Penance and Confession

Penance is taken in two ways, as it is a virtue and as it is a sacrament. The virtue of penance is a part of the sacrament of penance, namely the act of the penitent (sorrow for sins), which is necessary for validly receiving the sacrament; and from this part the sacrament takes its name.

218. Definition. Penance, as it is a sacrament, is defined: the sacrament by which sins committed after baptism are remitted to a contrite and confessed man through priestly absolution.

The specific difference of this sacrament from the other sacraments is set forth by the words by which the matter is signified, namely contrition and confession; the form, namely priestly absolution; and the effect, which is the remission of sins committed after baptism.

219. Nature of the sacrament of penance. To declare the nature of this sacrament, insofar as it is needed in moral theology, these things must be repeated from dogmatic institutions.¹

1. Christ gave to the apostles and to their successors in the priesthood the true power of remitting and retaining sins committed after baptism.

a. That this power was conferred on the apostles is clear from the words of Christ: Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained.²

b. That this power was handed on not only to the apostles but also to their successors in the priesthood is deduced especially from its end: for since the need of obtaining remission of sins exists perpetually in the Church, the power of remitting sins also ought to endure perpetually in the Church.

2. The power of remitting and retaining sins is a judicial power, which is exercised by way of judgment.

a. Three things are required for a judicial act or sentence: alpha. that knowledge of the cause precede it as a necessary condition; beta. that the judge, endowed with due authority, pronounce the law or sentence; gamma. that he pronounce sentence not according to whim, but according to the merits or demerits of the man whose cause is being treated.

b. Now that the power of remitting and retaining sins is not merely gracious, as is the power of baptizing, but judicial, is gathered both from the natural force of the words signifying the power of the keys and especially from the power of retaining sins joined with the power of remitting them.

3. The exercise of the power of remitting and retaining sins is the sacrament of penance, instituted by Christ in the very handing over of this power. Certainly all things are present in it which constitute a true sacrament: a. a sensible sign: namely Christ willed that by absolution pronounced by voice sins be remitted to men; b. efficacious of grace, since sins are remitted through the infusion of grace; c. stably instituted by Christ, namely as long as sinners exist who need the remission of sins.

In this this sacrament differs especially from other sacraments (except, however, matrimony, which also consists in a juridic act, namely in mutual consent): that it does not consist, like the others, in a certain consecration, but in a sacramental judgment; and that it does not remit sins by way of gift and benefit, but through a judicial act.

¹ Cf. Palmieri, De poenitentia, p. 45. Chr. Pesch, Praelect. dogm., VII, n. 58 ff. Hurter, Compend. theol. dogm., III, n. 436 ff.

² John 20:22, 23.

220. On the necessity of the sacrament of penance. 1. This sacrament, received in reality if it can be done, or, if it cannot be had, at least in desire, is necessary by necessity of means for salvation for all who after baptism have fallen into mortal sin: for the remission of mortal sin committed after baptism is simply necessary for salvation; but the means instituted by Christ for obtaining it is the sacrament of penance, received in reality if it can be done; but if it cannot be done, at least the desire of it is required.¹ Wherefore the Council of Trent says: This sacrament of penance is necessary for salvation to those fallen after baptism, as baptism itself is to those not yet regenerated.²

a. Although contrition perfected by charity reconciles a man to God before reception of the sacrament, nevertheless the reconciliation itself is not produced by contrition without the desire of the sacrament, which is included in it;³ for in the New Testament there is no remission of (mortal) sins independently of the power of the keys. Therefore the necessity of this sacrament is, like that of baptism, a hypothetical necessity of means.⁴

b. By desire of the sacrament is understood a serious will or purpose of confessing. This purpose does not necessarily have to be explicit, but an implicit one suffices, such as is contained in the act of perfect contrition: for he who truly loves God has the will of observing all things which from the will and institution of God are necessary for salvation. Nor must it be a purpose of confessing as soon as possible, but in due time, namely when either because of danger of death or because of the ecclesiastical precept the obligation of confessing presses.

2. This sacrament received in reality is necessary for all fallen after baptism by necessity of precept, both divine and ecclesiastical.

a. The divine precept: for for adults, from the institution and will of God, the sacrament of penance is a means necessary for obtaining remission of sins and eternal salvation.⁵

b. The ecclesiastical precept concerning the use of the sacrament of penance to be made every year by individual Christians was enacted in the Fourth Lateran Council, and again in the Council of Trent, and finally in the Code of Canon Law.⁶

¹ Cf. Pesch, VII, n. 353 ff.

² Sess. 14, c. 2.

³ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 3.

⁴ Cf. De Praeceptis, n. 7.

⁵ "If anyone shall deny that sacramental confession either was instituted or is necessary for salvation by divine law..." anathema sit. Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 6.

⁶ Fourth Lateran Council, c. Omnis utriusque. Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 8. Cn. 906. Cf. De praeceptis, n. 692 ff.

221. When the divine precept obliges. The divine precept of receiving the sacrament of penance or of confessing presses both of itself and by accident.

1. And of itself indeed it presses in danger of death: for positive precepts oblige at least at that time when they are necessary; otherwise they would be imposed in vain. But, with mortal sin supposed, confession in death is plainly necessary; therefore a sinner who is found in certain or probable danger of death is bound by divine law to confess, if he can.

According to the opinion of many authors it presses also several times in life, although it cannot be determined how often and when it presses. Yet this obligation from divine precept cannot be demonstrated with certitude. But from the argument of this opinion, namely that it is not licit for a sinful man to remain long in the state of sin, but that he is bound by divine law to reconcile himself with God, it does not follow that this must be done through sacramental confession: for it can be done through perfect contrition with the desire of confession to be made in due time.

2. By accident, however, it obliges: alpha. when the sacrament of the Eucharist must be received; beta. when the state of grace is required, e.g., if a sacrament of the living must be confected or received and an act of perfect contrition cannot be elicited; gamma. if at any time so grave a temptation presses that it cannot be overcome by other means.

222. On the parts of this sacrament. The parts of the sacrament of penance can be assigned in diverse ways: on the part of the whole sacrament the parts of penance are two, as in all the other sacraments, namely matter (contrition, confession, and satisfaction) and form (absolution); the parts of penance on the part of the penitent alone are contrition, confession, and satisfaction, and on the part of the priest alone, absolution. The question disputed among theologians, which parts of penance are essential, must at least be touched in passing.

1. With all agreeing, absolution is the essential and principal part of the sacrament of penance; and in like manner all agree that satisfaction actually imposed and fulfilled is only an integral part of this sacrament: for the primary effect of the sacrament of penance, namely the remission of sin, is produced even if satisfaction is not imposed or, once imposed, is not actually completed.

If satisfaction is called an essential part of the sacrament of penance, this can be understood in the confessor only of the power which can and must impose satisfaction, and in the penitent only of the will of accepting and fulfilling satisfaction, which will is always virtually contained in contrition.

2. Whether contrition and confession, or sorrowful confession, is an essential part of the sacrament is disputed. And the Thomists indeed, to whom also some Scotists had acceded, commonly teach with the more recent authors that the acts of the penitent, or sorrowful confession, are an essential part of the sacrament, so that together with absolution they signify and cause the remission of sins and justifying grace. But several Scotists with a few more recent authors affirm¹ that priestly absolution alone is the properly essential part of the sacrament, since it alone signifies and causes remission of sins and sanctifying grace; but that sorrowful confession or the acts of the penitent are necessarily required by way of disposition and condition without which not.

3. Therefore to the question in what the essence of the sacrament of penance consists, the Thomists answer: in the sorrowful confession of sins and in sacramental absolution together; but the Scotists answer: in sacramental absolution alone, with contrition and confession supposed as a necessarily prerequired condition. What is true in this question cannot be defined with certainty; each opinion is probable, neither is certain.

¹ Among recent authors the Scotistic opinion is not displeasing to D'Annibale (III, n. 181, 2), Ballerini-Palmieri (V, n. 3 ff.), Berardi (Prax. confess., IV, n. 2).

223. Effects of the sacrament of penance. 1. Remission of sins through the infusion of sanctifying grace, by which sins are so remitted that afterward they no longer revive because of a subsequent sin.

2. Condonation of eternal punishment: for when mortal guilt has been destroyed, eternal punishment is also remitted, which is commuted into temporal punishment. Certainly grace, which is infused through the sacrament, grants a right to eternal glory, which cannot stand at the same time with liability to eternal punishment.

3. Condonation of temporal punishment: according to the disposition of the penitent God also remits temporal punishment according to a greater or lesser measure. Therefore, although it can happen that even the whole temporal punishment due for mortal sins remitted is destroyed, nevertheless this does not occur, as the Council of Trent says, without great weepings and labors of ours.¹

4. Revival of merits: for meritorious works mortified by sin revive again through penance, insofar as, the impediment of mortal sin having been removed, they are again worthy of the reward of eternal life.

a. From the divine promise, sins are so destroyed through penance that after conversion they do not harm the wicked man;² but they would harm very greatly if merits did not revive. Moreover, unless merits revived, God would have to be said to punish eternal punishment, already remitted, again; for punishment would then exist in the privation of merits, since by the privation of a greater degree of glory proportionate to them it would endure forever; but this cannot be admitted, both because in revelation no mention occurs of a punishment of this kind, and because the state of punishment cannot be composed with the state of most perfect friendship, such as is in the blessed.

b. Therefore, of moral works which are performed by man, five kinds can be distinguished: alpha. meritorious works or living works, which are worthy of the reward of eternal life; beta. mortified works, which render a man worthy of eternal death; gamma. dead works, which in themselves are good, but because they are done by a man in the state of mortal sin, are worthy neither of reward nor of punishment; delta. mortified works, which before were living works indeed, but with sin supervening cannot be worthy of eternal life; epsilon. revived works, which before, having been mortified, once mortal sin has been removed, again become living and worthy of eternal reward.

5. Sacramental grace or a right to the helps of grace. And since the end of this sacrament is that sins be destroyed, these helps tend to this, that man may be able to satisfy for past sins and guard against future sins.

¹ Sess. 14, c. 2.

² Ezech. 18:21 ff.

The matter of penance is one thing remote, another proximate; it must be noted, however, that the word matter is used here in another sense than in the remaining sacraments.

a. The remote matter is all sins committed after baptism. It is also called the matter about which, because the acts of the penitent and the absolution of the priest are occupied about these sins themselves as to be detested and destroyed.

b. Remote matter is distinguished: alpha. necessary and free; beta. certain and doubtful; gamma. sufficient and not sufficient.

224. On necessary matter. Those sins are called necessary matter which by divine precept must necessarily be submitted to the keys of the Church through confession. This matter is constituted by all and only mortal sins committed after baptism and not yet directly remitted by force of the keys, or directly indeed remitted, but not accused as is required.¹

a. Sins are said to be directly remitted which are remitted by force of absolution; and in this way are remitted all those sins which by the penitent in themselves are rightly submitted to the keys of the Church and are pardoned by a confessor having jurisdiction over them. Sins are said to be indirectly remitted which are remitted by force of sanctifying grace infused through sacramental absolution. If, for example, a suitably disposed penitent omits a grave sin in confession from inculpable forgetfulness, the absolution of the confessor necessarily produces the remission of sins and the infusion of grace, but it itself cannot remit except sins submitted to the keys; yet grace cannot be infused unless all mortal sins are destroyed; therefore by force of the infused grace even the sin omitted in confession is remitted indirectly and by concomitance.

b. If a penitent because of a legitimate cause excusing from the integrity of confession, e.g., a dying man, accuses his sins only in general, these are directly remitted, but there remains the obligation of declaring them afterward more accurately, if it can be done, because the divine precept of declaring sins according to species and number has not yet been fulfilled.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5. Condemned proposition of Alexander VII, n. 11.

225. Whether an adult who has been rebaptized under condition is bound to confess sins committed before this baptism.

a. A Catholic adult who has again been baptized under condition is not bound to confess again sins already accused: for if the first baptism was valid, the sins have already been remitted through absolution; and if the baptism was not valid, they are remitted through the second baptism. But sins committed from the last confession and not yet accused must be declared integrally in confession.

Nor may it be said that, because these sins perhaps have already been remitted through the baptism now conferred, it is not certainly established that there is an obligation of confessing them; but a doubtful obligation is no obligation. For the obligation of confessing these sins is plainly certain, which will be evident from those things which must immediately be said concerning an acatholic adult baptized again.

b. An acatholic adult who, having been converted to the faith, because of baptism doubtfully conferred is baptized again under condition, must confess his sins integrally.

alpha. Several authors (D'Annibale, Ballerini-Palmieri, Bucceroni, Genicot) teach that confession indeed is to be advised, but is not to be imposed from obligation, except in those places in which it has been prescribed by the bishops. For baptism previously received is doubtfully valid and therefore the obligation of confessing the sins of the past life is doubtful; but a doubtful obligation is no obligation. But the sins themselves committed after the doubtfully valid baptism are certainly destroyed. For if the first baptism was invalid, they are destroyed through the second baptism; if it was valid, they are destroyed through perfect contrition or indirectly through confession performed with attrition.¹ But the decrees of the Holy See issued concerning this matter do not contain a universal law, but only a particular precept given for those to whom they referred, because of their special conditions.

beta. Nevertheless the opinion affirming the obligation of integral confession in the case under discussion seems to be held.

alpha. It is indeed true that there exists no decree of the Holy See by which the obligation of integral confession for those who are rebaptized under condition is expressly declared. For the four decrees of the Holy Office hitherto issued concerning this matter, by which the obligation of confession is proclaimed, are in reality particular: the first in the case of Carl Wippermann, 1715; the other to the bishop of Philadelphia, 1859; the third to the bishops of England, 1868; the fourth to the bishop of Vallispratensis, 1874. But the response of the S. C. de prop. fide, 10 July 1869, given to the bishop of Quebec and finally published in 1899, by which it is declared that the decree of the Holy Office to the bishops of England contains a universal law, is of private authority, published by the secretary of the congregation without the congregation itself having been consulted.² Yet it is rightly affirmed that the Church by these decrees, although in themselves particular, has virtually and equivalently declared that the sins of the doubtfully baptized constitute necessary matter of confession and must be declared in confession by divine law. For although the decrees refer to particular cases, nevertheless, since their circumstances are very diverse and yet the same decision is always presented, it is a sign that the same reason underlies all, which is no other than that the sins of the doubtfully baptized, from the will of Christ, constitute necessary matter of absolution and therefore must be submitted by all to the keys of the Church.

beta. The internal reason by which the certain obligation of confessing sins committed after baptism not certainly valid is proved is this. From the certain conferral of baptism there arises a certain right of the Church over him who received baptism (even if perhaps invalid), and this because of the very grave harms which would follow if the doubtfully baptized were not judged her subjects and subject to all her laws. The very same judgment must be borne in doubt concerning the value of a marriage certainly contracted, in doubt concerning the value of a religious profession certainly emitted, in doubt concerning the value of sacred ordination certainly received, and this because of the grave evils which would otherwise follow.

¹ Cf. Lacroix, l. 6, pr. 1, n. 323.

² Cf. Mannajoli, De obligationibus christianorum propriis, quibus in genere dubie baptizati obstringuntur (Rome: Pustet, 1913), p. 139 ff., p. 197.

226. Sins committed in baptism itself can practically be counted among the doubtful matter of the sacrament of penance; wherefore they need not necessarily be declared in confession, nor can they alone be remitted absolutely through absolution.¹

The sin of fiction or unworthy reception of baptism, or another sin, e.g., of doubt in faith, committed in the very act of baptism, does not indeed impede the value but nevertheless impedes the effect of baptism. Now it is asked whether these sins are destroyed by force of baptism, which revives when the obstacle has been removed, or whether they must be accused in the following confession, so that they may be remitted by force of absolution. Commonly authors, making no distinction between the sin of fiction and other sins, affirm that all sins committed in the reception itself of baptism constitute necessary matter of penance: for these sins must be said to have been committed after baptism; therefore they must be destroyed through penance. - For it can scarcely happen that sin is completed in the very instant of baptism conferred in such a way that it does not continue after baptism has been received; but if nevertheless it were already completed in the very instant of baptism conferred, it could not be destroyed through penance. Since, however, some doubt concerning the obligation of confessing these sins,² others deny it,³ and finally since it can scarcely be discerned whether the sin had already been terminated in the very instant of baptism or also endured afterward, these sins in practice are rightly counted among doubtful matter.

¹ Ballerini-Palmieri, V, n. 18.

² St. Alphonsus, n. 427.

³ D'Annibale, III, n. 164; Lugo, disp. 16, n. 2.

227. On free matter. Those sins are called free matter which can be submitted to the keys of the Church, but need not be. This is constituted by venial sins committed after baptism and not yet remitted, and by sins both mortal and venial already directly remitted.

a. Venial sins are matter of this sacrament, because they are true sins committed against the law of God and therefore can be remitted through the power of the keys, which is not restricted to some genus of sins; but free matter, because in confession they can be concealed without fault and in many other ways they can be destroyed.¹

b. Sins already remitted are matter of this sacrament, because nothing prevents the pardon of a committed sin from being sought and given repeatedly, as will be said below; but they are free matter, because sins already remitted do not need repeated accusation.

c. Since sins both venial and mortal already once remitted are not necessary matter but free matter, it follows that in the confession of mortal sins venial sins may licitly be omitted, whether all or several; but in the confession of venial sins some, even most venial sins, may be omitted; finally in a general confession which is not necessary, not only venial sins, but also mortal sins, whether some or several, whose confession has already once been duly made, may be omitted.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5.

228. On certain and doubtful matter. Certain matter is every true sin certainly committed, whose absolution therefore (with the things to be supposed supposed) is certainly valid; doubtful matter is a doubtful sin, i.e., either one not certainly committed, or one which is not certainly a true sin, whose absolution therefore (even with the other requisites supposed) cannot be called certainly valid. Therefore, if nothing is submitted to the keys except a doubtful sin, of which kind is alpha. a sin doubtfully committed; beta. a doubtfully mortal sin; gamma. a sin doubtfully accused, absolution will be valid if guilt really underlies it, and will be invalid if no guilt underlies it.

a. He who brings nothing except doubtful matter (whether because he doubts concerning consent or because he narrates mere imperfections) of itself can never be absolved absolutely, nor even conditionally without an urgent cause, because the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity. For this reason, if a penitent confesses only doubtful sins, he must be induced to accuse from his past life some certain sin already remitted, whether mortal or at least venial, either by saying: I accuse myself of sins committed formerly against charity, religion, chastity; or by responding affirmatively to the confessor asking: do you accuse yourself and are you sorry for sins committed formerly against charity, religion, chastity?

b. But if this cannot be done, whether because he has committed nothing certain or because from simplicity or weakness he does not remember them, he is to be absolved under condition (if you are capable), if the doubtful sins proposed are mortal. But if the doubtful sins which he confesses are venial and nothing certain from prior life can be added, he is not to be absolved even under condition except rarely, because on the one hand from absolution denied no great spiritual damage arises, and on the other hand the sacrament is not to be exposed to danger of nullity unless spiritual damage is feared which otherwise cannot conveniently be avoided.

c. The practice has grown strong in the Church that penitents, especially pious ones who confess rather often, add to the sins committed since the last confession at least generically one or another sin of the past life; and this is usually done for a twofold reason: first, that certain matter of confession may be had, if perhaps the sins committed since the last confession are only doubtful; then that sorrow for the sins declared in confession may be conceived more certainly, if perhaps true and sincere sorrow is lacking concerning light daily defects. Now, lest the end of this practice be frustrated, namely of providing for the validity and fruit of the sacrament, penitents must be warned that from the sins of their past life they add those which more burden their conscience and for which they truly and sincerely grieve and propose amendment.

d. Not rarely penitents accuse themselves with this or a similar formula: I had doubts against faith, or I had temptations against chastity; of these I accuse myself insofar as before God I am guilty. Ordinarily by this formula they intend to signify a doubt concerning a sin committed. Wherefore if they have not accused other certain sins, they cannot be absolved unless from past life they submit to the keys some certain sin for which they grieve and propose amendment.

229. On sufficient and not sufficient matter. Sufficient matter is said to be sins from which the penitent can validly be absolved; but insufficient matter is said to be sins from which he cannot validly be absolved. Every true personal sin constitutes sufficient matter; but what is not a true personal sin, such as an imperfection, constitutes insufficient matter, cn. 902.

1. That sins already remitted through absolution constitute sufficient matter of absolution is established from the use and practice of the Church: for it would be impious to doubt the value of some sacramental action which the whole Church throughout the world frequents.

That sins already remitted can be matter of absolution is certain and can be declared in this way. Just as we can truly renounce several times a right which we have already once renounced, e.g., by renewing religious vows, so God can truly renounce several times the right to vengeance which he had acquired from our sins. And just as a father, who has already given pardon of an offense to a son, if the son asks again, truly and properly grants the same pardon again, so God grants it again to a sinner asking pardon again in confession, even truly and properly. But the granting of pardon from divine institution is done through the infusion of grace. Nor can it be said that the words of absolution in this case are not true, since no sins are present to be absolved: for the words of absolution signify not only the remission of sin, but also the infusion of grace, which of itself and by its nature is remissive of sin and therefore would remit it if it were present; but since it is not present, the grace itself alone is conferred by accident.¹

2. By the name of imperfection here is understood both an indeliberate transgression of a precept and an action or omission which is opposed not to a precept but to a counsel.² Therefore imperfections of themselves are not sins, and accordingly do not constitute sufficient matter of penance; nevertheless penitents are not to be prevented from confessing their imperfections, both because ordinarily they have an attached venial sin, and because from knowledge of them the confessor can better direct the penitent. But mere imperfections which are submitted to the keys of the Church constitute only doubtful matter, because perhaps they are joined with venial sins.³

a. Imperfections which are committed by this, that counsels or more perfect things are neglected, have an attached sin when the more perfect things are omitted from a disordered affection, not from a reasonable motive.⁴ Now in order that these defects constitute apt matter of absolution, they must in some way be declared in confession, and true sorrow must be conceived concerning them.

b. Although imperfections as such cannot be the object of sacramental absolution, nevertheless they are moral defects concerning which we can grieve, so that we may render God more propitious and beneficent to us. For since God is accustomed to be more liberal toward those who perform even works of supererogation and of mere counsel, but ordinarily denies more abundant helps of grace and providence to those who neglect works of this kind, nothing prevents those desiring more abundant graces from grieving concerning negligences of this kind, so that God may more certainly become more beneficent toward them.

¹ Cf. Lugo, disp. 13, n. 73.

² Cf. De principiis, n. 286.

³ Lugo, disp. 16, n. 103.

⁴ Cf. De principiis, n. 92.

230. On sins accused only in general. a. The confession of sins is generic if sins are not accused in that specific mode (in the lowest species) in which from the will of Christ they must be accused. Therefore a generic confession of sins can be instituted in three diverse ways: alpha. if the penitent only says that he has sinned, and does not determine whether he has sinned gravely or lightly: I accuse myself of my sins, or if he gives only signs of sorrow without any confession of sin, e.g., by striking the breast or by sighs; beta. if the penitent only says that he has sinned gravely, and does not determine the genus or species of the sin: I accuse myself of my mortal sins; gamma. if the penitent only says the genus or subaltern species of the sin, and does not determine the lowest species: I accuse myself of sins committed against justice, against religion, against the fourth or sixth precept. Concerning the first mode especially the question is instituted, whether sins accused only in general are sufficient matter of valid absolution; for if that accusation suffices for valid absolution, a fortiori the others will be sufficient.

b. To solve the question, one must distinguish between the matter which is required from the precept of Christ, and that which from the essence of the sacrament instituted by way of judgment is required and suffices for valid absolution. Besides this, one must distinguish the case of necessity, where namely specific confession of sins is impossible and absolution is necessary, from the case in which either specific confession is possible or absolution is not necessary.

1. Outside the case of necessity a generic confession of mortal sins does not suffice for receiving valid absolution. For from the precept of Christ grave sins must be declared distinctly and determinately as to species and number, in order that absolution be valid: for Christ willed that absolution, which has the character of a judicial sentence, outside the case of necessity be an exact and perfect judgment, which cannot be instituted without accurate knowledge of the cause. Therefore he who does not confess sins distinctly fails in the precept of Christ, and therefore from defect of disposition is incapable of valid absolution.

2. In a case of necessity, where accurate confession is impossible, for valid absolution it suffices that sins be declared only in general: for impotence excuses from affirmative precepts; wherefore in a case of necessity no other confession is required except that which the essence of the sacrament or judicial sentence demands. But a judgment cannot indeed be had without any knowledge of the cause; nevertheless a true judgment, although imperfect, can be instituted, provided some confused and indistinct knowledge of the judicial cause is supplied; therefore, looking to the essence of judgment, generic and indistinct confession of sins suffices for valid absolution. These things are well confirmed from the practice of the Church, which is the authentic interpreter of the institutions of Christ: for the Church not only permits that, e.g., to soldiers when battle is imminent, or to sailors when shipwreck is threatening, after a generic confession has first been made, absolution be given; but also commands that the dying who can confess only generically be absolved not conditionally, but absolutely.¹ From these things it is rightly inferred that, for certainly valid absolution in a case of necessity, generic confession of sins suffices.

In human judgment, which primarily and principally consists in the condemnatory sentence of the delinquent through the imposition of a punishment suitable to the crime, determinate and perfect knowledge of the cause is required essentially; but in sacramental judgment, which primarily and principally consists in the reconciliatory and absolutory sentence of the penitent, determinate and perfect knowledge of the cause is not essentially demanded. Although of itself a punishment suitable to the crime must also be imposed, nevertheless this is not required for the essence of sacramental judgment.

3. Outside the case of necessity, for valid absolution generic confession of sins seems to suffice where free matter is concerned, and especially where venial sins are concerned: for in the confession of venial sins and of free matter generally, for receiving valid absolution no other confession is required besides that which is necessary for the essence of the sacrament; for there is no precept of confessing venial sins. But for the essence of the sacrament generic confession of sins is sufficient: for the essence of the sacrament is one and immutable; therefore what suffices in necessity for instituting a valid sacramental judgment must also suffice outside necessity. Therefore in the confession of free matter, and specifically of venial sins, generic confession of sins is sufficient.

¹ Roman Ritual, tit. 3, c. 1, n. 24.

231. Whether a wholly generic confession of venial sins only is licit. - No one denies that a wholly generic confession, whether of mortal or venial sins, is licit in a case of necessity: for what is valid is also licit in a case of necessity. But a wholly generic confession of venial sins only (if, for example, a pious penitent who is not guilty of mortal sin only says: I accuse myself of my venial sins and ask absolution) outside a case of necessity is not licit, because it is contrary to the practice of the Church, which has the force of law.

a. From the first centuries of the Church up to these times, by the use and practice of the Church outside a case of necessity, specific confession even of venial sins has flourished; but this long-lasting custom has obtained the force of law in the same manner in which vocal confession of sins has obtained the force of law from custom. Therefore, from a precept of the Church introduced by legitimate custom, a specific confession of venial sins must be made. b. The sacrament of penance was instituted by Christ by way of judgment, which of itself and ordinarily ought to be concerned with matter determined at least in species, as is clear from the obligation of confessing mortal sins according to species and number. But the dignity and fittingness of the sacrament demands that outside a case of necessity, whether mortal or venial sins are submitted to the keys, the sacrament always be administered in that mode in which it was instituted by Christ, namely so that a judgment can be borne concerning determinate matter. c. If once a merely generic confession of venial sins were admitted, several inconveniences would follow: alpha. penitents would lack the admonitions, counsels, and spiritual direction of the confessor; beta. the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity, for several penitents, not distinguishing imperfections from sins, would easily submit only imperfections and therefore doubtful matter to the keys; gamma. several would not satisfy the precept of confession, for holding mortal sins to be venial they would not declare them in species; delta. more indulgent confessors would easily admit a generic confession even of mortal sins.¹

There are indeed some (Gury-Ballerini, Eschbach, Bucceroni, Apicella, Genicot, and among the older authors Dicastillo) who judge that a generic confession of venial sins is licit. But their opinion does not seem probable and therefore is illicit in practice. For they bring no other argument except this: "With the certain validity of the sacrament standing, illicitness cannot arise from elsewhere than from a positive divine precept; but this precept is not had. Therefore, where grave sins necessarily to be accused in confession are lacking, there is no obligation of accusing the remaining sins in determinate number and defined species" (Bucceroni). But the obligation does not arise from an explicit divine precept, but from the reasons brought forward above, especially from custom, which has obtained the force of law. Nor is an exception to be taken against this reason, that it is not established whether the faithful confessing venial sins in species indicate a strict obligation or only that which is better, because they confess only from devotion. For those confessing from devotion know that they can licitly abstain from confession; but if they confess, they think that they must confess in species.

¹ Cf. Laymann, l. 5, tr. 6, c. 5, n. 15.

232. Corollaries: a. From these things this instruction is gathered for practice: if someone, to render absolution more certain, joins to doubtful or lighter sins which he has committed since the last confession sins of the past life already remitted, absolutely speaking it suffices that they be added generically and indeterminately (I accuse myself also of the sins of my whole life). Nevertheless it is to be advised that the genus or subaltern species of one or another sin also be declared (I accuse myself also of sins committed against charity, religion, or against the fourth or sixth precept). And this must especially be advised when the sins declared from the last confession are truly doubtful, so that the sacramental judgment may be more determinate.

b. Therefore generic confession of sins in a case of necessity suffices both for valid and for licit absolution. A case of necessity is present if, on the one hand, specific accusation is impossible, and on the other hand, absolution is necessary. This happens in the following cases: alpha. if a dying man deprived of speech expresses by signs in some way confession and desire of absolution; beta. if soldiers with battle imminent or sailors with shipwreck threatening can confess only generically because of lack of time; gamma. if deaf-mutes or those whose language the confessor does not know ask for absolution; delta. if rude men, or those of failing memory because of old age, come to confession, who can accuse no sin in particular and respond nothing to questions posed except that they are sinners like other men. Therefore penitents of this kind can validly and licitly be absolved, because on account of moral impossibility they are excused from a more accurate accusation just as the dying deprived of speech are excused; but only rarely (three or four times in a year), because only in a case of necessity are they excused from specific confession. For the rest, if the confessor proposes to a penitent of this kind some sins into which he can be presumed once to have fallen, in this way: do you grieve for sins ever committed, but especially for lies, for negligences in divine service, etc., and if the penitent responds that he grieves, a more determinate accusation is also had, since it can certainly be supposed that the penitent formerly committed one or another of the sins proposed.¹ With this effort used, these can be absolved as often as they ask for absolution.

¹ Elbel-Bierbaum, III, pr. 9, n. 15.

233. The proximate matter of this sacrament is the three acts of the penitent: contrition, confession, and satisfaction as to be accepted. By the Council of Trent these acts are called the quasi-matter of the sacrament of penance.¹ In what manner the acts of the penitent stand in this sacrament, whether they are true matter from which the sacrament is constituted and confected, or only a necessary condition so that sacramental absolution may obtain its effect (n. 222), dogmatic theologians dispute.²

a. With the Thomists, the common opinion of more recent authors affirms that the acts of the penitent are the true matter of this sacrament, which together with priestly absolution constitutes the sacramental sign efficacious of grace. These think that the Council of Trent calls these acts quasi-matter because they are not a material thing as water is in baptism.

b. The Scotists with a few more recent authors teach that the acts of the penitent are not matter from which the sacramental sign is essentially constituted, but only a condition necessarily prerequired so that absolution, which alone is the efficacious sign of grace, may produce its effect. These judge that by the Council of Trent these acts are called quasi-matter because they do not truly and properly have the character of sacramental matter. Nevertheless, this must be added: the Scotists conceive their opinion in a diverse manner. For several, especially the older ones (Bosco, Sporer, Holzmann, etc.), require contrition and sensible confession as a condition of valid absolution, because the nature of sacramental judgment demands knowledge of the cause; but others, especially the more recent authors (Ballerini, Berardi, etc.), teach that merely internal acts suffice for valid absolution, namely contrition, in which the purpose of confessing is always implicitly contained, and which alone is a sufficient disposition for obtaining pardon of sins through absolution.

alpha. The Church in the Council of Trent deliberately abstained from deciding this question (whether the acts of the penitent are the matter of this sacrament);³ wherefore we can follow either opinion theoretically and practically. But because the opinion which teaches that the acts of the penitent are the proximate matter of the sacrament does not lack its probability, absolutions cannot be held certainly valid when a sorrowful confession of the penitent, in some way sensible, has not preceded them. And since the opinion which teaches that the acts of the penitent have only the character of a necessary condition is not destitute of all probability, those also can be absolved under condition who manifest no sign of sorrow and confession.

beta. The practical importance of this controversy is seen especially in the absolution of the dying: for if the acts of the penitent are essential parts and true matter of this sacrament, which by its nature ought to be sensible, he cannot validly be absolved who does not outwardly manifest those acts by a sensible sign; but if they have only the character of a necessary condition and disposition, absolution will be valid even if those acts are not manifested outwardly.

¹ Sess. 14, c. 3.

² Cf. Palmieri, De poenitentia, p. 144 ff.; Pesch, VII, n. 75 ff.; Ballerini-Palmieri, V, n. 9 ff.

³ Cf. Pallavicini, Historia concil. trid., l. 12, c. 10, 27.

Since the sacrament of penance was instituted for producing the remission of sins ex opere operato, it must be treated briefly, so that those things which below must be said concerning this sacrament may be declared more clearly. From these things at the same time the way is known by which the sinner can recover sanctifying grace lost through sin.

241. What it is. 1. An adult man, for obtaining remission of sins, must dispose himself through penance, by which he withdraws from sin and returns to God.

a. From Sacred Scripture of both the Old and New Testament it is established that God grants to men remission of sins only under this condition, that they do penance for the sins committed: But if the wicked man shall do penance for all his sins... he shall live life and shall not die.² Be penitent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out.³ Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish.⁴

b. Therefore the Council of Trent teaches: "At every time this movement of contrition was necessary for obtaining pardon of sins,"⁵ and the same council enumerates penance among the dispositions necessarily required for obtaining pardon of sins.⁶

c. Although God could absolutely remit sins to a sinful man without a previous act of penance, nevertheless in this order of providence it never happens, and it is altogether consonant with reason that God not reconcile the sinner, who by sin inflicted offense and injury upon him, unless he himself retracts the offense and injury inflicted, which is done through penance. Hence the noted words of St. Augustine: "He who made you without you does not justify you without you... he made you not knowing, he justifies you willing."⁷

alpha. The condition required for obtaining remission of sins is contained in diverse acts to be performed by the sinner with the help of grace. These acts are comprehended under the name of conversion, which from the Council of Trent is completed by these, as it were, steps. The sinner, moved by faith in God and by hope of obtaining pardon of sins through the mercy of God, conceives sorrow for sins committed, with the purpose of sinning no more and of beginning a new life through the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church.⁸

beta. The Council of Trent enumerates several acts which ought to precede remission of sins and justification: faith, fear, hope, love (the beginning of love), penance, purpose of a new life, will of receiving the sacrament.⁹ Yet by these it does not intend to teach that all these acts are necessary in every justification, but it enumerates those which are ordinarily present in the conversion of a sinner. The absolutely necessary act, and that explicit, is penance or sorrow for sins committed, with the purpose of not sinning for the rest; faith, hope, and desire of receiving the sacrament are indeed themselves necessary, but only implicitly; but perfect charity is not necessary for obtaining the remission of sins through the sacrament, and in like manner servile fear is not required.

2. The penance which is said to be necessary for obtaining pardon of sins in the sacrament is formal penance, namely an act of detestation and sorrow formally elicited; but special penance is not required, for general penance suffices (215).

a. Although the opinion of theologians is not improbable which holds that virtual penance (which is contained in charity) suffices by way of disposition for obtaining remission of sins (even mortal sins), nevertheless it does not suffice by way of sacramental matter. But according to the probable opinion of several, acts of penance constitute the matter of this sacrament.

b. In charity, penance or detestation of sin is contained virtually and in desire: virtually, because he who loves God above all things, by this very fact has hatred of sin; in desire, because he who loves God wills the things that please God; but detestation of sin pleases God.

¹ Azor, Institutiones morales, l. 4, c. 10; Suarez, De poenitentia, disp. 11; Lugo, De poenitentia, disp. 9; Sporer-Bierbaum, III, pr. 3, n. 33-47; Tepe, Institutiones theol. mor. gener. (Paris: Lethielleux, 1898), II, quaest. 3.

² Ezech. 18:21.

³ Acts 3:19.

⁴ Luke 13:5. Cf. Ezech. 18:30; Judith 8:14.

⁵ Sess. 14, c. 4.

⁶ Sess. 6, c. 6.

⁷ Serm. 169, c. 11, n. 13.

⁸ Sess. 6, c. 6.

⁹ Sess. 6, c. 6.

242. Principles. In this order of providence no sin, not even a venial one, is remitted without sorrow for the sin committed; now it is asked whether one sin can be remitted without another, or whether all must be destroyed at the same time.

1. One mortal sin cannot be remitted without another.

Since mortal sin is remitted through the infusion of sanctifying grace, but sanctifying grace cannot exist at the same time with mortal sin, to which grace is absolutely repugnant, either all sins which are in the soul are remitted, or none.

2. Mortal sin can be remitted without remission of venial sins.

Since venial sins are not repugnant to sanctifying grace, and penance for mortal sins can be had without its also being had for venial sins, it can happen that, a mortal sin having been remitted through the infusion of grace, venial sins are not condoned, if penance does not also extend to venial sins. Thus if someone is sorry for his sins because he has deserved hell or has fallen away from eternal beatitude, the penance does not extend to venial sins.

3. Venial sin cannot be remitted without remission of mortal sins.

It is impossible that God be reconciled in a light matter to a man who still has grave enmities with him. Moreover, no venial sin is remitted unless the man has exhibited condign satisfaction to God; but one existing in mortal sin cannot satisfy condignly: for satisfaction is not condign unless it is pleasing and accepted by God; but the satisfaction of a sinful man, since he is an enemy of God, cannot be accepted by God.

4. One venial sin can be remitted without another.

Since penance for one can be had without its also being had for another, and individual venial sins are not repugnant to grace and divine friendship, nothing prevents one from being condoned while another is not remitted. Yet he who truly grieves for all can be freed from all at once, both through his own act of sorrow, if it is of sufficient perfection, and through a remedy instituted for this, e.g., through a sacrament.

Since venial sin, equally with mortal sin, induces liability of guilt and liability of punishment, its remission must be explained as to guilt and as to punishment.

1. On remission as to guilt.

Venial sins are sometimes remitted ex opere operantis outside the sacraments, and sometimes ex opere operato through the sacraments.

243. Ex opere operantis. For venial sins to be remitted ex opere operantis, or by man's own acts, does not signify that the dispositions of the penitent man by their own force and efficacy effect their remission, since God alone can remit sins, even venial sins only; but it signifies that the disposition alone of the penitent suffices for obtaining their pardon from God without the intervention of another remedy instituted for this, e.g., a sacrament. Now since the Council of Trent teaches that venial sins can be expiated outside the sacrament of penance "by many other remedies,"¹ it is established that they are remitted also ex opere operantis, namely by acts of the penitent himself.

That God himself effects the remission of sins is clear: for sin is remitted by this, that God, putting aside anger and indignation, renders himself propitious and appeased to us, which God alone can do. Moreover, any sin whatsoever, even only venial, is remitted through an infusion of grace, which God alone can infuse.

¹ Sess. 14, c. 5.

244. Required disposition. 1. Venial sin is not remitted without an act of penance at least virtual, by which the sinner withdraws from affection for sin and retracts it. For God, speaking of sin in general, i.e., both mortal and venial, promises its remission only under the condition of penance (n. 241).

a. It is not required that penance be formal, but virtual suffices. Formal penance is an act by which we explicitly grieve for and detest the sin committed itself; virtual penance is called an act which is directly contrary to the sin committed. Therefore he elicits virtual penance: alpha. who asks pardon from God; beta. who proposes that he will sin no more; gamma. who exercises an act of the virtue contrary to the sin; delta. who exercises any good work whatsoever with this intention, that he obtain remission of sins.¹

b. That virtual penance suffices for obtaining remission of venial sins is gathered from this, that penance is the necessary disposition for obtaining remission of sins; but for a necessary disposition nothing else is required except that the will retract affection for venial sin, which is obtained through virtual penance.

c. Therefore venial sins are not remitted through any good works whatsoever of a just man, but only through those in which there is contained at least virtual penance and displeasure for sin, or which are directly opposed to sins. Thus a work of temperance does not suffice for obtaining pardon of a lie, since it contains not even a virtual retraction of the lie. Indeed not every act of charity suffices for obtaining pardon of venial sins, because not every act of charity excludes affection for venial sins. For someone can love God above all things in such a way that he prefers him to absolutely all things which displease him; but he can also love him above all things in such a way that he prefers him to all things which displease him gravely. The former act of charity excludes affection for all sins, both mortal and venial; the latter act of charity can stand with an affection even actual for venial sin.

2. Although attrition suffices for obtaining remission of venial sins outside the sacrament, nevertheless it must be conceived from a more perfect motive.

There is no doubt that perfect contrition which also extends to venial sins suffices for obtaining their remission; but it is not necessary for obtaining this effect outside the sacrament.

a. According to the doctrine of the Council of Trent, venial sins can be expiated outside the sacrament of penance by many other remedies;² but if contrition were necessary for obtaining pardon of venial sins, it would have to be called the one means to this end. And certainly the remission of a lighter offense will also be easier; therefore, since mortal sin is destroyed by perfect contrition alone, venial sin can also be destroyed by imperfect contrition.

b. Motives of attrition can be distinguished into two kinds: some more perfect, as if someone grieves for venial sins because they are against obedience and reverence due to God, because they diminish the honor and worship of God, because they delay union with God, etc.; others less perfect, which are taken from the baseness of sin insofar as sin defiles the soul, from fear of purgatory, from fear of temporal punishments. Now if the same attrition sufficed for obtaining pardon of venial sins in the sacrament and outside the sacrament, the sacrament of penance would never destroy venial guilt: for before reception of the sacrament they would already have been remitted through attrition. But that the sacrament of penance never remits venial sins is contrary to the mind of Christ, who instituted penance also for destroying venial sins, and contrary to the sense and practice of the faithful, who confess frequently for this reason, because they are persuaded that through the sacrament of penance they obtain pardon of venial sins.³

¹ Sporer-Bierbaum, III, pr. 3, n. 35.

² Sess. 14, c. 5.

³ Cf. Lugo, De poenit., disp. 9, n. 29.

245. Ex opere operato. a. In order that venial sins may be said to be remitted ex opere operato, three things are required: first, that that through which venial sins are said to be remitted moves God to producing the effect by force of institution, i.e., that the sign itself or instrument instituted for this has the power of producing the effect, namely the remission of venial sins; then, that the effect to producing which God is moved, with the necessary disposition supposed, is immediately the remission itself of venial sins, not the conferral of a supernatural help by which man may dispose himself to obtaining remission; third finally, that sins are destroyed by force of a remedy instituted by God without that disposition which by itself alone suffices for destroying venial sins.

b. The sacraments have the power of remitting venial sins ex opere operato. This is certain concerning four sacraments: baptism, penance, extreme unction, and the Eucharist. For baptism and penance were instituted primarily for destroying sins, whether mortal or venial; extreme unction likewise was instituted secondarily for remitting sins; finally, concerning the Eucharist there can scarcely be doubt, since the Council of Trent says: "Our Savior wished this sacrament to be received as an antidote by which we may be freed from daily faults."¹ As to confirmation, order, and matrimony, the matter is less certain; nevertheless several theologians affirm it. For although they were instituted by Christ for producing peculiar effects, nevertheless they agree with the other sacraments in this, that they are remedies for sins; indeed sometimes first grace is also conferred through them and mortal sins are destroyed.²

c. Through the sacraments venial sins are remitted without that disposition which by itself alone would suffice for obtaining their pardon. Therefore, in order that venial sins may be remitted through the sacraments, no other disposition is required besides attrition for mortal sins (in the sacraments of the dead) or sanctifying grace (in the sacraments of the living), than the intention and will of receiving the sacrament as a remedy for one's sins without actual affection for any venial sin. For in this intention there is contained a virtual displeasure which is the necessary disposition for obtaining pardon of venial sins through the sacraments.³

Whether venial sins are destroyed through sacramentals, and whether through the sacrifice of the Mass, is said in their places, nn. 47 and 170.

¹ Sess. 13, c. 3.

² Cf. Lugo, De poenit., disp. 9, n. 53.

³ Cf. Sporer, l.c., n. 42 f.; St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 270.

246. Remission and its modes. 1. While guilt has not yet been remitted, punishment cannot be remitted: for guilt is the cause on account of which a man is worthy of punishment; but, while the cause has not yet been removed, the effect cannot be taken away.

2. When mortal guilt has been remitted, by that very fact eternal punishment is remitted; but when venial guilt has been remitted, by that very fact temporal punishment is not remitted.

The reason for the first: mortal sin is remitted by the infusion of sanctifying grace, by which a right to eternal life is conferred; but in the same man there cannot at once be a right to eternal life and the necessity of undergoing eternal punishment; therefore, when guilt is remitted, eternal punishment is necessarily remitted, or rather eternal punishment is changed into temporal punishment.

By the disposition of the divine will, eternal punishment in this sacrament is not wholly blotted out as in baptism, but is changed into temporal punishment, a thing which will be explained below.

The reason for the second: from the nature of the thing nothing prevents punishment from remaining to be paid after venial guilt has been remitted; but from faith we know that God has so established it, that when mortal guilt is remitted there remains temporal punishment to be paid; from this, moreover, we conclude that when venial guilt is remitted not even all temporal punishment is remitted.¹

The temporal punishment owed for remitted mortal sin is remitted together with the guilt itself, either wholly or in some greater or lesser part, according to the perfection of the disposition existing in the penitent. Likewise the punishment owed for remitted venial sins is blotted out together with the liability of guilt either wholly or in part according to the penitent's disposition.

3. Temporal punishment can be compensated or paid in three ways:

a. By voluntary satisfaction in this life, whether it is sacramental or extra-sacramental, through works of the virtues, among which the offering and hearing of the holy sacrifice is eminent.

b. By satispassion in purgatory in the other life.

c. By indulgences, by which God accepts the payment made by the Church from the satisfactions of Christ and the saints.

¹ Cf. Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 30.

The subject capable of the sacrament of penance is every and only man who after baptism has fallen into sin, whether mortal or venial. For receiving this sacrament validly and fruitfully there are required the acts of the penitent, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction. Now these acts, which together constitute both the matter of the sacrament and the disposition of the subject, must be treated in this chapter.

247. Definition. Contrition, taken generically, is defined by the Council of Trent as sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth.¹

Contrition essentially includes both acts, both sorrow and detestation. Sorrow indeed is the act by which the will is saddened and afflicted concerning a present evil, namely concerning sin; but detestation is the act by which it turns itself away from an evil, namely from sin, hates and condemns it, and, if it could be done, would destroy it, that is, it would will the sin not to have been committed. Moreover, in a wayfarer one of these acts is never separated from the other: for he who hates a sin committed also grieves over it, and he who grieves over a sin committed necessarily also detests it; but from the nature of the acts it is clear that sorrow supposes detestation, from which sorrow necessarily follows (n. 215). With the purpose: from this act of detestation and sorrow there follows another act, the purpose of amendment, which purpose of not sinning any more, at least implicit, belongs to the essence of contrition together with detestation and sorrow. Therefore three acts are essentially contained in contrition: sorrow, detestation, and purpose; the former acts regard the past, but the purpose is concerned with the future.²

Division. A twofold contrition is distinguished, one perfect, which is simply called contrition, the other imperfect, which by its proper name is called attrition. The former is conceived from the motive of charity and justifies the sinner outside the sacrament; the latter is conceived from another, inferior motive and does not justify the sinner except with the sacrament of baptism or of penance. Therefore contrition and attrition differ from one another in a twofold way: in motive and in effect, and under the same twofold respect contrition is more perfect than attrition.

¹ Sess. 14, c. 4.

² Sporer-Bierbaum III, pr. 3, n. 58 ff.

248. On contrition. 1. Definition. Perfect contrition is defined: sorrow of soul and detestation of sin, because sin offends God loved above all things. Therefore perfect contrition contains in itself, at least virtually and implicitly, perfect charity. Hence the Council of Trent says that contrition is perfected by charity.¹

A formal act of charity is not necessary for having perfect contrition: for the sinner considers sin as repugnant to the infinite goodness of God, and from this motive detests it; nevertheless perfect contrition obtains greater excellence if before or after contrition a formal act of charity is elicited. But charity is contained virtually in contrition: for the contrite man detests sin because it is repugnant to God, the highest good, lovable and to be loved above all things; but by that very fact he virtually and implicitly, indeed very often also formally and explicitly, loves the highest goodness of God.

2. Motive. Perfect contrition must proceed from the motive of charity; but the motive of charity is constituted both by the infinite goodness of God, or the complex of all the infinite perfections of God, and also by the several perfections (whether absolute or relative), which, since they are infinite, are not distinguished from the essence of God, but are the very essence of God conceived under some particular aspect. For God is supremely lovable not only because of the infinite fullness of all perfections, but also because of any other perfection, for example power, wisdom, justice, benignity, mercy, etc.

Therefore he who detests sin because it is against the infinite goodness of God to be loved above all things, or because it is against the justice, benignity, mercy, etc., of God, likewise to be loved above all things, elicits perfect contrition.²

Note. Although this formula used by the faithful, especially in Germany: I grieve from my whole heart, that I have so gravely offended the Lord my God, in the rigor of its terms does not express sorrow from the motive of charity, namely on account of the highest goodness of God, but from the motive of penance, namely on account of the offense or injury brought upon God; nevertheless those who seriously and from the heart utter these words usually elicit true contrition, because those who utter these words piously and seriously apprehend the offense of God not so much as an injury inflicted upon God, but as bitterness and displeasure brought by their sins upon God, their best Father, and from this motive they grieve concerning their sins, which is the motive of charity.³

¹ Cf. sess. 14, c. 4.

² Cf. De praeceptis, n. 55.

³ Sporer-Bierbaum III, tract. 9, n. 131.

249. Effects. 1. Perfect contrition justifies a man outside the sacrament, which is clear from Sacred Scripture both of the New and of the Old Testament:

a. If anyone loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make our dwelling with him.¹ Charity is everywhere so presented in Sacred Letters that it removes sin: Many sins are forgiven her, because she has loved much.² What is true of charity is true also of contrition, since it contains charity at least virtually; but charity, according to John, justifies: for he who loves God above all things is loved in return by God, and God dwells stably in him; but these things are not compatible with the presence of sin.³

b. The impiety of the impious shall not harm him, on whatever day he has turned from his impiety.⁴ When thou shalt seek the Lord thy God, thou shalt find him, if yet thou shalt seek him with thy whole heart.⁵ The conversion spoken of in the cited texts is perfect contrition, which alone can be called conversion from the whole heart; and remission of sins and justification follow upon conversion.

c. Therefore the Council of Trent teaches that through contrition perfected by charity a man is reconciled to God before he receives the sacrament of penance.⁶ Nevertheless contrition does not produce justification as its proper effect, but is the final disposition required by God; when this has been placed, sanctifying grace is infused.

2. Perfect contrition in the new law does not justify without the desire of the sacrament: for the act of perfect contrition, which formerly by itself could justify the impious man, after the sacrament was instituted, by the divine will does not blot out sins except in order to the keys of the Church; therefore the obligation remains of subjecting the same sins, if this can be done, to the keys through sacramental confession. And indeed the Council of Trent teaches that reconciliation must not be ascribed to contrition without the desire of the sacrament, which is included in it.⁷ It is sufficient, however, that this desire or purpose of confessing be implicit in the act of contrition; it is not required that it be explicit.

¹ John 14, 23.

² Luke 7, 47.

³ Cf. De praeceptis, n. 57.

⁴ Ezek. 33, 12.

⁵ Deut. 4, 29.

⁶ Sess. 14, c. 4.

⁷ Sess. 14, c. 4.

250. On attrition. 1. Definition. Imperfect contrition, or attrition, is sorrow and detestation of sin proceeding not from the motive of charity, but from another inferior motive, yet one having relation to God: for without respect to God true attrition, which is conversion to God, cannot be conceived; and for this reason attrition differs from any other detestation of sin insufficient for justification, such as detestation of sin insofar as it harms reputation or health. Therefore every motive of detesting sin on account of God, which is not the proper motive of charity, is a motive of attrition.

2. Motives of attrition. By the Council of Trent the motives of attrition are reduced to these three: to the turpitude of sin and to the fear of hell and of punishments; each of these suffices for conceiving attrition, as it is required in the sacrament of penance.¹

a. By the turpitude of sin the Council of Trent does not understand that by which sin is opposed to rational nature, but that by which sin is opposed to God commanding. But any sin contains in itself manifold turpitude or malice: disobedience, ingratitude, contumely, contempt, etc.; moreover any mortal sin produces most disastrous effects in the sinner himself: it deprives the soul of sanctifying grace and therefore of supernatural life, defiles it before God, and makes it the slave of Satan and hateful to God. But all these motives are comprehended under the name of the turpitude of sin, any one of which is sufficient for conceiving attrition.

b. Fear of hell is fear of supernatural and eternal punishments, which are inflicted by God on account of sin, namely the loss of merits, privation of beatitude, and the punishment of hell.

c. Fear of punishments: by this are understood temporal punishments, whether of the other life or of this life, not insofar as these follow naturally from sin, but insofar as they are inflicted by God offended by sin and as the just avenger of sinners.

¹ Cf. sess. 14, c. 4.

251. Effects. Although attrition cannot justify outside the sacrament, nevertheless it sufficiently disposes for obtaining justification in the sacrament. And indeed the attrite man recedes from creatures and now tends toward God, to whom he desires to be reconciled; but for obtaining justification through sacramental absolution this disposition suffices. This is the clear doctrine of the Council of Trent,¹ so that the opposite opinion must be called improbable, but this one certain; hence not even in the article of death is it necessary that he who has received the sacrament of penance with attrition elicit an act of contrition.²

a. From the doctrine of the Council of Trent it is certain that attrition disposes sufficiently for obtaining justification, whether through baptism or through absolution. Since the same council nevertheless says: those who dispose themselves for justification begin to love God,³ the question is asked, what is that initial love which is required as a disposition for justification. That initial love, first of all, is not required as the motive of sorrow, but as an act accompanying sorrow, which is always contained in due disposition for justification, whether in hope of pardon, or in purpose, or in the sorrow itself.⁴

In the sorrow: for he who grieves concerning his sins wishes to render God propitious to himself; but by this very fact he already approaches charity. In the purpose: for he who grieves concerning his sins wishes to observe all the precepts, in which is contained also the precept of charity toward God; therefore he has charity toward God in purpose and in desire. In hope: for he who grieves concerning his sins hopes for remission of sins unto obtaining eternal life; but eternal life is the most perfect friendship with God; therefore he has charity as the final end toward which he tends.

b. Since attrition with the sacrament justifies the sinner, that axiom has prevailed: through the sacrament the penitent is made contrite from attrite. This axiom must not be understood formally, as if the act of attrition through absolution became an act of contrition, or the attrite person by force of absolution always necessarily elicited contrition; but effectively, insofar as attrition with the sacrament produces the same effect which contrition alone without the sacrament produces, since it reconciles the sinner to God and restores friendship with God.

¹ Sess. 14, c. 4.

² Cf. Pesch VII, n. 159 ff.

³ Sess. 6, c. 6.

⁴ Cf. Lehmkuhl II, n. 289 (n. 391).

252. Whether it is necessary and when. Penance is simply necessary for salvation to a man who has committed grave sin (n. 241); but it alone does not suffice, unless either charity or the sacrament of penance is added. In this place the necessity of perfect contrition must be considered insofar as it is the means of reconciling oneself with God and of obtaining the grace of justification.

1. For a sinner, perfect contrition is necessary by necessity of means and of precept, both natural and divine positive, for obtaining salvation, unless there is an occasion of receiving the sacrament.¹ a. The effect of contrition, namely justification, is simply necessary for salvation for those who are constituted in mortal sin; therefore by the same necessity the means for obtaining the same effect is also necessary. b. The natural law obliges one to use the means necessary for salvation; but in Sacred Scripture penance is expressly commanded many times (n. 241). Nevertheless the precept of perfect contrition obliges only in defect of the sacrament: for in the new law perfect contrition is no longer absolutely necessary for obtaining justification, but attrition with the sacrament of baptism or of penance suffices, and this by the will of Christ the Lord, who by instituting the sacraments of the dead gave men a new means of obtaining eternal salvation. Therefore he who either intends to be justified through the sacrament of baptism or penance, or has already been justified, is not bound by the precept of contrition.

2. Perfect contrition is of itself necessary at death: for if contrition is a means necessary for salvation, it must certainly be used at that time after which it can no longer be used.

Therefore he who is in certain or probable danger of death and does not have the opportunity of receiving the sacrament of penance is bound to elicit perfect contrition; yet if he has received the sacrament with attrition, he is not further bound to elicit an act of perfect contrition, since he is now certainly justified. Nevertheless it is expedient that the dying be stirred up, as far as possible, to eliciting acts of perfect charity and contrition.²

3. Perfect contrition is of itself necessary when the precept of reconciling oneself with God urges and there is no occasion of instituting confession (n. 217).

4. Perfect contrition is accidentally necessary in these cases: a. if a consecrated minister existing in the state of mortal sin must solemnly administer and confect a sacrament, and there is no supply of a confessor; b. if someone existing in mortal sin must receive a sacrament of the living and either cannot or will not confess; c. if someone existing in mortal sin suffers grave temptations, which he thinks he cannot overcome unless, having been converted to God, he obtains greater helps of grace: for he must employ the means necessary for avoiding sin.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

² Cf. W. Lerch, Das letzte Mittel (Warnsdorf, Opitz); J. von den Driesch, Die vollkommene Reue, ein goldener Himmelsschlussel (Koln, Bachem), who discuss the nature of contrition and the way of eliciting it in a manner accommodated to the capacity of the common people.

253. The qualities of contrition in this place, with scholastic controversies set aside, must be weighed in such a way that it may be clear what is required for certainly valid absolution. Therefore, in order that contrition, whether perfect or imperfect, may suffice for receiving the sacrament validly, it must be true, supernatural, universal, above all things.

1. True and formal, i.e., an act must necessarily be elicited by which the will grieves concerning sin from a sufficient motive and detests it; since contrition at least constitutes the necessary disposition of the sacrament of penance, and therefore must be truly present; moreover, contrition probably constitutes an essential part of the sacrament, wherefore it must be formally present.

a. Because contrition must be true, a mere recitation of the formula of contrition does not suffice unless at the same time affections of the will are present; nor does sorrow merely thought suffice, even if out of invincible ignorance someone thinks that he has sorrow; nor does the desire of sorrow and of absolution suffice; nor finally does sorrow concerning punishment or another evil effect which has followed from sin suffice: but the sorrow itself is required, and that concerning sin by which God is offended. And because contrition must be formal, merely virtual sorrow implicitly contained in another act, e.g., in an act of perfect charity, does not suffice: for although an act of perfect charity has the power of blotting out mortal sins outside the sacrament, nevertheless it does not suffice for obtaining the remission of sins by force of the sacrament, but the proximate matter of the sacrament is required, which is the act of sorrow and detestation concerning committed sins, whether these are mortal or venial.

b. Among the older theologians, especially before the Council of Trent, several thought that supposed contrition, by which the penitent in good faith thinks that he is contrite, sufficed for receiving valid absolution.¹ But this opinion lacks all probability. Supposed contrition indeed preserves the penitent from the sin of sacrilege, but it cannot make absolution valid.² Some more recent theologians also (Lugo, Ballerini) maintain that virtual contrition suffices for obtaining valid absolution;³ but since this opinion does not exceed probability, it cannot be brought into practice without danger of frustrating the sacrament.

c. For practice, however, this must be noted: those who are of timorous conscience and desire to have sorrow, or grieve that they do not grieve, provided they try to elicit it, usually have true sorrow, even if they do not perceive it. Therefore, since it is not so much the sorrow itself but rather the quality of the sorrow, and that quality not necessary for the sacrament, which is lacking, namely intense and sensible sorrow, absolution is not to be denied to those who desire to have sorrow, or say that they grieve because they do not have sorrow, provided they seriously wish to abstain from mortal sins and to fulfill at least grave obligations.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 33 ff.

² Ibid., n. 46 note.

³ Ibid., n. 52 ff.

254. 2. Supernatural, both by reason of principle and by reason of motive; for sorrow is the disposition necessarily required by the will of God for obtaining justification, which, since it is wholly supernatural, the disposition required for it also must be supernatural.

a. By reason of principle: i.e., contrition must be elicited with the supernatural help of God, namely with actual grace moving and assisting unto eliciting the act of sorrow and detestation: for merely natural sorrow conceived by the powers of nature alone does not suffice in the sacrament of penance.

b. By reason of motive: i.e., sorrow must be elicited from a supernatural motive, i.e., from a motive which has relation to God, as the motives enumerated by the Council of Trent have it, not from a merely natural motive, such as sin would be insofar as it is opposed to rational nature, brings detriment to reputation, health, etc. There are those who for supernatural contrition require a motive supernatural in this sense, that it must be known from revelation and apprehended through the light of faith; now, although an act of truly supernatural contrition does not require a motive supernatural in this sense, nevertheless in reality a penitent will scarcely ever lack contrition truly supernatural also by reason of motive, because the motives enumerated by the Council of Trent are drawn from faith and are apprehended by penitents by the light of faith.

255. 3. Universal, which either explicitly or implicitly extends itself at least to all mortal sins not yet remitted, even if perhaps they do not occur to memory: for no sin is remitted without penance; but one sin cannot be remitted without another; therefore sorrow must extend itself at least to all mortal sins not yet remitted. But it is not necessary that it be universal explicitly; it suffices that it be universal implicitly, i.e., that it be elicited from a universal motive. Nor is it necessary that it also extend to venial sins not yet remitted, because mortal sins can be remitted without venial sins.

a. Explicitly: it can happen in a twofold way that sorrow explicitly extends itself to all mortal sins: first, if the penitent elicits as many distinct sorrows concerning the several sins; then, if by one act of sorrow he repents of all and each of those which he distinctly remembers and actually recalls to memory. Although for obtaining justification, whether in the sacrament or outside the sacrament, it is not required that sorrow explicitly extend itself to all mortal sins, nevertheless of itself it is most useful and very much to be recommended that the penitent call to mind the several sins and detest all and each.

b. Implicitly: again, it can happen in a twofold way that sorrow implicitly extends itself to all mortal sins: first, if the penitent knows himself to be in the state of sin, as guilty of several mortal sins, and by an act of sorrow conceived from a universal motive grieves concerning all the things which he thus knows confusedly; then, if he thinks expressly and in species of only one sin and grieves concerning it from a universal motive common to all mortal sins. For by the very fact that from a universal motive he detests one sin, he implicitly and necessarily also detests all other sins committed by himself which deserve to be detested on account of the same motive, even though he does not remember them.¹

¹ Sporer-Bierbaum III, pr. 3, n. 88 ff.

256. 4. Appreciatively highest or above all things. Therefore the penitent must esteem mortal sin as a greater evil and for this reason detest it more than any other evil, and must be prepared in soul rather to undergo any other evil whatever than again to commit sin. For sin is the highest evil, since it is contrary to the highest and infinite good. Moreover true contrition must exclude every will of sinning;¹ but unless the penitent detests sin above all things, every will of sinning is not excluded, since he is so disposed that for the sake of avoiding some evil he would wish to commit sin.

a. Nevertheless it is not necessary, indeed ordinarily it is to be dissuaded, that explicit comparisons be made between sin and some particular evil to be undergone (rather to be burned alive, rather to sustain the torments of the martyrs, etc., than to sin again). And if comparisons of this kind either occur spontaneously or are suggested by the tempter, nothing is to be chosen, but all are to be rejected with this pious and firm will: I do not wish to sin any more, and aided by divine grace I hope that I will not sin.

b. It is not necessary that contrition be intensively highest. Contrition would be intensively highest if the very act of the will by which we grieve concerning sin committed were greater and more vehement than the act by which we grieve concerning any other evil, however grave. But neither intensively highest sorrow nor sorrow of a certain and determined degree of intensity is required; rather true and internal sorrow in any degree, even remiss, suffices: for where the essence of contrition is had, a sufficient disposition for the remission of any sin is present; but the essence of contrition is had in any degree of true contrition.

c. From the same reason it is deduced that sufficient contrition does not demand any delay of time: for true contrition can be elicited by the will in an instant; nevertheless it is greatly to be recommended that some time be spent in eliciting sorrow, by which the sorrow may be more certain and more intense.

d. Finally, for contrition which suffices for justification, it is not required that sorrow be sensible, namely that it overflow into the sensitive appetite and into sensible acts, into tender affections of the heart, sighs, and tears; but it suffices that it be spiritual, by which namely the will from a sufficient motive grieves concerning and detests the sin committed. For sensible sorrow of this kind is not in our power, nor does it belong to the perfection of contrition: for it can happen that without sensible sorrow someone grieves more vehemently than another who by his nature is prone to tender affections and tears. Nevertheless signs of this kind, sensible ones, are very often indications of great and vehement sorrow in those who truly and sincerely grieve.

e. By these things it is not denied that contrition must be manifested outwardly by some sensible sign: for according to the probable opinion of many, contrition is an essential part of the sacrament; but the parts of a sacrament must necessarily be sensible. Moreover it becomes sensible through the sorrowful confession of sins, through the devout petition and expectation of absolution, and through other external signs.

Particular Questions. Having explained the qualities of contrition, certain questions which pertain to this matter must be proposed and solved. In treating these questions one must attend to the probable doctrine, namely that the acts of the penitent are essential parts and the proximate matter of the sacrament, lest the sacrament be exposed to danger of nullity.

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 4.

257. When sorrow must be elicited. a. It must necessarily be elicited before sacramental absolution: for no one can be validly absolved who is not rightly disposed; but he who does not grieve concerning sins committed is not rightly disposed.

b. Of itself it is not required that it be elicited before confession, although this is greatly to be recommended; but it suffices that it be elicited after confession, whether because the penitent himself only after confession disposes himself to sorrow, or because after confession he is at last disposed by the confessor to detesting sin.

Confession performed without preceding sorrow can indeed seem insufficient for receiving valid absolution, both because it is a simple narration of sins, not a sacramental accusation, and because sorrow which follows confession is manifested by no sensible sign: for ordinarily sorrow becomes sensible only through confession. Nevertheless there is no doubt that in him who truly grieves after confession but before absolution, both are found: sacramental confession and sorrow outwardly manifested. For by the very fact that the penitent has confessed with the intention of obtaining absolution, the confession is sacramental; but sorrow becomes sensible because the penitent, expecting absolution, as it were continues the accusation informed by subsequent sorrow and orders it to absolution: for the confession, the petition for absolution, and the expectation of it morally pertain to confession and constitute and complete it.

c. It is not to be elicited so long before confession that at the time of confession it no longer morally endures. But sorrow is judged to endure morally as long as it has not been revoked and endures virtually, i.e., in some effect, e.g., in the will to confess, in flight from occasions, in more frequent prayers, etc.

1. How long elicited sorrow endures virtually cannot be accurately determined: for intense sorrow and sorrow ordered to confession endure longer than remiss sorrow and sorrow not ordered to confession. Without doubt it can endure for three or four hours, indeed for a whole day or a whole night, and in some circumstances (where namely confession is instituted not from mere devotion or from obligation, but from sorrow conceived concerning sins) even for several days. Moreover, in the opinion of those who affirm that sorrow is only a necessary disposition, it suffices that sorrow endure habitually; but it endures habitually as long as it is not revoked. Sorrow elicited before confession is judged to be revoked through a fall into sin; indeed through mortal sin every sorrow is revoked, but through venial sin at least sorrow concerning that very sin which is committed is revoked.

Therefore he who, for example, prepared himself for confession in the morning, can validly and licitly confess in the evening without a new act of sorrow: for sorrow elicited in the morning in order to confession and not revoked is judged still to endure in the evening, so that by force of that sorrow the confession is sorrowful.

2. Two things must be noted here for practice. First indeed, it must be inculcated to the faithful that they elicit sorrow before confession: for it could very easily happen that that little delay, while absolution is being given, would not suffice for conceiving contrition, and therefore absolution would be frustrated of its effect. Then, it is by no means necessary that confessors induce a penitent whom they could finally move in the confessional to due disposition, so that he outwardly manifest sorrow and refer it explicitly to the sins already set forth, by saying, for example, I grieve concerning my sins already set forth, or I grieve concerning my sins, concerning which I accuse myself again; rather they can absolve him without a new accusation.

258. Whether elicited sorrow must be with the intention of confessing. The negative opinion seems to be true and morally certain: for it suffices that the confession be sorrowful; but for this it is not required that the sorrow be elicited from the intention of confessing, provided that afterward, when confession is instituted, the sorrow still morally endures. The reason for this matter is taken from Trent, which, when it accurately describes the contrition required for the sacrament, nowhere demands that sorrow be elicited from the intention of confessing.¹

Therefore he who, thinking nothing of confession, has elicited contrition, can approach the sacrament without new sorrow, provided the contrition morally endures. For the explanation of this matter it must be noted that there were authors who, for valid absolution, required not only a moral union between sorrow and confession, but further demanded that sorrow be elicited in order to absolution and be referred to the sacrament through the intention of the penitent: for, they say, the parts of the sacrament (matter and form) must be ordered to the sacrament by intention. But, with the opinion admitted by force of which the acts of the penitent are parts of the sacrament, only those parts which are placed by the minister must be made from the intention of confecting the sacrament. Therefore, since the opinion of those authors lacks every foundation, it does not seem to be probable.²

¹ Cf. sess. 14, c. 4.

² Cf. Lugo, disp. 14, n. 37 ff.; Suarez, disp. 20, sect. 4, n. 29; Ballerini-Palmieri V, n. 76 ff.

As the Council of Trent teaches, there is a divine law which prescribes that all who fall into grievous sin after receiving Baptism should confess such sin to a priest and receive absolution for it from him. This divine precept is contained in the institution of the sacrament of Penance, and will best be explained when we come to treat of that sacrament. Here we have to do with a positive ecclesiastical law which supposes the divine law, but further determines it according to time and the person to whom the confession is to be made. The divine law does not determine any precise time for making the confession nor does it limit the choice of confessor. This was done by the Fourth Lateran Council, c. 21: “‘ Let all the faithful of both sexes after they have come to years of discretion faithfully confess all their sins in private at least once a year to their own priest, and do their best to perform the penance which he shall enjoin them.”

According to the general rule, children become subject to and bound to obey the positive laws of the Church when they reach the age of seven. However, before the new Code of Canon Law came into force it was usual to defer a child’s first Communion until he had reached the age of nine or twelve. The Code (Can. 859) interprets the phrase “‘ years of discretion,” used by the Lateran Council, to mean the same as to attain the use of reason, and so, now, children are bound to make their Easter Communion when they are seven years of age, unless, indeed, for some good reason it is judged advisable to abstain for a time. This obligation, as far as it affects those under the age of puberty, falls chiefly on those who have care of them—that is, on parents, guardians, confessors, teachers, and parish priests (Can. 860).

Canon 863 prescribes that the faithful are to be exhorted to receive Holy Communion frequently, and even daily, according to the rules laid down in the decrees of the Holy See, and that those who attend Mass should dispose themselves to receive Holy Communion not only spiritually, but sacramentally.

Daily Communion may not be refused to anyone who is in the state of grace and who has a right intention. There should be suitable preparation and thanksgiving, and that daily Communion may be practised with more prudence and with greater fruit, the advice of the confessor should be asked.

It is a disputed point whether one who is now in danger of death and who has within the last few days received Holy Communion is bound by divine precept to receive Viaticum. Although any good Catholic would certainly receive it again, yet the obligation to do so is not clear, because the previous Communion in all probability satisfies the divine law, . If one becomes dangerously ill on the day on which he has received Holy Communion out of devotion, it was similarly a disputed point whether he might, or was bound to, receive it again as Viaticum. Ordinarily, indeed, no one should receive Holy Communion twice on the same day, but in this case he may do so, though he is not bound to do so, for the Code only says that it is very much to be desired (Can. 864, sec. 2).

PENANCE is both a virtue and a sacrament of the New Law. For as the Council of Trent teaches: ‘‘ Penitence was indeed at all times necessary in order to attain to grace and justice for all men who had defiled themselves by any mortal sin, even for those who begged to be washed by the sacrament of Baptism: that so, their perverseness renounced and amended, they might with a hatred of sin and a godly sorrow of mind detest so great an offence of God. Wherefore the prophet says, ‘Be converted and do penance for all your iniquities, and iniquity shall not be your ruin. The Lord also said, ‘Except you do penance, you shall all likewise perish ’; and Peter, the prince of the Apostles, recommending penitence to sinners who were about to be initiated by Baptism, said, ‘ Do penance and be baptized every one of you.’”’¹ God, therefore, has always required repentance or penance on the part of the sinner as a necessary condition for forgiveness. The virtue of penance may be defined as a habit inclining the sinner to hatred and detestation of his sin. He may be moved to this hatred and detestation by various motives, as, for example, by the thought of the goodness of God, who deserves better treatment than to be offended by the sinner, by the feeling of gratitude toward God for his benefits and mercies, by the sentiment of justice which induces the sinner to make reparation for the wrong which by sin he has inflicted on the majesty of God. Penance may thus be a general virtue with various motives, but theologians agree that it is also a special virtue with a particular motive of its own. More commonly they assign as this motive the hatred of sin as being an offence against God, something at which God is rightly and justly angered and displeased, and for which satisfaction must be made to God before peace and harmony can be again established between him and the sinner.

Our Lord Jesus Christ instituted the sacrament of Penance, by which the sins committed after Baptism might be forgiven on the sinner’s repentance. As the Council of Trent teaches: “‘ Nevertheless, neither before the coming of Christ was penitence a sacrament, nor is it such since his coming for anyone previously to Baptism. But the Lord then principally instituted the sacrament of Penance when being raised from the dead he breathed upon his disciples, saying, ‘ Receive ye the Holy Ghost: whose sins you shall forgive they are forgiven, and whose sins you shall retain they are retained. By which action so signal, and words so clear, the consent of all the Fathers has ever understood that the power of forgiving and retaining sins was communicated to the Apostles and their lawful successors for the reconciling of the faithful who have fallen after Baptism.”²

Penance may be defined as a sacrament of the New Law instituted by Christ after the manner of a judicial process for the remission of sins committed after Baptism by a priest’s absolution given to the contrite sinner who has confessed his sin to him.

This sacrament is instituted after the manner of a judicial process, which may be gathered from the very words of institution: ‘‘ Whose sins you shall forgive they are forgiven, and whose sins you shall retain they are retained,” said our blessed Lord; not, of course, that the Apostles were empowered to forgive or not to forgive sins according to their own pleasure. They were bound to exercise the power entrusted to them according to the intention of him who had given it, so that as faithful dispensers of the mysteries of God they were to forgive the sins of those who were worthy of forgiveness, and to dismiss without forgiveness those who were unworthy. But how could they know who was worthy and who was unworthy, and what sins they could forgive and what they could not? Evidently only by the sinner acknowledging his sins and showing that he repented of them, or on the contrary by his showing the want of the necessary dispositions. And so we gather from the words of institution of this sacrament what the tradition of the Church teaches, that for the forgiveness of sin in the sacrament of Penance the sinner must in sorrow confess his sin, and then it will be forgiven by the absolution of the priest. In this we have the substance of a judicial process, inasmuch as the sinner is the criminal who is witness against himself, and the priest is the judge who, according to the merits of the case, absolves the sinner and remits the sin in the name of God, or by not absolving the unworthy sinner retains his sin and condemns him to go unpardoned.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 1.

² Sess. Xiv,'C. 1s

The effects of a fruitful reception of this sacrament are the forgiveness of all mortal sins and of all venial sins which are confessed with due sorrow, the consequent remission of the eternal punishment due to mortal sin, and a partial remission according to the dispositions of the penitent of the temporal punishment which his sins have deserved.

Sins which are confessed to a priest who has the requisite jurisdiction to absolve them are forgiven directly by virtue of the power of the keys. On the other hand, if without fault on the part of the penitent some sin is not confessed and the penitent has the requisite sorrow, the sin will be forgiven indirectly, inasmuch as the absolution will take its effect and infuse sanctifying grace into the soul, and this sanctifying grace expels all grievous sin from the soul... The absolution will also be indirect when the priest has not faculties for some sin or sins confessed, but for some special reason he is justified in giving the penitent absolution.

The Council of Trent’ teaches that “ This sacrament of Penance is for those who have fallen after Baptism necessary unto salvation, as Baptism itself is for those who have not as yet been regenerated.” This sacrament, then, like Baptism, is a necessary means for salvation for all who have committed grave sin after Baptism. There is, consequently, for all such a divine precept which obliges them to go to confession. They must fulfil this precept at any rate before death, and the Church, using the power given her by her divine Founder, has obliged all who are conscious of being in mortal sin to go to confession at least once a year (Can. 906). If there is no opportunity of going to confession, one who has fallen into grievous sin can through the mercy of God obtain pardon for it by making an act of perfect contrition or of pure love of God. These acts implicitly contain a desire to receive the sacrament of Penance and to fulfil all other obligations imposed by God and by lawful authority. Even after sin has been forgiven by an act of perfect contrition or of pure love of God, there will always remain the obligation of confessing it, if it be mortal, when the time for the annual confession arrives or the opportunity occurs. Those who do not fall into grievous sin are under no obligation of going to confession, though, of course, they are the last to neglect the use of so powerful a means as frequent confession to attain purity of soul and to obtain great graces from God.

THE remote matter of the sacrament of Penance is the sins which have been committed after Baptism, for sins committed before Baptism, when this is received in adult age, are forgiven by Baptism. The matter of Penance is necessary, or free but sufficient. Mortal sins which have never been directly absolved are the necessary matter of confession, for as the Council of Trent teaches,¹ every mortal sin committed after Baptism must be submitted to the keys. The same council teaches that venial sins may be confessed, but that there is no necessity to do so, and so they are sufficient but free or optional matter of the sacrament. The same is true also of mortal sins which have been already absolved directly, for the penitent may with fruit renew his sorrow for them, and nothing prevents the sentence of absolution being repeatedly pronounced over them. The previous sentence of absolution is, as it were, confirmed anew, and thereby fresh grace is infused into the soul (Can. 901, 902).

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 2.

A doubt may sometimes arise as to whether a person has ever been baptized, or as to whether his Baptism was valid, and after Baptism has been conditionally administered in such a case so as to make so important a matter secure the question remains whether this person must make a general confession of past sins or not. If a Catholic has been in the habit of going to confession and making good ones as far as he knows, there will be no necessity to repeat those confessions after conditional Baptism. For if he was baptized before, his confessions would be valid, and if he was not baptized, his past sins are not matter for confession, A non-Catholic, however, who receives conditional Baptism is in a different position. His past sins have not been confessed; if he was baptized before, he is bound to confess them; if he was not baptized before, they are not matter for the sacrament of Penance. What is he bound to do when the fact of Baptism is uncertain, and at most it can be said that there are probabilities on either side?

The First Synod of Westminster¹ prescribes that a non-Catholic already probably baptized who is received into the Catholic Church must, after conditional Baptism, make a full confession of the sins of his past life. This decree was confirmed by the Holy Office, December 17, 1868, and several other decrees and instructions in the same sense have been issued. In practice, then, and in countries which are bound by these decrees and instructions, as are England and the United States, the question is settled by positive law. With regard to other countries which are not directly subject to the foregoing decrees and instructions, it is still a matter of controversy among divines whether a full confession is obligatory. In the opinion of several, there is no universal law, divine or human, which makes confession obligatory in such a case.²

¹ D. xvi, n. 8.

² Ferreres, Comp. Theol. Mor., ii, n. 527.

The proximate matter of Penance, according to the more common opinion, is the acts of the penitent: contrition, confession, and satisfaction. According to the Thomist doctrine, the acts of the penitent constitute the material part of the sacrament, so that they are the matter out of which the sacrament is made, and are an essential part of the sacramental sign. If the Council of Trent calls them the quasi-matter,¹ it is not because they are not the true matter in the sense just explained, but because they are not the matter which is used externally in the confection of the sacrament, as is water in Baptism, or chrism in Confirmation.

On the other hand, the Scotists allow, indeed, that contrition, confession, and satisfaction on the part of the penitent are necessary conditions for the administration of Penance, but they hold that the whole sacramental sign is contained in the words of absolution, These words alone are used by the minister of the sacrament, and they signify the grace conferred by the sacrament. Taken materially, they constitute its matter; inasmuch as they signify the giving of grace for the remission of sins, they constitute its form. This opinion has never been condemned by the Church, and it remains probable, but the question belongs rather to dogmatic than to moral theology.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 3.

It is not sufficient to confess one’s sins in general terms, and if they are grievous the law of God requires that they be confessed according to number and species, as the Council of Trent teaches.t As we have seen, venial sins are sufficient matter for absolution, but there is no necessity to confess them.

But supposing that a penitent has only venial sins, and he wishes to confess them, what kind of confession is necessary and sufficient¹ Will it be enough to say, “I accuse myself of some small sins and ask for absolution ”’; or ‘‘ I accuse myself of all the sins of my past life, and I have nothing serious ” All divines agree that it will be sufficient to mention some one sin in particular in this case, or to mention the virtue or obligation which has been violated, as by saying, ‘I accuse myself of slight negligence in prayer,” or ‘“‘ of small faults against charity.” They differ about the lawfulness of using a mere general formula. Such a method of confessing is against the practice of the Church, which, as St Thomas says, we should always follow; it is also liable to abuse, for penitents cannot always decide what is serious and necessary matter for confession or not, and shame might easily lead them to be content with generalities when they should give particulars. However, there is something to be said for the other view, inasmuch as some sort of confession is all that is required for the essence of the sacrament, and when there are only venial sins to be confessed there is no certain law which prescribes confession according to number and species, or even more than in general terms. This opinion is at any rate sometimes of use, as it may at times enable confessors to be satisfied with generalities when they cannot get more.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 5.

The solution of questions about the obligation of confessing doubtful sins largely depends on what system of moral theology is followed. The following principles are generally approved by probabilists:

(a) When the penitent doubts whether he has been guilty of some sinful act or not, he is not bound to confess it, for he cannot be said to be conscious of sin, and a certain obligation cannot arise from an uncertain source.

(b) When the doubt is as to whether full consent was given to what would have been a grave sin if that were the case, the question should be settled by recourse to presumptions. If in other cases consent has usually been given, the presumption is against the penitent, and he should confess the sin as it is in his conscience; otherwise there will be no obligation to do so, (c) If the doubt is whether the sin were mortal or venial, there is no obligation to confess it, for the penitent is not conscious of mortal sin; and only such are bound to confess.

(d) If the doubt is whether a mortal sin which was certainly committed has ever been confessed, we must distinguish; if there be no good ground for thinking that it has been confessed, the obligation will still remain; if, on the contrary, there be good ground for thinking that the sin has been confessed, there will be no obligation of confessing it again.

(e) It is generally better for penitents, unless they are scrupulous, to confess doubtful sins, as it conduces to peace of conscience, and is a meritorious act of humility.

When a doubtful sin has once been confessed as such there will be no obligation to confess it again, even though subsequently the penitent becomes sure that he committed the sin.

The sin was confessed as it was on the penitent’s conscience, and it was absolved directly.

According to the common opinion, although there is no strict obligation to confess a mortal sin which is doubtful, or which has probably been confessed, yet one should not go to Holy Communion in such a state of doubt without either going to confession and confessing at least some sin, or making an act of contrition. For a man should prove himself before receiving Holy Communion, and have a well-grounded belief that he is in a state of grace.

If a penitent mentions only doubtful matter for absolution, the confessor should secure certain matter before giving absolution. Although a penitent may confess only optional matter, yet he has a right to absolution founded on the tacit contract which the confessor entered into with him when he admitted him to confession.

Contrition is the first of the acts of the penitent which constitute the matter of the sacrament of Penance, It is defined by the Council of Trent to be a heartfelt sorrow and detestation of sin committed, with a purpose of not sinning again. In this section we will treat of contrition apart from the purpose of amendment, and in the following section, of the purpose of amendment.

A heartfelt sorrow is not quite the same thing as a hatred or detestation of sin. Sorrow is a pain which we feel on account of the presence of some evil or the absence of some good; hatred is an aversion for some evil which is past. Hatred of sin, consequent aversion for it, and a turning away from it is the chief element in contrition; for if we have this hatred we shall have sorrow for sin regarded as a present evil, we shall turn away from it as a past evil, and we shall propose to flee from it in the future. If, then, we have this hatred of sin, we shall have sorrow and a purpose of amendment; we shall have true contrition.

That sorrow for sin which arises from the perfect love of God is called contrition in the full and strict sense; sorrow for sin arising from less perfect motives, as from the fear of hell or the moral turpitude of vice, is called attrition, Ordinarily the word contrition is used indifferently of both kinds of sorrow.

Contrition or penitence or repentance is, as we have already seen, according to the teaching of the Council of Trent, a necessary condition for the forgiveness of sin by God. God will not forgive sin unless the sinner turn from his sin and approach him by sorrow of heart. Contrition, then, is a necessary means of salvation for all who have fallen into grievous sin. It is also matter of divine precept which must be fulfilled at least when the sinner is in danger of death, for then it becomes of supreme necessity, and also sometimes during life. The Church has determined this divine precept by commanding all who have come to the use of reason and have fallen into sin to go to confession at least once a year. Moreover, repentance for sin becomes necessary when any action has to be performed which for its due performance requires the agent to be in the state of grace. Furthermore, inasmuch as one who is deprived by sin of the grace of God cannot long resist temptation and will fall again and again before long, the sinner is obliged to rise from his sin in order to avoid repeated falls.

Of course it is better, and the sinner is to be urged, by all means, to rise at once when he has had the misfortune to fall into sin. He should never sleep while he is conscious of being out of the friendship of God. Still he is not bound under pain of committing a new sin to repent immediately after committing sin. It will be sufficient if he repent at least when repentance becomes necessary according to the doctrine which has just been laid down.

Not every sort of sorrow is sufficient to justify the sinner, even with the help of the sacrament of Penance. Although perfect love of God suffices to reconcile the sinner with God, though it leaves the obligation of confessing the sin it remits, still this love will not serve by itself as a preparation and disposition for the reception of Penance. A material part of the sacrament of Penance is contrition, and contrition is not love. The sinner, then, who wishes to receive the sacrament of Penance must have true and sincere sorrow for his sin; he must detest it and turn away from it in order to be reconciled with God, whom it offends. Mere natural sorrow for sin because of the temporal evils which it causes is not sufficient. I may well be sorry because sin has ruined my good name, or my health, or my fortunes, but such motives are merely natural, and have no relation to God. The sinner in the sacrament of Penance seeks reconciliation with God, and so the motives of his sorrow must have reference to God; they must be supernatural, founded on revelation and on faith. Without faith no act can be of avail for salvation, as ‘‘ without faith it is impossible to please God.”¹ ‘The sinner must regard sin as the greatest of all evils, as in reality it is. He must be prepared to do and to suffer anything rather than commit sin again. Otherwise he cannot be said to fulfil that greatest of all the commandments, which bids us love God with our whole heart, with our whole soul, with all our strength, and with all our mind. Inasmuch as any one mortal sin deprives us of the friendship of God, the sorrow of the sinner must also be universal and embrace all the sins by which he has grievously offended Almighty God. For this it is not necessary that there should be a separate and distinct act of sorrow for every sin committed; it will be sufficient if the motive be universal, so as to embrace all sins. Thus, inasmuch as all mortal sins are directly opposed to charity, and any such sin deserves the punishment of hell, if our sorrow is motived by love toward God, or by fear of hell, it will be universal in the sense required.

Provided that there be sorrow for all mortal sins confessed, a want of sorrow for venial sins will not invalidate the sacrament. For venial sins are compatible with the state of grace and the friendship of God. Still there must be some sorrow for sin confessed; otherwise an essential part of the sacrament of Penance will be wanting. And so if the penitent have only venial sins to confess, for none of which he is sorry, the sacrament would be invalid and sacrilegious. He must at least be sorry for one sin confessed, and he should not confess venial sins for which he is not sorry unless he has some good reason, as if he wishes to ask the advice of his confessor about them, or to make the state of his soul more fully known to him.

¹ Heb. xi 6.

As contrition, according to the common view, forms a part of the sacramental sign in Penance, it should in some manner be expressed outwardly, not indeed that any form of words is necessary, but the sorrow of the penitent should appear from his confession, from his demeanour, or from his words or other signs. It must exist, if not before, at least when absolution is given, for sin cannot be forgiven if there be no sorrow for it. Moreover, as the different parts of the sacrament go to make one moral whole, the penitent’s act of sorrow should in some way be referred to the sacrament. For this, however, it will be sufficient if together with the act of sorrow there be the intention to confess the sin. In case, then, a penitent has inadvertently omitted a serious sin from his confession, but remembers it immediately after he has received absolution and mentions it to the confessor, the latter may absolve him at once, nor is it necessary for the penitent to make a fresh act of sorrow for that particular sin.

On account of the necessity of a moral union between the several parts of the sacrament, there must not be too long an interval between the act of sorrow for sin and the reception of absolution for it. Ordinarily, of course, the sorrow is virtually renewed and expressed when the sin is confessed, but if this were not the case, and the act of sorrow preceded the confession by more than one or two days, it would be doubtful whether there was the necessary union between the parts of the sacrament so as to constitute one sacramental sign.

There have been heated controversies in the past as to the sufficiency of attrition to remit sin with the sacrament of - Penance. Although they are not quite settled even yet, nevertheless, since the Council of Trent the common doctrine is fairly clear and certain. The Council, then, seems to teach¹ that sorrow for sin because of the fear of hell, or its moral turpitude, or on account of the punishment with which God afflicts the sinner even in this life, will be sufficient for the remission of sin in the sacrament of Penance, provided that it destroys all affection for sin in the heart of the penitent and converts him from sin to God. The slavish fear of hell, by which a man refrains from sinful acts while preserving his affection for them, is, of course, insufficient even with the help of the sacrament to forgive sin and reconcile the sinner with God. The fear which is salutary and efficacious must be the filial fear by which the sinner turns to God because he neither wants sin nor its evil consequences any more. Such sorrow has all the elements which, as we saw above, are required in contrition.

¹ Sess. xiv, c 4

There is a controversy among theologians as to whether the sacrament of Penance can ever be valid without producing its effects in the soul at the time of its reception on account of some obstacle which is there. We saw above that this may be the case with Baptism and other sacraments. There is a special difficulty with regard to Penance, because the dispositions, whose absence is only an obstacle to grace given by other sacraments, enter into the substance of Penance, and so their absence would seem to destroy the sacrament itself. In spite of this, however, it is a probable opinion that at any rate in two cases the sacrament of Penance may be valid but unformed, as theologians say. The first case is when a penitent has forgotten some mortal sin for which he has never elicited an act of sorrow, but confesses other sins for which he is sorry for motives which are special to them and not universal. The second is when, through inculpable ignorance, the penitent thinks that it is not necessary to be sorry for all mortal sins confessed, provided there be the requisite sorrow for some. In these cases there will be all the elements necessary for the validity of the sacrament, which, however, cannot infuse grace into the soul on account of the presence there of grievous sin - still unrepented of.

When Penance is received in danger of death with attrition and not contrition, some theologians insist on the necessity of the dying person making an act of perfect love of God, either to make sure before death of the validity of the sacrament of Penance or to satisfy the divine precept, which, according to them, requires all who are in danger of death to make an act of charity. However, when the dying person has made a good confession and been absolved even with attrition, he is certainly in the state of grace, nor is there any valid argument which proves that such a person is obliged to make an act of charity. Neither the dying nor those who assist them are as a rule conscious of any such obligation.

Because the Council of ‘Trent, while describing the process of the sinner’s justification, mentions acts of faith, hope, and the beginnings of love toward God, some theologians concluded that explicit acts of those virtues are required for Penance in addition to contrition. Those acts, however, are implicitly contained in the other acts of the penitent, and the fact that the Council explicitly mentions them does not prove that it teaches that they must be explicitly elicited by the penitent sinner in order to receive absolution for his sins.

We saw in the preceding section that contrition is essentially a turning away with hatred from sin in order to approach to God, and so all true contrition necessarily implies a purpose not to sin again. If the truly contrite sinner thinks of the future, he can scarcely fail to form an explicit purpose of amendment, and some theologians hold that this explicit purpose is necessary, otherwise why should it find a place in the definition of contrition given by the Council of Trent? On account of its importance, it is well that the purpose of amendment should always be explicit, but still as it is virtually contained in all true sorrow for sin, and the fact that the Council explicitly mentions it does not prove that it must necessarily be explicit, the opinion which denies the absolute necessity of an explicit purpose of amendment for the validity of Penance is safe. A Roman council held in 1725 under Benedict XIII issued an instruction explaining how to make one’s confession, and it only insists on an implicit purpose of amendment.

Whether it be explicit or implicit, the purpose of amendment must be sincere, efficacious, and universal.

It must be sincere, with a genuine intention to avoid sin in the future; it will not suffice to make profession of good intentions with the lips, without any real determination to carry them into effect.

It must be efficacious, or the sinner must be prepared to take the necessary means to avoid sin. A mere half wish and half resolve will not do. The sinner must be prepared to do and suffer anything rather than fall into sin again. It would, indeed, be unwise to try one’s own determination by imagining all kinds of terrible temptations to sin to see if the will would remain constant, but at any rate the will must here and now be so rooted in good that, come what may, it is determined not to be moved.

There must also be a firm resolve to avoid all mortal sins for the future, not merely any that may have been confessed, but all others, or else there can be no friendship with God, whom we must love above all things. He cannot love God above all things who is prepared to offend him mortally. The purpose of amendment need not extend to all venial sins, provided that at least there is the sincere intention of avoiding some sin that is confessed, or at any rate of lessening the number of smaller transgressions,

CONFESSION, or the self-accusation of a penitent made to a priest with a view of obtaining sacramental absolution, is the second material element of Penance. Such confession is necessary because it is an essential element of the sacrament of Penance, which, as we have seen, is a necessary means of salvation for all who have fallen into grave sin after Baptism. The Council of Trent teaches that “ From the institution of the sacrament of Penance, as already explained, the universal Church has always understood that the entire confession of sins was also instituted by the Lord, and is of divine law necessary for all who have fallen after Baptism.’’¹

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 5.

This confession must be made by word of mouth according to the practice of the Church and the teaching of the Council of Florence.¹ However, oral confession is not absolutely necessary for the validity of the sacrament, for mutes or penitents who know no language known also to the confessor, or those who are dying and are unable to speak, may confess by signs. Moreover, for good reason, anyone may write his confession, hand it to the priest to read, and accuse himself in general terms, such as “‘ I confess all that is written there.” Although mutes and other penitents may thus confess in writing, yet there is no obligation to do so, for sacramental confession should be secret and auricular, whereas writing makes it to some extent public, litera scripta manet.

Clement VIII, by a decree dated June 20, 1602, condemned the opinion that it is lawful to confess by letter to an absent priest or to receive absolution in the same way from an absent priest, and forbade the opinion ever to be put in practice; whence theologians conclude that such confession or absolution would be invalid by divine law, else the Pope could not have condemned it in such absolute terms. It seems to follow that confession by telephone would also be invalid, for confession would be made by one who is absent, not present with the priest at the time of receiving this sacrament, as is required by the conditions of its valid administration.

¹ Decretum pro Armenis.

A full, entire, and specific confession of all the mortal sins which have been committed after Baptism is prescribed by divine law. According to the Council of Trent,¹ “ If anyone saith that in the sacrament of Penance it is not necessary by divine law for the remission of sins to confess all and singular the mortal sins which after due and diligent previous meditation are remembered, even those mortal sins which are secret, and those which are opposed to the two last commandments of the Decalogue, as also the circumstances which change the species of a sin ... let him be anathema.”

Theologians distinguish between the material and the formal integrity of confession. The material integrity consists in making known each and all the mortal sins which have been committed and which have not yet been confessed; the formal integrity consists in confessing all the mortal sins which occur to the mind after a diligent examination of conscience, or at least of all the sins which the penitent is bound under the circumstances to confess to the priest. It is formal integrity which is prescribed by divine law, and to procure it the penitent is bound before confession to make a diligent examination of his conscience. He should not be too anxious in making this examination; it will be sufficient if he employ that diligence which prudent men employ in worldly matters of importance. No general rule can be given to measure the length of time which the examination should occupy. Much depends upon the character of the individual, the length of time which has elapsed since the last confession, whether the penitent is accustomed to commit grave sins or not, and on similar circumstances. If the penitent cannot recollect the number of times that he has fallen into serious sin, he should mention the number as nearly as he can, and if he has fallen very frequently and almost continuously over a long period of time, it will be sufficient to mention the approximate number of times that he has fallen in the day or week, together with the length of time during which the habit has lasted.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 7.

A number of special questions must here be considered which touch on the integrity which is required in confession.

The Council of Trent, as we have just seen, teaches that those circumstances which change the nature of a sin must be made known; the theft of a consecrated chalice, which is a sacrilege, would not be adequately confessed by simply saying, “I committed theft.” Not only circumstances which change the specific nature of a sin must be confessed, but also those which make a venial sin mortal and vice versa. The quantity in theft, then, must be indicated sufficiently to enable the priest to judge whether it was a mortal or a venial sin. Divines are not agreed whether circumstances which merely increase the malice of a sin but do not otherwise change its nature or moral quality are necessarily to be confessed. Many, with the Catechism of the Council of Trent, teach that there is an obligation to confess them, but as they give no convincing reason for their opinion and the contrary is held by many approved theologians, we may safely follow the more easy and the more lenient view.

It is not sufficient to confess as an internal sin one which was completed in external act. It would not be sufficient for a penitent to say that he desired to steal when he actually stole. For although the malice of sin is in the internal act of the will, and the external act adds nothing to it per se, yet, considered as human actions, an internal is different from an external act, and therefore as sins are bad human actions, an internal sin is specifically different from the same sin completed in external act.

It is a matter of controversy whether the mere effect of a sin must be confessed. If a man wounds another with the intention of killing him, and then repents and confesses unlawful wounding with the intention of killing, but afterward the man dies, will his assailant be obliged to go to confession again and confess homicide? The opinion is more probable that there is no such obligation, for such an effect of sin is not a sin, and we are only bound to confess sins; a sin is a human action, and when the victim dies his assailant does not act; he would now prevent the death if he could, and so he does not sin.

A vicious habit or custom of committing sin is a cause of sin rather than sin itself, and as sins are the matter of confession, per se it is not necessary to confess a sinful habit. If, however, the penitent did not use sufficient diligence to correct his bad habit, and this caused him inadvertently to commit sin, to blaspheme, for instance, then although the blasphemy, because inadvertent, is not sinful in itself, it is nevertheless voluntary and sinful in its cause, and so the uncorrected bad habit must be confessed. It is sometimes of importance for the confessor to know whether his penitent has contracted a habit of sin in order to be able to direct him, and so the confessor has a right to ask in confession whether a habit has been contracted, and the penitent is then under an obligation to tell the truth.

If many sins have been committed with others it is usually immaterial whether they were committed with one and the same or with different persons. However, if a sin against chastity is committed with a married person, that circumstance must be mentioned, as it causes the sin to be against justice as well as against chastity. Similarly, if one or both accomplices in such a sin are bound by a vow of chastity, that must. be mentioned. A religious who is a priest, and even if he is solemnly professed, would satisfy his obligation of confessing a sin against chastity by mentioning it, and adding that he is under a vow of chastity. For it is probable that there is no specific difference between the violation of a solemn and a simple and even private vow of chastity, and a priest, like a religious, is bound to chastity by vow.

Sins against chastity committed with relations have the special malice of incest, but with the exception of the first degree in the direct line of consanguinity, it is probable that the several degrees of kindred or affinity do not constitute a specific difference in the sin. There is a special malice and difformity in a sin of impurity committed with parent or child, but among civilized peoples this is happily of rare occurrence. Hatred against relations is not only against general charity, but is also contrary to piety, which binds relations to love each other with a special affection. Grave hatred will be a serious sin also against this virtue of piety if it is indulged in against near relations, not if it is against more remote kindred with regard to whom the obligation is not so strict.

Mere superiority or position of itself does not change the nature of a sin committed by rulers, magistrates, and people in authority. And so if a master sin with his servant, the sin does not of itself differ from ordinary fornication. If, however, the sin is also a violation of a special duty, then of course it will have a special malice, and so if a schoolmaster corrupt a youth committed to his care, he must mention this circumstance in confession.

The time at which a sin was committed does not change its nature, and so even though a sin which has been committed recently be confessed as though it were a sin of one’s past life, the confession will be valid, but of course the practice is not to be commended, nor should it be indulged in.

Integrity of confession is prescribed by divine law, but as even divine law does not bind to what is impossible, physical or moral impossibility of making a full confession will excuse the penitent from obeying the law. And so danger of death when the dying person has not the strength or time for making a full confession, or ignorance of any language known to the priest, or danger of violation of the seal of confession, or danger to life from pestilence or other cause, will excuse the penitent from making a full confession of all his sins. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that a large concourse of penitents on some great feast is a sufficient reason for absolving them without requiring a full confession. When a penitent has been absolved without making a full confession on account of the physical or moral impossibility of doing so, there always remains the obligation of supplying the defect in the next confession, unless the impossibility continues. A proposition asserting the contrary was condemned by Alexander VII. Moreover, that a penitent may lawfully ask for absolution without making a full confession, the following conditions must be verified:

(a) There must be some sort of necessity for making the confession here and now, as, for instance, the obligation of receiving the sacraments at Easter, or the hardship of remaining long without the sacraments or in a state of mortal sin.

(b) There must be no other confessor at hand to whom a full confession could be made without grave inconvenience.

(c) All sins must be confessed which can be mentioned without grave inconvenience, extrinsic to confession, which affects the penitent, the confessor, or some third person. The reason of this is because it cannot be supposed that Christ our Lord intended to bind penitents to make a full confession when it would entail such a hardship, whereas we know that he did command a full confession in spite of shame or other difficulties which are the natural accompaniments of confession of sin to a fellow-man.

By a general confession is meant a repetition of preceding confessions. Sometimes this is necessary, sometimes it is useful; otherwise it is harmful, likely to beget scruples, and lead the penitent to think about the past when he should be thinking about the present and the future, and so it should not be permitted.

A general confession is necessary when, through want of jurisdiction on the part of the confessor, or of a full confession or of sorrow for sin on the part of the penitent, former confessions were certainly invalid. In these cases all the invalid confessions must be repeated at least as far as the necessary matter is concerned, A general confession at certain times extending over a certain period is frequently prescribed to religious by rule, which, of course, should be dutifully observed. Moreover, it is useful for most people to make a general confession sometimes, especially when about to enter upon a new state of life, or when, while making a spiritual retreat and meditating upon sin, the grace of God moves the soul to greater sorrow for the past than one ordinarily feels. Sometimes a general confession may be allowed to allay doubts and scruples of conscience with regard to past sins.

Unless some notable spiritual fruit is to be hoped for, a general confession should in other cases besides the above be regarded as harmful, and should not be allowed.

IT is part of the law of eternal justice that when we sin by following our own will instead of the will of God we must be brought back again into the right way by suffering what we would not. And so sin brings with it its penalty; when we have sinned we must suffer for it either in this world or the next. It is in keeping with this principle that by the institution of Christ one of the elements of the sacrament of Penance by which sin is forgiven is satisfaction. By satisfaction is understood some action which entails labour and pain, imposed by the priest in confession on the repentant sinner and accepted by him. We have already seen that the Council of Trent teaches that satisfaction is an element in the material part of Penance, and the same council in another place¹ adds: “‘ Therefore the priests of the Lord ought, as far as the Spirit and prudence shall suggest, to enjoin salutary and suitable satisfactions according to the quality of the crimes and the ability of the penitent.”

Confessors, then, are under the obligation of giving a penance to their penitents in satisfaction for the sins which they confess, As a general rule, they must give a grave penance for grave sins, otherwise they will sin grievously; but probably only a venial sin would be committed by neglecting to give a suitable penance for light faults, In the early Church the penances enjoined were very severe, but, according to modern discipline, that is considered a grave penance and suitable for a penitent who has confessed grave sins which would bind under a grave obligation if it were imposed by ecclesiastical law. The Church encourages her children to make up by gaining indulgences for what the justice of God may require in addition to the comparatively light penances which are imposed nowadays.

The natural sequence of judicial acts in the tribunal of Penance requires that a penance should be enjoined by the priest before giving absolution, but it will be valid if imposed after absolution.

The Ritual expresses a wish that, as far as possible, penances should be given which are contrary to the sins confessed, as almsgiving for avarice, fasting or other bodily affliction for lust, humiliations for pride, acts of devotion for sloth. For such as but seldom confess more frequent reception of the sacraments may be enjoined. The confessor should never apply to personal objects alms imposed on his penitents, nor enjoin public penance for secret sins.

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 8.

The penitent is bound to accept and to execute a reasonable penance which his confessor has imposed on him. This obligation will be grave when a grave penance has been imposed for serious sins, otherwise it will bind under pain of venial sin. As the penitent is bound to accept the penance, so he is obliged to execute it at the time prescribed, if any time was fixed, or if not, then at a reasonable time. To defer its execution so long as to be in danger of forgetting it would be equivalent to not fulfilling it. It is best to execute the penance as soon as can conveniently be done.

If the penitent forgets the penance which was enjoined, he is excused from fulfilling any penance, as he is not bound to confess the same sins a second time, and he cannot substitute some other of his own choice, as he is not the minister of the sacrament.

In order to be sure of obtaining the sacramental effect of fulfilling the penance enjoined by the confessor, the penitent must be in the state of grace when he fulfils it, for God does not remit temporal punishment due to past sins in favour of one who is at enmity with him. However, by fulfilling the penance even in the state of mortal sin, what had been enjoined would have been executed, though it would not then effect its object of remitting temporal punishment due to sin confessed. It is a disputed point among theologians whether fulfilment of penance while in a state of sin would produce its effect when the sinner repented and again recovered the state of grace. Many theologians hold that it does so, and that it revives in the same way as a sacrament revives which has been validly received, but which does not produce grace at the time of its reception on account of the presence of some obstacle in the soul.

Although it is better and safer to execute the penance while in the state of grace, and if it is executed in a state of mortal sin it does not at any rate at once obtain its effect, yet it is not certain that any fault is committed by doing one’s penance while in sin, any more than it is sinful to assist at Mass while out of the friendship of God. One who in sin hears Mass on Sunday satisfies the precept, though he does not obtain the full fruit of the sacrifice; in the same way one, who while in sin says his penance, fulfils indeed his obligation, but does not thereby obtain at the time the sacramental fruit of his action.

Although a penitent may not of his own authority substitute another penance for that which was imposed by his confessor, yet he may for good reason get this commuted either by the same or by a different confessor. The same confessor may commute the penance which he himself imposed either in or out of confession, provided that so long an interval has not elapsed that the commutation cannot be considered one moral act with the confession and the imposition of the penance which is commuted. If the penitent goes to another confessor and asks for a commutation of a penance which has been enjoined him, the commutation must be granted in confession, otherwise the new confessor will have no jurisdiction over the penitent. The former confession need not be repeated; it is probable that it will be sufficient if the new confessor knows the penance which was given and for which a commutation is asked, together with the difficulty which the penitent feels in executing it.

WE must distinguish the form which is required for the validity of the sacrament from the form which is commonly used according to the Ritual. ‘‘ I absolve thee from thy sins ” is sufficient for the validity of the sacrament, and probably even the mere words “I absolve thee.” The Ritual form consists of the four short prayers beginning with Misereatur, etc., of which the third is the most important, as it contains the absolution from censures and from sin. The absolution from censures is always given before the absolution from sin for the sake of greater security, because if the penitent were under censure, he could not lawfully receive a sacrament. A rubric of the Ritual expressly lays down that the other three prayers may be omitted in shorter and more frequent confessions, but it is better always to add the last prayer, as it probably gives a special satisfactory efficacy to the good works which the penitent subsequently performs.

We saw above that absolution cannot be given validly by a priest to a penitent who is not morally present at the time. This sacrament is a judicial process, and the priest, who is the judge, pronounces sentence on the culprit who is present in court. The absolution must be pronounced by word of mouth, and the penitent must be within hearing distance, not farther distant than the ordinary tone of voice carries.

The priest cannot pass sentence without having a sufficient knowledge of the sins to be absolved and the dispositions of the penitent. It is not necessary, however, nor is it possible to have a distinct knowledge of the subjective malice with which the sins of the penitent were committed. The confessor may presume that the subjective malice of the penitent corresponds with the objective malice of the sin, unless he has special reasons for concluding otherwise. With his habitual knowledge of the malice of different sins the confessor passes a sufficient judgement on them if he quietly listens to the self-accusation of the penitent.

A merely historical account of the sins which a person has committed may suffice for absolution if the penitent resumes them under some brief formula by which he expresses his desire to confess them and receive absolution for them. The priest must in this case, of course, retain at least a general and vague knowledge of the sins which he absolves.

A dying person, who through weakness or other causes is unable to make a full confession, may be absolved absolutely if he mentions what sins he can, or even if he asks for the absolution of his sins, for such a confession is formally integral.

The Ritual prescribes that a dying person who has lost the use of his senses is to be absolved even if he previously only expressed a desire himself or through others to receive absolution. In this case, also, it would seem that the absolution should be absolute.

Dying persons who have lost the use of their senses may be absolved conditionally even if they give no certain signs of a desire to confess or of sorrow for their sins. It may be that in such a state the dying person has the requisite dispositions, and is trying his best to give expression to them, and so the movements of the body or his laboured breathing may be indications of a wish to receive absolution. At any rate, in such a case of necessity we may use even a slenderly probable opinion, and it is now the common practice to absolve conditionally in such cases.

Christ our Lord gave his Apostles and their successors a twofold spiritual power to enable them to do the work which he commissioned them to do for the sanctification and salvation of souls. This twofold spiritual power is the power of Orders and the power of Jurisdiction, The power of Orders has reference to the holy Eucharist, and it was conferred on the Apostles at the Last Supper when, after consecrating the blessed Eucharist, our Lord said to them: “Do this for a commemoration of me.” The power of Orders has reference not only to the blessed Eucharist but to everything that is required to prepare and dispose men for the worthy and fruitful reception of it. And so, by the disposition of Christ our Lord the power of Orders is necessary for the forgiveness of sins. In other words, only priests can be ministers of the sacrament of Penance (Can. 871).

The power of jurisdiction is the power of ruling subjects, and it was given to the Apostles by Christ our Lord when he said to them: “ Amen, I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven. Both powers are implied in the institution of the sacrament of Penance when our Lord said to his Apostles: ‘‘ As the Father hath sent me I also send you. Receive ye the Holy Ghost, whose sins you shall forgive they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain they are retained.”

The power of Orders is conferred by the sacrament of Orders. We will treat of the power of jurisdiction in a separate chapter,

Priests are judges in the tribunal of Penance, and judges must have jurisdiction if their sentence is to take effect. As the Council of Trent teaches: ‘‘Wherefore, since the nature and order of a judgement require this, that sentence be passed only on those subject to that judicature, it has ever been firmly held in the Church of God, and this synod ratifies it as a thing most true, that the absolution which a priest pronounces upon one over whom he has not either an ordinary or a delegated jurisdiction ought to be of no weight whatever.”¹ Jurisdiction in general is the power of ruling subjects. We must distinguish jurisdiction in the internal forum from jurisdiction in the external forum. The latter has reference primarily and directly to the common good, to promote which it makes laws, administers justice, and directs the machinery of government. Jurisdiction in the internal forum refers directly and primarily to the good of the individual soul, whose actions it directs toward God. It is exercised either in the sacrament of Penance, when sins are forgiven, or outside the sacred tribunal, as when a dispensation is granted from ecclesiastical law. Again, jurisdiction is either ordinary or delegated. Ordinary jurisdiction is that which is annexed to an office by law; delegated jurisdiction is committed to a person.

The Pope and Cardinals have ordinary jurisdiction for hearing confessions throughout the whole Church.

Local Ordinaries and parish priests and those who are in the place of parish priests have ordinary jurisdiction for hearing confessions in their respective territories, as also has the Canon Penitentiary. The superiors of exempt religious have ordinary jurisdiction for their own subjects (Can. 873).

One who has ordinary jurisdiction for hearing confessions can absolve his subjects wherever he finds them.

Ordinary jurisdiction ceases by loss of office, and, after a declaratory or condemnatory sentence, by excommunication, suspension from office, and interdict.

The Ordinary of the place in which the confessions are heard grants delegated jurisdiction to hear the confessions of all penitents, whether secular or religious, to all priests, both secular and religious, even though they be exempt; but religious priests may not use the same without at least the presumed leave of their superior (Can. 874).

Local Ordinaries should not habitually grant faculties for hearing confessions to religious who are not presented by their own superior, nor without grave reason deny faculties to those whom he does present.

Local Ordinaries should only grant faculties for hearing confessions to such as have been proved fit for the office by examination, unless there is question of a priest whose theological knowledge they know from other sources (Can. 887).

Delegated jurisdiction can be granted with certain limitations as to time, place, persons, and cases.

Jurisdiction must be granted in writing or expressly by word, and without charge.

Parish priests, vicars of parish priests, and other priests with general delegation cannot delegate jurisdiction for hearing confessions without the faculty or mandate of the Ordinary of the place (Com. on Canon Law, October 16, 1919).

By Canon 881 all priests, whether secular or regular, approved for hearing confessions in any place, whether they have ordinary or delegated jurisdiction, can absolve validly and lawfully homeless persons and strangers who come to them from another diocese or parish, as also Catholics of any Oriental rite.

Without grave cause local Ordinaries may not revoke or suspend jurisdiction for hearing confessions, nor without consulting the Holy See can they lawfully take away faculties at one time from all the confessors belonging to a formed house of religious (Can. 880).

Delegated jurisdiction ceases when the mandate has been executed, when the time has elapsed or the number of cases for which it was given is exhausted, when the final cause of the delegation ceases; by the revocation of him who gave it directly intimated to the delegate, by the renunciation of the delegate directly intimated to him who gave it and accepted by him. It does not cease when he who gave it loses his authority, unless a clause was inserted to that effect, or jurisdiction was given as a favour to special persons to hear a confession and nothing has been done in the matter. If the case has been begun it may be finished (Can. 207).

However, if by inadvertence absolution is given after the lapse of the time for which jurisdiction was granted, or after the number of cases was exhausted, it is valid (Can. 207, sec. 2).

Even when a priest has not jurisdiction habitually, the Church sometimes supplies it for the good of the penitent, so that the absolution given may be valid.

In danger of death all priests, even though not approved for hearing confessions, may validly and lawfully absolve any penitents from any sins or censures, however reserved and notorious they may be, and even though an approved priest be present, but the special law about absolving an accomplice must be observed (Can. 882).

In a case of common mistake when many of the faithful think that a priest has faculties while he has not, the Church supplies jurisdiction, but if a priest knowingly exposes himself to hear confessions without faculties he sins grievously.

The Church supplies jurisdiction in a case of positive doubt and probability as to whether a priest has it (Can. 209).

According to Canon 883 all priests while on a sea voyage, provided that they have received faculties for hearing confessions, either from their own Ordinary or from the Ordinary of the port where they embarked, or from the Ordinary of any intermediate port by which they pass on their journey, can, during the whole voyage, hear the confessions in the ship of any of the faithful on board with them, although the ship on its voyage may pass by or even stay for some time in various places subject to the jurisdiction of different Ordinaries.

Moreover, when the ship stops on the voyage they can hear the confessions both of the faithful who for any reason come on board, and of such as while they chance to be on land ask them to hear their confessions, and validly and lawfully absolve them even from cases which are reserved to the-Ordinary of the place.

The Holy See has made special regulations with regard to the faculties of army chaplains (Can. 451, sec. 3).

¹ Sess. xiv, c. 7.

THE local Ordinary can give jurisdiction to hear the confessions of the members of a clerical order of exempt religious, as we have seen. Their religious superior, in accordance with the Constitutions, can likewise grant jurisdiction for hearing the confessions of the religious, of the novices, and of others who by day and night live in a house of the religious as servants, scholars, guests, or for the sake of their health. The religious superior can grant jurisdiction for hearing the confessions of all these to secular priests also, and to priests of other religious institutes.

In an exempt institute of laymen the superior proposes a confessor to the local Ordinary from whom he ought to obtain jurisdiction (Can. 875).

In an institute of laymen who are not exempt the local Ordinary designates a priest to hear confessions (Can. 529).

In each house of clerical religious it is prescribed that several lawfully approved confessors be appointed according to the number of the inmates, with power to absolve from cases reserved in the order in the case of exempt religious (Can. 518, sec. 1).

In institutes of laymen it is prescribed that an ordinary and an extraordinary confessor be appointed; and if a religious ask for a special confessor the superior should grant the request without in any way inquiring into the reason for the request, or showing displeasure at it (Can. 528).

To hear the confessions of novices in orders of men it is prescribed that one or more ordinary confessors be appointed according to the number of novices. In the case of clerical orders, these ordinary confessors should live in the novitiate; in the case of orders of laymen, they should at least frequently come to the novitiate to hear the confessions of the novices.

Besides the ordinary confessors some other confessors should also be appointed, and free access to them should be allowed the novices.

Moreover, at least four times in the year an extraordinary confessor should be allowed the novices, and all of them should present themselves to him at least to ask for his blessing (Can. 566). y Finally, while the Constitutions which prescribe or advise confession at fixed times to appointed confessors should be observed, if a religious even though exempt, for his peace of conscience, go to a confessor approved by the local Ordinary, even though he is not one of those designated for religious, the confession is lawful and valid, and any privilege to the contrary is revoked; and such confessor can absolve the religious even from sins and censures reserved in the order (Can. 519).

To hear the confessions of religious women in their convents lawfully and validly, both secular and religious priests of any degree or office, except Cardinals, require a special jurisdiction which the Ordinary of the place grants where the convent is situated, and any special law or privilege to the contrary is revoked (Can. 876).

To hear the confessions of such religious women one ordinary confessor only is to be appointed for each convent, unless the great number of the religious or some other cause require more (Can. 520).

The ordinary confessor is appointed for three years, but under certain conditions his office may be prolonged for a second or even for a third period of three years (Can. 526).

An extraordinary confessor for each community of religious women should be granted at least four times in the year, and all the religious and novices should present themselves to him at least to ask for his blessing (Can. 521).

The local Ordinary should appoint some special confessors for every house where a religious community lives to whom any nun may easily have recourse in particular cases, and if any religious asks for such a confessor no superioress in any way may inquire into the reason for the request, refuse it, or show displeasure at it (Can. 521).

III. Plurality of acts. The general rule is this: there are as many sins as there are morally distinct acts, or as there are physical acts not morally united into some one thing. "According to the unity of the will," says St. Thomas, "judgment is to be taken concerning the unity of that which is said to be in the moral genus" (In II Sent., dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1). Therefore where there is a morally diverse act of the will, there is a distinct sin. It remains to inquire when there is a morally diverse act; the particular rules will provide this, i.e., rules which regard diverse acts considered specifically. Now in relation to this matter acts are distinguished into internal acts, i.e., acts to be consummated in the will alone, and external acts.

Internal acts are divided into acts which do not tend toward another act, such as morose delectations, hatred, etc.; and acts which tend toward another act, such as the purpose of perpetrating an internal or external sin.

External acts are distinguished into complete and incomplete acts. Complete acts are those which by their nature are not ordered to another act of the same species, such as self-pollution, fornication, homicide. Incomplete acts are called acts which by their nature are ordered to another more principal act of the same species; thus an immodest touch is ordered to intercourse or to self-pollution. Sins of the mouth are equated with incomplete acts. There are added acts which, considered according to the notion handed down, are neither complete nor incomplete, namely acts indifferent by their nature, which are employed by the agent as means of arriving at a sinful act, such as taking the road in order to steal, preparing weapons in order to commit homicide. With these things noted, take the particular rules which follow:

1. Internal acts which do not tend toward another act constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation, i.e., a contrary act either of efficacious unwillingness or of simple displeasure; 2. after voluntary cessation, namely when someone indeed does not formally revoke the prior act, but nevertheless, reflecting upon it, either simply turns himself away from it, for example, from weariness, or turns himself to a work incompatible with the prior act, as if someone deliberately ceases from morose delectation and applies himself to study; 3. after indeliberate cessation, i.e., through natural inadvertence and distraction to other things, of such a delay that the repeated act cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and so to be united with the prior act or acts in the same cause; practically, after a cessation of some delay. I say, of some delay, because these sins, since they do not tend toward a work and therefore are plainly consummated in themselves, commonly do not proceed from the same impulse of passion as long as purposes do (St. Alphonsus, V, 37; Homo Apostolicus, tract. III, n. 58).

2. Internal acts which tend toward another act constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation; 2. after voluntary cessation; 3. after indeliberate cessation, if this is of so great a delay that the repeated purpose cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and the purpose does not remain virtually in some effect leading to the intended work. It is said:

a) If this is of so great a delay that the repeated purpose cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion. But how great a delay or sufficiently long interval is required depends on the intensity and firmness of the purpose. Nevertheless, according to St. Alphonsus, commonly an interval of two or three days suffices, because the same impulse of passion is with difficulty prolonged longer. "Hence he who perseveres in an evil will beyond two or three days must explain the time, so that in this way the number of internal acts concerning external sins may be morally understood" (St. Alphonsus, V, 39).

b) And the purpose does not virtually remain in some effect leading to the intended end. If this happens, the first purpose, whatever interval has intervened, is not morally interrupted. "Hence it is inferred: 1. that if someone proposes to kill a man, and for that reason prepares weapons, takes the road, and kills the enemy, he commits one sin, although he has sought him for many days and has repeated the will several times... 2. If someone resolves not to restore another's property, and always remains in the same will, even for a year, he commits one sin, because in that retention never retracted the first will virtually remains, as Roncaglia probably says... Nevertheless Diana rightly thinks... with authors cited by him, that if the thief becomes unable to restore, and then, having become able, does not restore when the opportunity is given, he commits a new sin. The reason is that in that case, through that time of inability, the will of not restoring does not persevere in the effect" (St. Alphonsus, V, 40). Understand this if the thief adverts that on account of inability he is not held to restitution and repudiates the depraved will which he had; otherwise the will morally perseveres in the effect, and it suffices for the penitent to declare the time during which he persisted in such a will (St. Alphonsus, III, 683). Finally, observe that a purpose not morally interrupted constitutes one sin in number with the external act.

3. Complete external acts constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated. Except if the acts, although complete in themselves, nevertheless constitute one whole with others and are not morally interrupted.

Corollary I. He commits several sins in number who twice defiles himself, twice fornicates, twice neglects Mass, etc.

Corollary II. Much more probably he commits several sins who successively absolves several persons. The reason is that each confecting of a sacrament constitutes an action complete in itself, nor do the diverse absolutions, although they may be done on the occasion of one session, constitute one whole. Thus, against several, St. Alphonsus (V, 50, q. 6), Billuart,¹ De Smet,² Pesch,³ Prummer,⁴ and others.

Corollary III. It is more doubtful how many sins are committed by one who celebrates in the state of mortal sin. Some think that only one is committed, because all these actions constitute or integrate one sacrifice. Others admit two sins, one of unworthy consecration, the other of unworthy communion. Others add a third, namely of ministration to an unworthy person. But with St. Alphonsus (V, 44; VI, 35) it seems it must be said that four sacrileges are committed by a celebrant of this kind, namely: being unworthy, he consecrates; being unworthy, he receives communion; being unworthy, he ministers; and he ministers to one unworthy. The reason is that the aforesaid acts, for example the reception, confecting, etc., of a sacrament, seem so disparate that it is scarcely admitted that they coalesce into one sin in number, although they integrate one sacrifice. There is added that, for example, unworthy consecration and unworthy reception are so diverse that they seem to constitute sins of diverse species and therefore also distinct in number.

Corollary IV. Sufficiently probably he commits only one sin who, in the state of mortal sin, distributes the Eucharist once to several persons. The reason is that all the administrations constitute one banquet (St. Alphonsus, V, cited place).

Corollary V. He who from one intention omits all the canonical hours commits one sin, because the different hours constitute one whole, i.e., the Office of the day (St. Alphonsus, IV, 148).

Corollary VI. He who, from the intention of stealing 100 florins, commits several successive thefts, or, having taken the purpose of reading a bad book, completes the reading over several times, seems to commit only one sin, because the stated acts by force of the intention seem sufficiently to constitute one whole, namely the theft of 100 florins, or the reading of the whole book. Except if in the cases brought forward the acts are morally interrupted, for instance through a rather long delay.

4. Incomplete external acts multiply sins in this way:

a) If they are ordered by the agent to a complete act, and the complete act follows, they constitute one sin in number with the complete act, unless they are morally interrupted. The reason is that on the part of the matter they form one moral whole with the complete act, and by reason of the intention they are placed as such. The same must be said of incomplete acts which immediately follow a complete act, because they can be regarded as the complement of the complete act (St. Alphonsus, V, 41). If in the case the complete act does not follow, the incomplete acts constitute one sin among themselves, unless they are morally interrupted.

Incomplete acts, however, are morally interrupted: 1. by formal revocation; 2. by voluntary cessation; 3. by indeliberate cessation, if this is of so great a delay that the incomplete acts cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion, and the purpose of arriving at the complete act does not remain virtually in some effect (p. 200).

Concerning the manner of confessing the aforesaid incomplete acts not morally interrupted, it must be said as follows: 1. if the intended complete act followed, it suffices to confess: I committed fornication; or: I committed adultery; etc. (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 42, q. 1, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, V, 41); 2. if the intended complete act did not follow, one can say, for example: From the intention of fornication, adultery, etc., I acted shamefully by kisses and touches (St. Alphonsus, V, 42).

b) If they are not ordered by the agent to a complete act, they constitute a new sin as often as they are repeated after a moral interruption; in other words, as often as they are repeated: 1. after formal revocation; 2. after voluntary cessation; 3. after indeliberate cessation of such a delay that the repeated act cannot be said to proceed from the same impulse of passion; practically, after an indeliberate cessation of a longer interval. Hence he commits one sin in number who "from the same impulse strikes several times, touches dishonestly several times, blasphemes the same saint or several holy days, reviles or detracts from someone several times in the same matter" (St. Alphonsus, V, 41).⁵

Concerning the manner of confessing the aforesaid incomplete acts not morally interrupted, it suffices to confess, for example: I acted shamefully with a girl by kisses and touches.

The things which have been said about incomplete acts not ordered to a complete act are valid even if, after those acts have been perpetrated, with lust boiling over, someone proceeds to the complete act. Hence "if someone, having kisses, touches, etc., had not from the beginning willed intercourse, but afterward, because lust had increased, completed intercourse, it does not suffice if he confesses only intercourse" (St. Alphonsus, V, 43); but he is held to declare that, independently of intercourse, he acted shamefully with a girl by kisses, touches, etc.

¹ De peccatis, diss. 2, art. 4.

² Collationes Brugenses, 1905, p. 555.

³ Tractatus dogmaticus, VI, n. 261.

⁴ Manuale Theologiae Moralis, I, n. 380.

⁵ Cf. p. 199, where we said that sins of the mouth are equated with incomplete acts.

I. Existence of the precept. The precept of annual confession, enacted by the Fourth Lateran Council in 1215,¹ confirmed by the Council of Trent,² is stated thus by can. 906: "Every one of the faithful of either sex, after he has reached the years of discretion, that is, the use of reason, is bound faithfully to confess all his sins at least once a year." For the rest, note that the precept of confessing is divine, as will be said in the treatise on the sacrament of Confession, but the precept of annual confession is ecclesiastical.

¹ Chapter Omnis.

² Session 14, De Poenitentia, canon 8.

(St. Thomas, part 3, questions 84-90; Supplement, questions 1-28; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, book VI, nn. 425-705; Homo Apostolicus, treatise 16.)

Before we discuss the sacrament of Penance, we shall undertake a discourse on the act itself of doing penance: both because the act of doing penance and the sacrament are intimately connected, indeed in such a way that the act of doing penance constitutes a part of the sacrament; and because, once the very act of doing penance has been explained, many things to be said about the sacrament are perceived better. Hence:

(St. Thomas, part 3, questions 84-90; Supplement, questions 1-28; St. Alphonsus, Theologia moralis, book VI, nn. 425-705; Homo Apostolicus, treatise 16.)

Before we speak of the sacrament of Penance, it is pleasing to premise certain things concerning the power of the Church to remit sins. And we do this both for the sake of completeness, and so that the connection of the whole theological doctrine on this matter may be clear; since the very use of the power to be explained constitutes the form of the sacrament, so that, once that power has been explained, we shall pass by a natural path to explaining the sacrament of Penance itself. Therefore let these points be set down:

I. Christ granted to the Apostles the power of remitting sins. This is of faith from these words of the Council of Trent: "If anyone says that those words of the Lord Savior, 'Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained,' are not to be understood of the power of forgiving and retaining sins in the sacrament of Penance, as the Catholic Church has always understood from the beginning, but twists them, contrary to the institution of this sacrament, to the authority of preaching the Gospel: let him be anathema."¹

II. The power of remitting and retaining sins differs from the power of baptizing. For the former, as we shall immediately say, is judicial, and therefore does not regard any except subjects, that is, the baptized, or those upon whom the power of baptizing has already been exercised. It is added that the power of baptizing cannot be exercised again upon the same person; otherwise than the power of remitting sins.

III. The power of remitting sins is judicial. This is of faith from the Council of Trent: "If anyone says that the sacramental absolution of the priest is not a judicial act, but a bare ministry of pronouncing and declaring that sins have been forgiven to the one confessing... let him be anathema."² And indeed three things are required for judicial power: 1. that the power be instituted by the supreme prince of the society; 2. that through it the application of law to a particular case be made; 3. that the application be made according to the merit of the cause. And all these things concur in the power of remitting and retaining sins. For: 1. the said power was instituted by Christ, the Prince of the Church (n. I); 2. through it the application of the divine law to a particular case is made, by which God has established that through his ministers he at one time remits, at another time retains, the sins of the baptized; 3. this application is made according to the merit of the cause, namely in such a way that the ministers remit or retain sins not according to their own whim, but according to the conditions required by Christ.

IV. The power of remitting sins extends itself to all sins of the baptized. This is clear from the breadth of Christ's words which were cited above. I said, however, of the baptized, because this power, as judicial, can be exercised upon subjects alone, that is, the baptized. For the rest, it is clear from elsewhere that sins committed before Baptism are remitted through Baptism (n. 61).

V. The power of remitting and retaining sins is perpetual in the Church. This is clear: 1. from the immutability with which Christ willed his Church to be furnished; 2. from the fact that until the end of the world there will exist sinners to be reconciled in the Church.

VI. The Church is bound to use the power explained, so that it is not lawful arbitrarily to repel anyone rightly disposed from the benefit of pardon to be obtained through the power of the keys. Theologians dispute concerning the right, for the public good, of repelling certain sinners in determinate cases; just as there also exists a controversy among dogmatic-historical writers concerning the existence of a universal discipline of excluding certain kinds of sin from pardon to be obtained through the ministry of the keys.³

With these points premised, we shall speak first of the sacrament of Penance considered in itself, then of the ministration, and then of the reception of the sacrament of Penance.

¹ Session 14, canon 3.

² Session 14, canon 9.

³ Ned. Kath. Stemmen, 1909, p. 304 sq.

Penance is the sacrament in which, through judicial absolution imparted by a legitimate minister, sins committed after Baptism are remitted to a rightly disposed member of the faithful (canon 870).

Once this definition has been handed down, we must treat first of the existence, then of the essence, then of the effects, and finally of the necessity of the sacrament of Penance.

The sacrament of Penance supposes remote matter; and once that has been posited, it is integrally constituted by proximate matter, form, and an integrating part. Now then:

I. The remote matter of Penance, that is, that around which the sacramental action can be concerned, is all sins committed after Baptism (n. 293; canon 902).¹

¹ Roman Ritual, title III, chapter 1, n. 1.

II. Proximate matter.

1. Proximate matter strictly so called - that is, that which with absolution constitutes the essence of the sacrament - is the contrition and confession of the penitent. Thus St. Thomas (part 3, question 84, article 2), St. Bonaventure,¹ St. Alphonsus (VI, 425), the Thomists, some Scotists, and most more recent authors. But Scotus² and most Scotists teach that contrition and confession, externally manifested nevertheless, are only conditions required for the validity of the sacrament. Finally, some³ hold as probable that internal contrition or attrition alone is the condition necessary for the validity of the sacrament; for the rest, that the essence of the sacrament is completed by the form alone, which, insofar as it is an external ceremony, constitutes the matter, and insofar as it has the power of signifying, constitutes the form. This opinion is almost commonly rejected. Of the opinions explained, the first is much more common and more probable; and the Roman Ritual⁴ and the Roman Catechism⁵ favor it. For the rest, note:

a) Contrition and confession become the matter of the sacrament insofar as by the minister, through absolution, they are assumed or elevated into parts or matter. But it is disputed whether and to what extent the aforesaid acts must be referred to the sacrament by the penitent himself; concerning this dispute there will be discussion later.

b) Contrition, which in itself is internal and spiritual, is not an essential part of the sacrament, that is, of the external sign, except insofar as it becomes sensible through confession or through the petition for or expectation of absolution (St. Alphonsus, VI, 445, 459).

c) It is disputed whether satisfaction in purpose, or the will of fulfilling the imposed satisfaction, is an essential element, or, in other words, whether it pertains to proximate matter strictly so called. Many affirm this, because the Council of Florence and the Council of Trent speak in the same way about satisfaction as about contrition and confession, so that satisfaction must be called, at least in some sense, an essential element. But satisfaction actually performed certainly is not an essential element. It remains, therefore, that we say it is essential at least in purpose. Others deny this, because ecclesiastical documents - besides the fact that they do not settle the controversy about the proximate matter of Penance⁶ - understand by the word satisfaction, in the obvious sense, satisfaction actually performed, just as by the words contrition and confession they designate contrition and confession actually exhibited. Therefore from the aforesaid documents nothing can be drawn as regards satisfaction in desire.

2. Proximate matter taken more broadly - that is, that which, informed by absolution, constitutes the complete sacrament - is satisfaction actually performed. The said satisfaction is not an essential part of the sacrament of Penance, because it is not ordered to its primary effect, that is, to the remission of fault; nevertheless, it is an integrating part of it, insofar as it brings it about that the sacrament can fully attain its effect, which is the remission not only of fault, but also of punishment.

Corollary I. Contrition, confession, and satisfaction are not only the proximate matter of the sacrament of Penance, but also, together with absolution, produce the effect of the sacrament. The contrary is taught not only by many Scotists, but also by some of those who hold the acts of the penitent to be essential parts of the sacrament; and St. Thomas also at one time taught that (distinction 22, question 2, article 1, solution 1, ad 2 and 3); afterward, however, he expressly corrected that opinion (part 3, question 86, article 6). The proposition is especially supported by the fact that according to the Council of Trent⁷ the force of the sacrament is situated in absolution as the form "principally" (therefore not totally, as the adversaries wish). It is added that, just as in physical things, so also in moral things, the effect must be attributed not to the form alone, but also to the matter, or, in other words, to the whole.

Corollary II. Practically it does not matter whether the acts of the penitent are called parts of the sacrament or merely conditions required for validity;⁸ nor whether the effect of the sacrament is ascribed also to the aforesaid acts or to absolution alone. But it does matter somewhat, as will be clear from what is to be said later, whether or not internal contrition or attrition alone is the condition required for validity, as Ballerini teaches.

¹ IV Sentences, distinction 17, part 2, article 1, conclusion 3; distinction 22, article 2, question 1, conclusion.

² Disputation XVI, question 1, n. 5 sq.

³ For example, Ballerini, Opus theologicum de Poenitentia, n. 4 sq.

⁴ Title III, chapter 1, n. 1.

⁵ Part 2, chapter 5, question 12.

⁶ Pallavicini, Historia Concilii Tridentini, book 12, chapter 16.

⁷ Session 14, chapter 3.

⁸ Many Scotists indeed do not require of itself that contrition be external; but because they also hold confession as a necessary condition, and confession in fact manifests contrition, practically the matter comes back to the same thing.

III. The form of Penance is the words of absolution, as the Decree of Eugene IV for the Armenians and the Council of Trent expressly teach.¹

And thus, once the summary notion of the sacrament of Penance has been handed down, we shall explain the essence of this sacrament more fully, speaking distinctly first of remote matter, then of proximate matter, then of form, and finally of the integrating part, or satisfaction. Hence:

¹ Session 14, chapter 3; Roman Ritual, title III, chapter 1, n. 1.

I. Notion. Confession, insofar as it pertains to the sacrament, can be defined: The accusation of one's sins committed after Baptism, made to a priest having jurisdiction and - most add - in order to sacramental absolution. I said insofar as it pertains to the sacrament, for something slightly different must be said if the matter concerns confession insofar as it obliges to the seal; what things are required and suffice for confession considered in that way will be said later.

II. Division. Confession is distinguished:

1. By reason of mode, into secret or auricular and public, insofar as it is made to the priest alone or before a multitude.

2. By reason of object, into distinct and generic, insofar as someone confesses sin according to its lowest species, or only the genus of sins. Generic confession can be subdivided three ways, namely: 1. into confession of the proximate genus, that is, of the genus which has the lowest species under itself, for example, "I accuse myself of sins of lust against nature." To this is almost equivalent confession of the less proximate genus, that is, of that which contains several proximate genera, for example, "I accuse myself of sins of lust"; 2. into confession of the remote genus, that is, of that which contains proximate and less proximate genera, for example, "I accuse myself of mortal sins"; 3. into confession of the highest genus, that is, of that which contains all sins, for example, "I accuse myself of my sins." Confession of this kind, which is also called wholly generic, can also be made by a sign, for instance by sighs, striking of the breast, inclination of the head, etc.

III. Necessity of confession is clear first from the Council of Trent, which expressly teaches the necessity of confession.¹ Next, it is elicited from the fact that the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a judgment, and therefore, in order that it be rightly exercised, it requires in the judge knowledge of the matter with which it is concerned, that is, of sins. But this knowledge must be supplied by the penitent himself, since he alone is a suitable witness, namely of internal acts, of many external acts, and at least of culpability.

Corollary. Confession is necessary by necessity of means. For it is necessary, as follows from what has been said, from the fact that the sacrament of Penance was instituted by Christ after the manner of a judgment. But what is required because of the nature of the sacrament is necessary by necessity of means, because the sacrament itself is required by necessity of means (n. 358).

¹ Session 14, chapter 5 and canon 7.

Question. How far generic confession suffices.

Response 1. Confession, even wholly generic confession, suffices both for validity and for liceity: 1. in a case of necessity, that is, when someone cannot confess otherwise, whether because of defect in the use of the senses, for instance in one dying, or because of lack of time, for instance when shipwreck or battle is imminent;¹ 2. when someone knows that he has sinned gravely, but remembers neither the species nor the proximate or less proximate genus; 3. when someone is so uneducated that no distinct accusation can be drawn out.

As regards one dying, this is clear from the Roman Ritual,² from the First Council of Orange,³ from the Third⁴ and Fourth⁵ Councils of Carthage; namely, the cited documents declare that one deprived of the senses is to be absolved, although in the case there can be question only of wholly generic confession (St. Thomas, Opusculum 65, § on the Sacrament of Anointing; St. Alphonsus, VI, 481).

As regards the other cases enumerated, the same reason holds as in one dying, namely inability to confess distinctly.

Response 2. Outside the cases just assigned, confession, even wholly generic confession, suffices for validity if someone does not have necessary matter, but only, for example, venial sins or mortal sins already distinctly confessed and remitted.⁶ For: 1. that which in a case of necessity suffices for the essence of the sacrament, with the necessary conditions posited,⁷ is deservedly presumed also to suffice outside a case of necessity; 2. by the consent of all, a confession generic in some degree, that is, of the proximate and even the remote genus, suffices for validity, so that formally distinct confession is not required. But if we posit that formally distinct confession is not required, but a generic confession in some degree suffices, it is no longer apparent why a more generic confession does not suffice, especially because the arguments which are brought against wholly generic confession seem also to militate against generic confession in some degree, that is, of the proximate and less proximate genus, and therefore to prove less (cf. St. Alphonsus, VI, 502, doubt 3).

It is disputed whether wholly generic confession in the case of which we are speaking is also licit. Those who deny this argue from the nature of a judgment, which of itself must be instituted concerning determined matter; likewise from the practice of the faithful; likewise from the inconveniences that would follow from admitted liceity. The sacrament would be exposed to danger of nullity because of defect of sorrow; penitents would lack admonitions and counsels, etc. But since all admit that confession of the lowest species, or even of the proximate genus, is not prescribed if the matter is free, it is no longer clear that wholly generic knowledge does not suffice. Next, the practice of the faithful proves an obligation in this matter no more than, for example, as regards the accusation of doubtful sins. Finally, the confessor must watch lest the assigned danger persist; and the admonitions and counsels of which there is question here pertain to perfection, not to necessity. Nevertheless, because of the reasons alleged, it is better to accuse oneself more determinately, and that custom should be promoted.

Objection 1. From the fact that wholly generic confession is valid in a case of necessity, it does not necessarily follow that it is also valid outside a case of necessity; this is clear from the fact that confession made through a messenger in the article of death is valid, but otherwise is not valid.

Response. I deny that confession made through a messenger in the article of death is valid; you may see that it is not valid proved in n. 312.

Objection 2. The sacrament of Penance is a moral institution, namely it has itself after the manner of a judgment. But a moral institution accommodates itself to the condition of things and persons, or according to circumstances now requires these things, now those, for validity. Hence from the fact that wholly generic confession sometimes suffices for validity, it is undeservedly deduced that it always suffices.

Response. The sacrament of Penance certainly was instituted after the manner of a judgment; nevertheless, of a judgment which is of its own kind, that is, primarily reconciliatory. Moreover, I concede that even from such a moral institution, from such a judgment, now these things and now those are required so that it may be exercised prudently. But that for validity also now these things and now those are required needs proof; until it is proved, it is permitted to presume the contrary. It is added that the contrary can also be demonstrated positively. Namely, from the fact that confession of the proximate and even of the remote genus, in other words quasi-generic confession, suffices for validity even when the circumstances bear a more determined confession, from this, I say, it is rightly deduced that by no means, according to the circumstances, now these things and now those are required for the validity of this moral institution.

Objection 3. More distinct knowledge is required for the validity of a judgment; therefore also for the validity of Penance, which was instituted after the manner of a judgment.

Response. I distinguish the major: more distinct knowledge is required for the validity of a secular judgment, I concede; for the validity of a sacramental judgment, which is primarily reconciliatory, more distinct knowledge is required, I deny, because of the arguments alleged.

Objection 4. According to the Council of Trent,⁸ a sacramental judgment cannot be instituted when the case is unknown.

Response. The Council treats of the prudent institution of this judgment, not of its valid institution. For it speaks of wholly distinct knowledge, that is, knowledge of sins according to their lowest species; but no one admits that this is required for validity.

¹ In circumstances of this kind let the confessor stir all to elicit a brief act of contrition and to repeat mentally what he himself is about to say; 2. to signify by a sign, for example by inclination of the head, the will of receiving absolution. Then let him say: I absolve you from all your censures and sins; in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen.

² Title 3, chapter 1, n. 24.

³ Chapter 12, in Labbe, t. 4, col. 703 and following; cf. Decretum Gratiani, canon Qui recedunt 7, cause 26, question 6.

⁴ Chapter 34, in Labbe, t. 2, col. 1404.

⁵ Chapter 76, in Labbe, at the cited place, col. 1443; cf. canon Is qui 8, cause 26, question 6.

⁶ If someone has necessary matter, he is bound under grave obligation to confess distinctly, and therefore, if he confessed only generically, he would receive the sacrament invalidly because of defect of disposition. Except if he proceeded in good faith.

⁷ With the necessary conditions posited, namely that the penitent has sufficient sorrow and purpose.

⁸ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

I. To a priest as judge, so that, for example, confession, or rather a narration of sins, made to a priest as friend does not suffice. For the word "confession," which the Council of Trent uses, considering both its obvious sense and the very matter treated there,¹ signifies the exposition of sins made in sacramental judgment. Nevertheless, it suffices for validity if someone, after a friendly narration has been made, says: "I accuse myself of the sins just narrated."

Question. Whether an accusation of this kind also suffices for liceity.

Response 1. Affirmatively, if the confessor has retained a distinct memory of the sins narrated. The reason is that then the subsequent accusation, although in appearance indistinct, is in reality distinct (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tract 16, n. 44).

Response 2. Otherwise it is disputed. Now with St. Alphonsus (VI, 502, doubt 1) it seems it must be said that this manner of acting does not suffice for liceity. For the Council of Trent declares that confession is required,² and that, in order that judgment be exercised prudently, it is required according to species and number.³ But in the hypothesis posited there is no confession according to species and number: the prior narration is not such, since it was not confession; nor is the general accusation that follows such, since it was not confession according to species and number. It is added that the confessor, before he gives sentence, must have had distinct judicial knowledge. But this is not had in our case: neither by force of the prior narration, since it was made before the confessor could exercise the office of judge in relation to this person; nor by force of the subsequent confession, since it was not distinct and therefore did not supply distinct judicial knowledge. Some indeed judge that judicial knowledge is present if the priest, as friend receiving the narration of sins, already suspected in some degree that he could lead the man, who then was thinking nothing of confession, to sacramental confession. But a suspicion, or even persuasion, of this kind does not suffice for the confessor to be constituted here and now as the judge of this man.

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapters 3 and 5.

² Session 14, on Penance, chapter 3.

³ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

II. To a present priest. For Clement VIII¹ condemned the proposition: "that it is licit, by letters or by an intermediary, to confess sins sacramentally to an absent confessor and to obtain absolution from the same while absent"; and at the same time he prohibited that "it ever be defended as probable in any case, printed, or in any way brought into practice." Moreover, from the fact that this opinion can never be brought into practice, not even in a case of necessity, it is deservedly deduced that confession of this kind is invalid; for no other reason can be assigned for that absolute prohibition. Nor should it be said that the particle "and" in the condemned proposition is to be taken in a copulative sense, not in a disjunctive one; since the Holy Office² declared: "The Most Holy One, namely Paul V, decreed that the said interpretation does not stand and therefore must be removed from his [Suarez's] books" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 428).

Nor from the fact that one dying, deprived of the senses, who before deprivation of the senses manifested a desire of confessing while the priest was absent, can afterward be absolved by a present priest, nor, I say, from that fact should you deduce that confession made to an absent priest in the article of death is valid. For one dying in this way can be absolved either because the testimony of the said desire, brought forward by a witness, is judged to be the confession of the dying person himself; or because the confession of the dying person, made while the priest was absent, morally perseveres when the priest is present, and as such is made here and now to the present priest; or because the dying person, with the priest present, perhaps expresses by some sign the desire of absolution. This suspicion suffices so that absolution may at least be granted conditionally (St. Alphonsus, VI, 481). From these things it is clear that our case is not comprehended by the condemnation of Clement VIII, namely because there is not, or at least probably there is not, confession made to an absent priest.

¹ July 20, 1602 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1088).

² July 14, 1605; likewise June 7, 1603 and January 24, 1632 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1089).

III. Secretly, that is, let confession be made to the priest alone, considering a usage which is not destitute of force.¹ Nevertheless, those who cannot confess otherwise are not prohibited, if they wish, from confessing through an interpreter, with abuses and scandals guarded against (canon 903). For the rest, confession through an interpreter can be made in such a way that the interpreter does not know the responses given by the penitent; for instance, if the confessor questions the penitent, the interpreter repeats the questions in the language of the penitent, and the penitent responds to them by signs perceived by the confessor alone.

¹ Cf. Council of Trent, session 14, on Penance, canon 6; response of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, January 10, 1920 (A.A.S. 1920, p. 43); likewise Lateran Council, chapter Omnis utriusque sexus.

IV. Vocally. The precept of confessing vocally was introduced by custom beyond the law,¹ and therefore is judged to persist.² It is also more commonly taught that the precept obliges at least under grave obligation insofar as one who, without an excusing cause, does not make the whole confession vocally sins mortally. A moderate cause suffices so that it is licit to confess by nods, signs, or writing, for example if someone because of shame cannot express a sin by mouth, or because of an impediment of the tongue confesses with difficulty by mouth; if the confessor is somewhat deaf, so that confession made by mouth could be heard by others (St. Alphonsus, VI, 493). Indeed, a just cause seems to suffice so that someone, after handing over a written confession and after it has been read by the confessor, may add: "I accuse myself of the sins read by you." Nor in practice should those who confess in writing be disturbed, nor should the confessor inquire why they proceed in that way.

¹ "Unless," as in the Extravagant Inter cunctas, on privileges, "an article of necessity occurs, oral confession is to be made to a priest."

² Cf. response of the Sacred Congregation of the Council, January 10, 1920 (A.A.S. 1920, p. 43).

I. Mortal sins committed after Baptism and not yet directly remitted must be confessed. This follows from the cited documents.

Disputation 1. Whether a sin must be confessed: a) in doubt whether it was committed; b) in doubt whether it was grave.

Response 1. One who opines either that a sin was committed or that the sin which was committed was grave is bound to confess it. For according to the Council of Trent¹ and canon 901 penitents must confess mortal sins "of which, after diligent discussion of themselves, they have consciousness." But one who opines that he sinned has in some way consciousness or knowledge of the sin committed (t. I, n. 215). It is added that each person is bound to observe a law if he opines that the fact founding the law has taken place (t. I, nn. 232 and 233 at the end). But one who opines that he has sinned gravely opines that the fact, that is, sin, founding the law, namely of confessing, has taken place. Finally, one who opines that he has sinned gravely opines that he is liable to the ordinary means for obtaining remission of sin, that is, to the sacrament of Penance. But one who opines in this way seems to be bound to apply that means, with liberty excluded of using only the supplying means, that is, perfect contrition or charity.

Response 2. One who strictly doubts is bound in this way:

1. If he strictly doubts about the commission of sin, he is not bound to confess it. For, as we just noted, the Council of Trent and canon 901 teach that mortal sins of which consciousness is had must be confessed, so that a further obligation should at least practically be excluded. But in strict doubt there is not consciousness or knowledge of a committed sin. The reason seems to be this: one who strictly doubts about a committed sin is only doubtfully liable to the ordinary means for obtaining remission of sin, in the case, to Penance; indeed he is only doubtfully capable of that means in relation to that sin. But such a one, sufficiently probably, is not bound to apply that means, but enjoys liberty of using either the ordinary means or the extraordinary or supplying means, that is, perfect contrition or charity. In the case, if the sin truly took place, it is not remitted independently of the sacrament of Penance.

2. If he strictly doubts about the gravity of the committed sin, these things hold:

a) One who doubts about the gravity of the matter is bound to expose his doubt to the confessor, unless he himself is versed in moral matters.

b) One who doubts about full consent in a grave sin must confess it if he has been accustomed to consent fully, because he is presumed to have consented fully. Otherwise it must be said of the fearful and scrupulous. The former are only to be exhorted to expose doubts of this kind; the latter are to be prohibited from doing so (St. Alphonsus, VI, 473-476; Istruzione e Pratica, chapter 16, n. 30).

Disputation 2. Whether grave sins committed after Baptism doubtfully validly conferred must be confessed.

Response. It seems that this must be affirmed. For first the Holy Office, to the question whether Carolus Wippermann, doubtfully validly baptized, "is to be rebaptized; and insofar as affirmatively, whether confession is to be placed before or after Baptism to be conferred under condition," to that question, I say, responded:² "The Most Holy One, after the votes of the Most Eminent Fathers had been heard, said: Carolus Ferdinandus is to be rebaptized under condition, and, after Baptism has been conferred, let him confess the sins of his past life, and let him be absolved from them under condition." Besides, the same Congregation, to the request of the bishops of England, "whether sacramental confession must be required from neo-converts in England, and whether it must be integral," responded:³ "Affirmatively, and let the decree of June 14, 1715 be given." Moreover, the Holy Office seems to signify that obligation to be universal not only by responding the same thing, but also by referring to the first response. This is confirmed by the fact that the Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Propaganda Fide, in a response to the Archbishop of Quebec,⁴ declared that the decree of the year 1868 contains a universal law, and therefore obliges not only in England but also in other regions. Nor is it an obstacle that that response lacked explicit promulgation; for according to jurisprudence, especially that in force before the Code, it sufficed that such decisions were known.⁵ Besides, the Holy Office, in assigning the norm for reconciling heretics, seems to suppose the affirmative opinion.⁶ Next, one who certainly sinned gravely - which we now suppose to have been done by one doubtfully validly baptized after doubtful Baptism - is bound, if he can, to use at least with moral certainty some ordinary means for obtaining remission of that sin. But by receiving Baptism conditionally he uses only probably the ordinary means for obtaining remission of that sin, because that sin was probably committed after valid Baptism, and therefore probably must be remitted by Penance. Therefore it remains that he receive not only Baptism conditionally, but also conditionally Penance in relation to that sin.

Corollary I. The law explained is divine, as is clear from the intrinsic reason alleged; besides, a priori it is hard to admit that the Church has made a law of confessing sins to the confession of which Christ does not oblige.

Corollary II. What has been said about those doubtfully validly baptized must also be applied to those doubtfully baptized, since the same formal reason subsists.

Corollary III. Sins committed before the first doubtfully valid Baptism are not to be confessed; for if Baptism truly was valid, the aforesaid sins were remitted by the first Baptism; but if it was invalid, they are remitted by the second Baptism. Nor must sins committed and sacramentally declared after the first doubtfully valid Baptism be confessed again; for if the first Baptism was valid, the aforesaid sins were remitted through absolution; but if it was invalid, they will be remitted through the second Baptism.

¹ Session 14, on Penance, chapter 5.

² June 14, 1715 (Collectanea, n. 286).

³ December 17, 1868 (Collectanea, n. 1338).

⁴ July 12, 1869 (Collectanea, n. 1338, in note).

⁵ The Cardinal Secretary of the Holy Office indeed in 1898, in the customary conference of cases of conscience at St. Apollinaris, declared that the response of December 17, 1868 was not general. But the authority of the said Secretary - since he was another than the one who was secretary in 1868, and since he put forth his opinion 30 years after the decree had been issued - is not greater than another private authority. The same must be said of D'Annibale, who was Assessor of the Holy Office after the decree had been issued, and who holds the more benign opinion as probable.

⁶ July 20, 1859 (Collectanea, n. 1178); December 2, 1874 (Collectanea, n. 1426).

I. "With children he ought to use every charity and gentler ways, as far as can be done" (Praxis, n. 90); nevertheless the confessor, especially as regards girls, should always be mindful of due gravity.

II. Sometimes it must be seen whether they enjoy sufficient use of reason, although those who present themselves to the confessor can commonly be presumed sufficiently instructed.

III. Let the confessor take care that from the beginning they learn to confess rightly according to species and number. In questioning let him be cautious, lest the child learn to sin; besides this, let him correct an erroneous conscience when they take for a sin, or for a grave sin, what is no sin or only a light sin. Let the confessor strive especially for this: that he excite the child to true contrition. If some child is found prone to a more harmful sin, for instance to a shameful sin, let him take pains that the vice be eradicated in time (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, nn. 90 and 91). Let the admonition be brief.

IV. As regards the sentence to be rendered, let the confessor follow this norm:

1. Those sufficiently certainly disposed are to be absolved, even if they have confessed only venial sins; since disposed children have a right to absolution just as adults do. Besides this, let him not easily defer absolution for a relapsing child sufficiently certainly disposed, lest, namely, the child be turned away from the sacrament or keep back sins.

2. Those doubtfully disposed are to be absolved under condition: 1. if they have certainly sinned gravely, they are to be absolved in the cases enumerated in n. 404; 2. in doubt whether they are guilty of grave sin, they are always to be absolved, whether the doubt proceeds from the matter of the sin, or from doubt about the full use of reason, or from suspicion of an erroneous conscience by which what is not grave is taken as grave; 3. if either they have sinned only venially, or it is doubted whether any sin was present, sometimes they are to be absolved (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 91; VI, 432). If they are dismissed with only a blessing, this should be signified to them.

Corollary I. Even to children there must be left the faculty of confessing to whomever they prefer; hence one who would establish that children should confess only to him who taught them Christian doctrine, or that girls should confess to the pastor and boys to the vicar, is especially to be reprehended.

Corollary II. A recent question was moved whether boys and girls before the years of puberty can sin gravely. Moreover, the affirmative answer must altogether be given. For first, the decree Quam singulari, issued by Pius X through the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments,² declares that children around the seventh year of age are bound by the precept of annual confession. But it would not declare these things unless it judged that children from that age are capable of mortal sin, because only those who have committed mortal sin are in fact bound to confession. There is added that the decree, with the Council of Trent, on one side teaches that children are held by the obligation of Communion "when by sinning they can lose grace"; in other words, when they can sin gravely; on the other side it declares that they are bound by the said obligation around the seventh year. Therefore, according to the mind of the one issuing the decree, grace can be lost at that age; in other words, grave sin can be committed. In addition, the decree disapproves delay of Communion for this reason, that it exposes children to the danger of losing their first innocence; this demonstrates that they are held as capable of grave sin. Finally, the whole manner of acting of children before the years of puberty shows sufficiently that they are capable of fully deliberate acts and therefore also of gravely sinful acts.

¹ Cf. Reuter, Neoconfessarius; Berger, Pastoraltheologie; Gaume, Manuel des confesseurs; Aertnys, Theologia Pastoralis; Krieg, Wissenschaft der Seelenleitung; Schuch-Polz, Pastoraltheologie.

² August 8, 1910.

I. The confession of the rude and the slow. Insofar as and in what manner they are to be instructed if perhaps they are ignorant of the things to be known by necessity of means and of precept, this has been said in n. 396. For the rest, in accusation and in eliciting contrition they must often be helped by the confessor. If they have omitted a diligent examination of conscience, they should not be dismissed so that they may search their conscience better.

Note. The things that have been said about the rude and the slow are also to be applied to deaf-mutes who are little instructed; for the rest, compare the things said in n. 396.

I. Notion of the habituated person. A habituated or customary person is one who has contracted a habit of some sin. Moreover, a habit of sin is a quality stable of itself by which someone is disposed to sin (vol. I, n. 333). Furthermore:

1. A habit of sin is obtained by frequency of acts. Nevertheless, frequency by itself alone does not suffice; rather it is required that contrary acts not be opposed to the sinful acts leading to the habit, by which contrary acts the origin of the habit would be prevented (vol. I, n. 341). Hence those who commit sins which of themselves arise rather from frailty or from a passing passion do not contract a habit of sin so easily as those who perpetrate sins which of themselves proceed more from malice. The reason is that the former, after the sin has been committed, more easily come to their senses and exercise contrary acts. Sins of the former kind are, for example, pollution and blasphemies; of the latter kind are hatred, theft, conjugal onanism, transgressions of the precepts of the Church, and so forth.

2. The habituated person has the will in some way fixed in sin, and therefore sins from a bad will, that is, from a will constantly inclined to evil, and therefore promptly and even from slight concupiscence, and as though without an effort of resisting; whence he comes to his senses with difficulty. "When someone," says St. Thomas, "sins from habit, which is to sin from malice, then the will tends by itself into the act of sin, as though now totally inclined from habit by way of a natural inclination into the act of sin" (De malo, q. 3, a. 13; cf. I-II, q. 78, aa. 2, 3, and 4; II-II, q. 156, a. 3; St. Alphonsus, V, 4, 2, 3; VI, 459; Praxis Confessarii, nn. 70, 73).

3. It cannot be accurately defined what frequency of acts, and how much time, is required for someone to be able to be judged to have contracted a habit of sin.

a) As regards frequency of acts, a greater number of sins committed through a certain time is required if the discussion concerns internal sins, to which sins of the mouth are equated, than if the discussion concerns external sins; greater, if it concerns solitary external sins than if mutual ones are concerned. The reason for the distinction is that a habit is formed the more easily, the greater the deliberation that preceded, as is usually the case in external acts, especially in mutual ones; and the more intense the deliberate acts are, as likewise customarily happens in external acts, especially in mutual ones. Hence a lesser frequency is required in these.

b) As regards time, this likewise depends on the intensity of the acts; likewise on the manner of acting more or less uniformly. Hence, for example, you would more easily call habituated one who through a notable time pollutes himself every week than one who sins frequently in one or another week and in other weeks resists temptation.

Corollary. "One who, for example, fornicated once a month for a year can well be called habituated here" (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 70); likewise one who for a year once a month has given himself to drunkenness; likewise one who through a notable time either commits pollution once a week, or two or three times a week indulges in morose delectations (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

¹ Cf. Cardinal van Rossum, Commentarius de iudicio sacramentali Ioan. B. Pighi ad trutinam vocatus; Berardi, De recidivis et occasionariis; Ter Haar, De occasionariis et recidivis.

I. Notion of occasion. An occasion is a person or external thing which creates for a person a danger of sinning.

I. A dying person can be absolved who gives a sign of confession to the priest present, for example by a nod of the head, pressure of the hands, the eyes, etc. For all things required for validity, namely intention, manifested contrition, and confession, are present, or at least by law are presumed to be present.¹

II. Likewise a dying person deprived of the senses can be absolved who showed a desire of confession before the priest approached.²

It is disputed whether in this case the dying person is to be absolved absolutely or under condition. Several think that he is to be absolved absolutely, because the Roman Ritual, in the cited place, seems to equate this case with the prior case and makes no mention of a condition. Others teach that absolution must be given under condition, because the accusation required for the validity of the sacrament is not certainly present, and consequently one can also doubt about the disposition (St. Alphonsus, VI, 481).

III. A dying person deprived of the senses, who neither gives a manifest sign of confession to the priest present, nor showed a desire of confession before the arrival of the priest, can be absolved under condition, whenever it is somewhat probable that the things required for validity are present. For in extremities, extreme things are to be tried. Now commonly the intention of receiving the sacrament is not certainly lacking, and perhaps some sign of confession and sorrow is exhibited by the dying person, for example a sigh, although the priest does not notice it. Added to this is that the doctrine is not certainly false which teaches that internal contrition alone, or internal attrition alone, is the necessary condition for the validity of the sacrament. Hence the following can be absolved: 1. a Catholic, whether he lived in a Christian manner or did not live in a Christian manner; 2. a Catholic who is deprived of the senses in the very act of sin, for example drunkenness or suicide; 3. an apostate who before his defection did not reject the priest, because, placed in extreme danger, he perhaps came to his senses; 4. one concerning whom it is doubted whether or not he is Catholic (St. Alphonsus, VI, 482, 483).

Observe that hearing commonly persists longer than the other senses; hence let the priest address the dying person in a loud voice, and suggest to him a general accusation and an act of contrition.

¹ Council of Orange I, chapter 12 (in Labbe, vol. 4, col. 703 sq.); Council of Carthage IV, chapter 76 (in Labbe, cited place, col. 1443; cf. canon Is qui 8, cause 26, question 6); St. Leo the Pope, Epistle 108 (otherwise 83) to Theodore, chapter 5 (in Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 54, col. 1013 sq.); Roman Ritual, title III, chapter 1, n. 25.

² Council of Orange I, chapter 12 (in Labbe, vol. 4, col. 703 sq.); Council of Carthage IV, chapter 76 (in Labbe, cited place, col. 1443; cf. canon Is qui 8, cause 26, question 6); St. Leo the Pope, Epistle 108 (otherwise 83) to Theodore, chapter 5 (in Migne, Patrologia Latina, vol. 54, col. 1013 sq.); Roman Ritual, title III, chapter 1, n. 25.

Question 1. Whether one can be absolved who, before he was deprived of the senses, rejected the priest.

Response. Having regard to the reverence due to the sacrament, it is better, as it seems, not to absolve him, unless the privation of the senses lasts rather long, or the dying person gives a sign which with some probability can be held as a declaration of a changed will.

Question 2. How often a dying person can be absolved.

Response 1. "While the sick person is still vigorous in his senses, it will help for absolution to be conferred on him several times after a brief reconciliation.

Response 2. "If the sick person now lacks the senses, it is not expedient that absolution be imparted to him more often within the same day. But in this matter the priest ought to direct himself by the conscience which they know of the sick person; for if he was habituated in evil thoughts, if he is dying from some wound, or is ensnared by some passion of hatred or impure love; if the illness is exceedingly bitter and he does not suffer with a willing spirit, then absolution can be given more often; but otherwise it suffices that a space of three or four hours intervene; more frequently, however, if he is already now about to die" (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 276).

Note. "It will not be beside the point to warn the sick person, while he is in possession of his mind, that, if he cannot speak, he should give some determinate sign while he seeks absolution, or while the priest wishes to confer it on him: for example, let him close or open his eyes, raise his hand, incline his head, and the like" (St. Alphonsus, Praxis Confessarii, n. 276).

IV. The apparently dead.¹ The instant of death, or of the separation of the soul from the body, can be determined by no one. As regards signs that death has followed, not even cadaveric rigidity, but only advanced putrefaction, is held as a certain sign of death. There have been and there are physicians who think that not only in a case of asphyxia, but also in other cases, life persists latently for some time after the ordinary signs of life have ceased; and this both in sudden cases and when disease has had its ordinary outcome.² As regards sudden cases, it is reported that several apparently dead persons have returned to the activity of life. As regards ordinary disease, they rely especially on experiments in higher animals. Therefore, having regard to those things which are asserted by some physicians, and which are not to be held as certainly false, it seems one must speak as follows:

1. In a case in which someone has died, apparently, whether from a sudden accident or from a disease which lasted for a brief time, it is strongly to be advised that the necessary sacraments - more safely first Extreme Unction, then Absolution - be administered under condition, and this even two or more hours after someone seems to have died.

2. In a case in which someone seems to have died in the ordinary way, they say that latent life commonly persists for a shorter time, say for a quarter hour or a half hour; hence during that time it is licit to administer the necessary sacraments.

3. Where there is suspicion that a case of asphyxia is present, a still longer time is admitted for administering the sacraments. Such a case can occur after uremia, epilepsy, and other diseases, concerning which Antonelli³ and Capellmann-Bergmann⁴ speak.

¹ Cf. Ferreres-Geniesse, La mort réelle et la mort apparente, et leurs rapports avec l'administration des Sacrements; Revue de Lille, 1905-1906, p. 442 sq., 481 sq.; Nouv. Rev. Théol., 1906, p. 606 sq.; 1907, p. 497 sq.

² Cf. Lacroix, De Poenitentia, VI, n. 1104.

³ Antonelli, Medicina pastoralis, II, n. 612 sq.

⁴ Capellmann-Bergmann, Pastoral-Medizin, p. 358 sq.

We are speaking of baptized non-Catholics who are in good faith, or at least are not certainly in bad faith. Now:

I. Outside danger of death, baptized non-Catholics cannot licitly be absolved. "It is forbidden," thus canon 731, § 2, "to minister the Sacraments of the Church to heretics or schismatics, even those erring in good faith and asking for them, unless first, having rejected their errors, they have been reconciled to the Church."

II. In danger of death. We distinguish between non-Catholics who admit confession and those who reject it.

1. Those who admit confession, as for example schismatics, can be absolved as follows:

a) If they are already deprived of the senses, they can be absolved, according to this response of the Holy Office:¹ "Whether absolution and extreme unction can be conferred on schismatics at the point of death when deprived of the senses? Response: under condition, affirmatively, especially if from the circumstances it may be lawful to conjecture that they at least implicitly reject their errors, scandal nevertheless being effectively removed, namely by making manifest to those standing by that the Church supposes that they returned to unity at the last moment."

b) If they are not deprived of the senses, of themselves they cannot be absolved, because of themselves they must first be taught revealed doctrine and fulfill the obligation of embracing it. Added to this is canon 731, § 2, cited above. They seem, however, scandal being removed, to be able to be absolved as if incidentally, whether, after warning has been given, they are judged to persevere in error in good faith, or whether they are not warned, lest perhaps they be deprived of good faith. For first, it is in no way clear what from the nature of the matter stands in the way of the defended opinion. But a merely positive prohibition, where the salvation of a person placed in danger of death is at issue, should not easily be admitted. Then the Holy Office², to the question "Whether material schismatics who are in good faith can ever be absolved," the Holy Office, I say, responded to that question: "Since scandal cannot be avoided: negatively; except in danger of death; and then, scandal having been effectively removed."

Objection 1. Canon 731, § 2 absolutely forbids administering the sacraments to schismatics unless first, having rejected their errors, they have been reconciled to the Church; therefore neither in danger of death is it licit.

Response. A priori it is difficult to admit that the canon cannot be combined with the response of the Holy Office. And in fact the canon can well be understood in such a way that it establishes what ought of itself to be done, which does not prevent departure from the rule on account of a very grave cause; and such a cause is certainly present in the case posited.

Objection 2. The Holy Office, on May 17, 1916, to question II, "Whether the sacraments of either absolution or extreme unction can be conferred on material schismatics placed at the point of death, asking for them in good faith, without abjuration of errors," responded: "Negatively, but it is required that, in the best manner possible, they reject their errors and make a profession of faith."³ Therefore schismatics, at least before they are deprived of the senses, cannot be absolved.

Response. Again, a priori it is difficult to admit that this response cannot be combined with the response of July 20, 1898. And indeed the response can be understood in such a way that schismatics of themselves cannot be absolved unless they reject their errors and make a profession of faith. Indeed the Holy Office, by adding that these things are to be performed "in the best manner possible," perhaps hints that an explicit rejection of errors and profession of faith is not always to be urged.

2. Those who reject confession should not be absolved. Nevertheless, I would not condemn one who conditionally absolves them after they have been incited to penance, according to what was said in n. 41; yet proceed prudently, and especially endeavor to bring them to perfect contrition.

Corollary I. In doubt whether a dying non-Catholic, deprived of the senses, admits confession, he can be absolved under condition.

Corollary II. One who assists a dying non-Catholic should not omit to bring him to perfect contrition and to an act of charity with the other preliminary acts, so that he may be saved more securely.

¹ May 17, 1916, to 2 (in Theol.-prakt. Quartalschrift, 1916, p. 692-695).

² July 20, 1898 (Collectanea, n. 2012).

³ In Theol.-prakt. Quartalschrift, 1916, p. 692-695.

(Summa Theologica, III, qq. 84-90; Supplement, qq. 1-33.)

Penance is the name both of a virtue and of a Sacrament of the New Law. The virtue was at all times necessary; the Sacrament is necessary since its institution by Christ. Having considered in the previous Article how the spiritual life is begotten, matured and preserved through the Sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and Eucharist, we shall consider in the present Article how spiritual death and infirmity are overcome by the remedies of Penance and Extreme Unction. But first we shall speak of the virtue of penance or repentance which is a requisite for the fruitful reception of the Sacrament of Penance and of its complement, Extreme Unction.

The Sacrament of Penance.—For those who lose grace after Baptism the Sacrament of Penance is necessary as a part of repentance and a means of forgiveness. This Sacrament may be defined as “a Sacrament of the New Law instituted by Christ in the form of a judicial process, in which, through the absolution of the priest, sins committed after Baptism are forgiven to penitents who confess them with sorrow.”

(a) The remote matter of this Sacrament is the personal sins committed after Baptism, for Baptism washes away all sins committed before its reception. Of this remote matter, some is necessary (i.e., sins that must be confessed), namely, post-baptismal mortal sins not yet declared or directly absolved in confession; some is free (i.e., sins that may, but need not be confessed), namely, post-baptismal mortal sins already forgiven in confession, and post-baptismal venial sins, whether already remitted or not (Canon 902). Imperfections which are not sins, or whose sinfulness is doubtful, are not sufficient matter for absolution; and if they alone are confessed, absolution may not be given, unless there is necessity, and then it may be granted conditionally (see 185, 186).

(b) The proximate matter of this Sacrament, according to the view commonly held, is the three acts of the penitent—contrition in the heart, confession in words, and satisfaction in work. Contrition must exist actually, but the other two acts in case of necessity need not exist actually, but are included implicitly in the act of contrition.

(c) The form of the Sacrament is contained in the words of absolution spoken by the priest. Certainly the words, “Ego te absolvo a peccatis tuis,” are sufficient for validity. But lawfulness requires that one use the entire form and the other accompanying prayers as given in one’s approved Ritual. In case of necessity, as in shipwreck or sudden danger of death, an abbreviated form is permitted. Absolution must be spoken or vocal, for the Church has never recognized absolution by signs or in writing. It must be given to one who is present, that is, one who is in the same place and not too far away to hear and be heard. Those who are in different rooms that do not open on each other are not in the same place; those who are more than twenty feet apart are too far away for presence, according to the common opinion; but in great need a more liberal view may be followed, and even absolution by speaking tube or telephone may be resorted to.

(d) The subject of the Sacrament of Penance is every baptized person who has committed venial or mortal sin after Baptism. If there is doubt about the Baptism or about the sin, absolution may be given conditionally. Besides the conditions given for the Sacraments in general, the recipient of Penance must exercise the three acts of contrition, confession and satisfaction. The first is essential in every case, and the second when possible; and without the third the Sacrament is not integral or complete.

Probabilism in Administration of the Sacrament.—In the administration and reception of the Sacrament of Penance it is lawful to follow opinions that are truly probable except in the following cases: (a) when the validity of the Sacrament is at stake (678), unless there is a case of emergency (679). Hence, as the law of material integrity pertains to the lawful, not to the valid use of Penance, one may use probable opinions in its regard (see 2740); (b) when the seal of the Sacrament is involved, lest confession become odious.

In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. L. 10 C. de Non numer. pec. - For no reason must be given for non-being, but for being; because non-being does not have its cause, but being does. But understand this of the principal fact, if it is doubtful: because, if the principal fact is certainly established and there is doubt about an accessory fact, then other principles have force: In doubt every fact is presumed rightly done; In doubt the fact which by law had to be done is presumed; In doubt one must stand for the value of the act; always excluding unjust damage to oneself or another or the community. For every being naturally tends toward its perfection and good. Therefore if nothing is established as obstructing, nature continues to pursue its course. The fact of a completed Confession is established; you doubt concerning the right, whether you confessed rightly with sorrow, with purpose; you can acquiesce. These three latter principles have force both for liberty and against liberty.

For liberty, if a contrary and certain presumption or the common good does not obstruct; for no obligation is to be imposed unless it is certainly established. Against liberty, namely if a contrary and certain presumption or the public good obstructs; for the common good prevails over private good. L. 1. 1. n. 26. 27. 137. 182. 251, l. 3. n. 201, l. 6. n. 505; L. Quoties 12 de Reb. dub. ff.

Resolves: He sins who on a fast day undertakes labor, although honorable, in order to be excused from the fast; although he, after he is gravely wearied, even with that evil end, is no longer held to the fast. L. 1. 3. n. 1022. But he does not at all sin who on the day before a fast spends the day hunting, foreseeing that through weariness it will not be licit for him to fast. He sins who, without a just cause, on the same feast day or one or another hour before it, begins a journey, foreseeing that he will not be able to hear Mass. But he does not sin if he does this on the preceding day. Gur. Ball. 111; Del Vecchio 161. But St. Alphonsus does not admit this, l. 3, n. 301, denying "that someone can set out on Saturday to hunt in a distant wood, although on Sunday he cannot hear Mass there."

"An excommunicated or interdicted person does not sin by omitting Mass, and likewise an imprisoned person, even if they neglect absolution or liberty, because these persons are not obliged to remove remote impediments," or extrinsic ones. L. 1. 3. n. 825; l. 1, n. 152; l. 7, n. 161. "Otherwise, however, they speak with respect to annual Confession and Communion, since this is one of the divine precepts, with regard to which we are held to remove impediments." L. 161; l. 6, n. 299. Excommunication and interdict, with relation to Confession and Communion, are not extrinsic impediments, but intrinsic, and therefore care must be taken that they be removed. "Tamb. and Viva, however, think that those detained in prison are not held to seek liberty in order that they may communicate." L. 1. 6. n. 299; Ithur., Cas. 3, n. 7.

As regards baptism, Confession, Communion. They can permit that, besides when danger of death is imminent or necessity urgent, baptism be administered to infants at home from a just and reasonable cause. S. C. de Sacram., 20 Dec. 1912. - They can choose for themselves a confessor outside the diocese, provided he is their subject, and they can take him with them to different places; but if he is not a subject he must be approved by his own Ordinary. - They can permit that the Holy Eucharist be carried privately to the sick from the church to the home, or without the prescriptions of the Ritual being observed. S. C. de Sacram., 20 Dec. 1912. - L. 65; l. 6, n. 565.

As regards Confession. - Regulars cannot confess licitly and validly except to Confessors deputed by their own Superiors. "With seculars, when the faculty of choosing a confessor for oneself is granted, it is always supposed that he is approved by the Bishop; but regulars, from express or tacit license of their own superior, can confess to any simple priest... Wherefore all regular superiors can choose for themselves as confessor any priest." L. 110.

As regards cases reserved in the order to be absolved, the faculty can and ought justly to be denied by the superior if there is question of harming others, i.e., when scandal or any harm whatever would perhaps be imminent either to religion, or to the house, or to another, or to the penitent himself; nor could it be met otherwise except by furnishing knowledge of the matter to the superior. But, "if the superior denies to the confessor of regulars, deputed for this, the faculty of absolving, but the confessor judges that it ought to be granted, he can absolve on that occasion," i.e., as often as that case occurs. This is established from the Decree of Clement VIII. Cf. Constitution of Urban VIII, Sanctissimus, 21 Sept. 1624; Ferraris, v. Praelatus regularis, n. 58; Pellizzar., de Monial., c. 9, n. 29.

Exempt Regulars are not subject to episcopal reservation, since they are exempt from the jurisdiction of the Bishop. Indeed neither novices nor familiars of regulars are subject to the reservation of Bishops. Thus from the Bull Superna of Clement X. But if a novice has fallen into a reserved case before entrance into religion, he can be absolved by the confessor of the religion by privilege. - L. 102, 103, 111, 112; l. 6, n. 583, 586, 602. Religious of Institutes of simple vows are altogether subject to episcopal jurisdiction as regards censures and reservation of cases, as also as regards dispensation of non-reserved vows and dispensations which local Ordinaries impart to their faithful.

C. cited Conditae a Christo. The Supreme Pontiff Pius X decreed that all Confessors approved in the City can hear the Confessions of all Regulars, of whatever Order, Congregation, Institute they may be, without any permission of Regular Superiors; and therefore they can also absolve them from all reserved cases in the same religious Orders, Congregations, Institutes, even with censure. S. C. de Relig., 8 Feb. 1903; Pagella Confessarior. in Urbe. The same Supreme Pontiff afterward extended this faculty to all Confessors of the whole world approved by local Ordinaries. S. C. de Relig., 5 Aug. 1913.

Resolves: Private persons among themselves are rarely bound to correction, at least under grave sin, unless they are familiarly joined to one another, because rarely are all the required conditions found; still more rarely toward superiors because of unsuitability. Prudence generally persuades that correction be omitted toward those whose character is wholly unknown, lest, receiving the correction with an unjust mind, they become worse. Scrupulous persons are ordinarily excused from making fraternal correction, because either they are too greatly wearied, or are unfit; for, disturbed by scruples and anxieties, they lack the necessary discretion for correcting, and are not able to attend to excusing causes.

When are children judged to have attained the years of discretion, so that they are bound by the precept of Confession? - When they are capable of mortal sin; that is around the seventh year, which is to be judged not from age alone, but chiefly from the degree of understanding or discretion of good and evil. But the spirit of discretion is judged to be present in those who now apprehend that lying or disobedience is evil, or who are ashamed of certain impure actions, etc. Hence pastors of souls are held gradually to prepare these little children for Confession, and to absolve those in whom they observe mortal sin, even doubtful, at least within the year, by force of the Lateran Council. In doubt concerning discretion, let them be absolved conditionally. Therefore Confessors who never wish to absolve children committed to them gravely err and cannot be excused. But from the same age of discretion, that is around the seventh year, the obligation also of Communion begins. S. C. de Sacram. 8 Aug. 1910.; L. 1. 3, n. 370.; l. 6, n. 432-666.

What things are required for religious profession? - For the value of profession there is required: 1. That the person be fit for entering religion. - 2. That the one professing has completed the sixteenth year, computing this time mathematically from moment to moment. For thus Trent decreed, s. 25, c. 15 de Reg., according to the S. C. and all the doctors. Laymen or conversi cannot be admitted to profession before they have arrived at the age of twenty-one completed years, from Clement VIII, C. Regularis disciplinae, March 19, 1603. But now from the Decree of the S. C. of Religious, January 1, 1911, they are admitted to solemn vows only when the thirtieth year of age has been completed, after a six-year period of simple vows, a year of Novitiate, and two years of Postulancy. Cf. 267 bis. - 3. That a whole year of probation has preceded. Trent ibid. - 4. That it be done with the intention of making profession; for it is a certain spiritual marriage with religion, which, just as carnal marriage, is itself lacking when consent is lacking.

5. That profession not be emitted because of fraud or deceit; otherwise true consent would be lacking. - 6. That it not be done from force or grave fear, unjustly inflicted from without to extort profession. C. 1 de His quae de vi metusve, etc.; C. ult. Qui clerici vel voventes; Trent s. 25, c. 18, 19 de Reg. - 7. That the three substantial vows be emitted; otherwise the essence of the religious state will not be present. - 8. That profession be made in some approved religion. - 9. That profession be accepted by one having power for this. Cf. Ferraris v. Moniales a. 1, n. 101 ff.; C. Ad Apostolicam de Regular. - 10. That the one professing attach no condition repugnant to the substance of religion. - 11. That express profession be made; for tacit profession as regards men has been abrogated by Pius IX, Decree of the S. C. Regular Discipline, June 12, 1858. Cf. Ferraris l. c. n. 109. By custom it has also been abrogated as regards nuns, and as regards more recent Institutes of simple vows. - 12. That both men and women first emit simple vows and remain in them for three whole years before solemn profession is to be emitted. From just and reasonable causes these vows can be extended up to the completed twenty-fifth year of age. Pius IX, Brief In universalis Ecclesiae, February 7, 1862; S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 3, 1902. Meanwhile they must remain in houses of the professed and of studies, and observe perfect common life, and they are held to the observance of the rule of the order as solemnly professed men and women are; and they enjoy the privileges and indulgences of the order or monastery as these do. The active and passive voice is computed from the day of emission of simple vows. Yet they do not have a suffrage in admission to solemn profession, and can be elected only to lesser offices, not also to offices of superiority. S. C. Regular Discipline, August 6, 1858; S. C. Bishops and Regulars, May 3, 1902; February 20, 1905. By this profession of simple vows, which precede solemn vows, residential benefices do not become vacant. S. C. Bishops and Regulars, March 30, 1908. - 13. If one vow, e.g., of poverty, is not solemn, neither are the other two solemn. S. Penitentiary 1820 to the Bishop of Limoges. - 14. As regards nuns, solemn profession is not had without papal enclosure, C. Periculoso un. de Stat. reg.; St. Pius V, C. Cura pastoralis, May 29, 1566. - Lugo, Resp. Mor. l. 4, d. 14, 18, 21, 43; l. 3, d. 16.

Concerning Religious bound to military service. - "... The S. C. of Religious ... decreed the following:

I. In Regular Orders in which solemn vows are emitted, young men who are not certainly established to be exempt from active military service, namely from that service which they, when first called to the military, must perform for one or more years, cannot be admitted to Sacred Orders or to solemn profession until they have completed military service and, this having been completed, have remained at least for a year, according to what is to be said below, in simple vows, with the decree Sacrosancta Dei Ecclesia, edited on this same day, observed as regards Laymen.

II. In Institutes of simple vows, the young men concerning whom in the preceding article will be able to be admitted only to temporary vows up to the time of military service; nor is it lawful for them, while they give service to the military, to renew profession. When they have been dismissed from military service, they will again emit profession, at least for a year, before they bind themselves by the bond of perpetual profession.

III. But let young men serving in the military take care lest they lose the gift of holy vocation, and let them always converse with that modesty and caution which befits religious men. Wherefore let them shrink from suspect places and little gatherings; let them abstain from theaters, dances, and other public spectacles; let them avoid the commerce of the bad, slippery conversations, things discordant with religion, men professing suspect doctrines, readings contrary to morals or faith according to the dictates of the Holy See, and other dangers of sinning; let them not omit, as much as is lawful for them, to frequent churches and the sacraments; let them approach Catholic circles or meetings for recreation and instruction of soul.

IV. Wherever their station is placed, if there is there a house of their Religion or Institute, let them frequent it and be under the immediate vigilance of the Superior. But if the aforesaid house is not present, or they cannot conveniently frequent it, let them approach a priest designated by the Bishop, and use his counsels and company, so that when it is necessary to leave the same station, they may be able to receive from him written testimony concerning the observance of all those things which are prescribed in the preceding article. But if a priest designated by the Bishop is not had, let them choose for themselves a prudent priest, to be indicated at once to their Superiors, who will procure for themselves from the Ordinary information about his morals, doctrine, and prudence. Furthermore, let them establish correspondence by letters and, as far as can be done, diligently pursue it with their respective Superior or another religious or member of their Institute designated for this, whom they are to make more certain concerning the manner and condition of their life, concerning each change of their station, and especially let them notify him of the name and domicile of that priest whose company and direction they use, as was prescribed above.

V. Superiors General or Provincial, even local according to the custom of each Institute, by themselves or by a delegated member, who in clerical Institutes is to be marked with the priestly order, are altogether held to inquire concerning the life, morals, and conduct of the pupils while military service lasts, especially by the work of the priest or priests concerning whom above, through secret letters if there is need, so that they may be made more certain whether these have preserved the right way of faith and morals, observed the cautions prescribed above, and shown themselves faithful to the divine vocation, their conscience being gravely burdened.

VI. When they have been definitively dismissed from active military service, let each one be held to return by a straight path to his own religious houses, and there, if it is certainly established concerning their good conduct, as was said in the preceding article, some days of holy recollection having been premised, those who are assigned to Institutes of simple vows are to be admitted to renewing temporary profession; but in Regular Orders, let them be placed among the younger clerics or professed, or at least in a house where perfect regular observance flourishes, under the special vigilance and direction of a religious commended for piety and prudence, who in clerical Institutes must be a priest. In that state they must complete the whole time, which, according to what has been said in articles I and II, will not be able to be less than a year, to be premised to solemn or perpetual vows according to the path of the Apostolic Prescriptions and of the Constitutions of their own Religious Family, yet in such a way that the time spent in simple or temporary vows from the first emission of vows up to departure from the religious house because of military service is indeed computed, but not that which was given to military service.

VII. At that time, let them give attention to studies and regular observance; but let the immediate Superiors and the members placed over the direction of the younger men consider them most diligently, investigate their morals, fervor of life, opinions, doctrines, and zeal for persevering, so that concerning them before the last profession they may be able to render an account under faith of oath to the higher Superiors.

VIII. If any, during military service or after it has ended, before they are admitted to solemn or perpetual profession, have given doubtful signs of perseverance, or have not obeyed the cautions prescribed during the time of military service, or have turned aside from purity of morals or faith, let them be dismissed by the Superior General with the consent of his Counselors or Definitors, and let their vows be held as dissolved by the very act of dismissal.

But if the young men themselves desire or spontaneously ask to be relaxed from the bond of vows, the faculty is given to the aforesaid Superiors, as delegates of the Apostolic See, of dissolving the vows, if it is a question of clerical Institutes; but if the matter concerns Institutes of laymen, let the vows be judged dissolved by letters of the Superiors, by which license is given to them to return to the world.

IX. Ecclesiastical Societies also are held by these prescriptions, which, although they do not use vows, neither solemn nor simple, nevertheless have simple promises by which their pupils are bound to those Societies.

X. If anything new, not foreseen in this Decree, or if anything doubtful in understanding it should occur, recourse is to be made in individual cases to this S. Congregation.... Anything contrary whatsoever notwithstanding." S. C. Religious, Decree Inter reliquas, January 1, 1911.

Declarations concerning the Decree Inter reliquas on the military service of religious. - "I. Whether perpetual vows emitted before the promulgation of the Decree Inter reliquas cease ipso facto when active military service is assumed?

II. Whether temporary vows likewise cease ipso facto when the same service is assumed?

III. Whether solemn profession in Orders, and perpetual profession in Institutes of simple vows, emitted in good faith by one who falsely thought himself exempt from military service, is valid?

IV. Whether solemn profession in Orders, and perpetual profession in Institutes of simple vows, emitted before a year has been completed from the day active military service was completed, is valid?

V. Whether a whole year must flow before he who was assigned to active military service for only three months is admitted to solemn or perpetual profession?

VI. Whether those Religious can be admitted to solemn or perpetual profession who, subject to active military service, nevertheless have and manifest the firm intention of giving themselves to foreign Missions, and of remaining in them up to the time established by civil law for obtaining perpetual exemption from military service, as, for example, in Italy it is the thirty-second year of age?

R. To I. In the negative. - To II. In the negative of itself, or, the vows do not cease ipso facto at the beginning of military service; nevertheless Religious can ask for dispensation from vows from the first day of military service, according to Art. VIII of the Decree Inter reliquas, if they do not intend to persevere; if they intend to persevere, in no case can they emit a new profession of vows unless military service has been completed, even if the time of profession has expired during military service. - To III. In the negative. - To IV. In the negative. - To V. In the negative; but it is necessary and sufficient in the case that there be three months, or a space of time shorter than a year, corresponding to the time spent in military service. - To VI. In the negative of itself. Yet the Sacred Congregation concedes that in the last year of the course of studies it is lawful to admit to solemn profession, or respectively to perpetual profession, and to promote to sacred Orders, young men about to set out for sacred Missions within a year, after an oath has first been emitted on the part of the candidate concerning service to be rendered to the Missions up to the time predefined by civil law for obtaining exemption, and with the conscience of Superiors burdened concerning its execution.

Concerning religious Profession in the article of death. - "... In any Order, or any Congregation or religious Society, or monastery whether of men or women, or even in Institutes in which, although vows are not emitted, nevertheless common life is lived after the manner of Religious, it is lawful thereafter to admit Novices or Probands, who by the judgment of the physician are gravely sick, so that they are judged to be constituted in the article of death, to profession or consecration or promise according to their own Rules or Constitutions, although they have not yet completed the time of novitiate or probation.

Yet, in order that novices or probands may be admitted to the above-said profession or consecration or promise, it is necessary:

1. That they have canonically begun the novitiate or probation.

2. That the Superior who admits the Novice or Proband to profession or consecration or promise be the one who actually governs the monastery or house of novitiate or probandate.

3. That the formula of profession or consecration or promise be the same which is in use in the Institute outside the case of sickness; and vows, if they are pronounced, are to be pronounced without determination of time or perpetuity.

4. That he who has emitted profession, consecration, or promise of this kind will be a participant in absolutely all the indulgences, suffrages, and graces which Religious truly professed dying in the same Institute obtain; and to the same there is mercifully conceded in the Lord plenary indulgence and remission of his sins in the form of a Jubilee.

5. This profession or consecration or promise, besides the graces declared in the preceding article, produces altogether no other effect. Therefore:

A) if the Novice or Proband after profession or consecration or promise of this kind dies intestate, the Institute will be able to claim for itself no goods or rights pertaining to him;

B) if he recovers before the time of novitiate or probandate expires, he is to be in altogether the same condition as if he had emitted no profession; and therefore: a) freely, if he wishes, he will be able to return to the world; and b) Superiors are able to dismiss him; c) he must complete the whole time of novitiate or probandate defined in individual Institutes, even if beyond a year; d) this time having been completed, if he perseveres, a new profession or consecration or promise will have to be emitted.

Anything contrary whatsoever notwithstanding." S. C. of Religious, September 10, 1912.

277 bis. What form of admission is to be observed? - When Novices are to be admitted to profession, "the Conventual Chapter ... is to declare by secret votes whether the Novice can be admitted to profession.... Then the Provincial and the Examiners (Provincial, at least three) are to define by secret votes whether the Novice ... can safely be admitted to profession. If the Novice has been approved, the Provincial is to render the Superior General instructed concerning everything, who ... is to revoke or confirm the approval ... yet so that he can never permit the profession of a Novice who has been rejected by the Provincial Examiners.... If the Constitutions and rules of some Order and Institute further require anything in admitting Novices to profession, that also will have to be observed only in that part which is by no means contrary to the tenor of this Decree." Decree Regulari disciplinae of the S. C. on the State of Regulars, January 25, 1848.

As regards nuns of solemn vows, those things are to be observed which are established in their proper Constitutions. As regards more recent Institutes of simple vows, the Norms of the Sacred Congregation and their own Constitutions approved by the Holy See are to be observed.

As regards the rite of making profession and renewing vows, the General Decree of the S. R. C., August 14, 1894, n. 3836, and June 5, 1896, n. 3912, is to be observed. - E. M.

What is penance? - Penance is a virtue, and it is a sacrament. Under the first respect, it is a moral virtue inclining to hatred, abomination, or detestation of sin and to sorrow or sadness, insofar as sin is an offense and injury against God, namely insofar as it makes God turned away from us and indignant, on account of the due honor of God being harmed by reason of his supreme dominion; and consequently it inclines to the efficacious purpose of avoiding it in the future and of satisfying divine justice, so that God may be reconciled to us. Hence penance is a virtue pertaining to justice, as its potential part. Suarez, d. 2, s. 3, n. 4 ff.; Lugo, d. 2, nn. 50, 52; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85. - Hatred, because it is evil; sorrow, because it is present or because it is apprehended as present.

Under the other respect, it is a sacrament of the New Law instituted by Christ the Lord after the manner of a judgment, for remitting, through priestly absolution, sins committed after baptism to a man who is contrite and has confessed. After the manner of a judgment: for there is present the penitent, at once the accused, witness, and accuser, and the priest, the judge pronouncing sentence, who is held by the strictest obligation of secrecy. But this judgment tends toward absolving the accused and reconciling him with God. Hence the difference is evident between this sacramental judgment and a forensic judgment. - Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 1, 2, 3, 4, cc. 1, 2, 3; Decree of the Holy Office Lamentabili, July 3, 1907, props. 46, 47; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 1; L. 246; E. M.

Is it lawful in the sacrament of penance to follow probable opinions? - Resp. In the affirmative, in those things which pertain to the judgment, provided the form of the judgment is preserved: for form gives being to the thing, and judgment pertains to the validity of the sacrament. And thus in those things which pertain to the integrity of Confession, to the jurisdiction of the confessor, etc., it is lawful to follow probable opinions. L. 468; H. A., tr. 16, n. 29. To jurisdiction, for when its probability stands, the Church supplies it. - In the negative in those things which pertain to the validity of the sacrament, because the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity; except, however, in a case of necessity; for the sacraments are for men. Wherefore it is not lawful to follow probable opinions concerning the very substance of Confession and of contrition. For sins pertain to penance, as sacrament, under the generic aspect of sin; as judgment, as individual things in themselves; and the same must consequently be said of the Confession of sins. Hence Confession pertains to penance especially insofar as it is a judgment. Contrition, on the other hand, pertains to penance especially insofar as it is a sacrament. But satisfaction rather looks to integrity, since it is added extrinsically. Finally, in the words of absolution is contained the form of the sacrament and the sentence of the judgment. - Cf. 348.

Is the sacrament of penance necessary? - Resp. In the affirmative, for those who have fallen after baptism. It is necessary for justification both by necessity of precept and by necessity of means, at least in desire. Trent, sess. 6, C. 14; sess. 14, C. 2, 4, 5; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 5; q. 87, a. 6; Suppl., q. 6, a. 1. - Hence the sacrament of penance is customarily called the second plank after shipwreck. Trent, sess. 6, C. 14; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 6. - But since no actual sin can be remitted in this life without the virtue of penance, it is also evident that this virtue is altogether necessary for the justification of adults who have fallen after baptism. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 86, a. 2; q. 87, a. 1. - St. Thomas, Quodl. 4, a. 10; E. M.

What is the effect of the sacrament of penance? - The effect of this sacrament is absolution from sins and reconciliation with God, and, as a consequence, remission of eternal punishment. Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 3, cc. 12, 15; sess. 6, C. 7; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 86, aa. 3, 4, 6. "For him who through contrition has obtained remission of sins as to guilt, and consequently as to the debt of eternal punishment, which is dismissed together with guilt, by the power of the keys... grace is increased and temporal punishment is remitted, the debt of which had still remained after the remission of guilt, though not entirely, as in baptism, but a part of it.... By the power of the keys, which works in the sacrament of penance, not all punishment is remitted, but something of the temporal punishment whose debt could remain after absolution from eternal punishment; and not only from that punishment which the penitent has or undertakes from absolution in confessing... but also something is remitted of that punishment which is due in Purgatory, so that one absolved who dies before satisfaction is punished less in Purgatory than if he died before absolution." St. Thomas, 4 d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, q. 2. - E. M.

What are the parts of the sacrament of penance; what is their efficacy? - The parts of the sacrament of penance are, as in the other sacraments, matter and form. The form is the words of absolution which the priest pronounces. The matter or quasi-matter is the acts of the penitent, which are distinguished into three parts. The first is contrition of heart. The second is confession of mouth. The third is satisfaction. Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 2, 3, c. 4. "Every sacrament produces its effect not only by the power of the form, but also by the power of the matter; for from both there is one sacrament.... Hence remission of guilt is the effect of penance principally indeed by the power of the keys, which the ministers have, from whose side that which is formal in this sacrament is received; but secondarily by the force of the acts of the penitent pertaining to the virtue of penance, nevertheless insofar as these acts are in some way ordered to the keys of the Church. And thus it is clear that remission of guilt is an effect of penance according as it is a virtue, but more principally according as it is a sacrament." St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 86, a. 6; q. 90, aa. 1, 2. - E. M.

What is the remote matter of the sacrament of penance? - The remote matter is all sins committed after baptism. But they are called the matter about which, because absolution is concerned with destroying them. - Necessary remote matter is all mortal sins committed after baptism and not yet directly remitted through the keys of the Church, even if already destroyed by perfect contrition, or inculpably omitted in a preceding Confession. Hence they must be manifested in the immediately following Confession, since they are not free matter but necessary; and therefore the penitent must necessarily be absolved from these, and a new penance must be imposed, even if someone confesses them immediately after absolution. L. 513. Nevertheless, as to sins omitted from forgetfulness or another just cause, there is no obligation to confess them as soon as possible, since they have already been destroyed, nor therefore is there danger to the soul in delay.

Wherefore their Confession can be deferred until, by force of another obligation, or spontaneously, someone confesses again. - Sufficient but free remote matter is all venial sins committed after baptism, and all sins, whether mortal or venial, already otherwise duly subjected to the keys of the Church. Their remission is confirmed and grace is increased. C. 12, de Poenit.; Extrav. 1, de Privileg.; 2, de Haeret.; Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, C. 7; prop. 11 condemned by Alexander VII; L. 425, 427. - For a certain greater security, besides ordinary light sins, it is expedient to add either some certain sin for which one grieves more vehemently, or at least a generic accusation of all the sins of one's past life. Reuter 202; Elbel 19. - St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, a. 2; E. M.

Resolutions: "Venial sins can be omitted, either all or some; likewise mortal sins once duly confessed, e.g., in a general Confession. In this, it is also not necessary to add to a mortal sin that it was committed after the last Confession..., unless some circumstance, e.g., one changing the species, or reservation of the case, or a proximate occasion of sinning, requires otherwise, and a sufficient penance is imposed." L. 425; St. Thomas, 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 3, q. 5, ad 4; d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, q. 2, ad 4. - Insufficient matter consists in imperfections which are not sins: that someone did not do the good which he could have done, did not respond to divine inspirations in those things which are of mere counsel. La-Croix, l. 5, n. 211; L. 425. - The Confession of all lethal sins, certainly invalid, must necessarily be repeated. For all mortal sins must of themselves be subjected to the keys. Nevertheless, Confession need not be repeated unless its invalidity is morally certain. The reason is: 1. Because when an act has certainly been placed, if a doubt arises whether it was rightly placed, that rule of Law obtains: one must stand for the value of the act. 2. Because the obligation of the divine law concerning making Confession has already probably been satisfied. L. 505; La-Croix 1221; Elbel 263. "Even if through culpable mortal error you have omitted such a sin, e.g., of self-abuse, or its number, or another necessary circumstance, you are not therefore bound to repeat the intervening Confessions made in good faith and legitimately, in which from natural forgetfulness you did not confess that defect, since they were valid and remain valid." L. 503. - Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, §§ 1, 2.

What is the proximate matter of the sacrament of penance? - The proximate matter, from which, intrinsic and essential, consists in the acts of the penitent, namely contrition, Confession, and satisfaction to be accepted, which however, as to its execution, pertains to the integrity of the sacrament. Lugo, d. 12, n. 40. But these acts are called quasi-matter by Florence, Decr. pro Arm.; by Trent, sess. 14, C. 3; and by St. Thomas, 4 d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, q. 1; not because "they do not have the nature of true matter, but because they are not matter of that kind which is applied extrinsically, as water in baptism and chrism in confirmation." Roman Catechism, n. 13. Several, who with Scotus think that the whole substance of the sacrament consists in absolution alone, raise a doubt about the mind of St. Thomas, whom they affirm stands for them. But, to pass over other things now, this holy Doctor has it in 3 p., q. 84, a. 1, ad 1: "In those sacraments which have an effect corresponding to human acts, the sensible human acts themselves are in place of matter, as happens in penance and matrimony." Cf. ibid., ad 2, ad 3. And a. 2 of the same question: "The proximate matter of this sacrament is the acts of the penitent, whose matter is the sins for which he grieves, and which he confesses, and for which he satisfies." Cf. ibid., q. 90, aa. 1, 2. But from the Council of Trent the acts of the penitent are parts of this sacrament. Moreover, in chapter 2 it says that this sacrament is completed by matter and form, and in chapter 3 it assigns the form, namely the words of absolution. Therefore the acts of the penitent are the matter, which immediately there it calls quasi-matter.

Note: A sin is said to be directly remitted when it is remitted by the power of the keys of the Church. For this it is necessary that the penitent confess the sin and that the confessor have jurisdiction over it. It is said to be indirectly remitted when it is remitted by the power of sanctifying grace, which is infused in the sacrament of penance, because this grace is incompatible with any grave sin whatever, and one grave sin cannot be remitted without another. This has place when the sin has been inculpably omitted or reserved. La-Croix 597; L. 478, 504.

Are mortal sins committed in the very reception of baptism matter of this sacrament? - "They very commonly affirm it.... The reason is that these sins, although they are simultaneous in time with baptism, nevertheless by nature are posterior to it. - But the reason which they adduce... does not seem to prove conclusively... for the sin of fiction, namely if he were to receive baptism while existing in mortal sin without sorrow." L. 427. D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 301, generally denies it for all sins admitted in the very reception of baptism, and says this is the true opinion. The reason is that the material object of penance, from Trent, sess. 14, c. 2, is the sins which one has committed after he began to be subject to the Church through baptism; and the sin is completed by the fiction itself of the one feigning in his entrance into the Church.

But if the sin is continued for some space of time after baptism, it is already matter of penance. - St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 69, a. 10; 4 d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, q. 3; Lugo, d. 16, s. 1.

Must an adult to be baptized conditionally, in doubt about a preceding baptism, confess sins already accused? - Resp. In the negative. The reason is that those sins either are already destroyed if the prior baptism was valid; or if it was invalid, they are destroyed by the later valid baptism and are not matter of Confession. Reuter 118; E. M.

Must the aforesaid adult confess sins committed since the last Confession and not yet accused? - It is disputed. The first opinion affirms it, because the obligation of confessing sins urges whenever it is not established that they were committed before baptism. Wherefore, after the later baptism has been conferred, those sins are then to be accused. This is confirmed from the response of the Holy Office, Dec. 17, 1868. The second opinion denies it, because, given the probable invalidity of the prior baptism, those sins are probably not matter of Confession; and therefore there is no certainty about a certain obligation. The matter of Confession consists in sins committed after baptism. Therefore whenever it is not established that those sins were committed after baptism, the obligation of Confession is not established. In order that the obligation of Confession can be urged, sins committed after baptism must be proved. Trent, sess. 14, C. 2, 4. But if the prior baptism was in fact valid, those sins will be able to be remitted either through perfect contrition, or indirectly through absolution with attrition. Nor does the praised response of the Holy Office settle the controversy generally, because it was given for Neoconverts in England, on account of special reasons of that region. His Eminence the Cardinal Secretary of the Holy Office publicly declared at St. Apollinaris in 1897 that that response was not a general decree, when this question was being debated expressly in the customary conference of cases of conscience. This also D'Annibale, assessor of the Holy Office and afterward Cardinal, explicitly affirms, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 301, note 3. And the Plenary Council of Latin America, adopting the same rule of acting, since it well knew that that response was not a general decree, carefully added in a note: "having before the eyes the norm of the decrees of the Holy Office, July 17, 1715, and Dec. 2, 1874," Collect. S. C. de P. F., nn. 644, 957, which contain almost the same prescription as the praised response of the Holy Office, Dec. 17, 1868. Mention of that decree is in fact omitted, and in place of it another decree, still more particular, of June 17, 1715, is cited, to which the response of Dec. 17, 1868, refers itself. And those words "having before the eyes," etc., after I myself proposed them to His Eminence Cardinal Vives, President of that Council, were then added in the note without any difficulty, for precisely this reason, since they were lacking in the prior schema: that there should be no place for a false interpretation of the mind of the Council concerning the universality of the decree cited. - Hence, when there was doubt about the priestly ordination of a certain beneficed coadjutor with care of souls, the Holy Office, Jan. 17, 1900, decreed that the ordination was to be repeated under condition, that the Masses celebrated were to be supplied from the treasury of the Church, and it said nothing about Confessions heard being repeated by penitents. Cf. 674; La-Croix, l. 6, p. 1, n. 324; L. 473, 474, 505; Monit. Eccles., vol. 11, p. 523; vol. 12, p. 540 ff.; E. M.

Nor indeed can a demonstrative argument, as is evident of itself, be taken from the Instruction of the Holy Office, July 20, 1859, cf. Ferraris, Supplementum, v. Baptismus, n. 15, in which an order is established, if baptism is to be repeated under condition, that there be: 1. abjuration, or profession of faith; 2. conditional baptism; 3. sacramental Confession with conditional absolution.

Formal abjuration of the sect is to be made by heretics who are converted to the Catholic faith and are baptized under condition. But from those who have not yet completed the fourteenth year of age only profession of faith is required. Collect. S. C. de P. F., n. 1680.

672 bis. The adversaries object against the preceding opinion set forth that the decree of the Holy Office, Dec. 17, 1868, is universal by reason of the matter. The argument of the adversaries in fact does not prove what is intended, and contradicts itself. For if in fact in the case of doubtful baptism one must stand for its validity until its nullity is established, and consequently the one doubtfully baptized is certainly held by the laws of the Church, among which is the law of confessing sins committed after baptism, it would follow from this also that he cannot be baptized again even under condition, and that a layman doubtfully baptized, who after that baptism has committed no grave sin, can and must approach Holy Communion at Easter time. Indeed the parish priest and Bishop doubtfully baptized could and would have to celebrate Mass for the people, etc.

Moreover, what they say, that a very slight doubt suffices for repeating baptism, but does not suffice for exempting from the certain law of confession, is in fact nothing. For first, the doubt in the case is not always very slight. Moreover, in order for it to suffice for repeating baptism, there must be at least some true probability, in the lowest degree. And consequently the principle remains entire and unshaken: a doubtful law does not oblige.

Finally the response which is brought forward as unknown, S. C. de P. F., July 12, 1869, in fact was not unknown, but was already known by private knowledge. But that response also does not prove the matter, because it is not a decree of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide. And therefore it was not related in the first edition of the Collectanea of this Congregation. But in the other edition it was placed not in the series of decrees, but in a certain note. And besides, even in that response of July 12, 1869, Collectan. n. 1338, it is not said absolutely that the decree of Dec. 17, 1868, concerning the law of confession after repeated baptism by reason of the preceding doubt, is absolutely universal, but at most universal for neoconverts, of whom alone there is question in that decree and in the praised response. And the decrees in fact are always referred to Protestants converted to the Catholic faith. Cf. Ferraris, Supplementum, v. Baptismus, n. 15, and if they are read well, it will surely appear that they wholly cohere with those things which have been handed down here, and that it does not seem gratuitously asserted that they do not cohere.

Is a sin accused only in general ever sufficient matter of Confession, as to its validity and liceity, e.g., if someone says: I accuse myself of all the sins of my life? - Resp. In the affirmative as to validity. For all agree that, in order that sick persons at the point of death, soldiers when battle is imminent, sailors when shipwreck is imminent, etc., be validly absolved, some external sign of Confession is sufficient, e.g., the taking of the hand, striking of the breast, etc. But since the essence of the sacrament is not changed outside a case of necessity, but is always the same for various cases, both in a case of necessity and outside a case of necessity, the aforesaid Confession will be sufficient as to the validity of the sacrament.

La-Croix 620; Reuter 303; Lugo, d. 17, n. 8; L. 480, 481, 482, 486, 504. - It seems that the same must probably be affirmed also as to liceity, for, granted the certain validity of the sacrament, illicitness cannot arise from elsewhere than from a positive divine precept. But this precept is not had, as is clear from Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, according to which the divine precept of explaining sins both as to number and as to species is had only for grave sins not yet directly remitted through the keys of the Church. Therefore where grave sins necessarily to be accused in Confession are lacking, there is no remaining obligation to accuse sins both in a determinate number and in a definite species. Dicastillo, de Sacr. poenit., d. 9, n. 760 ff.; Apicella, Ai Confessori Studio sull'assoluzione, etc.; A. S. S., vol. 4, p. 320.

Is there an obligation of confessing doubtful sins? - There is no obligation of confessing a positively doubtful mortal sin, namely when "on both sides there are probable reasons that a mortal sin was or was not committed." Thus "the very common opinion.... The reason: each person can licitly conform himself to a truly probable opinion." L. 473.

There is likewise no obligation of confessing a mortal sin doubtfully committed, namely when there is no prudent reason for affirming that the said sin was committed. The reason is, "because Trent, sess. 14, C. 5, does not oblige penitents except to confess all mortal sins of which they have consciousness... which imports having certain knowledge of the sin; for conscience is nothing other than knowledge of the heart and practical judgment concerning a sin committed. But a doubtful conscience is neither knowledge nor judgment, but a suspension of judgment; hence he who has no reason that he committed it can by no means be said to have consciousness of sin." L. 474. And indeed, if according to the very common opinion there is no obligation of confessing a positively doubtful sin, namely when it can probably be affirmed that it was committed, although it can also probably be affirmed that it was not committed, how will an obligation be able to be present when it could not even probably be said that the sin was committed? Since such a doubt does not rest upon a solid foundation, it cannot arise except from vain suspicion and fear of a sin committed, as frequently happens to scrupulous and fearful consciences. Ithur., Cas. 44, nn. 15, 18, 20 ff.

If it is a question of a sin certainly committed, and certainly grave in itself or objectively, but there is doubt about the consent given and about sufficient advertence, the following rule is handed down by St. Alphonsus, 476: "Those who are of a fearful conscience must be exempted from the obligation of confessing doubtful mortal sins. For these, in doubt, can reasonably, indeed morally certainly, believe that they did not consent, because presumption is taken from what commonly happens.... Conversely, the opposite must be judged about one who is accustomed easily to fall into mortal sins, because in doubt he is presumed to have consented. For if he had resisted, he would certainly remember that effort which he brought upon himself to repel the temptation. Hence La-Croix rightly concludes, 612, that scarcely ever in men of this kind, whether of the first or second genus, is there given a merely negative doubt; for presumption founds a probability of consent given or dissent." Ithur., Cas. 44, n. 15 ff.

If it is a question of a sin doubtfully grave, namely in itself and objectively speaking of itself, there is no obligation of confessing such sins. For after diligence has been applied, one can form for himself a practical judgment from the very well-known rule "that there is no certain obligation where the offense is doubtful." L. 474. Speaking of itself; for he "who is certain about his evil action, and does not know how to discern whether it was mortal or not, is indeed bound to stand by the judgment of the confessor, whose office it is to discern between leprosy and leprosy." L. 474; St. Thomas, 4 d. 21, q. 1, a. 3, ad 3. But, scrupulous persons excepted, generally speaking, it is useful to confess doubtful sins, both for greater peace of conscience and so that the confessor, knowing the dangers in which the penitent is placed, can admonish him and suggest suitable remedies for avoiding them. L. 476.

If there is doubt whether someone has or has not confessed a mortal sin certainly committed, and the doubt is negative, he is certainly bound to confess it. For the law of Confession is certain, and no prudent reason suggests that it has been satisfied. But if the doubt is positive, St. Alphonsus, 427, holds that the penitent must confess it, "since the obligation of Confession is certain and the satisfaction doubtful." But Lugo, d. 16, nn. 58, 59, says: "All commonly teach that someone is not bound to confess that sin which he probably judges he has already confessed.... Nothing is more frequent among theologians than to excuse from repeating Confession one who confessed... according to some probable opinion concerning its validity." And St. Alphonsus himself handed this down, in the Roman edition of 1757, dedicated to Benedict XIV, l. 6, n. 477, as common doctrine.

The reason is clear: for although the general law is certain, nevertheless, with probable satisfaction of it standing, its obligation in the concrete, in the particular case, now becomes doubtful. Besides, the same holy Doctor adds in the same place "that one who was diligent in confessing his sins, if afterward he doubts whether he omitted some sin, after much time has elapsed since he committed it, is not bound to confess it, since in that case he can believe morally certainly that he has already confessed it.... If someone previously, from a bad habit, had fallen into several sins, and afterward has been truly converted through constant integrity of life, if then he doubts whether in a general or particular Confession made with due diligence he omitted some sin or circumstance, let the confessor forbid him even to think back over his past life." But scrupulous persons, as the doctors very commonly say, are never bound to confess past sins unless they are certain that they were mortal and certain that they have never confessed them. L. ibid.

674 bis. Whether one who has confessed a sin as doubtful must confess it again if he recognizes it as certain is disputed. - St. Alphonsus, 478, 504, affirms it, because that sin was not accused as to its individual substance; for the accusation of a certain sin is not included in the accusation of a doubtful sin. Thus several other grave theologians. Reuter 332, Tamb., Meth. conf., l. 2, c. 1, § 4, n. 24, and also several other grave theologians deny it, since that sin was directly remitted through the keys of the Church; therefore it is not to be subjected to the keys again. - "Sanchez, etc., very commonly and most probably say that if someone confesses a sin which neither he nor the confessor knew to be mortal, and afterward knows that it is mortal from its genus, he is not bound to confess it again. The reason is that in this case the penitent has already exposed his sin to the confessor as it then was in his conscience and now is; and in the present nothing new occurs except that he now knows the matter of that sin to be grave, which he previously did not know." L. 478, 500.

Strictly speaking, someone can approach the sacred synaxis, without a preceding Confession, with a doubtful or probable mortal sin. The reason is that Trent requires Confession before Communion only for those who are conscious of mortal sin. Hence a priest doubting whether he adhered to a bad thought, or judging probably that he did not adhere to it, can celebrate, contrition nevertheless having been made first, without Confession, although he has abundance of a confessor. Yet contrition should first be made, lest he rashly expose the sacrament to the danger of being frustrated of its effect, and perhaps in fact lack the fruit of the Eucharist; and lest Jesus Christ be exposed at least to material irreverence and dishonor, if perhaps, really coming into us, the soul is defiled by mortal sin.

At least; for there seems to be a certain formal irreverence in this, that someone knowingly and prudently receives Christ himself in himself while doubtfully approved. L. 475. In practice, however, Confession is to be counseled. - Lugo, d. 16, s. 2, §§ 3, 4.

If the penitent offers only doubtful sufficient matter, is the confessor bound to seek certain matter from the past life, so that he can absolve? - Resp. In the affirmative, if he wishes to absolve, because otherwise the sacrament would be exposed to the danger of nullity. Except unless a case occurs in which the penitent can be absolved conditionally, concerning which below. In the negative, if he does not wish to absolve, but to dismiss the penitent with only a blessing, because the penitent who does not bring certainly sufficient matter does not have a right to absolution. Likewise, if the penitent seems to have doubtful sorrow about venials alone, the confessor is not ordinarily bound to apply great diligence to move him to sorrow, although he would do this much better. But it would have to be said otherwise if it were a question of doubtful mortals, because of the danger to the penitent. - L. 432.

Must one who brings not necessary matter, but free and certain matter, necessarily be absolved? - Resp. In the affirmative, speaking of itself. The reason is that, on the one hand, the penitent duly disposed, after he has performed confession, has an acquired right to absolution; but on the other hand, the confessor has no right to grant or deny absolution according to his own judgment, and thus to defraud the penitent of those spiritual gifts of grace which follow absolution. L. 604.

What is contrition and how many kinds are there? - Contrition is sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter. Sorrow is displeasure and bitterness of soul; detestation is reprobation and condemnation of sin. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85, a. 1, ad 3; Suppl., q. 1, a. 1. - One is perfect from the special motive of charity, and is customarily called contrition simply; another is imperfect from another motive, e.g., from consideration of the foulness of sin, from fear of hell and punishments, etc., and is customarily called attrition. Trent, ibid. - L. 435, 436; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, a. 1; E. M.

What is the necessity of contrition? - Contrition, either perfect with the desire of the sacrament, or imperfect with the sacrament itself, is altogether necessary to the sinner by necessity of means for obtaining justification and salvation. But that desire is implicit in contrition itself, from the very institution of the sacrament of penance and the obligation of confessing sins; nor must it necessarily be explicit. Trent, sess. 14, C. 1, 4; sess. 6, C. 6, 14; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, a. 1; L. 434. It is necessary besides by necessity of divine precept at some time in life, Luke 13:3, 5, and at the point of death, on account of the precept of obtaining the last end. L. 437. "Speaking of itself, a sinner delaying penance outside danger of death probably does not commit a special sin. The reason is that affirmative precepts, as St. Thomas teaches in 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, q. 4, must have a determined time in which they must be fulfilled; but nowhere is it established what time is determined for satisfying this precept of contrition. Hence the same holy Doctor, 2. 2, q. 14, a. 2, said that final impenitence is not a special sin, in these words: impenitence, not indeed in that mode in which it means permanence in sin until death..., in this way would not be a special sin, but a certain circumstance of sin, etc. Nevertheless that is indeed to be understood apart from a positive precept; for from the precept of annual Confession, prescribed by the Church, each person without doubt is bound to penance at least once in the year." L. 437. Wherefore the precept of penance does not oblige immediately after mortal sin has been committed.

But by accident the aforesaid precept obliges when another precept urges which cannot be fulfilled without contrition, e.g., when one guilty of grave sin is about to receive or administer a sacrament; as often as the sacrament of penance is received even for the sake of devotion. - Likewise when someone, existing in mortal sin, would defer penance for a notable time. The reason is clear from what St. Thomas teaches, 1. 2, q. 109, a. 8, where he says: "Without justifying grace, that one remain for a long time without mortal sin cannot be." "But what this notable time is, the doctors greatly disagree." L. 437. Concina and others think it is a week; St. Alphonsus in the cited place and others think it is a month; others a trimester, others six months, others a year. The more common opinion, as Palaus says, de Poenit., d. un., p. 3, n. 9, admits at least that delay which the precept of the Church also admits concerning annual Confession; St. Alphonsus there also attributes this doctrine to St. Thomas, 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 1, q. 4, although he himself "does not altogether acquiesce." Cf. Laymann, c. 2, n. 6; L., l. 6, n. 473; St. Thomas, Quodl. 1, a. 11. - Besides, as the same St. Alphonsus has it in the cited place, "sinners, especially the uneducated, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance on account of inadvertence." Cf. Lugo, d. 15, nn. 55, 56; Suarez, d. 15, s. 6, nn. 7, 8; d. 35, s. 3, n. 10.

What are the qualities of contrition? - Contrition 1. must be altogether true and real, not supposed; altogether formal, but virtual suffices, even for venials. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4; L. 443, 449.

2. It must be supernatural, even for venials, because it is part of the sacrament and a positive disposition for supernatural grace. But it must be supernatural not only because elicited with the help of grace, but also, at least in some way, on the part of the motive. The reason is that, as Lugo says, d. 5, n. 141, "for every justification, even in the sacrament, there is required a conversion of man to God, at least imperfect." But since that conversion is to God as supernatural end, hence that motive, at least considered inadequately, must be supernatural, proposed not by the light of natural reason, but by the light of faith. Busemb. 433; L. 440; Suarez, d. 20, s. 2. This is openly established from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, where, after it had recounted among other motives the fear of hell and punishments, which seemed especially to be known by the natural light of reason, it immediately adduces the example of the Ninevites, whose object was certainly manifested not by natural reason but by the light of faith.

3. It must be appretiatively supreme, even for venial sins; that is, so that one detests sin more than every other evil, whence the sinner is prepared in soul to lose and suffer all things rather than commit sin. - Contrition and sorrow must be supreme not in the sensitive part, but in the will, insofar as by the soul's judgment and estimation sin is held as graver than any other evil, which the will therefore turns away from and rejects before other evils. - It is not required that a formal comparison be set up in the appreciation between various evils and sin, which someone would indeed do foolishly. St. Thomas, Quodl. 1, a. 9; L. 433.

Nor indeed must contrition be supreme intensively, since intensity is something merely accidental. Lugo, d. 5, nn. 84-87; L. 441, 442; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 5, a. 3; 2. 2, q. 24, a. 12; q. 45, a. 4. - Nor likewise is any duration of time required, because this too is something merely accidental. L. 433.

4. It must be universal, if it is a question of grave sins, but by no means if of venial sins. The first reason is that the remission of mortal sins is made through the infusion of sanctifying grace, which is incompatible with any mortal sin whatever. But it suffices that contrition be universal from a universal motive, nor are individual acts of sorrow required for each individual sin. For then one virtually detests each of his individual sins. Otherwise one could not be cleansed from hidden sins through universal sorrow. Trent, sess. 14, C. 5; L. 438; St. Thomas, de Verit., q. 29, a. 5, ad 4; 4 d. 17, q. 2, a. 3, q. 5, ad 2. The second reason is that since sanctifying grace is not incompatible with venial sin, one can be remitted without another. "Hence it suffices to repent and purpose concerning only one venial sin, since venials are not necessary matter, but only sufficient matter. But Lugo, d. 14 from n. 138, etc., says that it also suffices if someone grieves for each one in particular.... La-Croix, 913, etc., also rightly says that someone can well grieve for deliberate venials and purpose to avoid all of them; but concerning semi-deliberate ones it suffices to grieve that he committed them, and in the future to wish to attend to avoiding them insofar as human frailty permits. And these things are according to the doctrine of St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, a. 1, ad 1." L. 449; Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, D. 29; E. M.

Wherefore contrition or attrition is also necessary as regards the remission of venial sins. St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 87, aa. 1, 2, 3. And lest efficacy be altogether taken away from the sacrament of penance as regards the remission of venial sins, it seems that one must say that outside the sacrament, for the remission of graver venials, a more perfect attrition is required, and for lighter ones a less perfect attrition; but in the sacrament of baptism, extreme unction, and penance, a lesser attrition is required. - Suarez, d. 11, s. 3; Lugo, s. 9, n. 28.

Must the contrition required for the sacrament of penance also be vocal? - It must indeed be sensible, but by no means necessarily vocal. The first reason is that it is part of the sacrament. The second reason is that otherwise dying persons unable to speak, although they give other signs of contrition, could not be absolved, which is against common practice and doctrine and against the Roman Ritual. - But it becomes sufficiently sensible by the very sorrowful Confession of sins, by the petition or expectation of absolution, and by other signs. - L. 445; H. A., tr. 16, n. 20.

Must contrition precede Confession? - It must certainly precede absolution, or at least coexist with it; it surely does not suffice that it follow absolution, since one who has not yet detested sins neither deserves nor can be loosed from the bond of sins. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4. - For the validity of the sacrament, sorrow need not necessarily precede accusation. The reason is that all things required for the sacrament are present, provided sorrow precedes absolution; nor can a precept be proved of placing sorrow for sins before Confession. Lugo, Suarez, and others more commonly, against others. Besides, when other theologians require a sorrowful Confession, and therefore say that sorrow must precede, they seem to demand nothing else than that the Confession not be a mere narration of sins, but an accusation of oneself in order to obtain absolution.

The Roman Ritual, de Sacram. poenit., favors this, where it is said: "having heard the Confession, the confessor will strive with efficacious words to lead him to sorrow," etc. From this the Ritual seems to suppose that sorrow elicited after Confession suffices well. Thus St. Alphonsus, 445. - Nevertheless the same St. Alphonsus, H. A., tr. 16, n. 20, says that the other opinion is probable and therefore to be followed in practice; and he adds: "But they commonly agree... that it suffices if, after the acts of sorrow, the penitent again says, I accuse myself of all the sins confessed."

But the same holy Doctor himself had previously handed down the first opinion in earlier editions of the Moral Work and of the Italian edition of the Homo Apostolicus; afterward, however, in later editions of the Moral Work, he changed it. - Ithur., Cas. 11, n. 4, says: "That sorrow is sufficient for the sacrament of penance seems to me certain, even if it does not precede Confession, provided it follows Confession and together with Confession is ordered to absolution; and this the very sense of the faithful and the practice of confessors sufficiently teach. It is founded on this: although the whole prior narration of sins, preceding sorrow in time, had not yet had the complete nature of accusation, nevertheless, afterwards informed by subsequent contrition, and thus subjected to the keys by the penitent both asking for and expecting absolution, it is sufficiently completed in the nature of sacramental accusation." E. M.

Through what space of time does an act of sorrow morally endure for validly receiving the sacrament? - Suarez, d. 20, s. 4, n. 29, and others judge that sorrow suffices which preceded Confession by a long time, provided it has not been retracted. For since such sorrow virtually perseveres in the flight from sin and in the very Confession which is made for preserving the state of grace, there seems to be no reason why such sorrow should be held insufficient. And Ballerinius seems to adhere to this opinion, Gur. Baller. 448. Cf. Lugo, d. 14, nn. 35, 50. - But others, such as Cardenas, in prop. 2 of Innocent XI, p. 65, n. 88, etc., say that sorrow preceding by one day suffices; for since Confession is the effect of that sorrow, sorrow virtually perseveres. Roncaglia, c. 3, q. 2, r. 2, agrees, even if sorrow preceded by several days, provided it virtually perseveres in some means, for example if the penitent, by force of the sorrow conceived, has persisted in frequent prayer, flight from occasions, penances, etc. L. 446. Gury 447 also agrees, even if sorrow preceded by one or several days, provided it was elicited from the intention of Confession and was not retracted by another sin. - D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 315.

In order that sorrow be apt matter, must it be elicited from or with the intention of Confession? - Several affirm it, and St. Alphonsus says this opinion is probable and more safely to be followed. But Lugo, d. 14, nn. 37-40, and others deny it; Tamburini thinks this probable, St. Alphonsus himself, 447, more probable, and Ballerinius, Gur. Baller. 447, as certain. The reason is both that, from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, that attrition is said to dispose for obtaining grace in the sacrament which excludes the will to sin with hope of pardon, all of which is verified in our case; and that then sorrow, although it was not ordered to Confession by an antecedent relation, is nevertheless ordered by a concomitant relation from this, that then sorrow is still verified as being laid open through Confession.

Is a new act of sorrow required for receiving a new absolution when the penitent immediately after absolution confesses a mortal sin omitted from forgetfulness? - The first opinion denies it, because the prior contrition certainly perseveres, and since it was universal it extended to all sins, even those omitted from forgetfulness; and it can well serve for another form of absolution. Nor otherwise is it required that contrition be explicitly ordered to the sacrament. Besides, once a new accusation has been made, it is already sufficiently ordered. Indeed there seems to be sorrow, in some way explicit, in the act of accusing that sin. For when vocal Confession is repeated, at least virtually the sorrow of the preceding Confession is repeated, still persevering morally and virtually. - The second opinion affirms it, because through absolution the judgment has been completed; therefore if a new absolution is to be imparted, new proximate matter is required; and although sorrow perseveres in itself, it nevertheless does not persevere in order to absolution. - St. Alphonsus, 448, speaking of this second opinion, says: "Since it is probable, indeed more probable, Croix and Concina say that it must altogether be followed in practice; at least I judge that the safer opinion must be held." But of the first he says: "It is more common, and Lugo, Anacletus, Viva with Perez, Henriquez, and the common opinion, Roncaglia who calls it morally certain, Sporer, Elbel who thinks it most probable with Gobat, Dicastillo, Henriquez, Bosco, etc., likewise apud Croix, Leander, Salas, Escobar, and Moya, who says it is undoubted among all, hold this." But for it Lugo says, d. 14, n. 27, "common practice also stands," which Dicastillo also testifies, de Sacr., tr. 8, disp. 6, dub. 22, n. 160, and Diana, t. 1, tr. 3, r. 95, n. 3, and many other grave theologians adhere to it absolutely. Fr. Gury, 448, says the second opinion rests on a light foundation.

But Ballerinius there says that "neither authority nor any solid reason supports the same second opinion," but that the first "can be held in practice as very safe." D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 315, says, "To me, if you wish to confess something forgotten, the first opinion seems truer, because this is contained, as in the same Confession, so also in the same sorrow; if you confess the same things again, the other opinion seems truer, because it is a new Confession, which in no way pertains to the prior one." But although it is a new Confession, nevertheless virtually persevering sorrow can well suffice for it. For as it suffices for the new Confession of a forgotten sin, so it can well suffice for the new Confession of sins already accused. - Elbel 75.

Does one sin who confesses some venial sin without sorrow? - If he opens this very defect of sorrow and purpose to the confessor, then the priest must not absolve from such a sin, nor should the penitent say it for this end, namely as matter of the sacrament, since in fact it cannot be such. Yet it can licitly be said either for humility, or for counsel, or for excitation to true penance. - If he opens a venial sin for which he does not grieve, like the others, as matter of absolution, "then," says Suarez, d. 39, s. 6, n. 7, "many think it is a mortal sin....

But although it cannot be denied that this is some fault, nevertheless I do not judge it mortal, because the matter of such fault is light; because the defect of that sorrow or purpose of itself and by its nature is not contrary to grace and justification, which is the primary effect of this sacrament signified by the form..., nor even does it impede the remission of other venial sins, concerning which a true accusation capable of true absolution is made, notwithstanding the obstacle of some venial sin." Cf. Lugo, d. 14, n. 48. Besides, even that light fault of which Suarez speaks will often be absent, either because the penitent does not advert to this defect of sorrow or to the disorder of the same defect, or because all displeasure is rarely absent, although it is not sufficiently efficacious; in this matter it is often difficult to avoid deception. - To approach the sacrament with light matter, without any sorrow, is grave, on account of the grave irreverence inflicted upon the sacrament by frustrating it of its effect, whether from grave or light matter. Lugo, d. 14, n. 108 ff.; L. 449.

Does fearful attrition, or attrition conceived from fear of hell, suffice for justification in the sacrament of penance? - Resp. In the affirmative, provided it is truly supernatural, absolutely efficacious, and only materially servile, not formally or servilely servile. The reason is: 1. because attrition of this kind is a true conversion to God and a true aversion from sin; 2. because this is clearly drawn from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, where it says that attrition conceived from fear of hell and punishments is honest and disposes the sinner for obtaining justification in the sacrament of penance. And this is certain and common among the doctors. - But attrition is called servilely servile when someone indeed grieves over sin and wishes to avoid it because of the punishments which he knows are to be inflicted by God, yet he would still be ready to sin if those punishments did not exist. But it is called simply servile when someone abstains from sin indeed because of fear of punishments, yet is not so disposed that he would wish to sin if those punishments did not exist. The former is evil, not because it is fear of punishments, but because of the depraved disposition of soul. - L. 440, 442; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 19; q. 225; Quodl. 4, a. 10; 4 d. 22, q. 2, a. 1, q. 3; E. M.

Whether attrition suffices for the sacrament of penance when conceived from fear of the punishments of this life, insofar as they are inflicted by God as avenger of sins? - The first opinion denies it. The reason is that Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, speaks conjointly of fear of punishments and of hell, when it teaches that "sorrow conceived from fear of hell and punishments" suffices, taking both for the same thing. For the punishment of mortal sin is eternal, and the sinner must fear this. The second opinion affirms it. The reason is that the particle and is to be taken disjunctively in the obvious sense, understanding hell for hell, Matt. 10:28, and punishments for temporal punishments, whether of Purgatory or of this life. This is confirmed by the example of the Ninevites, which Trent itself adduces, sess. 14, C. 4. St. Alphonsus, 443, says this second opinion is more probable, but that the first is not lacking its own probability, at least extrinsic; hence he concludes: "I think the safer one must be observed in practice." But others call the second opinion most probable, La-Croix 884; others morally certain, Elbel 59; others altogether certain, and Ballerinius seems to adhere to these, Gur. Baller. 452.

Insofar as they are inflicted by God as avenger of sins. For the aforesaid punishments must always be considered with relation to God as punisher of sins. Contrition sufficient for the sacrament cannot exist without relation to God.

Does attrition from fear of the punishments of Purgatory suffice for venial sins? - Resp. In the affirmative, with the very common and morally certain opinion; because all the reasons adduced above for the sufficiency of attrition from fear of hell are valid here also. Gur. 452.

Does attrition suffice for the sacrament of penance if it is conceived from the foulness of sin? - Resp. In the affirmative. Trent, sess. 14, C. 4.

But this foulness, the motive of sacramental attrition, is that which offends the eyes of God; which defiles the soul by deforming in it the image and likeness of God; which is known by faith; by no means, however, that which is contained in infamy among men, and which naturally belongs to vice, since it offends the order of right reason and is proposed merely by natural reason. The reason is that attrition must not be sorrow for sin in any manner whatever, but with some respect to God, the supernatural end of man; for there must be a certain conversion to God, at least imperfect. - Lugo, d. 5, n. 140 ff.; Suarez, d. 20, s. 2, n. 10; E. M.

Can there be a valid but unformed sacrament of penance because of a defect of sufficient sorrow? - There can be a twofold case: 1. When someone guilty of a double sin, from invincible forgetfulness, grieves over one only because of its special foulness, and confesses this alone. 2. When someone, from invincible ignorance, would believe that it is not a mortal sin to approach the sacrament without sorrow for all, while nevertheless sorrow was present for some sin because of its special foulness, e.g., because it is against justice, against chastity, etc., but not because it is simply an offense and injury against God. - Moreover the first opinion holds that such a sacrament is valid and formed, because the penitent places no obstacle to grace. The second opinion holds that it is not only unformed but invalid, because the sorrow is insufficient. The third opinion holds that it is valid but unformed: valid, because no essential part of the sacrament is lacking; unformed, because one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another, and the other cannot be remitted because sorrow is lacking. The first opinion seems true to D'Annibale, ed. 3, p. 3, n. 312; the third is more probable to St. Alphonsus, 444. - If contrition sufficient for the sacrament cannot exist without relation to God offended and with the purpose of not sinning thereafter, it certainly does not appear how it can be so particular that it is not at least virtually universal. Nor indeed does it appear how someone could with sincere soul detest the specific foulness of sin without also detesting the generic foulness. - Nor indeed does it appear how, according to what the Council of Trent has about the parts of this sacrament, sess. 14, C. 2, 3, it can still be an essential part of the sacrament with confession without contrition, as St. Thomas explicitly has it, Suppl., q. 9, a. 1, or with attrition, but not sufficient for grace, as others have it. Moreover this question is raised for this reason: that it may be known whether the penitent is bound again to confess the sins which he has already confessed, which indeed is doubtful in this variety of opinions. - Lugo, d. 14, n. 65 ff.; Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 29; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 9, a. 1; 4 d. 17, q. 3, a. 4, q. 1.

Is one who at the point of death has received the sacrament of penance with attrition bound besides to elicit an act of contrition? - The first opinion affirms it, and Suarez, d. 14, s. 6, n. 18, Sanchez, in Dec., t. 1, l. 1, c. 1, n. 34, etc., hold this. The reason is that at the time of such great necessity safer means for salvation are to be chosen. The second opinion denies it, and Lugo, d. 7, n. 263, Laymann, c. 11, n. 7, etc., hold this. The reason is that there is only an obligation, whether in the time of life or in the time of death, of choosing safe means, not safer ones. But from Trent, sess. 14, C. 4, it is certain that attrition suffices in the sacrament for obtaining grace. L. 440. - Each opinion, says St. Alphonsus, 437, is probable; but the first is altogether to be counseled, which is evident of itself, since it is a question of the supreme business of salvation. The holy Doctor adds besides that the first must be altogether followed, because of another reason, namely because of the obligation of eliciting then an act of charity. But since this obligation too is disputed, namely for a man already justified through the sacrament, who already has sanctifying grace and habitual charity, a certain obligation does not seem to be imposed. - Gur. Baller. 445.

In order to obtain grace in the sacrament of penance, besides sorrow are explicit acts of faith and hope also required? - Resp. In the negative. The reason is that it cannot be proved by any probable argument that these acts are explicitly required. Besides, a penitent eliciting an act of sorrow also in some way explicitly and in exercise elicits these acts, although not reflectively; because then without doubt he believes in exercise, and hopes that through the sacrament of penance, in virtue of the merits of Christ, his sins are to be remitted. - L. 439; E. M.

For obtaining justification in the sacrament of penance with attrition, is the beginning of love also required? - Resp. In the negative, if by the beginning of love is understood some degree of perfect charity, by which God is loved above all things. The reason is that for rightly receiving the sacrament there is not necessarily prerequired an act which outside the sacrament essentially justifies. But an act of charity, and therefore "sorrow which suffices for the nature of contrition, however small it may be, deletes every guilt," as St. Thomas says, q. 5, a. 3. Therefore. St. Alphonsus, 440, says this is morally certain. - But it can and must be conceded that some beginning of love is required, insofar as attrition, in order to dispose for the sacrament, must exclude, as Trent speaks, the will to sin; and as St. Thomas says, 2. 2, q. 17, a. 8, "someone is introduced to loving God through this, that fearing to be punished by him he ceases from sin." - And here it must be noted that contrition not only remits guilt and eternal punishment, but also, if very intense and perfect, can abolish every punishment; yet from its own nature it does not necessarily have this efficacy. - Trent, sess. 6, C. 6, 14, c. 30; sess. 14, C. 8, c. 12; E. M.

"Whether in a case of extreme necessity absolution can be given by telephone? Resp. Nothing is to be answered." S. Poenit. 1 July 1884.

"In the Cathedral of Padua, by immemorial custom, in the public administration of the sacrament of Penance, the Priest Confessors are forbidden from the use of the stole prescribed by the Roman Ritual; it is asked whether one must stand by a custom of this kind? Resp. Negatively, but one must stand altogether by the Ritual and other Decrees." S. R. C. 7 Dec. 1844.

"Whether the custom of ministering the Sacrament of Penance without a stole, even in a Church and in the Confessional Seat, can be observed? Resp. It is fitting that in a Church the stole be employed according to the decrees of the S. R. C." S. R. C. 31 Aug. 1867.

"Whether the Reverend Lord Bishop Visitator of Tongking rightly established that the Confessions of women are not to be received unless a small grating is interposed, except in the case of sickness? Resp. Affirmatively, according to the orders given many times by the S. C." S. C. de P. F. 12 June 1764.

"Since it befits men who, released from secular cares, have professed the institute of a stricter life by regular vows, to shrink from all familiarity with women, hence, that what has been sanctioned both by the Decrees of general and provincial Councils, and by the Constitutions of the Supreme Pontiffs, and especially most recently of St. Pius V, Gregory XIII, and Benedict XIV, namely that within the enclosures of male Religious no entrance be open to any women whatever, with most grave penalties inflicted both upon men who admit females, under whatever pretext, within the enclosure of Regular houses, and upon females who violate the cloister of the same houses: adhering to these most salutary sanctions, the S. C., although it has not ceased from time to time to warn Prefects of Missions if it has learned that some of them at any time have not been sufficiently vigilant in this matter, nevertheless with the interval of time, or from forgetfulness of the law, or because the disposition of man is prone to lessen the force of laws however most holy, it has often happened, as was reported to the same Congregation by the letters of many, that in stations and hospices of Missionaries women have sometimes been admitted, and in rooms, or in other places within the enclosure of the hospices, have received the sacrament of Penance. Indeed, the S. C., well knowing how unbecoming and how dangerous this is, since it desires its Missionaries dwelling among enemies of the Christian name to abstain not only from evil, but also from every appearance of evil, so that, according to the admonition of the Apostle, they may be without offense to Jews and Gentiles and the Church of God, upon the report of the Reverend Father Lord Stephen Borgia, Secretary, established and ordered that hospices and stations, or any houses whatsoever of whatever Order, Congregation, or regular Institute existing anywhere in places of Missions, in which two or three Missionaries of the Latin rite dwell, or may happen to dwell, are subject to the laws of cloister, so that it is not at all lawful for any Regular whatsoever to introduce any female within the private rooms, dwellings, or recesses of the same hospices or stations, under any title, appearance, and pretext whatever, much less to administer to them there the most holy sacrament of Penance; nor is it lawful for women, under the pretext of any licenses whatever, to enter the aforesaid private rooms, dwellings, or recesses of the hospices, under the penalties inflicted by the sacred Canons and by the above-mentioned Constitutions of the Pontiffs against violators of cloister. But so that access may also be open to women to the internal oratories, churches, and places of the same hospices where sacred things are performed, that they may be present at the sacrosanct sacrifice of Mass and at other ecclesiastical functions, and receive the sacrament of Penance, the same Sacred Congregation declares and decrees that women can be admitted in the internal churches, chapels, or public oratories of the aforesaid hospices, to which nevertheless they are to approach by a direct path, and not turn aside into rooms or private dwellings, and by the same way by which they approached, they are to return. The Sacred Congregation further orders and commands that the confessions of women be heard openly in churches, chapels, or public oratories where they are present, but where these are lacking, in another open and accessible place, and as near as can be to the door of the hospice, to be designated by the respective Ordinaries, and, these being lacking, by the local Superiors of Missions, with an iron grating or another barrier interposed between the mouth of the confessor and of the woman penitent. Those who shall have done otherwise, and shall have contravened these most salutary ordinances, shall incur the penalties against violators of cloister and despisers of the sacred Canons and of the aforesaid apostolic Constitutions.

This Decree of the Sacred Congregation, having been reported to Our Holy Lord Pope Pius VI, His Holiness kindly confirmed, adding the strength of his apostolic authority, and ordered that it be inviolably observed by all, under the aforementioned penalties." S. C. de P. F. 26 June 1780.

"Whether Your Eminences approve: 1. That, under penalty of excommunication latae sententiae, it be commanded to the Priests of that Vicariate that they hear the Confessions of women who are not lying sick only with at least a wooden or reed grating interposed, with small holes and with a veil placed over it, and only by day, unless grave necessity urges? 2. That, under the same penalty, entrance to the houses of Nuns be prohibited to the same Priests and their ministers, unless true necessity urges, namely when the Sacraments are to be ministered, or unless they have a special faculty given in writing by the Superior of the Mission? That, under the same penalty, access to Priests be prohibited to Nuns, except in cases approved by the Superior of the Mission? Resp. The Most Eminent Fathers, the gravity of the matter having been weighed with due maturity, judged that, in order to remove abuses, Decrees issued at other times are to be renewed and confirmed. One of these, appended here, from the year 1780, begins: Cum deceat, etc. But the other, of the year 1785, on 7 March, established that the precept of the grating which is in the first be observed in churches or oratories erected in the Mission; but in those cases in which there is lacking a duly constituted church or oratory, and the Missionary is compelled to administer the sacrament of Penance in private houses, and other suitable barriers are not at hand, in receiving the Confession of women he is to hear them only covered with a veil.

But as regards the association of women and sacred Ministers, besides those things which are contained in the Decree recounted above of the year 1780, the S. C. earnestly commends to Your Amplitude that you command the Missionaries never to turn aside from those rules which are handed down in the Synod of Szechuan, and especially in the Pastoral letters of the Bishop of Caradrus brought forward in the appendix. Indeed all these things, if they are exactly observed, will not only remove abuses, but there will not even be a place for suspicion. For the rest, the S. C., in rescripting these things, does not prohibit Your Amplitude from also ordering and decreeing other things, according to ordinary power, as shall seem more expedient in the Lord, yet in such a way that you proceed most cautiously to greater penalties, and much more to reservations, having before your eyes the inconveniences which follow thence in the place of Mission and the difficulties of obtaining absolution." S. C. de P. F. 17 Aug. 1839, to the Coadjutor of the Apostolic Vicar of Cochinchina.

"Whether the Confessionals of Nuns can be in Sacristies or houses which Confessors inhabit? Resp. They cannot, but ought to stand in the churches of monasteries." S. C. C. 2 Sept. 1642.

"Although, as the Council of Trent teaches, it has been commanded by no Divine precept, nor can it by any human law be prescribed with sufficient counsel, that offenses, especially secret ones, be opened by public Confession, nevertheless it seemed to the delegated Fathers, adhering to the same Holy Synod, that those who voluntarily wish to confess through an interpreter ought not to be prohibited by the Apostolic Vicar of Constantinople; for whom it will suffice to guard against abuses and scandals, and to take care that the interpreter be admonished concerning the obligation to the observance of the secret." S. C. de P. F. 1633.

"Whether in distant regions a Catholic, unconfessed for many years, asking absolution by signs only, because of defect of language, can be absolved without the help of an interpreter? Resp. There is no need of an interpreter in the proposed case, just as also absolution of sins can and must be imparted to one exhibiting the signs which he can..., provided they suffice for expressing some sin in species. But in the case in which someone tries as much as he can to exhibit signs of sins in species, but they cannot be understood at all, he can be absolved through only a manifestation of sins in general." S. C. S. O. 28 Feb. 1653.

"Missionaries dealing with penitents whose language they do not know should exhort them to employ an interpreter, through whom they may confess all sins; but if they should be unwilling to do this, let them at least confess some through an interpreter and the rest through nods and signs, as much as they can; but if they wish to confess none through an interpreter, let them confess through signs in every better way in which they will be able, as is done in the case of mute persons. But let Missionaries take care to learn from each language usual there those few words which are necessary for explaining the principal sins against the precepts of the Church." S. C. S. O. 10 Feb. 1668.

"But that the abuse which in the aforesaid regions, namely Goa and the adjacent islands, as is stated above, has crept in, of receiving Confessions through an interpreter, or by a catalogue of sins read to the penitent so that he may indicate by nods whether any have been committed by him, may be uprooted radically, it is strictly commanded to the capitular Vicars, the conscience also of the Regulars themselves and of whomever it concerns being gravely burdened, that in the future they permit this in no way, but that Confessions be heard only by those who sufficiently perceive the meaning of that language; and, to increase their number according to the requirement of the matter, secular Priests of that region are to be promoted altogether for receiving the Confessions of the faithful in the native language." Clement IX, Const. In excelsa, 13 Sept. 1669.

Whether and when parish priests are bound, under grave obligation, by themselves, or at least through another, to assist the dying even to the final agony of life, although they have already been duly furnished with the sacraments and seem well disposed? Resp. "One must stand by the prescriptions of the Roman Ritual; in the rest, let him consult approved authors." S. C. C. 23 March 1878. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 11, p. 189 ff.

".... Another inconvenience is in the excess of satisfactions which they impose, namely of many rosaries, even up to the number of three hundred, of as many litanies, with fasts, hair shirts, and other afflictive works, on stated days, through weeks, or months, or whole years....

But as regards the second excess in imposing a satisfaction of many rosaries, litanies, fasts, etc., two extremes also are to be avoided. A prudent Confessor, says St. Charles Borromeo in the Institutions of Penance, for imposing penance, should neither apply one so light that the power of the keys is thereby contemned, and he himself becomes a participant in the sins of others, nor also one so grave or long-lasting that penitents refuse to comply with it, or do not carry out completely the one accepted. There is no reason why we should linger over avoiding the first of these extremes; for it is enough to hear the Council of Trent, sess. 14, ch. 8: The Priests of the Lord ought, as much as spirit and prudence shall suggest, according to the quality of the crimes and the faculty of the penitents, to enjoin salutary and fitting satisfactions: lest, if perchance they connive at sins and deal too indulgently with penitents, by enjoining certain very light works for very grave offenses, they be made participants in the sins of others.

Yet to mitigate the second excess, which prevails among the Tongkingese Priests, we bring forward a few documents indeed, yet solid ones, full of wisdom and prudence, to which they ought diligently to attend, so that they may respond both to their own office and to the utility of penitents. Therefore let them attend to this doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas, in Quodlibet 3, dist. 13, art. 1: It seems sufficiently fitting that the Priest not burden the penitent with a grave weight of satisfaction, because just as a small fire is easily extinguished by many pieces of wood placed upon it, so it could happen that the small affection of contrition recently excited in the penitent might be extinguished because of the grave burden of satisfaction, with the sinner totally despairing; whence it is better that the Priest indicate to the penitent how great a penance ought to be enjoined upon him for his sins, and nevertheless enjoin upon him something which the penitent bears tolerably, from the fulfillment of which he may become accustomed to fulfill greater things. For those things which the Priest would not have dared to enjoin, and which he does apart from an expressed injunction, receive a greater force of expiation of past guilt from that general injunction when the Priest says: Whatever good you shall have done, may it be for you unto the remission of sins. The same Angelic Doctor repeats the same doctrine in 5, dist. 2, ch. 1, art. 2, little question 2, ad 3: A Priest, he says, *imposing a penance less than condign, does not always sin...., because sometimes, even by design imposing a lesser penance, he benefits the penitent more than he harms him, who perhaps by the magnitumagnitude of the penance he could be impeded from performing the penance, because of the weakness of virtue still newly recovered in him; and therefore he neglects the lesser harm in order to avoid the greater, and meanwhile the divine love strengthened in him will stir him up of his own accord to perform more works of penance than the Priest could have enjoined upon him according to the gravity of the sins.

Let them attend to and weigh the admonition of St. Charles Borromeo in the Institution of Penance: In imposing penance he will employ both prudence and piety and justice, account being had of status, condition, sex, and age, etc. Wherefore let him impose such a one as he judges can be performed by him; therefore sometimes, if he shall see it expedient, let him ask him whether he can, or whether he doubts that he can, perform the penance enjoined upon him; otherwise he will change or lessen it. He will consider besides the soul and mind of the penitent, and the weeping, groaning, and tears which are signs of inward sorrow.... Let them not impose alms upon the poor, nor is a fast indicated for those who seek their living from their own labor, which is also to be observed in other penances.

Finally let them attend to the counsel of St. Francis de Sales in the admonitions written for the instruction of Confessors, ch. 8: It is not expedient to impose satisfactions that are intricate and composed of various kinds of works or of a great number of diverse prayers, because that accumulation of diverse prayers or variety of pious works induces forgetfulness of the imposed penance, and thence will beget anxiety and scruples in the souls of penitents; then devotion is usually relaxed and grows tepid, while the penitent thinks more about what prayers he ought to recite or what he ought to do, and daily, than he attends to the prayers themselves which he pours forth, or to the works themselves which he does.

If they diligently attend to these and the remaining admonitions and counsels of St. Charles Borromeo, they will certainly mitigate the excessive rigor which they have exercised until now, and will consult both for the salvation of souls and for their own obligation." Instruction of the S. C. de P. F. for the Tongkingese or Annamite Priests, 1736.

Cf. n. 621.

"As regards the doubt whether the Vicar Capitular can suspend the faculty of hearing confessions of confessors who were approved by the deceased Bishop at pleasure, and without a defined time, the Most Eminent Lords ordered me to rescript that there is no difficulty as regards secular priests, because, since they depend immediately on the ordinary jurisdiction of the Bishop, to which the Chapter succeeds when the See is vacant, consequently the Vicar Capitular enjoys full power of limiting their faculty and also of suspending them from hearing confessions, either because of grave faults pertaining to the Sacrament of Penance, or because of defect of that doctrine, honesty, and integrity of life which is required in sacred Ministers. The same cannot be said of regular confessors; indeed, since these have been approved after a prior examination and without limit of time, or even at Our Good Pleasure, by the deceased Bishop, the Chapter or the Vicar Capitular cannot punish them by the penalty of suspension, even for just reasons, since this is the personal right of the Bishop, to which, according to the more common opinion of the Doctors, the Chapter does not succeed when the See is vacant. But since grave inconveniences would be produced from this defect of power, recourse must be had to the same S. C." S. C. EE. and RR. 19 June 1866.

"The Vicar Capitular sets forth that he has discovered that several secular and regular priests obtained from the deceased Bishop the faculty of hearing confessions with no prior examination, and that they are so unskilled that several scandals result. Therefore he supplicates for the faculty of calling them to examination, and of approving those whom he shall have found suitable and prohibiting the incapable. Hence it is asked: 1. whether the Vicar Capitular can do this; and insofar as negatively, 2. whether the requested faculty is to be conceded? The S. C. of the Council on 5 Feb. 1688 responded: to the 1st, affirmatively; to the 2nd, provision has been made in the first. Scavini, book 3, n. 472, Milan 1874.

"The S. C. C. judged that successor Bishops can, a reasonable cause supervening, even by office, even outside visitation, examine Parish Priests approved for parochial Churches." And it says the same concerning regular Parish Priests. The Roman Rota decreed that the pleasure alone and the sole quiet of the Bishop's conscience is a sufficient cause of a new examination. But if the matter concerns Parish Priests already examined by the same Bishop, whether he can examine them again, the same Congregation has these things: 1. "A Bishop can examine Parish Priests and Rectors once approved for the care of souls, when there is a vehement suspicion concerning their lack of skill. 2. He can proceed to an examination of this kind outside visitation. 3. For making the said examination it is not necessary that judicial proofs of lack of skill precede." Scavini, loc. cit.

The S. C. C., being asked whether Capuchins who in the Diocese of Padua had received Confessions without the license of the Bishop of that Diocese validly absolved, because some of these had been approved in another Diocese, while others had indeed been approved by the Bishop of Padua for a year, but the year had already elapsed, responded: "They illicitly and invalidly received Confessions, but those who confessed in good faith are not to be disturbed. Yet if those confessing should have learned this, or should have doubted concerning the invalidity of the Confession, they are bound to repeat the Confession." 11 Dec. 1683. Benedict XIV, Notification 84; Scavini, book 3, n. 479, Milan 1874.

"Priests undertaking a journey can be approved by the Ordinaries of the places from which ships set sail, so that while the journey lasts they may be able validly and lawfully to receive the confessions of the faithful sailing with them, until they arrive at a place where another ecclesiastical superior endowed with jurisdiction has been constituted. Nevertheless the Ordinaries themselves must beware lest they grant a faculty of this kind to priests who have not been recognized as suitable according to the lines of the Council of Trent, sess. 23, de R., ch. 15." Holy Office, 29 March 1869. Cf. Paul Villada, Cases of Conscience Accommodated to These Present Times, Part 3, Case 6, Brussels 1887.

"1. Whether chaplains of any army whatever, whether regulars or secular Catholic priests, can administer to soldiers dwelling in garrisons Penance, the Eucharist by way of Viaticum, and Extreme Unction, without faculty of the Apostolic See, or license and approbation of the Ordinary in whose Diocese they happen to be? 2. Whether they can assist at the marriages of soldiers of whatever station dwelling in garrisons with military women, without the said apostolic faculty and preceding proof of free status, and its recognition before the Ordinary of the place, and the license of the Parish Priest under whose Parish they remain? 3. Whether the same with soldiers dwelling in camps and winter or summer stations? 4. Whether the same with soldiers placed on actual expedition? 5. Whether the same with soldiers wishing to marry women who are not military, but Italian women originating from the place or Diocese in which they are found? 6. Whether non-Catholic soldiers contracting with non-Catholics are bound to observe the form of Trent? 7. Whether much more non-Catholics contracting with Catholic military women remaining in garrisons, camps, and expedition? 8. Whether non-Catholic chaplains can assist at marriages of non-Catholics with non-Catholics and respectively Catholics, even within the borders of Italy; and insofar as negatively in all things except the sixth and seventh, 9. whether and what should be consulted with and established by the Most Holy One for the healing of things done in the past and to be done in the future concerning all the aforesaid things as a certain rule?

The S. C. on 6 March 1694 responded: "to the 1st, negatively; to the 2nd, negatively and confirmed in Casalens. 28 June 1704; to the 3rd, 4th, and 5th, negatively; to the 6th, affirmatively, where the Council has been published according to the decree of the S. C. 26 Sept. 1602; to the 7th, affirmatively, and furthermore that they need a dispensation for the marriage to be licitly done; to the 8th, as to the sixth; to the 9th, as regards the past, concerning the sacrament of Penance, consciences are not to be disturbed; and concerning Marriages, for healing, consultation with the Most Holy One, the consent being renewed even before the confessor, who is bound to deliver testimony of the renewal of consents to the Parish Priest of that place where such renewal of consent followed." Scavini, loc. cit., n. 893.

1. All secular and regular priests approved for confessions by the Ordinary of Rome can confess in any hospital whatever of the city.¹

¹ The confession certificate, where it is said: that sacramental confessions of Christ's faithful.... in any hospitals whatsoever of the kindly City, according to the Briefs of Clement XII of holy memory, issued on 28 Apr. 1738, you may be able to hear, etc.

2. As regards Regulars, even those approved only in other dioceses can confess the sick of those hospitals to which they are sent by their superiors, according to the prescription made to these by the Supreme Pontiffs.²

² Edict of His Eminence Cardinal Guadagni, 6 Sept. 1738, renewed by His Eminence Cardinal Patrizi on 22 July 1850.

The faculty as regards absolution from censures, in the forum of conscience only, and from sins, which according to the Council of Trent (sess. 14, ch. 7) Holy Church concedes to any Priest whatever for the faithful placed in the article of death, namely, that there be no reservation. And therefore all Priests can absolve any penitents from any sins and censures whatever; this same most ample faculty is conceded by the Supreme Pontiffs to Confessors approved in the aforesaid manner, for the benefit only of the sick in the hospitals of Rome, although they are not placed in the article of death.³

³ The aforesaid Brief of Clement XII of holy memory, by which he approves that of Pope Paul III: "with all and singular faculties of absolving from all and singular sins, crimes, and offenses, however grave and enormous, even those reserved to the Apostolic See, etc., even if they were such that for them the Apostolic See deservedly ought to be consulted."

Then as regards the two cases reserved to the Vicar of Rome, namely of the buying and selling of the Easter ticket, and of the non-fulfillment of the Easter precept, besides the faculty of absolving them in the internal forum, there is likewise conceded the faculty of absolving in the external forum from the interdict him who may have incurred it because of the non-fulfillment of the said precept, and whose name had been published at the door of the Church, with the obligation on the Confessor, after having made the penitent aware of it, immediately to transmit the notice by means of authentic attestation to the office of the Vicariate, using the following formula.

I, the undersigned, declare that I have absolved the sick person N. N. of the Parish

And as regards censures he adds: "from any sentences, censures, and penalties whatsoever of excommunication, suspension, and interdict, and other ecclesiastical sentences, censures, and penalties, in whatever way incurred, and from other reserved cases.... in the forum of conscience only, we concede and indulge the faculty of absolving...."

N., notoriously denounced and interdicted because of the non-fulfillment of the Easter precept. In witness, etc. From the venerable archhospital N., on the day, etc.⁴

⁴ Decree of His Eminence Cardinal Patrizi, 23 February 1851.

1. Of commuting any vows whatever into other works of piety, excepted, etc. That is, of commuting into other pious works any simple vow whatever, excepted that of chastity, of religion, and of the three pilgrimages to the places of the Holy Land, ad limina SS. Apostolorum, and to St. James in Compostela.

2. Of relaxing any oaths whatever. That is, of dissolving any promissory oath, when there is no harm to a third party.

3. And of ministering ecclesiastical sacraments to those sick persons. By this is understood, besides the administration of the sacrament of Penance, also that of the Eucharist, both in common form and in the form of Viaticum, and the sacrament of Extreme Unction. Concerning this faculty, it is a fitting thing not to make use of it when it could displease the Priest who by his special office is bound to administer the said Sacraments.

4. Of imparting in the article of death a plenary indulgence and remission of all their sins; and this not only to the dying persons of the hospital, but also to those of the family, using the prescribed formula.⁵

⁵ The faculty concerning vows, oaths, the administration of the sacraments, and the blessing in the article of death is established from the aforesaid Brief of Clement XII, declared and confirmed by Pope Pius IX, Rescript of His Eminence Cardinal Vicar Patrizi, from an Audience of the Most Holy One, 5 Jan. 1856. But the faculty of giving the blessing in the article of death also to the dying persons of the family of the hospitals is had from the same Pope Pius IX, Rescript of 11 Feb. 1851.

5. In suffrage of the souls of the deceased in the hospitals, there are privileged the altar of the Most Holy Crucified in the cemetery of S. Spirito, and any other altar existing in the wards and chapels of the hospitals dependent on the Commission.⁶

⁶ Rescript of the Supreme Pontiff Pius IX, 11 March 1851.

“If there were in all the regenerate such gratitude toward God that they constantly preserved the justice received in Baptism through His beneficence and grace, there would have been no need for another sacrament, distinct from Baptism itself, to be instituted for the remission of sins. But because God, rich in mercy, knew our frame, He also bestowed a remedy of life upon those who afterward had delivered themselves into the servitude of sin and the power of the devil, namely, the Sacrament of Penance, by which the benefit of the death of Christ is applied to those who have fallen after Baptism. Penance was indeed at all times necessary for attaining grace and justice for all men who had defiled themselves with any mortal sin, even for those who sought to be washed by the Sacrament of Baptism, so that, their perversity having been cast away and amended, they might detest so great an offense against God with hatred of sin and pious sorrow of soul. Whence the prophet says: Be converted and do penance for all your iniquities; and iniquity shall not be your ruin. “The Lord also said: Unless you do penance, you shall all likewise perish. And Peter, the prince of the Apostles, commending penance to sinners about to be initiated by Baptism, said: Do penance, and let every one of you be baptized. Moreover, neither before the advent of Christ was penance a sacrament, nor is it, after His advent, for anyone before Baptism. But the Lord principally instituted the Sacrament of Penance when, raised from the dead, He breathed upon His disciples, saying: Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained. By this signal act and these words so clear, the universal consensus of the Fathers has always understood that the power of forgiving and retaining sins, for reconciling the faithful who have fallen after Baptism, was communicated to the Apostles and their legitimate successors. And with great reason the Catholic Church rejected and condemned as heretics the Novatians, who of old obstinately denied the power of forgiveness. Therefore, approving and receiving this most true meaning of those words of the Lord, this holy Synod condemns the fictitious interpretations of those who falsely distort those words, contrary to the institution of this sacrament, to mean the authority of preaching the word of God and announcing the Gospel of Christ.

“Furthermore, this sacrament is known to differ from Baptism in many respects; for besides the fact that it is most widely different in matter and form, by which the essence of a sacrament is constituted, it is certainly established that the minister of Baptism need not be a judge, since the Church exercises judgment over no one who has not first entered her through the gate of Baptism. For what have I to do, says the Apostle, with judging those who are without? It is otherwise with the household of the faith, whom Christ the Lord once made members of His Body by the laver of Baptism; for if afterward they have defiled themselves with any crime, He willed that they should not now be cleansed by a repeated Baptism, since that is in no way lawful in the Catholic Church, but should stand before this tribunal as guilty persons, so that by the sentence of priests they might be freed, not once, but as often as they should flee to Him in penance for sins committed. Moreover, the fruit of Baptism is one thing, and that of Penance another; for by Baptism, putting on Christ, we are made in Him an altogether new creature, obtaining the full and entire remission of all sins. Yet by the Sacrament of Penance we can by no means arrive at this newness and integrity without great weeping and labors on our part, divine justice requiring it; so that Penance has deservedly been called by the holy Fathers a certain laborious Baptism. But this Sacrament of Penance is necessary for salvation for those who have fallen after Baptism, as Baptism itself is for those not yet regenerated.

“The holy Synod furthermore teaches that the form of the Sacrament of Penance, in which its force principally consists, is placed in these words of the minister: I absolve you, etc.; to which, according to the custom of holy Church, certain prayers are laudably joined, but they in no way pertain to the essence of the form itself, nor are they necessary for the administration of the sacrament itself. The acts of the penitent himself—namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction—are, as it were, the matter of this sacrament. Insofar as these are required in the penitent, by divine institution, for the integrity of the sacrament and for the full and perfect remission of sins, they are for this reason called the parts of Penance. But the reality and effect of this sacrament, so far as concerns its force and efficacy, is reconciliation “with God, which in pious men who receive this sacrament with devotion is sometimes wont to be followed by peace and serenity of conscience, with vehement consolation of spirit. In delivering these teachings concerning the parts and effect of this sacrament, the holy Synod at the same time condemns the opinions of those who contend that terrors struck into the conscience and faith are the parts of Penance.

“Contrition, which holds the first place among the aforesaid acts of the penitent, is sorrow of soul and detestation for sin committed, together with a resolution not to sin thereafter. This movement of contrition was at all times necessary for obtaining the pardon of sins; and in a man who has fallen after Baptism it finally prepares for the remission of sins if it is joined with confidence in the divine mercy and with the desire of performing the other things required for duly receiving this sacrament. The holy Synod therefore declares that this contrition contains not only cessation from sin and the resolution and beginning of a new life, but also hatred of the old life, according to the saying: Cast away from you all your transgressions by which you have transgressed, and make yourselves a new heart and a new spirit. And certainly, he who has considered those cries of the Saints: Against You only have I sinned, and I have done evil before You; I have labored in my groaning; every night I will wash my bed; I will recount to You all my years in the bitterness of my soul; and others of this kind, will easily understand that they flowed from a certain vehement hatred of the former life and an immense detestation of sins. It teaches furthermore that, although it sometimes happens that this contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles man to God before this sacrament is actually received, nevertheless the reconciliation itself is not to be ascribed to the contrition apart from the desire of the sacrament, which is included in it. But that imperfect contrition which is called attrition, because it is commonly conceived either from consideration of the turpitude of sin or from fear of hell and punishments, if it excludes the will to sin and is joined with the hope of pardon, it declares not only does not make a man a hypocrite and a greater sinner, but is even a gift of God and an impulse of the Holy Spirit—not indeed as yet dwelling within, but only moving—by which the penitent, assisted, prepares a way for himself to justice. And although by itself, without the Sacrament of Penance, it cannot lead the sinner to justification, nevertheless it disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the Sacrament of Penance. For the Ninevites, profitably struck by this fear, did penance full of terrors at the preaching of Jonah and obtained mercy from the Lord. Therefore certain men falsely calumniate Catholic writers as though they taught that the Sacrament of Penance confers grace upon those receiving it without a good movement, which the Church of God has never taught or believed; and they also falsely teach that contrition is extorted and coerced, not free and voluntary.

“From the institution of the Sacrament of Penance already explained, the universal Church has always understood that the complete confession of sins was also instituted by the Lord and that it exists by divine law as necessary for all who have fallen after Baptism; because our Lord Jesus Christ, when about to ascend from earth to heaven, left priests as His own vicars, as presidents and judges, to whom all mortal crimes into which the faithful of Christ have fallen are to be brought, so that by the power of the keys they may pronounce the sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is established that priests could not have exercised this judgment without cognizance of the cause, “nor indeed could they have observed equity in imposing penalties, if penitents had declared their sins only in general and not rather in kind and individually. From these things it is gathered that all mortal sins of which penitents have consciousness after a diligent examination of themselves must be enumerated in confession, even if they are most secret and have been committed only against the last two precepts of the Decalogue—sins which sometimes wound the soul more grievously and are more dangerous than those committed openly. For venial sins, by which we are not excluded from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, although they are rightly and profitably declared in confession without any presumption, as the practice of pious men demonstrates, nevertheless can be withheld without fault and expiated by many other remedies. But since all mortal sins, even those of thought, render men children of wrath and enemies of God, it is necessary to seek pardon for all of them from God by an open and modest confession. Therefore, while the faithful of Christ strive to confess all sins which occur to their memory, without doubt they expose them all to be pardoned by the divine mercy; but those who act otherwise and knowingly retain some sins propose nothing to the divine goodness to be forgiven through the priest; for if the sick man is ashamed to uncover his wound to the physician, the medicine does not heal what it does not know. It is gathered furthermore that those circumstances which change the species of a sin must also be explained in confession, because without them the sins themselves are neither fully set forth by the penitents nor known to the judges, and it cannot come about that they are able rightly to judge the gravity of the crimes and impose upon the penitents the penalty that is fitting for them. Hence it is foreign to reason to teach that these circumstances were devised by idle men, or that only one circumstance is to be confessed, namely, that one has sinned against his brother. But it is also impious to say that confession, which is enjoined to be made in this manner, is impossible, or to call it a torture-house of consciences; for it is established that nothing else is required of penitents in the Church than that, after each has examined himself more diligently and explored all the folds and recesses of his conscience, he confess those sins by which he remembers having mortally offended his Lord and God; while the other sins which do not occur to one who thinks diligently are understood to be included generally in the same confession. For these we say faithfully with the prophet: From my hidden sins cleanse me, O Lord. The difficulty of confession of this kind and the shame of uncovering sins could indeed appear grave, were it not lightened by the so many and so great advantages and consolations which are most certainly conferred through absolution upon all who worthily approach this sacrament. Furthermore, as regards the manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone, although Christ did not forbid that anyone, for the vindication of his crimes and his own humiliation, and both as an example to others and for the edification of the offended Church, might be able to confess his offenses publicly, nevertheless this was not commanded by divine precept, nor would it be sufficiently prudent to command by any human law that offenses, especially secret ones, be disclosed by public confession. Hence, since secret sacramental confession, which holy Church has used from the beginning and now also uses, has always been commended by the holiest and most ancient Fathers with great and unanimous consent, the empty calumny of those who do not shrink from teaching that it is foreign to the divine command, is a human invention, and had its beginning from the Fathers assembled at the Lateran Council, is manifestly refuted. For through the Lateran Council “the Church did not establish that the faithful of Christ should confess, which she understood to be necessary and instituted by divine law, but that the precept of confession should be fulfilled at least once a year by each and all when they had arrived at the years of discretion. Whence throughout the universal Church, with great fruit for the souls of the faithful, that salutary custom of confessing during the sacred and most acceptable time of Lent is now observed; which custom this holy Synod greatly approves and embraces as pious and deservedly to be retained.

“Concerning the minister of this sacrament, the holy Synod declares that all doctrines which perniciously extend the ministry of the keys to any other men besides bishops and priests are false and wholly foreign to the truth of the Gospel; for they suppose that those words of the Lord: Whatever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven; and: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained, were spoken indifferently and indiscriminately to all the faithful of Christ, contrary to the institution of this sacrament, in such a manner that anyone should have the power of forgiving sins—public sins, indeed, through correction, if the person corrected acquiesces; but secret sins through a spontaneous confession made to anyone whatsoever. It also teaches that even priests who are held by mortal sin exercise the function of forgiving sins as ministers of Christ, through the virtue of the Holy Spirit conferred in ordination; and that those who contend that this power does not exist in bad priests hold an evil opinion. But although the absolution of the priest is a dispensation of another’s beneficence, nevertheless it is not merely the bare ministry either of announcing the Gospel or of declaring that sins have been forgiven, but is after the manner of a judicial act, by which sentence is pronounced by him as by a judge. And therefore the penitent ought not so to flatter himself concerning his own faith that, even if no contrition is present in him, or the priest lacks the intention of acting seriously and truly absolving, he should nevertheless think himself, by reason of his faith alone, truly absolved before God; for faith without penance would effect no remission of sins. Nor would he be anything other than most negligent of his salvation who knew that a priest was absolving him in jest and did not diligently seek another who would act seriously.

“Since, therefore, the nature and character of judgment demand that sentence be passed only upon subjects, it has always been held as certain in the Church of God, and this Synod confirms it as most true, that an absolution pronounced by a priest upon one over whom he has neither ordinary nor subdelegated jurisdiction must be of no effect. But it appeared to our most holy Fathers to pertain greatly to the discipline of the Christian people that certain more atrocious and graver crimes should be absolved not by just any priests, but only by the highest priests. Hence the Supreme Pontiffs, by reason of the supreme power handed down to them in the universal Church, were rightly able to reserve certain graver causes of crimes to their own peculiar judgment. Nor is it to be doubted—since all things that are from God are well ordered—that the same is lawful to all bishops, each in his own diocese, for edification, however, and not for destruction, by the authority handed down to them over their subjects above the other inferior priests, especially as regards those crimes to which the censure of excommunication is annexed. It is consonant with divine authority that this reservation of offenses have force not only in the external polity, but also before God. Nevertheless, lest anyone perish through this very occasion, it has always been most piously observed in the same Church of God that there be no reservation at the point of death; “and therefore all priests can absolve any penitents from any sins and censures. Outside this point, since priests can do nothing in reserved cases, they should strive only to persuade penitents to approach their superiors and legitimate judges for the benefit of absolution.

“Finally, as regards satisfaction—which, of all the parts of Penance, just as it has been commended to the Christian people by our Fathers throughout all time, is also the one especially assailed in our age, under the supreme pretext of piety, by those who have an appearance of piety but have denied its power—the holy Synod declares it altogether false and foreign to the word of God that guilt is never forgiven by the Lord without the whole punishment also being remitted. For clear and illustrious examples are found in Sacred Scripture, by which, besides divine tradition, this error is most manifestly refuted. Indeed, the nature of divine justice seems to demand that those who sinned through ignorance before Baptism be received into grace by Him in one manner, but in another manner those who, once freed from sins and the servitude of the devil and having received the gift of the Holy Spirit, did not fear knowingly to violate the temple of God and grieve the Holy Spirit. And it befits the divine clemency that sins not be remitted to us without any satisfaction in such a manner that, seizing the occasion and thinking sins lighter, we should, as injurious and insulting toward the Holy Spirit, fall into graver ones, treasuring up wrath for ourselves on the day of wrath. For without doubt these satisfactory punishments greatly recall men from sin and restrain them as by a certain bridle, and make penitents more cautious and vigilant for the future. They also heal the remnants of sins and remove vicious habits acquired by living badly through contrary acts of the virtues. Nor was any way ever deemed safer in the Church of God for averting the punishment impending from the Lord than that men should frequently perform these works of Penance with true sorrow of soul. Added to these things is that, while by making satisfaction we suffer for sins, we are made conformable to Christ Jesus, who made satisfaction for our sins, from whom is all our sufficiency; and from this also we have a most certain pledge that, if we suffer with Him, we shall also be glorified with Him. Nor is this satisfaction which we discharge for our sins ours in such a way that it is not through Christ Jesus; for we who of ourselves, as of ourselves, can do nothing, with Him who strengthens us cooperating, can do all things. Thus man has nothing from which to glory; but all our glorying is in Christ, in whom we live, in whom we merit, in whom we make satisfaction, bringing forth fruits worthy of Penance, which have their force from Him, are offered by Him to the Father, and through Him are accepted by the Father. Therefore the priests of the Lord, insofar as spirit and prudence shall suggest, ought to impose salutary and fitting satisfactions according to the quality of the crimes and the capacity of the penitents, lest perhaps, if they connive at sins and deal too indulgently with penitents by imposing certain very light works for very grave offenses, they become participants in the sins of others. But they are to keep before their eyes that the satisfaction which they impose is not only for the safeguarding of a new life and as a medicine for infirmity, but also for the vindication and chastisement of past sins; for the ancient Fathers also believe and teach that the keys of the priests were granted not only for loosing, but also for binding. Nor did they on that account consider

“the Sacrament of Penance to be a tribunal of wrath or punishments, just as no Catholic ever thought that, through satisfactions of this kind on our part, the force of the merit and satisfaction of our Lord Jesus Christ is either obscured or in any part diminished. Since the innovators are unwilling to understand this, they teach that the best Penance is a new life in such a way that they take away all the force and use of satisfaction.

“It teaches furthermore that so great is the bounty of the divine munificence that we are able to make satisfaction before God the Father through Christ Jesus not only by punishments voluntarily undertaken by us for the vindication of sin, or imposed at the discretion of the priest according to the measure of the offense, but also—and this is the greatest proof of love—by temporal scourges inflicted by God and patiently borne by us.

“Canon 1. If anyone says that in the Catholic Church Penance is not truly and properly a sacrament instituted by Christ our Lord for reconciling to God the faithful as often as they fall into sins after Baptism: let him be anathema.

“Canon 2. If anyone, confounding the sacraments, says that Baptism itself is the Sacrament of Penance, as though these two sacraments were not distinct, and that therefore Penance is not rightly called the second plank after shipwreck: let him be anathema.

“Canon 3. If anyone says that those words of the Lord Savior, Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained, are not to be understood of the power of forgiving and retaining sins in the Sacrament of Penance, as the Catholic Church has always understood them from the beginning, but distorts them, contrary to the institution of this sacrament, to mean the authority of preaching the Gospel: let him be anathema.

“Canon 4. If anyone denies that for the complete and perfect remission of sins there are required three acts in the penitent, as it were the matter of the Sacrament of Penance—namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction—which are called the three parts of Penance; or says that there are only two parts of Penance, namely, terrors struck into the conscience after sin has been recognized, and faith conceived from the Gospel or from absolution, by which one believes that sins have been forgiven him through Christ: let him be anathema.

“Canon 5. If anyone says that the contrition which is prepared by the examination, collection, and detestation of sins, whereby one reflects upon his years in the bitterness of his soul, pondering the gravity, multitude, and foulness of his sins, the loss of eternal beatitude and the incurring of eternal damnation, with a resolution of a better life, is not true and profitable sorrow, nor prepares for grace, but makes man a hypocrite and a greater sinner; and finally, that it is a coerced sorrow and not free and voluntary: let him be anathema.

“Canon 6. If anyone denies that sacramental confession was either instituted or is necessary for salvation by divine law; or says that the manner of confessing secretly to a priest alone, which the Catholic Church has always observed and observes from the beginning, is foreign to the institution and command of Christ and is a human invention: let him be anathema.

“Canon 7. If anyone says that in the Sacrament of Penance it is not necessary by divine law, for the remission of sins, to confess each and all mortal sins of which memory is had after due and diligent reflection, even secret sins and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of a sin; but says that this confession is useful only for instructing and “consoling the penitent, and that of old it was observed only for imposing canonical satisfaction; or says that those who strive to confess all sins wish to leave nothing to the divine mercy to pardon; or, finally, that it is not lawful to confess venial sins: let him be anathema.

“Canon 8. If anyone says that the confession of all sins, such as the Church observes, is impossible and is a human tradition to be abolished by the pious; or that each and all of the faithful of Christ of either sex are not bound to it once a year, according to the Constitution of the great Lateran Council, and that for this reason the faithful of Christ are to be advised not to confess during the time of Lent: let him be anathema.

“Canon 9. If anyone says that the sacramental absolution of the priest is not a judicial act, but a bare ministry of pronouncing and declaring that sins are forgiven to the one confessing, provided only that he believes himself to be absolved; or if the priest absolves not seriously but in jest; or says that the confession of the penitent is not required in order that the priest may absolve him: let him be anathema.

“Canon 10. If anyone says that priests who are in mortal sin do not have the power of binding and loosing; or that priests alone are not the ministers of absolution, but that it was said to each and all the faithful of Christ: Whatever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven; and: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained; by virtue of which words anyone can absolve sins—public sins, indeed, through correction alone, if the person corrected acquiesces; but secret sins through a spontaneous confession: let him be anathema.

“Canon 11. If anyone says that bishops do not have the right of reserving cases to themselves except with regard to the external polity, and that therefore the reservation of cases does not prevent a priest from truly absolving from reserved cases: let him be anathema.

“Canon 12. If anyone says that the whole punishment is always remitted by God together with the guilt, and that the satisfaction of penitents is nothing other than faith by which they apprehend that Christ made satisfaction for them: let him be anathema.

“Canon 13. If anyone says that satisfaction is by no means made to God through the merits of Christ for sins, as regards the temporal punishment, by punishments inflicted by Him and patiently borne, or imposed by a priest, nor even by those voluntarily undertaken, such as fastings, prayers, alms, or also other works of piety, and that therefore the best Penance is only a new life: let him be anathema.

“Canon 14. If anyone says that the satisfactions by which penitents redeem their sins through Christ Jesus are not worship of God, but traditions of men which obscure the doctrine of grace, the true worship of God, and the very benefit of the death of Christ: let him be anathema.

“Canon 15. If anyone says that the keys were given to the Church only for loosing and not also for binding, and therefore that priests, when they impose punishments upon those confessing, act contrary to the purpose of the keys and contrary to the institution of Christ; and that it is a fiction that, by the power of the keys, after the eternal punishment has been removed, a temporal punishment for the most part remains to be discharged: let him be anathema.”

“7. Most true is the proverb, and more excellent than every doctrine thus far given concerning contritions: not to do so thereafter is the highest Penance; the best Penance is a new life.” Proposition of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

“14. A good man ought so to conform his will to the divine will that he himself wills whatever God wills, and says: Because God wills in some manner that I sinned, I would not will not to have committed the sins. He added that this was true Penance. “15. If a man had committed a thousand mortal sins, if he were rightly disposed, he ought not to will that he had not committed them.” Propositions of Eckhart condemned by John XXII.

“1. Mortal sins, as regards guilt and the punishment of the next world, are blotted out by contrition of heart alone without relation to the keys.” Proposition of the Master of Osma condemned by Sixtus IV.

“3. The Sacrament of Penance, as regards the conferral of sacramental grace, is of nature, not of any institution of the Old or New Testament.” Proposition of Master Peter of Osma condemned by Sixtus IV.

“5. That there are three parts of Penance—contrition, confession, and satisfaction—is not founded in Sacred Scripture or in the ancient holy Christian Doctors.” Proposition of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

“11. Sins omitted or forgotten in confession because of an imminent danger of life or for another cause need not be expressed by us in a subsequent confession.” Proposition condemned by Alexander VII.

“39. The declaration of the Synod concerning the confession of venial sins, which it says it wishes not to be practiced so frequently, lest confessions of this kind be rendered too contemptible: Rash, pernicious, and contrary to the practice of the Saints and the pious approved by the Sacred Council of Trent.” Proposition of the Synod of Pistoia condemned by Pius VI.

“8. In no way presume to confess venial sins, nor even all mortal sins, because it is impossible for you to know all mortal sins. Hence the primitive Church confessed only manifest mortal sins.” Proposition of Martin Luther condemned by Leo X.

“Can catechumens confess sacramentally before they are baptized, whether absolutely or conditionally?—Response. As regards confession before Baptism to be conferred absolutely: Negative. But if the catechumen nevertheless wishes to confess, he is to be instructed that this can in no way be regarded under the aspect of a sacrament, since absolution cannot be imparted, nor is the missionary bound to observe secrecy. But if it concerns those who must be baptized conditionally, then, for the greater facility of the ecclesiastical function, they can first be heard sacramentally as regards the accusation of their faults; then, after the conferral of Baptism under condition, the confessor, having again reviewed with the penitent under principal headings those things of which he has already made accusation, is to absolve him sacramentally, likewise under condition.” Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office, 2 December 1874.

“Most Blessed Father: Among the decrees of the First Provincial Synod of Westminster, chapter 16, no. 8, where the abjuration of adult Protestants and Baptism to be conferred upon them under condition are discussed, this is added: ‘Sacramental confession also is always to be required in such a case.’ In the annotations which Father Ballerini added to the Roman edition of Father Gury’s moral theology, this confession is said to be more conformable to the Instruction issued by the Supreme Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office concerning the manner of reconciling heretics, from which Instruction it is deduced that a complete confession of sins is opportune. In the text of Father Gury it is held that it is to be advised in practice.

“But since this author, both in his theology and in the cases of conscience, cited the opinion of other authors who teach that, because there exists a doubt concerning the first Baptism received by new converts in infancy—so that, if that was null, the true reception of Baptism is that which is bestowed conditionally on the occasion of the abjuration—the obligation of confessing sins completely before this conditional Baptism is doubtful, some confessors in England, following those authors, judged a doubtful obligation of complete confession to be no obligation; and because of the reluctance of converts to make it and because of the danger of an incomplete or even sacrilegious confession, they deemed it altogether expedient that converts set forth only some sins to the confessor, so that they might obtain from him the benefit of sacramental absolution, should there perhaps be need of it.

“On the other hand, there is the constant practice of the greater part of the confessors of the kingdom, both before and after the approval of the Provincial Council, not only advising but also requiring complete confession. There is the difficulty of converts bringing their understanding into captivity unto the obedience of the faith except through humility and submission of soul, which Christ the Lord deigned to place in the Sacrament of Penance. There is also the impossibility of knowing, except through a complete manifestation of sins, whether the new convert is duly disposed for Baptism itself, and whether, for example, he is willing to make restitution of reputation or goods (if he should happen to be bound to it), to avoid the proximate occasion of sin, and to withdraw from a marriage contracted invalidly, even if it cannot be sanated through a dispensation of the Holy See—as in the daily more frequent cases of a marriage contracted after civil divorce. There is, moreover, the necessity of providing for his salvation through justification in the Sacrament of Penance, from the integrity of which no one once baptized in infancy can be exempted, especially in view of the diligence of the younger members of the English clergy in faithfully observing the rite of baptizing, and hence in view of the greater number of those concerning the validity of whose infant Baptism it is not lawful to doubt.

“But since it is certain that after several years the obligation of complete confession will entirely lose its force if theologians are able in practice to follow as safe the opinion of the aforesaid authors, the Archbishop of Westminster and the bishops of England earnestly request that Your Holiness, in your benevolence toward the missions of England, deign to declare the mind of the Church concerning this most grave question:

“Whether, according to the decree of the Provincial Synod approved by the Holy See, sacramental confession must be required from new converts in England, and whether it must be complete?”

“Response. Affirmative; and the Decree issued on Thursday, 17 June 1715, is to be given.” Holy Office, 17 December 1868.

1. Germana, an old woman, confesses thus: Father, she says, I performed the penance imposed on me; I faithfully recited morning and evening prayers; each day I also recited the rosary and attended Mass. Yet I have committed many imperfections, not obeying divine inspirations; perhaps I also had distractions in reciting prayers, but I do not know; I also sometimes had evil thoughts against the charity of neighbor; but I rejected them. I confess that we are all sinners, born in sin from Adam, and therefore I ask for absolution and penance. The confessor asks and urges Germana to declare some sin of her past life in species; but he obtains from her no other answer besides this: Father, I have already said everything; nothing remains for me to say.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Germana cannot be given the benefit of absolution from the preceding confession, because the certain matter of the sacrament is lacking. For the distractions in reciting prayers which she accuses, she accuses only doubtfully and with an entirely negative doubt. Generally, all uncertain or doubtful sins are insufficient matter; for upon them absolution cannot be given without exposing the sacrament to the danger of nullity. Although it is indeed best to accuse oneself also of non-correspondence to divine inspirations concerning works of counsel, nevertheless this does not constitute sufficient matter of absolution, because, speaking in itself, it is not a sin not to correspond to divine inspirations concerning works of counsel, contempt of them being excluded. But the rest which Germana accuses contains no sin, but an act of virtue. Therefore Germana, since she has accused no sin, even after the insistence of the confessor, is to be dismissed with only a blessing, leave being given to her that she may approach communion. G. 378; I. M. 666, 667.

2. Justinus, distinguished for piety and fervor, frequently wishes to confess in order to obtain the benefit of absolution. But, since rather often he finds in his conscience no fault voluntarily admitted, he is accustomed to accuse himself thus: I accuse myself of all the sins by which I offended God in my past life, chiefly of sins formerly committed against chastity. If he confesses before his ordinary confessor, he says only: I accuse myself of the sins of my whole life, especially of the graver ones, which at other times I have already confessed. Indeed sometimes he says only: I accuse myself of sins committed in my whole life, and I ask for holy absolution.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. Since Justinus is free from mortal sins, his accusation is sufficient. For there is question not of necessary matter, but of free matter; and therefore he is not bound to declare sins in their lowest species. "The lowest species of each sin," says D'Annibale, n. 303, "is to be explained, and, if the lowest is lacking or has slipped away, the highest; and if this also has slipped away, the sin in general, e.g., I detracted - I sinned against justice - I sinned mortally. - Wherefore for him who does not have necessary matter, it is enough to say, I have sinned." It is useful, however, in order that the sacrament of penance may be received with greater fruit, to declare at least some sins in species. G. 381-383; I. M. 666, 673.

Hence it is clear that a penitent is to be absolved who, on account of ignorance and rudeness and natural stupidity, on account of old age and weakness of memory, has absolutely no knowledge or memory of any sin in species or in particular, and confesses that he has sinned by thoughts, words, and deeds. The confessor is then bound to supply the defect of the penitent by proposing to him some specific sins into which it may prudently be suspected that he formerly fell; e.g., do you not accuse yourself of all sins committed against God, against neighbor; against charity, against chastity, against justice; by lies, imprecations, blasphemies, etc. And if the penitent answers that he accuses himself of all, and is sorry for all, let him be absolved. For although so general and too confused an accusation does not suffice in itself, nevertheless on account of moral impotence it is sufficient. The confessor, moreover, will act very well if he helps such a person, especially if he is sick and in danger of death, to elicit not only an act of contrition, but also acts of faith, hope, and charity, before he absolves him. G. 384, 385; Elbel 15; Reuter 303.

3. Sins after doubtful baptism - Titius, a Frenchman by nation, but a Lutheran by religion, staying at Rome and very desirous of embracing the Catholic faith, approaches Caius the parish priest and opens his mind to him. Caius, from conversations had with him, seriously doubts the validity of the baptism conferred on him by a Lutheran minister. Hence he exhorts him to dispose himself both to receive baptism again under condition, and to make a general confession of his whole life. Titius promises that he will do the first, but he is very much afraid of the confession of the sins of his past life; yet he is prepared in mind duly to accuse all sins into which he may fall after baptism has without doubt been validly received. Caius indeed would wish still to insist; yet, fearing lest Titius, because of the difficulty of confession, be deterred from conversion, he judges it better to desist from his proposal.

After some days another parish priest, a friend of Caius, learning these things, rebukes him, as if he had conducted himself badly, and urges the obligation of an integral confession in Titius, especially on account of the very recent decree issued by the Congregation of the Holy Office under the date Dec. 17, 1868; after which decree he thinks that the controversy previously agitated among theologians must be held as already defined. But Caius on the contrary objects that the general controversy was not settled by a decree of this kind, since it was given for Neo-Converts in England, on account of special reasons of that region. Hence he infers that it has no force for Gaul; indeed neither is it to be applied to Catholics as regards sins not yet confessed by them, if perhaps in doubt of a preceding baptism they are to be rebaptized under condition.

It is asked: 1. Whether an integral sacramental confession is to be required from neo-converts to be rebaptized under condition? - 2. Whether confession, if it is made, is to be put before or after baptism? - 3. Whether Caius rightly interpreted the aforesaid decree?

R. to the 1st. An integral sacramental confession is indeed to be required from neo-converts in England who are to be rebaptized under condition. This is clear first from the Decree of the first Provincial Synod of Westminster, approved by the Holy See. The same, moreover, is clear from the Decree of the Holy Office of Dec. 17, 1868. But as regards other regions the matter is controverted, and the case is still under judgment. Indeed, whether in general an adult to be baptized under condition, and whether in general a heretic to be baptized under condition, must confess the things they have committed since the last confession before repeated baptism, there are still two probable opinions among the doctors, even after the praised Decree of the Holy Office. For a Decree of this kind is not general, but is a Response for Neo-Converts in England. In that Response indeed the Sacred Congregation says that a similar Decree, issued on June 17, 1715, is to be given. But even this Decree is a particular Response. Indeed, when in the Question the question was concerning a certain Charles Wipperman, a German to be rebaptized, and the question was extended and made general - for it is said in the Question, both that care be taken for the salvation of him (Wipperman), and also that equal care be taken for the salvation of the others of that sect or religion, especially if they are ignorant - the Sacred Congregation with the greatest caution replied: "that Charles Ferdinand is to be rebaptized," evidently restricting its Decision to the individual person. Whence it is that this preceding Decree most evidently is not General. There is added that His Eminence Cardinal D'Annibale, who was Assessor of the Holy Office, certainly could, by consulting the Documents of the Holy Office, know the mind of the Sacred Congregation. Now in the last Edition made by the Author himself, namely in ed. 3 of the Summula Theologiae Moralis, p. 3, n. 301, note 3, these things are found: "Must, therefore, a heretic who, having returned to the faith, is rebaptized, confess the things which he admitted since the last confession before repeated baptism? Formerly Our men denied it, because the S. U. I. formerly seemed rather to advise this than to prescribe it. But on Dec. 17, 1868, consulting with the bishops of England, it judged that confession from neo-converts in England, and that integral, is to be required. Nevertheless, as regards other regions, I still think probable what Our men previously taught; 1. because the bishops of England had reported, among other things, that the younger men of the Anglican clergy faithfully observe the rite of baptizing... that most of them are those concerning the value of whose infant baptism it is not licit to doubt, etc.; 2. because the S. U. I. very cautiously replied: From Neo-Converts in England, etc."

Prescinding from heretics and Protestants, if there is discussion of others, no obligation of confession at all has been imposed by the S. C. And thus for catechumens in the Case of doubtful baptism, the Holy Office, Jan. 27, 1892, handing on the preceding Instruction of Aug. 1, 1860, decrees that there be added to this Instruction, "that if the catechumen has been invalidly baptized, he is to be baptized absolutely; but if he has been doubtfully baptized, he is to be baptized under condition." A. S. S. vol. 29, p. 570. Nor is anything had concerning confession. And in another Resolution, Dec. 2, 1874, soon to be reported in the Response to the 2nd, it indeed indicates the order to be followed in the confession and absolution itself, if confession is made, but makes no precept of confession.

Fr. Gury, Case 424, or rather his editor, Lyons 1885, assigns these reasons for that Decree for the English: "either because where there is question of the reception of sacraments which are necessary by necessity of means, the safer course is to be followed; or because baptism once certainly conferred is in possession, although there is doubt about its value, and therefore induces the obligation of confessing sins committed after it, so long as it is not certainly proved to have been invalid." But both these reasons are weak and by no means subsisting. For salvation in the Case is altogether placed in safety; since those sins committed before the repeated baptism, if they are not remitted by the repeated baptism, are certainly remitted indirectly by sacramental absolution, when he thereafter approaches to receive the sacrament of penance. But the possession of the prior baptism is probably doubtful; otherwise baptism could not be repeated. From that doubtful possession, therefore, a certain obligation cannot be drawn. For the rest, if that possession of the preceding baptism is of such force that it imposes a certain obligation of confession, then it can by no means at the same time admit the repeated conferral of baptism. And, if baptism is repeated, since it is not repeated except while the probability of its validity stands, the sins committed before it probably are not valid matter of absolution, and therefore again no certain obligation of confession can be given. Therefore the reason of the preceding Decree is to be drawn only from particular circumstances. Hence the Holy Office answered most cautiously: for neo-converts in England, etc.; Charles Ferdinand, etc. I. M. 672; Gury, Cases, ed. Lyons, year 1868.

To the 2nd. The response to the 2nd question is had from the S. C. itself in the cited Decree of June 17, 1715, where it is said: "that Charles Ferdinand is to be rebaptized under condition, and, baptism having been conferred, he is to confess the sins of his past life, and from them he is to be absolved under condition." Therefore baptism is to be put first, and then confession is to be made, as the right order of things demands, since penance presupposes baptism. But this does not prevent it from being possible to proceed otherwise also, namely that the confession first be heard, by which perhaps someone can be better disposed for baptism itself; but afterward, after baptism has been received, the confession being resumed summarily, he can be absolved. And this is also had from another Response of the same S. C., Dec. 2, 1874. "Can catechumens confess sacramentally before they are baptized, either absolutely or conditionally? - R. As regards confession before baptism to be conferred absolutely, Negatively; but if nevertheless the catechumen wishes to confess himself, let him be instructed that this can by no means be had under the character of a sacrament, since absolution cannot be imparted, nor is the missionary bound to observe secrecy. But if there is question of those who must be baptized under condition, then, for the greater facility of the ecclesiastical function, they can first be heard sacramentally as to the accusation of their faults; then after the conferral of baptism under condition, the confessor, again resuming with the penitent by summary heads those things of which he has already made accusation, absolves sacramentally likewise under condition." - Cf. Collect. S. C. de P. F. n. 644, 955, 957.

To the 3rd. It appears from what has been said that Caius is not to be disturbed because he thought that the aforesaid Decree did not contain a general law. Nor indeed, at least on account of parity of reason, does the aforesaid Decree seem to comprehend also the Case of Titius. For that Decree treats first generally of baptized Neo-Converts in England who are to be baptized again. It treats, moreover, of baptized Neo-Converts concerning the value of whose baptism it is for the most part not licit to doubt. But the Case of Titius is a certain altogether particular Case, and the validity of his baptism is seriously doubted. But given the difficulty of confession, which Titius openly manifested, Caius seems to have acted altogether prudently by not insisting on it, namely lest from this a very grave evil follow, that Titius be deterred from conversion. Nor indeed can another Decree of the Holy Office for Charles Wipperman be urged against Caius on account of identity of case, since his baptism had truly been doubtful, as appears from the exposition itself. For first, identity of case is not had from only one or another circumstance of cases, but from the complex of all the circumstances. Moreover, if identity of case is invoked, by that very fact it is affirmed that in reality in that Response there is question of a Resolution given for a singular case, which therefore does not pertain to another singular case. Moreover the Decision of the Sacred Congregation is of counsel and economy rather than preceptive, since those words let him confess, let him be absolved do not necessarily import a precept. And this indeed pertains to the prudence by which the S. C. is accustomed to define questions. For that which can be useful in one case and in one region on account of special circumstances is perhaps not useful, indeed perhaps could even be harmful, on account of other diverse circumstances, in another case and in another different region. Whence it is that unless there is first certainty concerning the general usefulness or necessity, the Sacred Congregations are not accustomed to issue a General Decree. But to assert that all Decrees of the Sacred Congregations have general force for all persons and for every place is against the very manner of proceeding of the same Sacred Congregations, which even in the titles themselves distinguish between particular Decrees and General Decrees. How many Responses indeed have come forth from the Sacred Congregation of the Council concerning the invalidity of clandestine marriages which are contracted by heretics where the Tridentine law is in force? Whence Fr. Gury, Comp. n. 841, judged that their validity must altogether be denied. But Benedict XIV, notwithstanding all those Decisions, affirms that nothing had yet been defined by the Apostolic See in any General Decree; and that the Responses of the Sacred Congregation are referred only to certain peculiar and various circumstances, and therefore were not always mutually conformable, since they were particular. See Const. Matrimonia, Nov. 4, 1741, § 2; de Synodo, l. 6, c. 6, n. 4. Likewise, how many Responses in more recent times did not come forth from the Sacred Congregation of Bishops and Regulars against the account of conscience to be rendered? Nevertheless the prohibition was not general, nor was there one, until the General Decree Quemadmodum came forth, Dec. 17, 1890. Indeed, as the S. Congregation itself declared by letter Jan. 20, 1891, even this Decree does not comprehend all religious Orders and all religious Congregations, but institutes of men by nature and governance entirely ecclesiastical are openly excepted. Likewise, how many Responses did not come forth from the Holy Office itself and from the Sacred Penitentiary concerning the illicitness of a sentence of divorce to be pronounced by a lay judge? Yet it was also positively declared that those decisions do not contain a General Decree for every region. See Enchiridion Morale, 3rd ed., p. 149. And, to pass over other things, the Sacred Congregation of Rites also, in the most recent Collection of Decrees which at present is being published in print, expressly distinguishes between General and Particular Decrees; and among the norms of this most recent Collection this was established in the 6th place: "The new general Decrees will have the title of Decretum or Decretum Generale according to the importance of the matter. The particular ones, however, will be named Dubii, Dubiorum, Romana, etc." To assert therefore that all Decrees of the Sacred Congregations are General, insofar namely as they contain a general force of comprehending all cases and of obliging all persons, is an assertion against the very Decrees of the same Sacred Congregations.

Nor finally, to demonstrate the universality if not of the Decree, at least of the matter itself, can there be objected the Decision of the Holy Office of July 20, 1859, by which, in the conversion of heretics, if baptism is to be repeated under condition, after abjuration or profession of faith, and after conditional baptism, sacramental confession with conditional absolution is established. For first, neither is this Decree of the Holy Office a General Decree, but a Response given to the Rt. Rev. Bishop of Philadelphia. But then what is said concerning the order to be observed in the conversion of heretics, if baptism is to be repeated under condition, is not a General Decree of the Sacred Congregation, but, as is expressly said there, it is an Instruction, and pertains to the Instruction. Hence it is clear that there is not had a universal law promulgated, nor a universal precept, but only an Instruction, to be most prudently observed where it can be done. And since in reality there is no universal law of this kind, and no universal precept, especially at present one must abstain from affirming it; since the Supreme Pontiff is expending every effort to recall Protestants and heretics into the bosom of the Catholic Church. Therefore judgment concerning this most grave matter is to be left to the same Supreme Pontiff when he himself judges it opportune, lest perhaps that desired return be impeded or rendered more difficult.

When a Case of this kind was proposed in the year 1897 in the public Conference of Cases of Conscience at St. Apollinaris, the Most Eminent Cardinal Vicar of the City, and Secretary of the Holy Office, President of the Conference, with several other wise observations added, altogether approved and confirmed the preceding Resolution. - Cf. I. M. 672.

1. Contrition outside the sacrament - "Getulius, having committed a mortal sin, remained for three months in this unhappy state. At last, conscience rebuking him, he throws himself at the feet of the confessor. The confessor asks him whether immediately after the sin had been committed he elicited an act of contrition. Since he answered negatively, he is on that account accused of a new mortal sin. The spiritual father then asks whether at least within the week he had been contrite. The penitent answers that he had delayed penance up to this time. You have acted very badly, says the confessor, for thus you have multiplied mortal sins; since you have sinned gravely as many times as, attending to the state of your soul, or remembering your sin, you omitted to elicit an act of perfect contrition.

It is asked: 1. Whether there is a grave obligation of eliciting an act of contrition immediately after a grave sin has been committed? - 2. What delay induces grave sin?

R. To the 1st. Negatively, more probably, because the precept of contrition is affirmative, or is an obligation of doing penance. Therefore it does not oblige at every moment. Therefore it does not immediately urge after a sin has been committed; otherwise sins would be multiplied according to the number of moments of delay, or as often as the sinner notices the obligation of doing penance, which is contrary to the common sense of the faithful and to the practice of confessors. Lig. 437.

To the 2nd. More probably it is grave to defer an act of contrition, after sin has been committed, beyond a month, because there seems to be a grave obligation of eliciting an act of charity once in a month; but an act of charity cannot be elicited without an act of contrition. In practice, however, many, indeed most sinners, are excused from that sin of delayed penance because of ignorance or inadvertence. Lig. 437; Comp. n. 444." Thus Fr. Gury 398, 399.

But some things in this resolution are not very carefully corrected. For it is not true what is said in the response to the 1st, that if the precept of contrition immediately urged after sins had been committed, they would be multiplied according to the number of moments of delay. For if it immediately urged after a sin had been committed, it follows only that someone would then immediately sin against the precept of contrition, and afterward would persevere in that sin until he elicited that act; otherwise he who stole another's thing and retained it for a year would commit as many sins as there are moments in the year, or at least as often as, noticing the obligation of making restitution, he does not restore, which is not true. And thus Fr. Gury himself, Comp. vol. 1, n. 166, raises the question: "Whether he who long defers restitution commits several sins." And he answers: "Negatively, if he habitually perseveres in the will of retaining another's thing, because the evil will perseveres by way of something continuous with the thing unjustly retained. Nevertheless, if the unjust possessor for a notable time has forgotten that restitution is to be made, and afterward renews the wicked purpose, he will commit a new sin, because his evil will is judged morally interrupted. St. Lig., n. 40, and others commonly, against others who say that the unjust possessor of another's thing sins as often as he attends to the obligation of restoring." Cf. Lig., l. 3, n. 683; Diana, tom. 1, tr. 7, res. 157; I. M. vol. 1, 308.

Moreover, as to the response to the 2nd, the same Fr. Gury, Comp. vol. 1, n. 218, says concerning the obligation of eliciting an act of charity: "The opinion of those who require an act of charity once in a month pleases St. Liguori. Ho. Ap. n. 12. But this opinion has no solid foundation." Likewise Fr. Gury, l. c., Comp. vol. 2, n. 444, raises the question: "What delay of contrition induces grave sin?" And he answers: "Theologians do not agree: it is indeed commonly admitted that there is given a grave delay of contrition independently of the precept of annual confession; but how great this delay must be, so that it may be judged grave, cannot be determined certainly: some extend it to a year; others to six months; others with St. Liguori to a month; nevertheless no reason or authority favors this last opinion. Moreover St. Alphonsus himself adds, n. 437, that sinners, especially rude ones, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this precept of delayed penance." I. M. vol. 1, n. 381; vol. 2, n. 478.

2. Defect of contrition in the Sacrament - Angelus, accusing only venial sins in sacramental confession, conceives no sorrow for them. For he says that, in order to blot them out in sacramental confession, their confession itself suffices, which is an act of satisfaction and penance.

It is asked: Whether at least attrition is necessary for the confession of venial sins.

R. Affirmatively. The reason is that Trent absolutely declares sorrow and detestation of sin to be the principal act on the part of the penitent, which with the others constitutes as it were the matter of the sacrament of penance. Cf. La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 682; Lugo, d. 9, s. 2; Suarez, d. 11, s. 3. Therefore confession of venial sins without sorrow can indeed be of itself an act of satisfaction and penance, but not sacramental. Angelus perhaps is indeed excused by good faith, but he acts badly, for, accusing only venial sins without sorrow, he exposes the sacrament to nullity, which is grave. I. M. 685.

3. Claudinus, a good old man, being asked by the confessor how he elicits the act of contrition for sins, answers: Thus I say: I love thee, my God, above all things, because thou art supremely good; spare, my God, spare my sins. The confessor, having heard this response, indeed labors with anxiety concerning the value of this contrition. Yet, thinking it to be a scruple, he absolves Claudinus.

It is asked: 1. Whether for sacramental confession perfect charity toward God suffices in place of an act of sorrow? 2. What is to be said to the Case?

R. To the 1st. Negatively. The reason is that the Council of Trent, sess. 14, cap. 3, asserts that the acts of the penitent are as it were the matter of the sacrament of penance. But among them it by no means enumerates charity, but places contrition, which the Council of Trent itself, in the following chapter, says holds the first place among the acts of the penitent. But it says that this is sorrow or detestation for sin committed. Therefore that contrition required by the Council for penance is formal contrition, by no means merely virtual; it is an act of the virtue of penance, by no means of charity. But the contrition required for penance must be such only as is expressed and prescribed by the Council, loc. cit., where it professedly hands on Catholic doctrine concerning the sacrament of penance. Therefore.

To the 2nd. An act of charity can be understood in two ways: first, as having for its material object God to be loved, and for its formal object the absolute goodness of God; and there that act stops; nor does that formal object advance in any way so far as to excite in us detestation of sins. And thus charity does not suffice without a true and formal act of sorrow or contrition for the sacrament of penance, so as to constitute part of its quasi-matter, although it suffices for the remission of sins outside the sacrament. But if that formal object of charity moves us also to detestation of admitted sins, then there is perfect contrition, formed by charity, as the same Council of Trent speaks, l. c., cap. 4; and it is best, not only for the remission of sins outside confession, but also in sacramental confession. Now indeed such seems to have been the charity of Claudinus, if attention is paid to the act which he elicited after the formal act of charity: spare, my God, spare my sins. For these words, by imploring divine mercy and the mercy of sins, implicitly signify sorrow of soul and detestation or hatred of the sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning henceforth. It is morally impossible that someone, recalling his sins, should elicit an act of love toward God without being sorry for his sins and detesting them, insofar as they are opposed to God supremely loved. Therefore Claudinus's confessor acted rightly.

"Nevertheless in our Case," says Fr. Gury 402, "Claudinus ought to be carefully questioned by the confessor, so that the latter may know whether he really thought about sorrow for sins, or uttered a mere formula, the sense of which perhaps he did not sufficiently understand. Moreover the confessor ought to have taught the penitent about the manner of eliciting an act of contrition before confession." But these things are said rather by divining; for, as is drawn from the exposition of the Case, there is no trace in Claudinus of such alleged ignorance and negligence. From the very fact that Claudinus did not remain only in that act of charity, I love thee, my God, above all things, because thou art supremely good; but further uttered another act of sorrow and detestation of sins, Spare, my God, spare my sins, he certainly did not utter these words materially, by no means understanding them. And indeed who is so stupid that, uttering these words, he does not understand them? Certainly Claudinus is not such, who forms so perfect an act of charity, and then asks from God remission of sins. But who, asking from God remission of sins from a motive of perfect love, does not at the same time have sorrow for them and detestation of them? It is utterly repugnant seriously to implore divine mercy and forgiveness of sins at the same time, and not to be sorry for them, nor to detest them. Moreover contrition consists essentially in detestation of sin. Sorrow is its companion or effect. Roman Catechism n. 23, 24; St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85, a. 1, ad 3. The object of contrition of this kind is sin, that is, an evil action by which God is offended. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 2. How therefore does someone explicitly asking forgiveness of sins from God out of true love not at the same time detest and reprobate them? Does he not at the same time have displeasure with them? Therefore no obligation appears in the confessor, in the Case, of teaching the penitent the manner of eliciting an act of contrition, since the penitent elicits an act of contrition so perfectly. I. M. 677.

4. Motive of contrition - Albert, after making confession, is asked by the confessor by what motive he is moved to sorrow for sins. The penitent answers: I am sorry for sins, because I fear lest God, who constantly appears in Sacred Scripture indeed merciful, but also just avenger of sins, punish me in this life with miseries or with sudden death. The confessor replies: Surely, my good man, did you sorrow for sins in the same way in the past, when you approached to confess? Albert affirms it. Whence the confessor, judging those confessions to have been invalid, orders him meanwhile to depart without absolution and to prepare himself for instituting a general confession of his whole life.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. "The confessor imprudently declared that the aforesaid confessions were invalid by reason of attrition elicited from fear of temporal punishments. The reason is that such attrition is more probably valid if it was had from a supernatural motive. Although in practice it is safer to excite sorrow from the motive of punishments to be undergone after death, nevertheless after the fact, the obligation of repeating confessions is not established. Therefore the penitent is not to be obliged to undergo that burden." Thus Gury 408. Now indeed in the Case it is not to be doubted that Albert's attrition was from a supernatural motive, since the object was for him as it is apprehended by supernatural faith. And in this way attrition of this kind is brought back to attrition from fear of divine judgment begun. For although the punishments are temporal, nevertheless if they are considered as inflicted by God, they indicate to us His wrath, and in a certain way begin divine punishment, unless we amend. Under this aspect, however, they can well move to supernatural attrition, which is very well reduced to that which is from fear of hell. Suarez, d. 5, s. 2, n. 15; Lugo, d. 15, n. 137.

But although grave theologians regard attrition of this kind only as probable, nevertheless several and also grave theologians regard it as morally certain, and even as altogether certain. I. M. 687. And the distinguished Ballerini, in Gury, Comp. 452, says that the opposed reasons detract nothing from the firmness of the common doctrine, which stands for the sufficiency of such attrition, nor can they reconcile any, even slight, probability to the opposed opinion. Hence according to this common doctrine Albert would have been disturbed neither before nor after confession. But since Albert's Case regards confessions already made, and certainly the opinion affirming that the aforesaid attrition suffices for the sacrament of penance is at least probable and most probable, Albert certainly ought altogether to have been absolved by his confessor, and could by no means be obliged to institute a general confession of his whole life.

5. Precedence of contrition - Eleonora, approaching the sacrament of penance for several years, is accustomed to act thus: 1. On Saturday night she institutes an examination of conscience, and is sincerely sorry for all sins. But on Sunday, very early in the morning, she makes confession, without seeing to the eliciting of a new act of contrition, although sometimes she reveals a mortal sin which had not occurred to memory in the examination on the preceding day. 2. On a certain day, when she had fallen into a lethal sin, she at once was contrite for it, yet without ordering it to confession. After three or four hours she goes to the church to pray. But seeing the parish priest coming out of the confessional seat, she runs to meet him, and at once confesses without a new act of contrition. 3. Sometimes, after absolution has been received, she remembers some sin which had not before occurred to memory; she opens it to the confessor, and is absolved of it, without becoming contrite again.

It is asked: What is to be said to the Case?

R. "More probably the contrition of Eleonora, elicited on the day before confession, was valid, because it seems virtually to persevere, especially if it had great intensity; nor does it stand in the way that the woman had forgotten a grave sin, because that sin was implicitly contained in the general contrition for the others. Eleonora is nevertheless to be exhorted that in the future she elicit an act of contrition immediately before confession.

More probably also the contrition of Eleonora was valid, although it was not elicited in order to the sacrament. The reason is that, from Trent, that attrition is said to dispose to justification in the sacrament which excludes the will of sinning with hope of pardon. Now all these things are verified in our Case. Therefore. Moreover, although sorrow was not ordered to confession by an antecedent relation, nevertheless it is ordered by a consequent relation, in that it is still verified that sorrow is laid open through confession. Nevertheless the opposed opinion is not without its probability, and therefore in practice contrition is to be renewed before confession for greater safety. St. Lig., n. 447.

Still more probably in the third Case the contrition of the woman was valid. For it was by no means necessary to elicit a new act of contrition in order to obtain a new absolution, because the prior contrition certainly persevered, which, as universal, was extended to all sins, even those omitted from forgetfulness. Add that it is not required that contrition be explicitly ordered to the sacrament, as has been said. Moreover explicit sorrow seems to be manifested in the very act of accusing that sin. Thus commonly. But since several theologians contradict, although relying on a slight foundation, in practice the opposed opinion, as safer, is to be chosen.

411. How important this Treatise is, is evident to all, both because in necessity it surpasses the other parts of moral Theology, and because it contains, resumes, and explains their difficulties.

Without doubt, the Sacrament of regeneration is necessary, without which no one can enter into the kingdom of heaven; but of no less necessity for adults is the Sacrament by which we recover the spiritual life lost through sin. Indeed, Baptism is required only once in life, while Penance is necessary as often as a Christian man has fallen into mortal sin.

Hence Penance is rightly called by the Holy Fathers and Councils a second Baptism or the second plank after shipwreck. And indeed, what would the immense benefit of regeneration have profited most men if, after they had been stripped of the wedding garment by the most savage beast of sin, the compassionate and merciful Lord had not supplied a second or even a manifold redemption? They would surely have been delivered over to eternal death under diabolical tyranny. But the most clement God, with whom there is mercy and plenteous redemption, whose treasure of goodness is infinite and whose mercy is without number, continually extends His hand to the most wretched shipwrecked, and presents to us this second plank, by grasping which we may be saved from shipwreck again and again and without any numerical limit. It is therefore by the mercies of the Lord that we are not consumed, and we are always able to await the blessed hope. The penitential seat is therefore truly to be called a throne of grace and a tribunal of mercy.

In this Treatise especially, a certain diversity of opinions appears among Theologians. For some perhaps seem to have inclined more than is right toward rigor, but others toward benignity. We, however, faithfully following as usual the footsteps of our Leader and Teacher, St. Alphonsus de Liguori, shall endeavor, according to our measure, to walk the middle way, declining neither to the right of rigorism nor to the left of laxity ¹; mindful nevertheless of that principle of St. Antoninus, part 2, tit. 4, ch. 4: It is better to render an account to the Lord for excessive mercy than for excessive severity.

¹ You will indeed find no one who does not most firmly believe, and even wish others to be entirely persuaded, that he follows the safest and therefore the middle way between laxity and rigor. Indeed, there has not been lacking one who wished this very claim to be proclaimed on the title page of his work in capital letters, as, for example, Eusebius Amort, who prefixed this title to his moral work: D. Eusebius Amort's MORAL THEOLOGY, A MIDDLE WAY BETWEEN RIGOR AND LAXITY. And this declaration is indeed an indication of good will, which otherwise will doubtless receive its reward from divine bounty. But what else is it worth? For since the notion of rigor and laxity supposes certain boundaries from which there is a deviation either to the right or to the left, it will certainly be possible to define what is lax or rigid when, either by the authority of the Church or by some other indication, those boundaries, that is, the truth, are certainly established. But where that lamp which shows the certain way does not shine forth, where the path which alone is to be trodden as certainly the only right one is unknown, whence, I ask, do you know that these have turned aside to the right and those to the left? And while, thinking that you hold the middle, you lament that some have gone into laxity and others into rigor, could it not, on the contrary, have happened that you yourself have strayed from the right way, and consequently that one seems to you to have fallen into laxity because you have fallen into rigor, but another into rigor because you have fallen into some laxity? This one thing, therefore, seems to remain: that, each of us thinking modestly of his own judgment, we leave the office of affixing the marks of rigor or laxity to that judge whose office it is also to point out the right way by a certain judgment. But let that saying which is in the proverb be sacred to us: In doubtful things, liberty; in all things, charity; so that with great charity we permit to others that liberty which we judge should also be permitted to us, namely, that we not be called laxists when we ourselves do not admit, and do not judge should be imposed upon others, the yoke of a law or obligation which is not established by certain reason; nor again be called rigorists when we demonstrate that the force either of authority or of reason exempting from the obligation is not so firm, and therefore judge that the law must be observed.

We must treat: 1. of the essence of the Sacrament of Penance; 2. of its subject, or of the acts of the penitent; 3. of its Minister, or of the Confessor.

1. Object. The spiritual life which is conferred in Baptism, strengthened through Confirmation, and nourished in sacred Communion, can be lost through mortal sin and sometimes is lost; but it is repaired through the Sacrament of Penance, which for that reason is deservedly called the Sacrament of Reconciliation, the second plank offered to the sinner after shipwreck, and a laborious baptism, which cleanses us from sin only by arduous labors.

Penance is at once an act, a virtue, and a sacrament. Right reason shows that some act of penance is necessary after sin has been committed. For the injury inflicted upon God must be repaired; moreover, after the grave sinful act has passed, man remains turned away from the last end until he is freed from sin by penance. Therefore, even before the Sacrament of Penance had been instituted, some act of penance was required for recovering justification lost through mortal sin.¹

¹ To the point, the Council of Trent says (sess. XIV, chap. 1): "Penance was indeed necessary, at every time, for all men who had defiled themselves with any mortal sin, in order to obtain grace and justice, even for those who had asked to be washed by the Sacrament of Baptism; so that, after perversity had been cast off and amended, they might detest so great an offense against God with hatred of sin and pious sorrow of soul."

For exercising acts of penance, according to the common opinion, there is infused into the justified the virtue of penance, which inclines us to detestation and expiation of sin.

Besides this, Christ instituted a Sacrament by which, once certain acts of penance have been placed, and by means of priestly absolution, sins committed after Baptism are remitted.

2. Division. We shall treat of this Sacrament in this Treatise, with a few preliminary matters, however, concerning the virtue of penance.

There will be two parts: in the former, which is chiefly dogmatic, we shall set forth the divine institution and nature of the Sacrament of Penance; in the latter, which is moral, we shall explain the duties of the penitent and of the confessor; in an Appendix, we shall hand down a few things concerning Indulgences, by which the temporal punishment owed to sin is diminished or taken away.

Dogmatic part:

• Concerning the power of the keys granted to the Church.
• Concerning the acts of the penitent required for the exercise of this power.
• Concerning the Sacrament itself: concerning matter and form; concerning effects.

Moral part:

• Duties of the penitent: contrition; confession; satisfaction.
• Concerning the confessor: concerning his power; concerning his duties.

Appendix: concerning Indulgences.

Before we treat of the Sacrament of Penance, a few things must be noted beforehand concerning the virtue of penance: 1. concerning its notion; 2. concerning its necessity. For, even after the Sacrament has been instituted, it is necessary to exercise acts of penance both within and outside the sacred tribunal.

3. 1. Etymological notion. Penance, according to most ancient authors, is derived from the words poenam tenere, "to hold punishment," and therefore designates the act by which we undergo punishment in order to make satisfaction for sins.

¹ St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 85; Suarez, de Paenitent., disp. I and VII; Morinus, Commentar. in admin. Paenitentiae, bk. I, chs. 1-2; Billuart, diss. II; Billot, De Paenit., thesis 6; L. de San, de Paenit., P. 1, chs. 1-6; Pesch, n. 87 ff.

More truly, however, more recent authors say that penance takes its origin from poena, or penitus, and etymologically designates something inward, which affects the heart itself.¹

¹ Cf. M. Breal and A. Bailly, Dictionnaire etymol. latin, Paris, 1898, p. 240.

Among profane authors, this word especially signifies three things: (a) an interior sense of weariness or displeasure; thus in Cicero, in the book On Old Age, it is said: "If, therefore, he had lived a hundredth year, would he be weary of his old age?" (b) sorrow because of a deed previously admitted, whether good or evil: "We are accustomed to say paenitere then, when the things which we ourselves have done, or which have been done by our will and our counsel, afterwards begin to displease us, and we change our judgment concerning them";² (c) sorrow conceived concerning some crime or delict: "We see King Alexander," says Cicero,³ "who, when he had slain Clytus, his familiar friend, scarcely kept his hands from himself: so great was the force of repenting!"

² Aulus Gellius, Noct. Attic., bk. XVII, ch. 1.

³ Cicero, in IV Tuscul. quaest.

In this last sense the sacred authors very often use the word penance, inasmuch as it signifies sorrow of the soul concerning a sin committed.

4. 2. Theological notion. Penance, whose scope is to repair the injury inflicted upon God through sin, is defined: a supernatural and moral virtue inclining the sinner to detestation of his own sin, insofar as it is an offense against God, and to a firm purpose of amendment and satisfaction.

In this definition four things are chiefly included: the nature, object, acts, and subject of this virtue.

(A) The nature of penance, which is: (a) a supernatural virtue. Speculatively and in itself there could be a natural habit of penance, acquired by repeated acts; but in fact penance in Christians must be supernatural. For they have been raised to a supernatural state, and therefore they can repent as they ought only under the influence of actual grace and from a supernatural motive known by revelation. Indeed, according to the more common opinion, this virtue is supernaturally infused, together with the other virtues, at the very instant at which the soul is justified.

(b) And moral, not theological: for it is not immediately concerned with God, nor is it founded upon one of the divine attributes; but it is concerned with sin insofar as it is amendable, and its motive is the honesty of expiation or satisfaction to be shown to God who has been offended.

(B) The object is twofold: (a) the material object, or that concerning which penance is concerned, is any personal sin whatever, insofar as it violates divine right and therefore must be destroyed and repaired by suitable satisfaction. Hence there is no penance properly so called concerning original sin, nor concerning the sins of others; for that alone can properly be retracted which was committed by one's own will. But penance taken broadly, insofar as it is hatred and detestation of sin, can be concerned with the sins of others, since we are bound to pursue them with hatred. In this sense Christ was penitent, insofar as He hated our sins and made satisfaction for them.

(b) The formal object or motive of this virtue is the honesty which is found in repairing an offense inflicted upon God. This is the special or proper motive, so to speak, of penance. Nevertheless, an act of detestation of sin can arise from other motives: of charity, gratitude, hope, fear of God, etc., because sin is opposed to these various virtues.

(C) The proper acts of penance are detestation and sorrow for sin committed, the purpose of not sinning thereafter, and satisfaction, or at least the will of making satisfaction.¹ In a broader sense, all those acts by which sin is repaired can be called acts of penance, for example prayer, fasting, self-denial, and other acts of the virtues, insofar as they are orderable to making satisfaction for sin.

¹ The genesis of these acts can be understood thus: when first the sinner apprehends the sin committed as evil, the will abominates and detests it, because it is evil; then he notices that this evil is present to himself, in itself or in its effects, and he grieves over it; but he cannot sincerely grieve over sin unless he firmly wills to avoid it in the future; and furthermore, since the past evil must be repaired, there now arises spontaneously the will of making satisfaction, as is explained below.

(D) The remote subject of penance is any man guilty of sin or capable of sin; for the act of penance properly so called indeed presupposes an act of sin, but the habit by which a man is rendered prompt for grieving over his own sin can be found in all who are capable of sin, since they ought to be prompt for grieving over sin, if perhaps it has been committed.

The proximate subject is the will, because hatred of sin is an act by which the will is turned away from sin; but this act of the will presupposes previous cognition by the intellect, by which sin is apprehended as evil; furthermore it often flows into the sensitive appetite, causing there sensible sorrow or sadness; but the will remains the proper seat of penance.

5. 3. Controversy concerning the nature of this virtue. (A) All theologians concede that penance is a virtue, but some have denied that it is a special virtue. A few, such as William of Auxerre and F. Mayronius, taught that sins are detested not through a special virtue, but through the virtue to which they are opposed; for example, intemperance is detested through the virtue of temperance. Others, such as Durandus, said that penance is nothing other than charity, insofar as it grieves over sin as an offense against God. Some, after Cajetan, maintained that penance is a complex of three virtues: charity, which hates sin; religion, which by confessing sins acknowledges the dominion of God; and vindicative justice, which furnishes satisfaction.

(B) Nevertheless, theologians commonly teach, after St. Thomas, that penance is a special virtue. For there is a special virtue where there occurs a praiseworthy act elicited because of a special motive or formal object; but the act of repenting is certainly a praiseworthy act, since it tends toward the destruction of past sin, and it is elicited because of a special motive, namely because sin is an offense against God. For this motive extends itself to all sins and differs from the motive of other virtues, and therefore it is a special motive. Therefore penance is a special virtue.

This virtue, moreover, is referred to commutative justice, not indeed as a subjective part, but as a potential part;¹ for through it the sinner in some way repairs the injustice committed against God, not indeed according to perfect equality, but in the best way possible. St. Thomas explains this thus (3, q. 85, a. 3): "Justice simply so called is between equals, because justice is a certain equality... But justice in a certain respect is said to be that which exists between those of whom one is under the power of the other, as a servant under a master, a son under a father, a wife under a husband. And such justice is considered in penance. Hence the penitent has recourse to God with the purpose of amendment, as a servant to a master, according to that:¹ 'As the eyes of servants are on the hands of their masters, so are our eyes unto the Lord our God, until he have mercy on us'; and as a son to a father, according to that:² 'Father, I have sinned against heaven and before thee'; as a wife to a husband, according to that:³ 'Thou hast committed fornication with many lovers; nevertheless return to me, saith the Lord.'"

¹ The subjective parts of some virtue are, as it were, the species into which it is divided, or the parts which fully participate in the nature of that virtue; potential or annexed parts are those which are ordered to certain secondary acts and do not have the whole nature of this virtue, but only something of its perfection. But although penance is a certain species of justice, it participates in something of the other virtues, as is excellently declared by St. Thomas (q. 85, a. 3, ad 4): "Penance is with faith in the Passion of Christ, through which we are justified from sins, and with hope of pardon, and with hatred of vices, which pertains to charity. But insofar as it is a moral virtue, it participates in something of prudence, which is directive of all virtues; but from the very notion of justice, it has not only that which belongs to justice, but also those things which belong to temperance and fortitude, insofar as, namely, it abstains from those things which cause delight, which pertains to temperance, and bears hard things, which pertains to fortitude."

¹ Psalm 122:2.

² Luke 15:21.

³ Jeremiah 3:1.

6. 4. False notion of the Protestants. (A) It is set forth. This flows from the way in which they conceive sin and justification. Since man, according to Luther, sins necessarily, penance properly does not consist in a change of will, which remains evil, but in a change of feeling (sentiment) in relation to God; namely, the feeling of terror, struck into him once sin has been recognized, is changed into faith or confidence by which one believes that sins are forgiven to him on account of Christ, and thus he is justified.

Calvin, however, corrected this notion, asserting that penance is the beginning of a new life arising from confidence, or "a true conversion of our life to God, proceeding from a sincere and serious fear of God, which consists in the mortification of our flesh and of the old man and in the vivification of the spirit."⁴

⁴ Calvin, Institutes, bk. III, ch. 3, n. 4.

Both contend that no satisfaction must be paid to God, since Christ has abundantly made satisfaction for us.

Modern Protestants, however, coming nearer to the Catholic truth, admit that the beginning of a new life is a prior condition for justification, and that true penance embraces humble confession of the delict before God, horror of the sin committed, and amendment of life.¹

¹ Cf. Bovon, Morale chretienne, Lausanne, 1897, vol. I, pp. 224-237.

7. (B) The Lutherans are refuted. Genuine and salutary penance is not only the purpose of a new life, but also the detestation of sins committed. This is certain.

(a) For whatever may be said concerning the etymological meaning of the words paenitentia or metanoia,² it is certain from biblical usage that words of this kind signify not only a simple change of counsel, but also detestation of the past life. Thus, for example, pious Job said: "I have spoken unwisely... therefore I reprehend myself, and do penance in dust and ashes";³ again the Psalmist says: "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humbled heart, O God, thou wilt not despise";⁴ nor do the Prophets speak otherwise: "Be converted, and do penance for all your iniquities... and make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit."⁵ Now in these and similar texts, besides a change of life, there is found detestation of sin; for what is it to reprehend oneself, to have a contrite heart, to do penance for sins, etc., if not to detest the past life? Moreover, St. Paul, addressing the penitent Corinthians, explicitly commemorates sadness as an element of true penance:⁶ "Now I rejoice, not because you were made sorrowful, but because you were made sorrowful unto penance... For the sorrow that is according to God works penance unto steadfast salvation."

² The word metanoia (meta, beyond or after; nous, mind) etymologically has the same sound as "trans-mentation," or change of mind; but from usage among both sacred and profane authors, it also signifies sadness and sorrow concerning the past, as is clear from lexicons even edited by Protestants, Schleusner, Robinson, Thayer, etc. Cf. Morinus, op. cit., bk. I, ch. 2. The same can be said of the word paenitentia; for from what was said above, this word sometimes signifies displeasure; this is confirmed from these verses of Ovid (bk. I de Ponto, Elegy I): "I repent: oh! if any trust is given to the wretched; I repent, and I myself am tormented by my deed."

³ Job 42:3-6.

⁴ Ps. 50:19.

⁵ Ezek. 18:30 ff.

⁶ 2 Cor. 7:9-10.

(b) Reason itself agrees: for he who comes to his senses, and changes his life for the better recalls his counsel for this reason: because he understands that the former life is evil; for why would he lead a new life unless he saw that the former one was contrary to equity? But just as we are bound to love the good, so also to hate evil, especially if it has been committed by us. Therefore penance imports detestation of sin. Moreover, reconciliation with an offended person requires more than cessation of the injury; for one who asks pardon from men must first manifest detestation and sorrow for the injury previously inflicted, so that, moved by this sorrow, the offended person may be willing to pardon the injury. In the same way, therefore, the sinner must conduct himself with God.

8. 1. State of the question. The question concerns fallen man, or the sinner, and concerns both the necessity of means and the necessity of precept. That is necessary by necessity of means which is a means, and indeed a necessary means, of justification and therefore of salvation, without which, consequently, even if it is inculpably omitted, salvation cannot be obtained. That is necessary by necessity of precept which is so prescribed that its omission, if culpable, is a sin, but if inculpable, does not harm salvation. (a) Now all Catholics teach that penance in general, that is, some detestation and retraction of sin, is necessary by necessity of means, once mortal sin has been posited; the controversy is only whether a formal act of penance is required, or whether a virtual act suffices, such as is contained in an act of perfect charity. The Scotists maintain that a virtual act of penance suffices; many Thomists think that a formal act is required. Suarez, however, distinguishes, saying that a formal act is required per se when someone thinks of his sins, but that remission of sin can per accidens be obtained by a virtual act of penance when, through forgetfulness or lack of consideration, someone does not think of his sins. We embrace this opinion as the more probable.

¹ St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 86, a. 2; Suarez, disp. IX and XV; Salmanticenses, disp. IV, dub. 2; disp. V, dub. 6; Drouin, q. I, ch. 3; Palmieri, thesis 7; de Augustinis, thesis 11; Sasse, thesis 6.

(b) Victoria² denies that there is a special precept of repenting, and therefore denies that impenitence is a special sin. For the texts of Scripture, he says, must be understood of the necessity of means, which is not always joined with a precept: thus, for example, sanctifying grace, although necessary for salvation, does not fall under a precept. But this opinion is commonly rejected by theologians.

² Tr. de Septem Sacram., q. 121.

9. 2. Thesis: Supposing mortal sin, it is certain that at least a virtual act of penance is necessary by necessity of means in the present order of things; it is commonly held that the same is necessary by necessity of precept. I said: once mortal sin has been posited, by which, namely, we are turned away from God, the last end; if the sin is only venial, penance, although desirable, is not necessary for salvation. I said also: in the present order, because some theologians think that God can, by His absolute power, pardon sin and infuse grace without any act of the sinner; but, considering His attributes, especially wisdom, justice, and holiness, He cannot.

(A) As to the necessity of means. (a) Scripture. For that is necessary by necessity of means which is so joined with the end that without it the end cannot be obtained; but, once grave sin has been posited, salvation is so joined with penance that without it salvation cannot be had, as is gathered from these and similar testimonies: "If that nation shall repent of its evil, against which I have spoken, I also will repent of the evil which I thought to do to it... if it shall do evil in my eyes, so that it does not hear my voice, I will repent of the good which I have spoken that I would do to it";¹ "But if the wicked man shall do penance for all his sins... he shall live by life and shall not die... but if the just man shall turn himself away from his justice and shall do iniquity according to all the abominations which the wicked man is accustomed to work, shall he live? All his justices which he had done shall not be remembered; in the prevarication by which he has prevaricated, and in his sin which he has sinned, in them he shall die."² Nor is it otherwise in the New Testament: "Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish";³ "Do penance, therefore, and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out,"⁴ as if it were said: the necessary condition that your sins be blotted out is that you do penance. Therefore, in the present order, penance is joined with the remission of sin as a means with the end.

¹ Jer. 18:8-10.

² Ezek. 18:21-27.

³ Luke 13:5.

⁴ Acts 3:19.

(b) Tradition. From the Council of Trent cited above: "Penance was indeed necessary, at every time, for all men who had defiled themselves with any mortal sin, in order to obtain grace and justice." From this it follows that penance is necessary by necessity of means, since at every time, even before a positive law had been established, it was required for the remission of sin.

(c) Theological reason. The sinner cannot be saved unless he has first obtained from God the remission of his sin; but without penance God cannot remit sins. For wisdom forbids that He reconcile to Himself and receive into His friendship one whom He knows to be voluntarily turned away from Himself and obstinate in the love of sin: for this would be nothing other than to foster and reward sin itself. Moreover, justice forbids that an offense be remitted without some reparation; holiness forbids that He unite to Himself something impure still adhering to sin. Now one who has gravely sinned, even from frailty, remains turned away from God, at least habitually, until he repents, and does not repair, as far as he can, the offense inflicted upon God, but perseveres in it and continues to adhere to sin. Therefore God cannot remit sin, considering His attributes, unless the sinner turns himself to God through an act of penance; therefore without penance the sinner cannot be saved.

10. (B) As to the necessity of precept. (a) Scripture. The texts adduced already demonstrate the matter; for God, by declaring the necessity of penance so emphatically and by threatening the gravest punishments to the impenitent, manifests clearly enough that He wills all to be bound to do penance. Furthermore, according to the testimony of Scripture, one who refuses to repent is convicted of disobedience, and indeed of grave disobedience, since he is punished with a grave penalty: "Because I called and you refused, I stretched out my hand, and there was none who regarded... I also will laugh in your destruction."¹ Moreover, Christ preached penance under the form of a precept: "From that time Jesus began to preach and to say: Do penance, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand."² In vain, however, is it objected that grace, although necessary for salvation, does not fall under a special precept; for grace is not a virtue, but a means to virtue, and therefore it is not directly prescribed; but penance is a special virtue, from what has been said, and therefore falls under a precept.

¹ Prov. 1:24-33.

² Matt. 4:17.

(b) Reason. Each person is bound, by force of justice, to repair an injury inflicted upon another; but man, through mortal sin, has inflicted a grave injury upon God; therefore, from the precept of justice, he is bound to compensate this injury by doing penance. Another reason is added: everyone is commanded to have care for his spiritual salvation; but the sinner cannot save his soul unless he repents of grave sins; therefore by force of charity toward himself he is bound to do penance.³

³ From this St. Thomas infers (3 p., q. 84, a. 7, c. and ad 1) that penance is prescribed by natural law: "For by natural reason man is moved to repent of the evils which he has done, but that he do penance in this or that way is from divine institution."

11. First, the precept of repenting can be considered as negative and affirmative: insofar as it is negative, it forbids one to take complacency in his sins; in this sense it obliges always and for always. Insofar as it is affirmative, it commands that one grieve over sins committed; and then it obliges at the opportune time, both per se, that is, by force of the virtue itself of penance, and per accidens, or by force of another precept which one is bound to fulfill.

(A) Per se, (a) it does not oblige immediately after sin has been committed. For a precept of this kind is affirmative, from what has been said; but it belongs to the nature of an affirmative precept that it does not oblige immediately and for always, but at a determined time, namely when the opportunity presents itself. Moreover, if it obliged immediately, one who did not immediately do penance would thereby sin, and would commit a new sin as often as, conscious of this obligation, he did not repent; but this is opposed to the common sense of the faithful, who by no means accuse themselves of these sins, and of confessors, who do not ask about them.

12. (b) It certainly obliges, however, in the article of death, or even in a very probable danger of death or of perpetual madness; for then each person is bound, by reason of justice toward God and charity toward himself, to be reconciled with God and to provide for his salvation, since otherwise either certainly or very probably no other opportune time remains.

(c) More probably, it also obliges sometimes during life. Thus more commonly against Durandus, Cajetan, Vasquez, and a few others, who contend that no time can be assigned within which this precept obliges outside the article of death. For excessive delay of conversion is gravely reprehended by the sacred authors: "Delay not to be converted to the Lord, and defer not from day to day: for his wrath shall come suddenly, and in the time of vengeance he will destroy thee";¹ "But according to thy hardness and impenitent heart, thou treasurest up to thyself wrath in the day of wrath."² Moreover, delay of conversion is dangerous to salvation, because it easily induces into new sins,³ renders merit de condigno impossible, and exposes one to the danger of damnation if death should suddenly occur; it is also injurious to God, since for a long time the sinner remains His enemy and defers until death the compensation for the injury inflicted upon God, thus despising the grace of God which moves him to conversion. And so voluntary delay of penance for a notable time is a new sin, namely the sin of impenitence.

¹ Eccli. 5:8-9.

² Rom. 2:4-5.

³ For St. Gregory the Great rightly says (Moral., bk. XXV, ch. 9, in Migne, P. L., LXXVI, 334): "For sin which penance does not wash away, by its very weight soon draws one to another." The reason for this is that one who remains long in the state of mortal sin is deprived of those efficacious graces which are necessary for overcoming grave temptations. Cf. St. Thomas, 1.², q. 109, a. 8.

13. What time, however, is notable and sufficient to constitute a new sin cannot be accurately defined. Delay for many years is commonly considered a notable time, especially because by the ecclesiastical precept, which seems to be determinative of divine law, the sinner is bound to confess his sins at least once a year, and therefore to do penance.

According to Laymann⁴ and many others, one who satisfies the precept of annual confession does not defer penance beyond the due time, because the Church, by determining the time of confession, seems also to have determined the time of penance. And this opinion is very probable, especially because generally the faithful do not think themselves guilty of a new sin unless they have deferred penance beyond a year.

⁴ De Sacr. Paenitent., ch. 2, n. 6.

Nevertheless, St. Alphonsus⁵ does not wholly acquiesce in this opinion, but he thinks that one month is a notable time in the delay of penance, both because of the obligation of eliciting an act of charity once a month, which the sinner cannot fulfill unless he grieves for his sins, and because one who remains in mortal sin through an entire year cannot avoid the danger of easily falling back into other sins. Yet he adds, and this is to be noted for practice, that sinners, especially the uneducated, can for the most part, indeed almost always, be excused from this sin of delayed penance on account of inadvertence.

⁵ St. Alphonsus, bk. VI, n. 437, and Homo Apostol., tr. XIV, n. 10.

14. (B) Per accidens it obliges whenever the sinner, from some other precept, is bound to recover the state of grace: (a) for administering the sacraments, if he is a priest, or for receiving the sacraments of the living; (b) for overcoming grave temptations, if the sinner is conscious that he cannot resist them unless he elicits an act of contrition; (c) for eliciting an act of charity toward God, if the obligation of fulfilling this precept is urgent. - But the precept of sanctifying feasts and the Lord's day does not import an obligation of eliciting an act of penance, since the state of grace is not required for keeping the Lord's day.

Therefore sinners are to be earnestly exhorted to do penance quickly, not indeed by asserting that the delay of penance is a new mortal sin, but by showing that impenitence is dangerous for the sinner and injurious to God,¹ as above.

¹ Among the passages of Scripture and of the Fathers which can be alleged, these especially are to be attended to: Prov. 1:22-23; Isa. 1:2-31; Jerem. 2, 3, 4; 18:5-17; Ezek. 18:21-32; Matt. 3:8-12; Luke 13:2-5; Acts 3:19-26, etc.; - St. Ambrose, De Paenitentia, bk. II, in Migne, P. L., XVI, 495 ff.; St. Augustine, sermon 20, in Migne, XXXVIII, 140-141, etc. - Cf. Bourdaloue, Careme, sermon for the Monday of the 2nd week, on final impenitence; Massillon, Careme, on final impenitence; Wiseman, Sermons on Moral Subjects, On delay of repentance; Newman, Sermons to Mixed Congreg., Neglect of divine calls and warnings.

15. 1. Notion of the Sacrament of Penance. Before the coming of Christ, Penance was not a sacrament; but in order that the faithful might more securely obtain the remission of sins committed after baptism, the Lord raised penance to the dignity of a sacrament, by handing over to the Church the ministerial power of remitting sins, and by determining the acts to be furnished by sinners for obtaining pardon.

Penance, insofar as it is a sacrament, is commonly defined by theologians: A Sacrament of the New Law instituted by Christ, by which, through the juridical absolution of a priest, sins committed after baptism are remitted to a man who is contrite, has confessed, and promises satisfaction.

It is said (a) by which, through the juridical absolution of a priest, so that there may thus be declared the form of this sacrament, namely, the absolution of the priest; the minister, or priest; and the mode in which it is administered, namely, the judicial form; (b) to a man who is contrite, etc., by which words are designated both the subject and the dispositions of the subject: contrition, confession, and the intention of making satisfaction, which, according to many, are also the proximate matter of the sacrament; (c) sins are remitted, etc., and thus are expressed not only the principal effect, but also the remote matter of the sacrament, namely, all sins, whether mortal or venial, committed after baptism. From what is to be said, it will be clear that this definition is legitimate.

16. 2. Division of this part. In the dogmatic part of this Treatise, we intend to demonstrate the existence, or divine institution, of the sacrament of Penance, and also to declare its nature.

For accomplishing this, we shall examine three things:

I. The power of the keys granted to the Church;

II. The acts of the penitent required for the exercise of this power;

III. The nature of the sacrament, insofar as it can be inferred from these two.

The reason for the division is this: according to the Council of Trent, the Lord especially instituted the sacrament of Penance when He conferred on the apostles the power of remitting sins, which is called the power of the keys; therefore it is necessary to explain this before all else. But since this power is not exercised unless certain acts of the penitent have been posited, namely confession, contrition, and satisfaction, these must be treated afterward. And since the sacrament itself is constituted from the power of the keys and from the acts of the penitent, it is fitting to discuss the sacrament itself by way of corollary, describing its matter and form as well as its effects.¹

¹ In this new edition, we have revised the dogmatic part with the kind cooperation of P. Callou, professor of dogmatic theology in the Seminary of St. Sulpice at Paris.

We shall examine two things: 1. whether this power was truly conferred by Christ; 2. who are the ministers able to exercise it.

17. State of the question. 1. The nature of this power is declared. (A) The power of the keys, as it is taken here, is the power of judging concerning the internal state of conscience, or the power of remitting and retaining sins, not only in the external forum before the Church, but also in the internal forum before God; and therefore it is the power of ruling the conscience of the faithful and of changing its interior relations with respect to God.

It is twofold: (a) the power of establishing new obligations which the penitent must fulfill in order to be freed from his sins, or the power of imposing penalties; (b) the power of dissolving spiritual debts before God, or of remitting sins.

(B) This power indeed is: (a) supernatural, delegated by God Himself, conferred in order to a supernatural end; (b) ministerial under Christ, and, as it were, a certain participation in the divine power; (c) truly efficacious, that is, binding or freeing the conscience itself. (d) Nevertheless it is not absolute, since its exercise and efficacy depend on certain conditions established by God Himself, which both the minister and the penitent must observe; (e) nor infallible, since the minister of God, although judging authoritatively concerning the internal state of the penitent, can err because of human infirmity. God certainly ratifies in heaven the sentence of the minister, but only when what must be posited has been posited, or when the conditions required on the part of the minister and on the part of the penitent have been fulfilled.

18. 2. Errors. Besides the Montanists and Novatians, concerning whom we shall soon treat in their own place, Protestants have attacked the power of the keys in different ways. Their general principle is that justification, and therefore the remission of sins, takes place through faith or confidence (above, n. 6).

(a) Luther indeed remained uncertain for a long time, now acknowledging, then rejecting, a sacrament of this kind; and his disciples imitated this hesitation.¹ Yet absolution, according to them, has only the force of declaring, not of effecting, the remission of sins. (b) Calvin openly denied the existence of the sacrament, teaching that Penance is not truly distinguished from Baptism, or from the remembrance of Baptism; for according to him, sin is not destroyed through Baptism, but only testimony is given that sins have been remitted by faith, or rather are not imputed. But afterward it happens that the baptized person is terrified by subsequent sins, and then it is useful to recall to his memory the Baptism previously conferred, as a pledge of justification received for the whole course of life; this remembrance of Baptism is nothing other than Penance, by which displeasure for sin and the purpose of a new life are renewed.² (c) Anglicans acknowledge that both the dying and those about to communicate publicly can be absolved by presbyters; indeed they admit the utility of confession, but not its necessity.³ (d) The Ritualists, furthermore, teach that absolution is a sacrament, namely one of the lesser sacraments; for among the greater sacraments they count only Baptism and the Supper.

¹ Hence in the Confession of Augsburg (art. 12) one reads: "Concerning Penance they teach that remission of sins can come to those who have fallen after Baptism, at whatever time they are converted; and that the Church ought to impart absolution to such persons returning to penance." (In Schaff, Creeds, vol. III, p. 14). - "Absolution can properly be called the sacrament of Penance, as also the more learned scholastic theologians say" (Melanchthon, Apology, art. 5). Cf. Pfisterer, Luthers Lehre von der Beichte, Stuttgart, 1857.

² "Thus one must think that, at whatever time we are baptized, we are washed and cleansed once for all life: and therefore as often as we have fallen, the memory of Baptism must be recalled, and the soul must be armed with this, so that it may always be certain and secure concerning the remission of sins; for although, once administered, it may seem to have passed, nevertheless it has not been abolished by later sins." (Calvin, Instit., bk. IV, ch. 15).

³ Before communion, these words are spoken by Anglican ministers: "If any among you is found whose conscience is troubled and in distress, and who needs consolation or counsel, let him have recourse to me or to another prudent priest, learned and skilled in the law of God; let him confess and disclose secretly his sins and his anxieties, so that he may be able to receive salutary admonitions, counsels, and consolations, and through us, ministers of God and of the Church, obtain confidence and absolution." Cf. Blunt, The Sacraments, London, 1868, p. 190; Morgan Dix, The Sacramental System, New York, 1893, p. 92-104. - See the doctrine of the Protestants expounded in Vacant, Dict. de Theol., t. I, col. 218-229.

19. (e) In our days, the American Protestant H. C. Lea,¹ renewing the arguments of Dallaeus, attacks the divine institution of confession and absolution in this way: 1) Christ in the Gospel, who often inculcates that God is to be worshiped in spirit and in truth, instituted no external rite for the remission of sins, but requires only love and penance of heart. 2) The power of remitting sins by some sacramental rite was by no means acknowledged in the first centuries of the Church. There did indeed flourish a certain penitential discipline, but it had force only in the external forum, for reconciling sinners with the Church, not with God. 3) The Fathers teach that there are many means for obtaining the remission of sins, but among them they do not mention priestly absolution. 4) Besides, the words of absolution recited over penitents are nothing other than prayers by which priests earnestly begged from God the pardon of sins, and by no means sacramental forms conferring grace.²

¹ Lea, A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences, Philadelphia and London, 1896. - The Liberals teach nearly the same thing.

² Op. cit., t. I, ch. I-VII, p. 5-167.

Against these errors we shall set forth and vindicate Catholic doctrine, by critically examining the texts of Scripture and of the earlier Fathers.

20. Thesis: Christ conferred on the Church the power of remitting and retaining all sins committed after baptism, and that by a truly judicial act.

It is de fide from the following canons of the Council of Trent:³ 1. "If anyone shall say that, in the Catholic Church, Penance is not truly and properly a sacrament, instituted by Christ our Lord for reconciling to God Himself the faithful as often as they fall into sins after Baptism: let him be anathema."

³ Trent, sess. XIV, can. 1, 3, 9.

3. "If anyone shall say that those words of the Lord the Savior, 'Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained,' are not to be understood of the power of remitting and retaining sins in the sacrament of Penance, as the Catholic Church has always understood them from the beginning, but shall twist them, contrary to the institution of this sacrament, to the authority of preaching the Gospel: let him be anathema."

9. "If anyone shall say that the sacramental absolution of the priest is not a judicial act, but a bare ministry of pronouncing and declaring that sins have been remitted to the one confessing, provided only that he believes himself absolved; or that the priest absolves not seriously, but in jest; or shall say that the confession of the penitent is not required so that the priest may be able to absolve him: let him be anathema."

The Council therefore teaches that the power of remitting and retaining sins was truly conferred upon the Apostles and their successors; - and that it can be exercised in the Catholic Church not once or again, but as often as the faithful fall into sins after Baptism, and therefore that no sin is irremissible; - but that this power is not a bare ministry of declaring that sins have been remitted, but a truly judicial act by which priests reconcile to God Himself sinners who are otherwise well disposed.

In order that the demonstration may be clearer, we premise two things: (a) that Christ, while He lived on earth, exercised the power of the keys, or the power of remitting sins, by a free act of His will, for example, in the case of the paralytic and of the sinful woman; (b) that He likewise, in a general way, conferred on the Apostles all power committed to Himself by the Father for promoting the salvation of souls, as is clear from the four Gospels. Now it is altogether improbable that the power of the keys was excepted from this general mission or delegation.

¹ Cf. Corluy, Spicilegium Dogmatico-biblicum, Ghent, 1884, t. I, p. 33-51; t. II, p. 438-452; Vacant, Dict. de Theol., t. I, p. 138-143.

In reality, Scripture being carefully inspected, two things are established: 1. that the power of the keys was promised to the Apostles and their successors, and within the amplitude of this power is contained the power of remitting sins; 2. that this power was in fact conferred on them on the very day of the resurrection.

21. 1. That this power was promised is clear from the words of Christ to Peter: "And I say to thee that thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my church; and I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven; and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven."² Likewise from the words of Christ directed afterward to all the Apostles:³ "Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven." For greater clarity of the proof, the sense of these texts must first be explained.

² Matt. 16:18-19.

³ Matt. 18:18.

(a) To Peter are promised the keys of the kingdom of heaven, that is, the power of jurisdiction over the whole Church, which Christ designates by the name kingdom of heaven, as is clear from the words previously uttered: "upon this rock I will build my Church." For to hand over the keys of someone's house or city is the same as to confer authority to close and open it, or supreme authority, as is clear from the usage of speech among sacred and profane authors; thus, when Eliacim is substituted for Sobna, the prefect of the temple or of the royal house, it is said:¹ "And I will give the key of the house of David upon his shoulder"; likewise, when the glorious Christ wishes to signify that all power has been handed over to Him, He says: "And I have the keys of death and of hell."² Therefore true authority over the Church is promised to Peter.

¹ Isa. 22:22.

² Apoc. 1:18; cf. 3:7.

22. (b) But what the nature of this power is, the following words declare: "whatsoever thou shalt bind... whatsoever thou shalt loose..." These must be declared accurately. We indeed admit that these words historically present a twofold sense: sometimes they signify nothing other than to declare that a thing is lawful or not (for example, in the Talmud one reads: Rabbi M looses, Rabbi N binds, that is, the former asserts that a thing is lawful, but the latter that it is not lawful); at other times, however, they designate legislative and judicial power. Now that this is the sense in the present place is clear from the context: 1) for Christ promises His own authority to the Apostles; but this authority is not only declarative, but at the same time legislative and judicial; therefore Christ promises the Apostles the power of making laws, imposing obligations, and also rendering judgment and loosening bonds which can prevent the faithful from entering heaven, especially sins, which are one of the chief bonds; 2) this agrees with the former part of the text, where there is handed over the power of the keys, or of closing and opening heaven, and therefore of taking away sin, which obstructs entrance into heaven; 3) and it is confirmed from the parallel passage, where the same power is conferred on the Apostles with respect to sins.¹

¹ Matt. 18:15-18. For there it is a question of sins to be remitted or retained: "If thy brother shall sin [against thee is lacking in the best codices]... tell the Church; but if he will not hear the Church, let him be to thee as the heathen and publican. Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind, etc."

That this power touches not only the external forum, but conscience itself, is clear from the fact that God ratifies in heaven whatsoever the Church shall have bound or loosed on earth.

23. (c) What Christ had first promised to Peter alone, a little later He likewise promised to all the apostles together; He does not indeed hand over to them the power of the keys, or the supreme power, but the power of binding and loosing, which they will exercise dependently on Peter.

(d) In both cases, there is question here of a power to be exercised over the Church itself, not over those who are outside: "I will build the Church, and I will give to thee the keys..." Likewise, when there is question of the power conferred on the Apostles, the Church is first mentioned: "Tell the Church; but if he will not hear the Church..." A power of this kind is therefore distinguished from the power of baptizing, which is exercised over those who are outside, so that they may be introduced into the Church.

The aforesaid argument, although general, is altogether valid. Its force is confirmed from the words of St. John and from the authority of the Fathers; for already St. Pontiff Callixtus used this text to prove that there was in him the faculty of remitting sins; but Tertullian, although a Montanist, did not deny this sense, but only said that this power conferred on Peter had been transmitted only to spiritual men.²

² Tertullian, De pudicitia, ch. 21, P. L., t. II, col. 1025.

24. 2. The power which Christ had promised He conferred on the Apostles; for, having returned from the dead, He stood in the midst of the disciples and said to them:³ "Peace be to you... As the Father hath sent me, I also send you. When he had said this, he breathed on them and said to them: Receive ye the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained."

³ John 20:21-23.

These words indeed are, as it were, an authentic declaration by which one of the many powers already promised to Peter and the Apostles in the aforesaid texts is specifically defined. For the power of which there is question here is not, as Protestants wish, a mere faculty of preaching the remission of sins, or of declaring that sins have been remitted to penitents, but the power truly to remit sins; - not only as to punishment, but also as to guilt; - extending to all sins; - to be exercised in a judicial mode; - and therefore not restricted to the power of remitting sins through baptism. This we shall declare successively.

25. (A) The power here conceded is the power truly to remit sins. This is gathered: (a) from the context; for Christ begins thus: as the Father hath sent me, I also send you; by which words it is declared that the mission to be given to the Apostles is similar to the mission which Christ received from the Father. Now Christ had not only preached the remission of sins, but had truly forgiven them; indeed He had come into the world for this, that He might truly destroy them.¹ Therefore the Apostles received the power truly to remit sins. - Afterward Christ, by the sensible sign of breathing, imparts the Holy Spirit to the Apostles, so that it may thus be manifest to all that the power to be conferred on them is a new and singular privilege, which they can exercise only with the help of the Holy Spirit. But to announce the remission of sins is not so new and singular a privilege, since the Prophets performed this, and any member of the faithful can perform it; the Apostles themselves had already done it by preaching. Therefore there is question not of preaching, but of the remission of sins.

¹ Matt. 9:2-8; Luke 5:20; 7:47; Apoc. 1, etc.

26. (b) From the text itself: 1) for the verb you shall forgive (Gr. aphete) is active, and signifies such remission as is done through a positive and efficacious action, not through a mere declaration of remission already made; this is confirmed from the other word you shall retain (kratete), which likewise denotes a positive action; for Christ did not say "you shall not forgive," which would be merely negative, but you shall retain, as if a positive action of the priest were required. 2) Moreover, in the second clause there is added "they are forgiven them, they are retained"; and this indeed, according to the Protestants themselves, sounds the same as they are truly remitted or truly retained; therefore, by force of the parallelism, the prior words, you shall forgive, you shall retain, ought to be understood in the same sense. For by what right is to forgive, in the prior clause, said to signify to declare remission, and in the latter, truly to forgive? 3) Finally, by force of this text, such is the relation between the remission of sins made by the Apostles and that made by God, that whenever the Apostles remit, God remits; but such a connection is indeed well explained if the Apostles enjoy a true faculty of remitting; but if they have only the power of preaching remission, there is no certain connection between the declaration of the Apostles and the remission of sins. For how, apart from a special revelation, can the ministers of the Church know and declare with certainty that sins have been remitted by God?

27. (B) The power conferred on the Church touches not only the debt of punishment, but also the debt of guilt, and therefore remits guilt itself before God. For Christ here uses the words aphete tas hamartias, which He had previously used to signify the true remission of sins as to guilt.¹

¹ Matt. 9:5, 6; Mark 2:10; Luke 5:20; 7:47-49.

This is confirmed from the context. For (a) there is question of that remission of sins by which the mission of Christ is brought to perfection and completion; but the proper end of this mission was the interior remission of sins: for Christ had come into the world to seek sinners and make them saved, to justify, sanctify, and lead to heaven those who by sin had been made alien from God.² (b) The Apostles, in remitting sins, act in the power of the Holy Spirit conferred on them: "Receive ye the Holy Spirit..." Now it is proper to the Holy Spirit to remit sins as to guilt: for in Him we have been washed and sanctified and justified.³

² Mark 2:17; Matt. 18:11; Luke 19:10; Rom. 5:10, 18, 19.

³ 1 Cor. 6:11.

28. (C) This power extends to all sins. For (a) no limitation is added: "whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them," and the Greek text an tinon aphete clearly designates that all sinners can obtain pardon; (b) moreover, these words are determinative of the general power of loosening bonds, which suffers no exception: "whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven"; therefore all sins can be remitted.

29. (D) The same power must be exercised by a judicial act, that is, by instructing the cause and rendering sentence. (a) First, indeed, the apostles and their successors must instruct and know the cause. For a twofold power is conferred, both of remitting and of retaining sins (which word, as we noted above, says more than not remitting); now a faculty of this kind cannot be exercised at will, but prudently. But how can someone know whether sins can be remitted or not, ought to be retained or not, unless he has first instituted a juridical investigation of the matter? For this there is required knowledge both of the offenses committed by the sinner and of the dispositions of the subject, so that the Apostles and their successors may be able to judge whether, as ministers of Christ who are bound to render an account of their administration, they can absolve those who are rightly disposed, or bind the indisposed. Therefore the power of remitting sins also supposes the right and the office of instructing the cause.

(b) But once the cause has been instructed, they must also render sentence: for it pertains to them to retain or remit sins according to the dispositions of the penitent, and therefore to prescribe the conditions to be fulfilled for the remission of sins, to impose burdens and satisfactions for the sins committed. For in them there is the power of binding as well as of loosing, and whatsoever things are retained or remitted on earth are retained or remitted in heaven. Therefore they enjoy judicial power, to which sinners are compelled to subject themselves if they wish to be absolved.

30. (E) This power is not restricted to the power of remitting sins through baptism, but also includes the faculty of forgiving sins committed after baptism. We do not indeed deny that the words of John can be understood, and in fact were understood by most of the Fathers, of the power of remitting sins through baptism; for the words of Christ are general, and of themselves can be heard of sins committed before or after baptism. Certainly, however, they are not limited to baptism alone: (a) this is clear from the context, both because they are universal, and because they suppose this power to be exercised indefinitely and in a judicial mode; and this indeed is understood of penance rather than of baptism, since the latter is conferred only once, and not properly after the manner of a judgment.

(b) This interpretation is confirmed by the authority of the Fathers: for Origen openly says that the power of forgiving sins was conferred on the apostles and their successors by force of the aforesaid words.¹ St. Pacian more directly refutes the Novatians, who said that the words of John were parallel to the words of Matthew, "Going therefore, teach all nations, baptizing them..."; and he shows that the text of John is to be expounded according to the words of Matthew, "Whatsoever you shall bind," and therefore regards sins committed after baptism.² St. Ambrose made this interpretation his own.³ But among the Fathers who take the aforesaid words of John concerning the remission of sins through baptism, some, such as St. Cyril of Alexandria, openly teach that the same words can also be understood of sins committed after baptism.⁴

¹ Origen, De orat., n. 28, P. G., t. XI, 529.

² St. Pacian, ep. 3a, n. 11, P. L., t. XIII, 1070.

³ St. Ambrose, De paenit., I, 68, P. L., XVI, 467-468.

⁴ "Moreover, men inspired by the Spirit remit sins, or retain them, in two ways, as I think: for either they call to baptism those worthy, men already proved, of course, by the gravity and constancy of life and faith, or they forbid and keep away from divine grace those who are not yet worthy; or in some other way they remit and retain sins, namely when they correct sons of the Church who sin, or pardon those doing penance." (St. Cyril, In Joan., bk. XII, ch. XX, 22-23, P. G., t. LXXIV, p. 722.)

From these words of St. John, therefore, and from the manner in which they were commonly understood already from the third century, it is rightly inferred that to the Apostles and their successors there was truly granted the power of remitting, by a judicial rite, all sins committed after baptism.⁵

⁵ Rightly, therefore, the following proposition 47 of the Modernists was condemned by the Holy Office (Lamentabili decree): "The words of the Lord: Receive ye the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, etc., by no means refer to the sacrament of Penance, whatever it pleased the Tridentine Fathers to assert."

31. Scholion. (A) On the exercise of the power of the keys by the Apostles. (a) The power of binding, or of imposing penalties for the correction and amendment of sinners, at least where there was question of public offenses, was certainly exercised by the Apostles. An example is had in the case of the incestuous Corinthian concerning whom St. Paul writes: "I indeed, absent in body but present in spirit, have already judged, as present, him who has done this, in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ... to deliver such a one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ."¹ For there the Apostle, by an act of judgment, condemns the incestuous man to undergo some penalty. (b) The power of loosing is also indirectly inferred from these words;² for the sinner is handed over to certain temporal penalties, to the end that afterward he may be justified and saved on the day of judgment; and thus already there appears the connection between the canonical penalty imposed by the Church and the remission of sin, which afterward is manifestly exhibited in penitential discipline.

¹ 1 Cor. 5:3-5. Cf. 2 Thess. 3:14-15; Tit. 3:10.

² Certain Fathers and Theologians thought that Paul directly exercised this power when he afterward absolved the incestuous Corinthian (2 Cor. 2:5-11); but it is much more probable that he of whom there is question in the second passage is not the incestuous man of whom there is question in the first.

The same can be inferred from the manner of acting with Hymenaeus and Alexander, whom he indeed hands over to Satan, but for amendment, namely, "that they may learn not to blaspheme."³

³ 1 Tim. 1:20.

32. (B) On the remissibility of all sins. The Apostles were persuaded that all sins, even the gravest, before judgment, were remissible by condign penance. Thus St. Paul supposes that the gravest sins, such as fornication, are remitted through penance;⁴ likewise St. John presents God as threatening dire punishments to those who are guilty of apostasy and idolatry, "unless they shall do penance from their works";⁵ therefore he supposes that the aforesaid sins can be destroyed by penance.

⁴ 2 Cor. 12:20-21.

⁵ Apoc. 2:19-23.

Yet a few texts are opposed, from which it seems to be clear that certain sins are irremissible. It is useful to explain these texts briefly.

(a) Namely, Christ said to the Pharisees: "Every sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven men: but the blasphemy of the Spirit shall not be forgiven."⁶ - Resp. Once the context has been inspected, the sin of which there is question is that by which works manifestly divine, such as miracles done to prove the divinity of Christ's mission, are ascribed to the devil, and thus the eyes are deliberately and pertinaciously closed to the light of faith; for there is question of the Pharisees who were saying that Christ cast out demons in Beelzebub. Now that sin is said not to be remitted, not because it is never forgiven, but because of itself it has no excuse and deserves no pardon; or, according to others, because it is forgiven with greater difficulty, not indeed from a defect of power or will in God and His ministers, but because it is difficult for a sinner who has pertinaciously abused the means of grace to repent sincerely. St. Thomas declares this most excellently (2a 2ae, q. 14, a. 3): "For one who sins from ignorance or weakness deserves a lesser punishment; but one who sins from certain malice does not have any excuse by which his punishment may be lessened. Likewise also one who blasphemed against the Son of man, His divinity not yet having been revealed, could have some excuse because of the infirmity of the flesh which he beheld in Him, and thus deserved a lesser punishment. But one who blasphemed against the divinity itself, attributing the works of the Holy Spirit to the devil, had no excuse by which his punishment might be diminished." The Holy Doctor continues by explaining that sin against the Holy Spirit is also said to be irremissible according to its own nature, insofar as it excludes faith, and therefore those things through which the remission of sins is effected; just as a disease is called incurable according to the nature of the disease, by which that through which the disease can be cured is taken away. "By this, however," he says, "the way of remitting and healing is not closed to the omnipotence and mercy of God, by which such persons are sometimes healed spiritually, as if miraculously."

⁶ Matt. 12:31. Cf. Maldonatus, on this place.

Others, however, with St. Augustine (serm. 71), hold that a sin of this kind is final impenitence, which is remitted in no way, because mortal sin in which a man perseveres until death cannot be remitted either in this life or in the future. Yet this explanation seems foreign to the context.

33. (b) The words of the Epistle to the Hebrews are alleged: "For it is impossible for those who were once illuminated, have also tasted the heavenly gift, and have been made partakers of the Holy Spirit, have nevertheless tasted the good word of God and the powers of the world to come, and have fallen away, to be renewed again unto penance."¹ - Resp. Here there is question of apostates, who, after Baptism had been received (illuminated), after the Eucharist and Confirmation had been received (the heavenly gift... partakers of the Holy Spirit), were returning to Judaism or paganism; and according to certain Fathers and Theologians, it is declared that they cannot be renewed through Baptism, since a sacrament of this kind cannot be repeated. St. Athanasius hands down this interpretation:² "Nor," he says, "is it impossible to repent, but it is impossible that we be renewed under the pretext of penance. But there is an immense difference between these sayings. For he whom it repents indeed ceases to sin, yet he retains the scars of wounds. But he who is baptized, puts off the old man, and is renewed, born from above by the grace of the Spirit." St. Chrysostom says the same (hom. IX on this place, n. 3). - But very many others, and indeed more probably, understand the word impossible of great difficulty, of moral, not physical, impossibility, so that the sense is that it is exceedingly difficult for apostates to return to the true faith. In almost the same way the following words can be understood: "For if we sin voluntarily after receiving the knowledge of the truth, there is now left no sacrifice for sins, but a certain terrible expectation of judgment";¹ since here also there is question of apostates, who, insofar as they remain in apostasy, lack the sacrifice for sins, just as those who voluntarily remain outside the Church are outside the way of salvation; yet from this the possibility of returning to the Christian faith, in which the sacrifice for sins is offered, is not precluded.²

¹ Hebr. 6:4 ff.

² Ep. 4 ad Serap., n. 13.

¹ Hebr. 10:26.

² Cf. A. Lemonnyer, O. P., Epitres de S. Paul, Paris, Bloud, 1905, t. II, p. 221-223.

(c) The words of John are also opposed:³ "He who knows his brother to sin a sin not unto death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him who sins not unto death. There is a sin unto death; I do not say that anyone should ask for that." - Resp. What that sin unto death is, theologians and commentators dispute. More probably, we think there is question here of the sin of infidelity, by which the divinity of Christ is denied, since throughout this whole chapter St. John is speaking of faith in Christ; but the Apostle does not declare such a sin to be irremissible, but only that the precept of praying for one's neighbor does not extend to those who have stained themselves with such a sin; because, on account of the enormity of their sin, they deserve to be abandoned by the faithful like heathens and publicans. In other words, these sinners are deprived of the public suffrages of the Church, as excommunicated persons are today. But if sin unto death is understood of final impenitence, the explanation already proposed above is valid.

³ 1 John 5:16.

34. Conclusion. The power of the keys, conferred by Christ on the Apostles, was exercised in apostolic times, but not in the same mode in which it is now exercised: (a) namely, not frequently, because lesser or venial sins, as not being necessary matter, were not then accustomed to be subjected to the power of the keys, and moreover greater sins, on account of the fervent life of the first Christians, were rarely committed; (b) with a certain severity, insofar as arduous penance was imposed on sinners, especially exclusion from the Church before absolution was granted, chiefly for this end, that the faithful might be more efficaciously deterred from sin. But it is not wonderful that the matter stood this way: for since Christ had not determined the mode in which the power of the keys was to be exercised, it belonged to the Church, according to the diversity of times and circumstances, to define this for the greater utility of the faithful.

35. 1. State of the question. Since today liberal Protestants contend that the Church reconciled sinners only in the external forum, namely insofar as it received again into its bosom those whom it had excommunicated on account of sins, our purpose is to show that they also obtained the remission of sins in the internal forum and before God.

¹ Petavius, De paenitentiae vetere in Ecclesia ratione, P. G., XLII, 1027 ff.; Morinus, Comment. historicus de disciplina in admin. Sacr. Paenitentiae, Antwerp, 1682, bk. I, ch. 3-7; ch. 16-19; bk. III-VII; Palmieri, Tr. de Paenitentia, 2nd ed., Prato, 1896, thesis IX-XI; L. de San, op. cit., n. 180-245; F. Pignataro, De disciplina paenitentiali priorum Ecclesiae saecul., Rome, 1904; Funk, Zur altchristlichen Bussdisciplin, Paderborn, 1897; Boudinhon, Sur l'histoire de la penitence, in Revue d'hist. et de Litter. relig., t. II, 1897, pp. 306, 496; Vacandard, in Rev. du Clerge francais, t. XIV, p. 192; t. XV, p. 195, etc.; id. in Vacant, Dict. de Theologie, t. I, p. 145-168; Batiffol, Etudes d'hist. et de theologie positive, 3rd ed., Paris, 1904; Swete, Penitential discipline in the first three centuries, in Journal of Theological Studies, April 1903, p. 321-337; Casey, Notes on a History of Auricular Confession, Philadelphia, 1889; P. A. Kirsch, Zur Geschichte der Katholischen Beichte, Wurzburg, 1902; Gartmeier, Die Beichtpflicht, 1905; G. Rauschen, Eucharistie und Bussakrament in den ersten Jahrhunderten der Kirche, 1908, in French, L'Eucharistie et la Penitence dans les six premiers siecles, trans. M. Decker and E. Ricard, 1910.

36. 2. General argument. But before we declare the individual texts, it is expedient to present a general argument, by proving that reconciliation with the Church also involves reconciliation with God, the testimonies of Scripture and of the Fathers being considered. It is proved by a twofold argument: (A) From the fact that to be united to the Church is the same as to be united to God Himself. (a) This is already clear from what was said in the Treatise on the Church, where we proved that the Church was instituted by Christ for sanctifying men (n. 607 ff.), and that outside the Church salvation is not given (n. 824 ff.): for from this it logically follows that to be truly and properly united to the Church is the same as to be joined to God Himself, who alone is the author of sanctification. (b) This indeed is confirmed from the fact that the Church, according to the doctrine of St. Paul, is the body of Christ, so that to be a member of the Church is the same as to be a member of Christ. (c) The most ancient Fathers teach the same, who, with St. Ignatius, assert that those who are intimately united to God and Christ are with the bishop, and that those who, led by penance, have returned to the unity of the Church, by that very fact are of God and live according to Christ.¹ The Fathers of the third and fourth centuries declare the matter more clearly, as we shall say below.

¹ Philad., III.

(B) From the comparison instituted by the ancient Fathers, Hermas and others, between baptism and penance as to the effects which they produce: for just as baptism internally and before God washes away sins, so likewise does penance, although in a different mode.

These things having been premised, we shall prove the thesis by a threefold class of testimonies: 1. by the implicit testimonies of the second century; 2. by explicit testimonies in the controversy with the Montanists; and 3. in the controversy with the Novatians. By way of appendix, we shall speak, 4. of penitential discipline through the first four centuries.

Yet we observe that certain documents of the earlier centuries, and indeed of the greatest importance, have perished, as can be inferred from the fact that the decree of Callixtus, concerning which below, is known to us only imperfectly, namely from the writings of Tertullian, who attacks it. Hence if the historical argument for the earlier centuries appears incomplete, that must be attributed, in part, to the paucity of documents; and therefore the things which are obscure must be elucidated both from the practice of the Church and from the documents of the subsequent age.

37. In the primitive age of the Church, the Doctors were wholly occupied in defending the fundamental dogmas of the faith, namely the unity of God, the divinity of the Christian religion, the divinity of Christ, the obedience to be furnished to bishops, etc. - Furthermore, under the influence of enthusiasm and fervor prevailing in the first Christian communities, not a few of the faithful thought that grave sins could scarcely be committed by the faithful, and therefore they thought little about penance. - Yet experience made it known that even the baptized were not impeccable, indeed that some also sometimes fell into very grave sins. From this arose the question whether and how these sins could be destroyed. Certain rigorists thought that sins committed after baptism were irremissible. Against them, the Fathers of the second century taught that sins committed after baptism can be destroyed through penance: not expressly, however, but incidentally and obscurely, if the matter is judged only from the documents which survive.

1. NECESSITY OF THIS SACRAMENT. —The Sacrament of Penance (sacramentum poenitentiae sive reconciliationis) is the normal means by which a Catholic who has committed mortal sin after Baptism can recover sanctifying grace. To receive this Sacrament, actually or at least in desire (in re aut in voto), is as necessary for persons guilty of mortal sin as Baptism is for those still in the state of original sin. This is but another way of saying that for all Christians guilty of mortal sin Penance is a necessary means of salvation (necessitas medii).¹ Christ has instituted this Sacrament for the forgiveness of sins, and hence perfect contrition without at least the votum sacramenti cannot justify a sinner, for contrition, to be truly perfect, must include the desire of employing the divinely ordained means of reconciliation, i. e., the Sacrament of Penance.² Justly, therefore, is Penance called "the second plank after shipwreck." ³

¹ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 2, can. 6 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 895, 915); St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 84, art. 5.

² Cfr. John XX, 21-23; Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. i and 4 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 135 894, 897 sq.).

³ St. Jerome, In Is., II, c. 3: "The second plank after shipwreck and consolation in miseries is to hide one’s impiety." (Migne, P. L., XXIV, 65).—IDEM, Epist., 130 (a/. 8), n. 9: "But let us remain ignorant of penance, lest we sin readily. Let it be, as it were, a second plank after shipwreck for the wretched; in a virgin let the ship be preserved intact. It is one thing to seek what you have lost, another to possess what you have never lost." (P. L., XXII, 1115). —Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., can. 2 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 912). —Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 1. —Peter Lombard, Sent., IV, dist. 14, p. 1. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 84, art. 6. —St. Bonaventure, Breviloquium, P. VI, c. 10 (ed. II, Vicetia. p. 531).—Pohle- Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, and ed., p. 73.

2. DUTY OF RECEIVING THIS SACRAMENT. —From the fact that Penance is by divine right necessary for all who have fallen into mortal sin, it follows that a Catholic is bound to receive this Sacrament —a) When he has had the misfortune of committing a mortal sin. Consciously and voluntarily to remain in the state of mortal sin is incompatible with the virtue of charity towards God, shows contempt for grace, and runs counter to Christian self-love, because the sinner thereby incapacitates himself for the performance of any and all meritorious works and endangers his soul.⁴ Hence it is advisable to go to confession as soon as possible after falling into mortal sin.⁵

⁴ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., can. i (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 911). —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 6, art. 5.

⁵ Cfr. St. Bonaventure, Comment, in Sent., IV, dist. 17, qu. 2, p. 2: "Yet I believe it sound counsel that all who fall through mortal sin confess as soon as they can; for one who carries the wound of sin hidden for so long does not seem truly contrite. To assert generally of such persons that they can defer until Easter seems dangerous to me." (Opera Omnia, IV, 445 sq.).

All sins committed after Baptism are matter (materia remota et removenda) for Penance. Mortal sins alone are necessary matter (materia necessaria). Therefore, one who is conscious of venial sins only, is not per se bound to receive the Sacrament, for venial sins can be expiated by other means besides Penance.⁶ Nevertheless, venial sins are admissible and sufficient matter (materia liber a sen sufficiens) for confession, and it is advisable to include them, as the Sacrament of Penance is the best and most efficacious means of obtaining forgiveness of them, for two reasons:—first, because men are easily deceived as to the character of certain sins, and, secondly, because Penance serves not merely to blot out sin and sanctify the soul, but also to instruct, console, and encourage the sinner, and thus aids him on the way to perfection.

⁶ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit,, c. 5, can. 6 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 899 sqq., 916); Pohle- Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, 62 sq. —Gopfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. III, 4th ed., p. 150.

A Catholic is furthermore bound to receive this Sacrament, b) When he is laden with mortal sin and in danger of death, or when he is conscious of being in the state of mortal sin and wishes to receive a Sacrament of the living; or c) When he is commanded to do so by an ecclesiastical precept (iure ecclesiastico). The Third Commandment of the Church says that every Catholic should worthily confess his sins at least once a year to a duly ordained priest.⁷ Of course, this binds only those who have committed mortal sin.⁸ No definite time is assigned for the fulfillment of this obligation, but the Church recommends that it be done in Lent. As a rule the annual confession is made in connection with the prescribed paschal Communion. Frequent reception of the Sacrament of Penance may be recommended as a most effective protection against sin and a powerful means of perfection.⁹

⁷ See A. Villien, A History of the Commandments of the Church, pp. 151 sqq.

⁸ Slater, Moral Theol., I, 576 sa.; infra, p. 152.

⁹ Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 46. Ph. Scharsch, Die Devotionsbeichte, 3rd ed., Leipsic 1920.

3. REQUISITES OF WORTHY RECEPTION. —Penance is described by the Fathers as "a laborious Baptism." ¹⁰ As such it demands a larger measure of personal cooperation on the part of the recipient than any other Sacrament. Whoever wishes to receive this Sacrament worthily must practice the virtue of penance or repentance ** and confess his mortal sins, or, as the case may be, one or more venial sins. More specifically, he must make an act of contrition coupled with a firm purpose of amendment (contritio cordis), confess his sins to a duly authorized priest (confessio oris), and accept and perform the satisfaction imposed (satisfactio operis). Not all of these conditions, however, are of equal importance. Actual satisfaction belongs merely to the integrity of the Sacrament, whereas contrition, confession, and absolution are of its very essence. ¹² The Catechism of Trent says: "In the general opinion of the pious, whatever of holiness, piety, and religion has been preserved in the Church in our times, through the boundless beneficence of God, is to be ascribed in a great measure to confession.”¹³ The same authority describes Penance as " this citadel, so to speak, of Christian virtue," and adds that, though sins are cancelled by perfect contrition, few can reach a sufficient degree of contrition, and consequently it was "necessary that the Lord, in His infinite mercy, should provide by some easier means for the common salvation of men; and this He did, in His admirable wisdom, when He gave to the Church the keys of the Kingdom of Heaven." ¹⁴ READINGS. —St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 3a, qu. 84-90. —P. Schanz, Die Lehre von den hl. Sakramenten, pp. 535 sqq. —Chr. Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. VIII, 2nd ed., pp. 4 sqq. —Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, Penance, pp. 130 sqq. —F. X. Zenner, Instructio Practica Confessarii, Vienna 1857. —F. Lorinser, Die Lehre von der Verwaltung des hl. Bussakramentes, 2nd ed., Breslau 1883. —J. Reuter, S.J., Neoconfessarius Practice Instructus, 4th ed. by J. Mullendorf, Ratisbon 1006. —A. Tappehorn, Anleitung zur Verwaltung des Bussakramentes, 5th ed., Diilmen 1908. —D. Palmieri, Tractatus de Poenitentia, Rome 1879.

¹⁰ See Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, p. 73. ll Cfr. op. cit., pp. i sqq.

¹² Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 2 and 3, can. 4 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 895 sqq., 914). —Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 20. — Error. M. Lutheri damnat. a Leone X., prop. 5 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 745). —Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, pp. 132 sqq. —B. Pascal, Pensées, P. I, a. 5, n. 8 (Vol. I, Paris 1812, pp. 194 »qq.).— J. A. Moehler, Symbolism (tr. Robertson), 5th ed., London 1906, pp. 223 sqq. —Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. III, pp. 349 sqq.

¹³ Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 36 (a/. 32); A. Kirchberger, Der gldvtbige Protestant und die Beichte, Innsbruck 1906.

¹⁴ Cat. Rom., ibid.

1. NATURE OF CONTRITION. —Contrition (contritio cordis) is the most necessary constituent of Penance, both as a virtue and as a Sacrament,¹ for without contrition there can be no genuine repentance and no forgiveness.² The Council of Trent defines contrition as "a sorrow of the soul and a detestation for sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning for the future." ³ Hence contrition is essentially an act of the will, by which man renounces sin and determines to avoid it in future. The act of renunciation is called contrition in the strict sense (contritio stricte dicta), while the determination to avoid future sins is termed purpose of amendment (propositum).

¹ Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, pp. 1 sqq.; 72 sqq.

² Joel II, 12 sq. —Cfr. Prop. Damnat. sub Innoc. XI., prop. 60: "Absolution is neither to be denied nor deferred to a penitent who has a habit of sinning against the law of God, nature, or the Church, even if no hope of amendment appears, provided that with his mouth he declares that he is sorry and proposes amendment." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1210).

³ Sess. XIV, De Poenit., cap. 4: "Contrition, which holds the first place among the aforesaid acts of the penitent, is sorrow of the soul and detestation for sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning for the future." —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 1, ad 1: "Contrition is sorrow undertaken for sins, with the purpose of confessing and making satisfaction."

Being an interior sorrow of the soul, contrition differs from that purely intellectual regret (dolor intellectivus speculativus) which consists in a mere perception of the damnableness of sin, and also from the so-called terror conscientiae, I. e., the fear with which conscience is smitten upon being convinced of iniquity.⁴ Both these emotions may be present without a spark of genuine contrition.

⁴ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., can. 4: "If anyone says that there are only two parts of penance, namely terrors struck into the conscience when sin is recognized and faith, let him be anathema." —Conf. August., art. 12. —Möhler, Symbolism, pp. 124 sqq.; pp. 223.

The moral value of contrition, as a turning away from sin and a turning to God (aversio a pec cat o et conversio ad Deum), consists in its being an act of the will,⁵ and consequently it need not be accompanied by sensible pain or grief, nor manifest itself by sighs and tears. Whilst there is such a thing as "tears of contrition," ⁶ sensible sorrow forms no constituent of genuine contrition, nor is its presence a sure proof thereof.

⁵ Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 24: "Because contrition has been defined as sorrow, the faithful are to be warned not to think that it is perceived by a bodily sense. For contrition is an act of the will." —Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c.

⁶ (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 798).

"As there are tears that indicate no deep emotion, so there is a sorrow without tears. As a rule, however, it is desirable that contrition should be manifested by outward signs. Such outward signs of internal sorrow for sin are technically known as signa contritionis, and divided into two classes, ordinary and extraordinary. The latter manifest themselves partly in an unusual stirring of the affections and partly in the making of special efforts to go to confession, seek advice, etc. Such extraordinary signs are of particular significance in the case of habitual sinners and recidivi, where ordinary signs fail.”⁷ 2. PROPERTIES OF CONTRITION. —Contrition may be perfect or imperfect.

⁶ Cfr. Ps. VI, 7; Matth. XXVI, 75; Luke VII, 44, 47. —Cfr. St. Augustine, Serin., 351, c. i: "As sorrow is the companion of penance, so tears are witnesses of sorrow." (Migne, P. L., XXXIX, 1536).—Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 28.

⁷ F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 212 sq. detestatio

Perfect contrition (contritio caritate per feet a, or simply contritio) is inspired by charity, i. e., a perfect love of God as the supreme good for His own sake.

Imperfect contrition (contritio imperfecta), now technically called attrition (attritio), is sorrow inspired by some other supernatural motive, e. g., fear of eternal punishment, repugnance to sin as an offense against Almighty God, regret at having lost divine grace and forfeited heaven, etc.⁸ As can be easily seen, the distinction between perfect and imperfect contrition is not based upon the degree of sorrow a man has for his sins, but upon the motives by which that sorrow is inspired; this distinction is specific rather than generic.

⁸ Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. tivo Mor., II, n. 318: "Contrition is distinguished as twofold: perfect, which is detestation of sin arising from the special motive of perfect charity, or of the goodness of God supremely loved for His own sake; and imperfect, or attrition, which is detestation of sin arising from another supernatural motive, for example, from consideration of the baseness of sin, from fear of hell, or from love of eternal beatitude." —Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 4 (Denn. 897 sq.).

Perfect contrition, coupled with a desire to receive the Sacrament of Penance (contritio cum voto sacramenti), is sufficient to effect the forgiveness of sins not merely in cases of necessity, or when it reaches the highest possible degree of intensity, but of itself and always. Imperfect contrition (attrition), on the other hand, can produce this effect only in connection with sacramental confession.⁹ Hence perfect contrition is not an essential requisite of Penance, but attrition suffices for the valid reception of this Sacrament, provided, of course, that the penitent is resolved to sin no more and confidently trusts in the mercy of God.

⁹ Conc. Trident., 1. c. —Cfr. Prop. Bait Damnat., prop. 31, 32, 70, 71 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1031, 1032, 1070, 1071). —Gury, l. c., n. 335: "Perfect contrition justifies a man of itself, even outside the Sacrament of Penance. This is evident from reason: for contrition necessarily includes perfect charity; moreover, to love God perfectly is to be united with God, since love consists in union; and union with God necessarily effects separation from sin, since one cannot embrace one extreme without withdrawing entirely from the opposite extreme. Therefore it follows. It is also evident from Sacred Scripture. Perfect contrition does not remit mortal sins, or justify a man, except with the desire for confession, for sins cannot be remitted except through the means instituted by Christ. An implicit desire suffices, however; for an explicit desire is required neither by the nature of perfect contrition, since it can justify by itself alone, nor by a divine precept, since none can be shown." 9a Cfr. Slater, Questions of Moral Theology, 355 sqq.

However, though there is no obligation to make an act of perfect contrition in preparing for confession, the faithful should be exhorted to do so, to the best of their ability.9* Broadly speaking it is safe to assume that imperfect contrition always includes an act of at least incipient love (amor initialis), while perfect contrition is rarely without an admixture of fear (timor filialis).¹⁰

¹⁰ Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, c. 6: "They are raised up to hope and begin to love God as the source of all justice." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 798). —Cfr. J. E. Pruner, Kath. Moralthevlogie, Vol. II, 3rd ed., p. 374.

For the valid reception of the Sacrament of Penance contrition (whether perfect or imperfect) should be: a) Sincere or heart-felt, for else it would be sheer hypocrisy. The quality of sincerity flows as a necessary effect from the nature of contrition. b) Supernatural, both in its origin and in its motives. True contrition owes its existence to divine grace and is based upon reasons or motives supplied by supernatural faith.¹¹ c) Supreme or sovereign, not in intensity but appreciatively, i. e., the penitent must detest sin as the greatest of all evils and be ready to give up everything he has, even life itself, rather than offend God.¹² Since contrition is in the will, not in the emotions, it may happen that the sorrow one feels at temporal misfortunes is both affectively and intensively greater than that felt at sin as a purely spiritual evil; but this need not prevent a man's contrition from being appreciatively supreme. "If we may not succeed in rendering our contrition perfect," says the Roman Catechism, "it may nevertheless be true and efficacious, for oftentimes things that fall under the senses affect us more than spiritual things, and hence some persons experience a greater sense of grief for the loss of their children than for the baseness of their sins.”¹³ Our sense of grief need not be supreme, for to make it so is largely beyond our control; but we must by a combined act of the mind and will abhor sin above all other evils. Theologians express this technically by saying that sin must be detested as the greatest of all evils, not affectively, but effectively ¹⁴ (non affective sed effective). d) Contrition must furthermore be universal, i. e., it must cover all the mortal sins committed by the penitent. As every mortal sin implies a complete turning away from God, no one mortal sin can be forgiven without the rest.¹⁵

¹¹ Conc. Trident., Sess. VI, can. 3 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 813). — Cfr. Prop. Damnat. sub Innoc. XL, prop. 57: "It is probable that merely honorable natural attrition suffices." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1207).

¹² Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., II, n. 328: "Supreme, that is, so that the sinner detests his offense more than every other evil and prefers to lose and suffer all things rather than commit sin. For conversion to God must be total, since sin is a total turning away; but it would not be total unless it were supreme—indeed, it would be nothing—for the man would still cling to a creature, since he would still prefer it to God."

¹³ Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, QU. 28: "Although we may be less able to attain that it be perfect, contrition can nevertheless be true and efficacious. For it often happens that things subject to the senses affect us more than spiritual things. Therefore some persons sometimes experience a greater feeling of grief from the death of their children than from the baseness of sin."

¹⁴ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 3, art. 1-2.

¹⁵ Cfr. Gury, op. cit., n. 328: "Universal, that is, it must exclude all grave sins, at least implicitly, either from one universal motive or from several particular motives which, at least taken together, extend to all mortal sins committed, even those not occurring to memory. The reason is that no actual sin is remitted without sorrow; but one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another, since remission takes place by the infusion of grace, which cannot coexist with any mortal sin." —Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 86, ad 3.

It is not, however, necessary to make a special act of contrition for each particular mortal sin. One general act for all the sins committed (universe) will suffice.

Venial sins can be forgiven severally, one without the other, and hence it suffices to make an act of contrition for one. When many venial sins are confessed, it is advisable to elicit a more specific contrition for the one or other of them, because a too general contrition might lack sincerity and efficaciousness.¹⁶ To receive sacramental absolution from a venial sin it is necessary to have at least imperfect contrition for that particular offence.

¹⁶ Cfr. Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 29 sq.; St. Alphonsus, Theol, Mor., I, VI, n. 433, 438, THE PURPOSE OF AMENDMENT

Being the proximate matter of Penance, contrition must be brought into moral connexion with the Sacra- ment, 7. e., it must precede the sacramental absolution or be present in the soul while the formula of absolution is pronounced by the priest. The best way is to make an act of contrition before entering the confessional.

READINGS. —Pohle-Pretiss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, pp. 132 sqq.—Chr. Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones Dogmaticae, Vol. VII, 2nd ed., pp. 39 sqq. —R. Schultes, O.P., Reue und Bussakrament, Paderborn 1907.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. III, pp. 296 sqq.

1. DEFINITION. —Genuine contrition, whether perfect or imperfect, must be accompanied by a firm purpose to amend one's life and to avoid future sins (propositum non peccandi de cetero). This truth may be deduced from the very nature of contrition, which, being a detestation of sin as an offense against God, must include both an act of sorrow for past sins (de praeterito) and the resolution not to sin again (de futuro).

The purpose of amendment which is included in contrition may be either explicit (propositum explicitum sive formate) or implicit (propositum implicitum sive virtuale). It is explicit when the penitent expressly thinks of the future and resolves never to sin again; it is implicit if he merely hates sin for fear or love of God, without eliciting a formal act of the will not to sin in fu- ture. A good resolution of the latter kind is called virtual.¹

¹ Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., II, n. 342: "A purpose is a true will not to sin any more in the future. It is twofold: explicit or formal, by which one, thinking about the future, resolves not to sin any more; and implicit or virtual, which is included in contrition itself without the future time being placed before one’s eyes." —Cfr. Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 4: “Propositum non peccandi de cetera.... Cessatio a peccato et vitae novae propositum el inchoatio." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 897).

The resolution to avoid sin and its proximate occasions for a supernatural motive is an indispensable condition of the valid reception of Penance. The controverted question whether the Sacrament requires an explicit (formal) resolution, or whether an implicit (virtual) purpose of amendment suffices, may theoretically be decided in favor of the latter opinion, though in praxi it is always better to choose the pars tutior, i. e., to give explicit consideration to the necessity of amending one's life and make a formal resolution to do so. A really contrite penitent will hardly ever fail to make an explicit purpose of amendment.²

² Gury, op. cit., n. 345: "Is an explicit purpose required in contrition? Three opinions are given. The first, more common and very much more probable, denies it, because a purpose with all its efficacy is included in true contrition; therefore an implicit purpose ought to suffice for the validity of the Sacrament, provided sorrow is elicited from a universal motive. The second opinion affirms it, because, although sorrow necessarily includes a purpose, nevertheless an explicit purpose is required by Trent when it says in the definition of contrition: with the purpose of not sinning for the future. The third opinion holds that an explicit purpose is not required if the penitent does not think of the future, as happens with the dying; otherwise, if he attends to the future. In practice the safer opinion is to be followed because of the authority of the theologians who maintain the necessity of an explicit purpose, although speculatively it seems rather improbable. Besides, it very rarely happens that truly contrite penitents omit an explicit purpose." —Cfr. Noldin, Vol. III, pp. 312 sq.

2. PROPERTIES. —The purpose of amendment, being an essential part of contrition, is as necessary for the valid reception of Penance as con- trition itself, and consequently, like the latter, and for the same reasons, must be: a) Universal (propositum universale), i. e., it must comprise all mortal sins which one might possibly commit in future and, in a general way, the lessening of venial sins.³ If none but venial sins form the matter of confession, it is sufficient to resolve to avoid at least one of them, or to diminish the total number.⁴ b) The purpose of amendment must be firm, i. e., the penitent must be determined to suffer any hardship rather than again offend God by a mortal sin.⁵ Distrust of one's strength or fear of relapse do not impair the firmness of purpose which a sinner must have to amend his life. All that is required is that he humbly trust in God and be firmly determined to cooperate with divine grace in fighting temptations.⁶ Actual re- lapse is not always a sign that one's purpose of amendment lacked firmness; for even the strongest resolution may weaken and finally succumb.⁷ But when the relapsed penitent has made no effort, or only the weakest kind of an effort, to amend his life, it may reasonably be presumed that he had no firm purpose of amendment. c) Since the purpose of amendment is essentially an act of the will directed to future performance, it must be efficacious (propositum efficax), that is to say, the penitent must be ready and willing to employ the means necessary and useful for the avoidance of sin, particularly to shun all voluntary proximate occasions ⁸ and to repair to the best of his ability whatever injury he may have done to others.

³ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 87, art. 1, ad i: "A man established in grace can avoid all mortal sins and each one; he can also avoid each venial sin, but not all. Therefore penance for mortal sins requires that a man purpose to abstain from all and each mortal sin; but for penance for venial sins it is required that he purpose to abstain from individual sins, though not from all, because the weakness of this life does not permit this. Yet he ought to have the purpose of preparing himself to diminish venial sins; otherwise he would be in danger of falling away, since he would abandon the desire of progressing or of removing the impediments to spiritual progress, which are venial sins."

⁴ Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 344, 347.

⁵ Ibid., n. 34: "The penitent must have an entirely determined will not to relapse into sin, notwithstanding any inconvenience or human fear; otherwise he would not will to turn totally and sincerely to God."

⁶ Op. cit., n. 346: "Should the purpose of one who indeed has the intention not to sin but believes he will certainly relapse be judged firm? The reply is negative, because, practically speaking, one who truly wills not to sin can abstain from sin. Therefore, if he believes he can abstain. Therefore, if he believes that he will certainly fall, this indicates weakness of purpose; for divine grace will always be present, with which he ought to hope that he will not relapse. Yet one who fears a fall because of past frailty is not to be judged indisposed. Hence that penitent has a true purpose who, when asked by the confessor about his will not to sin, replies: “I am very frail; I fear a fall, yet I do not now will to fall.” In practice, however, examine the penitent’s character and disposition. For you will not rarely find sinners declaring that they will relapse who fear that their purpose is not sufficiently firm, although they display nothing other than fear of falling and distrust of themselves. Such penitents are to be told that the question is not about what will perhaps probably happen but about the present will regarding the future and about placing supreme confidence in divine help."

⁷ Cfr. Matth. XXVI, 33-35; 69- 75. —St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, qu. 84, art. 10, ad 4: "That someone afterward sins, either in act or purpose, does not exclude the first repentance from having been true; for the truth of a prior act is never excluded by a subsequent contrary act. For just as one who afterward sits truly ran, so one who afterward sins truly repented."

⁸ Cfr. Gury, Camp. Theol. Mor., II, n. 344: "An efficacious purpose: the penitent must not only resolve firmly that he wills not to sin any more, but must also employ effort and all necessary means for avoiding sins and fleeing proximate occasions. It suffices, however, that the purpose be affectively efficacious; that is, it suffices that the sinner be prepared in mind to employ the necessary means, because future avoidance of sin is not of the essence of a purpose." dDe Imit. Christi, I, 19 (Opera Omnia, ed. Pohl, II, 32 sq.). Our translation is that of the "Seraphic Edition," by Father Thaddeus, O.F.M., London 1908, pp. 34 sq.

The purpose of amendment which forms part of contrition is of great importance for the spiritual life because there can be no progress on the way to perfection unless one has a straight purpose and keeps it. Thomas a Kempis says: "According to our resolution the course of our progress shall be; and he who would advance rapidly needeth great diligence. For if a man who maketh a firm resolution often faileth, how will he fare who hath seldom or never any fixed purpose? In many ways, however, we abandon our good resolve; and a slight omission of our exercises seldom passeth without some detriment to our progress. The good resolutions of the just depend not so much on their own wisdom, as on the grace of God, in whom they also ever trust in all their undertakings. For man proposeth, but God disposeth; and 'the way of a man is not His.' " 9 "Good resolutions," says Alban Stolz, "are like blossoms that drop from a tree; they bring no fruit unless a man employs the means necessary to carry them out."

READINGS.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. III, pp. 310 sqq.—Th. Slater, S.J., Manual of Moral Theol, Vol. II, pp. 161 sq —A Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 231 sqq.—A. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theol. Mor. et Past., Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 77 sqq.

1. NECESSITY. —The second essential constituent of the Sacrament of Penance is confession. By confession (confessio, ἐξομολόγησις)¹ we understand the sorrowful declaration of sins made to a priest with the purpose of obtaining forgiveness through the power of the keys.²

¹ Conc. Florent., Decretum pro Armenis: "The second part of penance is oral confession, to which it belongs that the sinner confess integrally to his priest all the sins of which he has memory." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 699).

² Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 33: "They define confession as an accusation of sins belonging to the class of a Sacrament, undertaken so that we may obtain pardon by the power of the keys. It is rightly called an accusation, because sins are not to be recalled as though we were displaying our crimes, as those do who rejoice when they have done evil, nor merely narrated as though we were recounting some deed to idle hearers for their amusement. Rather they are to be enumerated with an accusing mind, so that we wish them to be punished even in ourselves. We confess sins for the sake of obtaining pardon, because this judgment is far unlike forensic trials for capital crimes, in which punishment and torment, not freedom from guilt and pardon of error, are appointed for confession." (Ed. Ratisb. 43, p. 225). Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, pp. 181 sqq.

Sacramental confession is of divine institution and has been embodied among the commandments of the Church.³

³ Cfr. John XX, 21 sqq. —Cone, Trid., Sess. VI, ch. 14; Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 5, can. 6-8.

Every Catholic who has attained to the use of reason, i. e., who is able to distinguish between good and evil, and has sinned grievously, is obliged to confess his sins once a year (annua confessio).⁴ Not age, but intellectual and moral development is the decisive factor in regard to this obligation. Of course, the precept of annual confession binds only those who have committed a mortal sin. Those who are guilty of venial sins only are not strictly obliged to go to confession at all.⁵ Because of the danger of selfdeception, however, and particularly on account of the respect due to the law of Easter Communion, every Catholic is advised to go to confession at least once a year, even though he be not conscious of mortal sin.

⁴ Conc. Lot. IV., c. 21: "Omnis utriusque sexus fidelis, postquam ad annos discretionis pervenerit,... fideliter confiteatur...." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 437). —Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 38: "It is evident that no one is bound by the law of confession before the age at which he can have the use of reason. Yet that age is not certainly defined by a particular number of years; rather, this seems to be laid down universally: confession is enjoined upon a child from the time when he has the power to distinguish between good and evil and deceit can enter his mind. For when anyone reaches that time of life at which eternal salvation must be considered, then for the first time he ought to confess his sins to a priest, since otherwise no one burdened by consciousness of crimes may hope for salvation." (Ed. Ratisb. 43, p. 228).

⁵ Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., 1. VI, n. 667: "It is asked whether, in order to satisfy the precept of annual confession, one who has no mortal sins is bound to confess venial sins. The first opinion affirms it. The second opinion, however, which is common and truer, denies it. The reason is that by commanding annual confession the Church commands only that confession which is due from Christ’s institution. But Christ commands no confession other than that of mortal sins." —Supra, p. 138.

The obligation imposed by the precept of annual confession is not ad finiendam, but ad urgendam obligationem. Hence if a man surely foresees that he will not be able to comply with his duty later in the year, he is bound to do it now.

Sacramental confession, to be valid, must be made to the appointed priest in person, not by letter, telephone or messenger.⁶ The personal presence of the penitent is required even when oral confession is impracticable because the penitent is deaf or can speak no language known to the confessor. In the former case the avowal can be made by means of signs or in writing, in the latter, through an interpreter. In case of necessity, when oral confession is impossible, the penitent may manifest by signs the nature of his sins, his sorrow for them, and his wish to be absolved.6a II. PROPERTIES. —The properties of confession flow from the nature and purpose of the Sacrament. They are: (i) Integrity, (2) Sincerity, and (3) Clearness.⁷

⁶ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 9, art. 3; Decree of Clement VIII, June 20, 1602; Declaration of Paul V, July 14, 1605 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 962, 963); Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 45. —To the query whether absolution given by telephone (per telephonium) would be valid, and, in case of necessity, licit, the S. Congregation of the Penitentiary replied: "Nothing is to be answered" (July 1, 1884). —Cfr. Pohle-Preuss, The Sacraments, Vol. III, pp. 98 sqq. 6a No one is obliged to confess either in writing or through an interpreter. Cfr. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. III, pp. 318 sqq.

⁷ St. Thomas mentions no less than sixteen, but they can all be reduced to the three mentioned in the text: "Let confession be simple, humble, pure, faithful, and frequent, unadorned, discreet, willing, modest, complete, secret, tearful, prompt, courageous and accusing, and let it be ready to obey." Th. M. J. Gousset (Theol. Mor., I, 256) enumerates four: integritas, simplicitas, humilitas, caritas. Gury (Comp. Theol. Mor., II, n. 352) thinks that only two of these qualities are essential: "Many qualities of confession are assigned by various authors, namely, that it be integral, sorrowful, humble, prudent, simple, unadorned, modest, brief, secret, and vocal. Of these qualities of confession only the first two are essential; the rest pertain to its manner and perfection and need no special explanation."

1. INTEGRITY. —Confession is entire or complete if the penitent avows all the mortal sins he has committed since Baptism or his last previous confession, together with their number and spe- cific circumstances.⁸ To be able to do this properly he must examine his conscience.

⁸ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 5, can. 7; Cat. Rom., P. II, c. 5, qu. 40 sq.

The integrity of confession (integritas confessionis) may be material or formal. It is material (integritas materialis) if the penitent actually confesses all his mortal sins; it is formal (integritas formalis) if he is willing to make a complete avowal, but is prevented by physical or moral causes. a) The material integrity of confession requires:

α) That the penitent mention all those mortal sins which he has not yet validly confessed. When he is in doubt whether or not he has confessed a mortal sin, or whether some particular sin is mortal or venial, the penitent is not bound, but (cases of scrupulousness and urgent necessity excepted) earnestly advised to mention it. If the existing doubt is founded on weighty reasons (dubium prudens), it is advisable that the sin (peccatum dubium) be confessed. Mortal sins which have been inadvertently omitted (forgotten) in one confession, must be declared in the next. If a penitent has purposely concealed a mortal sin, his confession is invalid, and he must, besides confessing his sacrilege, repeat all the mortal sins mentioned in his invalid confession, unless the confessor has at least a dim recollection of them.

0. That the number of mortal sins committed be given as accurately as possible. If the exact number cannot be ascertained, it is sufficient to give an approximate estimate, declaring, for instance, how many times the sin has been committed each day, week, or month. y) That the circumstances be mentioned which change the species of a sin or add a new species (circumstantiae speciem mut antes vel addentes), and especially those by which a venial sin becomes grievous (e. g., scandal). Circumstances that merely increase the guilt of a sin within the same species (circumstantiae notabiliter aggravantes) as a rule need not be confessed, though it is advisable to do so. They must be expressly mentioned if they entail a censure or reservation, or if the confessor inquires about them with a view to ascertaining the disposition of the penitent or deciding whether restitution has to be made.⁹

⁹ Cfr. Prop, Damnat. sub Innoc. XI., prop. 58: "We are not bound to disclose to a confessor who asks us a habit of some sin." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1208).

Circumstances which might change an objectively grievous sin (i. e., one that is grievous merely from its object) into a venial sin should also be mentioned. This is not necessary for the integrity of the Sacrament, but advisable because it may enable the confessor to form a better idea of the penitent's state of mind.

The mortal sins a man has committed, together with their number and specific circumstances, constitute the necessary matter of Penance (materia necessaria). Venial sins are merely materia libera et sufficiens, that is to say, they need not be, but may and, considering the importance of the Sacrament, should be confessed. Previously confessed sins, whether mortal or venial, may be confessed again, and if properly regretted, constitute sufficient matter for absolution. All "the other sins, which do not occur [to the penitent] after diligent thought, are understood to be included as a whole in that same confession," and are summarily included in the usual declaration: "For these and all other sins of which I am not now conscious, I am heartily sorry," and so forth.¹⁰

¹⁰ "The remaining sins which do not occur to one who thinks diligently are understood to be included as a whole in that same confession."—Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 5; cfr. Ps. XVIII, 13.

In order to be able to confess his sins properly, the penitent, before approaching the sacred tribunal, should carefully and earnestly examine his conscience.¹¹ No time limit can be set for this important task. Circumstances of individuality, time, place, etc., must be taken into consideration. The only general rule that may be laid down is that the time and care devoted to the examination of conscience should be equal to that which is usually bestowed by prudent men upon important matters of business, and that there be no exaggeration or carelessness, lest the validity of the Sacrament be endangered and it become what Protestants have unjustly called it,—a "slaughter-house of consciences."

¹¹ "A diligent examination of oneself or due and diligent forethought." (Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 5, can. 7).—Cfr. Noldin, Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. III, pp. 339 sqq.

Material integrity of confession in the strict sense is not always possible because God alone knows the hearts of men and can judge them infallibly.¹² b) Confession is formally complete or entire if the penitent tells all the sins he is able to remember and confess, thereby proving his willingness to make a full avowal.

¹² Acts I, 24; XV, 8; 1 Cor. IV, 4.

The obstacles to material integrity are partly physical and partly moral. Physical obstacles are, e. g., deafness or inability to speak, impossibility of finding a confessor who understands one's language, immediate danger of death, inculpable ignorance or forgetfulness. Moral obstacles are: extraordinary difficulty, grave spiritual or temporal injury threatening the penitent, the confessor, or a third person; e. g., the danger of losing one's good name (not, however, before the confessor), serious scandal, violation of the seal, etc. Such obstacles dispense from material integrity, provided, of course, it is morally impossible for the penitent to wait or to find another priest to whom he could make a full confession. Physical exertion, crowding of the confessionals,¹³ intense shame¹⁴ or the necessity of indirectly revealing an ac- complice do not excuse a penitent from making a full confession of his sins.

¹³ The following proposition was condemned under Innocent XI: "It is lawful sacramentally to absolve those only partially confessed because of a great concourse of penitents, such as can occur, for example, on the day of some great feast or indulgence." (Prop. Damnat. sub Innoc. XI., prop. 59; Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1209).

¹⁴ Conc. Trident., Sess. XIV, De Poenit., c. 5: "The very difficulty of such confession and the shame of disclosing sins might indeed seem grave were it not relieved by so many and such great advantages and consolations, which are most certainly conferred through absolution upon all who worthily approach this Sacrament." —Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol., Mor,, II, n. 377: "A difficulty intrinsic to confession never excuses, however grave it may be. The reason is that confession by its nature is essentially laborious, and therefore, if a grave difficulty—for example, great repugnance or shame—excused from integrity, the faithful would very often be excused from accusing themselves of mortal sins, and consequently the institution of the Sacrament of Penance would for the most part collapse. Moreover, the Church could not reserve atrocious crimes, because that creates no slight inconvenience for penitents."

Under no pretext is the confessor permitted to inquire formally for the name of an accomplice or associate in crime (complex peccati aut socius criminis), his place of residence,¹⁵ or any circumstance that might reveal his identity. Nay, more, the penitent should not be allowed to disclose the name of his accomplice because confessor and penitent are both under obligation to protect the good name of others. But the penitent must divulge the degree of relationship of his accomplice if this is rendered necessary by some circumstance changing the species of his sin, e. g., incest, and the fact that a priest is involved when the confessional has been abused for soliciting to impurity. The laws of the Church require that a priest guilty of this crime be reported by name to the ecclesiastical authorities. If a penitent can, without great inconvenience, choose a confessor to whom his accomplice is unknown, he is in duty bound to do so.¹⁶

¹⁵ Benedict XIV., Const. "Suprema omnium," July 7, 1745; "Ubi primum," June 2, 1746; "Ad eradircandum," Sept. 28, 1746; "Apostolid ministerii," Dec. 9, 1749 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1474). —Cfr. Gury, II, 379, 382.

¹⁶ Cfr. Gopfert, III, 235 sqq. — Noldin, III, 338 sq.

If for some physical or moral reason the penitent has forgotten or otherwise omitted a mortal sin in confession, he must mention it in his next confession, —not to obtain forgiveness (as such sin has been forgiven indirectly by the grace of absolution), but to submit the forgotten sin formally to the power of the keys.¹⁷

¹⁷ Gury, II, n. 377: "When the cause excusing from material integrity ceases, the divine precept of confessing all omitted mortal sins again becomes urgent; for the excuse from the divine law of confession does not cease merely when an impediment occurs but is only suspended. Therefore, when the excusing cause ceases, the obligation of the law revives in its entirety; for the precept of confession is attached neither to a time nor to a circumstance but affects the whole of life, so that sins not yet accused must afterward necessarily be accused if this can be done. Nor is it an objection that the Church has determined the time of confession, for this determination is not for ending but for enforcing the obligation. It is evident, moreover, from the proposition condemned by Alexander VII, which reads thus: “We are not bound in a subsequent confession to disclose sins omitted or forgotten in confession because of imminent danger of death or another cause.” Therefore the contradictory of this proposition is true: consequently sins passed over through forgetfulness must necessarily be accused, although they have already been blotted out."

(cc. 870-910)

— Appendix XI belongs to this section. Historical Introduction. Cf. Appendix XI.

This will be the order of speaking: first we shall treat of the essence and necessity of the sacrament of Penance, then of its minister; then of its subject, then of its various circumstances. In the chapter on the minister, we shall examine the case of one absolving an accomplice; in the chapter on the subject, the obligation of denouncing a solicitor.

Finally, imitating the canonical Code, we shall add to the treatise a chapter on indulgences.

Utility. Not only a distinct knowledge of the essential parts of this sacrament, which pertains to the necessary learning of the confessor, insofar as he must reconcile men with God, but also the force and value of the formulae which are added to the essence, will help the physician of souls not a little in procuring spiritual health.

— 1. Notion. The Sacrament of Penance is the sacrament instituted by Christ in which, using the power of remitting and retaining sins, a suitable minister, by a judicial sentence, remits sins committed after Baptism to a faithful person sincerely penitent and confessing his guilt.

The conferred power is read openly in the Gospel of St. John 20:22 sqq.; but the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, defined that Penance is a sacrament properly so called, instituted by Christ, distinct from Baptism, and that the words, "Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained," which the Catholic Church from the beginning has always understood of the power of remitting and retaining sins in the sacrament of Penance, cannot be twisted to the authority of preaching the Gospel.

A suitable minister is a priest endowed with jurisdiction, as will be explained afterward.

Use is made both by absolving, and by binding, whether to fulfilling a satisfactory work, or to a new subjection to the power of the keys.

To a faithful person sincerely penitent and accusing his own guilt. For three things are required in the penitent for the integral and perfect remission of sins: contrition, at least that which is called by the special name of attrition, confession, and satisfaction; so that contrition and confession are required for the very validity, but satisfaction for the integrity and plenary effects of the sacrament. All these things are also established by the Tridentine canons concerning this sacrament. Yet that attrition itself suffices has not been defined.

Sins committed after Baptism. For by Baptism alone both original sin and sins committed before Baptism are remitted. Wherefore only a baptized man can validly receive this sacrament of Penance.

Nor is remission obtained by another sacrament, even if at the moment of Baptism, lack of attrition concerning prior sins wholly or partly impeded the effect of Baptism at that time. Wholly, I say, if because of prior grave sins not retracted, sanctifying grace could not be infused; partly, if a persevering affection toward prior venial sins prohibited guilt and penalties from being remitted by Baptism. For when the fiction recedes, the sacrament of Baptism confers sanctifying grace; when venial sins have been retracted, these, without any remaining expiation of penalties, will be blotted out. But if new grave sins require perfect contrition or use of the sacrament of Penance with attrition, then, when the act of perfect contrition has been elicited, or when the priest gives absolution, by the force of the prior Baptism, or of the permanent character, grave sins prior to Baptism will be taken away. But if someone, not even before death, has not sufficiently retracted certain venial sins, departing from this life in the state of grace and with the habit of charity, he will immediately after death retract these perfectly; and by force of the baptismal character, he will have no penalty to be paid for these sins, insofar as they are prior to Baptism.

By a judicial sentence: for that sacramental absolution is a judicial act was defined in canon 9, sess. XIV of the Council of Trent.

He remits to the disposed penitent, because he must use his power not according to his own judgment, but according to the rules to be declared afterward.

— What concerning sins which are committed in the very reception of Baptism, and concerning the sin of fiction, or of Baptism received with an obstacle?

Sins which are committed in the very reception of Baptism are remitted by Baptism, provided they were committed before the sacramental sign was placed, or before the infusion of water under the words of the form. And the same must be said about sins which, committed before Baptism, indeed exist at the moment of Baptism but merely habitually. If after Baptism they again become actual, for example because of a renewed will, it is clear that these are now remitted only by the means of post-baptismal Penance.

But concerning fiction, as Cardinal Billot skillfully observes, De Sacramentis, th. 30, this is special: that it is properly consummated if, at the moment at which grace was to be infused, someone consciously, through mortal sin either then committed or not retracted, placed an obstacle to grace. Wherefore, since the infusion of grace, or the reality of the sacrament, is by nature posterior to the sacramental sign and the impression of the character, the sin of fiction itself is necessarily, at least by nature, posterior to the sacrament. And therefore, properly speaking, the sin of fiction, as St. Thomas says (3 p., q. 69, art. 10, ad 2), will be remitted not through Baptism, but through Penance, in reality or in desire. But if you suppose a man who, forgetful of his indisposition, received Baptism, or if in good faith, with only an estimated attrition, he approaches the sacrament of Baptism, he will have no formal sin of fiction to be accused. And also a prior will of sacrilegious reception of Baptism, which is not formally consummated in Baptism, will be remitted through Baptism. Cf. St. Thomas, art. cit.; Suarez, in 3 p., d. 28, art. 5; Lugo, Paen., d. 15, s. 1; Lehmkuhl, II, 356.

— Acts of the Penitent. Contrition, confession, and satisfaction are called by the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 3, the quasi-matter of this sacrament. And this matter is proximate. But the remote matter is sins, posterior to Baptism, about which those acts are concerned; and this indeed in such a way that mortal sins are necessary matter as long as they have not been directly remitted sacramentally; but venial sins are sufficient matter and in themselves not necessary. In themselves, I say, because he who has no other matter to bring must accuse at least one venial sin with sorrow, if he wishes to use the sacrament.

But whether the acts of the penitent are true matter from which, together with the form, the sacrament is made, or whether the whole essence of the sacrament consists in absolution, so that the acts themselves of the penitent are nothing except matter about which: this is controverted. The more common opinion, of St. Thomas and the Thomists, embraces the former part, yet in such a way that satisfaction itself, excepting the necessary will of satisfying which is contained in contrition, is not held as an essential element, but only an integral one. Yet the different opinion of Scotus is not improbable.

For the remaining things which pertain to the acts of the penitent, cf. the chapter On the Subject.

— The Form of the Sacrament is the words of absolution, which in the Latin Church are: "I absolve you from your sins, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen," pronounced by voice upon a man present.

The word "I" is not essential; and the words "In the name of the Father," etc., now do not pertain to the form, as is demonstrated from ancient Rituals. More probably these suffice: "I absolve you"; or "I absolve from your sins." Yet because of doubt concerning this matter, under grave obligation at least these words must be said: "I absolve you from your sins"; and absolution is to be repeated under condition where anything from these has been omitted.

As is established from the proposition condemned and the usage absolutely proscribed by Clement VIII through the decree of the Holy Office, June 20, 1602, and the subsequent declaration of Paul V, July 14, 1605 (Denzinger, n. 1088), the form must be pronounced by mouth, and, on the part of the one absolving, bear the appearance of direct speech with the penitent. Wherefore absolution given in writing is invalid, or from a place so remote that the words could not be perceived, even if by some sign you manifest the absolution while it is being conferred. And Clement VIII prohibited absolving an absent person under penalty of excommunication. And although it is not necessary that the penitent truly hear the words of the confessor, or that he himself be perceived by sense by the confessor, who can be blind, nevertheless, so that there be no doubt from the side of distance concerning the value of absolution, it is necessary that the confessor and penitent not be separated by such a distance at which men, using an ordinary though somewhat louder voice, could not or would not be accustomed to hold conversations: which distance St. Alphonsus, VI, 429, thinks is contained within 20 paces. Yet at a longer distance, those are judged present who are part of a multitude whose first ranks are near. Thus an army can be present in the manner of one, provided the last ranks can perceive the voice (Noldin, III, 239). And the value remains probable as long as the penitent, the impediment being removed, could perceive the absolution in some way. Wherefore a priest will absolve under condition one whom he has seen or heard dying at a distance. But outside necessity, he will not hold as present someone who is in a room which does not communicate with the place where the confessor is, unless the walls are such that they allow the possibility of mutual conversation. But a departing penitent he will recall, if it can be done conveniently and prudently, or he will absolve until he is not farther away.

Absolution given through the telephone would be very doubtful, so that outside a case of necessity this means cannot be attempted. The question concerning the use of the telephone in extreme necessity, the Sacred Penitentiary, July 1, 1884, judged unworthy of a response. For to the proposed doubt it wrote back: Nothing is to be answered.

From the present discipline at least of the Latin Church, the form of absolution cannot be a deprecation, but must be decretory. And in the Constitution Etsi pastoralis, May 26, 1742, Benedict XIV, §5, commanded that Italo-Greeks, when they absolve Latins, use the indicative form prescribed in the Council of Florence: "afterward, if they wish, let them say that deprecative prayer which they had been accustomed only to say as the form of this absolution" (Coll. P. F., n. 338). Cf. also n. 966, response of the Holy Office, June 14, 1843. Concerning the theoretical question, cf. the historical introduction and the dogmaticians.

Invalid would be an absolution given under a condition concerning the future. Cf. above, n. 185.

Therefore the form would be doubtful: "May God absolve you," or "May Christ absolve you." It is clear that it does not harm validity if instead of "you," you say: "your Majesty."

— The Complete Ritual Formula of the Sentence of the One Absolving: 1. also embraces prayers before the essential words: "May almighty God have mercy on you, and, your sins having been forgiven, lead you to eternal life. Amen." Then, with hand raised, he continues: "May the almighty and merciful Lord grant you pardon, absolution, and remission of your sins. Amen";

2. A conditional absolution from censures by a twofold condition: of power in the one absolving, of necessity in the penitent: "May Our Lord Jesus Christ absolve you, and I, by his authority, absolve you from every bond of excommunication, suspension, if he is a cleric, and interdict, insofar as I can and you need";

3. Absolution, with decretory or absolute words: "Then I absolve you from your sins, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Amen." While he names the divine Persons, he makes the sign of the cross.

It is concluded with a deprecation: "May the Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the merits of the Blessed Mary Virgin and of all the Saints, whatever good you have done and evil you have suffered, be for you unto remission of sins, increase of grace, and reward of eternal life. Amen." Now:

The prayers Misereatur and Indulgentiam, from Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 3, are laudably added. But canon 885 warns us: "Let them not be omitted without a just cause." Both lack of time and a multitude of penitents easily furnish this cause (cf. Noldin, III, 237).

Nor is it established that he sins who has omitted: "May Our Lord Jesus Christ absolve you," etc., if there is no suspicion of censure, and the form of absolution from sins, by the intention of the one absolving, is referred also to censures and bonds connected with sins, if perhaps there are any. Then, even if the penitent is bound by a certain censure, the omission will not be grave. But it would be mortal to wish to absolve first from sins rather than from a censure which takes away the legitimate use of the sacraments, such as excommunication, and sometimes interdict.

Whether the word Deinde belongs to the black or red text is not so certain. At least it is better to pronounce it. Thus usage has it, and in the latest typical edition of the Ritual it is written in black letters. In the Ritual of Paul V, the word Deinde does not pertain to the text; Benedict XIV inserted the same into the text (cf. Hanssens, Per., XII, p. [41]).

To omit the Persons of the Most Holy Trinity is thought venial.

The formula "May the Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ," etc., is indeed not imposed as to be used under sin, but it is better to use it because of the spiritual utility of the penitent. For it joins with the good acts of the penitent a special satisfactory value, which some equate with the power of sacramental penance.

These words are thought by others merely to express the prayer by which, in the name of the Church, the priest prays God that he grant abundant actual graces by which the penitent may perform works very meritorious and satisfactory. They are then a certain useful sacramental: this interpretation agrees more with the natural signification of the words. But others attribute to the same words the power of elevating all the good works of the penitent to the dignity of sacramental satisfaction, not indeed indefinitely, but until the faults accused and remitted in the Sacrament have not been fully expiated (cf. Noldin, III, 259). Many grave authors judge this, and St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 507, thinks it more probably and more commonly affirmed. That a greater power of expiation of past fault accrues to good works from the aforesaid injunction is the opinion of St. Thomas himself, Quodlib. 3, art. 28.

Where there are many penitents to be heard, one could before the first absolution premise Misereatur and Indulgentiam, omitting the same in the following cases; but pronounce the formula "May the Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ" while the penitent is departing. The formula "May Our Lord Jesus Christ" is not regularly to be omitted.

When necessity urges, the Ritual teaches this very brief formula: "I absolve you from all censures and sins, in the name of the Father," etc.

What in the sacrament of Penance is the reality and sacrament, there is little agreement. St. Thomas, 3 p., q. 84, art. 1, ad 3, in passing places it in interior contrition. Cardinal Billot (De Sacramentis, th. VI) says it is the right to remission at least of guilt and eternal penalty; Rev. Fr. de la Taille (Mysterium Fidei, p. 581, note, and Xiberta, Clavis Ecclesiae) says it is "the extinction of debt toward the Church."

But the reality of the sacrament, as always, is sanctifying grace restored or increased, with actual helps for amending life, which constitute sacramental grace.

— Necessity of the Sacrament. For those fallen after Baptism into mortal sin, the sacrament of Penance is "necessary for salvation as Baptism itself is for those not yet regenerated" (Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 2). Therefore there is necessity of means, at least in desire.

— I. 1. By the Council of Trent, sess. XIV, we are taught that Penance is a sacrament properly so called, in which, through a truly judicial sentence, sins committed after Baptism are subjected to the keys by which the Church can remit and retain sins.

2. Matter. The acts of the penitent, contrition, confession, satisfaction, are called by Trent, sess. XIV, ch. 3, the quasi-matter of the sacrament; the more common opinion of St. Thomas and the Thomists holds them as proximate matter and sins as remote matter; yet the opinion of Scotus, which places the whole essence in absolution, is not improbable.

3. Form. In the Latin Church these are the words, pronounced by voice upon a man present: "I absolve you from your sins." Certainly the words suffice: "I absolve you from your sins"; more probably it is enough to say: "I absolve you"; "I absolve from your sins."

Written absolution would be invalid, or one pronounced upon an absent person; but the appearance of direct speech with the penitent is required. This seems to be lacking in the telephone, since those speaking in this way perceive a merely electric imitation of the voice.

Certainly present is he who is not more than 25 paces distant, or is part of a multitude whose first ranks are near.

From the present discipline at least, the form must be pronounced indicative, not deprecative.

The complete form of the Ritual embraces, before the essential words: a) the prayers "Misereatur... Indulgentiam..." which do not oblige under sin, yet are not to be omitted without a just cause; "May Our Lord Jesus Christ absolve you": nor is it established that these must be said under sin; b) conditional general absolution from censures, which is a vestige of reconciliation with the Church, necessary from the primitive discipline of the Church. They think this can today be omitted without sin if there is no suspicion of censure; and certainly it is omitted without grave sin, provided you do not wish to absolve from sins before absolving from a censure which takes away the legitimate use of the sacraments, such as excommunication, and sometimes interdict.

There follows the word Deinde, which is better pronounced than kept silent, since in the typical edition of the Ritual it pertains to the black text.

After the essential words, under venial obligation the Persons of the Most Holy Trinity are to be named. The formula is closed by the word Amen.

Through the added deprecation "May the Passion of Our Lord Jesus Christ," etc., a special satisfactory value is added to the good acts of the penitent. Wherefore, because of the spiritual utility of the penitent, it is better not to omit it.

When necessity urges, the Ritual teaches this brief form: "I absolve you from all censures and sins, in the name of the Father," etc.

— Reservation of a case is its calling away to the judgment of an ordinary Superior, by which at the same time the power of inferiors is limited (c. 893, §1 and 2).

By this genuine definition, the notion of reservation is restored; it is not, at least principally, a penalty, but directly says a restriction of jurisdiction, so that it directly affects the confessor, not the penitent.

Wherefore, concerning the subject of reservation, the Pontifical Commission on the Code, November 24, 1920, De reservationibus, prudently responded that travelers are bound by the reservations of the place in which they are staying (A.A.S., XII, p. 575). For, from c. 881, §1, they are absolved by the jurisdiction of the diocese of the place where they confess. But the absolving confessor possesses this jurisdiction restricted by reservation. In what way, therefore, could he use jurisdiction toward travelers beyond the limits within which he has it?

The reason which we have just added, however, excepts the case in which a traveler, in a foreign diocese, confesses before his own Ordinary or pastor, whose jurisdiction is not affected by the reservation of the foreign diocese. Nor in that case will the pastor have to attend to the reservations of his own diocese, since reservation does not exceed the limits of its own territory.

— The power of reserving cases belongs to all those who by ordinary right can grant the faculty of hearing confessions or inflict censures. Nevertheless, the power is denied to the capitular vicar; while the vicar general needs a special mandate (c. 893).

Indeed, by canon 896, in exempt clerical religions it is expressly assigned to the Superior General alone. Yet we think this is said with respect to the other Superiors, since the canon begins with these words: "Among Superiors." And so we judge that the power of a chapter or general congregation, in which the supreme jurisdiction of the Order exists, remains untouched.

— On Ignorance of Reservation. It is customary to ask whether ignorance excuses the penitent from reservation or not. With attention to the genuine notion of reservation, which subjects graver causes to a more mature judgment, so that it limits the jurisdiction of the inferior and is not numbered among canonical penalties, it seems that a certainly negative response must be given. This is confirmed not a little by the declaration just alleged concerning travelers. For these generally are ignorant of the reservations proper to a foreign diocese, nor are they bound by its penalties; and nevertheless it has been denied, without any distinction, that the simple confessor of the place where he confesses can of himself absolve them from reserved cases. Yet we do not yet dare to reject the extrinsic probability of the more benign opinion. For this, supplied with its reasons, cf. in the study of R. P. Fuster, S.J., Los reservados episcopales segun el nuevo Codigo, in Razon y Fe, t. 52 (1918), p. 510 sqq.; t. 53 (1919), pp. 103, 216, 510 sqq. Nevertheless, nothing prevents the one reserving from reserving only sins which were committed with knowledge of the reservation. The Ordinary will be able to signify this mind either expressly, by a declaration added to the reservation, or tacitly, for example if an excuse on account of ignorance is taught in his seminary. Therefore we shall never say, "ignorance excuses from reservation"; but rather we shall admit that knowledge of reservation is sometimes to be counted among the conditions of a reserved case.

— Sins and censures can be reserved. Both are called by the common name of reserved cases, so that power given over reserved things or over reserved cases, of itself, embraces both powers over reserved sins and reserved censures. But when a sin is at the same time punished by a censure, reservation can affect either the sin alone or the censure alone or both. But if the censure itself impedes the legitimate use of the sacraments, absolution from the censure must formally be placed before absolution from sins. Wherefore if then the reservation affects the censure alone, the sin is nevertheless called reserved by reason of the censure. But in the chapter on Penance, the Code treats almost only of reserved sins. We think we shall consult the utility of students if we immediately join the connected matter concerning reserved censures, so that first concerning reserved sins, then concerning reserved censures, we may propose the disciplinary rules summarily.

— Those Reserving. 1. The single sin reserved to the Holy See by reason of itself is false accusation, by which an innocent priest is accused of the crime of solicitation before ecclesiastical judges (c. 894).

Nevertheless, c. 2363 punishes a false denunciation of this crime, made to Superiors, with a censure specially reserved to the Holy See. How these things are composed, we shall say below.

— 2. The Ordinary of places is warned not to reserve sins unless, either from discussion made in synod, or after the cathedral chapter and some selected parish priests have been heard, the true necessity or utility of the reservation has been proved (c. 895).

3. Among religious Superiors, only the Superior General of an exempt religion, or the abbot of a monastery sui iuris, each with his own Council, can reserve sins, as above. Yet by this reservation they are forbidden to restrict the power of the ordinary confessors of the religious house; nor can they validly restrict the faculty of a confessor approved by the local Ordinary whom a religious has approached (cf. cc. 896, 518-519).

With his own council, that is, after that Council has been heard; for thus we judge that this clause must be interpreted. This interpretation is confirmed from the immediately preceding parallel place. For the local Ordinary is merely commanded to hear his chapter.

Since c. 896 expressly intends to define which Superiors, with others excluded, can reserve cases, and has declared the competent Superior to be one with his own council, he is to be judged not competent without such council, so that consultation of the Council seems necessary for the very value of the reservation.

— These laws are prescribed for Ordinaries:

1. few cases, three at most or four, from the graver and more atrocious external crimes only, specifically determined, are to be reserved (c. 897);

2. reservation is not to remain in force longer than the extirpation of some inveterate vice or the restoration of collapsed discipline demands (c. 897);

3. Ordinaries are entirely to abstain from reserving to themselves sins "which are already reserved to the Apostolic See, even by reason of censure; and regularly from those also upon which a censure, even one reserved to no one, has been imposed by the law" (c. 898).

The first condition, while it requires specific determination, demands that a genus, for example concubinage, not be reserved for attaining the species, but wishes that the case be circumscribed by those notes or circumstances which demand reservation: for example let adulterous concubinage be reserved, if on account of that circumstance it is to be reserved.

Today, indeed, not in every region can it be hoped that a vice can be extirpated by reservation. But if it impedes the propagation of the vice, we judge that this is already enough for the reservation to have the utility which is required according to the wishes of the Holy See.

Canon 898 prohibits Ordinaries from reserving sins even as such (or independently of censure) to which a censure reserved to the Holy See is annexed, even if the sin is reserved to the Holy See only by reason of the censure. For example, from c. 2351, duel is punished by a censure simply reserved to the Holy See. On account of ignorance not to be blamed, the guilty person could have escaped the censure, so that the sin is now not reserved to the Holy See. The Ordinary is prohibited from reserving the sin to himself even for such a hypothesis. Since, however, no invalidating clause is added, the reservation would be valid.

— Cessation. Any reservation lacks force, from c. 900:

1. when the sick who cannot leave the house confess, or betrothed persons for the sake of entering marriage;

2. whenever either the legitimate Superior has denied the faculty of absolving sought for some determined case, or, in the prudent judgment of the confessor, the faculty cannot be sought from the legitimate Superior without grave inconvenience of the penitent or without danger of violation of the sacramental seal;

3. outside the territory of the one reserving, even if the penitent has departed from it only to obtain absolution.

And matters stand equally whether there the confessor of the place or the pastor of the penitent gives absolution.

These rules, proper to sins which are reserved by reason of themselves, are laid down in such a way that a statute either of a bishop or of a religious Superior contrary to them would be destitute of value.

On account of the word "any," they also fall, as it seems to us, upon the single sin reserved to the Holy See by reason of itself. But in absolution, the conditions required by the very nature of things according to the mind of c. 2363 will have to be observed.

On account of the benign mind of the legislator, we judge that by the sick can be understood all those who by bodily infirmity, for example a broken foot, are detained at home; not, however, any persons whatever who are shut in the house, for example a prison, even for another reason, such as on account of guilt.

And the exception profits also those, for example religious, who are in a house where confessors dwell.

Betrothed persons, however, are whoever confess in order to a proximate marriage; that is, all those about to marry, although they have made no formal espousals.

A grave inconvenience of the penitent is, for example, a grave difficulty of returning to the confessor, the necessity of celebrating, difficulty of abstaining from Communion without some mark or suspicion; indeed, if we are not mistaken, the notable detriment itself of the soul which he would suffer on account of less good will, if it is to be feared that he may depart indisposed.

The danger of violating the seal will be present if, on account of the circumstances, it is to be feared that the Superior may come into suspicion of the person for whom the faculty is sought. But under this name does not come the danger that the penitent himself, by approaching a privileged confessor, may expose himself to that suspicion: for the penitent cannot violate the seal by his own deed. But such danger will have to be numbered among grave inconveniences.

Since, moreover, the faculty denied by the Superior, sought in a determined case, is conceded by the law itself, the force of reservation is reduced finally to this: that a penitent who has committed something reserved is compelled to approach a simple confessor twice; and thus he is advised to seek more mature confessors whom he can deservedly presume to be furnished with faculties. Moreover, promulgation of the reservation opportunely warns subjects concerning the gravity of the guilt, concerning its opposition to the reason of their state. Cf. Nouv. Rev. theol., De l'utilite des reserves dans les Ordres religieux (Besson), 1921, p. 24.

Since the reservation itself ceases, the absolution given is beyond doubt direct.

— The Efficacy of Reservation. 1. Ordinaries of places must take care that they bring their reservations to the knowledge of subjects; nor should they impart to anyone whatever and indiscriminately the faculty of absolving from reserved cases (c. 899, §1).

2. Nevertheless the law itself grants the faculty to the canon penitentiary; and it wishes that it be imparted habitually at least to vicars forane or deans, with the faculty of subdelegating added, especially in places more remote from the episcopal see, as often as confessors of their district recur to them if and when, for some more urgent case, they do so (c. 899, §1).

3. Besides, by the law itself, from cases which Ordinaries have in any way reserved to themselves, pastors, or others who in law come under the name of pastors, can absolve during the whole time useful for the paschal precept; individual missionaries, while missions are being held for the people (c. 899, §3).

By this canon, while it commands the publication of reservations and warns that reserved cases not be communicated to anyone whatever and indiscriminately, the legislator intends to provide for the efficacy of reservation. Yet from this let us not think that it is consonant with his mind that the faculty over reserved cases be delegated to no one or to only a few. He expressly wishes that the cases be few; but nowhere does he say: "Few should be able to absolve from them." Indeed he himself indicates several to whom he wishes an habitual faculty, with the power of subdelegating, habitually to belong. But when he cautions "lest it be given to anyone whatever and indiscriminately," he intends this one thing: that the faculty be committed to selected confessors, both secular and religious, a faculty which, according to the mind of the legislator himself, seems rather to be granted than denied.

From canon 451, under the name of pastors come quasi-pastors who govern quasi-parishes into which a Vicariate or Apostolic Prefecture has been divided (c. 216, 2, 3), and parochial vicars, if they are endowed with full parochial power (cf. n. 455).

Moreover, the time useful for fulfilling the paschal precept is that which is established either by common law or by the statute of Ordinaries using the power made for them; finally also, if we are not mistaken, that which has legitimately been extended for someone. Nor is it required that the confession be made for fulfilling the paschal precept. But the time itself is privileged, in which even those who have already satisfied the paschal precept can obtain from pastors absolution of cases which the Ordinary had reserved to himself.

Because the law is favorable, missions can be understood also as spiritual exercises, provided they are given to some people, that is, under a collective aspect. For the law does not require missions made in a church. And for the same end of conversion and spiritual renewal, both missions and spiritual exercises are given, except that in the latter a more active cooperation of the people or recipients is supposed.

— Various Notions. Censures (for example excommunications) are some reserved, others not reserved.

1. A censure ab homine is always and everywhere reserved to him who inflicted the censure or issued the sentence, or to his competent Superior or successor or delegate (cc. 2245, 2247).

Among censures a iure, some are reserved to the Ordinary, others to the Holy See simply, in a special manner, or in a most special manner (c. 2245).

2. The reservation of a latae sententiae censure does not bind in a doubt whether of law or of fact (c. 2245), nor outside the territory of the one reserving, "even if the censured person departs from the territory to obtain absolution" (c. 2247).

Since departure in fraud of the law now certainly does not harm, travelers everywhere can be absolved from the censures of their own diocese by any confessor. But they are not subject to the censures of other dioceses, unless they are added to a particular law which consults public order, or to a general law. But a general law will scarcely have to be fortified by a censure by the bishop, since the common law has sufficiently provided for this. (Cf. cc. 2226, 898).

Vagi, however, in a diocese are subject to the censures of the territory where they are actually staying.

3. "Reservation of a censure impeding the reception of the sacraments (that is, of excommunication and personal interdict) imports reservation of the sin to which the censure is annexed; but if anyone is excused from the censure or has been absolved from it, the reservation of the sin entirely ceases."

4. "If a censure is reserved to the Apostolic See, the Ordinary cannot validly impose another censure reserved to himself upon the same delict" (c. 2247, §1).

5. Absolution given by a confessor ignorant of the reservation is valid, unless it was a censure ab homine or reserved to the Holy See in a most special manner (c. 2247, §3).

And because the fault of the confessor cannot harm the penitent, matters stand equally whether the confessor labors under culpable or excusable ignorance.

But what if the penitent, conscious of the contracted censure, deliberately approaches a confessor whom he knows to be ignorant?

If this penitent is otherwise well disposed and has perceived the probity of the ignorant confessor, he will validly be absolved from censures, since the conditions of the canon are perfectly fulfilled.

We require probity, lest the penitent have to fear that absolution has been given out of malice, so that he cannot be secure.

6. If a general absolution is conceded to a penitent bound by several censures, this also has value for those withheld in good faith, but not for a censure reserved to the Holy See in a most special manner; a particular absolution has no value except for the cases expressed (c. 2249).

— Absolution. 1. Any confessor can impart absolution from censures reserved in any way whatever in the sacramental forum:

1° if the penitent is constituted in danger of death;

2° in more urgent cases: namely, if for the time necessary for the competent Superior to provide:

a) latae sententiae censures cannot be observed without danger of grave infamy or scandal; or

b) it is hard for the penitent to remain in the state of sin.

Here, therefore, the question concerns one excommunicated or personally interdicted; otherwise, one rightly disposed can be absolved from sin, the censure, for example of suspension, remaining firm.

2. In a more urgent case, the burden remains for the penitent of recurring within a month "at least by letter and through the confessor," under penalty of reincidence, to the competent Superior and of standing by his mandates, provided that this can be done without grave inconvenience, and the name having been withheld (c. 2254).

In danger of death, the obligation of recourse binds only for censures ab homine or by law reserved to the Holy See in a most special manner (no longer specially, as formerly): it is to be made after the penitent has recovered, that is, within a month after, the danger having been removed, he has sufficiently recovered strength so that he can easily complete the matter himself.

Danger of death can be understood as probable; grave inconvenience will be present if neither the confessor (for example because he must depart before a response is received and while absent the response cannot safely be communicated) nor perhaps the penitent himself, unskilled, can send a letter, and it is hard for the penitent to approach another confessor (cf. response of the Holy Office, November 9, 1898).

And because the burden of repeating confession before another is supposed to be grave, the confessor, after showing the great utility of liberation from the state of sin, can bring it about that it is hard for the penitent to remain in the state of sin even for a day, so that in practice almost always, under the burden of recourse, he can absolve from reserved censures.

3. The competent Superior in censures imposed a iure is the Sacred Penitentiary or a bishop or Superior endowed with due faculty (cc. 2252, 2254, §1, 2).

If recourse to the Holy See is impossible, recourse must be had within a month to the Legate of the Roman Pontiff, to the bishop or Superior (not confessor) endowed with due faculty. For they are expressly named; and so the opinion is excluded which would terminate the obligation of recourse at the reserving Superior alone. Moreover, we are warned with the same clarity that recourse also to the bishop is to be made by letter, nor is the opinion of those now to be admitted who thought that the use of a letter, as an extraordinary means, was to be employed only in recourse to the Holy See.

By delegable power, the Legate of the Roman Pontiff (that is, the Nuncio or Apostolic Delegate) can also in the external forum absolve from all censures a iure reserved either simply or specially to the Roman Pontiff.

But the bishop, by ordinary and delegable power, can absolve from censures in occult cases which are not reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special or special manner.

4. No one is obliged to approach a privileged confessor, but it is always lawful for all, even after recourse before the Superior has been introduced. In this case, the accusation of the delict at least being repeated, one must stand by the mandates of the confessor alone (cc. 2252, 2254, §1, 2).

This repeated confession of the delict is necessary so that the confessor may impose suitable mandates. For we think that the absolution of the sin is direct in every urgent case, since power over the reserved censure is conceded by the law itself.

— "But if in some extraordinary case this recourse is morally impossible, then the confessor himself... can concede absolution, without the burden of which above, nevertheless imposing the things to be imposed by law and imposing a suitable penance and satisfaction for the censure, so that unless the penitent, within a suitable time to be set by the confessor, has done penance and given satisfaction, he falls back into the censure" (c. 2254, §3). The case of absolution of an accomplice is excepted.

Here the question concerns a case in which recourse immediately appears or is prudently foreseen to be impossible. For if after absolution it becomes impossible, during the impediment, but not beyond it, the penitent or confessor will be immune from that burden. Recourse is morally impeded, for example if from it there arises a probable danger of violation of the seal or great detriment to reputation. As we have already said, the recourse of which the canon speaks is to the competent Superior, not to a privileged confessor. From the favor here conceded the priest (penitent) excommunicated on account of absolution of an accomplice is expressly excluded; but one suspended on account of solicitation to shameful things is not excluded. For in the first edition of the Code, c. 2368 is cited by mistake for c. 2367, §1.

— But the absolution which a competent confessor has given from a reserved censure has value even if the confession was null or sacrilegious, provided the penitent accused the reserved matters. If this accusation was omitted in good faith, not a few think that even then the censure was removed, since the confessor is thought to wish to use his power efficaciously as much as he can.

And these things hold also concerning reserved sins.

In a jubilee, however, valid use of jubilee faculties cannot be made in a sacrilegious confession.

— Observe:

1. reincidence into censure, by common law c. 2254, is established only for him who within a month does not recur or does not present himself to the confessor to receive mandates, but not for him who, after he has recurred, does not execute the mandates (unless this penalty is established in the rescript). Although such a person for the most part will be in a bad state;

2. now that the distinctions between those who are impeded for a short or a long time have been suppressed, absolution given in a more urgent case is direct, so that it removes the burden of repeated sacramental accusation. Therefore he who, after worthily received absolution, has omitted the required recourse, will have to accuse only this omission as a sin.

3. If, in some rare case, a simple confessor cannot use can. 900 for absolving a penitent from a sin reserved without censure, Ferreres, II, 679, thinks that it is lawful for him to absolve with the burden of recurring, as if the case were with a reserved censure: there is parity of cause, and in the decree of 1888, whence c. 2253 is taken, absolution even from a reserved case without censure is contained. Yet the matter is little demonstrated by these arguments.

— I. Reservation of a case is its calling away to the judgment of an ordinary Superior, by which at the same time the power of inferiors is limited (cf. c. 893, §1 and 2). Wherefore it principally says not a penalty but a restriction of jurisdiction.

Cases are reserved, of themselves, by all Ordinaries. Yet the capitular Vicar cannot reserve cases, nor, without special mandate, the vicar general. In a clerical religion, among Superiors, only the General or the abbot of a monastery sui iuris, each with his own council, can do this.

Knowledge of reservation can be placed among the conditions of a reserved case; but, standing by principles, ignorance does not excuse from reservation. We would not wish to exclude the extrinsic probability of the more benign opinion.

II. Sins and censures are reserved. Reserved things, or reserved cases, embrace censures and sins. When a sin is punished by a censure, reservation can affect only the sin or only the penalty, or both. Yet if the censure impedes the legitimate use of the sacraments, absolution from the censure must formally be placed before absolution from the sin; wherefore the sin is then called reserved by reason of the censure.

III. Reservation of sins. 1. On those reserving. The single sin reserved to the Holy See by reason of itself is false accusation before ecclesiastical judges of a priest as guilty of solicitation to shameful things in the sacrament of Penance. The local Ordinary is warned not to reserve sins without proved necessity or utility, proved through discussion in synod or after the chapter has been heard together with selected priests.

Alone, among Superiors, the General of an exempt religion or the abbot of a monastery sui iuris, after each has heard his own council, reserves sins. By this reservation they cannot licitly limit the power of the ordinary confessors of the house, nor validly the power of confessors approved by the local Ordinary.

2. On sins to be reserved. Few cases, at most three or four, from the graver external cases, specifically determined, are to be reserved, as long as the extirpation of vice or restoration of discipline demands it.

Ordinaries are entirely to abstain from reserving sins which are already reserved to the Apostolic See, even by reason of censure; and regularly those also upon which a censure, even one reserved to no one, has been imposed by law.

3. Cessation. Any reservation lacks force: a) when the sick who cannot leave the house confess, or betrothed persons, for the sake of entering marriage; b) when the Superior has denied the faculty sought for a definite case; c) when, in the prudent judgment of the confessor, the faculty cannot be sought from the legitimate Superior without grave inconvenience of the penitent, or without danger of the sacramental seal being violated; d) outside the territory of the one reserving.

4. Connected rules. Ordinaries must take care that they bring their reservations to the knowledge of subjects; nor should they impart the habitual faculty to anyone whatever and indiscriminately. Nevertheless it is necessary that it be granted habitually at least to vicars forane, with the power of subdelegating the faculty added as often as a confessor of their district recurs to them for a more urgent case.

Habitual faculty over reserved cases is delegated by law to the canon penitentiary; then, during the whole time useful for the paschal precept, to those who in law come under the name of pastors; and to individual missionaries during missions or spiritual exercises made for the people.

IV. Reservation of censures. 1. Rules concerning reservation. a) A censure ab homine, that is, one which has been brought by a particular precept or by a condemnatory judicial sentence, is always and everywhere reserved to him who inflicted the censure or issued the sentence, or to his competent Superior, or successor or delegate (cc. 2245, 2247). A censure a iure is sometimes reserved to no one; another is reserved to the Ordinary; another to the Holy See, and this simply, in a special manner, or in a most special manner (c. 2245).

b) Reservation of a censure a iure does not bind in a doubt whether of law or of fact, nor outside the territory of the one reserving.

When a sin is reserved by reason of a censure, this censure being excused or absolved, the reservation itself of the sin is removed.

In vain would an Ordinary impose a censure reserved to himself upon a delict which is punished by a censure reserved to the Holy See.

2. Rules concerning absolution. a) Absolution from censure and from sin, given by a confessor ignorant of the reservation, is valid unless it was a censure ab homine, or reserved to the Holy See in a most special manner.

b) Particular absolution has no value except for the cases expressed in it; general absolution has value also for those withheld in good faith; not, however, for those reserved to the Holy See in a most special manner.

c) Any confessor can impart absolution from censures reserved in any manner whatever in the sacramental forum: a) to a penitent in danger of death; b) in more urgent cases, if, during the time necessary for the competent Superior to provide, latae sententiae censures cannot be observed without danger of grave infamy or scandal, or if it is hard for the penitent to remain in the state of sin.

In a more urgent case, there remains for the penitent the burden of recurring within a month "at least by letter and through the confessor," under penalty of reincidence, to the competent Superior, and of standing by his mandates, provided that recourse can be made without grave inconvenience, and the name having been withheld (c. 2254).

If in some extraordinary case that recourse is impossible, the confessor (unless there is question of excommunication on account of absolution of an accomplice) can simply absolve, imposing the things to be imposed by law and imposing a suitable penance and satisfaction for the censure: these will have to be fulfilled within the time to be defined beforehand by the confessor under penalty of reincidence into the censure.

In danger of death, the obligation of recurring binds only for censures ab homine or reserved to the Holy See in a most special manner; and recourse is to be made only after, the danger having been removed, the sick person has sufficiently recovered strength that he can easily complete the matter himself.

d) The competent Superior, to whom recourse must be had at least by letter, for censures imposed a iure, is the Sacred Penitentiary, or a bishop or Superior insofar as he is endowed with faculty. By ordinary and delegable law itself, the bishop can absolve from occult cases which are reserved to the Holy See neither in a most special nor in a special manner.

It is lawful for anyone, even after recourse before the Superior has been introduced, to approach a privileged confessor (the accusation at least of the reserved delict being repeated) and to stand only by his mandates.

Absolution from a reserved censure given by a competent confessor has value even if the confession was null or sacrilegious, provided the penitent accused the reserved matters. (Then the sin indeed will remain, but it will no longer be reserved.) Indeed, if this accusation was omitted in good faith, not a few think that even then the censure has been removed.

Does he fall back into censure who does not execute the mandates of the Superior? On account of the silence of c. 2254 this can be doubted and therefore denied.

Absolution given in a more urgent case is direct.

If there is need, Fr. Ferreres, II, 697, thinks that a sin reserved without censure can be directly absolved with the burden of recurring, as if it had been reserved with censure. This is less approved by us.

— Appendix XII belongs to this section. Historical. Cf. Appendix XII.

— Notion. By his sacramental confession the penitent entrusts to the confessor a deposit inviolably sealed, whose seal can be violated directly or indirectly.

Direct violation is committed by him who narrates, with designation of the person to whom it pertains, a matter which is protected by the seal.

Indirect violation is of two kinds. Properly so called, or strictly taken, it is committed when that revelation is not intended but permitted, that is, when by speech or action diverse and directed to another end, danger is incurred lest what must be covered by the seal be manifested. This will be done when either the matter is narrated without open designation of the person, or the person is designated without indication of the matter, but with danger of manifesting the person, or of injecting suspicion of the matter.

Even with every danger of revelation excluded, every use of sacramental knowledge with a burden to the penitent is wholly prohibited to the confessor (c. 890, §1). This use can be referred to a certain more broadly so-called violation of the seal. And this will be committed when, on account of his accusation, the penitent suffers some burden distinct from suspicion of sin, whether he truly feels that burden, or at least it would be burdensome to penitents in general if such use of sacramental knowledge were lawful: as if someone, without the faculty of the penitent, should speak with him concerning sins accused.

But especially by c. 890, §2, every use for external governance is prohibited, of knowledge which has been had concerning sins in confession.

Finally an improperly so-called or analogical violation of the seal is had, without use of strictly sacramental knowledge, when something is revealed which brings a burden to the penitent, or renders confession odious, as if, in circumstances in which this is displeasing, you should say that such a one approached for confessing, or should reveal a defect of body or mind.

Less accurate modes of speaking have introduced no small confusion in this matter and have given place to various controversies. In the Code, on the contrary, c. 889 is destined to the seal strictly so called, whose obligation is distinguished in c. 890 from the prohibited use of sacramental knowledge with a burden to the penitent, or from the forbidden violation more broadly accepted.

If we comprehend every violation, even more broadly accepted, but not the analogical, we shall describe the obligation arising from the seal, or the obligation of the seal, as an obligation, inviolable in every case, of keeping silent, even after the penitent has died, concerning things said in order to sacramental absolution, whose revelation or manifestation would render the sacrament burdensome or odious.

— Demonstration. Thesis. By divine natural law itself, given the institution of the sacrament of Penance and of secret confession, there is imposed on anyone receiving knowledge of a matter signified by the penitent for fulfilling the burden of confessing sacramentally, the obligation of the sacramental seal, by which it is prohibited absolutely, or without any exception, to reveal the knowledge thus received, indeed to use it by any reason of which the penitent, on account of some burden, could reasonably be unwilling.

For, for the immediate reconciliation of the Christian with God, Christ, the author of the sacraments, requires confession made to a priest, which at the same time he permitted to be made to him alone, as if to God. And he wished this to be for the remedy of every sin altogether. Therefore he instituted confession and made it necessary for the sole end of one's own salvation and of the grace of the sacrament, simply or better to be obtained through the ministry of the priest. But when a thing has been divinely instituted for one sole end, any use of the thing by which that end is even lightly impeded is an abuse of the thing substantially or accidentally against that end, and therefore intrinsically dishonorable. I say substantially or accidentally against that end, according as the end itself is substantially either corrupted or, although wounded, remains intact.

But every use of knowledge drawn from confession, which it can be in the interest of the penitent not to be made, unless it has been made from the full consent of the penitent, is at least suited to impeding that end, since it renders perfect sincerity, and access itself to the confessor, more difficult. Besides, the order in which sacramental reconciliation is placed is the order of man's relation to God, or quasi-divine. This excellence of order removes every reason for thinking that an exception has been divinely conceded, so that some human good may be consulted. On the contrary, it is established that a slight utility of a higher order must be preferred to every utility of an inferior order. Therefore by natural divine precept every law of the seal is sanctioned with that force which we have said.

This precept is of religion, since it immediately protects man's relations to God. The obligation of justice is also added. For from the fact that he permitted, indeed commanded, that all baptized sinners use that sacrament and therefore make secret confession, Christ gave to all of them an absolutely inviolable right, transcending the order of natural justice, of attempting this remedy by doing whatever seemed to be demanded by them for its perfect use. Therefore the knowledge which was their own before confession, after communication in confession remains their own for every non-sacramental use, and this by force of a sacred right which can be destroyed by no contrary human right, since every human right is of an inferior order. Wherefore neither the safety of the people nor the malice of the penitent removes or diminishes that right.

Thus Christ, while he instituted secret confession according to the discretion and dominion of the penitent, at the same time gave to every penitent a royal safe-conduct, by which at the same time he promised perfect security from every inconvenience or burden extrinsic to confession.

But that this security affects whatever the penitent thinks must be said or manifested for accusing himself is gathered from the manifest intention of the divine Author. For Christ wishes men to use his remedy in the best way. But the more fully the accused manifests himself, by so much the more perfect of itself he permits the account of judgment which is in that sacrament to be. Therefore the law of the seal has the extension which we have described in the formula of the thesis.

Most with us hold that the obligation of the seal is natural, which follows upon the institution of the sacrament; and they think that the root of the absolute and perpetual obligation must be sought in the superior order of that knowledge. But others, with Richard, think that in forbidden communication the guilt of a lie must be detected, since the priest as man knows nothing; others, the guilt of violated fidelity and of a secret tacitly committed; others, the guilt of sacrilege, on account of the sacred nature of that knowledge, or on account of injury done to the sacrament, from which men would be drawn away, if in any case it were lawful to manifest matters accused. This is held by Suarez, Paenit., d. 13, s. 1, n. 7; Lugo, Paenit., d. 23, n. 8-15; d'Annib., III, 358 (8); Ball.-Palm., V, n. 591. - Vasquez, in 3 P., q. 93, art. 4, d. 1, n. 9.10, with whom Coninck, q. 9, d. 2, n. 34, and Tamburini, De sigillo, c. 1, n. 2, agree, think that the rigor of the obligation cannot be explained without a positive precept which Christ added to the natural force of the institution.

There is also one, like Lehmk., II, 586, who seeks help from the danger of hallucination, which we judge superfluous. We do not think that we disagree with St. Thomas. For in Suppl. 3 p., q. 11 art. 1 ad 2 and ad 4, he indicates the source of the obligation in the divine precept which follows the sacrament, and seeks the argument from the quasi-divine nature of the knowledge had by the priest who acts in the place of God.

A fuller explanation of the seal flows down an easy channel from the demonstrated thesis.

— Subject of the Seal. By the seal is bound:

1. The confessor. If he is questioned concerning a matter heard in confession, he can deny, even with an oath, that he knows or has heard the matter, since every question naturally ought to refer itself to his human knowledge, not to quasi-divine knowledge; but if the one questioning maliciously extends it to sacramental knowledge, he cannot expect a serious response, and we are outside formal conversation.

But what if from the denial of the confessor they infer that the confession was not integral? If anything of this kind is to be feared, the confessor should decline a direct response, by saying, for example, that the penitent accused his sins and that he himself fulfilled his office; or, better, if it can be done, he should rebuke the questioner concerning his rash or imprudent interrogation; or simply recall that outside confession he must always be ignorant of what perhaps he heard within confession, so that whether he heard it or not, his response must be the same.

For this reason also, if in a hospital he is asked whether the sick person whose confession he heard is to be communicated or not, let him regularly remit the questioner to the penitent, who has first been taught by him concerning the response to be made, so that he may declare whether or not he wishes to be refreshed by the sacred food. If the sick person asked him that the confessor himself should wish to take care of Communion, let the confessor narrate this mandate of the penitent, while he asks Communion for him;

2. The Superior to whom one to be absolved, or one absolved, from a reserved thing presents himself, or from whom license of absolving is sought;

3. An interpreter, whose help the penitent uses in confession, or he who, within confession, has written the accusation for an uneducated person. Some extend the obligation to him who before confession wrote the sins of an uneducated person, which we think must rather be denied, because he offers his work, which besides is not prescribed, outside confession, nor can confession be judged to have been begun before him;

4. One who by chance, even without fault, has heard something covered by the seal. He who has deliberately raised his ears has already acted against the seal.

They would not be held who heard a confession which the penitent wished to make public. But if, which God forbid, a preacher should violate the seal before the whole multitude, Suarez says, with Lehmk., II, 596, 7, approving, that all are so held to the seal that they cannot even speak among themselves concerning the matter heard;

5. All to whom something has been sacrilegiously or imprudently revealed against the seal;

6. A doctor or another who is consulted with the permission of the penitent; for knowledge is given to him for the end of obtaining absolution rightly. Thus the more common opinion. Some opine otherwise, since the knowledge of that doctor is not from confession. This license given by the penitent permits several conversations until the judgment has been completed (St. Alph., VI, 648).

Wherefore if someone is to be approached to whom restitution must be made, or with whom peace is to be concluded, it will be expedient that the confessor obtain a greater faculty by which the matter may remain sealed only by natural secrecy; and regularly he should accept the burden of such a mandate only under that condition (cf. Lugo, Paen., d. 23, n. 29; Lehmk., II, 596).

Yet he whom the penitent himself consults about making confession is held only by natural secrecy, unless, on account of a manifested will subsequently to confess to him, the consultation seems to put on the account of a begun confession;

7. He who reads a written confession while the penitent is actually using it for confessing.

Several say the same, if one left in the confessional is read. But here I think a distinction must be made. One left by the confessor is without doubt matter of the seal, for it is as it were the revelation of another's confession; but one left by the penitent after received absolution is as it were a new narration of sins, which, whether it was voluntary or involuntary, does not beget the obligation of the seal. If it is not known who left it, the reader will have violated the seal, because he accepts the danger of reading what is truly enclosed by the seal. But the reason which is everywhere given, that the paper in which the sins of a completed confession are contained is as it were a permanent confession, if it was left in the confessional, otherwise if outside, seems to us to be a comparison rather than a reason, and to introduce an arbitrary distinction. Nor, if it is read before use for confession, will there be sin against the seal. For the privileged seal of sacramental confession cannot be extended to non-necessary means which precede confession. It would have to be said otherwise if in confession itself an uneducated person dictated his sins to someone. Cf. Lehmk., II, 597, who nevertheless says that the paper on which the penitent wrote his sins is protected by the seal if the writing is a necessary means for the penitent of making an integral confession. But the penitent is never compelled to make writing before confession. It is manifest that the things which are read on such a paper are protected by natural secrecy, which obliges under light or grave obligation, according as light and not defaming things, or, on the contrary, gravely defaming things, are thus illicitly known (cf. Noldin, III, 410; Gen., II, 384, VIII).

But letters by which absolution from reserved things is sought are protected by the seal.

What if someone confesses to a layman whom he thinks to be a priest? Many hold that that deceiving layman is obliged by the seal, because the penitent opened his conscience in order to confession. That he did this with the intention of confession is not to be doubted. But the order to confession is objectively none without a minister; nor does the intention of a sacrament cause that the sacrament is had. But the seal is destined to the sacrament, not merely to the intention of the sacrament. Therefore the case is different from that of one who hears what is narrated to another confessor in the true use of the sacrament (cf. d'Ann., III, 357).

But without doubt there falls under the seal what is accused to a priest lacking jurisdiction. For that confession may be completed by valid absolution, it is enough that that minister be furnished with jurisdiction.

N.B. 1. By force of c. 1757, §3, 2°, "priests are incapable of bearing testimony as regards all those things which have become known to them from sacramental confession, even if they have been released from the bond of the seal; indeed things heard by anyone and in any way on the occasion of confession cannot even be received as an indication of truth."

And in the civil forum also, the confessor can refuse testimony concerning every matter heard in confession: which for the most part, even if he has obtained permission from the penitent, it will be expedient to do.

The penitent himself is not held by the seal, but he is bound by a graver office of natural secrecy than others, when the matter requires that things said by the confessor be pressed down by silence. Therefore he sins mortally who, excused by no just cause, "betrays those things from which the honor of the confessor is notably injured" (cf. Ball.-Palm., V, 611).

— Object of the Seal. Under the seal fall:

1. all things which the penitent accused as his own sins or purposes of sinning, material or formal, whether rightly or erroneously he judged them such;

2. sins of an accomplice, whether prudently or imprudently detected, in the accusation of one's own sins;

3. denied absolution, without addition, since this virtually betrays a grave accusation. It would be otherwise if, following the custom of some region where it still survives, you were accustomed to hear all three times before absolution, and said: I did not give absolution because he was approaching for the first time;

4. the penance imposed, unless it was very slight, such as is customarily given for the smallest sins: three Ave or Gloria;

5. circumstances of sins, which clothe the narration of sins, unless they were said presuppositively, and it does not matter to the penitent that they be known. Thus if it was an occasion of sinning, very extrinsic to the sin itself: for example, a penitent, attracted by a strange spectacle, therefore omitted Mass. What strange thing happened in the street, you know from it, and you will be able to narrate it without violation of the seal. But you will not be able to narrate illegitimate birth which rendered him irregular and was related in confession. One must proceed cautiously in this matter, lest any suspicion of sin arise. Wherefore let it not be said that the matter was known from the confessional;

6. things which deservedly or undeservedly are added by the penitent so that he may perfect his accusation: thus even virtues and graces received, by which the penitent wishes to show himself fragile, ungrateful.

The common reason is this: because one's own sins are the principal object and the intrinsic end of the obligation of the seal; but full security about accusing sins secretly would not be given, if the obligation did not comprehend all things which the penitent deservedly or undeservedly judged could opportunely be added for manifesting his guilt.

— Sins committed in confession, for example vain glory conceived from very rare faults accused, from the congratulation of the confessor, of themselves are not matter of the seal. For they are not accused. Yet their revelation would contain an indirect violation of the seal: for example, anger revealed, blasphemies of the penitent inject suspicion of a correction on account of grave faults, which gave place to anger.

Still less of themselves are natural defects of the body matter: stench, stammering of the tongue, dullness of mind.

What about scruples and scrupulosity? Certainly, he will have sinned against the seal who said: Titius has these or those scruples, for these were accused as sins. On the contrary, he will not have violated the seal who said of a penitent: he is so good that he sees sins where they are not; for this redounds to the praise of the penitent, and does not betray morbid anxiety. Finally if you merely say that someone is scrupulous who from another source can be known as such, you reveal only a natural defect, nor are you the cause of suspicion or defamation. But if, as many are, he is known as scrupulous from confession alone, because he knows well how to conceal his anxieties, you make use of knowledge drawn from confession which brings a burden to the penitent: which is opposed to the seal. Berardi, Praxis, n. 4947, thinks that for the most part the seal is violated by him who reveals that a penitent is scrupulous.

That virtues and merits do not fall under the seal except by that reason which was recalled in n. 508 is clear of itself.

— The approach made for confessing sometimes will not be able to be narrated without grave sin, but properly, since the very knowledge of such approach precedes confession, it is not matter of the seal. Confession is a fact of which the confessor is a witness, but he does not receive the knowledge from the penitent.

— The condition of the seal is sacramental confession, that is, directed to absolution, at least begun, even if it remained imperfect.

But the manifestation of conscience for obtaining spiritual counsels does not suffice. Nor can any mutual pact or sworn promise, or quality of him to whom the matter is entrusted, press the obligation beyond the terms of a rigorous committed secret (cf. St. Th., Suppl. 3 p., q. 11 art. 2 ad 2).

Much less is a confession merely simulated or made for extorting alms, or for laying snares, protected by the seal. In the latter case, it will be best to rebuke and repel the shameless tempter in a loud voice. But if the hope of alms is an extrinsic end of a confession otherwise sincerely and rightly made, there is no doubt that this is enclosed by the seal.

Nor is protected by the seal the revelation which the penitent has made after the priest has clearly protested that he wishes to receive nothing sacramentally (Suarez, Paenit., d. 33, s. 2, n. 5).

— Obligation of the Seal. 1. Which acts are prohibited has already been declared from the thesis itself in n. 506, and it will be more evident from the examples to be added below.

2. The obligation of the sacramental seal is inviolable (c. 889), and that absolutely, that is, on account of no public or private good to be procured, or evil or damage to be averted, do there become lawful either direct revelation, with the penitent indicated, of a matter which falls under the seal, or the use of sacramental knowledge with danger of such revelation, or the use of the same knowledge with a burden to the penitent. Yet while the use of that knowledge with danger of revelation is simply prohibited, use without danger is not prohibited except with some true burden of such a penitent, or of penitents in general, as is explained in n. 519.

3. Direct revelation admits no smallness of matter. The reason is because every direct revelation contains a substantial perversion of the order divinely sanctioned: that of secret confession. For direct revelation is, from its very notion, an action against the secret.

There is added then the motive which is customarily brought forward: that the faithful would be not a little drawn away from the complete use of that sacrament if they knew that small sins could be narrated, especially since some are easily a cause of ignominy or ridicule, on account of which they would prefer a grave sin of theirs to become known.

4. When there is question of direct or indirect violation more strictly accepted, no use of probable opinion is permitted. The reason is because the sanctity of the royal safe-conduct demands a broad interpretation, but severe opinions which are probable show us how far a broad interpretation extends; and because probable opinion immediately leaves the danger of material violation, which here, on account of the superior order to which that law pertains, cannot be evacuated by a reflex principle. To use other words, here nothing is lawful except what immediately, directly, morally is established to be lawful.

For this reason neither in the present case is there made a derogation from the principles of probabilism, but we are outside the matter to which it is applied: lawful and unlawful. It is not lawful probably to say what a probable opinion says is against the seal, either directly, or by that indirect reason which generates danger of revelation of the sin of the penitent.

5. But in indirect violation, or when the danger of revelation or the burden is very slight and uncertain, it is commonly admitted that there is light matter.

— The seal, introduced for sanctioning the right and security of free secret confession, is constituted in the power of the penitent, who therefore can always effectively or validly give license of speaking outside confession concerning matters accused or narrated in confession, provided:

1. the license is formal. Interpretative license does not suffice, nor presumed license even about the present, on account of the danger of error or imprudence; and virtual or tacit license must be used cautiously. The case is commonly brought forward of a penitent who speaks with the confessor about sins accused in confession: it can happen rather easily that, with the at least tacit assent of the confessor, he wishes as it were to resume the confession protected by the seal. St. Alph., l. 6, n. 151, insinuates that this is rather to be presumed, appealing to Lugo, Paen., d. 23, n. 131 and 133, whose testimony, however, is ambiguous. I said with the assent of the confessor; for just as after the judgment has been completed the confessor cannot without the license of the penitent wish to perfect his judgment (Lugo, d. 33, n. 141), so, that he may resume confession, the penitent seems to need the assent of the confessor.

— Applications. 1. Conversation with the penitent about a preceding confession within a new confession, or immediately afterward, when the judgment is still morally judged to endure, is never opposed to the seal, because the matter is treated in the same sacramental forum, and the prudent administration itself of the sacrament not rarely demands the faculty of recalling former sins to the penitent. Besides, received usage so has it.

Nevertheless, without a reasonable cause, this is not to be done; and if there is only a slight cause for doing it, let the admonition be omitted if annoyance of the penitent is feared.

Conversation outside confession, without the permission of the penitent, is a prohibited use of sacramental knowledge.

— The confessor commits an indirect but strictly accepted violation of the seal: a) who, not from the very beginning of the confession, but when it has already been prolonged, says in a loud voice to a deaf penitent: "Return" or "How often?"; b) who, sitting in the confessional, rises and in a manner which bystanders can observe reads the table of reserved cases; c) who by a visible gesture, by a groan, manifests wonder or sadness; d) who, after hearing confession, immediately leaves the church, in no way solicitous about the penitent's Communion, which, before confession, seemed likely; e) who, of two penitents, for example two brothers, praises one alone, or says that by him only venial sins are brought (cf. d'Ann., III, 262). For he injects suspicion of serious matter, or of grave sin, or of indisposition.

— An indirect violation, broadly or strictly accepted (according as suspicion of grave sin is avoided for the penitent or not), is committed by the confessor who reveals sins heard in confession of some group or place, when some suspicion affects individual persons and therefore the penitent himself; when the reputation of the community itself or of the place is injured. Wherefore he sins who says that in such a monastery, or even by a religious of such an Order, a sin has been committed from whose nature the esteem of the monastery or Order is diminished. Much more, if he should say that there such a crime is frequent. For observe: although no one is ignorant that fragile persons occur everywhere, and that in the most fervent community there can be a traitor, much greater detriment happens to the community when a general and indefinite conjecture is strengthened by the most grave testimony of the confessor.

— Sometimes the quality of the person to whom a thing is said will cause the communication made to be burdensome and unpleasant to the penitent, or not. We always suppose that no suspicion of crime or sin falls upon the penitent himself.

For some more easily than others wonder that such or such things have happened, or, on account of the fault of a few, hold many more lightly suspected. Experience of men will teach an older confessor in no way to esteem the clergy or a monastery less because some have committed lustful acts, while, on the contrary, to learn this will not a little harm the reputation of priests or religious before a layman who did not even suspect that these things could happen in the sanctuary.

If two confessors who together receive confessions of the same part of the clergy, so that they have heard the same class of men, communicate to each other their judgment about their moral condition, neither will add anything to the knowledge of the other, so that that conversation, certainly never to be advised, can be immune from every violation of the seal; on the contrary, the same conversation held before those who have not heard those penitents would lessen the esteem of that clergy.

But even with the danger of violating the seal excluded, the very account of a certain equity and grateful charity sufficiently exhorts us not to abuse another's confidence for mingling conversations which are contrary to the order or family of our penitents.

— As to the defamation of a place: today in several regions there is so great a diversity of religion and morals, or of thinking and acting, that they seem to lack as it were their own name or reputation, so that the crime of one, even enormous, in no way infects the other inhabitants.

Yet it will be more shameful if you say that a hidden vice, a venereal disease, dominates there. Formerly, under this respect, they distinguished from larger places those which numbered fewer than three thousand inhabitants.

Nevertheless it is lawful from things heard in confession to take occasion for inveighing against vices which exist everywhere in some degree, for example lust. Yet to manifest hidden things with detriment of the place is wicked. Therefore practically it is never opportune that by the aid of confession the arguments of sermons be selected. For vices not hidden are known from elsewhere; hidden vices, however, are corrected not without danger.

By equal reason he who, as pastor or confessor, is questioned by a preacher about the vices which are especially to be remedied, should give information according to those things which he has learned by human knowledge, but should not give reports which he has acquired for himself only as the minister of Christ. He will act more prudently, he will avoid scruples and anxieties for himself, and he will obey more the direction of the Holy See (cf. Lehmk., II, 602; Ball.-Palm., V, 657).

— Even with every danger of revelation or detriment to reputation which the community or place would suffer excluded, nevertheless, outside confession, every use of the knowledge of confession with a burden to the penitent is prohibited (c. 890, §1).

And this absolutely, as is clear from the proposition prohibited by Innocent XI, through a decree of the Holy Office, November 18, 1682 (Denz., 1220). But the burden must be understood either as that which the penitent truly and formally experiences, or as that which he would connaturally experience if he had known that that use of knowledge had been made. Wherefore:

1. the Code itself, c. 890, §2, forbids every use which for external governance would be made of reports about sins had in confession, "both by Superiors existing at the time and by confessors who later shall have been appointed Superiors";

2. unless a faculty has been obtained, it will be against the seal to deny a vote to him whom from confession alone you know to be unworthy, or to remove the same from office; to dismiss a servant, a fellow boarder; to commit to someone a difficult and unpleasant task; to show a harsher face to the penitent, or because of things heard in confession (not strictly on account of a natural defect known otherwise than from the accusation of sins, for example stammering, an obscure manner of speaking) to decline him, and no longer admit him to making confession.

414. - In cases of chastity and of the opposed lust, although the confessor cannot state false things, he must nevertheless act so prudently that, insofar as he can, he may avert from penitents the danger of falling; especially since it is often most difficult to pronounce with certainty concerning light or grave sin, concerning full or merely imperfect imputability; and rash condemnation has not rarely led a soul to despair, improvident hesitation to scarcely curable anxiety, and inconsiderate excuse to fatal audacity. Wherefore, let him quiet the fearful with firm responses, but at the same time efficaciously induce penitents, especially clerics and younger persons, to follow safer things, according to that saying ¹: "In this matter of the sixth precept, it is necessary, insofar as it is possible, to employ every severity."

¹ St. Alphonsus, Homo apostolicus, treatise 9, no. 34.

But paternal severity, which restrains rash actions, by no means excludes benevolence toward persons.

Nevertheless, that he may provide for his own security and perfection, let the confessor diligently attend that his affability remain supernatural, and that he seek himself in no matter.

Let him also show himself courteous and benign in such a way that he gives occasion to no sensual affection in others.

Let him not be ignorant that religious paranoia can lie hidden beneath a veil of intense piety, which is rooted in a morbid but exceedingly vehement concupiscence. Nor are there lacking persons for whom, in order to experience pleasure, it is sufficient to speak with another concerning sexual matters. Therefore, persons of this kind, especially unmarried women, can seek base satisfactions in the very tribunal of penance.

"Wherefore, the confessor must act with the greatest caution and vigilant prudence with persons of this kind, all the more because the religious-erotic fanaticism of women, especially unmarried women, sends deep roots into the feminine heart, which are afterward removed with sufficient difficulty. Unless the greatest vigilance, caution, and prudence are employed, the reputation of the priest can suffer the greatest detriment. When these women present themselves, they are to be sent quickly to a physician ²."

² Antonelli, vol. 2, nos. 222, 223. Cf. also Gemelli, Non moechaberis, pp. 43, 44, 55.

He will counsel spouses a tenor of life by which they may live, each content with the other, and grow in mutual love and esteem. Yet he should not neglect to lead them toward more perfect counsels.

But he will especially exhort others to these things:

That they flee whatever things are strange and unusual in these matters.

That, if there is a grave cause for seeing, reading, or treating something which can move the sense, they preserve a simple, not anxious, manner of acting.

That, except for a just cause, they involve themselves as little as possible in these matters and firmly repel specious pretexts.

That, even in a necessary action, they endeavor to avoid less pure affections and movements of the flesh.

That they value sincerity and strength of soul most highly and acquire them for themselves.

That they be mindful of human dignity and of the love with which Christ has espoused to himself the soul of the faithful.

That they assiduously foster higher studies.

That they taste most frequently the heavenly food of the Eucharist, with the devotion that is fitting.

That, also by tender devotion toward the most pure Virgin, they foster in themselves not only horror of sin but an apostolic love of chastity, of which St. Paul handed down an eminent example.

In this manner he will inculcate a delicate and pleasing purity; and he will form Christians concerning whom Athenagoras already said in the second century: "Since we have the hope of eternal life, we despise the pleasures of this life" ³.

³ Legatio pro christianis, no. 32 (M.P.G. 6, 966).

305. Preliminary note. "Let us approach the work of expounding this treatise on the sacrament of penance, to which indeed one must diligently apply oneself with every study above the other matters, since in it are contained the sum of all Moral Theology and the questions which pertain more to practice." Thus St. Alphonsus.¹ The Roman Catechism,² however, says: "Just as the frailty and weakness of human nature is known to all, and each one easily experiences it in himself, so no one can be ignorant of how great a necessity there is for the sacrament of penance. But if the diligence which pastors must employ in each subject is to be measured from the magnitude and weight of the matter which they treat, we shall altogether confess that they will never be so diligent in the explanation of this topic that it could seem sufficient; indeed, this sacrament must be treated more accurately than baptism, because baptism is administered only once and cannot be repeated, but occasion for penance is given and the necessity of repeating it imposed as often as it happens that one sins after baptism." But pastors and other priests are altogether unequal to instructing the faithful rightly concerning penance unless they themselves first have learned this matter exceedingly well. Hence let no priest dare to administer the sacrament of penance unless he is instructed with a perfect knowledge of penance.

We divide this whole treatise into three chapters: 1. on the essence of penance; 2. on the subject of penance; 3. on the minister of penance.

Innumerable authors have written concerning penance; we specially commend St. Thomas, S. theol. 3, q. 84 ff.; St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 427 ff., and his disciples Marc and Aertnys. Then Billuart, Drouven, Lehmkuhl, Noldin, Haine, Joseph Göttler, Der hl. Thomas von Aquin und die vortridentin. Thomisten über die Wirkungen des Bußsakramentes (Freiburg 1904); Reginald Schultes, O.P., Reue und Bußsakrament (Paderborn 1907); A. Tappehorn, Anleitung zur Verwaltung des heiligen Bußsakraments (Dülmen 1893). Paul Galtier, S.J., very learnedly unfolds the history of the sacrament of penance in De poenitentia: Tractatus dogmatico-historicus (Paris 1923).

¹ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 426.

² Part 2, c. 5, q. 1.

We divide this chapter into five articles: 1. on the notion of penance; 2. on the virtue of penance; 3. on the existence of the sacrament of penance; 4. on its essence; 5. on its effects.

306. Some derive the Latin name of penance from "to hold punishment" (poenam tenere), because the penitent imposes punishment upon himself in order to make satisfaction to the one offended. Others think that this name signifies to feel something "deeply" (penitus), that is, inwardly in the heart, and indeed weariness or sorrow of soul. In Greek penance is called μετάνοια, which is the same as a change of mind or resipiscence, that is, a return to right-mindedness.

The Greeks, however, in calling penance μετάνοια do not intend to say, as Luther did, that its whole essence consists in resipiscence, but that resipiscence is an evident sign of true penance. Lactantius already refuted Luther's error.³ The Greeks sometimes also call penance ἐξομολόγησις, that is, confession.

1. The profane senses of the name penance signify weariness, displeasure, and sorrow. Penance is employed both concerning good and concerning evil. Thus, for example, Cicero says concerning old age: "If then he had lived to his hundredth year, would he have regretted his old age?"

2. Theological senses. The word penance is taken by theologians principally in a threefold sense: a) for the moral virtue of penance; b) for the sacrament of penance; c) for that part of this sacrament which is also customarily called satisfaction. Penance taken in the first sense is rightly called interior penance by the Roman Catechism; but taken in the other two senses it is called exterior penance. Both penances, however, are intimately connected, so that in the present order of things neither can exist without the other. For the true virtue of penance includes the desire for the sacrament of penance, because the sinner cannot make satisfaction to God by his own powers, but needs the sacrament of penance for this. On the other hand, the sacrament of penance cannot be validly received unless an act of the true virtue of penance is present, namely, contrition or attrition. For although confession and satisfaction can be absent in a case of necessity, for example, in a man deprived of his senses, an act of the virtue of penance is altogether a condition without which someone cannot be validly absolved. This internal penance joined at the same time with external penance is customarily called by the Holy Fathers laborious baptism, or also the second plank after shipwreck. For the first plank of salvation after the shipwreck of original sin is baptism.

³ Inst. div. VI, 24 (Migne, Patr. lat. 6, 722 ff.).

316. Errors. Besides certain ancient heretics (such as the Montanists, Novatians, and so forth), the Calvinists, Lutherans, and in general almost all heretics teach that external penance, as it is now employed in the Catholic Church and will be explained in the following article, is not a true and properly so-called sacrament of the New Law. Thus, for example, the Calvinists think that no other remedy for actual sins exists than baptism itself recalled to mind with a certain confidence in the remission of sins. Harnack teaches that a theory concerning penance had indeed always flourished in the Church, and that the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) prescribed annual auricular confession, but that St. Thomas was the first to assert that this auricular confession is a true sacrament. The Modernists also taught false things concerning the sacrament of penance, as is evident from propositions 46 and 47 of the Syllabus of Pius X (Denz., nn. 2046 and 2047). Against all these, it is established with the Catholic Church:

317. Thesis. External penance, which is performed in the Catholic Church, is a true and proper sacrament of the New Law.

Proof 1. From the definitions of the Church. The Council of Trent:²³ "If anyone says that in the Catholic Church penance is not truly and properly a sacrament instituted by Christ our Lord for reconciling to God the faithful as often as they fall into sins after baptism, let him be anathema." The Council of Florence defines the same thing, saying: "The fourth sacrament is penance."

Proof 2. From Sacred Scripture. Three things are required for a sacrament, namely, a sensible sign, productive of grace, and institution by Jesus Christ. But these three are found in penance. For a) there is a sensible sign, namely, the sacramental judgment itself, consisting of a twofold element, that is, of the confession of sins and of absolution pronounced by mouth. It is evident of itself that this sensible sign of penance is distinct from the sensible sign of baptism, and accordingly the sacrament of penance is distinguished from the sacrament of baptism. b) Then sanctifying grace is produced in penance. For sins are remitted in penance. But sins cannot be remitted without sanctifying grace at the same time being infused. That sins are truly remitted in penance, however, follows from the power of the keys conferred upon the Church by Christ, which power the Church exercises in the sacrament of penance. Christ conferred the power of the keys both upon Peter and upon the other Apostles, saying: "Amen I say to you, whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven; and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven."²⁴ c) The institution of the sacrament by Jesus Christ follows from His words uttered after the resurrection and directed to the Apostles: "Receive ye the Holy Ghost. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained."²⁵ This power handed down to the Apostles is not merely the power of declaring that sins have been remitted, but the power of truly remitting sins. For immediately beforehand Christ had said: "As the Father hath sent Me, I also send you," by which words He signified that He was giving the Apostles a mission similar to that which He Himself had received from the Father. Now Christ not only declared that sins were remitted, but He Himself truly remitted them;²⁶ indeed, He came into the world for this. Moreover, when Christ conferred this power, He acted in a very solemn manner, for He first breathed upon the Apostles and then said: Receive ye the Holy Ghost, and so forth. Now to announce the remission of sins is not so new and singular a privilege that it can be exercised only with the special assistance of the Holy Ghost, since even the prophets of the Old Testament did this, and indeed any preacher is able to do it.

Proof 3. From tradition. In the book which is called the Doctrine of the Twelve Apostles and which was published in the second century, it is read: "But on the Lord's day, having come together, break bread and give thanks, after you have confessed your transgressions, so that your sacrifice may be clean."²⁷ Although this text is understood in diverse ways by diverse authors, nevertheless it is sufficiently evident from it that sacramental confession was already employed by the faithful in the second century, so that the sacrifice might be clean. Tertullian, living at the beginning of the third century, speaks sufficiently clearly concerning the sacrament of penance, but as a rigid Montanist he judged that it was to be administered to each person only once in life. At that time confession was first made by the sinner, which had to be made to the bishop or his delegate. Nothing, however, proves that this confession was always public. In the second place there was exomologesis, that is, satisfaction. At that time exomologesis was not the same as confession (as several have erroneously thought), but consisted of works of penance to be performed in satisfaction for sins committed. Hence Tertullian says: "And so exomologesis is the discipline of prostrating and humbling a man." In the third place absolution or pardon was given by the bishop.²⁸

The institution of penitentiary priests, already known in the third century, proves not obscurely the existence of the sacrament of penance. Socrates²⁹ writes concerning this institution: "From that time [the Decian persecution, 250] the bishops added a penitentiary priest to the ecclesiastical register, so that those who had fallen after baptism might confess their transgressions before the priest appointed for that purpose." Sozomen,³⁰ however, adds that this priest absolved sinners. From the fifth century and thereafter the existence of the sacrament of penance is clear. Thus, for example, Innocent I (fifth century) writes to Decentius, Bishop of Gubbio: "But concerning penitents who do penance either for graver offenses or for lighter ones, if no illness intervenes, the custom of the Roman Church shows that they are to be remitted on the Thursday before Easter. But it belongs to the priest to judge the weight of the offenses, so that he may attend to the confession of the penitent and to the weeping and tears of the one correcting himself, and then order him to be dismissed when he has seen that his satisfaction is fitting. Or if anyone has fallen into illness and has come even to desperation, he is to be released before the time of Easter, lest he depart from the world without Communion."³¹

These things suffice for our purpose. He who desires more should consult the dogmatic theologians and apologists.

²³ Session 14, can. 1, On Penance (Denz., n. 911).

²⁴ Matt. 18:18; cf. 16:18.

²⁵ John 20:22 ff.

²⁶ Cf. Matt. 9:6.

²⁷ Didache, n. 14 (ed. Funk).

²⁸ Cf. P. Galtier, De poenitentia, n. 143 ff.

²⁹ Hist. eccl. l. 5, c. 19 (Migne, Patr. graec. 67, 614).

³⁰ Hist. eccl. l. 7, c. 16 (Migne, loc. cit. 67, 1459).

³¹ In Migne, Patr. lat. 20, 559.

318. Necessity of the sacrament of penance. The necessity of the virtue of penance has already been proved above. But since it was said there that in the present order of things the virtue of penance cannot justify without the sacrament at least in voto, it is evident that the sacrament itself also is necessary, at least by divine precept. Hence the Council of Trent³² defined: "If anyone denies that sacramental confession either was instituted or is necessary for salvation by divine law, ... let him be anathema." The desire for the sacrament is understood as a serious purpose of making a sacramental confession, not indeed as soon as possible, but at the due time.

By ecclesiastical law the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) defined that the sacrament of penance must be received at least once a year by him who is guilty of mortal sin;³³ this indeed was confirmed by the Code of Canon Law, c. 906.

³² Session 14, can. 6, On Penance (Denz., n. 916).

³³ Denz., n. 437.

Preliminary note. In this article we shall treat of the constitutive parts of the sacrament of penance, after the definition of this sacrament has first been explained. Hence the whole article comprises four paragraphs: 1. on the definition of the sacrament of penance; 2. on its remote matter; 3. on its proximate matter; 4. on its form.

319. Definition. The sacrament of penance is a sacrament of the New Law instituted by Christ in the form of a judgment for remitting sins committed after baptism to a contrite man who has duly confessed, through sacramental absolution.

It is said, first: instituted by Christ. Since in the preceding article it was proved that the sacrament of penance exists, it follows that it was instituted by Christ, because all the sacraments were instituted by Christ. Concerning the time of this institution the Council of Trent³⁴ teaches: "The Lord then principally instituted the sacrament of penance when, being raised from the dead, He breathed upon His disciples, saying: Receive ye the Holy Ghost; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained." The Council, however, says: principally instituted, because Christ had already promised this sacrament before His Passion, and accordingly had instituted it inchoatively.³⁵

It is said, second: in the form of a judgment, and indeed a reconciliatory, not a condemnatory one. The Council of Trent³⁶ defined: "If anyone says that the sacramental absolution of the priest is not a judicial act, but a bare ministry of pronouncing and declaring that sins have been remitted to the one confessing, ... let him be anathema." In this sacrament the penitent is at once the accused, the witness, and the accuser, while the priest is the judge. The judicial form distinguishes this sacrament from all the others. For the sacrament of matrimony was instituted in the manner of a contract, while the other sacraments consist in physical things. Because of the judgment essentially required in penance, there are demanded the confession of sins, an indicative absolution (and not by way of entreaty), and several other conditions, as will be evident below.

Note. The sacramental judgment in penance, although it is a true judgment, differs in several respects from a civil judgment, in which the accused is never at once the accuser and the witness. Then human judgments intend the reparation of an injured public order and therefore often punish the guilty person gravely; but the sacramental judgment intends the reconciliation of the guilty person with God and, according to the present discipline, imposes the lightest punishments upon the penitent. The Church indeed has no power over the physical matter and form of the sacraments. But since in the sacraments of penance and matrimony the matter consists of the moral acts of man, the Church can impose conditions which are required not only for the lawfulness but also for the validity of both sacraments. Thus unimpeded jurisdiction is required for the validity of absolution in penance. Thus the Church establishes impediments which destroy the validity of matrimony.

It is said, third: for remitting sins committed after baptism. By these words the remote matter of this sacrament is indicated. Absolutely all sins, both venial and mortal, can be remitted in the sacrament of penance. Therefore there are no irremissible sins, as the Montanists and Novatians maintained. The Lutherans and Jansenists, however, attacked the confession of venial sins. Although it is not necessary to confess venial sins, nevertheless this is useful, and their remission can be obtained in the sacrament of penance. Through penance only sins committed after baptism can be remitted, since baptism remits all prior sins. If baptism was received with an obstacle, its efficacy then revives when the obstacle has been removed through contrition or through attrition with the sacrament of penance. Cf. below, n. 321.

It is said, fourth: to a contrite man who has duly confessed, through sacramental absolution. In these words are contained the proximate matter and the form of the sacrament of penance. For, as will be evident below, n. 327, the three acts of the penitent, namely, contrition, confession, and satisfaction, are the proximate matter of this sacrament, while the form is the sacramental absolution of the priest.

³⁴ Session 14, can. 1, On Penance (Denz., n. 894).

³⁵ Matt. 16:19; 18:18.

³⁶ Session 14, can. 9, On Penance (Denz., n. 919).

1643. "Let us approach the work of expounding this Treatise ON THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE, to which indeed one must diligently apply oneself with every study before other matters, since in it is contained the sum of all moral theology and the questions more pertaining to practice; and therefore I have spared no labor, that I might satisfy the desire of readers, and that they might find here all things necessary to be known."¹² Thus St. Alphonsus.

That we may touch the principal things which pertain to this Treatise of greatest moment, we shall treat in a threefold dissertation: 1. on the nature of the Sacrament of Penance; 2. on the Subject; 3. on the Minister.

In this first dissertation we shall treat: 1. on the notion of penance; 2. on the matter and form of the Sacrament.

The Sacrament of Penance is the virtue itself of penance elevated by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a Sacrament. Wherefore, we must speak: 1. of Penance as it is a virtue; 2. of Penance as it is a Sacrament.¹³

1644. DEFINITION. Penance is "a virtue tending to the destruction of sin, insofar as it is an offense of God, by means of sorrow and satisfaction."¹⁴

It is called a virtue, namely one which is referred to justice as a potential part, and is supernatural, as is clear from Trent, which teaches (sess. 6, can. 3) that without the grace of God man cannot repent as he ought; - tending to the destruction of sin, by which words the MATERIAL Object of penance is expressed, namely every sin, both mortal and venial, as to be destroyed or avoided; insofar as it is an offense of God, by which its FORMAL Object is shown, which is the reparation of the injured right of the divine Majesty; wherefore, he does not rightly repent who indeed sorrows for his sin, but without respect to the offense of God; by means of sorrow and satisfaction, which are the acts by which penance obtains its end, that is, peace with God. Moreover, sorrow for sin and detestation of it, with the desire of making satisfaction and the purpose of not sinning thereafter, pertains to the very essence of penance. - Nor therefore does a simple purpose of beginning a better life suffice; in this Luther erred, who affirmed that penance is contained in novelty of life alone, or reconsideration.¹⁵

DIVISION. Penance can tend to the destruction of sin in a twofold way: 1. through an act of perfect sorrow, which is also called contrition, and is detestation of sin from the motive of perfect charity, by which God is loved above all things; 2. through an act of imperfect sorrow, which is also called attrition, and is detestation of sin from motives of an inferior order, for example from fear of eternal punishment.

1645. Principles. I. Through true penance ALL SINS can be destroyed. - This is of faith from Trent, sess. VI, cap. 14, and sess. XIV, cap. 1. But true penance, through which sins, whether mortal or venial, ARE REMITTED, is either perfect contrition, even outside the Sacrament, yet with the desire, at least implicit, of receiving it; or attrition, with real reception of the Sacrament. These things will be expounded more fully below (n. 1673). - Concerning the other effects of penance it will be said more conveniently where the effects of the Sacrament are treated (n. 1653).¹⁶

1646. II. Penance is altogether NECESSARY for all men who have defiled themselves with some mortal sin, in order to obtain grace and justice. This is of faith, from Trent (loc. cit.). But it is necessary: 1. BY NECESSITY OF MEANS: for since the offense of mortal sin proceeds from this, that the will of man is turned away from God through a turning toward some changeable good, it cannot be that the offense be remitted unless the will, through a true change, turns itself again to God, with detestation of the turning it had toward a changeable good, and with the purpose of amendment; both of which pertain to the notion of penance. - 2. BY NECESSITY OF PRECEPT, both natural, by which each one is bound to make satisfaction for an injury inflicted and to seek again the divine friendship, and positive, often mentioned in the sacred writings. St. Thomas suitably says to the point:¹⁷ "By natural reason man is moved to repent concerning the evils which he has done; but that man do penance in this or that way is from divine institution."

Nor yet is penance so necessary that it is always required explicitly; for accidentally implicit and virtual penance can suffice, such as is contained in an act of perfect love of God, for example if someone, forgetful of his sin, elicits an act of perfect charity.¹

1647. Questions. Q. 1. WHEN does the aforesaid precept of penance oblige?

Resp. The precept of reconciling oneself with God through penance obliges: 1. of itself in the article, or in probable danger, of death or of perpetual insanity, because then no other time is available for doing penance; 2. accidentally, when one who has fallen into mortal sin must administer a Sacrament, or receive some Sacrament of the living; likewise, when he suffers grave temptations which he judges himself unable to resist unless he elicits an act of contrition; - finally, when he is bound to elicit an act of charity toward God; for then, if the memory of sin occurs, he is bound to detest it. - But the precept of sanctifying Feasts does not import an obligation of contrition.²

Q. 2. Whether the precept of penance, outside danger of death or insanity, ever obliges OF ITSELF, so that its delay involves a special sin?

Resp. Many authors indeed affirm; but the denying opinion is probable, because, apart from a positive precept, for example annual confession, the time of penance is not determined, although it ought to be determined of itself by reason of an affirmative precept. - Hence St. Thomas teaches³ that final impenitence is not a special sin.

But accidentally, certainly he sins gravely who, existing in mortal sin, delays and procrastinates his conversion for a notable time; because he violates at least the precept of charity both toward God and toward himself, since St. Thomas teaches⁴ that it cannot be that a man without justifying grace keeps himself immune from new sin for a long time. - Hence, a delay of one month seems grave to St. Alphonsus, who adds: "Yet it is true that the rude with difficulty notice that obligation."⁵ (cf. 472, q. 2).

1648. Things to be noted beforehand. 1. Venial sin is never remitted in those contaminated by mortal sin; for the remission of any fault is founded in the friendship of God and in sanctifying grace. Hence the guilt of those venial sins will inhere in the damned eternally.

2. The remission of mortal sin can occur without the remission of venials; for venial sin does not conflict with sanctifying grace.

3. One venial sin can be remitted without other venials, namely if a man truly sorrows for one, and not for the rest. The contrary must be said of mortal sins, all of which conflict with habitual grace.

Questions. - Q. 1. Whether penance is required for the remission of venial sin?

Resp. Venial sin is never remitted without penance, whether formal, that is, express and explicit, or virtual and implicit, namely one which is contained in some supernatural act. - This is clear both from Sacred Scripture, which universally requires penance for the abolition of any sin; and from the Doctors expressly affirming this;⁶ and finally from reason itself, which sanctions that he who sinned by his own will should not obtain pardon unless by his own will through penance he withdraws from sin.

Q. 2. What penance is required for the remission of venial sin EX OPERE OPERANTIS, or outside the Sacrament?

Resp. Several things must be distinguished: 1. If someone is guilty of mortal and venial sin at the same time, perfect contrition is required, which takes away both, as is gathered from the things noted beforehand. Yet not every act of contrition or charity takes away all venials, but only those to which it is opposed formally, or at least virtually. Hence the full remission of all venials is obtained only when the act of charity generally excludes affection for all venials, or when someone is so disposed that he wishes never to admit any venial sin, and sorrows, or would sorrow if it occurred to memory, for any one admitted. Thus commonly (cf. n. 471, 2).

2. If someone is guilty only of venials, an act of charity or of perfect contrition does not seem to be required; but more probably a motion of imperfect contrition suffices, for example prayer, by which pardon is humbly implored, or an act of some virtue which is repugnant to venial fault, or detestation of venials proceeding from consideration of their supernatural turpitude, for example because they are against the obedience owed to God, or elicited from the motive of hope. The reason is that, since venial sin conflicts neither with charity nor with habitual grace, it suffices that the disordered adhesion to a creature be removed from some supernatural motive and from a motion of actual grace.⁷

Q. 3. What penance is required for the remission of venial sin EX OPERE OPERATO, or through a Sacrament?

Resp. Distinguish. Remission can be obtained either in the Sacrament of Penance, or in other Sacraments. Now:

1. In the Sacrament of Penance, formal sorrow is required,⁸ so that the matter of the Sacrament be present (cf. n. 1659). But through this Sacrament are also remitted, more probably, venials involuntarily omitted,⁹ concerning which there is no formal or virtual complacency; for by the force of absolution, to which no obstacle is placed, there is conferred an increase of grace which of itself is remissive of sin; and besides, either in part or wholly, the punishment due to venials is remitted, if any remains.

2. In other Sacraments the matter proceeds otherwise. For: - 1. Baptism remits venials joined with original sin or with actual mortal sins, provided no obstacle is placed to this remission, that is, provided there is not a will actually or habitually adhering to venial sin. Thus commonly with St. Thomas.¹⁰ - 2. Extreme Unction likewise remits, according to a probable opinion, all venials, if they have in some way been retracted; for this Sacrament also was instituted to take away sins, as we shall see below (n. 1873). - 3. The Eucharist gives, ex opere operato, actual grace for exciting fervor, by which the just man obtains remission of venials (cf. n. 1513, 1). And the Sacrifice of the Mass produces this same effect, but only by way of impetration (n. 1591, 1). - 4. Whether other Sacraments also have a special power for the remission of venials is indeed uncertain, but the affirming opinion is more probable.

How venial sins are remitted through SACRAMENTALS, see what was said at n. 1441.

1649. DEFINITION. Penance is a Sacrament consisting in the acts of the penitent and in the absolution of the priest; - or, it is an external rite instituted by Christ, by which, through juridical absolution given by a priest, sins committed after Baptism are remitted to a contrite and confessed man, with competent satisfaction enjoined.

1650. Principles. I. There exists in the Church a SACRAMENT OF PENANCE, by which sins committed after Baptism are truly remitted. This is of faith from Trent (sess. 14, can. 1), defining thus: "If anyone shall say that in the Catholic Church Penance is not truly and properly a Sacrament, instituted by Christ our Lord for reconciling the faithful themselves to God, as often as they fall into sins after Baptism: let him be anathema." But the reason for this definition is clear; for Penance bears before itself everything which is required for the notion of a true Sacrament, namely a sensible and sacred sign, divine institution, and annexed grace, as will be clear from the words of Christ to be cited immediately.

1651. II. The Sacrament of Penance was instituted IN THE MANNER OF A JUDGMENT, in which the penitent is at once the accused and the accuser of himself, while the judge is the absolving priest. - This is clear from the words of the Savior (John 20:22-23): "Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose you shall retain, they are retained." By these words all the faithful of Christ who have fallen into fault are commanded to present themselves before this tribunal, so that through the sentence of priests, as often as they have sinned, they may be freed from the incurred guilt. Therefore it is clear that the Sacrament was instituted in the manner of a judgment. Hence Trent thus says (sess. 14, can. 9): "If anyone shall say that the sacramental absolution of the priest is not a judicial act: let him be anathema."

1652. III. The Sacrament of Penance, either in reality or in desire, is NECESSARY for all who have fallen into mortal sin after Baptism, by necessity of PRECEPT, indeed also of MEANS. - This is clear from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 2, end), where it is said: "But this Sacrament of Penance is necessary for those fallen after Baptism, as Baptism itself is necessary for those not yet regenerated." Namely, thus from the positive ordinance of Christ, who mercifully conceded to those fallen after Baptism, or having suffered shipwreck, this second plank, by which they may safely, although laboriously, escape again from the abyss of perdition. - But that it is conceded as a single remedy and one necessarily to be taken, is clear from the words of Christ: I will give the keys... they are forgiven... they are retained; for keys would be given in vain if entrance lay open without their help; nor would sins be retained through the Church if remission of them could be obtained by another way.

We said either in desire, namely explicit or implicit; for as for those not yet baptized the desire of Baptism suffices for justification and salvation, which is called baptism of the Spirit, or of the love of God above all things, so also for the baptized after a fall the desire of the Sacrament of Penance suffices, included in perfect contrition, yet in such a way that, if afterward the Sacrament can be received, it is altogether necessary.¹¹ (Recall what was said at n. 1645 and 1646.)

But when the reception of this Sacrament is obligatory will be said below, where Confession is treated (n. 1683 sqq.).

1653. Questions. Q. 1. What are the EFFECTS of the Sacrament of Penance?

Resp. They are principally the following: 1. Sins are remitted, as to fault and eternal punishment, so perfectly that they never revive through a subsequent sin; and this is through the infusion of sanctifying grace. 2. Temporal punishment is remitted both by reason of absolution, and by reason of the satisfaction imposed by the confessor; and indeed in a greater or lesser degree, according to the disposition of the penitent. But never, Trent being witness, can we arrive at complete newness and integrity without great weepings and labors on our part, divine justice requiring this. 3. Good works previously done in charity, and mortified through sin, revive. 4. Sacramental grace is conferred, through which we pursue sin with always greater hatred and are more efficaciously preserved from it.

To these add many other SECONDARY EFFECTS which well-disposed penitents, indeed also the whole Christian society, obtain from this benefit of God.¹² On this matter see the Dogmaticians.

Q. 2. In what things does the SACRAMENT of Penance differ from the VIRTUE of penance?

Resp. Especially in these: 1. Penance, insofar as it is a virtue, is placed under the genus of habit; as it is a Sacrament, it is placed under sacred sign. 2. The virtue through its acts is a part of the Sacrament; but this is the whole itself, which, besides the acts of the virtue, also includes absolution. 3. The virtue requires, for causing justification, a perfect act or contrition; the Sacrament justifies even with attrition alone, as will be seen below. 4. The virtue is a cause of grace by way of disposition, and ex opere operantis; the Sacrament, by way of an instrumental efficient cause, and ex opere operato.¹³ (cf. n. 1659, end.)

1654. As in the other Sacraments, so also in the Sacrament of Penance, there is a twofold matter, namely REMOTE and PROXIMATE.

The REMOTE matter, namely that about which the proximate matter is concerned in this Sacrament, is twofold: 1. necessary, which by precept must be subjected to the proximate matter; 2. sufficient only and free, which can indeed, but need not, be subjected to the proximate matter.

1655. Principles. I. The REMOTE matter of the Sacrament of Penance is sins committed after Baptism.¹⁴ Thus all.

It is said, 1. sins, whether mortal or venial; but not mere imperfections, for example that you have not responded to divine inspirations, that you have not done the good which you could, etc. For since these are opposed only to counsels, they do not have of their own nature the notion of sin

to be destroyed through penance.¹ - Except if accidentally they reach venial faults, as was said at n. 341.

It is said, 2. committed after Baptism; the reason is both because original sin and actual sins committed before Baptism are destroyed through Baptism itself, and because the power of the keys extends only to those who through Baptism are subjected to the Church.

It is asked: Whether and how sins must be confessed if, on account of doubt, BAPTISM IS REPEATED under condition?

Resp. 1. If he whose Baptism is to be repeated has already accused his sins in good faith, and was absolved from them, he is not bound to confess again. The reason is that, if the prior Baptism was valid, they have already been remitted through penance; but if otherwise, they will be remitted through Baptism.

2. If he has not yet accused the sins committed after doubtful Baptism, as happens among Protestants, he is bound to confess them; for if the prior Baptism was valid, the sins committed afterward cannot be destroyed through the repeated Baptism, as it is null. - Hence, when the Bishops of England asked: "Whether sacramental confession ought to be required from new converts in England, and whether it ought to be integral?" the Congregation of the HOLY OFFICE, on December 17, 1868, responded affirmatively to both, and that the Decree issued July 14, 1715, was to be given, in which namely it is contained: "that he is to be rebaptized under condition; and, Baptism having been conferred, let him confess the sins of his past life, and be absolved from them under condition."² (cf. n. 1833).

1656. II. The NECESSARY matter of Penance is all mortal sins not yet directly remitted through this Sacrament. - This is clear from Trent, which (sess. 14, cap. 5) declares "that all mortal sins of which penitents, after diligent examination of themselves, have consciousness, must be enumerated in confession." The reason is clear from what was said at n. 1646.

We said sins not yet directly remitted, or those which have not yet been expressly declared in confession, nor pardoned through valid absolution by force of jurisdiction extending itself to them. Hence, the necessary matter of confession is sins remitted through perfect contrition with only the desire of the Sacrament; likewise sins omitted either on account of inculpable forgetfulness, or on account of another just cause in a confession rightly made, and which were remitted together with others indirectly, or necessarily through the infusion of grace; likewise reserved sins, although distinctly declared, over which the absolving priest did not have jurisdiction, even though, from a grave cause, he had to impart absolution over the other sins.

1657. III. FREE and SUFFICIENT matter is both all venial sins not yet remitted by the power of the keys, and mortal or venial sins already directly remitted before, and confessed again. Thus all.³

We said, 1. venial sins not yet remitted by the power of the keys are matter: 1. free, because from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 5) "they can be kept silent without fault and expiated by many other remedies" (cf. n. 1648, q. 2); 2. sufficient, because the words of the Savior, whatsoever you shall loose, etc., do not distinguish between mortal and venial sins, and the Council, loc. cit., declares that venials are rightly and usefully said in confession. And truly, if confession had to be made concerning mortal sins alone, many, because of fear of publicly betraying themselves as gravely guilty, would be drawn back from that Sacrament; many, from false conscience, would judge themselves lightly guilty, etc.

We said, 2. sins already directly remitted are matter: 1. free, because what has once been remitted cannot any longer be called into fault; 2. sufficient, which is more than sufficiently clear from the Constitution of Benedict XI Inter cunctas and from the practice of the faithful. But the theological reason is that sin, although already remitted, nevertheless remains committed; and therefore the sinner can again and again sorrow for it and ask pardon, and likewise the priest can more often in the name of God pardon and remit it, just as among men it is customary that the same injury be more often remitted from the heart. And because the form of absolution, on account of the proximate matter which truly exists, namely confession and contrition, is verified, sanctifying grace is conferred, not indeed first grace, but second grace, with a fuller remission of temporal punishment, and the other effects which the Sacrament produces in a man already justified.

1658. It is asked: Whether a DOUBTFUL sin is sufficient matter of the Sacrament?

Resp. Only a sin actually committed is sufficient matter. Therefore, if the penitent confesses only a sin doubtfully committed, the Sacrament is exposed to danger of nullity. Hence:

1. If someone declares no certain sin, he should first be questioned about the obligations of his own state, about pride, vain glory, evil thoughts, the manner of acting with parents and other neighbors, detraction, anger, envy, etc. For many, unless they are helped in this way, respond that they know nothing more.

2. Pious penitents are to be advised that, to doubtful sins, as also to their lighter daily faults, they always add some certain sin from those already confessed, concerning which namely they sorrow more vehemently and on account of which they can conceive a firmer purpose.⁴ - But those who hold this salutary custom are to be forewarned not to append an accusation of this sort from mere use.

3. It does not seem to suffice if a penitent, whose conscience is not manifest to the confessor, simply says: "I accuse myself of all the sins of my past life." For the Sacrament of Penance was instituted by way of accusation and judgment; hence the accusation and judgment ought, ordinarily speaking, to be concerned with certain matter, and at least determined in species. - Therefore, except in a case of necessity, in which formal integrity of confession suffices, it is preferable to add: "Especially I accuse myself of sins committed formerly against such a precept or such a virtue," without the circumstances or number being expressed.⁵

1659. Scotus indeed and the Scotists contend that the whole essence of the Sacrament of Penance, namely matter and form, consists in the absolution of the priest alone; but that the acts of the penitent are only dispositions prerequired for obtaining the effect of the Sacrament. - But the other Theologians who lived after the Council of Trent commonly teach with St. Thomas that the acts of the penitent with the words of absolution are intrinsic parts of the Sacrament, and that they cooperate for the conferral of grace in Penance, just as washing cooperates in Baptism.⁶ Hence we say:

I. The three acts of the penitent, namely CONTRITION, CONFESSION, and SATISFACTION, are the proximate matter of the Sacrament of Penance. From Trent, sess. 14, cap. 3 and can. 4; from the Roman Catechism,⁷ and from the Ritual, which says absolutely: "The remote matter is sins, but the proximate matter is the acts of the penitent." They are called by the Council quasi-matter, "not because they do not have the notion of true matter," says the Roman Catechism, "but because they are not matter of that kind which is applied extrinsically, as water in Baptism and chrism in Confirmation." "In those Sacraments," says St. Thomas,⁸ "which have an effect corresponding to human acts, the human acts themselves are in place of matter, as occurs in Penance and in Matrimony." Nor is it an obstacle that contrition is not sensible of itself; for it is made sufficiently sensible through confession and other exterior signs of penance.⁹ Hence it can be said that the proximate matter of this Sacrament is properly sorrowful confession, since the Sacrament of Penance is intrinsically composed from it.

Let these other words of St. Thomas also be noted:¹⁰ "Every Sacrament," he says, "produces its effect not only by the power of the form, but also by the power of the matter; for from both there is one Sacrament. Hence, as the remission of fault in Baptism occurs not only by the power of the form, but also by the power of the matter, namely water, nevertheless more principally by the power of the form, from which the water itself also receives power; so also the remission of fault is an effect of penance, more principally indeed from the power of the keys, which the ministers have, on whose part is taken that which is formal in this Sacrament; but secondarily from the force of the acts of the penitent pertaining to the virtue of penance; yet insofar as these acts are ordered in some way to the keys of the Church."

1660. II. Contrition and confession are ESSENTIAL parts of the Sacrament, but satisfaction is only an INTEGRAL part. Thus commonly.¹¹ It is said, 1. Contrition and confession are ESSENTIAL parts, that is, so necessary that if one of them is lacking, the Sacrament cannot in any way stand; for without confession the information of the cause is impossible, and without contrition, in which the will of satisfying is necessarily included, reconciliation cannot be perfected.

It is said, 2. Satisfaction is an INTEGRAL part. By an integral part is understood that without which the Sacrament indeed exists essentially, but not altogether integrally; as he is essentially a man who lacks an arm or a leg, but nevertheless not whole and perfect. Hence sin can be remitted and reconciliation perfected before the satisfactory work imposed by the judge is fulfilled for obtaining remission of temporal punishment. - Yet this remission of punishment, insofar as it is obtained through satisfaction, is also an effect of the Sacrament, although secondary; and therefore it is required for the integrity of the Sacrament, or, as Trent says (loc. cit.), "for the full and perfect remission of sins."¹²

1661. I. The FORM of the Sacrament of Penance is the words of the priest: I absolve you from your sins. - This is clear from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 3), where it says: "The Holy Synod teaches that the form of the Sacrament of Penance, in which its force is chiefly placed, is set in those words of the minister: I absolve you, etc." Therefore it is clear that the form must be indicative, not deprecative, whatever may formerly have been disputed about the validity of a deprecative form.

Let it be noted: 1. The words I absolve you are of the essence; otherwise the presence of the penitent would not be indicated, nor would the very force of absolution be expressed. Some deny that the pronoun you is required for the value of the form, since this is sufficiently expressed in the word your. Although, speculatively speaking, this opinion seems more probable, nevertheless it cannot be held in practice, because the value of the Sacraments must be provided for most safely.¹³

2. The words from your sins, more probably, are not of the essence if it is said: I absolve you; because by the word you the matter is already sufficiently determined through the presence of the penitent who has confessed. But because the opposite opinion is also probable, those words could not be omitted without grave sin; and if they had been omitted, absolution would have to be repeated under condition.

3. The words In the name of the Father, etc., are not of the essence, because Christ did not here, as in Baptism, make mention of the Most Holy Trinity. Hence their omission would not exceed venial fault. Likewise, the pronoun I is not essential, as is clear.¹⁴

4. A form expressed by equivalent words would be valid, for example: I pardon, I remit your sins to you; or even if, for the sake of honor, it were said: I absolve Your Lordship, Your Excellency... But it would be illicit because unusual and contrary to the practice of the Church.

5. Several also would be validly absolved by this one form: I absolve you [plural], etc., because all things required for validity are found in it. But this can also be done licitly in a case of necessity, for example in shipwreck, before battle, or in battle itself.¹⁵

I ABSOLVE YOU FROM YOUR SINS, IN THE NAME OF THE FATHER +, AND OF THE SON, AND OF THE HOLY SPIRIT. AMEN. (If the penitent is a layman, the word of suspension is omitted.) - The Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ, the merits of the Blessed Virgin Mary and of all the Saints, whatever good you have done and whatever evil you have endured, may they be for you unto the remission of sins, the increase of grace, and the reward of eternal life. Amen.

"But in more frequent and shorter confessions, May Almighty God have mercy, etc., can be omitted, and it will suffice to say: Our Lord Jesus Christ, etc., as above up to this: The Passion of our Lord, etc."¹

"But when some grave necessity urges in danger of death, he will be able to say briefly: I absolve you from all censures and sins, in the name of the Father +, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen."

Concerning these things it must be noted: 1. The words May Almighty God have mercy... Indulgence, etc., can be omitted without any sin, according to the common opinion. - 2. The words Our Lord, outside necessity, according to many, cannot be passed over without venial fault; and their reason is that the Ritual seems to prescribe them even in more frequent confessions, as was noted above; yet others, with the common opinion, contradict this. - 3. The words The Passion of the Lord, etc., can always be omitted without fault; nevertheless, since through them, according to the opinion of St. Thomas, the good works of the penitent are raised to the dignity and merit of sacramental satisfaction, it is greatly to be advised that they never, or at least very rarely, be left unspoken.² - 4. The elevation of the hand and the formation of the cross are not necessarily required while absolving, although it is better to observe the custom. - 5. A pious custom has similarly prevailed that the confessor bless the penitent before confession with these words: May the Lord be in your heart and on your lips, that you may rightly confess all your sins; but neither is this formula of blessing prescribed by any law. - 6. The confessor gives absolution sitting, in the manner of a judge pronouncing sentence. - 7. "It is advisable," says St. Alphonsus,³ "that in the presence of other penitents the words of absolution be said quietly, lest, if someone is dismissed without absolution, others perceive it."

1663. Questions. Q. 1. Whether absolution can be sent to an ABSENT person?

Resp. No, since the form of the Sacrament cannot be expressed otherwise than by the voice. And this is certain among all; for in the year 1602 Clement VIII proscribed as false and rash this proposition: "It is licit through letters, or through a messenger, to confess sacramentally to an absent confessor, and to obtain absolution from him while he is absent."⁴ Therefore, since the Pontiff declared absolution of this sort illicit, he also declared it invalid, because in cases of necessity he could not have prohibited it. Now, such is the prohibition that absolution cannot even be sent to a penitent who has made confession while present, as Pope Paul V expressly declared on July 17 in the year 1605.⁵

Q. 2. What PRESENCE of the penitent is required, that he can be absolved?

Resp. Moral presence suffices, namely that within which men, with an ordinary voice, although somewhat raised, can and are accustomed to speak. Many extend this to twenty paces, especially if the penitent has not yet gone out from the sight of the confessor. But in a case of necessity, absolution is to be given whenever the one to be absolved is perceived by some sense. Hence, a penitent can be absolved who has already withdrawn from the confessional and is not much distant, and indeed licitly if he cannot conveniently be called back; likewise one who falls from a roof, who falls into a river, who, affected by plague, cannot be approached, etc. Yet, if the one to be absolved should be more than twenty paces away, absolution would have to be given under condition.

Q. 3. Whether by the words I ABSOLVE YOU the priest can validly absolve the penitent both from sins and from censures?

Resp. Yes, according to the common opinion of authors. "The reason is that nothing prevents those words, from the intention of the priest, from being directed to absolution both from censures and from sins."⁶ Yet this, unless there were altogether absent any suspicion that the penitent had incurred some censure, is not excused from venial fault, since it is against the use of the Church. Indeed, a Priest who, against the prohibition of the Church, wished to absolve the penitent first from sins and then from censures would sin gravely; but if the penitent were in good faith, he would be validly absolved from sins, although absolution from censures had not been premised; because the prohibition of the Church cannot invalidate a Sacrament whose value depends on divine law, when all essential requisites concur for it (cf. n. 1405).

Q. 4. Whether absolution can validly and licitly be given UNDER CONDITION?

Resp. 1. It is given VALIDLY if it is given under a condition concerning the past or the present; for when the condition is verified, the form of the Sacrament passes before God into an absolute form; but when the condition is not verified, the Sacrament is not confected, nor does the priest intend to confect it. (Recall what was said at n. 1414.)

Resp. 2. It is also given LICITLY "provided a just cause is present; namely if, absolution being denied, notable detriment would threaten the soul of the penitent." Thus St. Alphonsus⁷ with the common body of Doctors, against some.

Moreover: 1. The reason why it is licitly given is this: the Sacraments are for men, and the reverence owed to the Sacrament is preserved intact by the reasonable condition which is added. More probably, a condition retained in the mind suffices; although it is safer to express it in words, for example, "if you are contrite..., if you are disposed..., if you are capable, I absolve you."

2. The reason why it is not licitly given except when notable detriment is feared is that a condition is not rashly to be added to the form, and in a divine rite something is not easily to be changed. Besides, the priest ought to be a prudent dispenser, which he certainly would not be if from a slight cause, or in every doubt, he imparted conditional absolution. Yet extreme necessity, or danger of life, is not required, as Collet contends with certain others. For rigor of this sort would equally be harmful to penitents, especially to those who are to be judged unlikely to return to the confessor, and who, dismissed without absolution, would incur the danger of eternal damnation.

Q. 5. What are JUST CAUSES for giving absolution under condition?

Resp. These just causes can be either on the part of the confessor or on the part of the penitent. - The principal ones are the following:⁸

I. ON THE PART OF THE CONFESSOR: 1. If he positively or prudently doubts whether he absolved or not; for then he is bound to say: "if you are not absolved, I absolve you." - 2. If he doubts whether he has jurisdiction over the penitent, that is, in a doubt of fact, for example when there is doubt whether he received jurisdiction from the Ordinary, or whether he lost it on account of revocation; for then, with sufficient cause, he can absolve conditionally, saying: "if I can, I absolve you," etc. But in this case, says St. Alphonsus,⁹ the penitent must be warned "that he has been absolved only under condition, so that if afterward perhaps it becomes known that the confessor truly lacked jurisdiction, that penitent should confess his mortal sins again, as he ought." But in a positive doubt of law, that is, if because of the authority of Doctors the jurisdiction of the priest is probable, as, for example, in common error, he can give absolution in an absolute manner; because, a grave cause standing, the Church certainly supplies, as will be explained below (n. 1755 and 1756).

II. ON THE PART OF THE PENITENT there is a twofold species of cases, and therefore a twofold rule must be established:

Rule 1. A penitent who, placed in EXTREME necessity of soul, presents doubtful matter or disposition, is to be absolved under condition, lest perhaps he suffer grave detriment. - Hence the following are to be absolved under condition: 1. All the DYING, unless their incapacity or unworthiness is known, or can be positively presumed. - 2. Penitents DOUBTFULLY DISPOSED, if they are in grave danger of death, although not proximate, for example a woman in difficult childbirth, a sailor or another about to undertake a long voyage, a soldier about to fight with the enemy, a sick person before a very difficult surgical operation; or if it is prudently feared that, dismissed without absolution, they will thereafter altogether recoil from the sacred tribunal and languish in their sins, lest they pass over to heretics, lest they be alienated from the Church or from good works, lest they draw others to evil, etc.; or even if the necessity of communicating presses, for avoiding scandal or infamy, as easily happens in the first Communion of children and in general Communions, especially if the number of communicants is small.

Rule 2. A penitent who, placed in ORDINARY necessity, presents only doubtful matter or capacity, is SOMETIMES to be absolved, even under condition, lest he be deprived of a notable spiritual good. Hence the following are to be absolved under condition: 1. CHILDREN or the HALF-WITTED, whose use of reason is doubtful, or whose instruction concerning truths necessary to be known is doubtful, or whose sins are doubtful, especially if they are mortal of themselves. Therefore these are to be absolved both in danger of death, and when the precept of annual confession or of paschal Communion presses, and sometimes during the year, although they declare only venials and doubtful sins, lest perhaps they remain in a lethal state and be forced to live for a long time destitute of the help of sacramental grace. Yet great and accurate diligence must be premised, so that, as far as can be done, they are well instructed and rightly disposed.¹⁰ - 2. PIOUS PENITENTS who bring only imperfections, and can declare nothing certain from their past life; to these absolution under condition can be given once a month.

Let it be noted: 1. Penitents guilty of mortal sin who, on account of doubtful disposition or doubtful jurisdiction, have been absolved under condition, do not thereby have a right to the Holy Eucharist. For the precept of the Apostle stands in the way, saying: "But let a man prove himself..." Nor does doubtful, or merely probable, proof suffice when the sin was certain, but it must be certain morally (cf. n. 1756). - Hence, not only should the confessor not invite them to Holy Communion, but he should, if he can, prudently turn them away from receiving it.

2. Yet if they are already determined of themselves, or if from the denial of Communion a great evil is feared, let them be left in good faith, and let them be warned to excite themselves again to contrition.¹¹

1664. That every and only baptized man, fallen into at least venial fault, is the SUBJECT of the Sacrament of Penance, is already sufficiently known from the things disputed above. But this is proper and peculiar to this Sacrament, that its subject must contribute something, not only to its licit and fruitful reception, but to its very confection, namely by placing the proximate matter, which consists in the acts of the penitent himself, namely in CONTRITION, CONFESSION, and SATISFACTION. Therefore we must treat accurately of these acts, which are at once the proximate matter of the Sacrament and dispositions of the subject for receiving it.

1665. DEFINITION. Contrition is defined: "Sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning thereafter." Thus Trent, sess. 14, cap. 4.

It is an act of the virtue of penance, by which man assumes hatred toward sin committed by himself, and detests it so that by no pact whatever would he ever have wished himself to have sinned. But sadness of will necessarily accompanies such an act of detestation. But because contrition is defined as sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, Theologians dispute whether its essence consists in sorrow, or rather in detestation. The latter opinion seems truer to St. Alphonsus, because sorrow indeed is not the cause of detestation, but detestation is the cause of sorrow. - For the rest, as both are required, so one is contained in the other; for he who detests his sin necessarily sorrows for it, and conversely. Besides, detestation perseveres in the Blessed, but sorrow no longer does.¹² (Recall what was said at n. 1644.)

These things having been premised, we shall treat, according to the Tridentine definition, 1. of the sorrow of the penitent; 2. of his purpose.

We shall treat: 1. Of sorrow or contrition of the penitent, insofar as it is required in the Sacrament of Penance, abstracting from the perfection or imperfection of that sorrow; 2. Of perfect and imperfect contrition.

1666. Principles. I. Contrition is absolutely NECESSARY, both for the VALIDITY and for the LICEITY of the Sacrament of Penance, as often as it is received. The reason is that contrition is the proximate matter and an essential part of the Sacrament; therefore a Sacrament received without contrition is null, and consequently illicit. - Hence, although diligent labor is to be placed in the examination of conscience, more diligent labor must nevertheless be placed in exciting sorrow of soul. And although a brief space of time can suffice for conceiving this sorrow, it is nevertheless safer to prolong a little, or to repeat, the act of contrition, lest by too much haste it be extinguished in its very beginning.

We said: As often as it is received, namely lest the confession of venial sin be excluded. "For it is certain that, although outside the Sacrament some motion of grace or charity suffices for its remission, as St. Thomas teaches, nevertheless in the Sacrament FORMAL sorrow is altogether required, nor does virtual sorrow suffice, as the Doctors commonly teach with Roncaglia, Concina, and Croix, against a few."¹ - But:

It is doubted, 1. Whether he sins mortally who confesses venials without sorrow? "Genettus, Juveninus, and Natalis Alexander deny it; they say that as often as the mind of profaning the Sacrament is absent, to frustrate it in light matter does not exceed a light irreverence. But other Doctors commonly and rightly affirm it, and Lugo calls the former opinion altogether false, saying that the gravity of the injury does not consist in the matter, but in the frustration of the Sacrament, by not placing suitable and essential matter, as sorrow is. Hence, whether it is frustrated on account of grave matter or on account of light matter, the irreverence is always grave."²

It is doubted, 2. Whether in the confession of venials it suffices to sorrow for one without another? - "Some deny this; but Suarez, Lugo, and others commonly and rightly affirm it. And the reason is clear, because venials are not necessary matter, but sufficient matter. But Castropalaus, Lugo, Sporer, Tamburini, etc., say that it suffices to repent of a multitude of venials, without repenting of any one in particular; but Arriaga and Dicastillo contradict them, saying that sorrow concerning at least one of them is necessary. But these opinions are easily reconciled, because it is impossible that he who repents of a multitude should not sorrow for the last things which constitute the multitude."³ Likewise, it suffices to sorrow for a certain species of venials, or for deliberate ones alone.

1667. II. Contrition, in order to obtain pardon, must be TRUE, SUPERNATURAL, APPRETIATIVELY SUPREME, UNIVERSAL at least with respect to mortal sins, EFFICACIOUS, and finally must have joined to itself CONFIDENCE of pardon. We say in order to obtain pardon, and this both in the Sacrament and outside the Sacrament; because the aforesaid qualities or CONDITIONS also pertain to the virtue of penance (cf. n. 1644 and 1645).

1. It must be TRUE. "It is necessary," says St. Alphonsus,⁴ "that the soul conceive true sorrow, true displeasure, true bitterness concerning sin committed, and that it detest and abhor it." For contrition is called sorrow of soul or of heart, that is, of the will. Therefore contrition, or attrition, which is only thought to exist, even inculpably, does not suffice; nor does the desire of absolution without affection concerning sins, as some wish against the common opinion. And the reason is that true sorrow of the will is an essential part of the Sacrament.⁵ - Nor does it suffice to sorrow that you do not sorrow, nor a mere wish of not sinning. Yet Bonacina rightly notes that with the act by which someone sorrows that he does not sorrow for sins, there is usually joined sorrow for the sins, even if the penitent does not discern it.⁶

2. It must be SUPERNATURAL, both by reason of the motive from which it is elicited, which must be proposed to the mind by faith, and also by reason of the principle from which it proceeds, which is divine grace, without which no one can repent as he ought. - Hence, if someone sorrowed even most intensely, or in good faith, because his sin is repugnant to reason, or because it deprives him of reputation, health, or some temporal good, he would have merely natural sorrow, of itself plainly inept for obtaining justification, which is of the supernatural order. Hence this 57th proposition was condemned by Innocent XI: "It is probable that natural contrition, provided it is honorable, suffices." Yet the occasion of penance can be natural, as is clear from the example of the Ninevites.

3. It must be APPRETIATIVELY SUPREME, namely so that the offense of God displeases more than any other evil which could have happened to us. The reason is that "as God is the supreme good among all things which are to be loved, so also sin is the supreme evil among all things which men ought to hate."⁷ And the same reason runs concerning VENIAL sin; wherefore one must also sorrow supremely for it, that pardon may be obtained from God. We say appretiatively supreme, not intensively; because although it is fitting and to be desired that no end or measure be placed in the detestation of sin, this nevertheless is not required, nor is it in the common power of men.⁸

4. It must be UNIVERSAL, at least with respect to mortal sins. For the Lord says (Ezek. 18:21-22): "If the wicked man shall do penance for all his sins... I will not remember all his iniquities." The reason is clear: for it cannot be that he who truly sorrows for his sins detests one and takes complacency in another, since he knows that divine friendship is altogether extinguished by every mortal sin. - Yet there are not required, as is more commonly held, individual acts of sorrow for individual sins, which would often be impossible; but it suffices to sorrow for all universally, from a motive common to all, because universal sorrow virtually extends itself to all sins.⁹ (cf. n. 1397, 3.)

5. It must be EFFICACIOUS, namely so that it turns the will away from sin and disposes it to doing all things by which relapse is avoided. And to this pertain the words of Ezekiel (18:31): "Cast away from you all your transgressions... and make for yourselves a new heart and a new spirit." (cf. n. 1680, on formal purpose.)

6. It must have joined to itself CONFIDENCE OF PARDON; otherwise it would be similar to the sorrow of the damned in hell, who also repent of their sins, but without hope of remission. But the sorrow of the truly penitent is filled with hope and consolation; because the more a man repents of having displeased God, the more he trusts in divine mercy, and the more his consolation is increased. Hence St. Bernard thus addressed the Lord: "Lord, if it is so sweet to weep concerning Thee, what will it be to rejoice concerning Thee?"¹⁰

But are EXPLICIT acts of faith and hope required for obtaining grace in the Sacrament of Penance? Some indeed affirm, because sinners are said by Trent to prepare themselves for justification by these acts. But others more commonly deny it, because the necessity of those acts cannot be demonstrated by any sufficient reason. - Yet these opinions can be reconciled very well; for the penitent, by eliciting an act of sorrow, also explicitly elicits, not now reflexively but exercitively, acts of faith and hope; because then without doubt he exercitively believes that his sins will be remitted to him by the power of the Sacrament, and explicitly hopes that pardon will be granted to him through the Sacrament and on account of the merits of Christ.¹¹

1668. III. Contrition, which is a part of the Sacrament of Penance, must be SENSIBLE in some way, and must be MORALLY UNITED to the other essential parts of the Sacrament. - This is clear from what was said concerning the Sacraments in general (n. 1402 and 1434).

1. It must be SENSIBLE, not indeed so that it redounds into sense or the sensitive appetite; for such sorrow, although it often arises from sadness of the will, is not necessary; but so that it is manifested by some sign, for example through sorrowful confession, through petition for pardon, etc.; otherwise the confessor could not rightly judge concerning the disposition of the penitent (cf. n. 1817, q. 1).

2. It must be MORALLY UNITED to confession and absolution, so that from the diverse parts there may be one Sacrament. Wherefore the following things come to be discussed.

1669. Questions. Q. 1. Whether contrition must PRECEDE absolution?

Resp. Yes; otherwise absolution, which is the form of the Sacrament, would not be applied to its matter and would be invalid. Indeed, neither is contrition altogether safe when it is put off to the point of absolution; because it can easily happen, especially in the confession of the rude, that the form of absolution ends before the act of contrition has been elicited.

Q. 2. Whether contrition must also PRECEDE the ACCUSATION of sins?

Resp. The first opinion affirms it, both because sorrow, as the matter of this Sacrament, must be sensible and is not made sensible except through confession, and because confession ought not to be a simple narration, but a sorrowful accusation. The second and more common opinion denies it, and the Ritual greatly favors this, saying: "The confession having been heard, he will try to lead him to sorrow by efficacious words," namely the confessor. To the first contrary reason it is answered that sorrow is made sensible not only through confession, but also by other signs and words; but to the second it is answered that only this is required: "that confession not be a mere narration of sins, but have the character of a sacramental accusation; and for this it suffices that the confession be made with the mind of obtaining absolution, and that afterward sorrow be manifested at least through petition for, or expectation of, absolution; for thus the confession becomes well sacramental." And the very defenders of the first opinion concede this; whence it is clear that the two opinions differ more in words than in reality, and that the second, understood in the way we have said, is altogether safe.¹² "To calm scruples, confessors are accustomed, if they doubt concerning the internal disposition of the penitent, to excite him to sorrow concerning the sins just explained. This is done if it is said: I sorrow for and accuse myself of the sins narrated."¹³

Q. 3. Whether the act of contrition must be elicited IN ORDER TO THE SACRAMENT?

Resp. No, from the more probable opinion; "both because from Trent attrition, however had, suffices, and because sorrow is ordered at least to absolution when it is manifested through confession."¹⁴ - Yet the opposite opinion, which says that an act of contrition, when it was not elicited in order to the Sacrament, must be renewed in confession, is also probable, and therefore is to be held in practice.¹⁵ (cf. n. 1659, end.)

Q. 4. For how much time does an act of sorrow morally ENDURE for receiving the Sacrament validly?

Resp. According to the various circumstances, a longer or shorter space of time must be assigned: 1. If confession is made solely from sorrow for sins, sorrow endures virtually at least for one, or even another, day. - 2. But if it is made from mere devotion, or from precept, from vow, or from the mandate of a rule, a shorter space, for example from morning to evening, ought to intervene. For the rest, in practice it is counseled that the act of contrition always be renewed before absolution.¹⁶

Q. 5. Whether he is bound again to elicit an act of sorrow who immediately after ABSOLUTION confesses a sin omitted through forgetfulness?

Resp. According to the more common opinion, he is not bound; because the prior sorrow, since it is universal, extends itself also to the forgotten sins and perseveres up to the second absolution. - But according to another opinion, still probable and therefore to be followed as safer, a new Sacrament must be confected; because through the first absolution the judgment has already been completed, and therefore a new act of sorrow must be elicited, a new penance imposed, and a new absolution imparted.¹⁷

1670. Every act of contrition, as is already clear from what has been said, requires this for itself, that it be elicited from a truly supernatural motive; and in this respect, indeed, all and each of the acts of contrition generically agree. But because the motives from which they are elicited are of unequal order, and because on account of this inequality some are more perfect and efficacious than others, Theologians, relying on this foundation, distinguish two principal SPECIES OR DEGREES of contrition, one of which they call perfect contrition, and the other imperfect contrition. - Of each, separately, we must now treat.

1671. DEFINITION. PERFECT contrition, or contrition simply so called, is that which is elicited from the motive of divine charity, that is, insofar as sin

is an offense of God, the Supreme Good and to be loved above all things. For divine Goodness, just as on account of its supreme lovableness it draws our will to love of itself, so likewise it moves it to detestation of the evil which is opposed to it. - Hence an act of perfect contrition will be, for example, the following: My God, with my whole heart I sorrow for all my sins, and they displease me because I have offended Thee, infinite goodness.

Two things worthy of note must be premised here: 1. Several Theologians probably teach that an act of perfect contrition can be elicited from the motive of any offended divine attribute. For he, they say, who loves divine justice, wisdom, mercy, beneficence, already loves God Himself, since these attributes are God Himself. But others commonly and more probably hold that perfect contrition must proceed altogether from the sole motive of charity, namely from divine goodness contemned through sin, insofar as this is the root and aggregate of all perfections. For, from Trent, contrition must be perfected or informed by charity; but the object of charity is God insofar as He is Infinite Goodness itself, or the infinite Good.¹

2. Perfect contrition admits several DEGREES, among which are distinguished: 1. Contrition in a remiss or lowest degree, by which at least mortal sin is excluded from the motive of predominant charity. - 2. Contrition in a perfect degree, or intense degree of reason, by which in addition any venial sin and any affection for it are excluded. - 3. Contrition in the supreme and most intense degree of reason and sense, such as by special grace was granted to some sinners, who died from the vehemence of sorrow. - Yet these diverse degrees are of the same nature, because more and less do not vary the species.² (cf. n. 465 seq.)

1672. Principles. I. PERFECT contrition, even in the lowest degree, always JUSTIFIES a man before the Sacrament is actually received. This is proved, 1. from Scripture (Prov. 8:17): "I love those who love me." "Charity covers a multitude of sins" (1 Pet. 4:8). - 2. From Trent, which (sess. 14, cap. 4) teaches "that contrition perfected by charity... reconciles man to God before this Sacrament is actually received."³ 3. From the Fathers and Doctors, among whom St. Chrysostom:⁴ "Where charity is, all evils have been taken away"; and St. Thomas:⁵ "Charity cannot be with mortal sin." 4. From the 32nd proposition of Baius, condemned by Gregory XIII: "That charity which is the fullness of the law is not always joined with the remission of sins." But the theological reason is that an act of perfect contrition is a formal act of charity toward God, or an act intrinsically joined with charity, as is clear from the very definition of contrition.

We said, 1. even in the lowest degree. For it suffices that the love of God attain to the notion of charity, which consists in the love of God for His own sake, above all things. "And the reason is evident," says St. Alphonsus,⁶ "because as any aversion from God as from the ultimate end, even in a remiss degree, suffices for losing God's friendship, so any true conversion suffices for recovering it." Hence St. Thomas:⁷ "Any contrition is informed by grace making one pleasing; therefore however small it is, it destroys every fault." And this opinion seems so certain to our Blessed Doctor that he rejects the opposite altogether as improbable and false.⁸

We said, 2. always justifies, that is, even outside the case of necessity. This is likewise certain against Adrian and Cajetan, although the Council of Trent abstained from condemning those authors. It is clear from the condemned 71st proposition of Baius: "Through contrition even joined with perfect charity and with the desire of receiving the Sacrament, guilt is not remitted, outside the case of necessity or martyrdom, without the actual reception of the Sacrament."⁹

1673. II. Perfect contrition of itself does not justify a man except WITH THE DESIRE OF THE SACRAMENT, at least implicit. - 1. This is clear from the very nature of contrition; for, in order that it be true and perfect, there is required the will to fulfill all the precepts of God; but confession is a divine precept; therefore. - To the point Cardinal de Lugo says aptly:¹⁰ "Contrition is said to justify in order to the keys, not because it receives the power of justifying from the Sacrament, but because, when it justifies outside the Sacrament, it has in itself the implicit desire of subjecting mortal sins to the keys; to this a man remains bound even after he has been justified through contrition." - 2. This is further clear from Trent (sess. 14, cap. 4), where it is declared that the desire of the Sacrament is included in perfect contrition.

We said with a desire at least implicit; for it can happen that a sinner elicits an act of perfect contrition without actually thinking about confession, either from inadvertence or from invincible ignorance; but that ignorance or inadvertence detracts nothing from the merit of charity and contrition. Therefore. - Besides, from Trent the desire which is included in contrition suffices; but what is included in another thing is implicit, not explicit. - Yet if the sinner actually thinks about the precept of confession, he certainly must either confess, or elicit the purpose of confessing; otherwise contrition would not be true, as is evident.¹¹

1674. Several things must be noted here: - 1. Perfect contrition is not the very form which justifies the sinner, but is, in the present providence, the final disposition or final preparation for justification. For, when from actual grace there has been placed in the sinner an act of charity or of perfect contrition, habitual grace is immediately infused into him, by which the man loving God and loved by God is rendered just and a friend of God. This is drawn from Trent, sess. 14, cap. 4, and sess. 6, cap. 7.

2. Contrition, whether considered on the part of charity or on the part of sensible sorrow, can increase to such a degree that it suffices for the FULL DESTRUCTION of fault and punishment; as is clear from the example of the good Thief. For charity, which begets displeasure, can be so greatly intensified in act that the contrition following from it merits not only the removal of fault, but also absolution from every punishment. - Likewise, sensible sorrow, which the will excites in contrition, can be so greatly intensified that it suffices for the destruction of the whole punishment, by way of satisfaction.¹²

3. Most vehement contrition can further bring this about, that it removes the very REMAINS OF SIN. "For St. Thomas teaches¹³ that God sometimes removes the remains of sin successively through His cooperating grace, but sometimes immediately through a great commotion, by which man obtains perfect spiritual health... as is clear concerning St. Magdalene."¹⁴

Concerning the NECESSITY of contrition, recall what was said at n. 1647.

1337. - Penance, considered generically, sounds the same as the sorrow of soul which anyone experiences after he has done or omitted something which he would wish had not been done or had not been omitted. But in the strict and proper sense penance is sorrow of soul, insofar as it is referred to God offended, and hostile to us.

I. Penance, as a virtue, is defined: A moral virtue inclining one to detestation of sin, insofar as it is an offense of God, and to an efficacious purpose of avoiding it in the future, and of satisfying divine justice.

Penance was never not necessary to the sinner by necessity of means unto salvation. For it is altogether repugnant that an impenitent sinner be received by God into friendship.

It is also necessary by necessity of divine precept, as is clear from many testimonies of Sacred Scripture, e.g. "Unless you shall do penance, you shall all likewise perish," etc.¹

The effect of perfect penance, namely of that which leads to those acts of obedience by which, from His immense mercy, God Himself has revealed that He is placated and reconciled with sinful man, is twofold: 1° remission of sins, as is clear from countless places of Sacred Scripture; 2° remission of eternal punishment. For a justified man cannot be liable to eternal punishment. It is clear also from Trent.²

II. Penance, as a Sacrament, is defined: A Sacrament of the new law instituted by Christ after the manner of a judgment, for remitting, through priestly absolution, to a contrite and confessing man sins committed after Baptism.

This Sacrament differs especially from the others in this, that it is administered after the manner of a judgment: for the penitent is present at once as accused, witness, and accuser; and the priest as judge pronouncing sentence.

1338. Points To Be Established. - I. Penance is a true Sacrament of the new law. See Dogmatics.

II. The Sacrament of Penance has the power:

1. Of remitting all sins committed after Baptism.

2. Of restoring infused virtues, yet according to the measure of disposition.

3. Of revivifying works made dead. See Dogmatics.

III. The necessary parts of the Sacrament of Penance are 1° contrition; 2° confession; 3° absolution; 4° satisfaction, insofar as it is to be accepted by the penitent. For the Sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a reconciling judgment; but this cannot be had without sorrowful confession of guilt, a disposition of soul for undergoing the satisfaction enjoined, and the absolution of the priest. - But satisfaction, insofar as it is to be imposed or fulfilled, is only an integral part of this Sacrament; because the primary effect, namely grace and the remission of sins as to guilt and eternal punishment, can be had without satisfaction.

IV. But the acts of the penitent required for the remission of sins are: 1° contrition; 2° confession; 3° satisfaction in the sense explained. This is clear from Trent.¹

V. The Sacrament of Penance is necessary - by necessity of precept in reality, and by necessity of means in desire, at least implicit - for remitting mortal sins committed after Baptism. Thus in the new law Christ the Lord, the supreme legislator and provider, has established by His divine goodness and providence.

Hence for those stained by mortal sin committed after Baptism, the Sacrament of Penance is necessary unto salvation at least by necessity of precept; but penance or contrition with the desire of the Sacrament, or with a serious purpose, at least implicit, of confessing sins when the opportune occasion has been given, is always necessary by necessity of means.

1339. - As in the other Sacraments, so in the Sacrament of Penance there is a twofold matter, one remote, but the other proximate.

The remote matter is all sins committed after Baptism; which are called the matter about which, because absolution is concerned with destroying them. But it is either necessary, or merely sufficient and free.

The necessary remote matter is all mortal sins committed after Baptism, and never yet directly remitted by the power of the keys; because by divine precept sins of this kind are to be subjected to the keys. - But sufficient and free matter is all venial sins, and all sins, whether mortal or venial, already otherwise duly subjected to the keys. It is called sufficient, because any sins, even the least, can be the object of sacramental pardon. But it is called free, because there is no precept of subjecting them to the keys. Concerning these things there is proof from the perpetual practice and tradition of the Church, and also from the definition of Trent.²

But the proximate matter of the Sacrament of Penance is the three acts of the penitent, namely contrition, confession, and satisfaction, which are called as it were the matter of this Sacrament, because they are in the place of the sensible matter which in the other Sacraments is subjected to the form; for through these acts sins are proposed to be destroyed by the words of the form. This is clear especially from Trent.¹

1340. Questions. - Query 1° Are sins already duly confessed and remitted through absolution sufficient matter of the Sacrament of Penance?

Resp. Affirmatively. This is certain among all, says St. Alphonsus.²

The reason is, 1° because a sin, although remitted, is always a sin committed; and just as contrition for the same sin can be repeated with fruit, so also confession; and it happens only per accidens that the sin, as already remitted, is not remitted, though nevertheless per se, as committed, it is capable of remission. - Nor is it an obstacle that then the Sacrament does not delete this sin; for it suffices that it have the effect in first act, namely that it bestow grace destructive of sin, although per accidens in second act it does not delete the sin, as happens when someone approaches the Sacrament already perfectly contrite. For in each case absolution has the same force, namely an increase of grace, remission of punishment, etc.; and this grace, or increase of justice, can truly be called justification, just as an increase of heat is called heating, as Sylvius says.

2° Because a sentence already rendered can be confirmed for greater security, and greater consolation and quiet of soul, as is sometimes wont to be done in civil matters; and if perhaps the sin submitted to the keys has not yet been remitted, then it will be able to be remitted.

3° It is clear also from the Declaration of Benedict XI, in the Canon Law:³ "Although," he says, "it is not of necessity to confess the same sins again, nevertheless ... that the Confession of the same sins be repeated, we judge salutary." It is clear besides from the constant practice of the faithful, with the Church approving.

Query 2° Is an adult to be baptized conditionally, in doubt concerning the preceding Baptism, bound to confess sins already accused?

Resp. Negatively. The reason is that those sins have already been remitted through the Sacrament of Penance, if the prior Baptism was valid; but if it was not valid, they are not matter of Confession, and they will be remitted through the second Baptism. - Reuter.⁴

Query 3° Is the aforesaid adult bound to accuse sins not yet confessed, or committed after the last Confession?

Resp. Affirmatively, as is clear from what has been said n. 1264. IV. 2), and from Resp. S. Inq. p. LIX. related. The reason is that all obligations which are joined by some nexus with an act certainly performed, and which is not established to be null, remain in their force. Wherefore, since after Baptism there remains in the Church no other Sacrament by which sinners can be reconciled to God, they neither ought nor can be sent away freed from this obligation, who certainly have received Baptism, concerning whose valid collation only doubt is present.

Query 4° Must an adult who is to be baptized and absolved conditionally first be baptized or absolved?

Resp. From the Resp. S. Inq. in the preceding question 3°, he ought first to be baptized conditionally, and then to be absolved under condition. Yet it is expedient to premise Confession before Baptism for the better disposition of the one to be baptized, but to confer absolution immediately after Baptism. (6) p. 414.

Query 5° Is a sin accused only in general sometimes sufficient matter of the Sacrament of Penance, e.g. if someone says: I ACCUSE MYSELF OF ALL MY SINS?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, certainly in a case of necessity, or when the penitent, e.g. one at the point of death, cannot accuse any sin in species, even generically. - Thus most commonly with St. Thomas. - But I think the case of moral impossibility is to be likened to the case of necessity, when a sufficient cause is present, on account of which the penitent is not to be sent away without absolution. Such a case would be given if the confessor, as not rarely happens, wastes oil and labor while he tries in vain to induce an untaught person, or one dull from old age, or a pious person not having any certain venial sin, and not absolved from them for a rather notable time, to declare some certain venial sin concerning which they sufficiently grieve, or a mortal sin already confessed. - A general accusation also suffices, when there is question of a penitent whose sins already confessed are sufficiently known to the confessor.¹

Resp. 2° Negatively, at least as to liceity, since Doctors dispute concerning the sufficiency of such accusation for the validity of the Sacrament outside the cases under 1°, and because inconveniences arise from it.²

Query 6° If the penitent offers only doubtful sufficient matter, is the confessor bound to inquire about the past life, so that he can absolve?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if he wishes to absolve, because otherwise the Sacrament would be exposed to danger of nullity. Except if a case occurs in which the penitent can be absolved conditionally, concerning which below.

Resp. 2° Negatively, if he does not wish to absolve, but to send the penitent away with only a blessing; because the penitent who does not bring matter certainly sufficient has no right to absolution. - Likewise, if the penitent seems to have doubtful sorrow concerning only venial sins, ordinarily the confessor is not bound to use great diligence to move him to sorrow, although he does this much better.¹ - But the contrary must be said if there is question of doubtful mortals, on account of danger to the penitent.

But the confessor sending away the penitent with only a blessing is not always bound to procure efficaciously that the penitent himself understand this well. For in fact certain causes sometimes demand that with certain persons, either very ignorant, or scrupulous, or ostentatious of piety, one proceed in this or a similar manner: "You will recite, therefore, three Hail Marys; elicit an act of contrition, and may God bless you. The blessing of God almighty," etc.

Query 7° Must a penitent be necessarily absolved who does not bring necessary matter?

Resp. Negatively per se, if the penitent does not ask for absolution; but even without absolution he can be permitted to receive Holy Communion; because, since he is in the state of grace, the Sacrament of Penance is not required for disposing him to that. Yet ordinarily it is expedient to absolve such a person, if he has confessed sufficient matter, concerning which he sufficiently grieves, so that he may receive both an increase of sanctifying grace and sacramental graces, and an easier remission of venial sins and punishments, etc.

But if he has not received the Sacrament for a notable time, or if he needs special helps, e.g. for overcoming temptations, or if the penitent himself, offering, as above, sufficient matter and being disposed, desires or asks it, he must be absolved.¹

1341. Resolves. - 1° Sufficient and licit matter of Confession is venial sins, or mortal sins otherwise confessed, according to their own species, even generic, prescinding from number and from any circumstances whatever. The reason is that thus there is had Confession of a sin, and indeed of a determinate sin, at least of one in species; nor is there an obligation of adding the number of venial sins, or of mortal sins already remitted.¹

2° If someone accuses himself of no sin in particular, and says, e.g. I know nothing, except that I must often have sinned like other men, he should be examined as children are wont to be examined. If nothing can be elicited from the last Confession, let him be asked about his past life, ... whether he ever lied in his life ... whether he ever offended his parents, or was angry, or disparaged his neighbor, etc., etc.

3° With little women, devout women, and others of this sort, who confess only confusedly and about very light things, care must be taken that they add some fault from their past life in species, at least generically. Then, however, you will try to excite them to sorrow and purpose, and, having absolved them, you will dismiss them in peace.

4° For greater security and for perceiving the fruit more surely, penitents are to be induced so that, besides doubtful sins or even daily light sins, they always join from sins already confessed at least generically some other certain sin, concerning which they grieve more vehemently, lest perhaps the Sacrament be exposed to danger of frustration. But if the accusation of some mortal sin already confessed cannot prudently be obtained, then it will suffice if the penitent accuses himself of some venial sins, at least insofar as he has committed them innumerable times in his life, the confessor leading in this or a similar manner: "Now you accuse yourself of all sins committed in the time before this, i.e. of all disobediences, lies, murmurings, etc."

5° But penitents who observe the aforesaid practice are to be admonished that they not subject again to the keys a sin of past life only from a certain custom, especially if that sin is light; because there is fear lest they do not grieve sufficiently, and so do not attain the purpose of providing for the validity and fruit of the Sacrament.²

The form of the Sacrament of Penance can be distinguished as twofold: one essential for the validity of the Sacrament, and the other only preceptive or rubrical.

1342. - I. The essential form consists in the words: I absolve thee from thy sins. This is clear from Trent.¹

II. The preceptive or rubrical form consists in those prayers which precede or follow the essential form. But thus it is had in the Roman Ritual: May Almighty God have mercy on thee, and, thy sins having been forgiven, bring thee to eternal life. Amen.

May the almighty and merciful Lord grant thee indulgence, absolution, and remission of thy sins. Amen.

May our Lord Jesus Christ absolve thee, and I, by His authority, absolve thee from every bond of excommunication (suspension), and interdict, insofar as I am able and thou needest; then: I absolve thee from thy sins in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. Amen.

May the Passion of our Lord Jesus Christ, the merits of the Blessed Virgin Mary and of all the Saints, whatever good thou shalt have done and whatever evil thou shalt have endured, be to thee unto remission of sins, increase of grace, and the reward of eternal life. Amen.

The right hand is raised toward the penitent from the word Indulgence up to the word Passion of the Lord; and the Sign of the Cross is made over the penitent while saying: In the name of the Father ... The word suspension is omitted for lay persons. But there is a pious custom that the confessor before Confession, while blessing the penitent, say: May the Lord be in thy heart and on thy lips, that thou mayest rightly confess all thy sins, or recite a similar prayer.

In practice the prayers May Almighty God have mercy and May the almighty and merciful Lord grant thee indulgence can easily be omitted, as is clear from the Roman Ritual. Indeed according to the more common opinion they can always be omitted without sin. The same also is said concerning the prayers which follow absolution; but since, according to the probable opinion, these elevate the good works of the penitent unto the merit of sacramental satisfaction, it is fitting that they be omitted as rarely as possible. - But the words May our Lord Jesus Christ ... cannot be omitted without venial fault, unless necessity urges, since the Roman Ritual says: "In more frequent Confessions it will be enough to say: May our Lord ... up to the Passion of the Lord ... exclusively." - S. C. R.¹ and Conf. dir. per le C. 15. n. 2.

1343. Questions. - Query 1° Is absolution valid if the priest says only: I ABSOLVE; or I ABSOLVE FROM THY SINS; or I ABSOLVE THEE?

Resp. to the 1st. Negatively. The reason is that the word I absolve alone does not of itself carry any determinate sense, and it falls upon no subject; therefore it cannot be a valid form.

Resp. to the 2nd. Affirmatively as more probable, as it seems, at least speculatively. The reason is that by these words the subject is sufficiently determined; for the pronoun thee is sufficiently expressed in the word thy. - Thus Lugo.² - St. Alphonsus,³ as more probable, etc. Yet not a few deny it, whose opinion, as St. Alphonsus says,⁴ as safer, is to be followed.

Resp. to the 3rd. Affirmatively as more probable, with the common opinion. The reason is that the whole effect of the Sacrament is expressed in these words, without adding from thy sins. - Besides, it seems to be clear also from the Catechism of the Council of Trent,⁵ where only this is said: "But the form is: I absolve thee." And nothing else is added there. - Roncaglia, Lugo, etc. - Yet not improbably some deny it with Lacroix, and this opinion is to be stood by in practice.

Query 2° Is the deprecative form valid, e.g. May God absolve thee?

Resp. Negatively, at least more probably, with St. Alphonsus,⁶ Lacroix,⁷ and very commonly others. The reason is that the Sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a judgment; hence Christ wished that the priest as judge would pronounce a sentence, and would express this: therefore sins must be remitted by the priest himself as minister of Christ; therefore it does not suffice that he beseech God to remit them. Therefore, etc. Besides, from the Council of Florence the indicative form alone is prescribed as the true form of the Sacrament of Penance.

Query 3° Is the elevation of the hand and the formation of the Sign of the Cross necessary in imparting absolution?

Resp. 1° It is certain that it is not required for the validity of the Sacrament, because it pertains neither to the matter nor to the form. This is clear from the Council of Florence and Trent, and also from the unanimous consent of Theologians, at least after Trent.

Resp. 2° Nor is it required under mortal sin for liceity according to the common opinion, against a few; because it is only a Rubric, which does not seem grave. Indeed several grave authors assert that this can be omitted without sin, as Busembaum, reported and implicitly approved by St. Alphonsus,¹ and many others. At least the elevation of the hand can be omitted without sin while the prayers which precede formal absolution are recited.

Query 4° Can a priest validly absolve several by one form, saying: I ABSOLVE YOU FROM YOUR SINS?

Resp. Affirmatively, because all things required for validity are found. And it can also licitly be done in a case of necessity, e.g. in shipwreck, before battle, or in the battle itself, etc.; and such absolution would be multiple, not indeed formally, but virtually and equivalently, and there would be as many Sacraments as there were men who, through some Confession and sufficient sorrow, were disposed. - Lacroix,² and all others.

Query 5° What presence of the penitent is reckoned moral with respect to absolution?

Resp. It must be such that the words: I absolve thee, according to the moral estimation of men, are judged to fall upon the penitent; but that moral presence is reckoned sufficient within which men can and are wont to speak in a common voice, although a higher one. Many extend it to 20 paces, especially if the penitent is not outside the sight of the confessor. In necessity at least the penitent is to be absolved under condition whenever he is perceived by some sense. - Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus.³

Hence: 1° One who seems about to fall from a roof, to fall into a river, or to be submerged in the sea, is to be absolved, at least if he is not far distant from the confessor. 2° If the confessor, on account of danger of infection or for another cause, cannot enter the room of the sick person, he ought to absolve him from the door. 3° If a penitent were to withdraw from the confessor not yet absolved, thinking himself absolved, he would have to be absolved if he were seen at a small distance, or were certainly known to be present within the nearby crowd; yet he would have to be called back if this could conveniently be done.

Query 6° Through the words: I ABSOLVE THEE FROM THY SINS, can the confessor validly absolve the penitent both from censures and from sins?

Resp. Affirmatively, because these words: I absolve thee from thy sins, involve absolution from every bond arising from sins; and nothing prevents the confessor from being able to direct his intention to absolution both of sins and of censures. - Thus commonly. - St. Alphonsus,¹ Lacroix.²

Query 7° Is absolution valid if the confessor absolves from sins before he absolves from censures?

Resp. Affirmatively, because censure is not an obstacle to the validity of the Sacrament, but only to its licit reception or administration. Yet he would sin gravely who first absolved from sins before censures, because he would act against a grave prohibition of the Church: except if there is question not of excommunications, but only of suspensions and interdicts; because those censures do not of themselves deprive one of the reception of the Sacrament of Penance.³

1344. - Query 8° Whether and when is a conditioned form valid and licit?

Resp. to the 1st. It is certain that absolution under a condition concerning the present or the past is valid in every case, provided the other requisites for the validity of the Sacrament are present; for the condition in no way changes the sense of the sacramental form, which it does not affect at all; but it affects only the will of the confessor, who does not intend to absolve unless the condition added is fulfilled; but once this has been fulfilled, the form becomes absolute; and therefore nothing is found which can stand in the way of its validity. - Thus St. Alphonsus,⁴ who says that all agree concerning this. Cf. what was said n. 1218. q. 5°.

Resp. to the 2nd. It is equally certain that conditioned absolution is sometimes licit; for if it is valid, it must also be licit when necessity urges. - Thus most commonly the Theologians.⁵

Yet the doctrine of some is to be rejected as plainly lax, who hold that conditioned absolution can be imparted for any light cause whatever, and when no necessity urges, even if the sufficient disposition of the penitent, though burdened with mortal sins, is doubted in any way whatever. For no one fails to see how many sacrileges a practice of this kind would induce. Indeed the confessor would no longer be a prudent dispenser of the Sacraments, but would cast pearls before swine; and by this facility of absolving he would effect that penitents waste away in sins.¹

But no more is the doctrine of those to be admitted, who with Collet and certain others hold that absolution under condition is not to be imparted except in extreme necessity, or in extreme danger of life; for doctrine of this kind is supremely harmful to penitents, who can return to the confessor only with difficulty, and, dismissed without absolution, incur danger of eternal damnation.

But concerning the necessity in which absolution under condition can or ought to be imparted, according to the common doctrine and practice, the following rules seem to be established:

Rule I. - Absolution can and ought to be given under condition whenever, if granted absolutely, it would expose the Sacrament to danger of nullity, and, if denied absolutely, it would expose the penitent to danger of grave spiritual harm.

Rule II. - Even if necessity of this kind does not urge, nevertheless absolution can be given under condition whenever, if granted absolutely, it would expose the Sacrament to danger of nullity, and, if denied absolutely, it would deprive the penitent of some notable spiritual good, although not a necessary one.

Hence, with due conditions observed, when necessity urges, or when a just and proportionate cause is present, it is lawful to absolve conditionally in the following cases: 1° in doubt whether the penitent is living or dead; 2° in doubt of sufficient matter, for example if there is question of a pious penitent who "confesses only imperfections, which do not reach sins certainly venial." Yet very rarely,² or once in a month,³ "and when he cannot assign certain matter from his past life, or not without great trouble";¹

3° in doubt of fact concerning jurisdiction in the cases and under the conditions to be handed down n. 1394. q. 4°.² (On doubt of law, n. 60. I.); 4° in positive doubt (n. 1213) whether the penitent has been, or has been duly, absolved; 5° in doubt whether the penitent is morally present; 6° in doubt whether a dying person destitute of the senses is capable of the Sacrament; 7° in doubt concerning the disposition of the penitent, if there is question either of the half-witted, - to whom I equate those who are so stupid or untaught that whatever you say or do, you effect nothing, as sometimes happens with our Negroes; likewise the mute who do not know how to write, unless and insofar as one can deal with them sufficiently through some signs; likewise the deaf and those somewhat deaf in the case treated n. 1369. q. 6°; likewise those having their mind so confused or their tongue so stammering that their disposition cannot be judged, - or of children who are not yet perfectly capable of reason, especially if they bring a doubtful mortal sin, indeed also, not improbably, only venial sins, - or of a relapsed person in mortal sins, and there is fear lest he not return to Confession and waste away in his sins,³ or, I add, despair, or apostatize, or pass over to heretics, - or of a dying person, or, I would add, of a woman in difficult childbirth, of a soldier about to go into battle, of one about to undertake a dangerous voyage, of one about to undergo a dangerous surgical operation, of one condemned to be beheaded, and the like; 8° if in some case the necessity of avoiding scandal or infamy would truly urge, because bystanders would see that he did not approach Communion after Confession had been made; yet the penitent could not communicate unless certainly disposed through contrition, on account of the precept of the Apostle, concerning which n. 1306 has been treated.⁴

But if the penitent is in good faith and no fruit is hoped for from admonition about not receiving Communion, the confessor should conduct himself permissively. - But if the penitent asks the confessor whether he can communicate, a distinction must be made; for he asks either because he is of doubtful faith, and then one must answer according to the things said above; - or solely because from youth he was taught to ask in this way after individual Confessions, and then the confessor, if he does not hope for fruit from admonition, should answer evasively. - This lamentable necessity, of which I have spoken, is sometimes found when there is question of a Communion called general of Societies, especially if the number of male or female associates is small. Likewise if there is question of Communion on the occasion of funerals or the first Communion of children. - Some equate to the aforesaid necessity the necessity of celebrating Matrimony.¹ (16) p. 418.

Query 9° With what sacred vestments ought the confessor to be clothed while he hears Confessions in church, and in what place are they to be heard?

Resp. to the 1st. With surplice and violet stole,² unless custom (e.g. of certain Regulars), or occasion, or place (e.g. for the Confession of a sick person, in necessity, outside the church, where no opportunity is given for assuming surplice and stole) suggests otherwise.³ - Nevertheless, notwithstanding custom, it is fitting that in church a stole be used, as the S. C. R. rescripted.⁴ But for Confession outside the church the confessor laudably keeps a stole at home.⁵

Resp. to the 2nd. "Confessionals are to be erected in churches, for hearing the Confessions of women. ... But by the name church ... the sacristy is not to be understood, unless the place is public and open ... and it will be lawful for no priest to receive the Confessions of women in another place, without the special license of the Ordinary. But this," say the Fathers of the Council, "we trust is never to be granted except to priests advanced in age, or infirm, or on account of penitents who are deaf; or in other cases in which grave inconveniences would arise from observance of this rule. We wish also that this condition always be added, that the Confessions of women never be received in private houses, unless with grates interposed, and in an open place, insofar as the character of the place permits."⁶

Three are numbered, namely 1° Contrition; 2° Confession; 3° Satisfaction.

1345. - Contrition is sorrow of soul and detestation concerning sin committed, with the purpose of not sinning further. Thus Trent.¹ - Detestation of sin - which, if you except the Blessed, as incapable of sadness, necessarily includes sorrow - regards the past; but purpose is concerned with the future.

This definition abstracts from the new law, in which contrition can have no efficacy without the desire, at least implicit, of Confession. For the same Trent adds a little below: "with the desire of performing the remaining things ... which are required for rightly receiving this Sacrament" (of Penance).

Resolves. - The object of contrition is neither 1) punishments or other evils, the consequences of sin; nor 2) imperfections, even deliberate, at least speaking speculatively; nor 3) sins of others or original sin.

Not punishments; for contrition etymologically imports a breaking or crushing of a hardened will; but this hardness of the will, says St. Thomas,² is in the evil of fault, and not in punishment. Hence sorrow concerning the punishment of sin is indeed the occasion and beginning of contrition, but never essentially contrition itself.

Not imperfections, even deliberate, or voluntary actions or omissions which, with no precept being violated, are repugnant only to counsel here and now intimated either by divine inspiration, or from the dictate of reason soliciting to more perfect things, or from the directive ordinance of a Superior. For contrition is sorrow concerning sins, which imperfections are not. Yet I said: at least speaking speculatively; for, speaking practically, deliberate imperfections very often already have some fault annexed to them, for example by reason of an inordinate motive of sensuality, impatience, sloth, etc. Hence, as we said in n. 1344. q. 8°. § Hence ... 2° with St. Alphonsus, even those imperfections which do not reach sins certainly venial are sometimes sufficient matter of conditioned absolution.

Not sins of others or original sin; for contrition is sorrow concerning sin committed, or perpetrated by one's own will. - To be sure, it is fitting to foster true sorrow sincerely from the soul, both concerning original sin, by which we were constituted children of wrath, enemies of God and servants of the devil, and also concerning the sins of others, by which infinite goodness is offended and the souls of many are cast headlong into eternal destruction; but sorrow of soul of this kind is indeed displeasure and affliction, but not contrition properly so called. Thus nearly the distinguished Van Egeren.

It must be said 1° concerning contrition strictly so called; 2° concerning purpose.

1346. - Contrition is distinguished as twofold:

1° Perfect, which is detestation of sin arising from the sole and proper motive of charity, appreciatively supreme; with the purpose, on account of the same motive, of not sinning further. - I said: a) from the SOLE motive of charity; i.e. perfect contrition ought to be elicited from a motive of charity so efficacious or predominant that by itself it suffices to excite in the sinner supreme sorrow and detestation concerning sin committed, and a firm purpose of sinning no more; not, however, so that therefore other motives, less noble than charity, must be excluded by the penitent, just as hope and charity, or faith and knowledge, do not exclude each other. - I said: b) from the PROPER motive of charity; or of divine goodness. See n. 275.¹ - I said: c) appreciatively supreme; see the same n. 275 and n. 1349. III. 1350. q. 1°. q. 2°.

2° Imperfect or attrition, which is detestation of sin arising from a supernatural motive which is inferior to charity - e.g. from consideration of the baseness of sin, or from fear of hell, or from love of eternal beatitude - with the purpose, on account of the same motive, of not sinning further. - Trent.¹ Besides, contrition is either formal or explicit, by which a man, thinking of the sin committed, directly and expressly detests it; or implicit or virtual, by which a man, not actually thinking of the sin committed, posits an act which indirectly and tacitly contains sorrow and detestation of sin, for example an act of perfect charity.

Three things must be explained here: 1° necessity; 2° qualities; 3° efficacy of contrition.

1347. Points To Be Established. - I. Contrition, either perfect with the desire of the Sacrament, or imperfect with the Sacrament itself, is altogether necessary to the sinner by necessity of means for obtaining justification and salvation. This is clear from Scripture² and from Councils, especially Trent:³ "At every time this movement of contrition was necessary for obtaining pardon of sins." The reason from St. Thomas⁴ is this: "The offense of mortal sin proceeds from this, that the will of man is turned away from God through conversion to some mutable good; whence for the remission of the divine offense it is required that the will of man be so changed that it be converted to God with detestation of the aforesaid conversion and with purpose of amending."

II. Mortal sin being supposed, contrition is necessary by necessity of precept, at least sometime in life, and indeed of a natural, divine positive, and ecclesiastical precept. - Of natural precept; for the law of nature dictates that the means without which he cannot attain the end, which he is bound absolutely to procure, are to be assumed by man; but contrition, as is clear from what has been said at I, is for sinful man a means without which he cannot attain the end which he is bound absolutely to procure, namely his reconciliation with God and eternal salvation; therefore, etc. - Of divine positive precept, as is gathered from the words of Scripture cited at I. - Of ecclesiastical precept; for the Church, in commanding the faithful to confess their sins validly at least once in the year, by that very fact commands them to elicit true contrition concerning the sins to be confessed, since sacramental Confession without contrition cannot at all be validly instituted. - But it is understood that that contrition falls under the precept which is required for justification, namely perfect contrition outside the Sacrament, or attrition with the Sacrament.¹

III. The precept of contrition obliges sometimes per se, sometimes per accidens.

1° Apart from the precept of annual Confession, it obliges per se, i.e. from the motive of the virtue of penance - so that he who then does not elicit contrition commits a special sin of impenitence - when a grave necessity of reconciling oneself with God urges, namely in danger, even probable, of death or perpetual insanity, whether true or supposed, e.g. in a lethal disease, in war, in dangerous navigation, in difficult childbirth, in an arduous surgical operation, etc.; and this on account of the precept of attaining the last end. - I said: apart from the precept of annual Confession, in which case some say that it obliges per se, others per accidens. St. Alphonsus is silent concerning this controversy, and it seems to us a dispute about the name.

2° It obliges per accidens, when another precept urges which cannot be fulfilled without contrition, especially in the following cases, namely - when the precept of an act of charity urges, with memory of sin occurring, - when someone guilty of grave sin is about to receive or administer a Sacrament, - whenever the Sacrament of Penance is received, even for the sake of devotion, - when someone has fallen into mortal sin, in which case he would not be excused from a new mortal sin who deferred penance for a notable time. He would sin, namely, against the precept of charity toward God, which binds everyone at least several times in the year [see n. 277. q. 1°. R. 1°. c).], and against charity toward himself, since he would expose himself to the danger of new faults. But what time is to be called notable cannot be determined by one and the same rule for all; since the necessity of contrition varies according to the variety of greater or lesser infirmity of the sinner, of graver or lighter temptation which he suffers, of a continuing or passing occasion in which he is placed, etc. Nevertheless, speaking generally, St. Alphonsus, on account of the precept of charity toward God, thinks that time should not be extended beyond a month. Yet sinners, especially the untaught, for the most part, indeed almost always, will be able to be excused from this sin of delayed penance on account of inadvertence.²

1348. Questions. - Query 1° Is he who in danger or at the article of death receives the Sacrament of Penance with attrition bound besides to elicit an act of perfect contrition?

Resp. Some affirm it, because by the law of charity in danger of this kind each one is bound to safer means; others deny it, because means simply safe suffice. The affirmative opinion is altogether to be counseled, all the more because at the extremity of life we are bound to an act of charity, to which satisfaction cannot be made unless from the motive of the same virtue we detest sins, if they occur to memory.² Wherefore dying sinners, especially those whose penance was sufficiently weak and tepid, are seriously to be excited to contrition. Van Egeren.

Query 2° For obtaining grace in the Sacrament, besides sorrow, are explicit acts of Faith and Hope required?

Resp. Negatively. See n. 250. q. 2°, n. 270. II.

Query 3° Does he sin who confesses some venial sin without sorrow?

Resp. Negatively, more probably, provided sorrow concerning other sins, or at least one sin, is not lacking (which sorrow concerning one is necessarily included in explicit sorrow concerning a multitude), and the penitent does not knowingly subject the other sins as matter of absolution. The reason is, 1° because by reason of the validity of the Sacrament it suffices that some certain matter be offered, namely that sorrow concerning some venial sin be present, since venial sins are not necessary matter of the Sacrament of Penance, and besides, since they do not deprive one of the grace and friendship of God, some can be remitted without others; 2° because no injury is thereby done to the Sacrament if, from a good end and with all levity excluded, they are declared. Indeed usually those venial sins also concerning which sorrow, at least certain sorrow, is not had are usefully opened, namely for the greater manifestation of conscience and direction, for conceiving some shame, etc.¹

Query 4° Must contrition precede Confession?

Resp. 1° It must certainly precede absolution, or at least coexist with it, as is clear.² "But speaking practically, it is required that sorrow precede at least absolution, because no penitent sensing himself indisposed can ask for or receive absolution.

Resp. 2° The more probable and more common opinion is that for the validity of the Sacrament it is not required that sorrow precede accusation; the reason is that sorrow, although it must be sensible, does not necessarily have to become such through Confession, since it can become such through other signs; and the Ritual strongly favors this opinion, admonishing: "When Confession has been heard," the confessor is "to lead" the penitent "to sorrow," etc. The opposite opinion differs from the one set forth only in appearance; for its patrons require only that Confession not be a mere narration of sins, but have the character of sacramental accusation: but for this it suffices that Confession be made with the mind of obtaining absolution, and then that sorrow be manifested through petition for or expectation of absolution.³

Query 5° For how much space of time does an act of sorrow morally persevere for validly receiving the Sacrament?

Resp. It can certainly persevere for one day, or even another, if the penitent elicits such an act of contrition by which he is efficaciously moved toward Confession, so that the Confession afterward instituted is truly the effect of such contrition. "But otherwise, if someone confesses from mere devotion, or for fulfilling a vow or penance."² Moreover, supposing that the act of contrition was elicited with relation to the Sacrament, and before reception of this was not retracted, for example through a new mortal sin, the distance between the act of contrition and the remaining parts of the Sacrament certainly does not seem too long: 1° if the penitent, going to church with the intention of confessing, first elicits an act of contrition, and then, morally speaking, continues in examining conscience or in prayer, remains at the confessional, and confesses in his own place; even if in the Confession itself or in the reception of absolution, on account of distraction or some other cause, he no longer thinks about contrition;¹ 2° if the penitent in the morning elicits an act of contrition from the intention of confessing that day, e.g. in the evening, or in the evening with the intention of confessing the next day in the morning, and then at the time proposed confesses and is absolved, not actually thinking about contrition.²

Query 6° Is a new act of sorrow required for receiving a new absolution, when the penitent immediately after absolution confesses a mortal sin omitted from forgetfulness?

Resp. It is controverted. The probable, indeed more probable, opinion affirms. The reason is that, although sorrow morally perseveres in itself, nevertheless it does not persevere in order to the second absolution; for probably for the validity of the Sacrament it is required that sorrow be elicited in order to absolution. On which account St. Alphonsus³ judges that at least as safer this opinion is to be held.

Query 7° Can there be a valid and at the same time unformed Sacrament of Penance, on account of defect of sufficient disposition, in the case, for example, in which someone guilty of twofold sin, say theft and perjury, from invincible forgetfulness of the perjury, would confess only the theft, grieving not from a universal motive but from the special motive of baseness which is in theft?

Resp. It is controverted. Some deny with Billuart⁴ and Elbel.⁵ Their reason is that in the Sacrament of Penance contrition is the matter of the Sacrament; therefore, if it is insufficient, the Sacrament will be invalid. But if it is sufficient, the Sacrament is valid and at the same time formed, and therefore it immediately remits sins. - Yet others affirm, and indeed grave Theologians with Lugo,⁶ Lacroix;⁷ and St. Alphonsus⁸ calls this more probable. - But their reason is that in the alleged case, on the one hand nothing is lacking of those things which are required for the validity of the Sacrament - not formally integral Confession, since everything that occurred to memory was declared; - not sorrow, since it is present concerning the sin confessed; - not absolution, as is supposed. - But, on the other hand, the Sacrament must actually lack its effect, since one mortal sin cannot be remitted without the other, but defect of sorrow stands in the way of the remission of the perjury.

1349. - The qualities necessarily required for the validity of contrition, both perfect and imperfect, are numbered as these six, namely 1° that it be internal; 2° supernatural; 3° supreme; 4° universal; and, if there is question of receiving the Sacrament of Penance, 5° formal; and 6° elicited in order to Confession.

I. Internal or true, i.e. truly conceived in heart and soul. For contrition according to Trent is sorrow of soul.

II. Supernatural, i.e. elicited through the help of grace and from a motive known by faith. For natural means cannot conduce to a supernatural end. Cf. proposition 57 among those condemned by Innocent XI. p. XVIII, and Trent.¹

But suitable motives can be reduced to four: 1° to fear of punishment; 2° to hope of reward; 3° to the baseness of sin; 4° to the love of God.

III. Supreme, so that the sinner appreciatively, i.e. from a previous appreciation or intellectual estimation of sin as the supreme evil, detests his crime more than every other evil, and is prepared in soul to lose and suffer all things rather than commit sin.

IV. Universal, as regards all and individual grave sins committed and not yet remitted. - I said: 1° as regards GRAVE sins; for as regards venial sins it is not required that it be universal, as was said n. 1348. q. 3°, and will be said n. 1350. q. 4°. R. 2°. - I said: 2° as regards ALL AND INDIVIDUAL grave sins; not because individual acts of contrition must also be elicited concerning individual mortal sins - although it is expedient to detest one by one those sins toward which one is affected by a more vehement passion - but in reality one act of contrition suffices, extending itself at least virtually to all and individual sins, both known and forgotten, in the universal: namely, it must extend itself to all grave sins either from one universal motive, or from several particular motives which, at least taken together, extend themselves to all mortal sins committed, even those not occurring to memory. The reason is that no actual sin is remitted without sorrow; but one mortal sin cannot be remitted without another, since remission is made through the infusion of grace, which cannot stand together with mortal sin. I said: 3° As regards all and individual mortal sins committed and NOT YET REMITTED; for the precept of contrition does not extend to sins already remitted, except in the case in which these sins are necessary or free matter of Confession or sacramental absolution.

V. Formal, so that a desire for absolution does not suffice, although it be without affection for sin, - nor an act of charity; for by this desire or act alone the matter of the Sacrament is not yet posited.¹

VI. Elicited in order to Confession, at least practically, since this opinion is probable, although the opposite is more probable.²

1350. Questions. - Query 1° Must contrition be supreme intensively?

Resp. Negatively. The reason is that intensity is something merely accidental: for a greater or lesser degree of sorrow, or affection or effort, does not pertain to the essence of contrition, which can exist whole without a degree of this kind of intensity. Besides, how would you know that this or that degree of intensity must be attained? Moreover the intensity of sorrow is not always in our power. Hence, even when the sense is moved more vehemently toward temporal evil from God's offense, it is not therefore the case that the will itself, under which alone moral evil falls, is less affected by sin. It suffices, therefore, that the sin be displeasing appreciatively as the supreme evil.³

Query 2° Is a formal comparison required in appreciation between various evils and sin, or God?

Resp. Negatively. For it suffices that the sinner sincerely and truly detest sins, and not wish to sin anymore. Indeed confessors act very imprudently who, in order to explore whether sorrow is supreme, propose to penitents certain very dangerous comparisons, e.g. whether they would rather be burned alive, or suffer all the torments of the martyrs, or eat poisonous reptiles, than sin again? For such comparisons move the imagination more vividly, and when a strong temptation approaches, the true disposition which existed before is easily lost.¹

Query 3° What length of time is required for conceiving true and supreme contrition?

Resp. None per se, because length of time does not pertain to the essence of the act, but is merely accidental to it; wherefore it is enough that the act be substantially fulfilled, which can be done even in the smallest instant of time. Yet it is safer to elicit a more intense and more prolonged act of contrition, lest perhaps from levity or too much haste no act as to substance be conceived.²

Query 4° Must contrition concerning venial sins possess these same six qualities?

Resp. 1° It must necessarily possess the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, and practically also the 6th; namely it must be 1° internal, because contrition which is not elicited from the intimate heart is not true; 2° supernatural, because, as was said, natural contrition cannot be a means to a supernatural effect; 3° supreme, or the sinner must detest venial sin more than all natural evils; 4° formal, so namely that the matter of the Sacrament be posited;³ 5° elicited in order to Confession. See n. 1349.

Resp. 2° But it does not have to be necessarily universal, whether in the Sacrament or outside the Sacrament. The reason is that since venial sin is not incompatible with sanctifying grace, one venial sin can be remitted without others.⁴

Query 5° Does fearful attrition (formidolosa), or that conceived from fear of hell, suffice for justification in the Sacrament of Penance?

Resp. Affirmatively, provided it be truly supernatural, absolutely efficacious, and only materially, but not formally or servilely servile. The reason is, 1° because attrition of this kind, since it is a true conversion to God and a true aversion from sin, removes that which stands in the way of the operation of the Sacrament; 2° because this is clearly drawn from Trent,⁵ which says that such attrition disposes the sinner to obtaining justification in the Sacrament of Penance. Cf. the Roman Catechism. Besides, 3° the same Synod² teaches that it sometimes happens that contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles man to God before this Sacrament is actually received. Therefore the Council supposes that perfect contrition is not necessary for receiving the Sacrament rightly; otherwise not only sometimes, but always, the sinner would be justified before he received the Sacrament.

Moreover attrition is called servilely servile when someone indeed grieves concerning sin and wishes to avoid it because of the punishments which he knows are to be inflicted by God; yet he would still be prepared to sin if those punishments did not exist. But it is called simply servile when someone abstains from sin indeed on account of fear of punishments, yet is not so disposed that he would wish to sin if those punishments did not exist, although he abstracts entirely from this thought: if those punishments did not exist. The former is evil, not insofar as it is fear of punishments, but on account of the depraved disposition of soul.

Query 6° Does attrition from fear of the punishments of Purgatory for venial sins suffice?

Resp. Affirmatively, with the very common and morally certain opinion; because all the reasons adduced above for the sufficiency of attrition from fear of hell are valid here also.

Query 7° Does attrition from fear of the temporal punishments of this life, to be undergone for sin as they are inflicted by God, suffice?

Resp. Affirmatively, and, as it seems, more probably, provided it is supernatural. The reason is, 1° because it seems to be clear from the words of Trent, where it says: Attrition is conceived from fear of hell and of punishments: for it distinguishes between the punishments of hell and other punishments; 2° because in fear of this kind all conditions of true attrition can be present. "Yet since" the opposite opinion, founded on the reason that Trent does not say of hell or of punishments, "is not lacking in its probability, at least extrinsic, I think that in practice it is safer that it be observed." Thus St. Alphonsus.³

Query 8° Is also a beginning of love required with attrition for obtaining justification in the Sacrament of Penance?

Resp. Negatively, if by a beginning of love there is understood some degree of perfect charity, by which God is loved above all things. The reason is that for rightly receiving the Sacrament an act which outside the Sacrament would essentially justify is not necessarily prerequired. But an act of charity, and therefore "sorrow which suffices for the nature of contrition, however small it is, deletes every fault," as St. Thomas says.¹ Therefore, etc. - St. Alphonsus² says that this is morally certain.

"But if by initial love of God there is understood a certain pious movement, by which the penitent, sincerely averse from sin, trustingly turns himself to God, and begins to love Him as the font of all justice, or as his justifier, liberator, and glorifier, you will most rightly affirm the necessity of some initial love, since a true conversion of the sinner to God cannot be conceived without a begun love of God of this kind, and besides Trent³ enumerates a certain beginning of love among the dispositions required for justification in Baptism (therefore by parity in Penance). ... But ... such beginning of love of God is had by the very fact" that "the penitent, truly attrite, has recourse with hope of pardon to the tribunal of Penance"; for: 1° "True attrition is a certain sincere conversion of heart to God. But he who is converted to God with a sincere heart is certainly moved of himself toward God as toward good, and therefore he is moved by love. 2° True attrition includes a firm purpose of observing the divine commandments, among which the commandment of love of God obtains the first place. But he who firmly proposes to love God already loves God inchoatively; since a proximate voluntary disposition toward something is of itself already the beginning or inception of that thing. 3° True attrition includes hope of pardon to be obtained from God. But from this, says St. Thomas,⁴ that we hope goods can come to us through someone, we are moved toward him, as toward our good, and so we begin to love him. - Moreover, even that salutary fear of God the avenger, by which true attrition is more often conceived, already contains in itself a certain beginning of the love of God, our liberator and justifier, according to that saying of Ecclesiasticus:¹ The fear of God is the beginning of the love of Him." Thus Van Egeren.

1351. Principles. - I. Perfect contrition justifies man per se, even outside the Sacrament of Penance. 1° It is clear from reason; for contrition necessarily includes perfect charity: moreover, to love God perfectly is to be united with God; but union with God necessarily works separation from sin, since one cannot embrace one extreme without totally withdrawing from the opposite extreme. Therefore ... 2° It is clear from Scripture.²

II. Perfect contrition does not remit mortal sins, or does not justify man, except with the desire, at least implicit, of Confession: for sins cannot be remitted except through the means instituted by Christ; but the Sacrament of Penance in reality, or at least in desire, is the one means instituted by Christ for remitting sins committed after Baptism. Therefore, etc. It is clear besides from Trent.³

III. Attrition, as a prerequired disposition, suffices for obtaining pardon of sins in the Sacrament of Penance. This is clear from what was said n. 1350. q. 5°.

IV. But attrition outside the Sacrament cannot justify the sinner. For justification consists in the perfect union of man with God; but the attrite man, although he withdraws from creatures and begins the first steps of conversion to God, is nevertheless not yet perfectly converted to Him and united through love. Nor by its own power does attrition justify in the Sacrament, but it is only a prerequired condition; but the Sacrament itself justifies through the infusion of grace: wherefore in the Sacrament the penitent from an attrite man becomes contrite, namely contrite equivalently, or contrite by habit, through the infusion of sanctifying grace and the habit of charity, which is conferred by the force of absolution.

1352. Questions. - Query 1° Must the desire of Confession be EXPLICIT in contrition?

Resp. Negatively, more probably with the common opinion. The reason is, 1° because for remission it suffices that someone be truly united with God with his whole heart through perfect contrition; for God, as is clear from what has been said, cannot reject a sinner approaching Him with his whole heart and from the most perfect motive; but it can sometimes happen that a sinner elicits an act of perfect contrition without thinking of Confession, whether from inadvertence or natural forgetfulness, or from invincible ignorance. Therefore for the remission of sin through contrition it is not essential that the desire of Confession be explicit. 2° Because according to Trent this desire is included in contrition; but what is included in another is implicit, not explicit.¹

Query 2° Does contrition remit not only guilt, but also the punishment owed to guilt?

Resp. 1° It certainly remits eternal punishment, because a man justified through contrition cannot remain guilty of eternal damnation.

Resp. 2° According to its greater or lesser intensity it also remits part of the temporal punishment owed after mortal or venial sins have been deleted. Hence very intense perfect contrition can even abolish all punishment; but it does not necessarily have this efficacy from its nature. - This is drawn from Trent.²

Query 3° Does attrition elicited by a just man remit venial sins outside the Sacrament?

Resp. It is controverted. More probably it seems to be affirmed. The reason is, 1° because from Trent venial sins can be remitted in various ways: therefore they are not remitted by perfect contrition alone; 2° because in the opposite opinion venial sins are not more easily remitted than mortal sins: but this is contrary to common sense; 3° because the power of remitting venial sins is commonly attributed to Sacramentals: but it would be falsely attributed to these, if contrition were required for deleting them. - Thus Suarez,³ Lugo,⁴ and many others.

Yet not a few deny it, because from Trent¹ venial sins are usefully accused in Confession; but they would not be usefully accused if they could be remitted by attrition: therefore, etc. - But it is rightly replied that venial sins are usefully exposed in Confession also for other reasons, namely on account of remission of punishment, on account of the merit of shame, on account of the advantage of direction, etc.

Query 4° Does contrition or attrition remit venial sins without the desire of the Sacrament?

Resp. Affirmatively. The reason is that by divine institution the Sacrament is necessary for mortal sins alone: therefore venial sins can be deleted without the Sacrament of Penance; therefore no desire of this Sacrament is necessarily required for their remission. - Thus all.

1353. - Definition. Purpose is the will of not sinning further.

Division. It is twofold: 1° explicit, or formal, by which someone, thinking of the future, determines not to sin anymore; 2° implicit, or virtual, which is included in contrition itself, without the future time being held before the eyes.

1354. Principles. - I. Purpose, at least implicit, is altogether necessary for the remission of sin; because purpose is a necessary consequent of contrition, and at least virtually included in it, as is clear from its nature and definition.

II. True purpose must possess a threefold condition; namely, it is required that it be firm, efficacious, and universal.

1° Firm, i.e. not wavering, nor conceived with a light mind, so that it would be a certain velleity, or a certain volatile sensation by which even impenitent sinners themselves are not rarely affected, or rather are deceived by the devil, lest they awaken from the lethal cauterized sleep of their conscience; but a serious decree of the deliberate will, by which the penitent simply and absolutely determines to guard against sin in the future, notwithstanding any inconvenience whatever or human fear: otherwise he would not wish to be converted to God totally and sincerely. Yet the confessor must not test the soul of the penitent by using comparisons suited to disturb his imagination.

2° Efficacious, i.e. the penitent must not only firmly determine that he does not wish to sin anymore, but also to apply the means necessary for avoiding sin and for fleeing proximate occasions, etc. - But it suffices that the purpose be efficacious affectively, i.e. it suffices that the sinner be prepared in soul to apply the necessary means; because future amendment in fact is not of the essence of purpose.

3° Universal, or it must extend to all and individual mortal sins, not only those committed, but also those which could be committed. The reason is that full and true conversion to God cannot be given without aversion from any lethal sin whatever.

But as regards venial sins, for the validity of the Sacrament it is required and suffices that a firm and efficacious purpose be present of avoiding either one of the venial sins, or all those fully deliberate, or of avoiding or diminishing with all diligence, insofar as it can be done in a human manner, those which creep in without full deliberation.

1355. Questions. - Query 1° In order that purpose be firm, must it also be found constant?

Resp. Negatively; at least this is not absolutely necessary. The reason is that purpose affects the present will, which by its nature is otherwise variable. Hence from relapse after Confession the weakness of purpose cannot be gathered per se.¹

I said: at least this is not absolutely necessary. For if the penitent relapses immediately and with almost no resistance, it furnishes an argument, or at least a vehement presumption, that he lacked a truly firm purpose; for he who firmly proposes usually does not so easily forget his purpose, but is wont to persevere constant at least for some time, and to employ efforts for resisting temptations or occasions of sin, and therefore ordinarily falls with more difficulty and more rarely.²

Query 2° Can the purpose of him be firm who indeed has the intention of not sinning, yet fears that he will relapse?

Resp. Affirmatively; for fear, which is introduced from past frailty and the inconstancy of the human will, does not impede a sincere will. Hence that penitent can have true purpose who, when the confessor asks him concerning the will of not sinning, responds: I am frail, I fear a fall, yet I do not now wish it, nor do I choose the fall: which are the words of Gerson according to Croix.¹

But in practice you will look at the character and disposition of the penitent; for not rarely you will find sinners asserting that they will relapse, who for that reason fear lest they do not have a sufficiently firm purpose, and yet show nothing besides fear of relapsing and distrust of themselves. To penitents of this kind it must be inculcated that there is question not of those things which perhaps are going to happen, but of the actual will, and of confidence to be placed in divine help.

These things are said concerning him who only fears that he will relapse; for if he certainly believed it, he would furnish a certain suspicion that his purpose is not sufficiently firm. Thus St. Alphonsus resolves practically, although speculatively he admits that firmness of purpose can stand together with knowledge of relapse. The reason is that it cannot happen that he firmly proposes amendment who, knowing that God does not deny His grace to one who does what is in him, nevertheless certainly believes that he will relapse. Hence such a penitent, before he is absolved, is to be led to hope of amendment.² - Nor can the purpose therefore be judged weak because only the confessor, on account of the known frailty of the penitent, foresees, even rather certainly, that he will relapse; for Peter was not therefore judged indisposed for Communion because he was known by Christ to be going to fall. Besides, there are those who, when they say: I believe, I believe, that I will relapse, and therefore I will indeed avoid sins if I can, yet I am not able to promise anything, lest afterward I seem unfaithful, etc., - show nothing other than a well-founded fear and distrust of self, and they must be judged as those who only fear. - Finally, to relieve the soul of the penitent who, on account of an inveterate habit of sinning altogether deliberately, which perhaps he has contracted, thinks that avoidance of such sin is morally impossible for him, it will often be most useful to teach him that here and now there is strictly required of him only the purpose of not sinning anymore deliberately, i.e. with full advertence and full consent, etc.

Query 3° For receiving the Sacrament of Penance rightly, is explicit purpose required?

Resp. According to St. Alphonsus,¹ there is a threefold opinion. The first affirms absolutely: because, although sorrow necessarily includes purpose, nevertheless explicit purpose seems to be required from Trent saying: With the purpose of not sinning further.²

The second denies, in the case in which sorrow is elicited from a universal motive. The reason is that sorrow of this kind includes a purpose plainly efficacious. Moreover, from the Tridentine Synod, when attrition excludes the will of sinning, it sufficiently disposes a man to obtaining grace in the Sacrament.

The third teaches that if the penitent thinks of future life, he ought formally to propose amendment. Otherwise, if the penitent, e.g. immediately about to be beheaded, thinks nothing about the future. For if he thinks about the future, he would not seem sufficiently to repent, if he did not expressly propose amendment.

But St. Alphonsus thus interposes his judgment concerning these things: "These two latter opinions are indeed the more probable; but ... since the first ... is sufficiently probable ... before the fact the safer opinion is to be followed," indeed also after the fact, i.e. a penitent who, although in good faith, confessed a certain mortal sin without explicit purpose is bound to repeat the confession. See the reason n. 67. 2°.

Yet in practice this obligation will rarely urge. 1° Because those who are troubled about this matter belong almost to the number of those who have confessed only venial sins;³ whose accusation is no more to be repeated than to be made. 2° Because ordinarily there is only doubt concerning the defect of explicit purpose; in which case one must stand for the validity of the act. See n. 67. 2°. 3° Because the faithful are wont to recite a formula of contrition which contains the act of explicit purpose. 4° Because those who grieve in the due manner concerning sins do not easily omit an explicit act of purpose.

Query 4° What purpose is required, or suffices, for venial sins?

Resp. See n. 1354. 3°; but for practice observe:

1° It is safer to elicit purpose concerning some determinate sins, especially concerning the graver ones, and concerning especially those which are committed from habit, and to add to them some sin of past life.

2° When the faithful, even those who are held as pious and confess frequently, are seen after innumerable Confessions to make no or almost no progress, it is lawful to conjecture that they conceive purposes too general and confused, and therefore sluggish and languid.

3° Not rarely penitents are found, especially women, who spend much time in examining conscience, search out the smallest faults with the greatest anxiety, and draw out their Confessions beyond measure, and yet are not very solicitous concerning sorrow and efficacious purpose. These must be seriously exhorted that, omitting anxious care to declare all venial sins in species and number, they subject to the keys with serious sorrow and purpose of amendment only those sins which burden the conscience more, and which especially are to be rooted out. Indeed it is expedient that from those venial sins they select some one principal sin, for detesting and amending which before the others they diligently labor.

Confession is the accusation of sins committed after Baptism, made to an approved priest, in order to absolution.

Three things pertain here, namely 1° necessity; 2° qualities; 3° repetition of Confession.

1356. Principles. - I. Sacramental Confession by divine law is necessary for all who after Baptism have fallen into mortal sin. See the arguments among the Dogmaticians.

II. It is necessary also by ecclesiastical law, at least once in the year, according to custom to be computed from Easter to Easter. See n. 547. 548. L. VI. 662.

1357. Questions. - Query 1° When does the divine precept of Confession urge?

Resp. 1° It certainly obliges per se in danger, and still more in the article, of death, and often in life. - The reason of the first is that all positive precepts oblige at least in the time of necessity; otherwise they would never oblige, and would be imposed in vain. The reason of the second is that affirmative precepts do not oblige only in extreme necessity, but also when their fulfillment is judged reasonably necessary.

Resp. 2° It often obliges per accidens, namely 1° when the Eucharist is to be received (n. 1306. II.); 2° when the precept of reconciling oneself with God urges, or the state of grace is required, e.g. for administering Sacraments, or for receiving those which are called of the living, and an act of perfect contrition is not elicited (n. 1223. q. 7°; n. 1241. I.; n. 1347. II.); 3° when a grave temptation or depraved habit cannot otherwise be overcome.

Query 2° Does the divine precept of Confession oblige immediately once sin has been committed; or at what time does it urge?

Resp. 1° It does not oblige immediately after sin. The reason is that such an obligation rests on no certain foundation.

Resp. 2° It cannot easily be determined how often in life and at what precise time the divine precept urges. Whatever be the case, without doubt he satisfies who confesses even only once in the year; because it is not established that the divine precept urges more often, and, according to the more common opinion and, as it seems, the more probable one, Christ left the time of the obligation to be determined by the Church.¹

1358. - Many qualities of Confession are assigned by authors, which for the most part do not pertain to its validity; but they are chiefly contained in these little verses:

Let it be entire, simple, humble, discreet, faithful,
Vocal, sorrowing, pure, and ready to obey.

1° Entire, i.e. let it comprehend all mortal sins not yet confessed, as will soon be said.

2° Simple, i.e. not intermingled with impertinent conversations, nor painted with words, nor adorned with figures; but a naked, clear, and brief declaration of sins.

3° Humble, i.e. it ought to be made with true humility of heart and body, namely with knees bent, unless infirmity excuses, and with head uncovered, if a man confesses; humility ought to appear also in the manner of the voice, so that the penitent narrates his sins with shame, but not in the manner of a fable or bare history.

4° Discreet, i.e. it ought to be made in honest and discreet words, especially in explaining sins against chastity; nor ought the sins or defects of others to be manifested without necessity.

5° Faithful, i.e. sincere, without a lie, especially in grave matter and what is necessary for sacramental judgment. But faithfulness or sincerity consists not only in sins being duly declared, which pertains to integrity, but also in not exaggerating them or in not adding supposed sins.

6° Vocal, i.e. Confession ought to be made by the voice itself, but not by writing, nor by other signs, without necessity or grave cause, e.g. on account of very vehement shame, on account of an impediment of the tongue, etc.; in which case, the writing having been read by the confessor, let the penitent add: "of these I accuse myself."

Moreover Confession by writing is indeed valid per se; yet Confession or absolution by letters would be invalid. For the form consists in words, as Eugene IV defined in the Decree for the Armenians; moreover the form must be applied to present matter. - It is clear besides from the proposition condemned by Clement VIII (see p. XVIII), and from the declaration of Paul V, 14 July 1605, in the Congregation of the Holy Office. - Absolution given to him who without grave cause had made the whole Confession by nod or writing would also be invalid; for he would have sinned mortally,¹ unless he had acted thus in good faith.

7° Sorrowing, or sorrowful, as was said above n. 1348. q. 4°.

8° Pure, namely for an honest end, or for obtaining pardon of sins and sacramental graces, but not for moving the compassion of the confessor, or for capturing his benevolence or esteem, etc.

9° Ready to obey, i.e. the penitent ought to be disposed to obey the admonitions of the confessor, for example in fleeing occasions, in applying remedies, in making restitution, in accepting penance, etc.

Among the aforesaid qualities of Confession, integrity and contrition are especially principal. Enough has now been said concerning the latter; but now we must speak particularly concerning the former.

1359. - Integrity is distinguished as twofold, one material, the other formal.

1° That integrity is called material to which in reality nothing at all is lacking of those things which, speaking per se, are to be exposed, that is, of those things which of themselves constitute the necessary matter of Confession.

2° But that is formal to which nothing of the things said is lacking through grave fault of the penitent.

Hence whenever material integrity is had, formal integrity is also had; but not vice versa.

We shall speak 1° concerning the necessity of integrity; 2° concerning the causes excusing from it.

1360. - I. All mortal sins, committed after Baptism, must be accused by divine law, as far as this can morally be done.

It is clear 1° from the very words of the institution of the Sacrament of Penance; for thus Christ the Lord says: Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them; and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained. Hence the Council of Trent concludes in these words: "Our Lord Jesus Christ, when about to ascend from earth to heaven, left priests, His own vicars, as presidents and judges, to whom all mortal crimes should be brought, into which the faithful of Christ have fallen; that, according to the power of the keys, they might pronounce the sentence of remission or retention of sins. For it is clear that priests could not have exercised this judgment, the cause being unknown, if they themselves had declared their sins only in general, and not rather in species and singly. From these things it is gathered that all mortal sins, of which, after a diligent discussion of themselves, they have consciousness, must be enumerated by penitents in Confession, even though they are most hidden."

It is clear 2° from the same Council of Trent, which thus defined: "If anyone shall say that in the Sacrament of Penance, for the remission of sins, it is not necessary by divine law to confess all and each mortal sin, of which memory is had after due and diligent premeditation, even hidden sins and those which are against the last two precepts of the Decalogue, and the circumstances which change the species of the sin, ... let him be anathema."

II. To material integrity belong grave sins as to - number, - moral species, - certain circumstances, - the external act, - bad effects joined with the action and morally imputable. This is clear from what has been said and from what is to be said below.

III. Material integrity is not always necessary for the validity and fruit of Confession; for sometimes it is morally impossible, either from inculpable forgetfulness, or from other causes. But God does not command impossible things. Therefore, etc. It is also clear from these words of Trent: "But the other sins, which do not occur to one who thinks diligently, are understood to be included in the same Confession universally; for these we faithfully say with the Prophet: From my hidden sins cleanse me, O Lord."

IV. For the integrity of Confession there is prerequired a diligent examination, according to the capacity of the penitent, concerning sins committed since the last valid Confession; for he who is held to the end is held also to the necessary means.

1361. Resolves. - 1° We are held, in the Confession of mortal sins, to accuse not only the generic species of sins, but also the lowest species; for these are properly called species; and the Council of Trent requires the accusation of all species.

2° He who cannot disclose the lowest species must manifest the higher, or generic, species: e.g. if someone, knowing that he sinned against chastity, does not remember the specific sin, he must say that he sinned gravely against chastity.

3° He who knows that he has sinned mortally, but is ignorant of, or does not remember, the species, even the generic species, of his sin, must say in general that he sinned gravely, but that he does not remember of what sin he is guilty.

4° He who cannot remember the certain number is held to accuse the more probable number, or the one which more nearly approaches the truth, adding the particle about. But he who cannot even give a likely sum of sins is held to say how often approximately in a month, in a week, in a day, etc. He who cannot even indicate this should say whether he always consented to the temptation and whether it occurred often. Cf. what was said n. 216-227 and what is to be said n. 1424. III. c).

5° The confessor cannot exempt from the obligation of confessing integrally on account of a great crowd of penitents, e.g. on some more solemn feast day. This is clear from what has been said, and also from the 59th proposition condemned by Innocent XI. See p. XVII.

6° A defect of sincerity concerning even one mortal sin, which is omitted, constitutes a grave sin; because the divine precept of Confession is violated in a grave matter.

1362. Questions. - Query 1° What number is judged to be comprehended in the particle about?

Resp. This cannot be determined by an entirely certain rule; nevertheless not every excess is comprehended, nor a notable defect: but only a moderate one, greater however or lesser proportionately to the number expressed. Thus Theologians commonly establish it: a moderate excess or defect will be, relatively to about five sins, to add or subtract one unit on either side; relatively to about ten, two; relatively to twenty, three or four; relatively to forty, four or five; relatively to one hundred, five or six; ... and prudently in the first case the penitent will be judged to have sinned four, five, or six times; in the second, to have sinned eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve times; and resolve similarly concerning the others.

Query 2° Must a notable excess afterward be declared, if it is found after Confession?

Resp. Affirm. The reason is clear from what has been said; for since a notable excess is not comprehended in the number declared by the particle about, the penitent has not satisfied the obligation of Confession as to that excess. Therefore... Thus all.

Query 3° If someone has erred notably by exaggerating the number, must he afterward declare this also in Confession?

Resp. Neg., if in good faith he expressed that notably greater number. The reason is that he fully and integrally satisfied the obligation of Confession; for the true number was comprehended in the greater one, and therefore remitted.

Query 4° Is it always a mortal sin to lie in Confession?

Resp. Of itself one sins mortally only when the lie is concerned with necessary matter of Confession concealed without a just cause, or with grave matter falsely supposed, namely by advertently, not from scruple or simplicity, accusing what was not committed, or what is doubtful as certain, or by exaggerating the number.

A lie therefore concerning things not pertaining to Confession or to the conscience of the penitent is not of itself mortal; because neither is it gravely harmful to the penitent, as is supposed, nor gravely injurious to the Sacrament, since it is not referred to it. - Thus commonly with St. Alphonsus against a few who say that every lie in Confession is mortal. - But if the penitent lies concerning sins, even sins already confessed and absolved, when the confessor as judge or physician asks something about them, as necessary for the present Confession, he sins gravely, because he deceives in substantial matters. Cf. pp. 58a. among the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVII.

Query 5° Does it prejudice the integrity of Confession if someone accuses venial sins to his ordinary confessor, but mortal sins to another?

Resp. 1° Neg., speaking per se, provided that he never receives absolution unless he has manifested all mortal sins to one confessor and is absolved by the same. The reason is that that Confession is integral which includes all mortal sins, since venial sins are not necessarily to be accused.

Resp. 2° In practice, however, attention must be paid to the circumstances of penitents and to the motives by which they are led. For those are not to be condemned who sometimes confess graver sins to an unknown confessor, but submit lighter sins to the ordinary one, if, from the shame with which they would be suffused with a confessor familiarly known, they would put themselves in danger of confessing sacrilegiously. Wherefore the confessor should never inquire curiously about this, and much less vex with questions a penitent perhaps trying to conceal it, nor, if he knows it, show that this displeases him, but rather that the use of the liberty which the Church permits most amply is approved by him, while she makes available to the faithful an abundance of several confessors. - Nevertheless they would sin gravely, and because of defect of due disposition would confess invalidly, who for that reason remained in the occasion or habit of sin, or went around for this reason, that they might sin more freely. Say the same with Bouvier concerning a seminarian who with a base habit (n. 1523. q. 13°) wishes to ascend to Holy Orders and for this reason approaches an unknown confessor, lest he be troubled.

Query 6° Does it prejudice integrity if someone feigns another voice, lest he be recognized by the Confessor?

Resp. Neg. per se; for provided that he opens all mortal sins, he accomplishes an integral Confession.

Doubt here can be concerned chiefly, 1° with the act of sin, or with the sin committed; 2° with the gravity of the sin, both on the part of the matter and on the part of consent; 3° with the Confession of a sin certainly committed.

1363. Questions. - Query 1° Must mortal sins doubtfully committed necessarily be accused?

Resp. Neg. most commonly, if, after a diligent examination has been made beforehand, the doubt perseveres: and this holds even if the doubt is truly positive, or if a true probability is given concerning the sin committed. The reason is that here there is question of a doubtful law, which consequently does not oblige. And indeed from Trent those mortal sins must be accused of which consciousness is had; but there is not consciousness of doubtful sins; for to have consciousness imports certain knowledge of sin, since conscience is nothing other than knowledge of the heart and judgment concerning a sin committed. Therefore.

Others nevertheless contradict; because, as they say, it is gathered from the words of Trent that all mortal sins are to be accused as they are in conscience; and therefore, if they are doubtful in conscience, they are also to be confessed as doubtful. - But indeed it must be answered that in Trent it is not said that sins are to be accused as they are in conscience, but of which we have consciousness. In practice, however, an accusation of this kind is to be advised, says St. Alphonsus.

It is more common to teach that negatively doubtful sins are to be accused; but the denying opinion of St. Alphonsus is more probable; for there cannot be given an obligation of confessing negatively doubtful sins, since a doubt of this kind rests on no solid foundation, nor does it arise except from an empty suspicion, or fear of a sin committed, as frequently happens to the scrupulous or to those of timid conscience. - If however someone is in a positive doubt in the article of death, - knowing that he has not received the Sacrament of Penance or another Sacrament in good faith and being attrite after such a sin, - in order to escape the danger of damnation he would certainly be obliged either to receive absolution (yet he is not held to confess that doubtful sin), or at least to elicit an act of contrition.

What if he wishes to receive Communion? See n. 67. 12 a); 1307. q. 3°.

Query 2° Are sins doubtfully grave to be accused?

Resp. Neg. more probably per se, at least speculatively, even if a true probability is given concerning the gravity of the sin. The reason is the same as for the preceding question: for it is not established that a grave sin was committed; nor therefore can the obligation of Confession be established.

In practice, however, a twofold rule is to be followed:

Rule I. - In doubt whether the matter of the sin is grave. Boys and the unlearned ordinarily must accuse doubts, 1° because they can scarcely form a conscience by themselves; 2° because for the most part they do not know how to distinguish venial sins from mortal. Except, however, the scrupulous, who do not frequently tend to commit mortal sins. But instructed penitents are not held to accuse doubtfully grave sins, because they can form a conscience by themselves; nevertheless they are ordinarily to be gently exhorted to accuse these also, so that the confessor, observing the dangers in which the penitent is placed, may be able both to warn him and to remove them.

Rule II. - In doubt concerning full consent or perfect advertence: 1° if the penitents are of timid conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely, they are by no means held to confess doubtful sins, because the presumption favors them which is had from things ordinarily occurring; indeed they are often to be prevented from this accusation if they seem inclined to scruples; 2° if the penitents keep a middle way between a timid and lax conscience, they are indeed not to be obliged, but certainly to be induced to declare doubtful consent, because it profits for tranquility of conscience, etc.; 3° if the penitents are of lax conscience, they scarcely ever ought not to declare doubtful sins, because the presumption scarcely ever is not opposed to them.¹

Query 3° Must grave sins, indeed certainly committed, concerning which however you doubt whether you have confessed them, necessarily be accused?

Resp. Affirm. See n. 67. 1°. Except, 1° if doubt occurs concerning the omission of a sin already committed long ago in one who was diligent in confessing his sins, because the presumption taken from things commonly occurring favors him; 2° if there is question of a scrupulous person, to whom the rule handed down in n. 44. II. 8° must be applied.

Query 4° Must he who confessed some sin as doubtful repeat it, if afterward he knows it as certain?

Resp. It is controverted. The "true and most common" opinion, says St. Alphonsus, "affirms." The reason is that that sin was not truly accused as to substance: for a certain accusation is not included in a doubtful one. - Otherwise, if someone afterward recognizes as mortal what, without any doubt added, he confessed.²

Circumstances of various kinds are distinguished in sins. (See n. 27.)

1364. Principles. - I. It is certain that circumstances changing the species are to be accused, if the malice of a diverse species which the circumstance induces is grave (for if it was light, e.g. a light irreverence of him who in a Church steals the image of another, it is not necessary, as is established concerning venial sins, to express it in Confession). The reason is that they constitute a new sin, and indeed a mortal one, of itself; and this is clear from Trent.¹

II. It is certain that circumstances lightly aggravating, or diminishing, are not necessarily to be accused, although to expose them is of itself better. The reason is that venial sins are not necessary matter of the Sacrament of Penance.

III. It is also certain that circumstances must be expressed by reason of which a sin venial from its kind becomes mortal. Likewise circumstances are to be opened which so diminish the sin that what, with them set aside, would have been mortal, becomes by reason of them either no sin, or only venial (n. 204).

1365. Questions. - Query 1° Must circumstances notably aggravating the malice of mortal sins within the same species necessarily be accused?

Resp. There is a twofold probable opinion.

Opinion I, the more common and more probable, denies absolutely. The reason is: 1° because Trent requires nothing else than the Confession of the number and species of sins, and therefore seems to exclude the obligation of confessing other circumstances.² 2° Because otherwise Confessions made in good faith would have to be repeated, and penitents would have to be commonly admonished for the future about explaining aggravating circumstances. But a precept so doubtful does not oblige.

But per accidens even aggravating circumstances are also to be declared, namely by reason - either of number, and thus the circumstance of quantity of time through which hatred or concupiscence toward a woman endured is to be declared; - or of censure or reservation; - or of necessary direction, as in the case of those in habit, those in occasion, and generally when there is question of the obligation to restitution.³

Opinion II affirms. The reason is, 1° because the same reason holds for accusing aggravating circumstances as for accusing circumstances changing the species; 2° because a sin increased by notably aggravating circumstances is equivalent to several sins; 3° because, if they were not accused, the confessor could not impose a proportionate penance; 4° because the Roman Catechism teaches thus.¹ - But the patrons of the first opinion reply:

To the 1st reason: "If the reasons proved equally concerning both circumstances, without cause the Council would have limited that whole doctrine to the circumstances which change the species: for it ought to have spoken concerning both in general without limitation and discrimination." Thus Lugo.²

To the 2nd. No one ever sought the multiplication of sins in the same act from the possible division of the matter.

To the 3rd. "So exact an equality is not always required in the penance to be imposed." Thus the same Lugo.³

To the 4th. The text objected here is: "Nor indeed is it necessary only to explain grave sins by narrating them, but also those things which surround each sin and greatly increase or diminish its depravity." But it can be replied that these words are explained in the same place in such a way that it is not necessary to understand them concerning merely aggravating circumstances. And indeed - a) immediately the Catechism adds: "For some circumstances are so grave that the nature of mortal sin consists from them alone: wherefore it is always necessary to confess all these." But the nature of lethal fault is not had from a circumstance alone, unless this changes either the moral or the theological species. - b) This is confirmed from the fact that it prescribes that circumstances greatly diminishing are to be confessed. For even the adversaries concede that this holds only when the diminution changes the theological species.⁴ - c) The Catechism confirms its doctrine from the necessity of expressing the circumstance of a sacred person in homicide, and of Matrimony in intercourse. But these pertain to circumstances changing the moral species.

Query 2° Must the circumstance of the degree of incest committed with blood relatives or relatives by affinity be declared?

Resp. 1° More probably, incest between blood relatives and relatives by affinity does not differ in species, since it makes no difference whether the conjunction arises from blood or from Matrimony; for intercourse with blood relatives is prohibited from the same motive from which it is prohibited with relatives by affinity: therefore the circumstance of consanguinity or affinity is not necessarily to be expressed.¹

Resp. 2° According to the common opinion of Doctors, the circumstance of conjunction in the first degree of the direct line is to be opened, namely between father and daughter; mother and son; father-in-law and daughter-in-law; mother-in-law and son-in-law; stepmother and stepson; stepfather and stepdaughter (p. 258), on account of the debt of reverence. Indeed it must be explained whether a son has sinned with his mother, by reason of the special reverence owed to the mother. - They say the same concerning the circumstance of the first degree of consanguinity in the collateral line, namely between brother and sister. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus calls the contrary opinion equally probable.²

Resp. 3° More probably, however, the other degrees of consanguinity or affinity are not necessarily to be declared.³ Cf. n. 495.

Query 3° Must the circumstance of the dignity of the person necessarily be accused, e.g. if the one sinning is a Superior, Magistrate, Priest, etc.?

Resp. Neg. more probably per se, i.e. with the reason of scandal, of office, or of a particular obligation set aside. The reason is that the circumstance of the dignity of the person sinning does not change the species of sin per se, but at most aggravates the sin.

Query 4° Must the circumstance of a sin committed by a confessor with a penitent necessarily be declared?

Resp. Neg. more probably, provided that it has no relation to Confession. The reason is that by this sin no injury is done to the Sacrament, since it has no respect to Confession.⁴ Nevertheless it is easily clear that both such a penitent is wholly to be deterred from further confessing to that priest, and such a confessor from further admitting that penitent to Confession.

Query 5° Must the circumstance of sacred time necessarily be accused?

Resp. Neg. This is clear from the universal practice both of confessors and of penitents; indeed it is certain that the former are not solicitous about asking concerning such a circumstance, nor the latter accustomed to declare it. The circumstance of sacred time does not seem to have to be explained, unless certain things are specially prohibited on account of reverence for the time, e.g. lest someone on Good Friday present public games, comedies, or ludicrous spectacles.¹

Query 6° Does he who accuses a recent sin as committed long ago satisfy the integrity of Confession?

Resp. 1° Affirm. per se. "The reason,... because the sin is the same, whether he had confessed it before or not, unless perhaps the change of time brings with itself a circumstance diverse in species," or the reservation, as regards this confessor, of a sin not confessed, or the occasion or habit of sin demands something else, and provided that a sufficient penance is imposed. ... "Nor is it an obstacle that" the penitent "says that he wishes to make a general Confession; for by this he does not say that he wishes to confess only old sins, but that he wishes also to comprehend those," i.e. old ones; "for a general Confession includes all sins up to this hour. Nor also does it matter that the confessor understands that that is an old sin, for the penitent has not said this. ... Finally it does not matter that the penitent seems implicitly to indicate that they are old sins; for he truly has the intention of speaking about new sins, and wishes to speak of them, although he desires not to be understood as to this by the confessor," ... who "intends to absolve from the sins which the penitent has brought forward."²

Resp. 2° But if the penitent lies about the time, e.g. if he denies that he sinned today; and declares the sin as committed at another determined and remote time, the Doctors more commonly think that he does not satisfy his obligation. The reason is that the act which the penitent placed today is not an act placed in the past year. Hence he lies in two ways, namely by concealing the sin committed today, and by accusing a sin committed at another time. - Thus Tamburinus.³ Yet Theologians are not lacking who think this lie light. - See Lugo.⁴

Query 7° Must the external act of sin necessarily be accused?

Resp. Affirm., because it is one and the same thing with the internal act in the genus of morals, and these two constitute one total thing. Moreover the external act is directly prohibited by divine law, e.g. You shall not commit homicide. Besides, without the declaration of the external act the confessor generally could not perform his office, as is fitting, concerning admonitions to be given, etc. This is also clear from the universal custom of the faithful, which explains the law in this sense.

Query 8° Must the penitent declare the number of persons with whom he sinned?

Resp. Neg. per se. - Thus Bonacina,¹ Tamburinus,² Lacroix,³ and others commonly.

The reason is that it suffices that the number of sins and their species be declared; but sins do not change species because they were committed with several persons. Hence he who fornicated with three different persons, or three times with the same, satisfies by saying that he fornicated three times; nor is he held spontaneously to say whether the accomplice was one, or several; whether they were prostitutes, or others. - Nevertheless the penitent is held to declare it if there is a proximate occasion of sinning, as because sin was committed several times with the same person.

Query 9° Must the nearness of persons be declared in sins of grave hatred?

Resp. 1° Affirm., if there is question of nearer nearness, on account of the strict bond of piety. Hence hatred against parents, children, grandparents, grandchildren, spouse, relatives by affinity in the first degree of the direct line, and, at least if very grave evil is wished, brothers must be declared.⁴

Resp. 2° But neg. more probably, if there is question of remote nearness, namely among the other blood relatives or relatives by affinity. - Lugo,⁵ and others, against others who think the circumstance of nearness must be declared even in the fourth degree of consanguinity.

Sins omitted from inculpable forgetfulness must be accused, if they return into the memory of the penitent. For by divine precept all sins committed after Baptism must be declared in Sacramental Confession; nor can present forgetfulness excuse from so great an obligation even for the future. This is clear from the 11th proposition condemned by Alexander VII. See p. XIII.

1366. Questions. - Query 1° Must sins omitted from forgetfulness or another just cause be accused as soon as possible?

Resp. Neg. more probably. For an obligation of this kind is to be understood morally, especially since these sins have already been blotted out, and therefore there is no danger to the soul in delay. - Thus more commonly.

Indeed according to several grave Theologians the penitent probably can defer the Confession of these sins until from the force of another obligation he is held to confess again. Thus it could be deferred for several months, and even to the time of annual Confession. Bon.¹ (6) p. 405. But more probably another Confession, with these omitted, cannot be interposed. The reason is that it belongs to the integrity of Confession to declare in the actual accusation all mortal sins not yet accused, which occur to memory, or of which consciousness is had, as Trent says.²

Query 2° Must sins omitted from forgetfulness be accused before Communion, if they first occur to the mind?

Resp. Neg. very probably, even if the penitent can confess without inconvenience (n. 1307. q. 3°).

Query 3° Is a penitent, who remembers a forgotten sin and cannot, or does not wish to, confess before Communion, held to elicit an act of contrition?

Resp. Neg. with St. Alphonsus,³ Lugo,⁴ and with others commonly against certain others. - The reason is that no foundation appears why this contrition should be required. For it is not required from precept, because this is found prescribed nowhere; nor from the necessity of probation, because the sin has already been indirectly blotted out through the preceding Confession, and therefore does not need remission.

Query 4° Must a penitent accusing a grave sin, omitted in the preceding Confession from forgetfulness or another legitimate cause and already indirectly remitted, necessarily be absolved again?

Resp. Affirm. with the most common opinion. The reason is that all mortal sins, from the institution of Christ, must be subjected to the keys, so that they may be directly remitted. For although they have already been remitted, nevertheless they have not been remitted by the force of the Sacrament, or by the force of absolution, but only by the force of grace infused through the Sacrament, and concomitantly with other sins. - Sporer,¹ Collat. Andeg.² - Yet it happens that penitents confess as omitted from forgetfulness sins which, through the accusation of other sins in which they are necessarily contained, have already been sufficiently declared; in which case there will be no obligation of absolving.

The confessor may omit absolution with penitents who will return to him; since they will be directly absolved in another Confession; nevertheless it is better to impart absolution to all, when this can easily be done, for the consolation and tranquility of the penitent's mind, and also on account of the fruit to be received from the Sacrament. Add the danger lest the penitent may not be able to approach the same confessor any more.

394. The fourth sacrament is Penance. - By the three prior sacraments we are born, strengthened, and nourished in the divine life of grace; these three are required of themselves. But the life of grace can be lost; then incidentally, not indeed for all but for those sinning, a sacramental remedy is necessary for recovering that life; and this is the sacrament of Penance. This sacrament has this as proper to it: that it is not confected from external matter which is applied to the subject, but is materially constituted from the very human acts of penitents. Whence by way of introduction one must speak of the act and virtue of Penance itself, "not only," as the Roman Catechism says, "because the faithful people ought to be instructed by pastors toward every kind of virtue, but also because the actions of this virtue furnish, as it were, the matter in which the sacrament of Penance is concerned; and unless first what the virtue of Penance is be rightly understood, it is also necessary that the force of the sacrament be unknown." Therefore let the discourse be made:

We shall speak in seven articles: 1. of the virtue of penance itself; 2. of its object; 3. of its distinction from other virtues; 4. of the acts of penance; 5. of its subject; 6. of its necessity; 7. of its relation with the sacrament.

419. Order of discussion. - Christ the Lord properly instituted this sacrament when He conferred upon the apostles the power of remitting sins, which is called the power of the keys. Whence we must treat:

1° of the existence of this power of the keys, according to the documents of Scripture and Tradition;

2° of the existence of the sacrament itself, which is the effect of this power.

S. Th., in Suppl., q. 17 and 18; q. 8, a. 1, ad 1.

420. Errors. - Concerning the power of the keys many have erred, whether they denied it, or unduly restricted it, or badly understood it, or rejected its divine origin.

A. In the first times of the Church, the Encratites denied the power of remitting sins committed after Baptism, holding these sins to be irremissible, since Christians ought to be perfect and to abstain from sin; others unduly restricted it, such as the Montanists, to whom Tertullian joined himself, positing three irremissible sins: adultery, idolatry, and homicide; Novatian said this of apostasy, but his disciples of all the graver sins, which are unto death.

B. The Protestants rejected the power of remitting sins, although several, such as Luther, hesitated whether for this reason they would deny that Penance is a sacrament. Yet this sacrament would not remit sin ex opere operato, for absolution would have only the power of exciting faith and of declaring the remission of sins, not of effecting it. But Calvin, whom many followed, denied that Penance is distinguished from Baptism, or from the memory of it. Baptism indeed excites faith that sins have been forgiven and the purpose of a new life; but when sin has again been committed, the memory of Baptism renews the excitation of that faith and the purpose of a new life. Anglicans, however, acknowledge that sinners can be absolved by priests and admit the usefulness of confession, but not its necessity; indeed Ritualists say that absolution is a sacrament, but place it among the lesser sacraments.

C. Liberal Protestants hold the charismatics alone as leaders of the primitive Church elected by the faithful. At the beginning, penance was merely disciplinary, not sacramental. God alone remitted sins; but the charismatics declared the will of God showing mercy, before penitents were received into the Church, which bishops could not do unless they were at the same time charismatics. Later, when the charisms disappeared, this devolved upon the bishops, who, once the hierarchy had been instituted, arrogated true power to themselves, and assumed the ministry of sanctification, to which a special value was acknowledged.¹ Whence it happened that the faithful desired that through them release from sin be obtained for themselves; from which there arose the custom of manifesting or confessing sins to them. This custom was first propagated among monks, then widely among the faithful, so that it was said that there is no remission of sins except through priests. Finally confession itself was here and there prescribed, indeed imposed upon the universal Church in the Fourth Lateran Council, in the year 1215.

¹ To this also pertains proposition 46 of certain modernists: "There was not present in the primitive Church the concept of a Christian sinner reconciled by the authority of the Church, but the Church only very slowly became accustomed to a concept of this kind. Indeed even after penance was acknowledged as an institution of the Church, it was not called by the name of sacrament, because it was held as a shameful sacrament." Likewise prop. 47: "The words of the Lord: Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them, and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained, by no means refer to the sacrament of penance, whatever it pleased the Tridentine Fathers to assert."

Specifically, according to Lea,² Christ, who in the Gospel inculcates internal worship in spirit and truth, did not institute an external rite for remitting sins, but requires only love and penance of heart. Nor was a power of remitting sins by a sensible rite acknowledged in the first centuries, for the penitential discipline which was in force had the power of reconciling with the Church in the external forum, but not with God. For the Fathers, when they enumerate many means unto the remission of sins, do not commemorate priestly absolution among them. And the words themselves of absolution were nothing but prayers by which priests begged pardon from God, but in no way sacramental forms conferring grace and pardon.

² A History of Auricular Confession and Indulgences, 1896.

421. Thesis. Christ conferred upon the Church the power of remitting and retaining all sins committed after Baptism, namely, by a truly judicial act and in the manner of a forensic judgment. - This is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, confirming the doctrine of the Council of Florence.

It defined these three things:

1. In the Catholic Church all sins committed after Baptism can be remitted as often as the faithful fall into them (can. 1).

2. In it there is the power truly of remitting and retaining sins, and not only of preaching the Gospel or the remission of sins (can. 2).

3. This power is not the bare ministry of declaring that sins have been remitted, but is exercised through a judicial act, which requires the confession of the penitent (can. 3).

422. Catholic doctrine is proved from the Scriptures. - That there is in the Church a true power of remitting sins is established:

A. From the promise of the power of the keys, in which it is implicitly contained. The power is promised to Peter: "Thou art Peter, and upon this rock I will build my Church; and I will give to thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever thou shalt loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. XVI, 18-19); but to the other apostles a similar participated power is promised: "Whatsoever you shall bind upon earth shall be bound also in heaven, and whatsoever you shall loose upon earth shall be loosed also in heaven" (Matt. XVIII, 18).

By these words there is promised:

1° To Peter, supreme power in order to the kingdom of heaven, which is the end of the Church, and consequently in order to governing the Church itself. For to hand over the keys of a house or city is a metaphorical expression signifying supreme power in the house or city, as is established from constant sacred and profane usage.1

2° To Peter and the apostles, a universal and unlimited power of binding and loosing whatsoever, i.e., of imposing or relaxing a moral bond, and indeed in such wise that when they bind or loose on earth, this is held ratified by God in heaven. But there is a threefold bond prohibiting from the kingdom of heaven: the bond of law, the bond of sin, and the bond of punishment. Therefore they can loose from this threefold bond, and consequently remit sin, which is the only bond directly removing one from heaven.

3° A power to be exercised in the Church, but not upon those who are outside; for it is promised to Peter in order to the Church to be built, and to the apostles in order to judging and punishing delinquents denounced to the Church, as is clear from the context (v. 17); therefore it is altogether distinguished from the power of baptizing. But the power will be perpetual: for it is promised to Peter as the foundation of the Church, which must always remain for the support of the building, and to the apostles as leaders of the Church; and therefore it will always remain in the Church.

Nor is it an obstacle that, according to the manner of speaking of the rabbis, to loose and to bind signify to declare licit or illicit, according as the more benign masters are said to loose from obligation, the more rigid to bind. For the words are to be understood according to the subject matter: whence if there is question of schools, in which there is not authoritative power but only declarative power, the sense is to declare licit or illicit; on the contrary, when the discussion is concerning the power of the keys or of ruling, and concerning true judgment and excommunication by which someone is authoritatively cast out from the Church, the context requires that they be understood of the true power of obliging or of loosing from obligation.

B. From the mission given to the Apostles of remitting and retaining sins (John XX, 21-23): Jesus "therefore said to them again: Peace be to you. As the Father has sent me, I also send you. When He had said this, He breathed on them, and said to them: Receive the Holy Spirit. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them: and whose sins you shall retain, they are retained." By these words there is not handed down a mere faculty of preaching the remission of sins or of declaring that sins have been remitted to penitents, as Protestants contend, but an unlimited power truly of remitting all sins, not only as to punishment but as to guilt, and indeed to be exercised in a judicial manner. Whence it is altogether distinct from the power of remitting sins through the ministration of Baptism.

1° It is a power truly of remitting sins. For a) Christ hands on to the apostles a mission similar to that which He received from the Father, and which was not only of preaching the remission of sins but of truly dismissing and destroying them.³ - b) Whence by the sensible sign of breathing He imparts to them the Holy Spirit, by which He would manifest that a new and altogether singular power is handed over; such would not be a mission merely to announce the forgiveness of sins, which even the prophets did and which any one of the faithful can perform.⁴ - c) Hence He uses the active verb you shall forgive (aphete), which does not express some passive state to be declared, namely, that sins have been remitted, but indicates the positive action of effectively freeing from sins, as is established from biblical usage⁵ and from the verb to which it is opposed: you shall retain, which likewise requires a positive action. - d) But if in the second clause the words: they are forgiven them and they are retained, according to the Protestants themselves, are to be understood of the true remission or retention of sins, there can be no doubt that in the first clause they must be taken in the same sense. - e) Whence the remission made by the apostles is immediately efficacious, so that there is present the nexus of true causality between the pronouncement of remission by the apostles and the remission itself. For He does not say: Whose, i.e., whosever, sins you shall forgive, they will be forgiven them, but they are forgiven (apheontai), i.e., by that very fact they are remitted, just as those which you shall retain are retained. Therefore it is in no way a question of the preaching of remission, which does not have an immediate infallible effect, nor of the pronouncement of a remission already made, which would not depend on the apostles themselves remitting, but they on it.

³ Matt. I, 21; IX, 2-13; XVIII, 11; Luke V, 20, 32; VII, 47; XIX, 10; XXIV, 47; Apoc. I, 5.

⁴ Therefore it is not a question of fraternal correction, which proceeds from a private person and is made toward a private person, but of the public mission which Christ received from the Father, and which is conferred through the Holy Spirit, namely, through a supernatural charisma for carrying out a divine mission. And this also appears from the fact that the object of the mission is the remission of sins, which according to Matt. IX, 2-4 cannot be done except by divine power, and therefore requires a divine mission.

⁵ Matt. XVIII, 32, 35; Mark XI, 25; Luke VII, 47-49; XI, 4; Rom. IV, 7.

2° It is a power of remitting not only the punishment but the guilt itself of sin before God. For a) the expression aphienai tas hamartias signifies, and indeed constantly, the remission of guilt itself.⁶ - b) This is more manifest in the present case, since the mission of Christ itself is thus to be carried out and completed by the apostles; and He had come to take away the guilt itself of sin.⁷ - c) Whence the apostles, by remitting sins, act in the power of the Holy Spirit, whose proper work it is to cleanse from sin and to blot it out.

⁶ Matt. VI, 12, 14; IX, 5, 6; Mark II, 5, 10; Luke V, 20; VII, 47-49; XXIII, 34; Rom. IV, 5; VIII, 11; James II, 13.

⁷ Matt. I, 21; IX, 13; XVIII, 11; Mark II, 17; Luke V, 32; XIX, 10; Rom. V, 10, 18, 19.

3° The power is to be exercised by a judicial act in the manner of a forensic judgment. For a) the power is conferred as one and indivisible toward two contrary opposed terms, and therefore in its very exercise it needs to be determined toward one or the other through judgment. - b) For to retain (kratein, saisir, tenir) is more than not to remit, but is positively to preserve the bond of sin and to impede remission, so that it is not remitted nor can validly be remitted: it is to bind or oblige someone to appear again in judgment and in the meantime to remain subject, and to prescribe the conditions, works, and satisfactions required so that he may obtain remission. - c) But such a power, which is exercised in the name of Christ in so grave a matter, is not to be exercised arbitrarily at pleasure, but prudently and according to discretion; whence it prerequires judgment concerning the offenses committed by the sinner and concerning his dispositions, which per se cannot be had without his confession.

Therefore it is a power altogether diverse from the power of baptizing and of remitting sins through Baptism, both because it is not limited to that, since it appears to be exercised unlimitedly, toward whatever sinners; and because Baptism washes away sins, it does not formally remit them, whence the taking away of sins is attributed to the external washing and to the power of water and of the Holy Spirit; and because in Baptism a judicial act is not properly exercised, nor is there any power of retaining: for not to baptize is not positively to retain, but merely negatively to omit. But if it were not distinguished from the conferral of Baptism, there would be no power of remitting to be exercised upon the members of the body of the Church. - This is also clear from the interpretation of the Fathers.

423. Corollary. - From the foregoing it is established that the power of remitting sins was granted as unlimited, and that it extends itself to every kind of sin, as is manifest from the words "whose, i.e., whosever, sins you shall forgive," since they are said without restriction. But this is understood the more easily because it is only a part of the power of the keys of loosing whatsoever. Whence to Peter asking, Matt. XVIII, 21: "Lord, how often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him? Until seven times?" Jesus responded: "I do not say, until seven times, but until seventy times seven," i.e., always, just as the power of loosing which you will exercise in my name is indefinite.

They object very many things against this conclusion:

1° That sin against the Holy Spirit, according to Christ Himself, is irremissible, namely, it is not remitted either in this age or in the future (Matt. XII, 31; Mark III, 28; Luke XII, 10).

Resp. The sin against the Holy Spirit of which the Gospel speaks is that sin of the Pharisees by which, out of malice, they attributed to the devil the miraculous works of Christ, done by the power of the Holy Spirit so that men might be saved and drawn back from evil; and thus they maliciously contemned the means granted precisely by the Holy Spirit for converting men. Whence this sin includes a depraved disposition of pertinacity, which of itself is permanent, and while it remains it is an obstacle of positive resistance to the action of divine grace converting, and thus according to its own nature it excludes remission. For this reason it is remitted with the greatest difficulty, more rarely, and only as if miraculously, and it can truly be called morally irremissible; although it is not absolutely irremissible by reason of the omnipotence of God (q. 86, a. 1, ad 3; II-II, q. 14, a. 3).

2° The doctrine of the epistle to the Hebrews concerning apostates.

a) Of these it is said VI, 4: "For it is impossible for those who have once been enlightened (by Baptism), have also tasted the heavenly gift (the Holy Eucharist), and have been made partakers of the Holy Spirit (by Confirmation), and nevertheless have tasted the good word of God and the powers of the age to come, and have fallen away, to be renewed again unto penance."

Resp. It is not said that their sin cannot be remitted, nor that they cannot repent; but it is affirmed that they cannot be entirely renewed, as is done through Baptism, because that is unrepeatable, as Athanasius, ep. 4 to Serapion, 13, and Chrysostom in hom. 9 on this place, 3, interpret; or because the rudiments of faith which brought about the first conversion are insufficient for this, as certain moderns understand. - Others less well explain it of moral impossibility, in the same way as was said concerning sin against the Holy Spirit.

b) Likewise X, 26: "For if we sin voluntarily after having received the knowledge of the truth, there is now left no victim for sins, but a certain terrible expectation of judgment."

Resp. It is not said that apostates cannot be converted and repent, but that they, while they remain in apostasy, lack a victim for sins. For if they have departed ungrateful toward Christ immolated, there is not another victim to be immolated for them to redeem them anew. Namely, those who deny Christ have nothing by which they can be redeemed, as the Fathers understand: Athanasius, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Epiphanius.

3° The words of I John V, 16 concerning sin unto death: "He who knows his brother to sin a sin not unto death, let him ask, and life shall be given to him sinning not unto death. There is a sin unto death; for that I do not say that anyone should ask."

Resp. The sin unto death seems to be that of apostasy and infidelity by which the divinity of Christ is denied, from whom alone we have eternal life (v. 11-13); whence this sin is unto death. But it is not said to be irremissible; rather the apostle says that he does not ask that prayer be made for those who have committed it. Whence it is a sin which incurs public excommunication; but public prayers are not made for the excommunicated.

424. Catholic doctrine is proved from Tradition. - Penitential doctrine embraces three questions: a) whether in the primitive Church there was a power of remitting sins committed after Baptism, and whether it was held to have been instituted by God; - b) whether confession was necessary for the remission of sins, and whether it was public or private; - c) whether that power was exercised by way of absolution to be given by bishops or priests. The first question is concerning the existence of the sacrament of Penance, the second concerning sacramental confession, the third concerning the minister of Penance. In the present matter only the first comes to be considered.

Pastoral theology is the practical instruction of the pastor of souls for the right and fruitful management of his office. Wherefore it is rather an art than a science; but an art which applies the principles of theological science, namely dogmatic and moral theology.

Its end is to feed the sheep; therefore it regards all the means of salvation by which the pastor, in the internal and external forum, may feed his sheep and lead them to the ultimate end. It is the art of ruling souls; the practical method by which the pastor, according to the rules of theology, may be able to direct the souls entrusted to him.

The office of the pastor is threefold: to preach dogmatic and moral doctrine; to direct and edify by example and counsel, where ascetical theology comes into use; to minister the sacraments. Pastoral theology proposes an apt method by which the pastor, in those various offices, may be able to direct souls according to the rules of religious truth, morality, and perfection; whence it also includes the rules and method of preaching and catechizing.

For the present, however, we consider only the method in the administration of the sacraments, chiefly in the internal forum of the sacrament of Penance, where the priest concurs more closely and principally in procuring the salvation of souls by doctrine, correction, and counsel, as also by his own holiness and zeal.

The end of our treatment is the begun instruction of the younger priest for the ministry of souls; in French they would say: "to initiate the young priest into the exercise of the ministry of souls." This we shall furnish by an exposition of the rules which he must follow and of the means which he must use, in order more surely to convert sinners turned away from God, and more greatly to sanctify the just united to God. By these rules, it is by no means our mind to supply for experience, which, under the light of the principles of moral theology, will always remain the mistress of the government of souls; but we intend to use the experience of others, that we may avoid errors and even involuntary defects.

"The government of souls is the art of arts," says St. Gregory. For it is a work most sublime, because a divine work: to exercise the judgment and mercy of God; most difficult, since it is more difficult to know the diseases of the soul than those of the body; most salutary: from the good or bad government of confessors, says St. Alphonsus (Praxis Conf., n. 1), the salvation or ruin of the people depends. For this there are required in the confessor: 1) science possessed not only speculatively but prepared for practice: namely, method, exercise, and practice by which he may be able to apply principles; 2) great prudence; 3) goodness of life and zeal. Hence the things which are set forth in moral theology concerning the qualities and duties of the confessor are here to be applied.

Pastoral discipline is certainly not new, although now it is commonly treated more orderly and more completely. Peter of Poitiers, in the twelfth century, is said to have been the first to cultivate casuistic theology, and to have had several imitators. From the thirteenth century, throughout the whole Middle Age, the penitential Summas were very well known, such as those which Peraldus, O.P. (d. 1250), St. Raymond of Pennafort, O.P. (1175-1275), Ioannes Rumsik of Fribourg, O.P. (d. 1314), Bartholomaeus of Pisa, O.P. (d. 1347), Angelus of Clavasio or Carleti, O.M. (d. 1493), Trovamala, O.M. (d. 1495), Tabiena, O.P. (d. 1521), Sylvester Prierias, O.P. (d. 1523), Bartholomaeus Fumus, O.P. (d. 1545), and Bartholomaeus of St. Faustus, O. Cist. (1571-1639), are read to have written. To the same genus belong Ioannes Nider, O.P. (d. 1438), Formicarius, Tr. de 10 Praeceptis, and Consolatorium timoratae conscientiae; St. Antoninus, O.P. (1384-1459), Summula confessionis; Cajetan, O.P. (1469-1534), Summula Peccatorum; Bartholomaeus de Medina, O.P. (1528-1581), Brevis instructio de Poenitentia; Azpilcueta, Doctor Navarrus (d. 1586), Manuale confessariorum; Lopez, O.P. (d. 1596), Instructorium conscientiae; Binsfeld (d. 1598), Enchiridion Theologiae pastoralis; Martin Fornari, S.I. (1547-1612), Institutio Confessariorum; Loth, O.P. (d. 1652), Resolutiones theologicae; Stoz, S.I. (d. 1678), Tribunal Poenitentiae; Antonius a Spiritu Sancto, O. Carm. (d. 1677), Directorium Confessariorum; Segneri, S.I. (d. 1694), Parochus instructus, Confessarius instructus, Poenitens instructus; Lohner, S.I. (d. 1697), Instructio de conversatione apostolica, Instructio pastorum; Reuter, S.I. (1680-1762), Neo-Confessarius practice instructus; Wigandt, O.P. (d. 1708), Tribunal Confessariorum; Gaume (1802-1879), Manuel des Confesseurs. Several Saints also, besides those already cited, have deserved well of pastoral theology, as St. Charles Borromeo (d. 1584), writing an instruction of pastors, and St. Francis de Sales (d. 1622), an instruction to confessors; but especially St. Alphonsus (1696-1787). Here also can be referred works of Moral Theology of a more practical character, such as Lacroix, S.I. (1652-1714), and Sporer, O.M. (d. 1708); or cases of conscience, such as Toletus, S.I. (1532-1596), Bartholomaeus a Ledesma, O.P. (d. 1604), Bianchis, O.P. (d. 1622), Nazarius, O.P. (1556-1646), Pontas (1638-1728), and P. Van der Velden, O.M. (d. 1857), resolved in the work: Praxis administrandi sacramentum Poenitentiae.

In more recent time special treatises of pastoral theology have already been published, such as, among many others, Alberti, Sailer (d. 1832), Benger (d. 1870), Gassner, Amberger (d. 1889), Schuech (d. 1893), Pruner (d. 1907), William Stang (an American), Goepfert (d. 1913), Krieg, etc., wrote; but more specially in order to the practice of the confessional: Zenner (d. 1861), Tappehorn (d. 1906), Probst. For our purpose, however, let the following be held as specially commended: St. Alphonsus, Praxis confessariorum and Silva Rerum praedicabilium; Aertnijs, C.SS.R., Theologia Pastoralis; Berardi, Praxis Confessariorum; Reuter-Lehmkuhl-Umberg, S.I., Neo-Confessarius practice instructus; Frassinetti, Compendium Th. Moralis; Schneider, Manuale Sacerdotum; to which we wish to add more practical modern moral manuals, such as Aertnijs and Marc from the C.SS.R.; Haine and Theol. Mechliniensis; Lehmkuhl, Genicot-Salsmans, Noldin-Schmitt, and Vermeersch from the S.I.; Tanquerey, S.S.; and Prummer from the O.P.; or also collections of cases of conscience such as were made by Gury, Lehmkuhl, Genicot, and Villada.

I. The present treatment pertains to the final part of the doctrine concerning Penance, where the subject of this sacrament is discussed.

Now the subject of Penance is every and only wayfarer man, baptized, a sinner, truly contrite, and confessing in some manner. He must be:

1. a wayfarer man, because the sacraments were instituted for him alone;

2. baptized, because Baptism renders persons capable of receiving the other sacraments, which otherwise would be received invalidly;

3. a sinner, that is, one who after Baptism has committed at least a venial sin, because the virtue of penance is only concerning actual personal sin, and the sacrament of penance was instituted for the remission of sins committed after Baptism; but if he were not a sinner, the words of absolution would not be verified and absolution would be invalid;

4. contrite, at least by imperfect contrition; otherwise he would not truly be penitent, since contrition is the principal and essential act of penance, without which it is impossible to obtain remission of actual sin;

5. confessing in some manner, or externally accusing himself of being a sinner. For without an external accusation the sins and dispositions of the penitent would be unknown to the minister, who would not be able to exercise judgment; but any external accusation whatever, even a minimal one, suffices for this in circumstances in which a greater integrity of confession is impossible.

II. All the foregoing things are clear from the doctrine concerning the virtue and sacrament of penance. Hence, in the present matter, an application must be made of the principles set forth in the whole treatise concerning penance to the various categories of penitents which can present special difficulties.

The categories can be divided according to the particular dispositions of penitents; the condition of the body, or of the soul; the state of life; or the kind of sin.

But we limit the exposition of the present little work to the three former kinds of classes; perhaps we shall treat of the remaining ones at a future time.

III. Moreover, the questions to be treated can be reduced to the following:

I. Concerning penitents variously disposed:

1. Concerning penitents who are to be directed in the examination of conscience.

2. Concerning penitents who are to be interrogated.

3. Concerning penitents who are to be instructed and admonished.

4. Concerning customary sinners and recidivists.

5. Concerning those in occasions of sin.

6. Concerning penitents who are to be obliged or induced to a new or general confession.

II. Concerning penitents various according to the condition of the body:

1. Concerning children.

2. Concerning the half-witted and deaf-mutes.

3. Concerning adolescents and young persons.

4. Concerning men and women.

5. Concerning abnormal persons.

6. Concerning the sick and the dying.

7. Concerning the incarcerated and those condemned to death.

III. Concerning penitents various according to the condition of the soul:

1. Concerning the pious and devout.

2. Concerning the perfect and contemplative.

3. Concerning the tempted.

4. Concerning the scrupulous.

5. Concerning the lax.

In the sacrament of penance, through judicial absolution imparted by a legitimate minister, sins committed after baptism are remitted to a rightly disposed faithful person (Can. 870).

Penance can be considered simply as a virtue, and as a sacrament. If it is considered in the first way, it is defined: A moral virtue inclining to detestation of sin, insofar as it is an offense of God, and to an efficacious purpose of avoiding it in the future and of satisfying divine justice. - I said, insofar as it is an offense of God, that is, insofar as it brings injury to God and harms His rights over man; but not insofar as it offends the supreme goodness and perfection of God considered in itself: for this pertains to contrition perfected by charity. Hence most theologians after St. Thomas teach that penance, as it is a particular virtue, pertains to justice, by which man renders to God what is His. - Cf. St. Thom. 3, q. 85, art. 3.

But if Penance is considered as a sacrament, it is defined: A sacrament of the new law, instituted by Christ after the manner of a judgment, for remitting through priestly absolution sins committed after Baptism to a contrite and confessed man. - Moreover concerning the truth, necessity, and constitutive parts of this sacrament, the following things must be held:

I. Penance is a true and properly so called sacrament of the new law, and by force of divine institution it has the power of remitting all sins committed after Baptism. This is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 1, where it is said: "If anyone shall say that, in the Catholic Church, Penance is not truly and properly a sacrament instituted by Christ our Lord for the faithful, as often as they fall into sins after Baptism, to be reconciled to God Himself, let him be anathema." - Cf. De Augustinis, part. 2, Thes. 13, p. 155.

II. The sacrament of Penance is necessary by necessity of means, in reality or, if it cannot be received in reality, at least in implicit desire, for remitting mortal sins committed after Baptism. This is clear from the Council of Trent, which in sess. 14 declared these two things, namely in chap. 2: "But this sacrament of Penance is necessary unto salvation for those fallen after Baptism, as Baptism itself is for those not yet regenerated"; and in chap. 4: "The Holy Synod teaches that, although it sometimes happens that contrition is perfected by charity and reconciles man to God before this sacrament [of Penance] is actually received; nevertheless this reconciliation itself is not to be ascribed to contrition itself without the desire of the sacrament, which is included in it." - Cf. De Augustinis, part. 2, Thes. 26, p. 197.

III. The parts of the sacrament of Penance are contrition, confession, absolution, and satisfaction. For the sacrament of Penance was instituted after the manner of a reconciliatory judgment: but this judicial reconciliation is situated essentially, on the part of the penitent, in the sorrowful accusation of sins, that is, in contrition and confession; on the part of the priest bearing the place of Christ, in the remission of the same sins through absolution; but it is perfected and completed by satisfaction, by which the guilt of temporal punishment also is removed. Therefore satisfaction, insofar as it must be fulfilled, is only an integral part of this sacrament; because the primary effect, namely grace and remission of sins as to fault and eternal punishment, can be had without satisfaction. Cf. De Augustinis, part. 2, Thes. 18, p. 227.

Question 1. When was the sacrament of Penance instituted? Resp. It was instituted when Christ after His Resurrection breathed upon His disciples, saying: "Receive the Holy Spirit; whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them," etc. For then, as the Council of Trent declares, sess. 14, chap. 1, He conferred on them the judicial power which before the Passion He had only promised. Hence the Tridentine Fathers say that this sacrament was instituted chiefly after the Resurrection.

Question 2. Whether and how far sacramental judgment and forensic judgment agree? Resp. They agree partly and differ partly, as is clear from the form of each. But the chief difference is twofold, one as to mode and the other as to effect: as to mode indeed, because in sacramental judgment the whole matter is carried on secretly, and consequently the penitent himself is the accused, the accuser, and the witness, otherwise than in forensic judgment; but as to effect, because forensic judgments tend to punish the accused, and consequently are of themselves vindicatory; but sacramental judgment tends to absolving, or to reconciling the sinner with God. - Cf. Lehmkuhl, n. 255, note 11.

He condemned the following propositions, which I transcribe in the order observed in the decree.

1. He satisfies the annual precept of confession who confesses to a religious presented to the bishop but unjustly rejected by him. [no. 13]

An opinion is probable which says that the Bull "In Coena Domini" forbids absolution from heresy and other crimes only when they are public; and that this does not derogate from the faculty of Trent, in which there is discourse of hidden crimes; which in the year 1629, on the 18th of July, in a Consistory of the Sacred Congregation, was seen and tolerated by the most eminent Cardinals. [no. 3]

4. Regular prelates can in the forum of conscience absolve any seculars whatsoever from hidden heresy and from the excommunication incurred on account of it.

5. Although it be evidently established to you that Peter is a heretic, you are not bound to denounce him if you cannot prove it.

6. A confessor who in sacramental confession gives to a penitent a paper to be read afterwards, in which he incites to venery, is not reckoned to have solicited in confession, and consequently is not to be denounced. [no. 14]

7. The way of evading the obligation of denouncing a solicitation is that the solicited person confess with the solicitor: the latter can absolve him without the burden of denouncing.

11. Sins omitted or forgotten in confession on account of an instant danger of life, or on account of some other cause, we are not bound to express in the following confession.

12. Mendicants can absolve from cases reserved to bishops, without having obtained for this the faculty of the bishops.

13. He satisfies the precept of annual confession who confesses to a regular presented to the bishop but unjustly rejected by him.