First Question: On the Proper Act, or Dilection

S. Th. II-II, q. 27.

916. The virtue of charity, like every friendship, tends toward love, not toward that by which we are loved by others, but that by which we love others. For it is a love of benevolence; and benevolence wishes more to love than to be loved. Whence:

1. the proper act of charity is to love, which "befits charity insofar as it is charity";

2. "to love befits it more than to be loved": to love befits it according to itself, insofar as a virtue is inclined to its proper act; to be loved befits it through another, insofar as it itself also is a certain lovable good, and has the common character of good toward the loving of which others are moved by an act of charity; whence mothers, because they love most, seek more to love than to be loved;

3. to love is more praiseworthy and better than to be loved, whence friends are praised more from this, that they love, than from this, that they are loved; indeed, if they do not love, they are blamed. And although the better, insofar as they are better, are more lovable, from the fact that in them there is more perfect charity they are more loving.

917. The proper and principal act of charity is dilection. - This is not simple benevolence, by which we merely will good, but is a love of benevolence and friendship, and therefore also includes union according to affection between the one loving and the one loved, insofar as we esteem those whom we love in some way as one with us, and thus are moved toward them and also will good to them (nn. 844 and 846).

Therefore dilection includes benevolence and adds union of affection and complacency. Whence benevolence is the principle of friendship.

Therefore it is not sufficient to will a greater good to those who are to be loved more, or even effectively to do them good more, but it is also necessary according to affection to love one more than another, so that from the greater affection charity may proceed into a greater effect according as it shall be necessary.

918. How God is to be loved. - A. God is to be loved on account of himself: 1. as final cause, because he is not ordered to another, but he himself is the ultimate end of all; 2. as formal cause, because he himself is his goodness by essence; 3. as efficient cause, for his goodness proceeds from no other, but, on the contrary, the goodness of others proceeds from him. - But 4. not as dispositive or material cause, for on account of other things we are disposed to loving God in himself, for example, through benefits received from him, or through rewards hoped for, or through punishments which we intend to avoid through him. And thus hope and fear lead to charity.

B. God is to be loved immediately, and by means of him whatever other things there are are loved. For although here on earth he cannot be known immediately and in himself, yet he can thus be loved, because love tends into the thing loved not according as it is in the knower, but according as it exists in itself;¹ and therefore in heaven charity is not emptied out but remains.

¹ Cajetan notes: God in himself is the immediate term of love, although he does not immediately move to loving, because through other things we know God and so are moved to loving him.

C. God is to be loved totally: a) on the part of the thing loved, because the whole that pertains to God ought to be loved; b) also on the part of the one loving, because man ought to love God according to his whole power, that is, to order his whole self and all that is his to the love of God. - c) Nevertheless he cannot be loved totally according to the comparison of the one loving to the thing loved, so that he would be loved as much as he is lovable, because no creature can love infinitely him who is infinitely lovable.

D. God is to be loved supremely and without mode, and no mode is to be imposed on the dilection of him, because in the dilection of God there cannot be excess. For God is the ultimate end and the measure and supreme rule of all actions. But no one can adhere too much to the ultimate end, nor to the supreme rule; otherwise there would be another end of the ultimate end and another measure of the measure, and thus one would proceed to infinity. But the more the ultimate end and rule is attained, so much the better it is. Therefore the more God is loved, so much the better is the dilection.²

² Therefore it is not in the mean, but supreme: "The end," says St. Thomas, a. 6, "of all human actions and affections is the dilection of God, by which we especially attain the ultimate end, and therefore in the dilection of God a mode cannot be taken as in a measured thing, so that there would be in it taking more and less; but as mode is found in the measure, in which there cannot be excess, but the more the rule is attained, so much the better it is: and thus the more God is loved, so much the better is the dilection."

919. Observations. - As regards the merit of dilection, St. Thomas teaches: 1. the dilection of a friend, on the part of the object, is more meritorious than the dilection of an enemy, because it is better to love the better; but the dilection of an enemy, as being more difficult, is a sign of greater dilection of God, which is shown to be stronger in proportion as from it we do more difficult things; nevertheless charity loves friends more fervently than enemies because they are more proximate to us (a. 7).

2. If they are considered separately, the dilection of God is more meritorious than the dilection of neighbor, for this latter is not meritorious except through the former; but if the dilection of God alone and the dilection of neighbor on account of God loved are compared, so that it includes the dilection of God, thus the dilection of neighbor is preeminent (a. 8).