§ III. On the End

28. - The end is that for the sake of which something either is of itself, namely independently of the will of the one acting (the end of the work; proper; intrinsic), or is made at pleasure by the agent (the end of the one acting; extrinsic). Thus the relief of the poor person is the end of the work in almsgiving; but in the one giving it, either that very relief or vain glory will be able to be the end of the one acting. Concerning this alone, as being the only thing properly called end (motive), we must speak.

But this is: 1° either primary, which flows into the act as an efficient cause, so that without it the act would not be done; or secondary, which only allures to acting, without nevertheless being the efficient cause of the action. Thus a priest in celebrating Mass primarily intends the worship of God, secondarily the stipend.

For others, the primary end is that on account of which the act is chiefly placed; the secondary is that which moves the agent less than the primary, yet so that nothing prevents the agent, if that (secondary end) were lacking, from not acting. Primary in the former sense (which is ours) is equivalently the only or total end, and thus it is understood by St. Alphonsus (H. A. XVI. 136), when he explains who are to be judged to pass otherwise into fraud of reservation. Secondary, in the latter signification, is employed by the same holy Doctor, L. IV. n. 206, § Nota igitur, and is called by him the secondarily motive, without which the act (he is treating of a vow) would not be done. The Vindiciae give an example (Ed. 2. T. I. p. 307 (1); Ed. 1. p. 919. 1) in one who resolves to enter Religion in order to work out his eternal salvation; but since he is borne inordinately toward the eating of fish, he wishes to enter none but that of the Carthusians.

2° The end is intermediate or ultimate, according as it is referred to another end, or the will rests in it. Again the ultimate end is either a) positively or negatively ultimate, according as it is intended, or is not intended, with the exclusion of another end; or b) explicitly or implicitly intended, according as the agent is moved by an end of this sort expressly or only virtually. Thus the dealings by which a miser strives to increase riches, in which he places his beatitude or ultimate end, can be called so many intermediate ends. But if in riches the will rests in such a way that it excludes God, these will constitute an end positively ultimate; otherwise negatively ultimate. Again, if it expressly excludes God, those dealings will be an ultimate end explicitly intended; if not expressly, but he acts in such a way that he must be said by his deed to exclude Him, as if for increasing riches he commits mortal thefts, those dealings will be an ultimate end implicitly intended; for through mortal sin he renounces God. - A means is that which is intended insofar as it is useful for the end, without the will taking pleasure in it, as, for example, the lack of food which the miser unwillingly tolerates in order to increase his riches. Hence the intermediate end participates in the nature of a means insofar as it is referred to a further end; but in the nature of an end insofar as the will takes pleasure in it.

I say: 1° A human act derives true morality from the end, as being consonant with or dissenting from reason. Thus it is conformed to right reason not only to give alms, but also to give them for the remission of sins; just as likewise it is repugnant to right reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to make oneself drunk.

I say: 2° He sins who acts for delight alone. The reason is that he acts inordinately, perverting the order of things instituted by the author of nature. For according to the order instituted by the author of nature, delight exists on account of operation, and not conversely; namely delight, for example in eating or drinking, is as a certain salt and seasoning, which serves for enticing one to actions necessary or useful for life. Therefore delight is only a means for carrying out those actions more easily, better, and more constantly, but is not the ultimate end of the action. For thus St. Thomas says: The divine intellect, which is the institutor of nature, has appointed delights on account of operation.¹ Confirmation from proposition 8 condemned by Innocent XI (p. XV). - Yet this disorder of itself is not grave, and therefore does not exceed venial sin; because ordinarily the ultimate end is not excluded, not even implicitly, unless the matter is of those "whose," as the Apostle says, "God is the belly."

29. Resolutions. - 1° Every choice of an evil means is evil, but, conversely, not every choice of a good means is good. Thus no one is praised from the fact that he abstains from drink from avarice; but he is to be held guilty who steals money for making alms.

2° He who chooses an honorable means for an honorable end places an act of twofold honorableness, if each honorableness is intended. Likewise he is guilty of twofold malice who chooses an evil means for an evil end, for instance if someone steals money in order to make himself drunk.

3° He who employs an evil means for a good end contracts only the malice of the means, for example if someone lies in order to free his neighbor from danger. Likewise, conversely, he who employs an honorable means for an evil end contracts only the malice of the end.

4° He who employs an indifferent means for a good or evil end contracts only the goodness or malice of the end. Thus, for example, if you take up a journey in order to show a traveler the way, you have only the merit of the end; likewise if you sing in order to cause annoyance to another, you contract only the guilt of the end.

30. Questions. - It is asked 1° whether any evil end corrupts the whole goodness of the act.

Resp. 1° A gravely evil end always wholly infects the act, however good the object may be in itself. For an act by which someone, by sinning mortally, totally withdraws from God, can in no part be approved by God. Thus if someone gives alms to a needy girl in order to entice her to sin, although also in order to relieve her poverty, the act is wholly infected by the evil end.

Resp. 2° A lightly evil end also corrupts the whole act if it is the total end, or at least the primary end of the agent. For the total end (i.e. the end intended solely), since it embraces the whole object, infects the whole, because the agent wills the good under the aspect of evil, and therefore, insofar as it is willed by him, it is evil.²

This is also clear from the words of Christ:¹ "If ... thy eye be evil, thy whole body will be dark." But if there is a twofold end, and the evil one is primary, it must be resolved in the same way, because in such a case there is not indeed physically, but morally, one act of the will, since the secondary end is subordinated to the primary end² (in the sense declared above in n. 28 in the former place); as if someone gives alms from mercy and from vain glory, and would not give unless he expected the praises of men.

Resp. 3° But if the end, lightly evil, is merely secondary, more probably it does not corrupt the whole act, which is partly good and partly evil. The reason is that in this case two acts of the will are present, even morally, of which one is not subordinated to the other, and of which one is good, the other evil. If it were otherwise, fewer good acts would be found. - You have an example in one who from a sincere affection of mercy wishes to give alms to a poor person, but because the poor person asks publicly, there also enters the stimulus of vain glory, which is not repelled. - Let the same be the judgment concerning a lightly evil circumstance sometimes accompanying an act good from the object, as when someone, rebuking another from charity, incidentally consents to a movement of anger. For a movement of this sort is an act standing of itself. Wherefore properly it does not deprave the act which it accompanies, but mixes evil with it.²

31. - It is asked 2° whether all our actions must be referred to God, according to the words of the Apostle:³ Whether therefore you eat, ... do all things unto the glory of God?

Resp. More commonly, with St. Thomas, Doctors teach⁴ that in the words of the Apostle a precept is truly contained.

It is asked 3° what is required so that one not sin against this precept.

Resp. "This relation" of all works "unto the glory of God is understood either in act, or in aptitude of being referred, which is not only in good things, but also in indifferent things."⁵ With these things set down, I say:

1° On the part of the work, it is required that it be referable to God; such is also a work indifferent from the object. Therefore it suffices that it be neither mortally nor venially evil.

2° On the part of the agent, some positive relation of works to God is certainly required. But what kind?

Resp. a) An actual relation is required as often as the precept of eliciting an act of charity urges; for "under the precept of charity it is contained that God be loved from the whole heart; and therefore a man cannot fulfill the precept of charity unless all things also are referred to God."¹

b) When the precept of eliciting an act of charity is not urging, a virtual relation is required and suffices. It is required, "so that an actual relation to God be joined to every action of ours, not indeed in act but in virtue, according as the virtue of the first ordering," i.e. of the actual ordering previously had, "remains in all following actions, just as the virtue of the ultimate end also remains in all ends ordered to it."²

c) In neither case is an explicit relation required, but an implicit one suffices. It suffices in the former case, namely when the precept of eliciting an act of charity urges, "because whenever the habit of charity goes forth into act, the ordering of the whole man to the ultimate end takes place, and consequently of all the things which are ordered to him."³ It likewise suffices in the latter case; for "it is not necessary," nor possible, "that someone always think of the ultimate end whenever he desires or does something."⁴

d) It is not required that we refer our works to God from the motive of charity; for the mode of charity does not fall under the precept of the divine law, except when from precept an act of charity is to be elicited.⁵ St. Alphonsus agrees,⁶ requiring nothing other and nothing more, except that works be referred "to any honorable good."

e) Nor is it required that all things be done from a supernatural motive. "And therefore when some unbeliever, from the dictate of reason, does some good thing, not referring it to evil, he does not sin."⁷ This is confirmed from proposition 8 among those condemned by Alexander VIII (p. XXII).

Corollaries. - 1. Those are to be said to observe this precept, insofar as it demands an actual relation, who elicit an act of charity when the precept of eliciting it urges.

2. Likewise those who, when this precept does not urge, deliberately place a work honorable in itself, "not referring it to evil";¹ - who study to preserve the mean of virtue in jokes, games, recreations, adornment, etc.;² - who collectively order all their works to God. For those who deliberately place a work honorable in itself, by this very fact that they do not refer it to evil, are to be judged to intend, at least implicitly, the honorableness of the work. But those who study to preserve the mean of virtue in jokes, etc., by this very zeal of theirs show themselves to seek the good of virtue. Finally, the collective relation of all works to God implicitly contains the relation of each one.

3. "Although someone approaching the table does not think of the conservation of life, but only of the delight of food, ... he does not on that account sin, because he wills such delight," at least virtually (as is supposed), "on account of the conservation of life, and thus he does not inordinately seek it."³

4. "That the intention may remain more in virtue in our daily actions,"⁴ and that the precept of the Apostle may be fulfilled in a more perfect and more salutary manner, "one ought more often in the day, at least in the morning, generally to offer all one's acts to God."⁵

It is asked 4° in what way the human will, that it may be good, ought to be conformed to the divine will.

Resp. 1° In all things it ought to be conformed at least negatively, i.e. it is never permitted to disapprove that which God wills, or to murmur against it; for He disposes all things wisely.

Resp. 2° Positively our will can be conformed to the divine will in two ways, namely in the thing willed materially and in the thing willed formally. The thing willed materially is the thing itself or object which we will; the thing willed formally is the reason or end on account of which we will that thing. Again, the thing willed formally is of two kinds: one proximate or particular, i.e. the particular reason on account of which we will that thing; the other universal or ultimate, and it is the glory of God. Thus, while I will my father to live, whom God wills to die, the thing willed materially is the life of the father; the thing willed formally and proximately is the reason of piety toward one's father, the good of the family, etc. But if I should will this ultimately on account of the glory of God, my will is conformed to the divine will in the thing willed formally and ultimately; because just as the ultimate reason on account of which God wills my father to die is the glory of God, so the ultimate reason on account of which I will my father to live is also the glory of God. With these things set down:

I say: a) Our will ought positively to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed formally and ultimately, but not always in the thing willed formally and proximately. - I say: "it ought positively to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed formally and ultimately"; for the motive of the divine will is ultimately referred to the glory of God, to which the human will, that it may be right, ought to refer all its actions, at least virtually, as was said above.

I added: "but not always in the thing willed formally and proximately"; because, although it is unlawful to will something opposed to the divine will under the same reason under which God wills it, nevertheless it is not always unlawful to will it under a diverse reason, namely one which is not dishonorable. Thus it can happen that a son, on account of reasons of particular good, lawfully wills his father to live; but God wills him to die on account of other reasons, for example on account of sins, or because the course of nature demands it.

I say: b) Our will ought to be positively conformed to the divine will also in the thing willed materially, where the matter concerns a sufficiently known precept or prohibition; for the will of God commanding or prohibiting, when sufficiently known, always has annexed the will of obliging man to willing and doing what He commands, or to not willing and not doing what He forbids. I said: "where the matter concerns a precept or prohibition." - Wherefore 1. of itself I am not bound to will to follow the evangelical counsels. Yet I am bound, as is clear from the things said under Resp. 1°, to be conformed negatively to the divine will with respect to them, insofar as it is not permitted to disapprove them, since they are good and salutary. - Nor 2.

am I bound to will all things harmful to me which, God willing, happen to me, hunger, sickness, the death of parents, etc., in such a way that it is lawful for me, as much as I can, to flee them or strive against them. But after and insofar as these things have already happened, it is not permitted with an absolute and consequent will to oppose them, because again this would be the same as not being conformed to the divine will even negatively. But with an antecedent or conditioned will I am not bound in these things to be conformed to the divine will; and in this way it is lawful for a son to will his father, who is already dead, to live, namely while he wills this under another reason than that under which God willed the opposite. For the antecedent or conditioned will considers the life of the father under the reason of a particular good, abstractly from the circumstance of the divine will. - Haine,¹ Dens.² Cf. S. Th.³ and St. Alphonsus.⁴