Question V: Whether justice is the most excellent of the moral virtues

S. Doct. seems in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. 8. to hold it the most noble of all the others. Therefore he compares it to a rule, a line, a straight path; he likens it to the polar star; he proclaims it the most precious gem among the others. It is the view of Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 3. and of Scotus in 4. dist. 49. quaest. 4. post litt. L. Mastrii. disp. 7. quaest. 8.

First indeed legal Justice seems more perfect than all the moral virtues, because it has for its object the common good, and, as superior and more universal, it commands all the moral virtues, referring all their objects to the common good. Therefore Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 1. compares it to a most resplendent Star, and D. Bonav. in Diaeta, tit. 5. cap. ultimo to the straight Rule, Measure, Line, polar star, etc. as I said quaest. 3.

SECONDLY particular Justice is not simply more perfect than all the other virtues which are toward another; for Mercy seems more perfect. Likewise Piety, and much more Religion, which regards God infinite proximately, as the object to which worship is due and rendered, not as the object Quod of the Theological virtues. And indeed it is most noble among the virtues which are concerned with one's own good.

The REASON is, because, as D. Thom. teaches in the cited article, the good of another is contained in a certain diffusion, in which the notion of goodness resplends most, as Aristotle teaches in the first book of the Rhetoric, cap. 9.

Then the object of Justice conduces most to the common good of human Society, as Cicero says lib. 1. offic. and Aristotle 5. Eth. cap. 5.

YOU OBJECT with Buridanus after Scotus in 3. dist. 27. quaest. 1. that the virtues which are concerned with one's own good are more according to the inclination of Nature and of Charity.

It is ANSWERED that legal Justice is more according to the inclination, because it is toward the common good; but particular Justice has other excellences, which on that account preponderate, as I said in prima secundae, Tract. 2. disp. 2. quaest. 12. Then the Virtues which are concerned with one's own good for the moderating of the passions, such as Fortitude, Temperance, and others annexed to these, do not have so rational an object, but more a sensible one, as D. Thom. says and Valentia puncto 5.

I shall not repeat the excellences of Justice indicated quaest. 3. from D. Bonau. in Diaeta, which S. Doct. pursues again ad Psal. 18. on those words: Who shall direct my ways, etc.