Question V: Whether charity is one special virtue

There WERE some with D. Bonau. asserting that all the Virtues are indivisibly one substance, multiplied in acts, yet in such a way that one has the acts of the others; whence Justice is prudent, and Prudence is just, Faith loves, Charity believes, and especially Charity, which, as the Apostle says, 1. Corinth. 13. is patient, is benign, and enumerates there fifteen works of virtue. They strongly lean on this opinion of D. August. from his saying de moribus Ecclesiae, where he says: Virtue is nothing but the highest love of God.

OTHERS said that Charity, since it perfects the concupiscible power, which is diffused through all the other powers, is a general virtue, embracing the rest.

The TRUE opinion is that Charity is a special Virtue, distinct from the others. So S. Bonau., D. Thom., and the rest of the Theologians.

I ASSERT first that Charity is a special virtue, distinct from the others.

IT IS PROVED by D. Bonau. first from the Apostle 1. Cor. 13. There remain Faith, Hope, Charity, these three: but the greater of these is Charity. Since therefore he calls charity one of the Theological virtues, and greater than the others; he admits that it is distinct, as Valencia also notes disp. 3. quaest. 1. p. 1.

IT IS PROVED secondly by S. Doct. with the reason used by D. Thom., Valencia loc. cit., Caspensis disp. 1. sect. 3., Fuliens. lib. 3. cap. 8. That is a special virtue which has a special formal object. Such is charity: Therefore. The Minor is proved, because it tends to God insofar as in himself he is the highest good of the supernatural order, which cannot be had naturally. But no other Virtue regards this formal ratio, neither a moral one, as is evident per se, nor a Theological one; for Faith and Hope, which are Theological virtues, regard God under other ratios. For Faith regards him as he is the first and highest Truth: Hope regards God as a supernatural good, and the object of our beatitude, not in any way whatever, but as arduous to attain.

IT IS PROVED thirdly by S. Doct. from the acts. Habits are found to differ by diverse acts; but the acts of charity are altogether diverse from the acts of the other virtues: Therefore.

IT IS PROVED fourthly by S. Doct. from the subject. The Theological virtues are ordered to rectifying the powers in relation to God; but charity rectifies a different power, namely the concupiscible; as Faith the rational, and Hope the irascible: Therefore.

IT IS PROVED fifthly by S. Doct. by comparison to its opposite. Because the vice opposed to charity, namely the hatred of God, is distinguished from all the others: Therefore by reason of a special habit of one opposed Virtue; for one thing is opposed to one.

IT IS PROVED sixthly by comparison to the reward. When some things are so related that when one is perfected the others are evacuated, those habits must differ essentially; but the habit of Charity is perfected and consummated in the fatherland; while the habit of Faith and Hope is evacuated, as is said in prima Corinth. 13. Therefore.

IT IS PROVED seventhly in corpore from the principle which it represents. That the image of God be in the soul expressly, it is necessary that three distinct potencies be found; and that, reformed supernaturally, they have similitude, it is necessary that they be clothed with supernatural habits toward God; but on account of the image of creation they are one essence in three potencies, representing one Divine essence in three Persons: Therefore that it may express the supernatural similitude, for which it was created Genes. 1. God created man to his Image and similitude, it is necessary that the essence be endowed with sanctifying grace, and the three potencies with Theological habits: the Intellect indeed with Faith; Memory with Hope; and the Will with Charity. See disp. 6. quaest. 10. in calce.

YOU OBJECT first, prima Corinth. 13. Charity is patient, benign, etc. Therefore it is general.

S. Doct. answers that the acts of the other virtues are elicited by them; but commanded by charity, which also elicits its proper acts of loving God.

YOU OBJECT secondly: Charity is that Virtue by which every thing to be loved is loved, as D. Hieronymus says.

S. Doct. answers that this definition is causal, because Charity moves all the virtues to operating, and what is chief, meritoriously; for without charity nothing profits for eternal life, as is said 1. Cor. 13.

YOU OBJECT thirdly, from D. Bernardo lib. de diligendo Deo, and D. August. lib. 15. de civit. cap. 22. Virtue is nothing other than the order of love.

S. Doct. answers first that this is a causal definition; for charity is the commanding Cause, and thus even the efficient of the acts of the other virtues. It is also a form; for it gives to all their perfect being in the genus of merit. Finally it is the End of the whole law and of the precepts, and joins to the ultimate End.

RESPONDET: S. Doct. answers secondly that that love which is put in the definition of Virtue is the love of whatever virtue, not charity.

You object fourthly. As the precept of charity is related to the other precepts, so the habit of charity to the other habits: but the precept of charity embraces the other precepts: Therefore also the habit of charity all the other habits.

S. Doct. answers that Charity comprehends the other precepts not by identity, but by a certain reduction, in that they are reduced to the root of charity, as D. Gregor. says, homil. 27. in Evang.: not that the other virtues do not fulfill the precepts in their own genus, as Temperance abstaining from fornication; but because the other virtues without charity do not execute the precepts according to the divine execution.

You object fifthly. As the object of charity is related to the objects of the other virtues, so the acts of charity to the acts of the other virtues; but the object of charity is the good, which is the common object of all the objects of the other virtues: Therefore the habit also is common.

S. Doct. answers that Charity does not regard the Good as it is a passion of being, but the highest good immediately; and this is its material object, by which it is distinguished from the Cardinal virtues, which regard created good: Nor does it regard a good begun in any way whatever, but under the formal motivating ratio, as I said quaest. 2.

You object sixthly. That which is superfluous is not admitted by God and nature; but the other virtues are superfluous: Therefore. The Minor is proved; for Charity suffices for merit. Therefore D. August. says Hold charity, and do whatever you wish. It suffices also for beatitude; for to enjoy is to adhere in love, as D. August. says, lib. 1. de Doctrina christ. cap. 4. Therefore either the other virtues are superfluous; or Charity itself is General.

S. Doct. answers that charity is said to suffice for merit and for reward on account of the connection it has with the other virtues and dowries. For whoever has Charity has the other virtues; and whoever has the corresponding dowry has also the other dowries. Therefore it is not rightly inferred that the others are superfluous, because no one can merit unless he believes and hopes; nor is he fit for believing and hoping except through Hope and Faith.