Article — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Article III. The Person to whom Restitution Is to Be Made

1010.

I. Restitution per se must be made to the injured person, or to him who has succeeded to his rights, whether as owner, or as administrator or possessor (St. Alphonsus, III, 596). I have said per se, because sometimes, from the presumed will of the owner, it can be assigned to the poor; thus, for example, alms received under the fictitious title of poverty can be granted to the true poor. For the rest, you should especially conclude and note:

  1. If a moral person has been injured, whether it is a universitas of things or a universitas of persons, restitution is to be made to it. But if a society pursues only a dishonest end, and therefore lacks the right of existing, possessing, etc., restitution per se and pro rata is to be made to the individual members. Since this can scarcely be done in practice, there will easily be reason to spend the sum to be restored, for example, on the poor or on a pious cause; all the more because the individual members, for the most part, do not suffer grave damage. I have said "only a dishonest end"; for otherwise the answer must be different, if the society also pursues a legitimate end.

  2. What has been said, which it is especially useful to note, is also to be applied to an insurance society; and this holds even if that society has shareholders, or has reinsured its damages with another society. For it, as voluntarily injured by you, has a strict right to restitution; all the more because a contract has often also been added, which you would not call unjust.

Objection. In determining the price to be paid annually, the society also takes account of damages voluntarily to be inflicted, so that it has already provided for itself.

Response. That, considering both the latitude admitted in prices and the aleatory character annexed to the contract, does not prevent the price from being called just.

  1. Damages unjustly inflicted on the republic can be restored to causes, for example Catholic schools, etc., which receive or have received subsidies less than just.
1011.

II. In doubt as to whom restitution ought to be made, the following rules hold:

  1. If it is unknown to which one out of a few the thing belongs, let it be handed over to those few, who may divide it among themselves according to the proportion of the doubt. If something prevents it from being handed over in that way, let the possessor himself divide it among those few. The reason is that each one has a truly probable right in the thing (St. Alphonsus, III, 589).

  2. If it is unknown to which one out of many the thing belongs, the possessor can retain it. For since, in the case supposed, no determinate person has a truly probable right in the thing, and since, as is supposed, there is no hope of acquiring further knowledge, that thing can be held as a thing belonging to no one, or at least be treated as such (n. 798). And this is so not only by a possessor in good faith, which all concede, but, as it seems, also by a possessor in bad faith; for no reason appears why he should seem to be excluded. Nevertheless it is praiseworthily advised that a possessor of this sort spend the thing so possessed on pious causes.

Objection 1. Let no one take advantage from a possession formally unjust.

Response. From a possession formally unjust as such, I concede; from the fact that, on the occasion of such a possession, the thing has now been placed in that condition in which it has become no one's, or in which it can be treated as no one's thing, I deny.

Objection 2. Canon Law1 prescribes that things accepted through usury or simony be spent on pious causes; and this by custom has been extended to all things accepted from delict.

Response. The new Law is silent about that disposition; this being so, even the custom which extended the disposition of the law, granting that it truly had place, now no longer seems to be binding.

What the law is if the injured owner later appears, see n. 798.

  1. If it is unknown precisely to whom, out of many, restitution is to be made, or if many of some commune have been defrauded, for example by a merchant, innkeeper, or baker who sold adulterated merchandise or diminished measures or weights, and it is not known precisely to whom damage was inflicted, restitution per se ought to be made to the ordinary buyers, not to the poor. And restitution can be made, for example, by selling better merchandise or by increasing measures or weights. But if the buyers are not judged to have been gravely injured, the seller is not held under grave sin to restore to the ordinary buyers, but satisfies the grave obligation by restoring to the poor of the place; and he is even excused from venial sin if there is a reasonable cause for restoring to the poor, for example because he cannot restore to the ordinary buyers without suspicion arising about past frauds, or because some poor are in great need, in which case it is licit to presume that the owners are not unwilling. But if the ordinary buyers are judged to have been gravely injured, restitution must be made to them under grave sin, unless again either a proportionate cause is present for restoring to the poor, or the owners, even in the case, are reasonably presumed not to be unwilling (St. Alphonsus, III, 589, 595, with 534, question 2).

  2. If it is entirely unknown to whom the thing belongs, the possessor, even in bad faith, can retain it, as was said about the case in which it is unknown to whom out of many the thing belongs.

Corollary I. What was said under 1, 2, and 4 about the possessor is also to be applied to a mere damager. Therefore: 1° if it is unknown to which one out of a few damage was inflicted, restitution is to be made to each according to proportion; 2° if it is unknown to which one out of many, and likewise if it is entirely unknown to whom damage was caused, there is no obligation of restoring.

Corollary II. In the case in which restitution can or must be made to the poor, the debtor himself, if he is poor, can prefer himself (St. Alphonsus, Praxis confessarii, n. 24).

1 Alexander III, cap. V, De usuris.

Within this article