§ II. On Circumstances

27. - Circumstances, so called as if standing around the act, can be defined: "Accidental determinations, or certain accidents of an act, without which this act could indeed exist as to substance, but which nevertheless add to it a morality in some way different from that which that act already participates from the object and the end." Therefore, in order that a circumstance confer some morality upon an act, it is required that, for example, the circumstance of the sacred place in which it is perpetrated confer the malice of sacrilege upon an act of lust; but that the fact that a theft was committed with the right or left hand confers nothing of morality upon the theft.

Circumstances, as also the end, as such, attribute to the act a secondary and accidental morality. Cf. the things said at the end of n. 26. I said: as such; because sometimes they attribute to the act a first and essential morality, as if either a work objectively indifferent becomes evil from the end for which it is placed (to sing for vain glory) or good (to sing so that the profit coming from it may fall to pious causes), or if an evil circumstance is the whole reason why a good work is chosen (to sing divine praises in church merely so that you may be praised by men). But then circumstances, as being intended in themselves, induce the notion of object in the genus of morals. Haine, ib. p. 19. q. 46.

I say: A human act derives true morality from circumstances. The reason is that circumstances determine the act as moral, namely as having a relation of agreement or disagreement with reason and right order; indeed, as I have said, sometimes circumstances alone induce agreement or disagreement into an act, as happens in the acts about which we spoke above. Hence some circumstances leave the object in the same moral species, as the quantity of money stolen by theft or given in alms; for the species of malice in theft, or of goodness in alms, is not changed by the quantity of money stolen or given. But others change the species itself, or add a new one over it; thus the circumstance that the thing taken away is sacred adds over the malice of theft a new species, namely sacrilege.

From the former circumstances, some aggravate malice, but others diminish it, and that gravely or lightly. Thus the greater or lesser quantity of money taken away by theft, or given in alms, renders either the malice of theft or the goodness of alms greater or lesser, and that gravely or lightly lesser, according as the quantity of money is notably or not notably greater or lesser.

But if circumstances transfer a sin from venial into mortal, or conversely, then they are said to change not the objective species, which they only increase or diminish, but the theological or demeritorious species. Thus the theft of one cent does not differ as to the virtue to which it is opposed from the theft of a gold coin; nevertheless it differs as to fault, namely theologically, because the theft of one cent, as being a light sin, does not deserve the privation of grace and glory, as does the theft of a sum that is grave, as being mortal.

Number of circumstances. - Seven circumstances of human acts are commonly enumerated, and they are comprehended in that common little verse:

"Who, What, Where, By what helps, Why, How, When."

See the reason for precisely this number, if you wish, in St. Thomas.¹ Bouquillon² and Haine³ explain them clearly in the following practical way.

Who, or the one acting, is considered not by reason of himself, for thus he belongs to the substance of the human act, but by reason of his accidental quality or condition, which morally attributes to the act in moral estimation either a diverse value (changing the species), or a greater or lesser value (aggravating or diminishing in the same species). It changes the species, for example, in a sin of lust, if it is committed by a religious; it aggravates in theft, if it is perpetrated by a priest, insofar as, other things being equal, any sin whatever is graver in a priest than in a layman. I say: other things being equal, that is, supposing that in each the act is voluntary in the same degree, and thus in a holy man the same venial sin, committed from frailty or subreption, is wont to be lighter than in one not holy, because the holy commonly neglect less to guard against sins of this sort.¹ Similarly it also increases goodness, if, for example, an eminent man humbles himself, or a poor man gives alms.

What, that is, not the object itself into which the will is borne first and of itself, for a circumstance comes to the object; but the quantity or accidental quality joined to the object. In theft, for example, it is aggravating insofar as it signifies quantity, and thus the theft of 1000 coins is worse than of 100; but it can change the species insofar as it signifies quality, as if the thing stolen is sacred.

Where, or the circumstance of place, namely sacred, profane; public, private. If it operates anything morally, it ordinarily changes the species. Thus the holiness of the place adds the species of sacrilege to a homicide perpetrated in a church; publicity adds the species of scandal to a sin which is committed in a public place. But if you cling to base thoughts in church, it is only aggravating. But if an act, lawful in itself, is prohibited in reverence for a place, for example the extraction of a thief from an immune place, the quality of the place passes into the substance and gives the first species.

By what helps, or by what means which is not necessarily joined to the act; for, as I again admonish, circumstances are accidents of a human act. It changes the species if, for example, by the help of a demon or magician you have brought evil upon your neighbor, or have put on sacred vestments in order to deceive another; it aggravates if, for example, someone steals the ladder of one person in order that he may take away the money of another.

Why, or the end of the one acting, about which presently.

How, or by what accidental manner an act of virtue or of sin is placed; intensely or remissly; from malice or from vincible ignorance; with force brought upon someone or without it, etc. It changes the species, for example, in violation and in robbery; it aggravates, for example, if you sin from malice; it diminishes if you sin from vincible ignorance, from grave fear, from strong temptation, etc.; it changes the theological species if with semi-full advertence.

When, or the accidental quantity (for a long or short time) or quality of time, namely sacred or not sacred. The quality of time ordinarily does not notably aggravate the malice of an act; but, according to Lugo,¹ to a sin which is perpetrated on a feast day it can add a malice diverse in species (namely sacrilege), and that grave, if from the circumstance of sacred time notable irreverence were inflicted upon divine worship; as if someone should exhibit public games, etc., on the Parasceve of the Lord.² I would add: in places where that day is publicly or at least commonly distinguished from other days. - If an act not evil in itself is prohibited at that time, for example the eating of meat, the time passes into the object.