Article I: On the Excellence of Charity in Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, aa. 3, 4, 5, 6; I-II, q. 66, a. 6; De Virt., q. 2, aa. 4 and 5; III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, a. 2.

857. Charity is a virtue because it is a habit rendering man perfect, for it joins him to God, who is the supreme rule of human acts. It is a special virtue because it has a special object, namely, the goodness of God in himself, insofar as it is the object of supernatural beatitude. It is one virtue because there is one end of charity and one principal reason for loving God, ourselves, and neighbor, namely, the divine goodness which he wills to communicate to us all; - and because there is one communication of eternal beatitude upon which the friendship of charity is founded.

Nor should it be said that friendship is not a virtue. For St. Thomas responds, Q. D. de Virt., q. 2, a. 2, ad 8: "Friendship (human) is not posited as a virtue, but as consequent upon virtue, because from this very fact that someone has virtue and loves the good of reason, there follows from the very inclination of virtue that he loves those like himself, namely, the virtuous in whom the good of reason flourishes. But friendship which is toward God, insofar as he is blessed and the author of (supernatural) beatitude, must be set before the virtues which ordain to that beatitude. And therefore, since it is not consequent upon other virtues but a preamble..., it must itself be a virtue in itself." Likewise II-II, q. 23, a. 3, ad 1: "Friendship... is not a virtue by itself distinct from others. For it does not have the character of the laudable and honorable except from the object, namely, insofar as it is founded upon the honorable character of the virtues; which is clear from the fact that not every friendship has the character of the laudable and honorable, as is clear in friendship of the pleasurable and the useful. Hence virtuous friendship is rather something consequent upon virtue than a virtue. Nor is there a likeness concerning charity, which is not founded principally upon human virtue but upon divine goodness."

1. Sometimes human friendship is called a virtue, but then the question is not of friendship properly so called and internal, but of external friendship, by which men live together with one another and conduct themselves toward one another as if they were friends: it is, namely, affability. Cf. II-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad 1.

858. Charity is the most excellent virtue. - For

1. it is more excellent than the moral virtues, because it attains God himself;

2. it is also more excellent than the theological virtues

a) on the part of the formal object, because it attains God more and more perfectly: for faith and hope attain him insofar as from him there comes to us either knowledge of the true or possession of the good, but charity attains him in himself, so that it rests in him, and not so that some good may come to us from him; in other words, faith and hope rely upon God revealing and helping, charity relies upon God in himself;

b) on the part of the condition of the material object, because charity is more closely related to God: for faith and hope include distance from God and imperfection, since faith is concerning God not seen, and hope concerning God not possessed; but charity is concerning God who already in some way through the love of friendship is united to us and possessed by us, and will be possessed fully: "for the beloved is in the lover, and the lover is drawn by affection to union with the beloved" (cf. Col. III, 14; I Cor. XIII, 13).

In one word: faith and hope of themselves include imperfection, namely, either obscurity or the absence of the arduous good; but charity of itself introduces no imperfection. Hence those are made void in the fatherland, but not charity, which there is perfected by reason of the object present and intuitively seen.

859. They object to the aforesaid doctrine that faith resides in the nobler power, the intellect, but charity only in the will. - It is answered: knowledge is naturally perfected according as the object understood is in the intellect, and therefore the perfection of knowledge is measured by the dignity of the intellect; but volition is perfected according as the will is inclined to the thing as to a term, and especially dilection according as the one loving is drawn to the thing loved, and therefore the perfection of volition and dilection is measured by the perfection of the thing toward which it tends. But those things which are below us are in the intellect in a nobler mode than in themselves (because each thing is in another according to the mode of that in which it is); but those things which are above us are in themselves in a nobler mode than in our intellect. And therefore knowledge is more perfect than dilection of those things which are below us; but of those things which are above us, as God, dilection is more perfect than knowledge. Hence charity is more excellent than faith, according to Eph. III, 19: the charity of Christ surpassing knowledge. Hence God can be loved in himself without being known in himself. - Thus it is in the state of the way; otherwise in the fatherland: for in the beatific vision (by which we see God in himself), God is not represented in our intellect by a species received in us, but is immediately seen in himself without a created and received species, whence the intellect is united to the thing according as it is in itself, to God as he is in himself. And therefore vision is more perfect than dilection.