Question XX: Whether irrational creatures are to be loved out of charity

In two ways, as St. Bonaventure says, something can be loved out of Charity: First, elicited by the proper act upon the proper object. Second, commanded, when it commands other virtues their acts. Therefore he teaches that irrational creatures can be loved by Charity commanding natural piety, but not by a proper elicited act. The reason, which St. Thomas also uses, is that Charity is a certain supernatural friendship; but friendship is borne toward a friend to whom we wish good, as toward an end; and we cannot properly will good to brutes, since they are incapable, as Aristotle teaches 2 Physic. tex. 59. Then, friendship implies a communication in goods; and if it is supernatural, in supernatural goods; but man does not communicate with irrational creatures in the good life, which is the communication of friends, from Aristotle 8 Eth. cap. 3. and 4. much less does he communicate in the goods of eternal life, by which communication supernatural friendship is sustained.

In another way also the Saintly Doctor opens and expounds his meaning. In a threefold way something can be loved out of Charity: First, as object and end; and in this way God is loved. Second, as a loved object, not as an end, and in this way the neighbor is loved; because we wish him the highest good. Third, something can be loved out of Charity, not as an end or beloved object, nor on its own account, but on account of another; and in this way irrational creatures are loved, inasmuch as God is loved in them, in the manner in which someone who loves a friend also loves his dog, as Tannerus notes, disp. 2. quest. 3. dub. 1. Therefore the love of Charity, which is friendship toward God, extends to the neighbor as the children of God; just as the friendship by which I love Peter extends also to his son; yet not to his flesh. But if you should ask what virtue elicits that love in creatures, the Saintly Doctor answers that it is a certain natural piety, by which, considering all Creatures as the works of God, it rises to praises and love of God, as St. P. Francis wonderfully exhibited; for the more one returns to natural uprightness, the more from the very creatures he is raised up to God the maker.

I ASSERT therefore that irrational creatures are not loved by Charity.

It is PROVED by the Saintly Doctor, first from St. Augustine Lib. 1. de doctrina Christiana, cap. 33. where he teaches that only those things are loved out of Charity which, by a certain society, are referred with us to God, as man and angel, or our own body.

It is PROVED second. Only those can be loved out of Charity which communicate in the object of Charity, which is the uncreated good, namely God. For Charity is a Theological virtue: Therefore only those can be loved by Charity which are able to enjoy the beatific object: But irrational creatures are not such: Therefore.

It is PROVED third by the Saintly Doctor. Charity is the bond of perfection; but irrational creatures cannot be bound to us by the virtues: Therefore.

It is PROVED fourth by the Saintly Doctor. The love of Charity is a friendship of the superior order to natural friendship; but this cannot be between us and irrational creatures: Therefore. The minor is proved, because for the love of friendship it is required first that we wish good to a friend; but for good to be able to be willed to him, he must be able to use that good; but irrational creatures have no dominion over good; whence Aristotle says 2. Phys. textu 39. that for this reason we do not say of such things that anything happens to them well or ill, except by similitude. Second, because every friendship is founded upon some likeness of life; for nothing is so proper to friendship as a good life, as the Philosopher says Lib. 8. Eth. cap. 3. and 4.; but irrational creatures cannot communicate with us in life.

It is PROVED fifth. Only those are to be loved by Charity which are included in the two precepts; but irrational creatures are not included in them, because they are neither neighbor nor God: Therefore.

You OBJECT first. Charity makes us conformed to God; but God loves all the things that he made Sap. 11. Therefore.

The Saintly Doctor answers that God loves creatures not by Charity, willing them eternal good, but they are only the object of his natural love; but Charity wills the highest good.

Nor does Charity conform our wills to the divine will, because in God there is one most simple love, which is borne toward diverse things; but we cannot imitate him in simplicity; rather we are borne by several loves: indeed by Charity toward rational creatures, to whom the highest good can be willed; but by piety toward irrational ones, because Charity is only toward those who communicate with God, as St. Augustine says tract. 65. in Ioannem.

You OBJECT second. As Faith is related to believing God the Creator of rational and irrational creatures, so also to loving: Therefore we can also love irrational creatures, as ordered to God, by Charity.

The Saintly Doctor answers that the reason is not parallel, for Faith regards God not only as end but also as beginning; therefore it believes him the maker even of irrational creatures; but Charity regards God only as end and good; and because irrational creatures do not tend with rational ones by the same reason to the highest good, therefore they are not loved by Charity.

You OBJECT third. Rational creatures are to be loved out of Charity because they are like God; But irrational creatures also are like God: Therefore.

The Saintly Doctor answers that not any likeness whatsoever makes something an object lovable by Charity, but that which renders it capable, as St. August. says 14. de Trinit. cap. 3. For Charity wishes the highest good to the beloved; but we do not enjoy this except through knowledge and love, which are in those only that have the reason of the Divine image.

You OBJECT fourth. Virtue and vice are about the same; but toward irrational creatures there can be a depraved love contrary to Charity: Therefore also Charity.

The Saintly Doctor answers that although virtue and vice are about the same subject, they are not about the same object; for more is required for virtue than for vice. Then the argument fails, because although Charity is a special love, yet it is not necessary that Charity itself and every special opposite vice be about that same object. Therefore, although cupidity is about temporal goods, it does not follow that the virtue of Charity is about them; and therefore it is not necessary that these temporal things be loved by Charity, but that they be dispensed by the rules of liberality and retained with moderation.

You OBJECT fifth. Meritorious love is out of Charity; but someone loves riches so that he may make alms from them: Therefore he loves them out of Charity.

The Saintly Doctor answers that that act is meritorious even if it is only from Charity commanding. Then, when one loves temporal things in order to serve God, he directs his love to God; nevertheless the affection of Charity is not extended to all, as has been said.