Article — Noldin, Summa of Moral Theology
Article First. On Capital Sins.
335. Notions. 1. Capital sins are not called capital or mortal because they would be the greatest sins or always mortal, but because, having arisen from original sin, they are as heads and sources from which many other sins arise. But they are sources of sins not as acts, but rather insofar as they are depraved passions or habitual propensions; therefore they are better called capital vices than capital sins.
According to the doctrine of St. Thomas, other sins arise from the capital vices as from a final cause. For since the object which the capital vices inordinately seek vehemently allures man, as riches, which avarice seeks, in order to attain that object frequently and abundantly he applies many and diverse illicit means, which are so many sins arisen from a capital vice.2
- After St. Gregory the Great3 and St. Thomas,4 the capital vices are commonly numbered as seven: pride, avarice, lust, envy, gluttony, anger, sloth. Concerning each one the treatment must be so made that they are considered both insofar as they are vices and insofar as they are sins.
a. The seven capital vices are not enumerated by all in the same way: for some, considering pride as the root of all vices, still number seven under it, of which the first is ambition; but others, numbering pride among the seven capital vices, place ambition in the first place among its daughters.
b. The seven vices are comprehended in the mnemonic word Saligia, whose individual letters signify the individual vices in order.
§ 1. On Pride.
1 St. Thomas, De malo, q. 8 ff. Holzmann, Theologia moralis, l. 1, tr. 3, disp. 2, c. 5. Struggl, Theologia moralis, tr. 2, q. 3. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 697-745.
2 St. Thomas I-II, q. 84, a. 3.
3 Moralia, l. 31, c. 7.
4 Summa I-II, q. 84, a. 4.
336. 1. Pride is defined as an inordinate appetite of one's own excellence. Pride is opposed by excess to the virtue of humility.
a. Inordinate: for there is also an ordered love of one's own excellence, when someone does not esteem his own goods more than is fitting, and desires to be preferred to others because he judges that it will be useful for the glory of God and his own salvation or that of others.
b. Pride arises from this, that a man, considering his own excellence and not adverting that he has it from God, values it more than is fitting. This consideration brings it about that he conceives an excessive estimation of himself, is pleased with himself, prefers himself to others, despises others, desires to manifest his own excellence to others, to be honored and praised by them, and to be placed before them.
- Complete pride is a sin mortal from its whole genus; incomplete pride is a sin venial from its whole genus.
a. Complete pride is that by which someone so wishes to excel and to be placed before others that he wishes to be subject to no one, neither to superiors nor to God himself; such is the pride of the devil. This contains direct, not only indirect and virtual, aversion from God, and on that account belongs to the gravest sins of all.
b. Incomplete pride is that by which someone, while retaining subjection toward God and superiors, values himself more than is fitting and desires to excel above others, whom he despises and contemns as inferiors. Incomplete pride is a venial sin: for the inordinate appetite of a thing indifferent of itself is venial. But accidentally it can be a grave sin, namely if it is joined with grave injury of others, or if it induces one to commit other grave sins.
- Pride is not undeservedly called the mother of all sins, because inordinate love of one's own excellence can move one to any sins whatever; nevertheless there are certain sins which in a peculiar sense are called daughters of pride, insofar as pride induces to them almost by a natural necessity. These are the following:
a. Presumption, which is the appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. This of itself is venial, unless someone through his lack of skill exposes himself to grave danger of injury to be inflicted on God or neighbor, as if someone without sufficient skill desires to exercise the office of pastor, physician, judge, etc.
b. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of honor and dignity not owed, as if someone ambitiously seeks an office of which he is unworthy. But to seek a dignity or honor suitable to oneself with moderation and from a good end is not a sin, but an act of magnanimity.
c. Vain glory, which is the inordinate appetite of the manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious, as if someone inordinately seeks praise or rejoices concerning the humiliation of others. He does not commit the vice of vain glory who, on account of an honorable end, strives to excel, e.g. that he may become fit for an office to be carried out afterward, that he may please his parents, that he may obtain a prize proposed. It is called vanity if someone seeks praise and honor from goods of lesser moment, e.g. from wealth, from bodily beauty, from garments, etc.
Vain glory manifests itself in a threefold way:
a. boasting, which is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence through words;
b. ostentation, which is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence through deeds or signs;
c. hypocrisy, which is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence through simulated virtues.
§ 2. On Avarice.
337. 1. Avarice is defined as an inordinate appetite of temporal goods, i.e. of goods of fortune. Avarice is opposed by defect to the virtue of liberality.
a. The love of riches is inordinate if it is not ruled by a due and honorable end, such as providing for the necessities of a family, doing good to others, etc.; moreover, if through excessive solicitude for acquiring riches or excessive parsimony the mode prescribed by reason in these matters is injured.
b. The vice of avarice can be found equally in the poor man and in the rich man, since each can adhere with excessive affection to things possessed or desire things to be possessed with excessive desire.
- Avarice is a sin venial from its whole genus: for excess in a thing otherwise indifferent and licit is venial; but the love of temporal goods is of itself indifferent.
Avarice can become a mortal sin if not only liberality, but also another virtue is injured, e.g. justice or charity toward neighbor, as if a man so inordinately loves riches that on account of them, e.g. by becoming rich from the goods of others, he violates the law of God, or by denying due alms he fails in duties toward neighbor.
Avarice is committed in two ways: a. by excess in retaining goods acquired (Geiz); b. by excess in care and solicitude for acquiring new goods (Habsucht).
Chiefly five daughters of avarice are numbered:
a. Hardening of heart toward the poor, whom the avaricious man addresses harshly, repels empty-handed without mercy, and with rigor exacts debts from them, even if they are unequal to paying.
b. Disquiet of heart, e.g. vehement and inordinate application of the mind to acquiring and preserving riches with a vain fear lest they not be acquired or lest they be lost.
c. Fraud, which is the deception of another accomplished by deed, as when weights and measures are adulterated in things to be sold.
d. Guile, which is the deception of another accomplished by words.
e. Betrayal, which is the deception of another, against faith given, accomplished to his harm.
§ 3. On Envy.1
1 Lust is treated in the fascicle separately edited: De sexto praecepto, etc.
338. 1. Envy is sadness concerning another's good, insofar as this is apprehended as diminishing one's own excellence, e.g. the honor of a companion as a dishonor to the one envying. It is directly opposed to charity, which rejoices concerning the good of neighbor, which good the envious man wishes destroyed and, when it is not destroyed, grieves.
It differs: a. from emulation; for an emulator is not saddened concerning the good of neighbor, but is saddened concerning his own evil because he lacks that good which he sees in another; b. from hatred, by which someone is saddened concerning the good of another insofar as it is his good; c. from that sadness which someone has concerning the good of another insofar as he fears some evil to himself from it, e.g. if someone is saddened concerning the elevation of another because he fears oppression to himself from it; d. from indignation, by which someone is saddened concerning the good of another insofar as this other is unworthy of that good. This of itself is not a sin; but it can become a sin if it is repugnant to divine providence, which for certain ends bestows goods, both temporal and supernatural, even on sinners.
Envy arises from pride, insofar as someone so inordinately loves his own excellence in some good, whether true or fictitious, that he is unwilling that a good of this kind be possessed by his neighbor. Envy is accustomed to be in those who are equals or nearly equals, because the glory of those who greatly excel is not accustomed to be apprehended as a diminution of one's own excellence. And although some are by nature more prone to envy than others, nevertheless this vice has been so deeply implanted in all that some first motions of envy are found even in perfect men.
Envy is a sin mortal from its genus: for it is repugnant to charity; but sins against charity are grave from their genus. Nevertheless it admits smallness of matter. In order that envy be a grave sin, it is required: a. that it be referred to a great good of the neighbor, whether corporal or spiritual; b. that the envious man seriously will the neighbor to lack that good, lest he himself undergo a fictitious lessening of his own good.
The greater the good is concerning which someone envies another, the greater is the sin of envy; therefore the gravest sin of envy is that by which someone envies his neighbor spiritual goods themselves: the gifts of the Holy Spirit, grace, virtue, sanctity.
- Five following daughters of envy are numbered: hatred, susurration, detraction, exultation in adversities, affliction in the prosperities of the neighbor.
While the envious man is saddened concerning the good of the neighbor insofar as it is apprehended as a cause of his own evil, there arises in him the desire that the neighbor fall away from that good; therefore he strives to diminish it or utterly destroy it through evil speeches against the neighbor, which, if they are hidden, are called susurration, and if they are manifest, detraction. But if he obtains this end, he exults; if he does not obtain it, he is afflicted and saddened; and this sadness, if it endures, generates hatred.
§ 4. On Gluttony.
339. 1. Gluttony is the inordinate appetite of food and drink.
a. The inordination of gluttony consists in this, that the mode prescribed by reason in the use of food and drink is not preserved.
b. Gluttony taken generically is opposed to two virtues which pertain to temperance: abstinence, which moderates the use of food and non-inebriating drink, and sobriety, which moderates the use of inebriating or alcoholic drink. Therefore there are two species of gluttony: overeating, or gluttony specifically taken, and drunkenness, which are specifically distinct sins.
- One can sin by gluttony in five ways, which already are comprehended by St. Thomas in this little verse:
Too hastily, sumptuously, too much, ardently, elaborately.1
For inordination in the use of food and drink can be occupied either about the food itself or about the taking of it, and indeed:
a. About the substance of the food, if foods more costly and more exquisite than befit the state and condition of the determined man are sought: sumptuously.
b. About quantity, if one eats beyond the appetite of nature, i.e. more than is required for good health of body and for a fitting disposition of mind: too much.
c. About quality, if preparation of foods is applied, on account of seasonings and things of this kind, that is too delicate and exquisite: elaborately.
d. About the taking, by reason of the mode, if someone eats too greedily and voraciously: ardently.
e. About the taking, by reason of the time, if someone anticipates the due time or eats and drinks more often than is fitting: too hastily.
- Gluttony is a sin light from its genus: for from the general rule, excess in a thing otherwise indifferent or licit is of itself nothing but venial. But accidentally gluttony can become mortal, and that in many ways, but especially:
a. By reason of injured charity of God, because a man so inordinately loves the delectations of food and drink that, constituting them as his ultimate end, he is prepared rather to contemn precepts gravely obliging than to renounce these delectations. These are those whose God is the belly.2
b. By reason of grave harm in the body, if someone advertently gravely injures the health of the body through excessive gorging.
c. By reason of grave harm in the soul, if someone advertently renders himself unfit, through excess in food and drink, for carrying out duties obliging under grave obligation.
a. It is not a grave sin to indulge gluttony up to vomiting: for nothing else is had except excess, indeed enormous, in the use of delectation from food and drink; but this excess from its genus is venial, unless a circumstance changing the species is added.
b. Although it is a grave sin without necessity to feed on human flesh, both because this is repugnant to the piety owed to the dead and because it opens the way to human killings, nevertheless in the extreme necessity of hunger this seems to be licit, because in extreme necessity those things sometimes become licit which otherwise are prohibited by the law of nature. But it is never licit to kill a man for this end.3
- St. Thomas enumerates five daughters of gluttony:
a. Hebetude of mind, or a disordering of reason situated in this, that someone can neither pray nor perform other things of that kind.
b. Inept joy, or an inordination of the appetite.
c. Much-speaking, or an inordination of words.
d. Scurrility, or an inordination of external acts to which inept joy induces.
e. Uncleanness, or an inordination in the body: for from satiety arise emissions of semen, vomiting, and other excretions of superfluous things.
1 St. Thomas II-II, q. 148, a. 4.
2 Phil. 3, 19.
3 Lessius, De iustitia, l. 4, c. 3, n. 9 ff.
340. On temperance to be preserved. In the use of food and drink reason prescribes the mode which the end requires on account of which food and drink were created by the author of nature. But food and drink are ordered to the necessity and sustenance of life, namely that the body may be preserved in integrity and vigor and thus may be able aptly to serve the mind in its functions. Now indeed, not only that is called necessary for the sustenance of life which is required for existence, but also that which is required for fittingness and comfort. In the same way, that is called not necessary for life both which impedes the health of the body and the suitable disposition of the mind, and that which is not required for fitting sustenance of life. He who preserves the virtue of temperance in the use of food and drink eats and drinks as much as is required for fitting sustenance of life, but never takes what he foresees will be harmful to bodily health or to the suitable disposition of the mind for exercising its functions: for this would be the sin of gluttony. It is clear that those things which are required for living suitably and fittingly are not restricted to a definite quantity, but have a certain latitude, so that more or less can be taken, and yet no harm be brought to health and the apt disposition of the mind. Now indeed it is licit to use moderately those things which are not required for fitting sustenance and yet do not impede the apt disposition of mind and body, on account of just causes, e.g. of hospitality, festivity, extraordinary joy, etc.; for by these temperance is not injured nor is the sin of gluttony committed.1
On Drunkenness.
1 Cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 141, a. 6. Lessius, De iustitia, l. 4, c. 1, n. 9 ff.
341. Notions. 1. Drunkenness taken passively signifies the defect of the use of reason induced by excessive drink, whence someone is called drunk; drunkenness taken actively denotes the very drinking which induces this effect, and is defined: voluntary excess in drink from pleasure alone unto violent privation of the use of reason. Active drunkenness is a sin; passive drunkenness is the effect of sin.
a. In drink: namely of wine or of another inebriating liquid, by which words it differs from overeating. From pleasure alone: for if drink were taken from another cause, e.g. by reason of medicine, even unto privation of the use of reason, it would not be drunkenness. Nevertheless it does not therefore cease to be drunkenness because pleasure is not perceived from the drink, provided the drink is not taken from another reasonable end. Violent: for the use of reason is interrupted in a natural manner by sleep and in a violent manner by excessive drink, whereby it happens that the drunk man, not even when awakened from sleep, can use reason.
b. From these things it is clear that the proper malice of drunkenness is not in drinking alone inducing privation of the use of reason, but in drinking which brings on privation of the use of reason in a violent manner, without sufficient cause, on account of the pleasure of drink.1
- Drunkenness is called perfect if it entirely takes away the use of reason, and is called imperfect if it does not entirely take away the use of reason.
One is judged to labor under perfect drunkenness: a. who no longer knows how to distinguish between good and evil; b. who on the following day does not remember notable things which he said or did in drunkenness; c. who does utterly unusual things which he was not accustomed to do with an intact mind. Drunkenness will be imperfect if, with the use of reason preserved, or with the power of acting morally preserved, only the phantasy is somewhat disturbed, the tongue stammers, the feet stagger, the eyes see double, objects seem to be turned in a circle, vomiting follows, and things of this kind.
1 Lessius, l. 4, c. 3, n. 13 f.
342. Its formal malice. 1. The sin of drunkenness consists essentially in inordinate drinking, from pleasure alone, of an inebriating liquid with foresight of the loss of the use of reason. Therefore in the sin of drunkenness, the immoderate delectation of wine is willed of itself; the loss of the use of reason is willed in the cause. Since this loss is admitted without a sufficient motive, only on account of the pleasure of drink, it is morally evil. Since the proper malice of drunkenness consists in drinking unto privation of the use of reason from pleasure alone, without necessity, if the drinking of wine is done from another motive, and that an honorable one, it is not evil, although it causes privation of the use of reason; for it is not done inordinately or against the rule of reason, as that which is done from pleasure is.
To indulge the pleasure of drink immoderately, or against the rule of reason, is a venial sin, even if reason is disturbed somewhat; but to indulge the same pleasure unto full loss of the use of reason is a grave sin.
For resolving the questions which pertain here, it helps to note that the immediate effect of abundant drinking is relaxation of the nerves and stupor of the senses, from which the loss of the use of reason follows as an effect. Since drinking from an honorable motive, or for obtaining a licit effect, is not morally evil, although disturbance of reason follows from it, in resolving particular questions it must be considered whether the harm of temporary privation of the use of reason is sufficiently compensated by the good on account of which that privation is permitted, and whether privation of the use of reason is not intended.
What is said concerning the use of inebriating liquid must be affirmed in the same way concerning the use of opium, ether, chloroform, and similar things: namely, their immediate effect is weakening of the nerves and stupor of the senses, from which privation of the use of reason follows. Now that stupor of the senses is licitly brought on for obtaining a sufficiently grave good effect, even if, besides the intention, the evil effect follows, namely violent disturbance of reason.
a. Therefore it is licit to make oneself drunk for driving away a disease according to the counsel of physicians, e.g. for curing the disease of cholera or for evacuating the force of poison: for temporary disturbance of reason is sufficiently compensated by the good intended.
b. It is licit to make oneself drunk or to use chloroform for lessening pains or not feeling them, e.g. in a surgical operation or in a difficult childbirth: for privation of the use of reason is sufficiently compensated by the good intended, which is the mitigation of sharp pain.
It is asked whether it is licit to use chloroform for mitigating the ordinary pains of childbirth. It is doubtful whether this cause is sufficient both for permitting disturbance of reason and especially for bringing on the danger which arises from the use of chloroform both for the mother and for the offspring.1
c. It is licit to make oneself drunk for avoiding death which someone threatens to another unless he makes himself drunk, except, however, the case in which someone demands drunkenness in contempt of God or in hatred of virtue: for from abundant drinking it follows immediately that the other desists from the will of inflicting death; but the effect of inebriation is permitted from the sufficiently grave cause of freeing oneself from death.
d. It is licit to make oneself drunk for driving away the trouble of sleeplessness (Schlaflosigkeit) under this condition, that other harmless remedies have been applied in vain, but drunkenness is useful for inducing sleep.
e. It is not licit to make oneself drunk for driving away melancholy or for lightening grief, both because that end is not a sufficient cause for permitting disturbance of reason, and because other means are at hand for obtaining that end. Nevertheless it is licit on account of this cause to drink up to cheerfulness.2
1 Cf. Capellmann, Medicina pastoralis^7 (Aachen: Barth, 1893), p. 40 f., who judges that in ordinary childbirth this is not licit; nevertheless Olfers, Pastoralmedicin^2 (Freiburg: Herder, 1893), p. 103, contradicts him.
2 Gobat apud Lacroix, l. 5, n. 344.
343. Its moral malice. 1. Perfect drunkenness is a mortal sin: a. Sacred Scripture numbers drunkenness among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven;1 b. it is a grave disorder violently to deprive oneself not only of the use of reason but also of the proximate power of using it, and to cast oneself down to the condition of beasts on account of the pleasure alone taken from drink.
a. Even perfect drunkenness admits smallness of matter: if therefore someone without necessity deprives himself of the use of reason for a brief time, which does not reach an hour, he does not commit a grave sin. Nevertheless for practice this note is scarcely of any moment, because it can scarcely be foreseen that drink will not deprive one of the use of reason for a longer space than an hour.
b. He who drinks so immoderately that perfect drunkenness would certainly follow, even if by committing himself to sleep he does not experience this effect, nevertheless sins gravely: for by the drinking he not only posits the cause of the evil, and indeed the whole cause, but also remains deprived of the proximate power of using reason. Nevertheless he does not sin gravely who by a medicine prevents himself from being deprived of the use of reason from immoderate drink.
- Imperfect drunkenness of itself does not exceed venial sin; but accidentally it can become grave: a. by reason of scandal, which, for example, a priest would give, even only once, or a father of a family, if he were more often half-drunk; b. by reason of harm which is inflicted either on health or on the family; c. by reason of the end, as if someone were to drink in order to excite stronger lust in himself; d. by reason of grave sadness which is caused thence to a wife, children, or parents.
a. Ballerini prudently notes: "When someone confesses drunkenness, he will have to be asked whether he fully lost the use of reason. For commonly they think, by a false opinion, that grave sin is present if wine has provoked him to vomiting."
b. Therefore without doubt it is a grave sin to induce others to drunkenness; and so: a. to challenge someone to equal draughts with danger of drunkenness; b. to offer drink repeatedly with foresight of drunkenness; c. to urge and, as it were, compel another to drink with danger of drunkenness, even if it is done for the sake of politeness. But it is licit to offer and propose abundant drink to guests who are foreseen to become intoxicated from it, provided a sufficient cause makes honorable this remote cooperation.
c. Whether and to what extent sins committed in drunkenness can be imputed is said elsewhere; in this place let it be noted: a. insults uttered against others are not imputed to a drunk man; for since they are not esteemed even by those whom they affect, they are not apt to injure another's honor. b. There are those who affirm this same thing also concerning blasphemies; nevertheless this sentence is commonly rejected, because the honor of God requires that even material blasphemy be avoided.2
2 Lehmkuhl I, n. 745. Ballerini-Palmieri I, n. 731 ff.
344. On the use of morphine.1 For lessening pains and for putting the senses to sleep, physicians now frequently use diverse means; and indeed morphine is ordinarily applied for lessening pains, but other "narcotics" also serve for putting the senses to sleep. The question is asked concerning their effects and concerning their liceity.
- The effects which the use of morphine produces are diverse according to the diverse quantity which is taken. What is said here concerning morphine is also valid concerning opium, cocaine, and other remedies of this kind.
a. Drunk in a great quantity, in the same way as poison, it induces death; taken in a lesser quantity it causes stupor of the senses and privation of the use of reason, which effect indeed differs in nothing from drunkenness; finally, if a very moderate quantity is taken, it serves for quieting the nerves and restoring strength.
b. Injections of morphine, which are made under the skin in small quantity, serve for lessening pains and produce a certain pleasure that is by no means slight. But if those subcutaneous injections are repeated in greater quantity for a notable time, they gravely harm the health of the body, notably shorten life, and moreover provoke a vehement craving for morphine, which can be overcome with greater difficulty than drunkenness itself and can scarcely be cured except in hospitals erected for this end. Nevertheless these malignant effects are not caused except from the use of a greater quantity repeated rather often; a few injections, and those moderate, scarcely harm the body or the soul in any way.
1 Cf. Olfers, l. c., p. 103 f. Capellmann, l. c., p. 41 ff.
345. 2. From these things, as regards the liceity of this use, the following are now gathered.
a. A use of morphine so slight that it produces no other effect except restoration of strength and quieting of the nerves is manifestly licit.
b. A moderate use of morphine, even without a just cause, applied only for calming the craving for it, does not exceed venial sin, since it does not gravely harm health nor cause a notable shortening of life; but to use morphine in that quantity and frequency such that notable detriment to health and life follows from it is a grave sin.
c. The use of morphine applied in such a quantity that the senses are put to sleep and privation of the use of reason follows:
a. without a just cause is a grave sin, equally as drunkenness arising from the drinking of wine;
b. from a proportionately grave cause of necessity or utility is licit, e.g. that the sick man in a surgical operation may permit himself without resistance to the hands of the surgeon, or that the sick man may not feel sharp pains;
c. in the article of death is illicit not only if the dying man is not yet disposed for dying well, but even if he has been duly disposed for death, because there is not a sufficient reason for depriving a dying man of the use of reason, unless a fall into sin is to be feared; since indeed at that time the use of reason is of such great utility that it cannot be compensated by any temporal advantage. For the dying man would lack the merits which he could gain both from pains patiently tolerated and from acts of perfect conformity with the divine will and of other virtues.
346. On euthanasia. 1. Today the dying frequently demand from physicians, and physicians procure for them, the euthanasia, as they call it, namely a placid and tranquil death without pain, because by means of morphine they induce stupor of the senses and perfect privation of the use of reason. a. If only pains are lessened by morphine, but the use of reason is not taken away, or if the use of reason is taken away only for a time, it is clear that its use is licit even in the dying. b. If by morphine the use of reason is fully taken away for the whole time of agony, its use is illicit, even in those who have already fulfilled their obligations, both because there is not a sufficient reason for admitting privation of the use of reason, unless at the same time there is danger of sinning, and the more so because in the time of agony pains are lessened of themselves; and because privation of the use of reason continuing until death is equivalent to a shortening of spiritual life, which is illicit. c. Less efficacious for demonstrating this is the argument taken from the necessity that the faculty of praying and meriting be preserved for a man. For although the faithful rightly judge it a great gift of grace if they can await death with serene mind, nevertheless no obligation exists of preserving the use of reason in death, as far as can be done, so that the dying man, master of himself, may await death and offer his life to God, nor so that he may be able to acquire merits for himself, since the neglect of this occasion of praying and meriting, if it is done not from contempt but from fear of an evil, even a temporal one, is not a sin.
- If in the article of death, on account of excessive pains or from other causes, a fall into sin were to be feared, some indeed judge that this can be permitted, but Lehmkuhl rightly denies it (n. 743).1 Therefore the same author judges that the priest assisting the dying ought to resist the practice of physicians of putting the dying to sleep, not only as regards those who are not yet disposed for death, but also as regards the disposed in whom there is no danger of sinning gravely; only as regards the dying who are in danger of sinning gravely can that practice be not positively permitted, but tolerated in silence. Likewise, if a dying man in good faith demands that the use of reason be taken away from him, and there is no hope that he will obey after being warned, the use of morphine could be tolerated.
1 Cf. Lacroix, l. 5, n. 341. Villada, Casus conscientiae III, p. 309.
347. On combating drunkenness. Drunkenness (Berauschung), especially if it is committed frequently, produces the most destructive consequences, both individual and social. Individual consequences: it excites and promotes the carnal appetite, lust; it dulls and blunts the sense of morality and religion; it squanders goods of fortune; but especially it brings the greatest harm to the health of mind and body. Social consequences: it disturbs domestic peace and family life, provides occasion for innumerable crimes, and, what tends to the ruin of peoples, leads to the degeneration of offspring. Especially for this reason ebriositas (Trunksucht), which signifies the habit of making oneself drunk, is so monstrous a vice that it must be attacked and overcome in every way. Since manifest signs of degeneration induced by the excessive use of alcohol were already being detected in diverse nations, there arose a zeal for introducing and propagating either total abstinence from any alcoholic drink whatever or at least great temperance in its use; and societies against alcoholism have been erected, which assume for themselves the task of preventing the abuse of alcohol. The things which pastors of souls can contribute toward eradicating this evil, so pernicious and so widely diffused throughout the world, are contained in about the following:
a. To instruct the faithful concerning the malignant effects not only of drunkenness, but also of abundant drinking, which is done beyond a determined measure almost daily; concerning the error of those who think that from the use of alcoholic liquor the organism is nourished or strengthened; concerning drunkenness as the destructive source of offenses and crimes; concerning the sin of those who offer alcoholic liquors to infants.
b. To promote associations which are instituted for this end, that either temperance or even abstinence may be exercised.
c. To disseminate writings and periodical sheets by which the faithful may be suitably taught concerning these matters and excited to exercising temperance or abstinence.1
1 Ferstl, Die Alkoholfrage der Gegenwart. Sechs Vortrage (Regensburg: Verlagsanstalt, 1906). Pieper, Die Massigkeitsbestrebungen (M. Gladbach: Zentralstelle, 1906). A. Egger, Der Klerus u. die Alkoholfrage (Freiburg: Herder, 1899). Hoppe, Die Tatsachen uber den Alkohol^3 (Munich: Reinhart, 1904). Bunge, Die Alkoholfrage. In Basel, at the publishing house of the League of Opponents of Alcohol, a whole series of small writings concerning this question has appeared.
348. On Alcoholism. By this name are signified both the abuse of alcohol, which consists in immoderate drink, and the malignant effects which drunkenness produces in the health of man. Alcoholic liquors taken in small quantity indeed do not harm health, but drunk beyond due measure they can harm health very greatly, and this indeed in all organs of the body, but especially in the nervous system. The harm which they bring to health depends not only on the quantity and quality of alcoholic drink, but also on the disposition of the subject; thus in neurasthenics and in the children of parents who are given to drunkenness, they produce much worse effects. The quantity of alcohol which can be drunk without detriment to health is determined in diverse ways by experts.1 And so drunkenness is morally evil also on account of the harm which it inflicts on the body. When this harm is grave cannot be determined accurately.
a. Assiduous or frequent drunkenness certainly inflicts grave harm on the body and therefore also under this respect is a grave sin.
b. Abundant and assiduous drinking, which nevertheless does not cause drunkenness, harms the body more than drunkenness committed now and then.
c. Whether abundant drinking of this kind ever constitutes a grave sin on account of the harm brought upon the body is difficult to say. Indeed, the consequences of such drinking both in the individual and in the human race are most destructive, nor can there be imagined a cause excusing the drinking and its evil effects; nevertheless, because the evil effects are produced only gradually and in different persons in a different degree, it cannot be determined when a more liberal use of alcohol begins to harm gravely.
d. Frequently to offer or permit alcoholic drinks to infants and to those before puberty cannot be excused from grave fault.
§ 5. On Anger.
1 Capellmann-Bergman, Pastoralmedizin^15, p. 86 ff. Antonelli, Medicina pastoralis^3, n. 455 ff.
349. 1. Anger is usually defined as an inordinate appetite of vengeance. Anger is opposed by excess to meekness.
a. Anger, therefore, insofar as it is a vice, or irascibility, is a passion of the sensitive appetite, namely the irascible appetite, which consists in the appetite of vengeance.
b. Anger, according to the twofold element which it contains, properly includes a twofold inordination: one on the part of the motion in the irascible appetite, or on the part of the kindling of anger, which is excessive; the other on the part of the object, or on the part of the vengeance which it seeks, greater than is just or on account of an unjust cause. This definition of anger exhibits both elements, by which it is called an inordinate motion of the soul inordinately seeking vengeance.
c. Inordinate: because both the passion or motion of anger and the appetite of vengeance of themselves can be indifferent, honorable, and licit, if, for example, parents are angry on account of the faults of children and vindicate them by punishment.
- Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate motion of the irascible appetite, is a sin venial from its whole genus: for excess in an indifferent thing of itself does not exceed venial fault.
a. This anger is committed when someone is inflamed with anger concerning a thing which does not deserve anger, or beyond what the thing deserves, or more often than is fitting.
b. Accidentally this anger can become a mortal sin by reason of enormous excess utterly deforming rational nature, when someone deliberately acts so furiously as if he were deprived of reason.
c. Three species, or diverse modes, of this anger are assigned: a. rancor (Groll), which is anger insofar as it causes indignation, aversion, and hatred; b. madness (Tollheit), which is anger insofar as it deprives the mind of the use of reason; c. fury (Wut), which is anger insofar as it breaks forth into enormous external motions.
- Anger, insofar as it is an inordinate appetite of vengeance, is a sin mortal from its genus: for it is directly repugnant to charity or even to justice, because it inordinately or even unjustly seeks evil for the neighbor; but sins against charity or justice are mortal from their genus.
This anger is committed: a. when someone seeks vengeance against him who does not deserve it; or b. beyond what he deserves; or c. not for the due end, namely not from zeal for justice, but from hatred of the person or for satisfying a malevolent soul or from lust for vengeance, etc.
§ 6. On Sloth.
350. 1. Special sloth, insofar as it is a capital vice, is sadness concerning the divine good, namely concerning the grace and friendship of God, insofar as it is man's proper good.
a. Sloth taken broadly is weariness or sadness concerning labor. It is divided into natural and spiritual, or moral, sloth. Natural sloth is weariness or sadness concerning bodily labor on account of its difficulty. It is clear that this sloth must be carefully distinguished from weariness of body and from lack of strength. Spiritual sloth is divided into general and special, or capital, sloth. General sloth is weariness or sadness concerning spiritual things on account of the labor necessary in exercising them. This sloth is not a special sin distinct from the sin committed through transgression of a precept from sloth, as if someone from sloth omits Sunday Mass. Special sloth is sadness concerning the divine good, i.e. concerning the grace and friendship of God, insofar as they pertain to man.
b. A special vice must be opposed to a special virtue. The virtue to which sloth is opposed is charity toward God. As hatred is opposed to the love of charity, so sadness concerning the divine good is opposed to the joy of charity. For he who loves God, on account of God rejoices concerning his own spiritual good, namely that through grace he is conformed to God and admitted to fellowship in the divine nature. But the slothful man is saddened concerning this spiritual good, unwilling that he be destined by God to such goods.1
- Special sloth is a sin mortal from its whole genus, because it is directly repugnant to divine charity, from which the slothful man recedes on account of displeasure with the spiritual goods which God bestows on men. Nevertheless it can be venial from imperfection of the act. For the rest, this worst sloth is not committed so frequently.
A young man who is saddened because he is compelled to perform works of devotion and virtues which are not prescribed does not commit the special sin of sloth, nor does he sin gravely. But he sins gravely by the special sin of sloth who is saddened that he must acquire eternal beatitude for himself, or that he has known the Catholic faith.
- Its principal daughters are numbered as five:
a. Malice, by which someone has hatred for spiritual goods and would wish them not to exist.
b. Rancor, by which those who induce one to spiritual things are distasteful.
c. Despair concerning salvation.
d. Torpor, by which good things are not done with due fervor.
e. Wandering of mind, by which someone wanders about illicit things in the exercise of spiritual matters.
1 Cf. St. Thomas II-II, q. 35, a. 3.