Article I: On the Mode in Which One Sin Causes Another

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 75, a. 4; q. 84; De Malo, q. 8.

493. One sin can be the cause of another, just as one human act can be the cause of another. But this happens in three ways: 1. it can be the material cause of another, insofar as it supplies and prepares matter for another, as gluttony prepares matter for lust, and avarice for litigation, because it multiplies temporal goods which are the matter of lawsuit; - 2. it can be the efficient cause of another: a) per accidens, insofar as it removes grace, or charity, or shame, or submission, or anything else which draws one back from sin and would impede it: thus from drunkenness or anger all sins can arise, because they remove the judgment of reason by which man is restrained from sin;¹ b) per se, insofar as by some sin, for example, of lust, man is disposed by way of inclination or habit to similar acts, or sins of the same species; - 3. and especially it can be the final cause of another, insofar as on account of the end of one sin someone commits another sin, as if someone steals in order to fornicate. And because the end in morals gives the species or form, thus one sin is also the formal cause of another, because it gives form to the other: for if someone steals on account of fornication, theft is as the material, fornication as the formal (q. 75, a. 4).

¹ In this way pride, on the part of aversion, is the cause of every sin indirectly, insofar as it removes subjection to God, which draws one back from sin.

494. Capital sins are those which for the most part are the cause of many other sins, especially the final cause, because they have an object or end most appetible; hence on account of that end other sins are easily committed. They are called capital from the head, which is said metaphorically of that which is the principle and directive and in some way leading of others: for they are the principle or cause of other sins, as was said; they are directive because they are their final cause: for human acts are directed by the end. Hence the capital sins are as leaders, and the vices which arise from them as armies (q. 84, a. 3).

Therefore capital sins are not the greatest, since many others are graver than they, for example, those which are directly against God or are directly opposed to the theological virtues; nor are they necessarily mortal, even if done deliberately, as is clear concerning anger and gluttony, which often are venial.

**495. The capital sins are seven,**2 as is shown in the following way: Capital sins are those which have very appetible ends and therefore principal ends for moving the appetite.3 But something moves the appetite directly per se, and thus good moves it to pursuing; another thing moves indirectly through another, and thus good moves it to fleeing, insofar as someone flees a good on account of an evil joined to it.

Now the good which man most seeks can be:

1. excellence of praise and honor, which is a good of the soul, which vainglory inordinately seeks;

2. food and drink, which is the good of the body by which the individual is conserved, which gluttony inordinately seeks;

3. the use of venereal things, which is the good of the body by which the human species is conserved, which lust inordinately seeks;

4. external goods, which avarice inordinately seeks.

But the good which man flees on account of an adjoined evil which he most fears is:

5. his own spiritual good, which sloth inordinately flees on account of the bodily labor joined to it;

6. or another's good, which impedes his own excellence and thus is an evil, which envy inordinately flees;

7. or that against which anger rises up (q. 84, a. 4).

2. Ecclesiastical writers and the holy Fathers began to discuss these and to indicate more or fewer in number, until the authority of St. Gregory prevailed, so that seven capital sins were commonly numbered. Cf. Wrobl, Die Hauptsundenlehre des Ioannes Cassianus und ihre historischen Quellen, in Divus Thomas, 1923-1924.

3. Hence capital sins are not either those which are only the material cause of others, because it is not the cause of sin in act, but occasionally and in potency; or those which are only the efficient cause of others, which otherwise is verified of all sins, and thus every sin would be capital; or those which are the final cause but from the condition of the sinner, because this happens per accidens to the sin itself: "One sin is ordered to the end of another in two ways: in one way on the part of the sinner himself, whose will is more prone to the end of one sin than of another; but this is accidental to sins. Hence according to this they are not called capital sins. In another way, from the very relation of the ends, of which one has a certain agreement with another, so that in many cases it is ordered to it ... and according to this it is necessary to take the capital vices." Q. D. De Malo 8, a. 1; cf. I-II, q. 84, a. 4.

1. "Or otherwise. Good principally moves the appetite from this, that it participates in something of the property of happiness, which all naturally seek. Of its notion there is 1. a certain perfection; for happiness is a perfect good, to which pertains excellence or brightness, which pride or vainglory seeks; 2. ... sufficiency, which avarice seeks in riches that promise it; 3. ... delight, without which happiness cannot be ... and this gluttony and lust seek." a. 4.

496. Pride is the beginning of every sin, according to Ecclesiasticus X, 15 (the printed text has IX, 15), not only in the historical order, because the Angels and the first man were guilty of it, but also from the nature of the thing, because it is the final cause of all sins: for all sins can and are apt to arise from it, insofar as the temporal goods which man seeks in other sins he can will on account of his own excellence, which is the end of pride. And because the end is first in the order of intention, and intention precedes execution through means, it is rightly called the beginning of every sin. Therefore pride is the final cause of all sins, and consequently it is not a capital sin, from which only many vices arise, but rather the cause of all the capital sins, and the mother and queen of all vices.²

² Some have interpreted this concerning pride improperly so called, that is, a) concerning aversion or contempt of God, by which someone does not will to be subjected to his rule, which per se pertains to pride, but is found implicitly in all sins, consequent to conversion into a good opposed to the law; this general pride is the cause of sin or the beginning on the part of aversion: for from this sin has that it is evil, and therefore on the part of aversion the notion of evil begins; also b) concerning the inclination of fallen nature to such contempt, from which all sins proceed. - These things are true, but they do not hand down the sense of Scripture, which manifestly from the context speaks of pride properly so called, which is a special sin, namely, the appetite of one's own excellence (q. 84, a. 2).

497. Avarice is the root of all sins, according to the Apostle, I Tim. VI, 10, or a cause, not indeed final (as pride is), but disposing to all, because through riches man acquires the faculty and facility of perpetrating, and the occasion of desiring, any sin whatever, because for having any temporal goods whatever he can be aided by money, according to that saying of Ecclus. X, 19: All things obey money. Hence it is the root or first sin in the order of execution, because it offers the opportunity and gives the means of perpetrating all things; and therefore, just as a root furnishes nourishment to a tree, so money nourishes the desire of every sin, and in this sense any sin whatever can arise from avarice.³

³ Some have interpreted this concerning avarice improperly so called, namely, a) concerning inordinate conversion or tendency toward any temporal good whatever, which is found in every sin: this general cupidity is called the cause of sins on the part of conversion to created good, from which sin is nourished and fostered, whence it is called a root; also b) concerning the inclination of fallen nature toward inordinately seeking temporal goods, from which all sins proceed. - These things are true, but they do not hand down the sense of Scripture, which manifestly speaks of avarice properly so called, which is a special sin, namely, the inordinate appetite for riches (q. 84, a. 1).

Avarice, insofar as it is the root of all sins, is not a capital sin, but insofar as it is besides the final cause of many, it is rightly numbered among the capital sins.

498. Remark. - The capital sins are not those which are opposed to the fundamental or cardinal virtues, because "there is not the same account of origin in virtues and in vices. For virtues are caused through the order of the appetite to reason, or even to the incommutable good, which is God; but vices arise from the appetite for a commutable good. Hence it is not necessary that the principal vices be opposed to the principal virtues" (a. 4, ad 1).