Question XII: Whether charity can be increased without limit

Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with thy whole heart, and with thy whole soul, and with thy whole strength; but this precept is fulfilled with perfect execution only in the fatherland. Therefore it must be granted that it is then fulfilled completely when there is no other capacity in the heart; otherwise it would not be said with the whole heart. Nor is it true that a more intense quality makes the nature of the subject more disposed beyond its capacity; but within its limits. Therefore, if some subject is apt to receive so much heat as 4, it will not be able for 5 to accede. Thus therefore neither does the supernatural disposition dilate the power of capacity to infinity, but unto a limited term.

It is PROVED secondly by the Saintly Doctor. What in bodily things is bulk, that in spiritual things is virtue, and they stand proportionally, as St. Augustine teaches de quantitate animae, cap. 3. but in the quantity of bulk, by reason of the subject, the whole augmentation has a certain fixed state, because, as Aristotle says, 2 de anima, textu 41: Of all things constituted by nature there is a term, and a ratio, of magnitude and of augmentation: Therefore similarly in the quantity of virtue. Gallus uses this reason 3. dist. 13. quaest. 1. cap. 3, and the author of the controversiae, Sotus contr. 10, secunda Pars.

But the reason is taken in both genera also from the finitude of perfection; for as the quantity of bulk is finite according to the natural and ordinary course, so also grace, which is a participation of God. Therefore it is said Sap. 11: Thou hast ordered all things in number, measure, and weight. Thus Scotus also argues. For it is a finite participation of the infinite; otherwise heat could be infinite. By which the response of Mastrius is refuted, disp. 10. Phys. quaest. 4. n. 65: That the fire of hell can grow on the part of the receptive subject.

Cajetan answers that the reason is not the same concerning natural things and supernatural things: for heat, for example, is a participation of the infinite, not with formal congruence; but Charity is with formal congruence; for God is formally Charity, but heat is not formally God. Further, concerning natural things Aristotle indeed says, 2 Animae text. 41: Of natural things also the augmentation has a state.^{2 2} Editor's note: the print/OCR reads 'Omnium naturalium etiam statum augmentum'; kept as printed because both the scan transcription and the OCR dump agree, though the Aristotle quotation (2 Animae text. 41) appears garbled in the 1655 print itself.

BUT this response is cold; for it seems to suppose that Charity, by which we are perfected, is God himself, and not a created habit, which is an error. But suppose that God is formally Charity; nevertheless he himself is not that Charity by which we are perfected by habit, or act. Whence the parity runs, that since Charity is a created participation of God, it has a finite and terminated perfection. But that the object of love is infinite makes nothing, as the Saintly Doctor observes ad ultimum; for the object is God, infinite, with whom our created Charity is not commensurate.

Caspensis answers that the habit is not varied by the multiplication of the parts continuing it, and participating the same nature, but by the diversity of the essential degrees, of which the quiddity and the species of it consist; and this has more place in acts, which regard an infinite object. Mastrius answers the same loco citato, Scrin 3. disp. 2. quaest. 3. art. 1.

BUT this response is frivolous: for in accidental beings the degrees of intension are substantial, for example in heat eight degrees signify the summit of the perfection of heat, nor can it ascend to nine; for the virtue arises from the essence, nor does it transcend it. Therefore the degrees of Charity, since they arise from a finite essence, must be finite, as the Saintly Doctor argues; for an effect is not nobler than its cause. But although acts regard an infinite object, nevertheless they regard it, as the habit also does, according to their own capacity, and virtue, which is created; and accordingly from a finite potency they have a finite intension. This argument, however, is not to the taste of the Saintly Doctor, as I said p. p. Tract. 5. disp. 8. quaest. 5.

It is PROVED thirdly. That is perfect to which in its genus no addition is possible: but there is given a perfect Charity in the fatherland: Therefore. The major is Aristotle's, primo caeli, textu 12. The minor is proved from prima Corinth. 13: When that which is perfect shall come, that which is in part shall be done away; but this perfect, he says, is Charity.

It is PROVED fourthly by the Saintly Doctor. The more perfect anything is among creatures, the more it is joined to an end: but Charity is perfect: Therefore; but if it were augmentable to infinity, it would have no end.

St. Thomas ANSWERS that Charity has an end, but in the other life. Yet this does not resolve it, because an end, which is a terminus, must be given to each finite thing in itself.

They have ONE reason only, taken from the infinity of God the agent, and from the part of the object, which is infinitely lovable.

BUT these are worn away by St. Bonaventure. For although the object be infinitely lovable, nevertheless the power of the creature is finite; whence, as it is infinitely intelligible, nevertheless the intelligibility is limited by reason of the created intellective power; so also in our matter. But that the principal agent is infinite makes nothing; otherwise all the effects of God would be infinite; but they are limited by their own capacity; for God does not act as much as he can act, as the Saintly Doctor observes.