of reason, and, in married life, impotence and sterility are some of the effects of venereal excesses. Any excitement of the sexual passion before the body has received its full development is more or less injurious to its welfare; and all excesses or unnatural indulgence of it at any period of life is pregnant with deplorable consequences. Now, such evil practices are too much overlooked by many physicians; yet it is certain that thousands of patients might, by timely warning on these matters, be saved from unspeakable mental and physical sufferings. To give sensible and intelligible directions on a subject as delicate as it is important in medical practice, it will be necessary to enter into some scientific details.

The passion which prompts to sexual intercourse is altogether natural in itself, and, as such, intended by the Creator to be indulged in at the right time and in the proper manner. It is the stimulus which He has provided for the propagation of the human race. If the stimulus is strong at times, this too is a special effect of His wisdom; because without a powerful prompting of this kind, most men would shirk the burden of married life, just as very many would not care to toil if they had no hunger and thirst and other bodily wants to satisfy.

But though all these cravings are useful and even indispensable to mankind, all of them need the regulation of reason. When they are indulged immoderately or in unnatural ways, they become most copious sources of bodily diseases, of mental disorders, and moral degradation. Every one knows how the passion of drink, when abused, proves the ruination of millions; excessive eating, too, injures the systems of countless people. But no animal passion is more liable to become disorderly, none needs more firm control and habitual watchfulness, than the passion of lust. Reason dictates that it should be indulged for no other purpose than that for which the Creator has made it, namely, marital intercourse. I say marital and not merely sexual intercourse; for outside of married life all nations have always condemned its indulgence.

Besides, it is only in the married state that the children, which are the fruit of such intercourse, can be properly educated. To generate a race of young barbarians is certainly not the purpose of the sexual relations. Children must not be begotten unless they can be properly raised, in a manner worthy of their noble destiny. Now, it is only in the married state, in the family or domestic society, that they can be thus educated. They need the tender hand of a mother to supply their material wants; they need the manly care of a devoted father to provide the necessaries of life, his firm hand to break their wanton wills, and his wise direction to set them well on the road to temporal and eternal happiness. Therefore, no one has the right to beget or to bear children except in marital life. Now, the sexual passion is to be exercised only in connection with its proper object, the procreation of children and the fostering of such mutual love between husband and wife as is conducive to domestic happiness. Therefore this passion is to be kept under careful and rational constraint. This the law of morality requires; all nations have ever exacted that this passion shall be subject to established rules; no free-love has ever been tolerated where there was the least pretence to civilization, and I do not know that it was ever permitted even among barbarians.

Even the distant approach that Mormonism made towards free-love has been absolutely condemned and repressed by the common-sense of the American people, as incompatible with civilization. In fact, all history testifies that the true civilization of any race or country rises or falls with the restraints imposed on the passion of lust; no polygamous nation has ever been more than half-civilized. The greatness of Rome and Greece decayed when the laws of social purity declined; and in our own day the immorality of what is called “the social evil” is the darkest stain on modern civilization.

And what we say of civilization or social soundness, the soundness of the body politic, applies in a great measure to individual soundness, the health of every person’s mind and body. Personal purity promotes health and vigor, it lends beauty to form, gives a keen edge to the intellect, adds energy and brings success to manhood, and prepares for enduring and honored old age. Venereal excesses, on the contrary, undermine the vigor of the constitution, bring on a host of bodily infirmities, exhaust the system before the proper time, debauch and degrade the mind and will, and prepare their victims for an early grave or a decrepit old age.

II. But how can a passion so ardent be properly restrained? In particular, what can a physician do to prevent the manifold injuries which, if not properly controlled, it will bring to his patients? These are practical questions directly to our purpose.

The first requisite for all effective action is to have correct knowledge and strong convictions on a subject. No one will check a passion with firmness if he have a lingering doubt as to whether, after all, he is strictly bound to restrain it. As a man’s mind matures, at least if his mind be upright and not distorted by the strain of a ruling passion, he understands more and more thoroughly that his perfection consists and his highest interests lie in obeying at all times the law of reason, in maintaining his specific dignity of a rational being, and not allowing himself to be controlled by passion, the ruling power of brute animals. Besides, he becomes aware in various ways of the evil results of immoral practices, and he sees many reasons to keep his passions in check. But young people have neither such experience nor such information, and they are not always wise enough to understand the imperative dictates of self-restraint. And yet it is often in early years, while body and mind are in the period of development, that the most serious injury is done to the constitution and to the character by the indulgence of carnal pleasures. Habits are then engendered which become a real slavery; so that later in life when there arises a sincere desire to stop such disgraceful practices, there is a feeling of impotence to resist temptations which by one’s own fault have become a second nature.

What then can be done with the young? They must early and authoritatively be told of the wrong, the sin of base self-indulgence, and of every practice that leads to it. If a beginning of immorality is discovered in a child, it must be plainly told and emphatically warned of the serious consequences involved. The child’s mother is, as a rule, the best guide and director in infancy. Later on, the Doctor has frequent chances to do so; it comes from him with better grace than from others; and his warning is likely to be minded, because it is clear that he knows and ought to know what he is talking about with regard to bodily consequences. Yet it is always a matter of delicacy; and great care should be taken lest, while pointing out the evil, there be also a stimulus added to a prurient curiosity.

Much good sense is required in any given case to decide whether more good or more evil is likely to result from the warning; in doubt of success, it is better to leave the matter alone.

“Where ignorance is bliss

’Tis folly to be wise.”

The safest way of repressing the passion of lust is the provision that an all-wise Providence supplies in Religion, in which God authoritatively forbids all immoral action and even all immoral coveting or desire. Positive dogmatic teaching on this subject is required, especially with the young. You cannot argue with them on this matter as you can with grown people. That is one reason why religious teaching should permeate early education. The Decalogue should be the back-bone of a child’s training: and it should be proposed on the authority of God, and explained so as to check not only sinful acts, but also covetings, prurient curiosity, improper reading, immodest looks and thoughts, in a word, whatever paves the way to the walks of sin. The greatest of teachers has Himself laid down the law in this matter: it must be proposed as coming from His divine lips, as it did: “I say to you that whosoever shall look on a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart” (St. Matt. v. 28). The lesson is enforced by these words of the^† great Apostle: “Neither fornicators, nor adulterers, nor the effeminate ... shall possess the kingdom of God” (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10).

True, the child will not realize the full import of such lessons; but he will understand it in due time; and already in early years he will be warned against indulging his nascent passions. It is well that the conscience should be early awakened in this matter; for the more this passion is indulged, the more it craves for further indulgence till it becomes almost uncontrollable.

III. No possible evil to any individual man or woman can result from the firm control that one may acquire over the passion of lust. On the contrary, if it should be controlled all through life, this would only add to a man’s strength of mind, firmness of will, soundness of body, and length of life. For in the school of morality, in which every Physician should be educated, the leading principle is: “Contraries are cured by contraries,” “Contraria contrariis curantur.” On this principle, lust is most efficiently controlled by aiming, at least in youth, at total abstinence from its indulgence. You know that, in the Catholic Church, priests and religious lead a single life, and pledge themselves for life to practise the most perfect control of the sexual passion. What do you think is the result of their total abstinence on this point with regard to their length of days? As a rule their life is much longer, in normal circumstances, than that of the other learned professions. Here are a few proofs. In France, during the twenty years from 1823 to 1843, 750 priests died in the diocese of Paris. Of these only 200 were under sixty years old; there were 554 between sixty and seventy years old, 448 over seventy, and 177 over eighty. Again, of 202 Carmelite nuns who died in a large convent of Paris, Dr. Descuret, the attending physician, states that 82 had lived over seventy years, 23 over eighty years. Most Trappists and Carthusians die of scarcely any other sickness than old age. All young people who aspire to the clerical or religious profession learn from their early years the holiness and the loveliness of purity. Our Church effects this result by placing before their youthful imaginations the most perfect of patterns of virtue, the infant Saviour, the virgin Mother, the boy saints Aloysius and Stanislaus, the maidens Agatha and Cecilia, and a whole phalanx of Christian heroes and heroines.

I dwell the more willingly on this subject, gentlemen, because, besides protecting modesty in your young patients generally, it may fall to the lot of some of you, in the course of your professional careers, to be attending physicians to religious houses; and you will then appreciate the delicacy of the flowers of virtue that bloom beneath the shadow of the sanctuary. Certainly even there you may happen to find isolated cases of infidelity to duty; for human nature is not angelic nature; but in such abodes it comes near to it, at least for the vast majority.

IV. On the other hand, what sad havoc does not the sexual passion play where it is precociously developed and wantonly indulged. Dr. H. Fournier, one of the most eminent physicians of Paris, says: “There is not a vice more fatal to the conservation of man than masturbation.” This unfortunate habit is sometimes acquired by very little boys and girls. Foolish or vicious nurses may bring it on by handling young children most indelicately. This is one of the many reasons why none but virtuous servants and nurses should be employed by wise parents and physicians. In later years, children often learn this degrading and most injurious vice from their depraved companions, some of whom seem even to regard the practice of it as a manly accomplishment. When habitually indulged in, it produces on the health and the strength of the constitution effects the most deplorable. Even the intellect is liable to become thereby enfeebled, a want of virility is exhibited both in the body and in the mind of its victims; then follows a loss of ambition and self-control. “When this morbid passion gets control of a person,” writes an experienced practitioner in medicine, “it is as though an unclean spirit had entered, subdued the will, weakened the moral forces, enfeebled the intellectual faculties, lessened the power to resist temptation, and overcome every obstacle opposed to its gratification. Even while the intellect is still clear, and the sense of wrong keen, the individual is a slave to this morbid impulse.” Though the baneful effects may not always affect the physical health of the victim, the unfortunate practice very often engenders in boys and girls tendencies which in later years lead to all the miseries conspicuous in houses of debauch and infamy. But I need not dwell on consequences that belong to pathology rather than to Jurisprudence.

V. Confining myself to my sphere of what is morally right or wrong, I must be permitted to point out some gross violations of duty in some members of your honored profession. There are physicians so reckless of consequences and of principles alike as to advise at times the practice of illicit sexual intercourse. Let them beware; they are doing a very unwise and guilty act. Even if an immoral practice should save a human life, it may not be indulged, on the principle which must be by this time very familiar to your ears, that the end does not justify the means. And besides no good result can be expected from what is contrary to the law of nature and of nature’s God. It was to punish sins of the flesh that the Deluge was sent, which destroyed nearly the whole human race. “All flesh had corrupted its way,” says the sacred historian. It was to punish unlawful indulgence of lust that Sodom and Gomorrha were destroyed by fire from heaven; and the memory of these guilty cities is preserved in the very name of Sodomy. Onan, as the same sacred volume relates (Gen. xxxviii), performed the marriage act in a manner to frustrate it of its legitimate purpose, the generation of children, and the Lord slew him; and his sin is to this very day branded with his name and called Onanism. And yet in Christian lands physicians are found who will at times dare to recommend such practices to their patients.

On the occasions mentioned, God punished the guilty miraculously; but that is not His usual way. He has so contrived our natures that sins committed against His laws in our bodies ordinarily bring a part of their punishment in their train, not the less certain because slower in its operation than a miracle would be. All the venereal diseases are there to act as earthy ministers of Heaven’s justice, anticipating, and often mercifully averting, the punishments of the future world.

VI. Besides private and secret tortures of body and mind, a public and most deplorable calamity has descended of late on our own vigorous young nation, as well as on some older lands, threatening in the not distant future the extinction of many of its most esteemed families and of what was, not long ago, a vigorous stock. The following article by Dr. Walter Lindley, Professor of Gynecology in the University of Southern California, will explain the matter better than my words could do. It was read in Los Angeles at a meeting of the Southern Californian Medical Society in June, 1895, and is printed in the “N. Y. Medical Journal” of August 17 of the same year (pp. 211 and following). It is headed “American Sterility;” I will quote freely from it:

“The obstetrician finds his vocation disappearing among the American women from the face of the earth.

“It is a fact that the American family with more than one or two children is the exception. From the records of six generations of families in some New England towns, it was found that the families comprising the first generation had on an average between eight and ten children; the next three generations averaged about seven to each family; the fifth generation less than three to each family. The generation now on the stage is not doing so well as that. In Massachusetts the average family numbers less than three persons. In 1885 the census of Massachusetts disclosed that 71.28 per cent of the women of that State were childless. The census of 1885 in the State of New York shows that twenty-five per cent of the women of that State are childless, fifty per cent average less than one child, and seventy-five per cent average only a trifle over one child.

“Southern California has fully as dark a record as New England—that is, in the family where the man and wife are American-born. It goes without saying that the medical profession in this country is composed to a great extent of typical progressive Americans, and I ask you to make mental statistics of the children in the families of the physicians in Southern California, and you will find very few of them containing more than two.

“Had the Rev. T. R. Malthus lived in the United States to-day, he would never have argued about the danger of over-population, as he did in his interesting volume on ‘The Principles of Population.’”

After quoting the views of Plato, Aristotle, and Lycurgus, Dr. Lindley continues: “In Southern California there are, it is true, many children, but the average American family is very small.

“As I sat writing this an evening or two ago, I jotted down the names of twenty-five families of my acquaintance in Los Angeles, taking them as fast as I thought of them. The list was composed entirely of professional and business men ranging in age from thirty-five to fifty. All had been married quite a number of years. The result of my memorandum was that in these twenty-five families there were but eighteen children. These families were wholly unselected, and are about the average Protestant American families outside the rank of laborers.

“What are the causes of this small proportion of children? Disease, preventives of conception, and abortion form the trinity of responsibility in this grave condition. It is true that the first cause (disease) results in many women being barren, but I believe that you will agree with me that the last two causes, preventives of conception and abortion, are the two chief causes.

“The A. P. A. might find food for thought by investigating the infrequency of criminal abortion in Catholic families in the United States. It is the Protestant or agnostic American who too often uses one of the preventives of conception.” (Here the Doctor refers to a foot-note in which he says: “I write this opinion as a Protestant, and should be glad to learn that it is not well founded.”) He continues: “If, through inadvertence, pregnancy should occur, then an abortion is in order. Disease and poverty and war and accident all work together to keep down the population, but we are overcoming these. Plagues and pestilences are rare. The number who die of starvation in California is very small, while war has played but a small part. Through the diffusion of the laws of sanitation, improved dietary, and advanced therapeutics, the longevity of man is increasing, but the American woman’s aversion to child-bearing is blighting our civilization, and can be well named the twentieth-century curse. In this aversion the woman frequently echoes the wish of the husband.

“A large proportion of the American young women who marry do so with the determination that they will have no children. They are abetted in this notion by many elderly women. The cure for this terrible sentiment is education. The home, the press, the schoolroom, and the pulpit should be centres for reviving the ancient idea of the nobility of motherhood. The physician should not underestimate his influence.

“By constantly bearing in mind the danger of the present tendencies, he can do much to change the current. Let us hope that we shall again see the day when thoughtful motherhood shall be considered the highest function of womanhood, and to shirk this natural duty will be deemed a disgrace.”

Gentlemen, it would be easy to prove that this testimony of Dr. Lindley is not that of an exceptional witness, or a piece of special pleading; but it is the acknowledged conviction of the medical profession generally, confirmed by the last United States Census, and in fact not questioned, to my knowledge, by any weighty authority. As early as 1857, Dr. H. B. Storer, an eminent physician of Boston, startled the community by publishing two books on this subject, entitled: “Criminal Abortion. Why not?—A Book for Every Woman”; “Is it I?—A Book for Every Man.” Soon after, Rev. John Todd, a Protestant minister of Pittsfield, Massachusetts, published a work styled “Serpents in the Dove’s Nest,” all which works and a multitude of others tell the same tale of woe regarding the increase of child-destroying crimes in New England, chiefly among the old stock peculiarly called Americans. Dr. Nathan Allen, of Lowell, Massachusetts, in his treatises, “Changes in the New England Population” and “The New England Family,” gives overwhelming testimony. “Harper’s Magazine” (quoted by the “Catholic World” for April, 1869) remarks: “We are shocked at the destruction of human life on the banks of the Ganges, but here in the heart of Christendom fœticide and infanticide are extensively practised under the most aggravating circumstances.” We Catholics are not personally interested in this matter; but the good of our fellow-men and chiefly our fellow-countrymen calls for the earnest exertion of us all to stop this dreadful evil. All the works I have referred to exempt Catholics from the blame pronounced; the “Harper’s Magazine” article referred to expressly says: “It should be stated that believers in the Roman Catholic faith never resort to any such practices; the strictly Americans are almost alone guilty of such crimes.” This matter is fully explained in a recent work called “Catholic and Protestant Countries Compared,” by Rev. Alfred Young, C.P., ch. xxxii.

VII. Now, gentlemen, I am very much afraid that while physicians as a body abhor all such murders and openly condemn them, many do not show much repugnance to allow, and even sometimes to suggest, such onanistic intercourse among married people as shall prevent the possibility of conception. For instance, if it happens that a young mother suffers much in her first confinement, at once the suggestion is made that a second parturition may prove fatal. From that moment regular intercourse is dreaded. Either onanism is habitually practised, or the husband becomes a frequent visitor to dens of infamy, where to where to save his wife’s health, he encourages a traffic that leads multitudes of wretched girls to a premature and miserable death. Every one despises those outcasts of society; but are not the men who patronize them just as guilty? Probably enough, if the imprudent suggestion about dangers of a second child-bearing had not been made by the Doctor, the young wife might have become the happy mother of a numerous family of healthy children. For we must trust in Divine Providence. If a husband and wife do their conscientious duty, there is a God that provides for them and their family more liberally than for the birds of the air and the lilies of the field. And if He should so dispose that the worst should befall, well, such temporal clangers and sufferings as attend child-bearing are the lot of woman-kind, just as the dangers and hardships of the battlefield, the mine, the factory, the forest, and the prairie are the lot of the men.

The man who shirks his duty to family or country is a coward; women, as a rule, are brave enough in their own line of duty, and patiently submit to God’s sentence pronounced in Paradise, “I will multiply thy sorrows and thy conceptions, in sorrow shalt thou bring forth children” (Gen. iii. 16), just as they have to submit to the words immediately following: “Thou shalt be under thy husband’s power, and he shall have dominion over thee.”

Certainly, the husband of a delicate woman ought to spare her strength and restrain his passion, but not at the sacrifice of morality; and Doctors ought to be very careful not to cause false or exaggerated alarms, and thus make themselves to some extent responsible for untold moral evils. They should remember that, as a rule, the raising of a family is the principal purpose of a married life. The happiness and virtue of the parties concerned depend chiefly on the faithful performance of this duty. How sad is the lot of those—and they are many—who undertook in early years of married life to prescribe a narrow limit to the number of their children; they had one or two, and they would have no more, and for this purpose criminally thwarted the purposes of nature. Then comes death and snatches away their solitary consolation: and they spend their old age childless and loveless, in mutual upbraidings and unavailing regrets.

How different is the lot of those aged couples—and they were many of yore, and are yet in various nations—who are like patriarchs amid their crowds of children and grandchildren and great-grandchildren, dwelling in mutual love and as if in a moral paradise where all domestic virtues bloom!

VIII. True, such families are usually the outcome of moderately early marriages; and many Doctors nowadays disapprove of such unions as an evil. A moral evil they certainly are not; and the physical evils sometimes attending them must, I think, be traceable to a variety of causes; for such evils are certainly not inseparable from early marriages. As to their moral advantages, Mr. Wm. E. H. Lecky, in his “History of European Morals,” writes of the Irish people in particular: “The nearly universal custom of early marriages among the Irish peasantry has alone rendered possible that high standard of female chastity, that intense and jealous sensitiveness respecting female honor, for which, among many failings and some vices, the Irish race have long been pre-eminent in Europe” (v. i. p. 146). And that he does not confine his statement to female chastity is evident from what he adds farther on: “There is no fact in Irish history more singular than the complete and, I believe, unparalleled absence among the Irish priesthood of those moral scandals which in every Continental country occasionally prove the danger of vows of celibacy. The unsuspected purity of the Irish priesthood in this respect is the more remarkable, because, the government of the country being Protestant, there is no special inquisitorial legislation to insure it, because of the almost unbounded influence of the clergy over their parishioners, and also because, if any just cause of suspicion existed, in the fierce sectarianism of Irish public opinion it would assuredly be magnified. Considerations of climate are quite inadequate to explain this fact; but the chief cause is, I think, sufficiently obvious. The habit of marrying at the first development of the passions has produced among the Irish peasantry, from whom the priests for the most part spring, an extremely strong feeling of the iniquity of irregular sexual indulgence, which retains its power even over those who are bound to perpetual celibacy” (p. 147). No one will say, I believe, that the custom of early marriages in Ireland has any injurious effects on the health of either parents or children. Nor need it necessarily have such effects on those of our American young men and women who lead regular lives and are not enfeebled by unnatural vices or demoralized by dainty food and luxurious manners.

A wise physician has many proper ways of providing for the health and strength of both parents and children without advocating practices which are a snare for innocence. Let him insist with all his patients on the cultivation of healthful habits for the family and the individual; wholesome and not over-delicate food; moderation in eating and drinking; regular and manly exercise, especially in the open air; early hours for retiring and rising. But, above all—and this is directly to our present purpose—let him show the greatest regard for the laws of morality, the main support of individual and social happiness. His views upon such matters, manifested alike in his conduct and his conversation, but especially in his management of cases involving the application of moral principles, will go far to influence the community in which he moves. His task is to be a blessing to his fellow-men, a source of happiness and security to individuals and to society.

5. There are various kinds of medical treatment to which we can scarcely have recourse without exposing ourselves to serious evil consequences. Such is the use of cocaine, morphine, and even in special cases of alcohol. The drugs in themselves are useful, but they often lead to evil results. Now in the use of all such drugs as are apt to be beneficial in one way and injurious in another, we must ever be guided by the rules formerly explained concerning evil indirectly willed, or rather permitted to result, while good results are directly willed or intended. If the Doctor is satisfied that a dose of morphine or an application of cocaine will do more good than harm, he can, of course, prescribe or apply it. Still in such matters he must remember that the good effect is but temporary, while its pernicious consequences, especially when habits are thus contracted, are likely to be permanent and cumulative. Besides, the good results affect the body only, the evil often affect body and soul. Many a wreck in health and morals has been caused by imprudent recourse to dangerous treatment, where a little more patience and wisdom would have been equally efficient in curing the bodily ailment, without any deleterious consequences. If once a patient becomes a slave to the morphine or cocaine habit, the only cure is to cut off all the supply of the drug either at once or, at any rate, by daily diminution. To leave him free control of the poison is to co-operate in his self-destruction.

(b) For the same reason, the physician should not prescribe such doses of morphine or other anæsthetics as will render the patient unconscious at a time when he ought to be preparing to meet his Judge. This would be not kindness but cruelty. A little suffering more in this life may save much suffering in the next. If a Catholic priest, on being called to a patient’s bedside, finds that the family’s physician has been so inconsiderate, he cannot help protesting against employing such a man in Catholic families.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 4; q. 84; De Malo, q. 8.

493. One sin can be the cause of another, just as one human act can be the cause of another. But this happens in three ways: 1. it can be the material cause of another, insofar as it supplies and prepares matter for another, as gluttony prepares matter for lust, and avarice for litigation, because it multiplies temporal goods which are the matter of lawsuit; - 2. it can be the efficient cause of another: a) per accidens, insofar as it removes grace, or charity, or shame, or submission, or anything else which draws one back from sin and would impede it: thus from drunkenness or anger all sins can arise, because they remove the judgment of reason by which man is restrained from sin;¹ b) per se, insofar as by some sin, for example, of lust, man is disposed by way of inclination or habit to similar acts, or sins of the same species; - 3. and especially it can be the final cause of another, insofar as on account of the end of one sin someone commits another sin, as if someone steals in order to fornicate. And because the end in morals gives the species or form, thus one sin is also the formal cause of another, because it gives form to the other: for if someone steals on account of fornication, theft is as the material, fornication as the formal (q. 75, a. 4).

¹ In this way pride, on the part of aversion, is the cause of every sin indirectly, insofar as it removes subjection to God, which draws one back from sin.

494. Capital sins are those which for the most part are the cause of many other sins, especially the final cause, because they have an object or end most appetible; hence on account of that end other sins are easily committed. They are called capital from the head, which is said metaphorically of that which is the principle and directive and in some way leading of others: for they are the principle or cause of other sins, as was said; they are directive because they are their final cause: for human acts are directed by the end. Hence the capital sins are as leaders, and the vices which arise from them as armies (q. 84, a. 3).

Therefore capital sins are not the greatest, since many others are graver than they, for example, those which are directly against God or are directly opposed to the theological virtues; nor are they necessarily mortal, even if done deliberately, as is clear concerning anger and gluttony, which often are venial.

**495. The capital sins are seven,**2 as is shown in the following way: Capital sins are those which have very appetible ends and therefore principal ends for moving the appetite.3 But something moves the appetite directly per se, and thus good moves it to pursuing; another thing moves indirectly through another, and thus good moves it to fleeing, insofar as someone flees a good on account of an evil joined to it.

Now the good which man most seeks can be:

1. excellence of praise and honor, which is a good of the soul, which vainglory inordinately seeks;

2. food and drink, which is the good of the body by which the individual is conserved, which gluttony inordinately seeks;

3. the use of venereal things, which is the good of the body by which the human species is conserved, which lust inordinately seeks;

4. external goods, which avarice inordinately seeks.

But the good which man flees on account of an adjoined evil which he most fears is:

5. his own spiritual good, which sloth inordinately flees on account of the bodily labor joined to it;

6. or another's good, which impedes his own excellence and thus is an evil, which envy inordinately flees;

7. or that against which anger rises up (q. 84, a. 4).

2. Ecclesiastical writers and the holy Fathers began to discuss these and to indicate more or fewer in number, until the authority of St. Gregory prevailed, so that seven capital sins were commonly numbered. Cf. Wrobl, Die Hauptsundenlehre des Ioannes Cassianus und ihre historischen Quellen, in Divus Thomas, 1923-1924.

3. Hence capital sins are not either those which are only the material cause of others, because it is not the cause of sin in act, but occasionally and in potency; or those which are only the efficient cause of others, which otherwise is verified of all sins, and thus every sin would be capital; or those which are the final cause but from the condition of the sinner, because this happens per accidens to the sin itself: "One sin is ordered to the end of another in two ways: in one way on the part of the sinner himself, whose will is more prone to the end of one sin than of another; but this is accidental to sins. Hence according to this they are not called capital sins. In another way, from the very relation of the ends, of which one has a certain agreement with another, so that in many cases it is ordered to it ... and according to this it is necessary to take the capital vices." Q. D. De Malo 8, a. 1; cf. I-II, q. 84, a. 4.

1. "Or otherwise. Good principally moves the appetite from this, that it participates in something of the property of happiness, which all naturally seek. Of its notion there is 1. a certain perfection; for happiness is a perfect good, to which pertains excellence or brightness, which pride or vainglory seeks; 2. ... sufficiency, which avarice seeks in riches that promise it; 3. ... delight, without which happiness cannot be ... and this gluttony and lust seek." a. 4.

496. Pride is the beginning of every sin, according to Ecclesiasticus X, 15 (the printed text has IX, 15), not only in the historical order, because the Angels and the first man were guilty of it, but also from the nature of the thing, because it is the final cause of all sins: for all sins can and are apt to arise from it, insofar as the temporal goods which man seeks in other sins he can will on account of his own excellence, which is the end of pride. And because the end is first in the order of intention, and intention precedes execution through means, it is rightly called the beginning of every sin. Therefore pride is the final cause of all sins, and consequently it is not a capital sin, from which only many vices arise, but rather the cause of all the capital sins, and the mother and queen of all vices.²

² Some have interpreted this concerning pride improperly so called, that is, a) concerning aversion or contempt of God, by which someone does not will to be subjected to his rule, which per se pertains to pride, but is found implicitly in all sins, consequent to conversion into a good opposed to the law; this general pride is the cause of sin or the beginning on the part of aversion: for from this sin has that it is evil, and therefore on the part of aversion the notion of evil begins; also b) concerning the inclination of fallen nature to such contempt, from which all sins proceed. - These things are true, but they do not hand down the sense of Scripture, which manifestly from the context speaks of pride properly so called, which is a special sin, namely, the appetite of one's own excellence (q. 84, a. 2).

497. Avarice is the root of all sins, according to the Apostle, I Tim. VI, 10, or a cause, not indeed final (as pride is), but disposing to all, because through riches man acquires the faculty and facility of perpetrating, and the occasion of desiring, any sin whatever, because for having any temporal goods whatever he can be aided by money, according to that saying of Ecclus. X, 19: All things obey money. Hence it is the root or first sin in the order of execution, because it offers the opportunity and gives the means of perpetrating all things; and therefore, just as a root furnishes nourishment to a tree, so money nourishes the desire of every sin, and in this sense any sin whatever can arise from avarice.³

³ Some have interpreted this concerning avarice improperly so called, namely, a) concerning inordinate conversion or tendency toward any temporal good whatever, which is found in every sin: this general cupidity is called the cause of sins on the part of conversion to created good, from which sin is nourished and fostered, whence it is called a root; also b) concerning the inclination of fallen nature toward inordinately seeking temporal goods, from which all sins proceed. - These things are true, but they do not hand down the sense of Scripture, which manifestly speaks of avarice properly so called, which is a special sin, namely, the inordinate appetite for riches (q. 84, a. 1).

Avarice, insofar as it is the root of all sins, is not a capital sin, but insofar as it is besides the final cause of many, it is rightly numbered among the capital sins.

498. Remark. - The capital sins are not those which are opposed to the fundamental or cardinal virtues, because "there is not the same account of origin in virtues and in vices. For virtues are caused through the order of the appetite to reason, or even to the incommutable good, which is God; but vices arise from the appetite for a commutable good. Hence it is not necessary that the principal vices be opposed to the principal virtues" (a. 4, ad 1).

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 162, 130, 131, 132; De Malo q. 8 and 9.

499. Pride is the inordinate appetite of one's own excellence.¹ It is called:

¹ Capital sins, if they are considered singly according to their proper species, pertain to special moral theology; but insofar as they are capital and thus exercise a general influence on other vices, they already pertain to the general part of moral science. Concerning them see the little work De Variis Peccatis in sacramentali confessione medendis, c. III.

1. an appetite, because pride resides in the appetite, namely principally in the will, if it seeks excellence in spiritual things; secondarily in the irascible appetite, which tends toward a sensible, arduous, and excellent good;

2. inordinate: to seek excellence according to itself is not evil, but it is against the order of reason that someone tend above that which he is, as the proud man does: "for right reason has this, that the will of each one be borne toward that which is proportioned to him" (II-II, q. 162, a. 1);

3. of excellence: both relative, by which someone wills to excel others, implicitly at least contemning them; and absolute, by which someone simply wills to excel above that which he is, even without thinking of others;

4. one's own: the special object from which pride receives its species is the loftiness of one's own person; for not in this or that matter, but commonly and in all things, the proud man bears himself as lofty. Therefore pride seeks a certain universal excellence, and by this it is distinguished from presumption, ambition, and vainglory, which inordinately seek some particular excellence, whether in works, or in honors and dignities, or in fame and glory.

500. Pride of itself is contrary to charity and therefore is mortal sin: for the proud man exalts himself above that which he is, that is, above that which has been fixed for him by God; hence implicitly at least contempt of God is included in pride, insofar as man does not will to be subjected to God and his rule. But this is to be turned away from God, which is against charity, by which we are converted to God, and therefore according to itself it is mortal sin. - If that contempt is explicit, formal, and perfect, from an intention of contemning God because one disdains being subjected to God and his law and it seems injurious to one's own excellence, it is always mortal. But if it is only implicit, without an intention of contemning God, it can indeed be mortal, namely, in a grave matter; but often it is venial, not only from indeliberation but also from lightness of matter.

Now, according to Gregory (Moralia, l. 23, c. 4), pride is committed in four ways, diverse in species on the part of the object: 1. by judging that the goods which someone has are had from himself, not from God, or by acting as if he judged that he had them from himself; - 2. by judging that he has received them from God, but on account of his own merits, or by acting as if this were so;² - 3. by attributing to himself goods which he does not have; - 4. in the goods which he has, by willing, others being despised, to be preferred to them more than is fitting. The first two modes, since they include formal contempt of God, are mortal sin; the last two are often only venial, unless they are done with grave irreverence toward God, or render one prepared for sinning mortally, or there is grave contempt of neighbor or notable detriment.

² If the proud man truly believed, by a speculative judgment, that he had all these things from himself or on account of his own merits, he would be a heretic; for the most part he does not specially think this, but practically bears himself as if these gifts were not from God, or not without merit.

501. Daughters of pride. - "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters" (II-II, q. 132, a. 5). All vices indeed are apt to be ordered to the end of pride; yet certain ones, because they seek special excellence, have an object very close to the object of pride, and therefore immediately, proximately, and more frequently than other sins arise from it according to the account of the end, and immediately serve it; whence those alone are called its daughters. But they are three: 1. presumption, which is the inordinate appetite of excellence in works, namely, by undertaking something above one's powers; 2. ambition, which inordinately seeks the excellence of dignity and of honor not due, or greater than is due; 3. vainglory, which inordinately tends into fame and glory, that is, into a vain manifestation of excellence.

Presumption, ambition, and vainglory of themselves are venial sins, because they are not against charity, but are an excessive appetite for a thing good or indifferent according to itself. Per accidens they become mortal (more often vainglory), either because they proceed from a mortally evil cause, for example, from affection for mortal sin; or because they have mortal sin as their effect, as if they are done with notable harm or injury to neighbor, or if someone on account of them is prepared to commit mortal sin; or by reason of matter, as if someone seeks honor or glory from mortal sin (cf. treatise on Fortitude).

502. Vainglory is the inordinate appetite of glory and fame, that is, the appetite of vain glory, or of a vain manifestation and estimation among others concerning one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. This happens in three ways: a) by seeking glory concerning a thing which is not worthy of glory or of so much glory, as concerning an evil, false, fictitious, fragile thing, concerning riches, trifles, etc.; b) by seeking it from those who are not able to discern what is worthy of glory, for example, from one whose judgment is not certain; c) by seeking and not referring glory to the due end, namely, to the honor of God or the salvation of neighbor or one's own utility.

From vainglory seven vices more commonly arise, and therefore they are called its daughters. For by vainglory the manifestation of one's own excellence is sought, which can happen: a) directly: 1. either by words through boasting, by which someone glories concerning a work committed; or by deeds, 2. through presumption of novelties, by which someone devises novelties which excite the admiration of others; and 3. through hypocrisy, by which someone does good so that he may seem good, although he is not; - b) indirectly someone seeks the manifestation of his own excellence by showing himself not to be less than others, and this happens: 4. as to the intellect, through pertinacity, by which someone adheres too much to his own opinion; 5. as to the will, through discord, by which he does not will to recede from his own will so as to agree with others; 6. as to speech, through contention, by which he quarrels noisily; 7. as to deed, through disobedience, by which he does not will to execute the precept of a superior.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 118; De Malo q. 13.

503. Avarice is the inordinate appetite of riches: but under the name of riches come all exterior goods insofar as they are useful to man and can be valued by money.

Avarice is twofold: 1. the inordinate appetite of riches in taking and retaining unduly, which is opposed to justice and therefore often is gravely evil; 2. the inordinate affection for riches, by which they are too much loved or desired or please too much in delight, which is opposed to liberality, and of itself is lightly evil, unless on account of affection for riches someone does not fear to commit some mortal sin, or constitutes his ultimate end in riches.

504. From avarice seven vices more frequently arise, as from a final cause, which are called its daughters. Insofar as it is immoderate in retaining, there arises 1. hardening of heart, or inhumanity against mercy toward neighbor; insofar as it is immoderate in taking, there arises 2. in affection: unrest or superfluous solicitude about acquiring goods; in effect: 3. violence, when someone uses force for acquiring goods; 4. fallacy, and 5. perjury, when he uses deceit in words, either simple words or words confirmed by oath; 6. fraud, and 7. betrayal, when he uses deceit in deed, either as to things or as to persons, as is clear concerning Judas, who from avarice betrayed Christ.

St. Thomas, II-II, q. 153 and 148.

505. Lust is the inordinate appetite of venereal things, which of itself is mortal, as will be said in the treatise on Temperance. Since the appetite of lust is most vehement, it follows that it most greatly impedes the use of the higher powers, that is, of the intellect and will, because it distracts power from them and moves toward objects opposed to reason.

From lust many vices arise. - For:

Capital sins are so called because they are as it were the heads or fountains of other sins. Hence they should be called vices rather than properly sins, if they are considered in general.

Seven are enumerated, namely: 1st. Pride; 2nd. Avarice; 3rd. Lust; 4th. Envy; 5th. Anger; 6th. Sloth; 7th. Gluttony. But how fittingly all sins are reduced to seven heads St. Thomas explains excellently, 1-2, q. 84, art. 4.

We shall say very few things here about the individual capital sins, but we shall carefully indicate the places of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus to which recourse must be had for a fuller exposition of the doctrine.

Pride is the disordered love of one's own excellence, and is distinguished into perfect, or complete and consummated in its own genus, and imperfect. It is called perfect when a man so stands in himself and is pleased with himself that he is in the disposition of gravely transgressing the law rather than obeying the commands of superiors. But this, by that very fact, always includes mortal sin in itself. In other cases it is called imperfect, and then of itself it is accustomed to introduce only venial sin. From pride proceed ambition, vain glory, presumption, boasting, ostentation, and hypocrisy. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 162; and QQ. DD. De Malo, qq. 8 and 9.

Avarice is the disordered appetite of temporal goods. It is opposed to justice or to liberality. If the former, it will easily issue into mortal sin, namely as often as it impels one to grave injustice toward the neighbor. - If the latter, of itself it will produce only venial sins. For the rest, excessive affection toward earthly things can impel, and indeed is accustomed to impel, into other even grave sins. From avarice also proceed hardness of heart toward the miserable, disquiet of soul, perfidy, deceit, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 118; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 13.

Lust is the disordered appetite of a venereal thing. Lust is a grave sin from its whole genus; but this is to be understood if venereal delectation is deliberate in itself and directly willed. But if it is only indirectly voluntary, it sometimes admits smallness of matter, as will be said more fully below where the sixth precept of the Decalogue is treated.

Blindness of mind, inconsideration, inconstancy, hatred of God, languor of faith, indeed even loss of faith, are effects of lust. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, qq. 153 and 154; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 15.

Envy is sadness concerning the good of another, insofar as it is judged as one's own evil, or at least as one's lesser good. To it is reduced joy concerning the evil of another, which is judged an increase of one's own good. Envy is directly against charity, and from its genus, although not from its whole genus, imports grave sin. From envy proceed detraction, calumny, whispering, contumely, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 36; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 10.

Anger is the kindling of the soul, and a disordered motion against someone or something; or it is a disordered appetite of vengeance. Irascibility is the habit of anger. Anger is mortal from its genus, if it is an appetite of vengeance; but venial, if it is only a disordered motion of the soul. - Anger generates indignation, rancor, shouting, insults, blasphemies, etc. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 158; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 12. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 80 and seq.

Sloth in general sounds the same as laziness; but more strictly it is torpor of mind and weakness of will, from which distaste for spiritual things flows because of the labor and trouble attached to them. - If it is so great that grave obligations are omitted from it, it must be held grave; if otherwise, it is to be judged slight. Torpor, wandering of the mind, nausea in prayer, etc., are the fruits of sloth. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 35; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 11. - St. Alphonsus, n. 84.

Gluttony is the disordered appetite of food or drink, and from its genus it is nothing but venial sin. But it becomes grave if it gravely harms health, or if it renders someone unfit for duties. - From gluttony come drunkenness, about which more fully presently, dullness of mind, buffoonery, much speaking, and uncleanness of every kind. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 148 and 150; and QQ. DD. De Malo, q. 14. - St. Alphonsus, nn. 74 and seq.

Note. - It would perhaps be very fitting to consult St. Thomas concerning sobriety. Sobriety is especially concerned with drink having the power of making drunk. For sobriety preserves measure: "and therefore," says the Angelic Doctor, 2-2, q. 149, a. 1, "it especially assigns to itself that matter in which it is especially praiseworthy to preserve measure. But of this kind is drink capable of making drunk, because its measured use contributes much and a moderate excess harms much, because it impedes the use of reason more than excess of food." And ibid. ad 3: "although measure is required in all things, nevertheless sobriety is not properly said in all things, but in those things in which measure is especially necessary." Now then, "it pertains to moral virtue to preserve the good of reason against those things by which it can be impeded. And therefore," he says ibid. a. 2, "where a special impediment of reason is found, there it is necessary that there be a special virtue for removing it. But intoxicating drink has a special account of impeding the use of reason, insofar as namely it disturbs the brain by its fumes. And therefore ... a special virtue is required, which is sobriety." And although "food and drink commonly can impede the good of reason, by absorbing it through immoderation of delectation, ... drink capable of making drunk impedes according to a special account." Would that also the following words of the Angelic Doctor were noted by some: "in all drinks capable of making drunk there is one and the same account of impeding the use of reason. And thus that diversity of drinks is related accidentally to virtue." Ibid. ad 3. No food or drink, speaking according to itself, is illicit. Yet drink can be rendered illicit by accident, either "because by wine [a man] is easily harmed, or because by a special vow he is obliged not to drink wine," or "from the manner of drinking, because namely he exceeds measure in drinking," or "on the part of others who are scandalized by this." Ibid. art. 3. To the objection that the use of wine is totally illicit, because it impedes wisdom without which someone cannot be in the state of salvation, the Angelic Doctor responds: "Wisdom can be had in two ways. In one way according to the common mode, insofar as it suffices for salvation. And thus it is not required for having wisdom that someone altogether abstain from wine, but that he abstain from the immoderate use of wine. In another way according to a certain degree of perfection. And thus it is required in some persons, for perceiving wisdom perfectly, that they altogether abstain from wine, according to the conditions of certain persons and places." ad 1. But for women and young people, if we regard proneness to pursuing bodily pleasures, "for old men in whom reason ought to flourish for the instruction of others, and for Bishops or any ministers of the Church who with devout mind ought to insist upon spiritual offices, and for kings who by wisdom ought to govern the subject people, sobriety is specially enjoined." Ibid. a. 4. - Cf. the places to be cited at n. 148 from St. Thom. 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1; 2-2, q. 150, a. 2.

Drunkenness is a voluntary excess in drink unto disturbance of reason, whether this is done from or with pleasure, or without pleasure. But it is divided into perfect and imperfect. The first is had when the use of reason is altogether taken away, so that the drunk man is incapable of acting morally; but the other is that by which the mind is indeed disturbed, yet still has the power to discern between good and evil.

But many others, following St. Thomas, define the vice of drunkenness as: superfluous drink without necessity and from the pleasure of wine alone unto deprivation of the use of reason.

Perfect drunkenness is always a mortal sin, but imperfect drunkenness of itself is only venial. The reason for the first is gathered both from the consent of theologians and the estimation of God-fearing men, and because to deprive oneself of the use of reason in a violent and unnatural way, and indeed in such a way that it cannot immediately be recovered, gravely repugns rational nature; and finally because in the Scriptures, for example, I Cor. vi, 10, drunkards are excluded from the kingdom of God. But the reason for the second is both because there is no grave disordering as long as one can act morally, and because the consent of theologians so holds. - Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, art. 2. - St. Alphonsus, n. 75. But St. Thomas speaks thus, 1-2, q. 88, a. 5, ad 1: "Concerning drunkenness it must be said that according to its own account it has this, that it is a mortal sin. For that a man without necessity renders himself unable to use reason, through which man is ordered to God and avoids many sins that occur, from the pleasure of wine alone, is expressly contrary to virtue. But that it is venial sin happens on account of a certain ignorance or infirmity, for instance when a man does not know the strength of wine or his own weakness, whence he does not think that he will be made drunk: for then drunkenness is not imputed to him as sin, but only overabundance of drink. But when he is frequently made drunk, he cannot be excused through this ignorance, without his will seeming to choose rather to suffer drunkenness than to abstain from superfluous wine, whence the sin returns to its own nature." Therefore the drunk man is guilty of a twofold disordering according to St. Thomas: by drinking wine from pleasure alone; and by drinking from excess unto the loss of the use of reason without any motive which would justify even the account of excessive drink. Cf. Baller., tr. 4, n. 381, seq. - Azor., l. 7, c. 33, q. 5. - Lessius, lib. 4, c. 3, d. 3, n. 13. - Dicastillo, lib. 1, disp. 3, d. 11, n. 104.

You Will Resolve. 1st. It is lawful to use any liquors whatever, as medicine for driving away diseases, for example, typhus, even if drunkenness is foreseen as going to follow, provided nevertheless that it is not directly intended, and the salvation of the soul is not placed in danger. It is required namely 1st. that drunkenness follow only indirectly, and 2nd. that no danger be present that the sick man die without reception of the sacraments. Cf. St. Thom. 2-2, q. 150, a. 2, ad 3. - St. Alphonsus, n. 76. St. Thomas speaks thus: "When someone drinks much according to the counsel of medicine ... the drink is not reputed superfluous." l. c.

2nd. The same seems able to be said of those of our country who take a great quantity of liquor in order to expel or restrain the poison which they have drawn from the bites of serpents; for drunkenness, if any follows in such a case, would be said to have followed only indirectly. In this case it is not taken from the pleasure of wine alone nor without necessity.

3rd. It can never be lawful to assume drunkenness as a means for obtaining some effect, however good, because evils are not to be done that goods may come. But if a great quantity of liquor were taken, not indeed for violent deprivation of the use of reason, but for relaxing and thus soothing the nerves, so that from this some surgical operation may be done more easily, it does not appear why this would be illicit, since it is said to be lawful to use opium or ether for performing similar operations.

4th. Those mothers or nurses are altogether to be condemned who, for quieting the tears of children, use alcoholic or opiated drinks, and thus from the first age introduce an evil custom into them.

5th. A fortiori doctors are to be condemned who recur to the same remedy in order to provoke the sick to gladness or to lessen pains of the body; for those acting thus, although perhaps they can be excused from the sin of drunkenness, because they procure it only indirectly, nevertheless certainly introduce an evil custom into the sick if they recover; or, if they die, expose them to the danger of eternal damnation.

6th. Certainly they sin gravely who by command, counsel, or provocation induce others to drunkenness, or induce them to drink with foresight of future drunkenness: something which here and there is done under the vain pretext of friendship or civility.

7th. Likewise he who drinks to excess in order to free himself from the death which another threatens against him does not drink from the pleasure of wine alone or without cause; hence it is not sin.

Question 1. What must be said concerning the promise not to drink (the pledge) as it is accustomed to be made among us?

Response. Although a promise of this kind is good in itself, and, as daily experience establishes, offers an excellent remedy for amending the life of many, nevertheless the practice of receiving it is not without difficulties. For if it is said openly, what theologically speaking is certainly true, namely that violation of that promise is no sin or only venial sin, it will scarcely not happen that the whole efficacy of the remedy vanishes. But from the other side, if nothing is said, many and grave sins will be perpetrated from an ill-formed conscience; since there are many who judge violations of that promise to be graver sins than perfect drunkenness. Therefore much prudence and discretion is needed in receiving promises of this kind. - Wherefore, if there are those who doubt concerning the quantity of that obligation and inquire about it, or if they are not so untaught that they can easily grasp an explanation, or are not drawn to liquors by an utterly mad and ruined love, it will be useful, indeed necessary, to explain to them what the nature of that promise is; for since this is not a vow, but only a purpose manifested to a priest, it cannot of itself oblige under grave sin. But in the other hypothesis perhaps it would be better to say nothing, and to bear oneself permissively concerning those grave sins which would follow; for the lessening of drunkenness will be a sufficient reason for permitting them. - Cf. Irish Ecclesiastical Record, May 1883, pp. 338 and seq.

Question 2. What must be said concerning those sodalities recently instituted for extirpating the vice of drunkenness?

Response. That they are very good and are preferred by many apostolic laborers to the other remedy which consists in the promise not to drink. The reason is that these more recent remedies, while from one side they foster piety more, which is the beginning of every true conversion, from the other side offer no occasion of new sins. The Fathers of the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore indeed alluded to these remedies in the following words: "Since monstrous scandals arise from excessive drinking, we exhort pastors, and beseech them by the bowels of Jesus Christ, that they put every zeal into eliminating the vice of drunkenness. To this end, we judge worthy of praise the zeal of those faithful who abstain from every ardent liquor in order to decline more safely the danger of excesses. But those who spontaneously enter a society among themselves, so that by mutual examples of virtues they may help and strengthen one another, ought first of all to employ those aids which Christ the Lord left in the Church, by which human vices are amended and infirmity is sustained; and by prayer, frequent reception of the sacraments, and other exercises of piety, to obtain heavenly aid for themselves, and to trust not in themselves, nor in their purposes, but in God, without whom human effort profits nothing." But the Fathers of the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, speaking more explicitly, say: "The societies which come under the name of 'Catholic Union for promoting Total Abstinence' and 'Sacred Thirst,' we acknowledge as worthy of great praise; for they are governed by a truly Catholic spirit, and seek the necessary strength not so much in firmness of their own will as in the power of prayers and of the sacraments. Moreover it is known that the Head of the whole Church and Vicar of Christ on earth has more than once enriched them with his apostolic blessing and with the indulgences of the Church. Therefore we also exhibit to the same the signs of our benevolence, and that they may flourish the more, we commend them to the paternal care of all our priests, that they may not only add courage to them but also always show them the Catholic path." Cf. Conc. Plen. Balt. II, nn. 470 and seq.; and Conc. Plen. Balt. III, nn. 260 and seq.

Very recently special spiritual graces in favor of the faithful enrolled in societies of Temperance or Abstinence from intoxicating drink were conceded by the Supreme Pontiff Pius X on 21 May 1914 - namely: indulgences both plenary and partial, and also an altogether singular favor by virtue of which all Masses which are applied by any priest whatsoever for the soul of some deceased member can assist that soul as if they had been celebrated at a privileged altar. These graces were granted by the Supreme Pontiff wishing to show his more favorable will toward the aforesaid Societies and to find their Members more eager in advancing so salutary a purpose. - Acta Apost. Sed., v. VI, p. 309.

Question 3. Is it lawful to induce someone to drunkenness so that he may be turned away from a greater evil?

Response. Affirmatively, if drunkenness is only material to him; because a material evil can be permitted for a grave cause. Thus commonly against Collet, Concina, etc. But they more commonly deny it if drunkenness is formal; because evils are not to be done that goods may come: nevertheless St. Alphonsus, n. 77, admits the opposite opinion as probable with several others, "because it is lawful to induce another to a lesser evil so that he may be impeded from a greater." For when someone can be deterred from perpetrating a greater evil by no other means, to persuade the lesser evil has the account of good. See below n. 185. Q. 5th.

Note. - 1st. Habitual excessive drink produces enormous harms for the individual, the family, and society. It harms the health, fortune, and morals of individuals: domestic peace departs from the family, horrible crimes are committed, reason itself day by day becomes degenerate and more vicious.

Personal remedies: for all to avoid the occasions of this sin and those persons and assemblies by whom temperance is violated; to acquire strength by exercise of this virtue and of Christian mortification, and by consideration of motives both natural and supernatural by which men may become stronger against the vice of drunkenness, finally by petition of divine aid. - Dictionnaire de Theol. Cath., under the word Gourmandise.

2nd. The use of morphine, chloroform, and other medicines bringing exile of reason must be ruled by these general principles. The use of morphine, etc., for calming grave pains by soothing the senses is permitted in surgical operations, in more difficult births, and in general when there is a just cause. The use of morphine, etc., taken habitually induces an unquenchable thirst, to which follows unfitness for performing grave duties, and servitude under the medicine itself: such use is gravely prohibited; indeed doctors sin gravely who so frequently prescribe these things to the sick that there is proximate danger of inducing this habit or desire for morphine. The use of morphine which does not bring with it this danger but only a lessening of pains is not illicit of itself. The use of morphine, etc., inducing the loss of the exercise of reason for a long time without cause is certainly a grave sin.

The use of morphine, etc., employed with the dying without their consent so that they may remain in a state of semi-wakefulness is a grave sin and against natural right: such use in those circumstances, that is, with one dying, is gravely illicit when he is not prepared by the sacraments for dying, nor is it lawful for him to consent to it. If he is prepared and there is no danger of falling into grave sin, doctors are to be deterred from employing these means. But what if the pains are most bitter and extraordinary, for example, if someone is burned by slow fire in a conflagration, and cannot be removed from the flames themselves, because, say, he is held by the beams of the house? Is it lawful in this case, when there is no danger of falling into a state of sin, without the consent of the dying man so to soothe his senses that he will remain in fainting until death? It is not lawful: because he has a right to acquire enormous merits. What if he himself wishes it, or if there is danger of falling into grave sin? In those most difficult circumstances let the priest assist him with every help and exhortation so that he may suffer the pains bravely. If at last the sacred minister himself fears, let him be silent; indeed it does not seem altogether certainly prohibited so to soothe the senses, because in the case, morally speaking, he is a prepared sick man: to this indeed he is bound, but it is not clear that he is bound to acquire greater merits. It is his right: but whether a grave obligation rests upon him, this is not evident. Cf. Villada, Cas., v. 3, p. 309. Lehmkuhl speaks more severely, n. 892, ed. 11a.

3rd. Nor does artificial sleep seem illicit, by which, induced by medicinal injections, a woman giving birth does not fully perceive the pains of birth. During this state, so it is reported, she is not deprived of the use of the senses; afterward, however, she is said not to remember those things which then happened, and the sleep is called twilight. Moreover we affirm that if the woman in that state is duly protected, if the doctor is prudent, if care is applied so that nothing harmful happens either to the woman or to the fetus, the matter is done licitly. But another thing would have to be said if these conditions were not verified.

SINCE Charity, after the manner of fire, always acts, and is impatient of idleness, hence, the material of operating being furnished to it by the readiness of the one operating, it rejoices in great gladness; but when the will slackens from the good work, sadness is born; hence Acedia is opposed to the Joy of Charity, as D. Bonav. notes, prima parte Centiloq. sect. 21. Therefore it must be treated of here.

Envy is thus opposed to Charity, that as for the latter all things, even evils, cooperate unto good, so for the former all things, even goods, cooperate for evil; and as Charity covers the multitude of sins, so Envy covers all the goods of the neighbor, that they may not be seen; whence the envious one is said to be from non-seeing, as the Seraphic Doctor has, where below.

On Envy the Fathers have written many splendid things: Cyprian, serm. de Invid., Basil homil. 11. et 21., Chrysostom homil. 44. et 45., Cassian collat. 18., Prosper lib. 3. de vita contemplativa, cap. 9., and others as gathered by St. Bonaventure, Lib. 2. Pharetrae, cap. 8., where, drawing on St. Gregory (Lib. 2. moral. cap. 20. Lib. 3. cap. 17.), he lists the daughters of Envy, which are Hatred, Whispering, Detraction, Anger; and others, from other Fathers, chiefly St. Augustine (de disciplina Christiana, cap. 1.) and Jerome (epist. 99.), where they call it a diabolical vice.

Envy is defined by all as: Sadness over the neighbor's good, judged as an evil of one's own, insofar as by comparison it diminishes the excellence of one's own good. So the Socratic Doctor (opusc. explic. Terminorum Theologiae; et p. p. censil. sect. 19.). Hence Aristotle (Lib. 2. Rhet. cap. 9.) says the cause of Envy is equality, or similarity, and proximity. And the Saints have similar things: Augustine in Psalm. 104., as gathered by St. Bonaventure loc. adducto, Damascene Lib. 2. cap. 24. St. Augustine also, Lib. 11. de Genes. ad litt. cap. 14., describes Envy, saying: Since each loves his own excellence, he envies equals, that they be made equal to him; inferiors, lest they be made equal to him; superiors, because they are not made equal to him; etc. The same is taught by the Angelic Doctor (p. p. censil. sect. 19.). Hence also Lucan sang:

— Emulous virtue gave the spur, and now each can no longer bear that Caesar be before him, or Pompey his equal. —

Therefore not only the surpassing good of one's neighbor begets Envy, but anything even equal, insofar as it is apprehended as diminishing our excellence or impeding our surpassing others. In this sense St. Gregory is to be understood, Lib. 5. moral. cap. 33. We cannot envy except those whom we think better than ourselves in some respect; for he does not call them better simply, but insofar as they diminish our excellence, as Tancretus noted (disp. 2. quaest. 6. dub. 1.), Valencia (disp. 3. quaest. 14. puncto 1.). Hence St. Augustine (Lib. 11. in Genes. cap. 15.), as cited by St. Bonaventure loco cit., says the differences of envy are three: namely, envying superiors, because one is not their equal; equals, because they prosper for the better; inferiors, lest they be made equal to oneself. But one must note that Envy agrees with the other three affections in the character of sadness, but differs by the other parts of the definition, as the Angelic Doctor indicates (p. p. Censil. sect. 19. et in speculo animae, cap. 1.).

For first, there is a certain effect of fear, which is sadness over another's good insofar as it is feared to bring ruin upon us; and this is not a sin, as is clear from Aristotle loco cit. and St. Thomas (hic art. 1. et 2.) and St. Bonaventure in speculo animae. The envious man, however, is not saddened over another's good under this aspect, but as in fact judged to surpass him in his own excellence.

The second effect, similar to Envy, is when one is saddened not over another's good, so as to envy it, but over his own deficiency, insofar as he himself does not have that good; and this is not a sin, as St. Bonaventure says. This affection is called zeal and emulation, as the Philosopher teaches (Lib. 2. Rhet. cap. 11. and St. Thomas art. 1.). But Envy is saddened over another's good insofar as it diminishes one's own excellence. Hence 1 John cap. 3. says, For this reason Cain slew his brother, because his brother's works were just. Here the Angelic Doctor notes that Envy is sometimes called by the name of anger, Genes. 4. Why are you angry? where the Gloss reads: you are tormented by envy; sometimes by the name of hatred: His brothers hated him, Genes. 37.; sometimes by the name of emulation, 1 Kings 1. Her rival afflicted her. To this belongs what Nyssenus says, Lib. de vita Moysi: The envious man grieves at the happiness of others, and rejoices in their calamities. And Chrysostom, homil. 44. ad pop. Why do you grieve, O man, at your neighbor's goods? We ought to grieve at the evils we suffer, not at the goods by which we seem to be held in esteem by others. Therefore this sin is without any pardon. And Isidore, Lib. 3. sent. cap. 25. There is no virtue that has not for its contrary the evil of Envy; only misery is without envy.

The third affection, similar to Envy, is sadness over another's good insofar as we judge him unworthy of that good; and this affection is called Nemesis, or Indignation. So Aristotle loco cit. cap. 9.; and St. Bonaventure asserts that this affection, with regard to temporal goods, which more often bring ruin, is not a sin (in speculo animae, supra citato.). See him also, Lib. primo de profectu Religiosi, cap. 13. Hence St. Gregory (in Pastorali, part. 3. cap. 1. admon. 23.) says: It often happens that, without losing Charity, we are gladdened by the ruin of an enemy, and again saddened by his glory without the guilt of envy: since we believe in our mind that some are thereby well raised up; and as he advances, we fear that very many are unjustly oppressed. So reports St. Bonaventure, Lib. 3. Pharetrae, cap. 21.

From what has been said it follows that Envy does not exist among those who are not equals or similar in some state, as Aristotle teaches (cap. 10.); for among these only the excellence of one obscures the excellence of the other. Hence he infers that neither the dead, nor those most remote at the pillars of Hercules, are envied; but envy, he says, exists among neighbors and rivals, and among those who desire and strive for the same things, whence the saying: The potter envies the potter, and the smith the smith.

Hence you infer that those prone to envy are the faint-hearted, since to them all things seem great, as St. Gregory noted above; to this Job 5: Envy slays the small one. On the contrary, the magnanimous are free from envy, as Silius Italicus says. See Valencia.

From all these things the Angelic Doctor concludes in the place cited in the Summa that Envy is opposed to piety, which arises from Charity.

TWO are the vices opposed to Liberality, namely, Avarice, and Prodigality.

AVARICE consists in an immoderate appetite for having, even if it injures no one. Thus St. Doctor defines it in the Diaeta, tit. 1. cap. 6: Avarice is an immoderate love of money to be sought, or retained. There he sets forth splendid similitudes of avarice and reviews its harms.

He there enumerates the twelve daughters of Avarice, and these are they. Usury, Rapine, Robbery, Unjust Tallies, The fraud of traders, The deception of Advocates, The acceptance of gifts, Simony in the promotion of relatives, The sins of Anchorets, that is, of those who are promoted by favor and the power of Princes, The fraud of merchants, Avarice for knowledge, The iniquity of Gamblers. This is roughly what he has in the places cited, and they are rather material species, as also those referred to in 4 Eth. cap. 1.

In Compend. Theolog. verit. lib. 3. cap. 19. he defines Avarice thus from D. Bernardo, epist. 42: Avarice is an insatiable and dishonorable desire for things of any kind. Or from Tullio: It is an immoderate love of having.

That this is a grave sin he proves from the Apostle Ephes. 5, where it is called: the service of idols, because it renders to money what is owed to God; for it hopes in money, places in it its ultimate end, and loves it supremely. Hence Eccles. 10 says: Nothing is more wicked than the avaricious man; but avarice does not have this precisely in itself, but because it — covetousness — is the root of all vices, on account of which many have erred from the faith; for all crimes are wrought through avarice: thefts, perjuries, homicides, debaucheries, adulteries. Second, because it is against the law of nature, Luke 6: Whatever you wish that men do to you, etc. Third, because it is against the written Law, Luke 6: Be merciful, etc. Fourth, because it is against the law of universal communication; for the avaricious man holds goods captive so that they may not be shared.

He asks, indeed: whether it is lawful to heap up treasures. And he answers that it is not lawful with the affect of avarice, without one's own or another's necessity; but it is lawful from consideration of necessity; thus it is lawful for parents, for raising children and endowing daughters, but not for enriching them; and this with the manner or state of the person preserved.

It is lawful also for Princes and Kings to heap up treasure for the preservation of the Kingdom. But Ecclesiastical persons, he says, may not, because the Church has money not to keep it, but to spend it, as St. Ambrose says, lib. 2. offic. cap. 28. He there enumerates the seven daughters of Avarice. See him.

In p. p. Centil. sect. 22. he hands down many definitions of avarice, and besides those enumerated above he brings another from D. Augustino, lib. 14. de civit. cap. 15: Avarice is the lust of having money; he soon brings the reason why it is called: the service of idols, Eph. 5: because the worshiper of God is compared to him in three ways, by honoring, by hoping, by loving; and the avaricious man renders these to money.

But St. Doctor observes that Avarice is opposed to liberality, and to Charity, and insofar as it is against liberality, it is an immoderate appetite for money, and thus it is not a mortal sin, if it stops there, so that it does not prefer its love to the Divine love or the love of neighbor, so that one is not willing to do anything against what is owed to God or neighbor. So also D. Thom. q. 118. art. 4, and commonly, as Tanner says, num. 45.

But as it is opposed to Charity, it is mortal; for he loves money, preferring it to the commandments of God, to almsgiving, to restitution, etc.; he does not shun frauds, betrayals, perjuries, violences, mercilessness, and the like.

He treats all these things more exactly in speculo animae, cap. 2.

But he notes there that this is the concupiscence of the eyes, of which John speaks in epist. 1. He says that three branches arise from this stock: namely, the Inordinate appetite for having, Inordinate acquisition, and inordinate possession. From inordinate love arise inordinate desire of having, inordinate love of what one has, and inordinate grief over what is lost. From inordinate desire of having arise solicitude in the mind, and injustice in deed. This solicitude can be mortal, if on account of it the commandments are omitted, for instance of sanctifying the Feast, or hearing Mass.

Injustice in deed is either open or hidden, and the latter is called fraud: the open is divided into Theft, Rapine, Usury, An unjust sentence, Unjust advocacy, Unjust tolls, Extortions, the acceptance of gifts, the use of forbidden games.

Hidden injustice contains frauds in contracts, not only about temporal things, but also spiritual ones, as about benefices, judgments, sentences, counsels, etc.

Inordinate love of having causes Mercilessness toward the poor, delay of restitution, non-recompense, illiberality, etc. All these have been discussed in the preceding Tractates.

In Compend. Theol. verit. lib. 3. cap. 26. he gives rules for knowing when avarice is mortal or venial. He presupposes, however, the definition of avarice from Cicero above: It is an immoderate love of having.

This desire consists either in appetizing, or in acquiring, or in retaining. As to desire in acquiring, he assigns five modes.

The FIRST is, if one appetizes efficaciously, and would proceed to the act if the faculty were present; and it is a lethal sin.

The SECOND, if one appetizes with an incomplete illicit will, namely insofar as one procures, but simoniacally, so as to obtain an Ecclesiastical benefice undeservedly.

The THIRD, if one appetizes simply to have superfluous things, with an appetite that suffocates the mind from care for oneself and consideration of divine things, so that on this account one falls away from God, wishing rather to be enriched than to observe the commandments; and this is lethal.

The FOURTH, if with a superfluous love one clings to temporal things, yet beneath God, not on that account wishing to be wanting to God's commandments; and this is venial.

The FIFTH, which he records in the third place, is of one who appetizes such things, whether illicit or another's, with a conditional will, namely, if one could have them without offense to God or injury to neighbor. And then it is either no sin, or venial, if one actually or habitually adds such a condition.

This being said, that great question is resolved: Whether a conditional consent, by which one wills something under that condition — if it were lawful for me, or if it were not a sin — excuses, when the act is mortal.

Many respond thus categorically. When the added condition takes away all malice, it excuses from fault, as, if it were not a sin, I would kill Peter; but not when the condition does not take away the malice, as by saying, if there were no infamy, I would steal. Thus Gerson 2. part. in reg. moral. alphab. 24. littera G, where he has the same words which I reported from D. Bonavent. Caietanus summa, verb. Cogitatio, Armilla num. 1. Sà verb. Peccatum, num. 2. And they speak also of sins against the law of nature. Alcozer follows them, sum. cap. 6. doctrina 2. Manuel citing others, tom. 2. sum. in 2. edit. cap. 112. Vasquez prima 2. quaest. 74. art. 8. dub. 116. cap. 2. num. 4. Sayrus in clav. reg. lib. 8. cap. 7. num. 28. and 29. This is the opinion of D. Bonavent. in the place cited, and it is true.

The OPPOSITE indeed others hold, distinguishing: for if that thing be intrinsically evil, as if it is against the law of nature, they say the malice is never purged by a condition, because, being essentially evil, it cannot be purged by any condition, and the condition added involves a contradiction. Thus Adrianus quodl. 10. art. 2. Azor tract. 1. Instit. moral. lib. 4. cap. 6. quaestio 10. Sanchez Tom. 1. in Decal. lib. 1. cap. 2. num. 23, citing others.

I ASSERT with the former opinion that a condition wholly purging whatever malice there is in the act excuses from sin.

It is PROVED, because whenever the malice is taken away from the act, there is no sin; but in this case it is taken away: Therefore. The minor is proved, because the will is borne in the manner in which it represents the object to itself under the condition; but this is, not to will the object efficaciously unless it is purged of malice; for it is not borne efficaciously absolutely into the object, but efficaciously conditionally. Here Sanchez was deceived, urging that the will is borne efficaciously into that object. For I say it is borne efficaciously, therefore not with mere complacency; but not efficaciously absolutely, rather conditionally, if it were lawful; and it has no act of not willing the thing, but it would have one, if it were lawful; whence, just as it implies that the object is purged of malice, because it is intrinsically evil, so it implies that the will is not borne absolutely into that object.

But let us now return to our opinion.

Titius, a Catholic, gets himself drunk not rarely; and since for that reason he rather frequently omits hearing Mass on Sunday, and indeed, while drunk, beats his wife, although, when his reason has been recovered, on hearing this he grieves greatly; and since his son, having seized the occasion of his father’s drunkenness, not only omits hearing the commanded Mass but spends the whole Sunday in revelries and games with dissolute companions, Titius, being about to confess, consequently doubts what and in what manner he is bound to confess. Hence it is asked:

1. What sort of sin is drunkenness, and in what does its malice consist?

2. Are the sins of children imputed to their parents?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. What sort of a sin is drunkenness, and in what does its malice consist?

St. Paul enumerates¹ drunkenness among the sins which prevent those who commit them from entering the kingdom of God, and so it is a mortal sin. This should be understood of complete drunkenness, which deprives one of the use of reason, so that he does not know what he is doing and can not distinguish between right and wrong. Partial drunkenness is only a venial sin, unless by reason of scandal or harm done to health or fortune, or some similar extrinsic reason, it becomes a grievous sin.

1 Gal. v. 21.

The malice of drunkenness does not consist merely in voluntarily depriving oneself of reason, for we may do that for a good cause, as we do when we take chloroform. Its malice consists in depriving oneself of the faculty of reason without good cause by yielding to an inordinate appetite for intoxicating drink. Drunkenness not only deprives one of the use of reason but also of the capacity to recover it for a considerable time.

2. Are the sins of children imputable to their parents?

Yes, certainly. “Parents sin gravely if, insofar as it lies in them, they do not take care that their children be imbued with good morals . . . avoid the company of the wicked, observe the commandments of God and the Church, frequent the sacraments, and abstain from sins.”¹

1 Busembaum apud St. Alphonsus, lib. iii, n. 339.

3. Titius committed grave sin every time he got completely drunk so that he did not know what he was doing. We must suppose that he foresaw that he would not be able to hear Mass on the following Sunday when he got drunk, and so he is guilty of mortal sin on this account also. If he knew that he usually beat his wife when he got drunk, he committed sin also on this account, even though he was sorry afterward; his sorrow should have prevented him from getting drunk. If his son was of age to be corrected and compelled to go to Mass and avoid bad company, Titius was obliged to see to this, and he committed grave sin by neglecting his duty and by giving bad example to his son. The sin which he commits is against his obligation as a parent, and the sins of his son are imputable to him under this head; not that the father is guilty of the specific sins committed by his son on account of the father’s neglect. Titius, then, must confess these sins with the number of times that he has been guilty of them.

Titius, a layman of outstanding ability, was studying civil law; and, since he knew that he easily surpassed others, he hoped that he would acquire the highest honors and dignities, from which he could leave a great name to posterity. By a certain misfortune he failed in a case of great importance. Thereupon, ambition having been cast aside and reputation among others despised, he indulged in drunkenness and, if not an excuse for his vices, found at least some consolation in the sayings of ascetical writers about the vanity of the world and contempt for glory. Paul, a friend of Titius, indeed knows that Titius erred, but he finds it by no means easy to say, practically and theoretically, where virtue stands. Hence it is asked:

1. What is pride, and in what precisely does its malice consist?

2. What is ambition, and what kind of sin is it?

3. What is vainglory, and how is it distinguished from care for a good name?

4. Did Titius sin in these things, and how?

1. What is pride and in what precisely does its malice consist ?

Pride is the inordinate love of one's own excellence. To acknowledge and to love in due measure the good qualities of soul or body or the gifts of fortune which one possesses is not pride; if such blessings are referred to their proper source, they become the grounds of a proper and becoming self-respect. Truth requires that we should esteem ourselves at our real value, and that we should attribute any good that we have to its true source, our Creator and Lord. If we leave God out of account and claim practical independence of Him, and magnify ourselves for the gifts which we possess or which we think that we possess, we become proud. Similarly inordinateness and pride make their appearance when we attribute the good that we have to our own merits, or when we affect to have more than in reality we have, or when we conduct ourselves as if we were the only persons who had such good things, and consequently look down with contempt on others. The malice of pride consists in so extolling oneself as to claim practical independence of Almighty God. The proud man does not like to acknowledge his indebtedness to God for all that he has; he does not like to submit to the ordinances of God or to those of legitimate superiors; he strives to shake off as far as possible the yoke of subjection which is the necessary condition of man inasmuch as he is a creature.

2. What is ambition and what sort of sin is it?

Ambition is an inordinate desire of dignities and honors. A moderate desire of dignities and honors for a good object is not vicious, but if the desire becomes immoderate, or the end in view is not good, or unlawful means are employed to attain honors, vicious ambition makes its appearance. It is a venial sin in itself, but it may be mortal on account of the means employed, or the end, or on account of injury done to one’s neighbor.

3. What is vainglory and how is it distinguished from the care of a good reputation ?

Glory is knowledge by others accompanied by their praise.

It is natural and praiseworthy to seek by good deeds to deserve the esteem and praise of the good. "This is what is meant by a good reputation, and we are obliged to strive to acquire it and to preserve it when acquired, as the necessary condition for doing good in the world. The desire of being praised by others becomes the sin of vainglory when praise is sought for what does not deserve praise, or without due moderation, or for an improper object, or from those whose opinion is of no value.

4. Did Titius commit sin in the case, and if so, what sin?

Titius was a clever young man who studied law. He knew that he surpassed others in ability and aspired to the greatest honors and dignities, and thus he hoped to enjoy a great reputation with posterity. There is nothing that is necessarily vicious so far. He failed in a case of great importance, and disappointment caused him to give up his schemes for the future, to care nothing about his reputation, and to take to drink. He found some consolation if not excuse for his conduct in the sayings of ascetics about the vanity of the world and contempt for human glory. Here, of course, Titius did wrong in taking to drink, and he misapplied the sayings of ascetics. Ascetics warn us truly of the vanity of the world, and they teach us not to indulge in vainglory, but they do not tell us that we may throw away a good reputation. On the contrary, a good reputation is useful not only to others, but to the possessor of it as well, especially while his virtue is immature. Few can afford to rest on God alone; the many, who are good but imperfect, need the spur of others’ praise and the fear of their censure in order to persevere in the difficult paths of virtue.

Titius had heard that voluntary drunkenness is not of itself and necessarily a sin, but only when someone gets himself drunk without necessity. Hence, when by misfortune he had broken his arm and was suffering the greatest pains from it, having no other remedy, he got himself drunk while the doctor who would treat the arm was being summoned. On another occasion, when for several nights he had taken scarcely any sleep, he got himself drunk and was sunk in a profound sleep for twelve hours. When he had also lost his dearest daughter by death and had fallen into great melancholy, he at length extinguished his grief by copious drinking to the point of drunkenness. Finally, when occasions of drunkenness were multiplying gradually and imperceptibly, moved by conscience he approached a confessor, who asks:

1. Is drunkenness intrinsically bad, and in what is its malice to be placed?

2. Is it lawful to make oneself or another drunk?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. Is drunkenness intrinsically evil, and in what is its malice to be placed?

Yes; drunkenness is intrinsically evil, or, in other words, it is inordinate and wrong in itself; it is not wrong merely because it is prohibited. Its malice more probably does not consist in any single element, but in several. It consists in voluntarily depriving oneself of the use of reason for a considerable time by drinking intoxicating liquor to excess without good cause. The malice of drunkenness, then, does not consist merely in depriving oneself of the use of reason; we may do that both naturally in sleep and artificially by using an anesthetic for a good reason. Probably, at least, a man bitten by a poisonous snake may make himself drunk by way of antidote. But without sufficient cause to deprive oneself of man’s noblest attribute by worse than brutish excess in drinking intoxicating liquor is inordinate and wrong.

2. Is it lawful to make oneself or another drunk?

These are disputed questions among theologians. According to St. Alphonsus¹ a man may take intoxicating drink in order to expel bad humors from the body, even though he foresees that the drink will deprive him of the use of reason, but he may not take it to make himself drunk, for that is always intrinsically evil. However, other theologians, in keeping with what was said above, allow a man to make himself drunk for a sufficient reason. The only question will be about the sufficiency of the reason. As to the question whether it is lawful to make another person drunk, St. Alphonsus acknowledges that the opinion is probable according to which one may make another drunk even with his knowledge when it is the only means available to prevent him from committing a still greater sin on which he is determined.²

1 Book v, no. 76.

2 St. Alphonsus, book v, no. 77.

3. The case. Titius had heard of the theological doctrine that drunkenness is not always and necessarily sinful, but only when a man gets drunk without sufficient reason. He applied the doctrine first when he broke his leg and suffered great pain. Having no other remedy at hand, he made himself drunk till the doctor came and set the limb. Titius may be excused for this. On another occasion when he had got scarcely any sleep for several nights, he made himself drunk and slept for twelve hours. Some theologians would excuse Titius from sin in this case also; but it is preferable to say that he should consult a doctor, or take exercise in the fresh air, or adopt some other remedy, as taking drink in excess for sleeplessness would almost certainly lead to abuse, and therefore it must be forbidden.

In taking drink to drown his sorrow for the loss of a dearly loved daughter Titius committed sin. For such spiritual evils spiritual remedies should be used, or at least not such remedies as getting drunk; otherwise terrible abuses would creep in and have to be condoned. The confessor therefore will know what to say to Titius, whose wrong application of a right principle led to abuse in his own case.

1. Anger is a compound passion, made up of displeasure, desire, and hope: displeasure at a slight received, desire of revenge and satisfaction, and hope of getting the same, the getting of it being a matter of some difficulty and calling for some exertion, for we are not angry with one who lies wholly in our power, or whom we despise. Anger then is conversant at once with the good of vengeance and with the evil of a slight received: the good being somewhat difficult to compass, and the evil not altogether easy to wipe out. (Cf. s.i., n.4, p. 43.)

2. Anger is defined: A desire of open vengeance for an open slight, attended with displeasure at the same, the slight being put upon self, or upon some dear one, unbefittingly. The vengeance that the angry man craves is a vengeance that all shall see. "No, ye unnatural hags," cries Lear in his fury, "I will do such things,—what they shall be yet I know not, but they shall be the terror of the earth." When we are angry, we talk of "making an example" of the offender. The idea is that, as all the world has seen us slighted and set at naught, so all the world, witnessing the punishment of the offending party, may take to heart the lesson which we are enforcing upon him, namely, that we are men of might and importance whom none should despise. Whoever is angry, is angry at being despised, flouted to his face and set at naught, either in his own person, or in the person of one whom he venerates and loves, or in some cause that lies near to his heart. Anger is essentially a craving for vengeance on account of a wrong done. If then we have suffered, but think we deserve to suffer, we are not angry. If we have suffered wrong, but the wrong seems to have been done in ignorance, or in the heat of passion, we are not angry, or we are not so very angry. "If he had known what he was about," we say, or, "if he had been in his right mind, he could not have brought himself to treat me so." But when one has done us cool and deliberate wrong, then we are angry, because the slight is most considerable. There is an appearance of our claims to considerations having been weighed, and found wanting. We call it, "a cool piece of impertinence," "spiteful malevolence," and the like. Any other motive to which the wrong is traceable on the part of the wrong-doer, lessens our anger against him: but the motive of contempt, and that alone, if we seem to discover it in him, invariably increases it. To this all other points are reducible that move our anger, as forgetfulness, rudely delivered tidings of misfortune, a face of mirth looking on at our distress, or getting in the way and thwarting our purpose.

3. Anger differs from hatred. Hatred is a chronic affection, anger an acute one. Hatred wishes evil to a man as it is evil, anger as it is just. Anger wishes evil to fall on its object in the sight of all men, and with the full consciousness of the sufferer: hatred is satisfied with even a secret mischief, and, so that the evil be a grievous one, does not much mind whether the sufferer be conscious of it or no. Thus an angry man may wish to see him who has offended brought to public confession and shame: but a hater is well content to see his enemy spending his fortune foolishly, or dead drunk in a ditch on a lonely wayside. The man in anger feels grief and annoyance, not so the hater. At a certain point of suffering anger stops, and is appeased when full satisfaction seems to have been made: but an enemy is implacable and insatiate in his desire of your harm. St. Augustine in his Rule to his brethren says: "For quarrels, either have them not, or end them with all speed, lest anger grow to hatred, and of a mote make a beam."

4. Anger, like vengeance, is then only a safe course to enter on, when it proceeds not upon personal but upon public grounds. And even by this maxim many deceive themselves.

Readings.—Ar., Rhet., ii., 2; ib., 4, ad fin.; St. Thos., 1a 2æ, q. 46, art. 2, in corp.; ib., q. 46, art. 3, in corp.; ib., q. 46, art. 6; ib., q. 47, art. 2.

St. Thomas shows (2. 2. g. 36. a. 4.) not only the character of envy as capital sin, but also how the filiae invidiae: susurratio, detractio, cxultatio in adversis proximi, afflictio in prosperis proximi, odium, develop therefrom. Furthermore, he refutes the objection against classification of this sin as capital sin, as also the objection that the above-mentioned exultatio and afflictio coincide with envy; respecting the exultatio, he denies it entirely; respecting the afflictio, he admits it under one point of view, while under another he denies it. This may suffice as regards envy as capital sin.

Our task here is to ascertain whether envy is ex genere suo peccatum mortale, and if so, whether ex toto genere.

The answer to the first question is simple, if the nature of envy is precisely determined. Not infrequently penitents lack this knowledge, and they accuse themselves of envy, although they did either not sin at all, or sinned (grievously or lightly), but not through envy. There are acts which have one or two characteristics in common with envy. One characteristic, the tristitia de bono proximi has, in common with envy, the so-called aemulatio, or zelus, when someone is sad at his neighbor’s possession, because he, too, would like to possess, not in eodem individuo, but in eadem specie vel mensura. If the aemulatio has reference to natural or supernatural mental qualities, it is quite praiseworthy; if to temporal advantages, it is also of itself laudable, or at least permissible, but it becomes sinful if the desire is in any way inordinate; nevertheless, it has not even in this case the character of envy. For this there would be required the desire that the neighbor might not possess the benefit. Even this wish is not the nota specified of envy. Such desire is present also in other kinds of tristitia be bono proximi. For instance, in the tristitia, which is a result of fear, if someone, for instance, mourns over a neighbor's possession because he fears, either for himself or for others, evil consequences from it, be they deserved or undeserved. In the former case the tristitia is faulty, not so in the latter, though the fear which produces it may be inordinate, for instance, if there is no sufficient reason for suspecting that the neighbor will misuse his power in order to harm us or others. In no case has this tristitia the character of envy. Again, the desire that the neighbor might not obtain, or not possess, something of value is connected with that tristitia which someone entertains because he considers the neighbor unworthy of the benefit in question. This étristitia is called indignatio, or nemesis. In regard the bona honesta, ex quibus aliquis justus efficitur, so St. Thomas teaches (/. c. a. 2.), this tristitia can not occur at all; for the gratia justifications is not obtained except by proper preparation, if otherwise such preparation is possible (comp. Cone. Trid. sess. 6. de justif. cap. 5.). It is only possible with respect to riches and other such things, which can fall to the worthy and the unworthy (S. Thom. I. c.), and is sinful if directed against Divine Providence, which allows the unworthy to have such goods either ad eorum correctionem, in order to incite them to penance and conversion, or ad eorum damnationem, that, if they do not become converted and thus incur damnation, they will be rewarded then for the good that they have done. It is sinful also if it proceeds from a contempt of the eternal goods which God has reserved for his faithful (ps. 36. 1.). But neither in the one nor in the other case has it the character of envy.

Finally, the desire that the neighbor may not obtain, or possess, a benefit, is present in the tristitia, which is sad at the neighbor’s possession, in quantum proximo bonum est, and this tristitia is odium inimicitiae, just like the gaudium and desiderium circa malum proximi ut ipsi malum est, it results from envy (S. Thom. 1. c. 8, q: 34. a. 6.), is nearest related to it, yet not envy itself.

Although the envious does not grieve over a possession of the neighbor, because it is an advantage for the latter, still envy is directly contra caritatem (proximi), cujus est gaudere de bono proximi, because the envious only grieves over the neighbor’s possession and would like to see him deprived of it, quod sit diminutivum propriae excellentiae. The diminutio propriae excellentiae per bonum proximi is in itself never a just reason to grieve over the possession of the neighbor and to wish that he might not have the same, unless he makes use of it ad diminuendam excellentiam nostram, or if he is unworthy to possess it in common with other more worthy persons, or even in preference to them. (Compare what is said above of tristitia ex timore and the indignatio.) Then again it is quite false that the bonum proximi, except in the cases just mentioned, is a diminutio propriae excellentiae, since from your neighbor’s happiness, because of the union of charity and friendship, some excellence is rather added to you, as Laymann (l. 2. tr. 3. c. 10. n. 2) correctly remarks. For this reason we said quod sit, and not quod est, diminutivum, etc. Is envy thus directly contra caritatem proximi, it is evident that it is ex genere suo peccatum mortale (comp. S. Thom. I. c. q. 36. a. 3.).

The second question is whether it is mortale ex toto genere. St. Thomas says nothing about this, because he makes, in general, no distinction between mortale ex toto genere and non ex toto. Many other authors explicitly declare that there is not respecting this sin a parvitas materiae, but do not explain this further. Of all authors to whom we have turned for advice, we find Schwane (Special Moral Theology, I. p. 140) most explicit, in spite of his brevity: “Envy is a grievous sin if our fellow-beings are envied on account of their spiritual advantage. Envy that concerns temporal possessions of our fellow men is not always a grievous sin.”

Leaving aside this distinction between spiritual and temporal benefits, we say: Envy is always a grievous sin if the object is a possession of such nature, or such extent, that the neighbor, by its absence or deprivation, would suffer an important injury.

Dr. Anton Auer.

Mary and Anna had conceived a mortal grudge for each other. It grew out of envy and jealousy. For a long time they kept it in check, as far as any public outward manifestation of it was concerned. However, one Sunday, as they were both leaving the church, they met, and immediately began to abuse and vilify each other, before all the people, and finally came to blows. Of course it caused a scandal and everyone was greatly shocked.

How many sins did these two women commit, both as regards the kind and the number of the sins?

Answer. There can be no doubt but that these two women sinned against the love they owed each other. Envy and jealousy are sins against charity. Charity is a virtue that disposes one to love one's neighbor, to wish one's neighbor well, and to do him good. Envy is a feeling or sentiment of grief or discontent and uneasiness at the sight of another's excellence or good fortune, coupled with a certain degree of hatred or dislike (odium inimicitiae) for such a person, and a desire to possess equal advantages. Envy and jealousy are directly opposed to charity and are therefore sinful. Now since Mary and Anna both harbored, for a long time, feelings of envy and jealousy, these sins of envy and jealousy must have been multiplied many times, since they were peccata mere interna, or sins of the heart, or of the will. These internal sins, or sins of the heart, are said to be multiplied as often as the evil feeling or desire is expressly or tacitly retracted and again revived and consented to. In fact, it may be said that internal sins, or sins of the heart are multiplied as often as they are physically interrupted, no matter even if the interruption be involuntary. In this way sins of the heart are multiplied as often as they are physically interrupted, no matter from what cause, so that there will be as many sins numerically, as there are interruptions. An exception is made for the case where many acts are prompted by the same burst of passion; in that case the several actions, following quickly upon one another, are united or rather unified by the one cause from which they proceed, namely the same outburst of passion. But now, ordinarily speaking, no outburst of passion lasts more than two or three hours at most, and therefore Mary and Anna must have multiplied their internal sins of envy and jealousy, at least several times a day. In practice, however, it will suffice if these women indicate the length of time that they indulged these sinful feelings against one another. For instance, it will be sufficient if they confess to having harbored sentiments of envy or hatred or jealousy for one month, or two months, etc. For by so doing, they make it sufficiently clear to the confessor, just about what is the number of these sins that they committed. Besides, it would scarcely be possible to be more exact or explicit in matters of this kind. The Council of Trent says that mortal sins must be confessed, according to kind and number, prout sunt in conscientia, at the time of confession. It is the conscience of the sinner that eventually must number his sins or keep count of them. But, usually, the sinner is ignorant of those theological distinctions, regarding number and kind and the method of distinguishing them. These rules must be applied to the sinner according to his special circumstances. We take it for granted that these two women had no intention from the beginning of making any external demonstration or of coming to blows. Therefore as often as they desisted from these thoughts of envy and hatred, they multiplied these sins numerically. Did they intend from the beginning to come to blows, an interval of time would be required to multiply actus internos cum proposito externam actionem ponendi.

So much for the internal sins of the heart that Mary and Anna committed by envy and jealousy. Let us take up the sins of act, or the external sins that Mary and Anna committed on that Sunday morning, when with much mutual abuse and vilification and many imprecations, they engaged in a physical encounter before the whole congregation. How many different sins did they commit on this occasion? Sins, of course, of action, external sins. Were they many in number and many in kind?

They seem to have committed only one sin against charity, by anger. St. Thomas says that sins of the tongue are multiplied according to kind or species, not by reason of the things that are said, but rather by reason of the purpose for which they are said.

"Species peccati oris magis attenditur ex fine, quam ex materiali objecto." (2-2 q. 74, a. 2.)

In the case before us, the abuse and imprecations and maledic tions, all proceed from the same outburst of passion, from the same explosion of anger and hatred, and are all meant, not as so many separate and formal evils which they mutually call down upon one another's head, but rather as evil in general which they wish one another, not attending to the particular kinds of evil that their words imply, and they constitute one act along with the physical act of beating one another, which is the principal act. Whilst, therefore, physically speaking, all these different acts of abuse and contumely and physical encounter, constitute separate physical acts; nevertheless, morally taken, they form but one act, containing but one kind of moral malice. If these women belong to the rank and file of the community, there will be no question of loss of honor or defamation, because the spectators do not believe what these hurl at one another, knowing that it is said in the heat of passion, etc.

But did they not give grave scandal to the community by such conduct on Sunday, in the sight of the whole parish?

If there were non-Catholics in the community, who witnessed this scene, or who learned of it immediately, with all its disgusting details, of course there would be given serious scandal. For such conduct necessarily leads the non-Catholic to despise the Catholic religion. But if there were only Catholics present, or in the community, then we should have to consider whether they would be led into sin by such a scene. Scandal is not necessarily given because a sin is committed before others. A sin committed before others is scandalous only when it will very probably lead the others into sin also. The sinful action may shock others or outrage their feelings, but as long as it does not lead them into sin, it is not scandalous. Now a community of Catholics might witness such a scene as the above, and never be led into any sin by it. In that case no scandal is given. They might feel bad about it and shocked and humiliated, but they would not be scandalized.

To sum up therefore, Mary and Anna, by harboring ill will and envy and hatred toward one another, committed a grave sin against charity, and they multiplied their sin several times daily, all during the time that they entertained the grudge for one another.

Secondly, when they came to blows, they committed a new sin against charity, with which the abusive language and epithets, that immediately preceeded it, constitute one moral act. This they will sufficiently confess by saying that they quarreled and came to blows.

The various evils that they wished each other, did not constitue a new kind of sin, nor was there any defamation of character or grave scandal.

Case.—Aegidius, a poor man, is much inclined to sadness at the thought that the rich are favored above his class not only temporally, but even spiritually, since they are better able to give alms and may thus acquire greater merits in this life and have more suffrages offered for them after death.

Questions:

1. Are Aegidius’ dispositions sinful?

2. What should be thought of his opinions? Solution:

1. Envy is a sorrow over the good fortune of our neighbor inasmuch as we consider that it surpasses our own good. Such feeling is of course out of harmony with the law of charity, which bids us to love our neighbor as ourselves and to rejoice at his prosperity. Therefore envy is sinful and, if fully deliberate, a mortal sin. Envy of the spiritual good of another is a most grievous crime, and is numbered as one of the sins against the Holy Ghost.

Quite different from envy is emulation or zeal, which causes us to grieve at our neighbor’s good, not because he possesses it, but because we ourselves are wanting in that good. Such sadness, if its object be moral goodness or righteousness, is virtuous and praiseworthy: “Let us consider one another to provoke unto charity and good works” (Heb., x, 24; cfr. 1 Cor., xiv, 1). But if it be concerned with temporal things only, emulation is or is not sinful according to circumstances.

Temporal possessions may assist a person to love God. It is not wrong, then, to desire such advantages, provided avarice, covetousness and impatience be excluded. As Aegidius is a spiritually minded man, it is not likely that he begrudges his neighbor the favors with which God has blessed him; he merely wishes that he enjoyed certain opportunities for good that others have. Such a wish springs not from envy, but from zeal. If, however, some slight movements of envy are mingled with his anxiety about his soul’s welfare, his inadvertence and ignorance will excuse him from serious fault.

2. For it is not true that riches are usually an advantage in the supernatural order. An abundance of this world’s goods does not generally lead its possessor towards God, but it does make him more responsible before God. The rich are deserving of compassion rather than envy, if we view matters in the light of faith, Hence it is not the rich, but the poor whom our Lord calls blessed. While Aegidius is not able to give liberal alms, there is much that he can do for his neighbor. The widow’s mite was worth more in our Lord’s eyes than the great gifts of the Pharisees. Merit and reward are proportioned to internal charity rather than to the actual relief that is effected.

As to the greater number of Masses that the rich can have offered for the repose of their souls and their speedier liberation from Purgatory, Aegidius should remember: (1) God is the Supreme Master of His creatures, and if it pleases Him to grant to one an easier way to salvation than to another, the latter has no right to complain; for the graces of God are free gifts of His bounty, they are given sufficiently to all, and each one will be judged according to his opportunities and merits. (2) If the rich are enabled to obtain greater suffrages after death, the poor by patiently bearing their difficulties during life have made a satisfaction that acquits the temporal punishment due to sin more quickly than do the sufferings of Purgatory. (3) The sacrifice of the Mass is profitably offered for the dead and its fruits are applied to him for whom it was offered, if there be no obstacle. But the remission of the temporal punishment of sin depends upon the Divine mercy and liberality. Hence it may happen that a great portion of the fruit of Masses and other suffrages that are offered for the soul of one person may be applied to another whose life on earth made him more deserving of mercy. (4) The poor man has more security of salvation and the opportunity for greater merit and a higher reward. These infinitely surpass the advantages of his wealthy neighbor, even though the latter should be liberated sooner from Purgatory.

Case.—Anna has a great desire for Christian perfection. Accordingly she goes to confession every week, and receives Holy Communion daily, whenever possible, hoping thus to attain by sacramental graces a steadily increasing purity of heart. The results, however, do not meet her expectations, she is conscious of still possessing many faults, hence she loses courage and weakens in her efforts.

Question.—How should a confessor treat his penitent in order to encourage her faithful adherence to the practice of daily Communion?

Solution.—In the well-known decree of December 20, 1905, hope is expressed that Communicants who receive daily, with the right dispositions and in the state of grace, may also gradually avoid venial sins. Anna desires to be freed of her faults, hence her zeal in receiving the Sacraments. She had hoped to draw this fruit quickly from daily Communion, but she is disappointed in her expectations. The confessor, as a wise physician of the soul, must, before all things, inquire into the causes of this disappointment. Possibly it is brought about by the fact that her expectations were exaggerated, or even presumptuous. Anna believed that she would be freed not only from all sins, but even from all imperfections. As imperfections, the moralists designate either acts or omissions contrary, not to a positive commandment, but to a counsel; another definition classes them as violations of the moral law which are quite involuntary, such as distraction in prayer, involuntary emotions of anger, envy, etc., and, in general, all faults that proceed from guiltless ignorance or inattention. This latter definition, where there is discussion of the difference between imperfections and venial sins, is to be preferred to the former, since imperfections in the first sense are not always free from real sin, while, as defined in the other sense, they never include guilt. To free one’s self by degrees from such imperfections, in as far as this is possible to human beings, should be the endeavor of every Christian, but he should not forget that he can never achieve this perfectly in this life. Perfect purity is exclusively the privilege of the spirits dwelling in Heaven; on earth even the just have always occasion to accuse themselves of moral shortcomings, and to lament with the Apostle: “Who will deliver me from the body of this death?”

It would be presumptuous to insist on the gift of angelic purity, and it would surely lead to various errors. To a penitent with such aspirations St. Francis of Sales gave the admonition, “Often we take pains to become good angels, and in our zeal we neglect to be good men and good women.” He pointed out the importance of being patient with oneself: “Patience is that virtue which most assures us perfection. We must practice it in dealing with others, but it is equally necessary to exercise it with ourselves. Those who aspire to a perfect charity, must have more patience with themselves than with others. We must endure our imperfections in order to gain perfection.”

With venial sins it is different. These are more or less voluntary violations of the moral law, for this reason they offend God, and in this aspect they are to be abhorred as a positive evil. While in this life it is not possible to avoid always even the least of venial sins, yet it is possible to lessen their number, or to keep oneself entirely free from a certain species of them. That the penitent may never become lax in this endeavor, should be the special solicitude of the confessor. He will, in order to avoid the rock of extreme severity, and in order to discourage neither himself nor his penitent, clearly distinguish between sins of frailty and sins that result from a perversity of the will, or from bad habits. Even the saints were not wholly free from sins of frailty; they, too, had to confess with St. James: “In many things we all offend.” Such faults enter only too easily into our minds, actions and omissions; they can, however, be just as easily wiped out again, especially through prayer, as St. Augustine teaches: “For the daily, brief, and light sins without which this life is not led, the daily prayer of the faithful makes satisfaction... this prayer completely wipes away slight and daily sins,” Ench. 71. As a matter of fact these very faults of weakness work for the good of those who truly love God; for as they are thus continually reminded of their frailty, they are more firmly imbued with an humble self-knowledge. P. Scupoli tell us how advantageous is this knowledge of our faults: “O happy knowledge (of our frailty) which sanctifies us in this world, and uplifts us to the glory of Heaven! O splendid light, proceeding from the darkness and flooding the soul with celestial clarity! O hidden pearl, shining forth from our obscurity! O nothingness that uplifts us to the possession of all things!” If the saints received extraordinary graces from God, not a little of this was due to the fact that they chose to give themselves up to the contemplation of their own nothingness, and fostered within themselves the spirit of humility and contrition.

Upon this important point Anna must be enlightened so that what should really inspire confidence and courage may not become a cause for discouragement.

When, however, there is question of faults arising from perversity of will, and deliberately committed, then the case assumes another aspect. A spiritual condition of this kind requires careful treatment on the part of the confessor.

How harmful such faults are to our striving for virtue is aptly told by P. Lancicius. He writes, in the introduction to an exhaustive treatise upon venial sins: “During the forty-seven years of my priesthood, I have been at different times the spiritual director of lay persons and of Religious. In this work I was made aware that many persons received great graces from the Lord, but with the greater number I saw that they received lesser graces than the Divine bounty would have poured out upon them if they had been more diligent in avoiding numerous venial sins, especially those committed with deliberation.”

Should the confessor perceive that Anna is enmeshed in faults of this kind, that she commits certain faults from habit, then he will, first of all, prescribe the remedies needed against her shortcomings, and impress upon her the conscientious use of the same. Some pious, but little instructed, persons fall into the error that sacramental grace will do all and that it will suffice to receive Communion frequently in order to attain the heights of Christian perfection. If Anna sincerely desires to be cured of moral ills she will assuredly show her good will by a diligent use of the prescribed remedies, and thus gradually attain the desired goal. Should Anna, however, manifest a lack of good intention, by neglecting to cooperate with sacramental grace by her own suitable effort, then the prudent confessor will regard her case as critical, and, if necessary, treat her with warranted severity. Such souls are frequently in grave danger of straying afar from the path of virtue. In the case of such persons the question arises: Have they, indeed, the pious disposition, which is before all things requisite for daily Communion? Are they, indeed, in the state of grace? Admittedly they will not commit any sin which they regard as a grievous sin. Yet, what security is there, in their deplorable condition, that their supposedly venial sins are not really mortal sins, or at least will not soon lead to such? In judging sinful acts, which Moralists hold to be grievous sins ex genere suo, which, however, may be slight on account of parvitas materiae, it is often very difficult to define the borderline that divides venial sins and grievous ones, and, since even the most skilled Casuists often admit their inability to distinguish in this matter, how can a person, less well-informed, without conscious self-deception claim that this borderline has not been overstepped, when she has over and over again sinned deliberately against charity, justice, etc.? Moreover the neglected grace is gradually withdrawn from the tepid soul, and the Divine warning is being fulfilled which was pronounced upon the Bishop of Ephesus: “Because thou art tepid I will begin to vomit thee out of my mouth.” There is, finally a particular point to be taken into consideration regarding such persons. Not infrequently the habitual faults of those avowing the aspiration to a devout life are yielding scandal. Their lack of charity, of fidelity to duty, of humility, meekness, etc., casts not seldom a dark shadow upon piety itself and brings it into discredit. The scandal which the world takes at the devout is surely often a pharisaical scandal-taking, their malice gleefully making small faults the occasion for vilification of all religion. Unfortunately, however, there is sometimes real scandal of this sort which the confessor must combat with energy. Should all his endeavors fail, then he must not hesitate to keep such persons, who evidently misuse the sacraments, from approaching them until they are induced to make a better use of the same.