Article II: On the Excellence of Charity Relative to the Other Virtues

S. Th. II-II, q. 23, aa. 7 and 8; I-II, q. 65, aa. 2 and 4; De Virt., q. 2, a. 3.

860. Without charity there is no perfect virtue. - Since virtue renders man perfect and the highest perfection of man consists in ordination to the ultimate end, which is not had without charity, it follows that without charity no virtue is had in the full sense and in the perfect state. Nevertheless, without it there can be true virtues which render man honorable and perfect under a certain respect, as regards some particular end; yet because these lack ordination to the ultimate end, which is the supreme perfection or form of morality, they are called imperfect or unformed virtues, such as faith, hope, or natural virtue in a sinner (I Cor. XIII, 1-3). But they are formed when they receive order to the ultimate end from charity, which accordingly is called the form of all the virtues.

861. Charity is the form, queen, and end of all the virtues. - Relative to all the virtues, charity is:

1. The end, because it orders the acts of all the virtues to the ultimate end, which is precisely its object and its own proper end; and since precepts concern acts of virtues, it is also called the end of the law (I Tim. I, 5; Rom. XIII, 10).

2. The form, not indeed intrinsic and essential, but extrinsic and accidental, because it gives and impresses upon the acts of the other virtues their form and ultimate perfection, namely, order or tendency to the ultimate end, and thus it bestows upon them the merit of eternal life (I Cor. XIII, 1-3).¹

¹ For a fuller understanding of this doctrine, it must be observed:

1. St. Thomas, q. 23, a. 8, demonstrates it by this argument: That which gives to a human act order to the end gives to it form or perfection. But through charity the acts of the other virtues are ordered to the ultimate end. Therefore charity gives form to the acts of the other virtues. The major is proved: That which gives to an act order to the object gives form to it. But human acts have as object the good or end. Therefore that which gives to a human act order to the end gives form.

2. Therefore the principle of the demonstration is: In moral matters the form of the act is from the side of the end. This supposes the doctrine explained in I-II: When an act is from two principles, the higher mover gives form, the lower is as it were material. Therefore q. 13, a. 5, concerning choice, says that it is essentially an act of the will, but formally of the intellect; and q. 16, a. 1, concerning use, that it is an act of the will but with reason preordaining. And conversely q. 17, aa. 1 and 4, concerning command, that it is essentially an act of reason, but formally of the will as moving; and q. 18, a. 6 and q. 20, a. 3, concerning the case of a double act, says that the will of the end is the formal element, but the exterior commanded act, toward the end, the material element. Therefore if the act of charity moves the other virtues to its end, which is the ultimate end, it gives form to them.

Concerning the habit, however, one must speak as concerning the act: for the virtue itself is spoken of in order to formed acts. Therefore the virtue of charity is the form of the other virtues.

3. But what kind of form is it? Not intrinsic or constitutive of the essence, nor essential; but extrinsic, effective or motive, and accidental, as giving the ultimate complement of perfection. And yet it gives something intrinsic to the other virtues, thus constituting them in an accidental respect: namely, it imposes and impresses order in the acts of the other virtues by moving the habit to act.

What does it impress? Cajetan answers: The passive participation of its command and ordination is, as it were, the form constituting those acts in virtuous being simply. From this participation the acts of the other virtues are called and are formed.

Hence it adds something intrinsic, which constitutes them under some respect, namely, in the notion of perfect virtue, whence their merit and dignity. And yet they are not the same virtue: they have this by participation at the moment when they are moved by charity; just as an instrument participates in the power of the principal agent but does not become principally agent.

4. Is it an exemplary form? St. Thomas seems here to deny it, ad 1; but in the Q. D. de Charitate he affirms it. But it is a question of words. Under one aspect it is not exemplary; under another aspect it is exemplary. And he does not altogether deny this in the Summa, for he says: it is called form not exemplarily, but rather effectively. Hence it is not merely exemplary.

For an exemplary cause, properly, is that to whose likeness the others are; more broadly, that to whose likeness the others operate, insofar as inclination to the good is similar to the inclination of charity to the highest good.

Hence charity properly is not an exemplary form, because virtues are not generated according to the likeness of charity, but more broadly, insofar as they operate according to the likeness of charity (Q. D. de Char., a. 3, ad 6 and 8). Therefore it is exemplary only as regards order to the ultimate end.

5. Hence charity is placed in the definition of every virtue as meritorious (ibid., ad 1 and 3). It does not give to them their proper species, otherwise it would be an essential and constitutive form (ad 1); but it gives to them the common species of perfect virtue, and is the common form (ad 5 and 9). Hence there is one common species in all virtues (ad 1 and 5); not one proper species, which is called most special.

Nor is it an obstacle that thus there would be several forms in one thing. For it is not repugnant that there be several accidental forms, provided this is according to a certain order (ad 2).

3. The root, because it nourishes and sustains them, bestowing upon them strength so that they may be exercised more easily and more frequently.

4. The mover and queen, because it can move and command all of them so that they produce their acts when and how its end, the love and glory of God, requires it.

5. The mother, because from the appetite of the ultimate end it conceives and generates the acts of the other virtues by commanding them (I Cor. XIII, 4-7).

862. Observation. - Prudence is the form of the moral virtues because it gives order to a particular end according to right reason; charity is the form of the theological virtues, of prudence, and of the moral virtues because it gives perfect order to the ultimate end; grace is the form of charity and of the virtues, as regards divine being, because it gives dignity and a right to the ultimate end.