Question — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Question XIX: Whether all gratuitous gifts are to be loved out of charity
The first opinion, found in St. Bonaventure, is that these gifts are not loved by an elicited act of Charity; for Charity does not love our own advantage, as a natural affection does, but is poured out toward another, as St. Gregory says homil. 17. in Evang.; and because our spiritual advantage is placed in these gifts, which order us to beatitude; therefore the love of such gifts is elicited by natural love, but commanded by Charity, whose office it is to command our acts, that they may be rightly moved toward their ends.
An omnia dona gratuita sint CHARITATE diligenda.
Prima opinio apud D. Bonavent. est, haec dona non esse amata actu Charitatis elicito; Charitas enim non amat proprium commodum, ut affectus naturalis, sed in alterum protenditur, ut ait D. Gregorius homil. 17. in Evang. et quia commodum nostrum spirituale reponitur in hisce donis, quae nos ordinant ad beatitudinem; ideo amor talium donorum est a dilectione naturali elicitive; sed a Charitate imperative, cuius est imperare actibus nostris, ut recte moveantur in suos fines.
The Saintly Doctor attacks this view; For Charity tends also to our own beatitude, that we may enjoy God. Then, because although it belongs to nature to seek the advantages of the body, yet to love spiritual gifts belongs to gratuitous love.
Hunc modum impugnat S. Doctor; Nam Charitas tendit etiam in propriam beatitudinem, ut Deo fruatur. Deinde, quia licet naturae sit quaerere commoda corporis; tamen spiritualia dona amare est dilectionis gratuitae.
The second opinion is that, since good is the object of Charity, and the act receives its species from the object, the intensity of the act of loving varies according to the reason of good: But something is called good in a twofold way: in one way concretively, because it is ordered to beatitude as to an end. In another way abstractively, because it is that by which one is ordered to the end. Therefore the gratuitous gifts are not called good in the first way but in the second; because by them we are directed to beatitude. Hence they are more called goodnesses than goods, and more reasons for loving than lovable things; therefore these are not properly to be loved out of Charity, but rather the recipients of the gifts are loved out of Charity. And since an accident together with its subject constitutes one thing, therefore loves are not multiplied toward these gifts so as to be distinct from the loves by which men are loved.
Secunda opinio est, quod cum bonum sit obiectum Charitatis, et actus recipiat speciem ab obiecto, intensio actus diligendi variatur secundum rationem boni: Bonum autem dicitur aliquid dupliciter: Uno modo concretive, quia est ordinatum ad beatitudinem, ut finem. Alio modo abstractive, quia est id, quo ordinatur ad finem. Dona igitur gratuita non dicuntur bona primo modo, sed secundo; quia illis dirigimur nos ad beatitudinem. Ideo magis dicuntur bonitates, quam bona, et magis rationes diligendi, quam diligibilia; ideo haec non sunt proprie ex Charitate diligenda, sed potius Charitate diliguntur susceptivi donorum. Quoniam vero accidens cum suo subiecto unum constituit, ideo non multiplicantur dilectiones ad haec dona, quae sint distinctae a dilectionibus, quibus amantur homines.
Against this the Saintly Doctor argues: For even God, who is the highest goodness, falls among the things to be loved out of Charity.
Contra arguit S. Doctor: Nam etiam Deus, qui est bonitas summa, compatatur inter diligenda ex Charitate.
Then: On account of which a thing is such, that thing is more such; but spiritual gifts are goods on account of which men are loved: Therefore much more are they themselves to be loved, as St. Thomas also argues art. 2.
Deinde: Propter quod, unumquodque tale, et illud magis tale; sed dona spiritualia sunt bona propter quae homines diliguntur: Ergo multo fortius ipsa diligenda sunt, ut arguit etiam D. Thom. art. 2.
He asserts, therefore, that spiritual gifts are loved by Charity; yet not with friendship, because for those gifts no good is wished; but with the love of concupiscence, insofar as they are goods for us toward union with God. For thus the Saints sigh out of Charity for the gifts of heaven.
Asserit igitur, dona spiritualia diligi Charitate; non tamen amicitia, quia eis donis non desideratur bonum; sed amore concupiscentiae, quatenus nobis bona sunt ad unionem cum Deo. Sic enim Sancti ex Charitate dona coelestia suspirant.
It is proved first by St. Bonaventure from St. Augustine 8. de Trinitate, cap. 7, where he says: He who loves his neighbor, it follows that he loves also that very love.
Probatur primo a D. Bonavent. ex D. Augustino 8. de Trinitate, cap. 7. ubi ait: Qui diligit proximum, consequens est, ut etiam ipsam dilectionem diligat.
Second it is proved by St. Bonaventure. That which orders to beatitude is to be loved out of Charity; such are these gifts: Therefore.
Secundo probatur a S. Bonavent. Id, quod ordinat ad beatitudinem, est Charitate diligendum; talia sunt haec dona: Ergo.
Third it is proved. Such gifts are to be expected and asked of God; and he who loves them merits by loving: but the chief meritorious love is the love of Charity: Therefore.
Tertio probatur. Talia dona sunt a Deo expectanda, et petenda; et qui illa diligit, diligendo meretur: sed praecipua dilectio meritoria, est dilectio Charitatis: Ergo.
Nevertheless he concludes that these means are loved by Charity secondarily, as the Saintly Doctor explains, quest. 6.
Colligit tamen, secundario amari Charitate haec media, ut explicat S. Doctor, quaest. 6.
Fourth. As gratuitous love is related to the gifts of grace, so natural love to the gifts of nature. But these are loved with natural love: Therefore.
Quarto. Sicut se habet dilectio gratuita ad dona gratiae; ita dilectio naturalis ad dona naturae. Sed haec amantur amore naturali: Ergo.
You object first. No creature lacking reason is to be loved out of Charity, because it does not communicate in life with us.
Obiicies primo. Nulla creatura ratione carens, est amanda Charitate, quia non communicat in vita nobiscum.
It is answered that it is true that such creatures are not loved with the love of friendship, but of concupiscence.
Respondetur, verum esse, tales creaturas non diligi amore amicitiae; sed concupiscentiae.
You object second: To love is to will good to someone; but we do not will good to these gifts.
Obiicies secundo: Diligere est velle alicui bonum; his autem donis non volumus bonum.
It is answered that this is true of the love of friendship; but the love of concupiscence is rather to desire a good.
Respondetur, verum esse de dilectione amicitiae; amor vero concupiscentiae est potius bonum desiderare.
You object third. Only the beatifiable are lovable by Charity, inasmuch as they can communicate with us in supernatural life.
Obiicies tertio. Sola beatificabilia sunt Charitate amabilia, quippe quae possunt communicare nobiscum in vita supernaturali.
It is answered that this is conceded of the love of friendship, and St. Augustine enumerates only these Lib. primo de doctrina Christiana, capite 23.
Respondetur, hoc concedi de dilectione amicitiae, et haec sola enumerat D. Augustinus Lib. primo de doctrina Christiana, capite 23.