§ 1. On Irritation of Vows

637. DEFINITION. Irritation of a vow is its annulment or suspension, made by him who has dominative power over the will of the one vowing, or over the matter of the vow.

DIVISION. One irritation is direct, or properly so called: this touches the very will of the one vowing, and rescinds his vow in such a way that the obligation of the vow never revives. Another is indirect, and this does not fall precisely upon the act of the one vowing, but upon the thing promised by him; and it impedes execution of the vow, yet in such a way that, once the impediment has been removed, the obligation revives: whence it is rather suspension of a vow than irritation.

638. PRINCIPLES. I. Direct irritation can be made by any Superior in whose possession there is dominative power over the will of another. The reason is sought from natural law itself; for an inferior whose will, by force of a positive act, is fully subjected to the will of a Superior cannot, with the Superior's right preserved, dispose concerning himself.¹ Whence his vows, whatever they are, always imply this condition: unless the Superior shall have contradicted. Therefore, as long as he has not contradicted, emitted vows are indeed valid, but weak, so that when the Superior contradicts, they are destroyed, and the obligation undertaken is altogether extinguished. And thus indeed all vows in general, even reserved or onerous vows, even future vows, even with the inferior refusing, can be validly irritated (III, 227, 228, 231).

Yet vows about which it is doubted whether they were emitted before or after the time of begun subjection cannot be directly irritated; but they can be irritated indirectly, if namely their matter is subject to the Superior (III, 237).

Hence: 1. The superiors of regulars and nuns can directly irritate all vows, even internal and unknown to the Superior, which were emitted after profession; because a religious has transferred his whole will and refusal to the prelate (III, 233). Therefore this power is possessed: a) by the Supreme Pontiff, as the supreme prelate of all religious; b) by the Superior General of the Order, provincial and local Superiors; indeed, these primary Superiors being absent, by secondary Superiors, and finally, according to a probable opinion, by Abbesses;² c) by the Bishop, if the house or congregation is not exempt from his jurisdiction. Yet vows approved by a prelate of a higher grade must be excepted, as also the vow of passing into a stricter Religion. For no Superior has power from God of impeding a greater good. But see n. 642, 3, and n. 2178.

But a prelate cannot irritate the vows of a religious if he is no longer subject to him (III, 238).

2. The father, and in defect of the father the paternal grandfather or tutor, can directly irritate the vows of the impubes, both personal vows, even of chastity and Religion, and real vows, even concerning military or quasi-military peculium; indeed also the mother, in the presence of the father or tutor, provided the father or tutor does not contradict, as is evident from can. Puella (Can. 2, caus. 20, q. 2). The reason is that in such an age perfect deliberation for so great an obligation is lacking. Wherefore natural law has provided for this defect by giving parents the faculty of irritating such vows. Moreover, the father or another having paternal authority can, as long as he possesses dominative authority (cf. n. 698), irritate a vow emitted by a son in the time of impuberty, even if the son has already become pubescent, provided he has not confirmed the vow in puberty, knowing that it was weak (III, 229, 230; H. Ap., V, 36). - But what the father can do toward the pubescent, see below (n. 639, 3).

3. More probably, according to D. Thomas (2.2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3) and many others, a husband can directly irritate the vows of his wife emitted during the time of marriage, although they do not prejudice the use of matrimony, or the education of offspring, or domestic governance, even vows emitted now but to be executed after the death of the husband, for example of Religion, chastity. The reason is "because it is very expedient for the peace of the family, for fostering mutual love, that the wife have her will totally dependent on the husband, and thus the impulses of women be checked" (III, 234; H. Ap., V, 36; Conf. dir., V, 10). - But the wife cannot irritate the vows of the husband, unless they prejudice her, as a vow of a long pilgrimage, or of not asking the debt (III, 235).

Yet the man cannot irritate the vows of the wife once formal divorce has been made.

639. II. Indirect irritation can be made by every Superior who has power over the matter of the vow. It is a question of vows by which the power of the Superior would be wounded. But by force of natural law it is licit for no one to promise any thing which tends to the harm of a third person who possesses a right in it.

The power of indirectly irritating vows often arises from dominative power, sometimes also from power of jurisdiction.

Hence vows can be indirectly irritated: 1. by the Pope, the vows of all the faithful, and by Bishops, the vows of subjects, insofar as they prejudice them (cf. A. A. S., III, p. 391); 2. by Superiors of religious Orders, the vows of novices, in those things which impede regular observance; 3. by the father, the real vows of the pubescent, insofar as they do not have administration of their goods, and the same must be said of the mother, of the tutor, of the curator, etc.; but he cannot irritate personal vows, for example a vow of keeping chastity, of receiving the sacraments, unless perhaps they prejudice domestic governance, as would be a vow of a long-distance pilgrimage, a vow of keeping such a manner in fasting which would differ too much from the manner of living observed in the family; 4. by masters, the vows of servants which are opposed to owed services; 5. by the husband, vows emitted by the wife before matrimony, insofar as they stand in the way of his rights with respect to governance. And by like reason the wife can indirectly irritate vows of the husband opposed to her rights (III, 242; H. Ap., V, 36).

From what has been said it is evident that INDIRECT irritation is not valid unless a just cause is present. Except, if it is a question of indirect irritation which arises from dominative power.

640. IT IS ASKED. Whether DIRECT irritation can be made without just cause?

Resp. 1. It is certain that, for the value of the irritation, no cause is required, since the vow of the inferior was made under the condition: if the Superior shall have consented. Indeed, this seems certain even if the Superior previously held the vows as ratified; because he cannot take away from himself the dominative power which he has over subjects.

Yet if he who wishes to obtain irritation from a Superior does not proceed sincerely, conceals the circumstance of the vow, and asks only permission to perform such a thing, the irritation ordinarily will not be valid; because the Superior, by mere denial of permission, is not supposed to will to irritate a vow whose existence he altogether does not know.

2. It is truer that such irritation, of itself, is no sin, unless the Superior has positively approved the vow. - We say: a) Of itself, or by reason of the power; for with difficulty from another side can he be excused from venial sin, both because one irritating thus does an idle act, and because he irrationally impedes the progress of the inferior. But any reasonable cause suffices for excusing from venial sin. We say: b) Unless the Superior has positively approved the vow; for in that case, if he irritates without just cause, he certainly sins; but, according to the more probable opinion, only venially, scandal or contempt being excluded. Whence it is evident that a graver cause is required for the irritation of vows if the Superior has held them as ratified than if he has not approved them (III, 239).

From this doctrine, some Doctors deduce that the husband can irritate the vow of the wife, even if by mutual consent they have vowed chastity; because he is able to irritate vows approved by himself. Nor does a certain reason appear why this opinion should be condemned. Nevertheless, since it was against the common opinion, St. Alphonsus left the matter to be decided by the wiser (ibid.; cf. VI, 944, 948). Now several authors today expressly approve this opinion. Thus Lehmkuhl, I, 612; Ballerini-Palmieri, II, 689; and others. See what is to be said n. 2096.