Lying and Mental Reservation

A LIE is defined by St Thomas to be a speech contrary to one’s mind.¹ It is, then, of the essence of a lie that there should be an intention of saying what is false, that there should be a contradiction between the mind and the external expression of it. One may tell a lie, then, by saying what is true if it is believed by the speaker not to be true, and a lie is told by denying what is false if it is believed to be true. Although a liar usually has the intention of deceiving others, yet such an intention is not of the essence of a lie. A man may be well aware that he has no chance of being able to deceive another, but may say what he knows to be untrue in order to excuse himself or not to stand self-convicted. Men who are known to lie habitually do not expect others to be deceived by what they say, but still they lie when they say what is not true. One may lie to God, though he knows that he cannot deceive him.

In saying that a lie is a speech contrary to one’s mind we understand not only words but gestures, or any signs by which our thought is manifested to others. As St Augustine says: “* He tells a lie who has one thing in his mind and says something else by word or by any signs whatever.”² For we may and do constantly speak not only by word of mouth, but by our tone, looks, gesture, actions, and by the very circumstances in which our words are uttered. The words “I am not guilty ” in the mouth of a murderer have quite a different meaning when they are uttered in the dock and at the feet of his confessor. The words, the tone, the look may be the same; the circumstances make it a true speech in the first case and a sacrilegious lie in the second.

A lie in action is called hypocrisy or simulation, but the malice is the same as in lying words.

Lies are divided by theologians into jocose, officious, and hurtful lies, A jocose lie is told to amuse others; it is something said in joke which the speaker knows to be false, and uttered with the intention of saying what he knows to be false. If what is not true is said in joke without any intention of lying, and in such a way that ordinary hearers would understand, there is no lie. To speak ironically is not to lie.

An officious lie is a lie of excuse, or a falsehood which, while procuring some advantage, does nobody any harm.

A hurtful lie does an injury to someone.

¹ Summa, 2-2, q. 110, a. I.

² De Mendacio, c. 3,

According to the common Catholic teaching, lying of every kind is intrinsically wrong; so that, inasmuch as we may not do evil that good may come of it, we are never justified in telling a lie, not even if the life of another or the safety of the world depended on it. St Augustine, St Thomas, and other Catholic Doctors and theologians gather this doctrine from the teaching of Holy Scripture which in many places seems to forbid all lying as absolutely as it forbids theft or homicide. Pope Innocent III gives expression to this teaching when he says in the Decretals, “‘ Since Holy Scripture prohibits lying even to save the life of another.”¹ Reason teaches us the same doctrine. For a lie is something inordinate in itself. It is a perversion of the moral order which the law of nature prescribes should be observed between the mind and the expression of it in our intercourse with others, We are endowed with the faculty of making known our thoughts and feelings to others; right order requires that the external expression should agree with the internal thought, that the machinery should be correctly regulated, that there should be no contradiction between the parts of the same agent, as there is when a lie is told. The moral turpitude which there is in such a contradiction between the mind and its external expression is well seen in the vice of hypocrisy. When a man pretends to be other than he is, there is the same perversion of right order that there is in lying. in nature; It is like a monstrosity the parts of one whole do not fit harmoniously together; they are out of gear and offensive to the view. There is, then, a special virtue of veracity which prescribes that when we have to make known our thoughts and feelings we should do it truthfully, or, in other words, we should make the outward expression agree with the thought. This virtue of veracity exists and is of obligation apart from any right to the truth that there may be in others. Veracity is something which we owe to ourselves as well as to our neighbour. It is true indeed that society is very much interested in sincerity and veracity. Social intercourse is very much hindered by lying and the mistrust which lying generates.² But although this is true, yet lying must be avoided primarily because it is unworthy of the dignity of man; it is a perversion of right order; it is intrinsically, in itself, wrong.

Some of the Greek Fathers held a different view from the above, and thought that lying was not wrong under all circumstances, but that it was occasionally allowable, like medicine, on account of inevitable necessity. English moralists have very commonly held a similar opinion, that a lie is only told when what is false is said to one who has a right to the truth. Some modern Catholic theologians have also adopted this opinion, which places the malice of lying in the denial of the truth to one who has a right to it. They do not, however, sufficiently explain the nature of that right, whether it is a strict right of justice, or a right in a vague sense demanded by the good of society, and so due out of legal justice, or charity, or piety, or obedience. Moreover, it is as difficult to determine when that right exists as it is to determine what is a lie according to the common opinion, and the door seems to be opened to promiscuous lying provided that no injury be done to our neighbour. The only lie which the theory acknowledges seems to be the hurtful lie. Nor does it sufficiently answer the arguments on which the common opinion is based.

¹ C. Super eo, De usuris.

² Eph. iv 25.

If it is never lawful to tell a lie, if the lie of necessity cannot be allowed, what means have we of safeguarding a secret ?

Catholic theologians answer this question by propounding their doctrine of mental reservation. Mental reservations are either strictly or widely so called. The former is the restriction of one’s meaning in making an assertion to the proposition as modified by some addition made to it within the mind of the speaker. As if on being asked “ Are you going to town ?” one were to answer “ Yes,” meaning “‘ in imagination.” In wide mental reservations the words used are capable of being understood in different senses, either because they are ambiguous in themselves, or because they have a special sense derived from the circumstances of time, place, or person in which they are spoken. Thus, when a servant says that her master is not in, the words may mean either that he is absent, or that he does not wish to see the visitor. The servant’s real meaning is restricted to one of these senses. In the same way a defendant on his trial in an English court .of justice pleads not guilty—i.e., until the charge be proved. A lawyer or a doctor questioned about professional secrets replies, “ I don’t know ”—i.e., I have no knowledge which I can communicate.

Although strict mental reservations are lies, and therefore sinful, yet wide mental reservations are in common use; they are necessary, and they are not lies. They are necessary because justice and charity require that secrets should be kept, and frequently there is no other way of keeping them. They are not lies because, as we saw above, words take their meaning not only from their grammatical signification, but from the circumstances in which they are used. When a priest is asked about a sin which a penitent has confessed to him, and he answers, ‘‘I never heard of it,” he speaks as a man, not as a confessor who holds the place of God in the tribunal of Penance. All are aware that he is a priest, and to all his words mean, “‘ I never heard of it outside of the confessional.” He never speaks of what he has heard inside the confessional, and nothing can, or should, be gathered about what he has heard there from the words which he uses. Although these wide mental reservations are not lies, yet they must not be employed without just cause, for the good of society requires that we should speak our mind with frankness and sincerity in the sense in which we are understood by our hearers, unless there be a good reason for permitting their self-deception when they take our words in a sense that we do not mean.

Truth requires not only that we should say nothing that we know to be false, but also that we should weigh our statements and not make rash and unconsidered assertions. There are some people whose talk runs babbling along like a stream in a fresh, and with as little meaning. A man with a love for truth will be more sparing of his words, and will weigh them before giving them currency.

Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology

Ludovicus Wouters, C.SS.R. — 5 passages

Vol. I, Bk. II, Tr. II, Diss. I, Pt. VIII, Section I. On the Injury of Truth, or on Lying

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 5. The Quasi-integral…, Temptation of God · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 6. The Remaining Potential Parts of Justice; the Gift of Piety; the Commandments, Lying · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 6. The Remaining Pote…, Mental Reservation · Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 6. The Remaining Pote…, Simulation

(St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 110, 111; St. Alphonsus, cf. Theologia Moralis, book III, nn. 157-171; Homo Apostolicus, tract 5, nn. 15 and 16.)

To truthfulness is opposed every act of manifestation discordant with the internal concept. If that act is contained in words, signs, or writings, it is called a lie; if it consists in deeds, it is called simulation. Hence what we are going to say about lying should also be applied to simulation.

n. 1062.

I. Notion. A lie is customarily defined: speech contrary to the mind. It is said:

Speech; by this word is understood the ordering of concepts toward another, by means either of words, which hold the principal place among signs, or of other signs (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 1, ad 2).
Contrary to the mind, i.e. which is opposed to the concept of the mind.

Corollary I. For a lie there are required: 1° the will of saying what is false, i.e., insofar as false is taken here, what is contrary to the concept or what is held as false; 2° speech contrary to the concept. "The account of a lie is taken from formal falsity, namely from this, that someone has the will of uttering what is false; whence also a lie is named from this, that it is said contrary to the mind" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 1). But there are not required: 1° a concept false in reality, hence he lies who holds as false what he says, although what he says is true; 2° the will of deceiving, for "that someone intends to establish falsity in the opinion of another, by deceiving him, does not pertain to the species of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.); nor 3° deception of the neighbor, as is clear in the accused person who, before a judge who was an eyewitness, denies the crime.

Corollary II. It is not a lie: 1° to say what is false, when the speaker holds it as true; 2° to say in jest things which are openly false, because the circumstances remove the ordinary signification of the words; 3° ironic or hyperbolic expressions, by which words are really transferred to another signification; 4° equivocal expressions, or those uttered with a broad mental restriction, as will presently be explained more fully; nor 5° is it a lie if I sufficiently show that I am unwilling to manifest the truth, because then the words from that circumstance again receive another meaning.

n. 1063.

II. Division. A lie is distinguished as threefold: jocose, officious, and pernicious or damaging, according as it is done for the sake of pleasure or utility, whether one's own or another's, or with damage to a third party (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 2). But under the word pernicious lie there can also be comprehended a lie which is done with injury to God (cf. St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 4).

n. 1064.

III. Morality. 1. A lie is a sin, and is never licit. It is a sin, which is clear both from Sacred Scripture¹ and from reason. For an act is illicit which is opposed to the end which has been appointed to the act by nature, i.e. by the Author of nature. But a lie, i.e. speech contrary to the concept, is opposed to the end which has been appointed to speech, i.e. to the ordering of concepts toward another (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 3). Then, "because man is a social animal, naturally one man owes to another that without which human society could not be preserved; but men could not live together with one another unless they believed one another as manifesting truth to one another" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 109, a. 3, ad 1). Nor is it ever licit, because the prior disordering, about which we have spoken, cannot be removed (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 3; Quodlibet 8, a. 14; St. Alphonsus, III, 171).

Objection. An act with a double effect, when the things to be posited have been posited, is licit. But speech contrary to the mind sometimes becomes an act with a double effect, of which one, namely the defense of a secret, is intended, while the other is permitted.

Response. For an act with a double effect to be licit, it must be at least indifferent in itself, not disordered. But speech contrary to the mind is disordered in itself, or sinful, as follows from what has been said.

What if someone cannot hide without a lie a truth which must be positively hidden?²

Response. In the case, the obligation of hiding ceases, and the obligation of not lying prevails, because the intrinsic disordering of a lie cannot cease. But the case scarcely occurs except from the dexterity of the one asking and the weakness of the one responding.

If someone subjectively believes that he must positively hide a secret, and no possibility appears of doing this without a lie, from a perplexed conscience the lesser evil is permitted.

A lie as such, or insofar as it is opposed to truth, is only a venial sin. The reason is that the abuse of a sign and the deception to follow from it, as such only, i.e. without bringing damage to the neighbor or injury to God, involve only a slight injury of the social order.
A pernicious lie is grave from its kind, i.e. grave or slight according as it brings grave or slight damage to the neighbor. If it is pernicious to God, i.e. if it brings injury to God, it is grave.

Corollary. To lying pertains, as we noted above, simulation, which is had when "someone by certain signs of deeds or things signifies something contrary to that which is in him ... whence simulation is properly a certain lie consisting in exterior signs of deeds; but it does not matter whether someone lies by word or by any other deed whatsoever ... whence, since every lie is a sin, as was said above, it follows also that every simulation is a sin" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 111, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 171). Moreover, a species of simulation is hypocrisy, "by which someone simulates the person of another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 111, a. 2).

¹ Prov. VIII, 5; Col. III, 9.

² With respect to a secret, there is no obligation of positively hiding it, but only the obligation of not manifesting it; yet it can happen that a secret is in some way manifested unless it is hidden. Besides, accidentally there can be an obligation of positively hiding a secret, for example by reason of charity.

n. 1065.

IV. Concealment of truth as such is not a lie, because it does not involve the will of saying what is false, but only the will of keeping silent about what is true. Moreover, truth is concealed not only by being silent, but also by speaking with some mental restriction; about this more must be said.

Notion of mental restriction. It is had when the speaker mentally restricts words to a meaning which they have either in no way, or which they have, whether from themselves or from the circumstances, besides another meaning.
Division of mental restriction. It is distinguished as twofold, broad and purely mental. It is purely mental when the speaker mentally restricts words to a meaning which they have in no way, so that in no way, i.e. neither from the words themselves nor from the adjuncts or circumstances, can it be perceived; as if, asked whether he had been in Paris, he affirmed it, understanding silently: "in mind." Broad mental restriction is had when the speaker restricts words which have a double meaning to the less obvious meaning, permitting the more obvious meaning to be taken by the hearer; as if, asked whether he knows something, he replies, "No," understanding silently: "with communicable knowledge." Broad mental restriction is also called equivocation or amphibology, which, namely, is had when the words uttered have a double meaning (St. Alphonsus, III, 151, 152; Homo Apostolicus, tract 5, n. 15).
Morality of mental restriction. a) Purely mental restriction is never licit. For it falls into a lie: namely, the words in the case in no way express the meaning which the speaker intends, while the expressed meaning is supposed to be opposed to the speaker's judgment; therefore there is speech contrary to the mind (St. Alphonsus, III, 152). There are added the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, namely:

26: "If anyone, either alone or before others, whether asked or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation or for any other end, swears that he has not done something which in reality he has done, by understanding within himself something which he did not do, or another way from that in which he did it, or any other true addition whatsoever, in reality he neither lies nor is perjured";²

27: "A just cause of using these amphibologies is present whenever this is necessary or useful for protecting the health of the body, honor, family property, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealment of truth is then judged expedient and diligent";³

b) Broad mental restriction, with which equivocation coincides, is per se illicit; for it is opposed to sincerity, and in fact commonly leads the hearer into error. Yet it becomes licit if a just cause is present, and there is not from some other source an obligation of opening the truth, for example from the precept of a Superior. This is clear both from the example of Christ,⁴ and from the fact that in broad mental restriction the words also contain the meaning intended by the speaker, so that there is not speech contrary to the mind, or that intrinsic disordering which inheres in a lie (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary I. Besides other applications of the doctrine explained which occur in different treatises, it is useful to report certain ones from St. Alphonsus:

"One in need, with goods hidden for his sustenance, can respond to the judge that he has nothing. Likewise an heir who has hidden goods, if he is not held from them to satisfy creditors, can respond to the judge that he has hidden nothing, understanding silently: from which he is held to satisfy" (III, 158).
"He who accepted a loan, but afterwards satisfied it, can deny that he accepted a loan, understanding silently: so that he must pay" (III, 159).
An adulteress, asked by her husband whether she has committed the crime, can deny it, understanding silently: in such a way that she must manifest it (III, 162).
A servant by order of his master can respond that he is not at home, understanding silently: for speaking with someone (III, 165).
One bound to a secret can respond to the one asking that he knows nothing, understanding silently: for example, with communicable knowledge (III, 153).
One asked to give or lend money can respond that he does not have it, understanding silently: money which he wishes to give or lend (III, 163).
One invited, who is asked whether the food, which is tasteless, tastes good, can respond that it is good; for responses of this sort need not necessarily be taken in an absolute sense (III, 160).

¹ Cf. Waffelaert, Dissertation morale sur la malice du mensonge; Koenraedt, in N. K. Stemmen, 1925, p. 297; Gregorianum, 1920, pp. 11, 278; A. Kern, Die Luge.

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1176.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1177.

⁴ John VII, 8; Matt. XXIV, 36.

McHugh–Callan, Moral Theology

John A. McHugh, O.P., and Charles J. Callan, O.P. — 17 passages

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 5. The Quasi-integral…, Temptation of God

n. 2301.

Cases Wherein There Is no Temptation of God

Cases Wherein There Is no Temptation of God.—(a) To seek a proof of divine perfections is not temptation of God, if the purpose is only to find new reasons for what one already accepts, or to experience in an affective way what one already admits speculatively. Hence, a theologian may study the attributes of God with a view to further illumination; hence also, one may prove the sweetness of God or the goodness of His will from the spiritual taste or relish for divine things (Psalm xxxiii. 9; Rom., xii. 2).

(b) To seek a sign of God’s will or a manifestation of His perfections is not temptation of God, if this is done, not from curiosity, ostentation or other vain motive, but from some reason of necessity or great utility, as when Gedeon prayed for a sign that the Lord had spoken to him or was with him (Judges, vi. 17, 37), or when Elias called on Jehovah to show His power before the worshippers of Baal (III Kings, xviii. 37). Hence, he does not tempt God who, when ordinary means of direction fail him in some critical affair, asks humbly for a sign of God’s will; or who in a matter of great moment asks for miraculous help if it be pleasing to God to grant it; or who exposes himself to serious danger for some priceless good that cannot otherwise be had, in the trust that God will be with him.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 6. The Remaining Potential Parts of Justice; the Gift of Piety; the Commandments, Lying

n. 2389.

Lying

Lying.—A lie is a word spoken with the purpose of stating what is not true.

(a) It is said to be a word, by which is meant any external sign consisting in speech or its equivalent. A lie may be expressed by language, oral or written, by signs, by gestures, by insinuation, by expressive silence, by actions or conduct (see 2012, 2028).

(b) A lie is spoken, that is, expressed externally. But the guilt is found in the will, and hence those who plan lies are guilty of mendacity, even though they do not carry out their plans.

(c) A lie is told with purpose; that is, there is a comparison by the intellect of the sign with the thing signified and a voluntary choice of the insufficient sign to be used. An infant or an unconscious person, therefore, may tell an untruth, but he cannot tell a lie. Moreover, a person who has no good command of language or no clear understanding of a subject is not guilty of lying when in spite of his efforts to the contrary he gives misleading impressions. But those who do not think before they speak, or who use language carelessly or inaccurately, may be guilty of injustice and deception, or even of indirect lying.

(d) The purpose of a lie is the statement of what is not true, or the pretense that what is not in one’s mind is in one’s mind. Just as truth is the agreement of the word with the thought, so a lie is the disagreement of word with thought. But a lie need not be entirely false, and indeed one of the most dangerous of lies is what is known as a half-truth, in which some real facts are told in order to give support to pretended facts, or in which valid arguments are adduced to throw dust in the eyes as regards other arguments that are sophistical.

n. 2390.

Statements Liable to Misunderstanding or Misinterpretation

Statements Liable to Misunderstanding or Misinterpretation.—A word that sufficiently expresses one’s idea is not a lie or a deception, even though another idea will be taken from it by a listener or is conveyed by its mere letter.

(a) Thus, misunderstanding due to defect, not of the speaker, but of the listener, does not make one’s words untruthful, any more than it makes them scandalous (see 1462), as when the listener has not given attention to what was said (John, xxi. 23). Even a speech worded obscurely because the matter is obscure, or because the listener would be harmed by plainer speech (see 1001), is not mendacious but prudent.

(b) Misinterpretation to which a statement is open on account of its wording does not make the statement untruthful, if the context or circumstances sufficiently disclose the true meaning of the words. Examples: hyperbolical, ironical or other metaphorical speech; words spoken in jest or in terms of customary politeness, such as “your most obedient servant”, statements made inquiringly or hypothetically (e.g., when a judge or prosecutor accuses a defendant of crime in order to discover the truth; cfr. Gen., xiii. 9), or by way of mere quotation or of fictitious narrative (e.g., fairy tales, stories, reveries), or of disputation as in school debates exercised for the sake of practice in argumentation. It is not a lie to write under a pen-name, to speak according to the personality one represents (Gen., xxxi. 13; Tob., v. 18), to answer according to the mind of a questioner, as when A says to B: “Have you seen your father?” meaning, “Do you know where he is?” and B replies: “I have not seen him,” meaning “I do not know where he is.” Lying contests, in which fishermen, sportsmen, etc., vie with one another to see who can tell the most incredible yarn or tall tale, are not in themselves sinful, but there may be circumstances (for example, scandal, deception, danger) that make them reprehensible.

n. 2391.

Divisions of Lies

Divisions of Lies.—(a) Intrinsically, or in respect to its nature as a departure from the speaker’s mind, every lie is either an exaggeration, which tells more than the truth, or a suppression, which tells less than the whole truth. He who affirms what he does not believe, or who states as certain what he thinks is uncertain, exaggerates; he who denies what he believes, or who states as doubtful what he holds as certain, is guilty of suppression.

(b) Extrinsically, or in respect to purpose, mode, and result, lies are of many kinds. As to mode, a lie is either spoken or acted, the former being a falsehood and the latter a simulation or hypocrisy. As to its immediate purpose, a lie is meant either to express falsehood only or to deceive, the former being misrepresentation and the latter deceit (e.g., if Claudius knows that he calumniated and that Sempronius heard the calumny, and yet brazenly denies the calumny to Sempronius, there is misrepresentation); if Claudius tries to mislead others who only suspect him and gives false alibis, there is deceit. As to its ulterior purpose, a lie is meant for good (an officious or jocose lie) or for evil (a pernicious lie), or is directed to both good and evil. As to its result, a lie sometimes produces and sometimes does not produce a statement at variance with fact; it sometimes deceives and sometimes does not deceive the auditors.

n. 2392.

Classification of Lies

Classification of Lies.—Every lie is harmful from its nature, since it tends to deceive others and so to disturb the good order of society. But the reason that moves persons to lie is not always evil, and hence we have the following classes of lies.

(a) Some lies are told for a good purpose, as when one lies in order to please (jocose lie) or to serve another (officious lie). Jocose lies include all kinds of humorous and interesting narrations and descriptions meant only to afford pleasure, but given out as facts by one who does not believe them to be facts. Untruths told in such a way (e.g., with a laugh or in a playful tone, especially if the auditors have a sense of humor) that it is clear they are not meant to be taken seriously, are not jocose lies or lies of any kind. Officious lies are told with a view to assisting or accommodating a neighbor, that he may receive some good (e.g., to hold out false promises as an inducement to good conduct) or escape some evil (e.g., to fill the ears of a despondent man with false reports of good news in order to revive his spirits). It seems that we should regard as officious lies various statements made by Jacob (Gen., xxvii. 35), David (I Kings, xx. 6, xxi. 2, xxvii. 10), and Judith (X. xi. xii).

(b) Some lies are told for an evil purpose, as when one lies merely to indulge a propensity for falsehood or for the sheer pleasure of lying (lies of inclination), or when one lies to injure another person (pernicious lies).

n. 2393.

Motives for Lying

Motives for Lying.—The motives for lying are not always simple, and it may happen that in one and the same lie there are several motives of different character.

(a) Thus, an officious lie is not always dictated by pure benevolence. It may be selfish (e.g., when one lies to conceal the delinquency of another in which one was involved), as well as altruistic (e.g., when the liar derives no benefit from the lie), or self-sacrificing (e.g., when the liar is put to expense, trouble or loss through his lie).

(b) An officious lie may also be pernicious and jocose, for it may affect different persons in different ways. Thus, if Claudius calumniates Julius in order to shield Balbus from the bad opinion of Caius, who does not know Balbus, and to amuse Sempronius who knows the truth, the lie is pernicious as regards Julius, officious as regards Balbus, and jocose as regards Sempronius.

n. 2394.

Comparison of the Gravity of Various Lies

Comparison of the Gravity of Various Lies.—(a) Lies of exaggeration are not worse as lies than lies of suppression, for in both cases the truth is departed from. But it is more imprudent to overstate than to understate, and in this sense the lie of exaggeration is worse.

(b) Lies are aggravated by the purpose to harm, and the greater the harm, the greater the sin. Thus, the worst of all pernicious lies is that which is directed against God, as in false religious doctrine; and the lie that harms a man in spiritual goods is worse than a lie that harms in temporal things only.

(c) Lies are mitigated by the purpose to help, and the greater the good intended the less the sin. In other words, lies that are not pernicious are not so bad as pernicious lies, officious lies are less sinful than jocose lies, officious lies told for the sake of some great good are not so grave as those told for the sake of a lesser good. Thus, it is a less evil to lie in order to save a man’s life than to lie in order to take his life; it is less sinful to lie in order to spare another the shock of bad news than to lie for the sake of embellishing a tale; it is a less offense to lie in order to ward off a bodily harm than to lie in order to prevent a financial loss.

n. 2395.

Sinfulness of All Lies

Sinfulness of All Lies.—But though lies are unequal in sinfulness, it remains that no lie, even the smallest (such as are called fibs or white lies), is ever justified, even by the greatest good (Job, xiii. 7), for a lie is intrinsically evil, and the end does not justify the means.

(a) A lie is a sin, because it is an abuse of speech and other signs given by God for the manifestation of truth; because it is an unfriendly and unsocial act, tending to the disruption of kindly relations between men; because it is directly opposed to truth, the proper and distinctive good of the human mind. Even the pagans have regarded liars with contempt and considered lies as disgraceful, and even those who lay no claim to virtue feel gravely insulted if called liars. In many places the Scriptures forbid lying (Exod., xxiii. 7; Levit., Xix. 11; Prov., xii. 22; Ecclus., xx. 26; Col., iii. 9), and St. Paul especially (Eph., iv. 25) is very clear on this point: “Putting away lying, speak ye the truth every man with his neighbor, for we are members one of another.” The Fathers and the theologians are generally agreed that no necessity, not even the danger of death, excuses a lie, any more than it excuses theft or adultery. If God could approve of even one lie, would not that approval undermine our faith in His own veracity? Surely we have no implicit confidence in one who helps to deceive us even in a small matter.

(b) A lie, considered precisely as a lie, seems from its nature to be only a venial sin, for the disorder of using signs against one’s mind is not serious, and the harm done society by mere denial of truth is not necessarily grave (the case would be otherwise if truth could be denied on principle as a lawful thing). Even pious persons do not regard harmless lies as very sinful (see 2143, 2386). Hence, as jocose and officious lies have no other malice than that of untruthfulness and as the malice is lessened by the intention, they are generally venial; but some extrinsic circumstance (such as scandal, the fact that one lies habitually and without scruple, or disastrous results) may render them mortal. Pernicious lies have another malice besides that of untruthfulness, and accordingly the case with them is different.

n. 2396.

When Lying Entails No Formal Sin

When Lying Entails No Formal Sin.—Lies are sometimes free from all formal sin on account of ignorance (as in the case of children or uninstructed persons, who think they may use lies in case of great difficulty) or on account of irresponsibility (as in the case of certain defectives who seem to be born liars).

n. 2397.

Pernicious Lies

Pernicious Lies.—Pernicious lies are mortal sins from their nature, but may become venial from the imperfection of the act or the lightness of the matter. For a pernicious lie sins not against truth only, but also against justice or charity. Hence, it is said that the liar destroys his own soul (Wis., i. 11), that a lie is abominated and hated by the Lord (Prov., vi. 17, xii. 22), that it has the devil for its father (John, viii. 44), that it brings down divine vengeance (Ps. v. 7) and will receive its portion in the pool of fire and brimstone (Apoc., xxi. 8). This sin is committed in two ways, as follows:

(a) a lie is pernicious when its matter is harmful, as being contrary to sound doctrine, good morals or true science. Hence, a preacher sins gravely if the substance of his pulpit teaching is mendacious (e.g., if in a sermon he enunciates or defends erroneous principles of conduct), venially if he lies about accidentals (e.g., if he gives the wrong chapter or verse for a text); a scientist, a physician, a jurist, or the like is similarly guilty of a pernicious lie when he misleads the public by unreliable information. A penitent in the confessional and a witness in court lie perniciously if their statements about relevant matters are untrue, for the one injures the Sacrament and the other injures public justice; but if the lie is about some matter of slight importance, the sin is venial, unless there is no other matter in the confession, or the testimony is under oath;

(b) a lie is also pernicious when the intention of the liar is to injure God or his neighbor, even though the matter itself is not opposed to true doctrine or is not official testimony. Examples are found in those who lie in a humorous way in order to injure or sadden others.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 6. The Remaining Pote…, Mental Reservation

n. 2398.

Concealment of the Truth

Concealment of the Truth.—Truthfulness is offended not only by the declaration of falsity (i.e., of what is not in the mind), but also by the unlawful concealment of the truth (i.e., of what is in the mind). The truth is concealed either negatively or positively.

(a) There is negative concealment of the truth, when one has recourse to silence or evasion. Everyone admits that this kind of concealment is lawful when there is no obligation to give information, or when there is an obligation not to give it. Thus, a person who is besieged by newspaper reporters does not feel obligated to answer all their questions; a person who is interrogated by curious individuals about his business or financial affairs, does not feel guilty if he evades their questions by changing the subject, or by asking them similar questions, or by putting them off till a more convenient time, etc.

(b) There is positive concealment of the truth, when one gives a reply in language that is obscure to the listener or obscure in itself. If the listener has no right to the truth, it is not wrong to speak to him in words which he will not understand (e.g., in technical or scientific terms); for if he is deceived, he can blame only his own impertinence or dullness. The case is more difficult, however, if the reply is obscure in itself, that is, if use is made of ambiguity or mental reservation.

n. 2399.

Mental Reservation

Mental Reservation.—Mental reservation is an act of the mind by which a speaker restricts or limits his words to a meaning which they do not naturally or clearly convey; or it is an internal modification of an external speech delivered without any or without clear external modification. There are two kinds of mental reservation.

(a) Strict mental reservation is that in which the internal modification is manifested by nothing external, neither by the natural sense of the words (i.e., the meaning that ordinarily attaches to them) nor by their accidental sense (i.e., the meaning they receive from their context, such as the circumstances of time, place, usage, person who questions, person who is questioned, etc.). Example: Titus, who struck Balbus with a club, denies that he hit him, meaning that it was the club which hit Balbus directly.

(b) Broad mental reservation is that in which the internal modification can be perceived, at least by a prudent person, either from the natural sense of the words (because they are known to be capable of different meanings), or from the context (because circumstances indicate that the words are not to be taken in their obvious sense). Example: Claudius accidentally ran against and wounded Sempronius and the latter thinks that someone struck him a blow. Claudius denies that he struck Sempronius, or declares to those who have no right to ask that he knows nothing about the matter.

n. 2400.

Lawfulness of Mental Reservation

Lawfulness of Mental Reservation.—(a) Strict mental reservation is unlawful and has been condemned by the Church (see Denzinger, nn. 1174-1178). The reasons are, first, that it is a lie, since it employs words that do not at all express what the speaker has in mind, and his mental reservation cannot give them a significance they do not possess; secondly, that, if it were lawful, every dishonest person could easily escape the guilt of lying and yet deceive at will. According to Scripture the sophistical speaker is hateful (Ecclus., xxxvii. 23), but the just man speaks and swears without guile (Ps. xxxiii. 14, xxiii. 4).

(b) Broad mental reservation is unlawful when there is a reason that forbids its use, or when there is no sufficient reason to justify its use. Reservation is forbidden when a questioner has the right to an answer free from all ambiguity, for example, when a pastor questions parties preparing for marriage, when a person who is about to be inducted into office is asked about his freedom from disqualifications, when a witness in court is interrogated about matters on which he can testify, when one party to a contract seeks from the other necessary knowledge about the contract; for in all these cases injury is done by concealment of the truth. Reservation is not justified, unless it is necessary in order to secure some good or avoid some evil, whether spiritual or temporal, whether for self or for another, and the end compensates by its importance for the deception that may be caused. Apart from such necessity mental reservation is, to say the least, a departure from the virtue of Christian sincerity or simplicity, which pertains to truthfulness and which forbids one to conceal the truth from others when there is no good reason for concealment (Matt, v. 37). Moreover, the friendly relations of mankind would be impaired if it were lawful to speak equivocally even when trifling things are discussed or when there is no reason to be secretive.

(c) Broad mental reservation is lawful when there is a sufficient reason for it, such as the public welfare (e. g., the preservation of state secrets or of military plans), spiritual welfare (e.g., the prevention of blasphemy or intoxication), bodily welfare (e.g., the prevention of death or murder), or financial welfare (e.g., the prevention of robbery). But the reservation must be necessary, as being the only lawful means that will secure the end (e.g., one should not use reservation when evasion or silence will suffice); and it should not be injurious to the rights of another (e.g., it should not be employed against the common good, in favor of a private good). The reason for the present conclusion is found in the principle of double result (see 103 sqq.) and in the fact that a broad mental reservation is not intrinsically evil, since it contains no lie or insincerity and causes no injury to individuals or society. There is no lie, because the words correspond with the thought, either from their natural signification (in case of double-meaning words), or from their accidental signification (in case of words whose meaning is varied by the context); there is no insincerity, for the aim is only to conceal a truth that should not be made known; there is no injury to the listener or questioner, since, if he is deceived, this is due to his own heedlessness or dullness or unjustified curiosity; there is no injury to society, since the general welfare demands that there be some honest means of eluding unjust inquiries and of protecting important secrets. Our Lord Himself, who is infinitely above all suspicion of duplicity or insincerity, may have used broad mental reservations when He declared (John, vii. 8-10) that He would not go up to Jerusalem, that the daughter of Jairus was not dead but sleeping (Matt., ix. 24). Other cases of mental reservation in Scripture are found in Eliseus (IV Kings, vi. 19).

n. 2401.

When Is Broad Mental Reservation Lawful?—There is general agreement that broad mental reservation is lawful in the following cases:

(a) it is lawful and obligatory when one is bound to keep the truth from the person who asks it. Hence, those who are questioned about secrets which sacramental or professional confidence forbids them to disclose (e.g., confessors, doctors, lawyers, statesmen, and secretaries) should deny knowledge, or, if hard-pressed, even the facts. The answer, “I do not know” or “No,” in these cases simply means: “I have no personal or communicable knowledge.” In war time a government has the right to censor the news in order to keep information from the enemy. A reason of charity might also make it obligatory to disguise the truth by mental reservation (e.g., when a clear reply given to the question of a sick person would only weaken a slender hope of saving his life, or when exact information given to a gunman would enable him to overtake an intended victim);

(b) it is lawful when a reasonable local custom permits one to withhold the truth. Thus, an accused person, even though guilty, has the right to plead not guilty, which means that he does not confess guilt; a person who has a visitor at an unseasonable hour may send word that he is not at home, which means that she is not at home to visitors, a person who is asked for an alms or a loan which he cannot conveniently grant may answer, according to many, that he has not the money, which means that he has no money to spare for those purposes (see 2251).

n. 2402.

Ambiguous Answers

Ambiguous Answers.—Are ambiguous answers which are not given according to the questioner’s mind, and for which there are no reasonable justifications, to be classed as lies?

(a) If the answer, even in the setting of its context, retains its ambiguity or can be interpreted in two ways, there is not strictly speaking a lie, for the words signify, though obscurely, what is in the speaker’s mind. But this is a form of insincerity known as equivocation or quibbling, which many regard almost as disreputable as plain lying. The pagan oracles that made predictions that would suit any turn of events and politicians who so word themselves as to be on opposite sides at the same time are examples of equivocation.

(b) If the answer, though verbally susceptible of two senses, is contextually limited to one sense, it is a lie; for it does not express the speaker’s mind. Thus, if Titus knows that Balbus is good physically or mentally but not morally, he equivocates by answering that Balbus is good, if from the circumstances this indicates only that in some way or other Balbus is good; but Titus lies by answering that Balbus is good and restricting his meaning to physical goodness or industry, if the question propounded referred to moral goodness.

Vol. II, Pt. II, Q. II, Art. 6. The Remaining Pote…, Simulation

n. 2403.

Simulation or Pretence

Simulation or Pretence.—A special form of untruthfulness is simulation or pretence, which uses external deeds or things to signify the contrary of what one thinks or intends internally.

(a) Simulation uses external deeds or things, and thus there is an accidental difference between lying and simulation, the one being untruthfulness in word and the other untruthfulness in deed (see 1678 sqq.).

(b) It employs deeds or things to signify. Unlike words, deeds and things were not meant principally to signify, and hence not all conduct at variance with one’s ideas is simulation. One may act without any thought of the impression the act makes on others (e.g., when one keeps sober, not from wish, but from necessity). And even when an act is done with the intention to influence others by it, the purpose may be, not to signify, but to conceal something (e.g., Josue fled from the troops of Hai to keep them from a knowledge of his plans, Jos., viii. 1 sqq.; David feigned insanity to conceal his identity, I Kings, xxi. 11. sqq.). Thus, simulation teaches error, and dissimulation hides truth from those who have no right to it. That dissimulation is generally recognized as lawful is seen from such examples as stratagems, ambushes, camouflage in war, disguises in detective work, and concealment of marriage by couples not ready for housekeeping.

(c) It signifies the contrary of what one has in mind, as when one who is sad laughs and jokes to make others think he is happy, or one who is well apes the actions of a sick man so as to appear unwell, or when one who hates his neighbor treats him as a friend in public. A special form of simulation is hypocrisy, which makes a show of virtue that one does not possess at all or in the degree pretended. There is no simulation if the exterior corresponds with what one has is mind, for example, at Emmaus Christ made as though He would go farther (Luke, xxiv. 28), but He meant not to stop without an invitation.

n. 2404.

The Sinfulness of Simulation

The Sinfulness of Simulation.—(a) In general, simulation is a sin, since it is nothing else than an acted lie. But deeds, with the few exceptions of bows, nods, gestures and the like, are not from their nature signs of thoughts, and those employed to serve as signs are more indeterminate and equivocal than words; hence, it is not always as easy to decide that an act is simulatory as to decide that a word is a lie. Thus, it is not simulation to make use of false hair, false teeth, or false jewelry as means of protection or of adornment, there being no intention to mislead; neither is it simulation for a wicked cleric to wear the clerical garb, for the dress signifies primarily his state, and not necessarily his personal moral character.

(b) In particular, simulation by hypocrisy and treachery is detestable; for hypocrisy prostitutes works of virtue to the ignoble ends of applause or lucre or worse, while treachery uses the intimacy or marks of friendship as means for betrayal. The most stinging rebukes of Our Lord were given the hypocritical Pharisees (“Blind guides, whited sepulchres, serpents, generation of vipers,” Matt., xxiii. 23 sqq.), and among the saddest words of Christ are those addressed to Judas (“Dost thou betray the Son of man with a kiss?” Luke, xxii. 48). Against the former he pronounced woes, and He declared that it were better if the latter had never been born (Matt., xxvi. 24).

Bucceroni, Institutions of Moral Theology

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 13 passages

Vol. II, On the Eighth Precept of t…, IV. On Lying

n. 1523.

What is lying, and how manyfold is it? - A lie is a false word, i.e., against the mind; false, with the intention of saying what is false. The intention of deceiving does not pertain to the essence of a lie, otherwise jocose lies would be excluded from lying, since they are not said for deceiving, but for joking; and because it is evident that he lies who, with you present, did something, and immediately afterward denies to you even that he did it, although there is no will or faculty of deceiving.

Wherefore from lying are excluded jokes which are uttered or done in such a way that from the very mode of uttering or acting, it is sufficiently understood that what is outwardly stated is false; although the hearer, from his own excessive simplicity and stupidity, takes the joke seriously, and is deceived rather by himself than by the one joking. Likewise excluded from lying are tropical and figurative locutions, ironies, fables, and parables; because they contain the true sense which the speaker intends to express, although sometimes he observes that it is not immediately apprehended by the hearer, but another false sense is conceived, which the speaker does not intend, but only permits. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 110, a. 1.; Quodl. 6, a. 17. A lie is threefold, namely jocose, officious, pernicious.

A jocose lie is one which neither profits nor harms, but is uttered so that it may delight. An officious lie is one which is done without injury to another, so that it may profit a third party. Finally a pernicious lie is one which is done with injury and harm of another, even if it profits some third party. - St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 110, a. 2, 3. No one regularly lies by silence and dissimulation, by not speaking, not acting, St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 1 ad 4.; because he who is silent, does not act, neither affirms nor denies. Regularly, for sometimes not to speak, not to act, is not without deceit and fraud. Lugo d. 23, n. 82.

n. 1524.

What is mental restriction and how manyfold is it; what is equivocation or amphibology? Mental restriction is an act of the mind turning or restricting the words of some proposition to another sense than the natural and obvious one; if, e.g., when asked whether you received Easter Communion, you answer that you received, understanding internally in the preceding year. - Mental restriction is: 1.

Purely or strictly mental, if the sense of the speaker added by the speaker's mental addition alone can in no way be perceived, neither from the obvious signification of the words in themselves, nor from the circumstances; and this is properly called mental; e.g., if someone is asked by a Protestant friend whether he is a Roman Catholic, and answers that he is not, because he was not born at Rome. 2. Broadly or improperly mental, if the sense of the proposition can be gathered either from the very signification of the words, because they are ambiguous, or from the circumstances; e.g., if someone is asked whether he received a benefice from the Bishop, and answers that he did not, because he properly received that benefice from the Holy See, to which it was reserved; and if someone has secretly compensated himself, and is asked whether he accepted anything, he can deny it, because he accepted nothing except what was his own. Equivocations or amphibologies are referred back to mental restriction; these are locutions having of themselves a double principal sense, but one more and the other less obvious; e.g., if someone answers nothing to a question about some matter done, and then to one insisting: what do you say? he answers: I say no.

n. 1525.

What is simulation? - A lie not by words, but by deeds, is called simulation. Yet not every simulation is a lie: for to simulate is indeed to do one thing and to will to signify another, and consists in this; but deeds are not, as words are, destined to signify the mind and to speak to others; therefore by these no one lies unless he uses them to deceive someone. Wherefore, if someone uses them only for concealing the truth, every lie is absent. And if a lie is sometimes absent from the very words, when someone is not questioned by right concerning some matter, how can that right always be present in deeds, so that you must do this or that, lest another be deceived? To simulation or to lying pertain hypocrisy, boasting, irony. All are opposed to the virtue of truth, which is a special virtue through which man duly orders his outward things, whether words or deeds, to something as sign to thing signified. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 109, a. 2.; q. 110, a. 2.; q. 111, a. 1.; Quodl. 6, a. 17.; Quodl. 8, a. 14. "Hypocrisy is a simulation by which someone simulates the person of another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 2. Generally and of itself hypocrisy is a light sin. It becomes grave from a gravely depraved end, or another gravely evil circumstance. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 4. Boasting is properly said "when someone extols himself above that which is in him." And it is grave or light by reason of a grave or light object. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 112, a. 2. Irony is had when "someone says lesser things, departing from truth, for instance when he asserts about himself some vile thing which he does not recognize in himself, or when he denies about himself some great thing which nevertheless he perceives to be in himself; and it is always a sin," light of itself, grave per accidens....

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 113.

n. 1526.

Whether lying is illicit? A lie is intrinsically evil, because a lie formally imports the intention of stating what is false, contrary to the institution of words. Besides, a lie is immediately opposed to the virtue of created truthfulness, which establishes truth in signs, and mediately to the virtue of divine truthfulness; and therefore it is intrinsically evil and in no case licit. Hence Innocent III, C. Super eos de Usuris, says: "Not even for protecting life is it licit for us to lie." Indeed truthfulness is a special virtue, through which man duly orders his outward things, whether words or deeds, to something as sign to thing signified. Cf. Eccl. 8:14.; Lev. 19:11.; Eph. 4:24.; Col. 3:9.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 109.; q. 110, a. 1, 3.; Quodlib. 8, a. 14.

n. 1527.

What kind of sin is lying? A jocose and officious lie is a sin from its genus venial, but a pernicious lie is from its genus mortal, because a jocose and officious lie is opposed only to the virtue of natural truth or truthfulness; and a pernicious lie is opposed also to charity and justice; hence the first two are sins slight of themselves, but the third is grave of itself. But a pernicious lie in the individual case is often a venial sin, not only from imperfection of the act, but also from smallness of matter, or of the harm inflicted on neighbor through the lie. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 100, a. 3, 4.; Quodl. 8, a. 14.

n. 1528.

Whether purely mental restriction is licit? - It is never licit to use purely or properly mental restriction. Wherefore neither is it licit to swear with it, because it is simply a lie. For it states what is false simply, although it is internally determined to a true sense by the mind of the speaker. Thus, when someone questioned about theft answers that he stole no money, understanding gold, silver, bronze, when he stole paper money: he certainly lies. This is also clear from propositions 26, 27, 28 condemned by Innocent XI. L. 152.; E. M.

n. 1529.

Whether broadly mental restriction is licit? It is sometimes licit from a just cause to use restriction broadly, i.e., improperly mental, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that by this very fact that the truth can be prudently gathered from some circumstance of the thing, place, time, or person speaking, the aforesaid restriction is not evil in itself, since neighbor is not properly deceived, but from a just cause only his deception is permitted. Moreover, for the good of society it is required that a means be present of licitly concealing a secret and of avoiding damage from its manifestation; and sometimes no other means is at hand besides broadly or improperly mental restriction. And so in a case of this kind it is licit to use restriction not purely mental, by answering according to the mind of the questioner, or according to those things which appear and are commonly believed, or according to the ordinary non-authoritative mode of speaking, or finally according to received custom; e.g., if someone denies that he entered such a house, namely in which he himself committed no theft, as is believed, although truly he entered it; if those joined in civil marriage and commonly judged to be joined in legitimate marriage are mutually called husband and wife; if someone, asked by a friend about another's crime injuring reputation, answers that he does not know it; if a servant answers importunate visitors that the master is not at home. Struggl tr. 5, q. 3, n. 17.; Ithur. Cas. 37, n. 11 seqq.

n. 1530.

Note: It is licit to use a broad restriction of this kind even with an oath, although a greater cause is then required, since divine testimony is not to be used without judgment. L. 151.

n. 1531.

Whether amphibologies are licit? - Amphibologies, or equivocations, altogether discordant and remote from the matter at issue, so that they cannot be noticed and understood in a human way, are illicit; since then human commerce would utterly perish, as if someone asserted that he does not have a dog at home, because he does not have the constellation of the Dog. But if the aforesaid amphibologies or equivocations are perceptible of themselves, although not altogether easily and immediately, they are not illicit of themselves; but sometimes they are licit, unless they are done from the positive intention of deceiving another; for then they are not against the mind of the speaker and the virtue of truthfulness.

n. 1532.

When are restrictions and amphibologies not purely mental illicit? Restrictions and amphibologies, or equivocations, even not purely mental, are not licit: 1. if they are done without an honest and proportionate cause; 2. if from them damage to neighbor would emerge against the order prescribed by charity; 3. when mutual contracts are celebrated; 4. if the one questioning has the right of inquiring or commanding the confession of truth. Proof. The 1st reason is that, if without any honest cause and always it were licit to speak amphibologically, equivocally, and with restriction even not purely mental, all sincerity and human faith would perish; but men are held by natural law to preserve human faith. The 2nd and 3rd reason is that this is required by charity and justice. The 4th reason is that to that right there corresponds an obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity.

n. 1533.

Resolutions: Public persons questioned about matters committed to their trust can especially use restriction of this kind; such are secretaries, legates of Princes, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever has office and reason for concealing some truth. For if the secrets committed to these persons were violated, very grave inconveniences in society would follow. L. 165.

n. 1534.

Whether simulation is licit? "Formal simulation, namely when someone intends through an external deed to signify something other than he has in mind, is never licit, because it is a true lie of deed; but material simulation, that is, when someone does something, not intending the deception of another, but some end of his own, is licit with a just cause, always and when from the circumstances others can conjecture that it is done for another end; as was said about restriction not purely mental. Thus Christ the Lord, Luke 24, at Emmaus feigned that he would go farther, not intending that the Disciples believe this, but wishing to signify that he truly would have gone farther unless he were invited by them." L. 171. - St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 1. Dissimulation is had when, by not speaking, not acting, something is covered and someone is deceived from it. Of itself it is licit, for there is no obligation of always manifesting the truth.

n. 1535.

Whether a superior has in every case the right of knowing the truth, so that one questioned cannot licitly use broadly mental restriction? Resp. Negatively, as is clear from the following exceptions. For: 1. A confessor questioned by a tyrant whether Titius confessed homicide can and ought to answer: I do not know; because the Confessor does not know this with communicable knowledge. Indeed even if the tyrant insisted and said: Do you not know this with communicable knowledge? He could still answer: I do not know. The reason is that the tyrant knows well that he does not have the right of questioning about this, nor does the Confessor understand that he knows it as a man, but as vicar of God and therefore by incommunicable knowledge.

Almost the same must be said of him who knows a matter from a committed secret, for the sake of asking counsel. 2. A penitent questioned by a Confessor about a sin confessed can swear that he did not commit it, understanding internally that which he did not confess. Thus Cardinal, the Salmanticenses, Sanchez, etc. Yet this must be understood unless the Confessor justly questions in order to know the state of the penitent. From proposition 58 condemned by Innocent XI. L. 157. - "But if the penitent has not sinned mortally since the last confession, the Confessor sufficiently knows his state, and then he has no right of questioning about the past life."

Gur. Cas. v. 2, n. 442. 3. "The opinion of Cardinal de Lugo, de Iust. d. 40, n. 15, Tamburini, Cardenas, Sporer, Mezger, Babenstuber, Elbel, and several others is sufficiently probable; they admit that the accused, when the proof stands only half-full, and when there is hope of escaping death, can use amphibology and deny the crime even with an oath, understanding internally: so that I am held to confess, as long as hope of escaping death appears. The reason for this is that the precept of obeying a legitimate judge cannot oblige the accused so that he acts against himself and by his own confession completes the half-full proof of his capital crime, when otherwise it cannot be sufficiently proved.

Nor is the aforesaid restriction, in such a circumstance of the case, purely mental; because it can prudently be gathered by a sagacious judge and assessors. Hence a Confessor will be able safely to follow this opinion, at least so that he not deny absolution to an accused person wishing to follow it; as the cited doctors note." Struggl de 8 Praec. 46 and de Virt. relig. q. 3, n. 22.; L. 154.; l. 4, n. 57.; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 33, a. 7 ad 5. 4. A witness can swear that he does not know what he truly knows, understanding internally that he does not know a crime about which inquiry can legitimately be made, namely if it is certain to him that the crime lacked fault; or if he knows the crime, but under secret, with no preceding infamy; or if the crime is altogether hidden.

Struggl de Virt. relig. l. c. 21, 22. 5. The truth cannot be denied or hidden if one contracting marriage is questioned by the pastor or by the Bishop whether he is bound by any diriment impediment; if one to be promoted to orders is questioned by the Ordinary whether he is affected by some censure or irregularity. One to be promoted to a magistracy or public office, when there is no obligation of accepting it but it is free to accept it, cannot, if he is questioned, deny a hidden crime. Proposition 28 condemned by Innocent XI. - E. M. 554.

Gury-Ballerini, Compendium of Moral Theology (8th ed., 1884)

Jean-Pierre Gury, S.J.; notes by Antonio Ballerini, S.J. — 8 passages

Vol. I, Treatise On the Precepts o…, On the Eighth Precept of t…, Ch. I, Article I. On Lying in General

n. 438.

- A lie is speech or signification against the mind, with the will of deceiving. If it is done by nods or by some deed, it is called simulation. Scav. - A threefold genus of lie is distinguished: 1. harmful, by means of which unjust damage is brought upon someone; 2. officious, which is put forth for the sake of one's own or another's utility; 3. jocose, which is done from joke and only for the sake of trifling.

n. 439.

Principles. - I. A lie properly so called is always intrinsically evil. The reason is, 1. because it is repugnant to right reason to use words against their natural end and institution; 2. because if it were lawful to deceive others in speaking, the order of society, which rests on the mutual commerce of men, would be altogether subverted. Hence, Coloss. 2. 9: "Do not lie to one another." - St. Thom., 2. 2, q. 110, art. 3. - St. Aug., book On Lying and Against Lying.

n. 439.

II. A harmful lie is grave according to the measure of the damage which is brought upon the neighbor; therefore the obligation of repairing the damage follows from it. - Thus all. - St. Thom., ibid., art. 4.

n. 439.

III. An officious lie is per se a venial sin, because grave disorder is not apprehended in it. - Thus all. - A fortiori a jocose lie per se does not exceed venial sin. Indeed, sometimes that which is called a jocose lie is free from altogether every fault; because it is not a lie properly so called, but a joke used for the sake of recreation without any intention of deceiving another, and therefore our definition does not fit it. But this can be admitted only when the adjuncts of things are such that hearers can easily understand that the speaker wishes only to joke. - Thus commonly.

Resolves. - 1. They do not lie who assert as false what they believe true, but only err. On the contrary, they lie who say what is true, which they think false, because they speak against the mind.

Tropic, ironic, and hyperbolic expressions are not lies, when they can and customarily are easily taken as such by hearers. Much less parables, which Christ himself used so frequently. Nor are equivocations lies, if they do not prevent the sense of the speaker from being able to be known.

They do not lie who write fables, or from joke say openly false things, as is manifest.

To lying are referred simulation, hypocrisy, flattery, and empty boasting, which per se do not exceed venial sin; yet they can become mortal, or rather mortal sin can accede to them on account of another species of sin which supervenes.

Bucceroni, Cases of Conscience

Gennaro Bucceroni, S.J. — 16 passages (filed under the subtopics)

88. Mental Restriction, Secret

Magdalena, a wife, is accused by her own husband concerning adultery altogether hidden, so that he can institute divorce before a judge and enter another marriage. Hence Magdalena asks her confessor whether she is held to confess her sin in court. The confessor responds that she can deny that she committed adultery.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. “It must be said that concerning this a distinction must be made. For if the adultery is altogether hidden, she ought not to confess her sin in court, nor ought an oath concerning speaking the truth to be demanded from her, because hidden things are reserved to the divine judgment alone; according to that saying, 1 Cor. 4:5: Do not judge before the time, until the Lord comes, who will illuminate the hidden things of darkness. But when infamy proceeds from adultery, or some evident signs appear which can cause vehement suspicion, or when it has been half-proved, then an oath concerning speaking the truth ought to be demanded from her, and she herself is held to confess the truth.” S. Th. Quodl. 5. a. 16. Therefore, since in the Case there is question of adultery altogether hidden, Magdalena can, by mental restriction, deny it, saying, I did not commit adultery, and understanding, which I am held to confess in court. For the response is of itself to be understood according to the question made. But a question made by a judge concerning adultery is evidently a question concerning adultery about which he himself can ask and render sentence, and which consequently the guilty woman is held to confess in court. I. M. 1530, 1535; G. 418, 419.

Galenus, a most skilled physician, knew a most powerful herb for checking the flow of blood. He communicated the secret only to Laelius, his dearest friend, under the latter’s promise of keeping the same secret. Galenus having died, Laelius, who alone knows the secret, would like to manifest the secret for public utility; and he proposes the doubt to his confessor.

Q. Can Laelius, in the Case, manifest the secret?

R. It seems that Laelius can manifest the aforesaid secret. The reason is that from that manifestation no damage at all can come to Galenus, indeed good can come, namely praise and honor for him. Nor truly can damage of this sort come to any other, since Laelius alone knows the secret. Whence, communication of that secret having been made to him by Galenus, he himself is now the absolute owner of this secret. Besides, the secret is altogether useful to the common good of others. Wherefore it would rather seem to be against charity not to communicate a salutary remedy to all. This is confirmed by the authority of St. Thomas. For the Angelic Doctor, Quodl. 12. a. 21, raises the question: “Whether one receiving the teaching of some experiment under an oath not to communicate it is held to observe the oath”; and he responds: “One thing must be said here simply, and another in the Case. Speaking simply, he is not held, but he acted badly by swearing. An oath loses force not only when the oath is illicit, but also when he swears to worse things; because an obligating oath ought to have judgment, justice, and truth. But even if I sometimes swear something which it is lawful for me not to do, say, not to go to church, nevertheless it is not lawful to swear (forever), because although it is lawful for me for some time to do or omit this good, which is to go to church, nevertheless it is not lawful for me to interpose an oath and to harden my soul toward not doing some good, because this is to act against the Holy Spirit. And therefore an oath against everything which is of the genus of good things is illicit and not to be observed. Nevertheless, in the Case, he is held to observe it, say if that man or another sufficient physician were present and were prepared to cure and to use that experiment for the bodily health of others.” Scavini, ed. 12, Milan 1874, l. 2. n. 229, speaking of an oath of keeping a secret concerning the art of making some medicine, of healing some infirmities, says: “Notwithstanding the oath, you are held from charity to reveal it, if otherwise someone would undergo grave danger of death, or if the art would therefore die with him, with harm to the commonwealth, and the sick cannot otherwise be healed, since an oath is not for damage.”

Eustachius, under the strictest promise of secrecy, manifested to Hilarius that Amalia, his daughter, was spurious. Moreover Hilarius in his own mind had proposed to marry Amalia; but, her condition having been learned, he altogether changed his mind and married another.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Hilarius used his own right, nor did he act illicitly in any way. A secret is, as it were, another’s thing, and consequently of itself it is not lawful to explore or extort it. For that would be, as it were, to snatch his own thing from the owner, although someone proposes to himself not to reveal the secret to others. But after someone has in whatever way naturally learned a secret, that knowledge has now been made his own, and he is not prohibited from using it without any unjust damage to another. Hence, if the secret is some invention of art or science, I can use it, if utility follows for me and no damage follows for another; indeed also, according to Lessius, if some damage to another follows, because that knowledge is mine. If the secret regards some fact, someone can then use it, namely by doing those things to which he already had a right before the knowledge was accepted; for after the knowledge has been accepted, he does not lose the right, as, e.g., if someone seeks a benefice or office which he has learned to be vacant, or buys a field in which he has learned that a treasure lies hidden. Less. l. 2. c. 12. n. 131.

Sempronius had written his wife as heir in usufruct, with the burden added that she furnish support to Caius and to Titia, his mother; but in ownership he had named Caius himself as heir, and if he should die without offspring, he had substituted the sons of his niece Bertha, from his sister, who, the testament excluded, by law would have succeeded to the inheritance of her maternal uncle. After the death of the testator, Bertha pressed in civil judgment for the nullity of the testament, since he had called an adulterine son to the inheritance, namely Caius himself, as she said, born from Titia at a time when marriage with his wife was standing. But truly, since the arguments deduced for proving this did not exceed the limit of mere conjecture, and Bertha had declared that in the episcopal Chancery and in the baptismal parish archive documents existed by which the true status of Caius, as she contended, would be placed in clear light, the presiding judge asked the bishop that he exhibit the mentioned documents.

Q. Could the bishop manifest and hand over the commemorated documents?

R. Negatively, as is evident from the Response of the S. C. EE. et RR. 25 Feb. 1842, Bizzarri Collectan. ed. 1855, p. 101. But the reason is that it is especially of the public good that the things which are committed to some person established in some ministry by reason of office, it be unlawful to publish and manifest; for otherwise it would be done with the faith owed to public authority, especially of the Church; for no one would any longer be found who would entrust himself to the same. And thus the Civil Laws themselves exempt Advocates, Physicians, Surgeons, and other professionals from giving testimony concerning those things which become known to them by reason of profession. Nor truly could the bishop or pastor have exhibited the aforesaid documents, entrusted to his faith, from the fact that Bertha already knew the tenor of the documents from the rumor of the crowd. For if truth is obligated to guarding a secret, it cannot confirm public report and rumor, often doubtful and uncertain, by its assent and its affirmation, and render it undoubted and certain. For then it would already be done against the law of secrecy. And although perhaps Bertha knew the matter certainly from the corrupted faith of officials, and so from a shameful and unjust fact, nevertheless to continue and confirm baseness and injustice is altogether illicit. Nor truly is he to be heard in court who alleges his own baseness. Whence Bertha could acquire no right from this to the exhibition of the aforesaid documents.

Lucianus, by a fortuitous event, received letters directed to Lucius. Recognizing the handwriting of Rufinus, by whom many damages had already been inflicted on him, and fearing lest those letters contain something against him, whence Lucius, his friend and a powerful man, could be turned away from his friendship, he at once opens and reads the letters, and in them he in fact finds several calumnies asserted against him. Hence, saying nothing about the letters received, by opportune means he forestalls the mind of Lucius, and easily frees himself from every evil machination of Rufinus.

Q. What as to the Case?

R. Lucianus licitly read the letters in the Case. For he did this not with the intention of prejudicing the right of another, but with the intention of averting from himself an unjust burden threatening him, judging probably, indeed morally certainly, that the aforesaid letters had been written to his prejudice. But it is lawful to read another’s letters, just as it is lawful to manifest a natural secret, for forestalling unjust damage to be inflicted on oneself or on another. Elbel 616; I. M. 1545.

But what if Lucianus had deceitfully stolen the letters beforehand: could he still use them for removing from himself the grave danger of damage which he first learned from the letters themselves was threatening him, or which he otherwise knows to threaten him? Generally it is not lawful to use another’s letters deceitfully stolen, especially if damage to that other follows from it. The reason is that no one can continue in sin and in injustice. But if someone uses that knowledge, unjustly acquired, for driving away from himself grave and unjust damage, that is not illicit. It is lawful in those very circumstances in which someone licitly reveals another’s sin and reads another’s letters. For just as someone would now licitly acquire that knowledge and licitly use it, so now he can licitly use knowledge already acquired, although its acquisition was unjust in the beginning. I. M. 1494, 1495, 1545; G. 429, 430, 440-442.

Tanquerey

Adolphe Tanquerey, S.S. — 14 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Vol. III, Contracts, and the Obligat…, On the Virtue of Justice (…, Part I — Chapter II: On Injury, or the Violation of Right

n. 404.

II. On Lying.

Preliminary note. A lie is speech against the mind, expressed by words or by other exterior signs.

¹ St. Augustine, De Mendacio, one book; Contra Mendacium, one book; Migne, P. L., XL, 487-548; St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 110-111; Lessius, lib. II, cap. 47, dub. 6; J. Barnes, O. S. B., Dissertatio contra aequivocationes, Paris, 1625; Th. Raynaudus, S. J., De aequivocatione et mentali restrictione, among his works, Lyons, 1565, t. XIV, p. 71, 232; L. Thomassin, Traite de la Verite et du Mensonge, Paris, 1691; St. Alphonsus, n. 151-171; Carriere, n. 923-960; Bolgeni, in Melanges theologiques de Liege, 4th series, 1850-1851, p. 406-413; Examen de l'opinion de Bolgeni, in Melanges, 6th series, 1852-53, p. 410-462; Waffelaert, Dissertation morale sur la malice du mensonge, Tournai, 1884; F. Bouillier, Questions de Morale pratique, Paris, 1889, p. 249-359; Ami du Clerge, XVIII, 1896, p. 561-572; Dubois, Une Theorie du mensonge, in Science catholique, Sept. 1897; Etude sur la malice intrinseque du mensonge, by a professor of Theology, Paris, 1899; Du mensonge proprement dit, by a Professor of Theology, Paris, 1903.

If it is done solely for the sake of joking, it is called jocose; if for one's own or another's utility, it is called officious; but when it is brought forth in order to inflict damage unjustly upon someone, it is named pernicious. - To lying are recalled simulation, by which by deed or external sign the neighbor is induced into error; and also hypocrisy, which covers internal wickedness with the external appearance of virtue; boasting, by which someone by praising himself or his own passes beyond the limits of truth; flattery, which extols another beyond the limits of truth, with the mind of blandishment.

Since there have been various opinions concerning the essence and intrinsic malice of lying, we shall set forth the matter historically, in order to deduce practical conclusions from it.

n. 405.

1. The Common Doctrine Concerning the Intrinsic Malice of Lying Is Set Forth.

(A) Doctrine of St. Augustine. Before Augustine, the Fathers in a general way reproved lying as contrary to Christian truthfulness;² yet a few, such as Clement of Alexandria, Origen, St. Chrysostom, and St. Hilary, had taught that in a case of necessity, for averting the greatest damage, it is licit to use a lie just as a medicine; and in this sense they understood certain deeds related in each Testament.¹ Being questioned concerning this matter, St. Augustine set forth his doctrine in two works, De Mendacio (around the year 365), and Contra Mendacium (around the year 420); in both he openly teaches, - not indeed as Catholic doctrine, but as an opinion to which he firmly adheres, - that every lie is a sin, and that one must never lie: (a) not for the temporal salvation of anyone whatever, since the life of the soul is more powerful than bodily life;² (b) nor for preserving purity or avoiding defilement, since purity of the soul excels the integrity of the body;³ (c) nor for the eternal salvation of another: for just as, in danger of eternal salvation, it is not licit to aid a man through defilement, so neither through a lie, which truly is a sin;⁴ therefore it is not licit to deceive the guards of a prison in order to baptize a man; nor can Catholics falsely say that they are Priscillianists, in order that they may know the secrets of these.⁵

² Thomassin, op. cit., p. 75-107; 129-189, sets forth their doctrine excellently.

¹ See the testimonies in Thomassin, l. c., and T. Raynaudus, op. cit., p. 143-149.

² In Migne, XL, 494, 541-545.

³ Ibid., 496-497.

⁴ Ibid., 546-547.

⁵ The book Contra Mendacium was directly written so that Catholics might be deterred from using a lie to uncover hidden Priscillianists. - Migne, l. c., p. 517.

n. 406.

But since not a few texts of the Scriptures were opposed by adversaries for defending lying, he handed down that these are to be explained in a threefold way: (a) let it be shown that the deeds alleged, if rightly understood, are not lies: thus the manner of acting of Jacob, who seems to deceive his father, is not a lie, but a mystery;⁶ (b) but if they are lies, they are not to be imitated; (c) or at least concerning those matters which pertain to the doctrine of religion, one must in no way lie.⁷

⁶ Ibid., 533.

⁷ Ibid., 535.

Concerning equivocation and mental restriction he is entirely silent, and he seems by the whole mode of arguing to exclude them.

But the reasons why, according to Augustine, lies are utterly and always illicit are: (a) the authority of the Scriptures, especially of the Apostle saying:⁸ "Putting away lying, speak truth each one with his neighbor, because we are members one of another"; where the word neighbor designates all, even heretics;⁹ (b) the intrinsic malice of lying, which is no less an evil than adultery;¹⁰ (c) the depraved consequences to follow from this; since indeed faith is not had in other matters toward one who lies in one.¹¹

⁸ Ephes., IV, 25.

⁹ In Migne, l. c., p. 527.

¹⁰ Ibid., 527-528 and passim.

¹¹ Ibid., 523.

Yet since he knows that there are some defenders of lying, he says: "At least in the worship of God let them concede that one must not lie... concerning the other kinds of lies, let him who is pleased that lying is to be done choose for himself what he thinks to be the mildest and most innocent kind of lying."¹

¹ Ibid., 544.

n. 407.

(B) Doctrine of St. Thomas. Most Fathers embraced the opinion of St. Augustine, with a few nevertheless excepted, who, with Cassian,² held that lying can be applied as it were as hellebore, in a case of necessity, for averting an imminent evil. St. Thomas polished the Augustinian doctrine, (a) by defining the conditions required for a lie properly so called: "Therefore if these three concur, namely that what is enunciated is false, and that the will to enunciate the false is present, and again the intention of deceiving, then there is falsity materially, because what is false is said, - and formally because of the will of saying what is false, - and effectively because of the will of imprinting falsity."³ (b) Afterward he establishes that every lie is a sin, because it is evil according to itself: for it is against nature that someone by voice signify that which he does not have in mind.⁴ (c) The sin is grave when the lie turns upon divine matters, that is, faith or religion, or inflicts grave damage upon the neighbor; - but it is venial if light harm is inflicted, or if the lie is officious or jocose.⁵

² "And so one must think of a lie, and use it so, as if the nature of hellebore were in it; if it is taken when a deadly disease is imminent, it becomes healthful; otherwise, when taken without necessity of the greatest danger, it belongs to present destruction... Therefore when some grave danger threatens from the confession of truth, then the refuges of lies are to be received, yet in such a way that we are healthfully bitten by the guilt of a humble conscience." (Collat. XVII, cap. 17, in Migne, XLIX, 1062-1063.)

³ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 110, a. 1. Yet he adds that the intention of deceiving does not pertain to the essence of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it.

⁴ Ibid., a. 4.

⁵ Ibid., a. 3.

n. 408.

(C) The theory of moralists concerning equivocation and mental restriction. Up to this point nothing had been said concerning equivocation or mental restriction; yet soon theologians understood that in certain circumstances, in order to avoid a greater evil, truth can be hidden under the appearance of equivocation. This, already before implicitly proposed, Lessius and Parsons more directly set forth and defended;⁶ but J. Barnes and Thomassin (op. cit.) attacked their opinion; Th. Raynaudus, op. cit., strove with all strength to vindicate the doctrine of Lessius; and, although some theologians, such as Caramuel,¹ held the same as very dangerous, nevertheless this became common in the schools.

⁶ Lessius, in the book de Antichristo, § 31; de Justitia, lib. II, cap. 11, dub. 20, and cap. 42, dub. 9, and also cap. 47, dub. 6; Parsons, Tr. de Aequivocatione.

¹ Theologia Fundamentalis, Frankfurt, 1652, Fundam. LXII, p. 639.

Yet certain theologians proceeded further in this matter, whose propositions Innocent XI condemned as scandalous and pernicious in practice on March 2, 1679 (n. 24-28):

"To call God as witness of a light lie is not such irreverence on account of which He would will or could damn a man.
"With cause it is licit to swear without the mind of swearing, whether the matter is light or grave.
"If someone, either alone or before others, whether questioned, or of his own accord, or for the sake of recreation, or for any other end whatever, swears that he did not do something which in reality he did, by understanding within himself something which he did not do, or another way from that in which he did it, or any other true addition, in reality he does not lie, nor is he perjured.²

² From this it is clear that this and the following propositions are condemned because in these there is question of purely mental restriction, which cannot be understood even by a prudent man, and indeed confirmed by oath.

"A just cause of using these amphibologies is as often as this is necessary or useful for protecting the health of the body, honor, family affairs, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealment of truth is then judged expedient and studious.
"He who by means of recommendation or gift has been promoted to a magistracy or public office will be able with mental restriction to render the oath which by mandate of the king is customarily exacted from similar persons, without respect being had to the intention of the one exacting: because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime."

n. 409.

With these excesses set aside, the theory concerning equivocation and mental restriction is proposed today in this way. Equivocation is a word or other sign which, from its nature and the common use of men, is not determined to signify one thing, but can signify several.³ Mental restriction is an act of the mind, by which the words of the speaker, through something which is retained in the mind, are determined to another sense than the natural and obvious one; if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, the restriction is purely or strictly mental;⁴ but if it can be understood from the context or from the circumstances, the restriction is called broadly mental.¹

³ Thus when Christ said: "Lazarus our friend sleeps" (John XI, 11), these words could be understood of sleep or of death.

⁴ Thus if to one asking "whether you have seen Rome," you answer affirmatively, understanding in a picture.

¹ If someone, questioned about a secret which he ought to conceal, responds, I do not know.

Now, for the legitimate use of equivocation or mental restriction, two conditions are required together: (a) that the true sense can be discovered by a prudent man from the context or from the circumstances; (b) that a proportionately grave cause be present; for since deception is a certain evil, it is not licit without reason to give another an occasion of deception; on the other hand, the nearer this occasion is, and the graver the error to which another is exposed, the greater cause is required.

n. 410.

2. The Theory of More Recent Authors Concerning Lying Is Set Forth.

Yet this theory concerning mental restriction by no means pleased many recent philosophers, who contended that, with it admitted, no one is now certain in what part the words of another ought to be taken; since, on the other hand, there are not lacking cases in which it is necessary to say what is false in order to avoid a greater evil, they tried to mitigate the rigor of the Augustinian theory and to accommodate it to human weakness. Namely, they say that a lie properly so called is illicit, which is repugnant to the right or good of others; but in a case of necessity a false-saying (faussete) is licit, by which what is false is indeed enunciated, but only when truth is not owed to others, and on the other hand these suffer no damage from the assertion of what is false. Thus especially Grotius and Pufendorf.² Most Protestant theologians,³ not a few Rationalists, and certain Catholics⁴ assented to these. - A lie properly so called indeed is always illicit, they say, because it violates the right which someone has to knowing the truth; but false-saying does not injure the neighbor's right, since by hypothesis truth is not owed to him; nevertheless it cannot be applied without reason, since speech of itself was instituted for saying what is true.

² Grotius, De jure belli ac pacis, lib. III, c. 1, § 10-21; Pufendorf, De jure nat., l. IV, c. 1.

³ Thus among others Taylor, Milton, Paley, Johnson, whom Newman cites, Apologia pro vita sua, 5th ed., Appendix, p. 378-384; de Wette, Christl. Sittenlehre, III, 126; Martensen, Die christl. Ethik, 1879, t. II, p. 245 sq.; Dorner, Christian Ethics, New York, 1887, p. 489-492; N. Smyth, New York, 1892, p. 392-400.

⁴ Bolgeni, Il possesso, c. 48; author of the article in Melanges theol., l. c.; Piat, in Appendix IV to Theologia Moralis by Van der Velden, Tournai, 1875, t. I, p. 524-533; Dubois, l. c.; author of the little work Etude sur la malice intrinseque du Mensonge; Fonsegrive, Elements de Philosophie, t. II, p. 475.

n. 411.

3. Conclusions To Be Deduced from This Controversy.

(A) A lie properly so called, or the denial of owed truth, is intrinsically evil and a sin grave of itself.

(a) For as often as truth is owed to someone, whether from justice, or from obedience, charity, or another virtue, the neighbor through a lie is deprived of truth to which he has a right, and therefore incurs damage grave from its nature; for truth is the essential good of the intellect, just as virtue is the good of the will; and if someone is deceived in a grave matter, by that very fact he suffers grave harm. - Moreover, once the liceity of lying is admitted, the security of social life is now overthrown; for this consists in mutual confidence; now if, when truth is owed to the neighbor, it is licit to say what is false, confidence vanishes and suspicions disturb security on every side.

(b) Deservedly, therefore, Scripture prohibits and rebukes lying: "You shall not lie, nor shall each deceive his neighbor";¹ - "You will destroy all who speak a lie";² - "The just man will detest a lying word";³ - "Do not plow a lie against your brother, nor do likewise against a friend; do not will to lie every lie: for its assiduity is not good";⁴ - "Putting away lying, speak truth each one with his neighbor, because we are members one of another."⁵

¹ Levit., XIX, 11.

² Ps., V, 7.

³ Prov., XIII, 5.

⁴ Eccli., VII, 13-14.

⁵ Ephes., IV, 25.

n. 412.

Hence when someone is bound from office to announce the truth, as a preacher of the Gospel; or is legitimately questioned by superiors or judges;⁶ or if there is question of entering into pacts or contracts, - it is never licit to use equivocations or false-saying by which the neighbor can be induced into error.

⁶ In certain regions, one who is accused of a crime can legally declare himself guilty or not (to plead guilty or not guilty); in this case he is not bound to confess the crime committed by himself, but can wait until he is judicially proved guilty; but if as a witness he wishes to appear in his own cause (in the witness-box, as they say) he is bound to manifest the truth.

n. 413.

(B) Even when truth is not owed to the neighbor, lying is illicit outside the case of necessity, but only under light sin.

For since error is an evil of the intellect, it is not licit to induce the neighbor into error, unless grave necessity excuses this. - Besides, since speech by its nature is the expression of the mind, he who deliberately and without grave reason asserts something false acts voluntarily against the natural order of things and against his own dignity. - Under light sin, from the common sense of the faithful.

n. 414.

(C) But in a case of necessity, when grave damage, whether temporal or spiritual, is foreseen as going to arise from open declaration of the truth, it is licit to use these words or signs which induce the neighbor into error, if the damage cannot otherwise be averted. But this mode of speaking is commonly called mental restriction by theologians, false-saying (faussete) by moderns, or a psychological lie.¹

¹ Therefore those are little consistent with themselves who on the one hand reprove the moderate use of mental restriction, and on the other approve false-saying in many cases; let them deservedly blame the abuse of equivocations, but not condemn the use, unless, with Augustine and Kant, they altogether exclude every assertion of what is false. Nor likewise are theologians consistent with themselves who do not hesitate to assert that, even in a case of necessity, any false-saying whatever is intrinsically illicit, and on the other hand permit the use of certain restrictions which by all upright persons ignorant of theological distinctions are held as lies or false-sayings. Wherefore Genicot says (n. 416): "For it is not an inconvenience if the unlearned call those things licit lies which are more commonly called broadly mental restrictions by Theologians." - Now today not only the unlearned, but many of those who otherwise are learned, do not understand mental restrictions, but abhor them, as is clear both from their writings and from their public speeches; therefore if the word false-saying pleases them more, one must not dispute about the name itself.

(a) For in this case the deception of the neighbor is not directly intended, but the good effect which follows from the deception, namely the legitimate defense of oneself or of others; on the other hand the neighbor in the case does not have a right to knowing the truth, and the accidental error which is caused in his mind is a lesser evil than that which would follow from the manifestation of the truth; besides, the neighbor is deceived for this reason, because he does not attend to all the circumstances. Therefore here there is question of an act good in itself, namely of the temporal or spiritual safety of the neighbor, from which nevertheless an evil effect is foreseen, namely error caused in the mind of another.

n. 415.

(b) It is certainly necessary that a practical means be at hand for all, by which secrets, otherwise necessary or very useful, may licitly be protected from an importunate and unjust investigator; now unless in a case of necessity it is licit to use equivocations or false-saying, there will be no means of this kind; for silence will betray the truth, and will bring great damage; for the manifestation of a secret is as pernicious to human intercourse as lying itself, as St. Alphonsus says, n. 152. Now no one ought to be in that condition that, whatever he chooses, he sins; therefore there ought to be a legitimate means for warding off the importunate, by inducing them into error.

Let us explain the matter by examples: if some innocent person is sought by unjust aggressors, who wish to kill him, and cannot be saved in any other way than by deceiving the unjust persecutors, is it not licit to deceive them? In this case, if they were actually attacking the innocent person, it would be licit to repel them by force, even by inflicting death; is it not a lesser evil to induce them into accidental error? - Likewise a physician foresees that some sick person is going to die unless he is deceived; an advocate, judge, confessor, and others bound from office to preserve a secret foresee that the secret committed to them cannot be preserved by silence alone, and therefore they say, "I do not know," or "he about whom you ask by no means committed such a crime"; in this case do they not deserve better of society itself than if by keeping silent they had manifested the secret?

n. 416.

And indeed, when the use of equivocation or false-saying is circumscribed by these limits, social security is by no means endangered; for the neighbor is not deceived except when he unjustly inquires into the truth, and he ought to attribute to himself the error into which he falls.¹

¹ We have said nothing of those modes of speaking by which the truth is politely covered, e.g., the master is not at home, so that it may be signified that he, although present, does not wish or is not able to receive anyone; these and other similar things are easily understood and cannot be held as lies.

Most theologians indeed admit this as regards mental restriction, but they commonly assert that false-saying is opposed to divine truthfulness, and therefore is intrinsically illicit, even in a case of necessity.

It is answered that false-saying is no more opposed to the truthfulness of God than homicide is to His supreme dominion; now, in a case of necessity, for the defense of oneself or of others, indirectly willed homicide is permitted, without the right of God being violated by such an action; why would the denial of truth (whether it be called mental restriction or false-saying) not likewise be permitted in a case of necessity, in defense of oneself or others? For then divine truthfulness is by no means injured, which remains intact, but only a particular truth is kept silent or denied, knowledge of which would be truly harmful.

n. 417.

Points to be noted for practice. (a) Whatever opinion is chosen, love of truth should be carefully and unceasingly inculcated upon all, especially the younger; when it is said that light lies are venial sins, at the same time it should be clearly and explicitly taught that it is shameful to lie and unworthy of an honorable man, and that those are worthy of every praise who speak candidly and openly according to the mind, even if they suffer not a few inconveniences from this. Therefore teachers should receive kindly boys who ingenuously confess their faults, and for the most part grant them pardon, or at least mercifully mitigate the penalty inflicted upon them; on the contrary they should strictly punish those who deliberately use lying and hypocrisy to cover their faults.

(b) If someone, in a case of necessity, is forced to have recourse to equivocations or false-sayings, let him use them only from a proportionately grave cause, and when by no other way can his own or another's damage be averted.¹

¹ Nor should someone easily persuade himself that the threatening evil cannot be averted in another way. To the point is Bentzon, Causeries de Morale pratique, Paris, 1899, p. 134: "There are in life those distressing situations where one asks oneself whether concealing the truth is not a duty of mercy. There again, let us take good care. No doubt pain wants to be spared, weakness also. But with tact, kindness, a lively sympathy, there are scarcely any things that one cannot gradually say as they are." - Cf. Montaigne, Essais, liv. II, XVII.

Koch–Preuss

Antony Koch; adapted and edited by Arthur Preuss — 28 passages

Vol. V, Pt. I, Ch. II, Section 5: The Sin of Lying

DEFINITION.—To lie is knowingly to tell an untruth in order to deceive others.¹

¹ St. Augustine, De Mendacio, c. 4, n. 5: “Whether one who has no will to deceive lies . . . and whether anyone who wishes to state what is true for the sake of deceiving lies can be doubted. But no one doubts that he lies who willingly states what is false for the sake of deceiving; therefore it is manifest that a false statement uttered with the will to deceive is a lie.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 491).—IDEM, Contra Mendac., c. 12, n. 26 (P. L., XL, 537).—IDEM, Enchirid., c. 22: “Everyone who lies speaks contrary to what he feels in his mind, with the will to deceive.” (P. L., XL, 243).—Cfr. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 453: “A lie is speech contrary to the mind, with the will to deceive.”—Cfr. P. Ch. Kierkegaard, De Notione atque Turpitudine Mendacii, Göttingen 1829.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. I, ARTICLE I: ON LYING IN GENERAL · Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. I, ARTICLE II: ON MENTAL RESTRICTION

To constitute a lie, the false declaration, whether made in word or deed, must be opposed to the interior conviction or belief of him who makes it (enuntiatio contra mentem), and further, it must be inspired by the intention (voluntas fallendi) of deceiving and misleading others, especially those who have a right to know the truth.

n. ¶3.

The matter of a lie (materia), therefore, is the untruth uttered,—not objectively, however, but subjectively, i.e., as opposed to that which one knows or believes to be true.

n. ¶4.

Consequently, an objectively false statement which one believes to be true is no lie, and, vice versa, an objectively true statement which one believes to be false, is a lie. It is the intention that constitutes a lie (ream linguam non facit nisi mens rea).² One who makes a false statement which he believes to be true, does not wish to deceive others, but is himself deceived.³

² J. Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching, pp. 108 sqq.—St. Augustine, Serm., 180 (al. 28 De Verbis Apost.), c. 2, n. 2 (Migne, P. L., XXXVIII, 973); De Mendacio, c. 3, n. 3: “He lies who has one thing in his mind and states another in words or by any other signs. Hence the liar is also said to have a double heart, that is, a double thought: one concerning the thing which he knows or thinks to be true and does not state, and another concerning the thing which he states in its place, knowing or thinking it to be false. Thus one may state what is false without lying, if he thinks it is as he says although it is not; and one may state what is true while lying, if he thinks it false and states it as true although in fact it is as he states. For a man must be judged a liar or not a liar according to the judgment of his own mind, not according to the truth or falsity of the things themselves. Therefore one who states as true what is false, yet believes it to be true, may be called mistaken and rash, but he is not rightly called a liar, because when he states it he does not have a double heart and does not wish to deceive, but is himself deceived. The liar’s fault, however, is his mind’s desire to deceive in making a statement, whether he does deceive when his false statement is believed, or does not deceive, either when he is not believed or when he states what is true with the will to deceive, not believing it true. When such a statement is believed, he certainly does not deceive, although he wished to deceive—except insofar as he deceives by being thought to know or believe as he states.” Ibid., n. 4: “Although it is most subtly asked whether, when the will to deceive is absent, there is no lie at all.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 488).—IDEM, Enchir., c. 22: “Every lie is therefore to be called a sin, because a man ought to state what he bears in mind not only when he himself knows what is true, but also if he sometimes errs and is deceived, as a man may be, whether that thing be true or only thought true and is not so.” (P. L., XL, 243).

³ Ibid., c. 18: “No one is to be judged a liar who says what is false while thinking it true, because, so far as he is concerned, he does not deceive but is deceived.” (P. L., XL, 240).

n. ¶5.

Substantially false statements which are not inspired by the intention of deceiving others (e.g., symbolic or figurative locutions, fables, fairy tales, novels, dramas, riddles, etc., in fact poetry in general) do not partake of the formal character of lies because they are designed merely to veil, sugar-coat or elucidate, not to misrepresent, the truth.

n. ¶6.

Materially untrue phrases and expressions of which everybody knows that they are not to be taken literally, or the true sense of which is sufficiently revealed by the context or the accompanying circumstances, are not properly lies. To this category belong the complimentary phrases customary in polite society, figurative or metaphorical locutions, such as hyperboles, irony, etc., as well as stratagems and deception in war, at games, and on the theatrical stage.

n. ¶7.

St. Thomas teaches that the intention to deceive does not belong to the essence of a lie, but rather to its perfection.⁴ Others hold a different view.⁵ According to the Angelic Doctor all that is required to constitute a lie is the intention of telling an untruth. A common example adduced by the defenders of this theory is that of the convicted criminal who denies his guilt. But what is it that inspires his persistent lying if not the intention of deceiving others? Purposely telling an untruth always includes, at least indirectly, the intention to deceive. If the object is not achieved, this is not owing to the liar or his false statement, but solely to the will of the hearer. A lie, therefore, is more correctly defined as telling an untruth with the intention of deceiving others. It must be admitted, at any rate, that the indirect or interpretative intention to deceive is practically always present in the mind when a man lies, because deception is the natural result of lying, though the actual accomplishment of this purpose is not required for the essence of lying, so that he who knowingly tells an untruth is guilty of lying even though he accidentally finds no credence among his hearers.⁶

⁴ Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 1: “It does not belong to the species of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it.” On the controverted question whether the purpose to deceive belongs to the essence of lying, the student may consult J. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit, pp. 133 sq., and Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, N. Y. 1902, pp. 215 sqq.

⁵ “A statement of the false (a false statement) uttered with the will to deceive.”—Cfr. Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, p. 166.—St. Augustine, De Mendac., c. 3, n. 3: “He certainly does not deceive, although he wished to deceive.” (P. L., XL, 489).

⁶ M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 67 sqq.—Lehmen, S. J., Lehrbuch der Philosophie, Vol. IV, 2nd ed., p. 170.

n. ¶8.

The notion of a lie, therefore, in contradistinction to that of error, includes (a) the conscious telling of an untruth and (b) the intention to deceive. In popular parlance even objective untruths which are not intended to deceive, are often called lies, e. g., historical lies. But such phrases are misleading. A statement may be an untruth without being a lie. The so-called lies of history are for the most part merely errors and blunders.

n. ¶9.

DIVISION.—a) A lie may either be uttered in words or indicated by signs. A verbal lie consists either in the denial of a truth (falsiloquium) or the assertion of an untruth with the will to deceive (mendacium).

n. ¶10.

Other species of lying are simulation (simulatio) and hypocrisy (hypocrisis),⁷ which may be defined as the act of assuming a false form, appearance, character, or condition in order to deceive others as to one’s real thoughts or intentions, and especially in regard to one’s true character. Simulation frequently takes the form of sanctimony, an assumed or outward show of probity,⁸ exemplified by the kiss with which Judas betrayed Christ.⁹

⁷ St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., 63, n. 11: “Simulated innocence is not innocence; simulated equity is not equity, but twofold iniquity, because it is both iniquity and simulation.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 765).—IDEM, Serm., 355 (al. 49 de Divers.), c. 3, n. 6: “It is evil to fall away from a purpose of holiness, but it is worse to feign such a purpose.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIX, 1575).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 111, art. 1: “Just as it is opposed to truth for someone by outward words to signify something other than what he has within himself, which pertains to lying, so it is also opposed to truth for someone by certain signs of deeds or things to signify something contrary to what is in him, which is properly called simulation. Hence simulation is properly a kind of lie consisting in outward signs of deeds.”

⁸ Matth. VI, 1–6, 16; cfr. 2 Cor. XI, 13–15.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 111.

⁹ Matth. XXVI, 48–50; Luke XXII, 47 sq.

n. ¶11.

A subspecies of hypocrisy is flattery, which consists in giving insincere, false, or exaggerated praise to others with a view to influencing their future conduct. As a rule flattery is inspired by purely egotistic motives, and partakes of the malice of such motives.¹⁰ b) According to the purpose for which they are uttered, or the effect which they produce, lies are divided into several categories. There is, for instance, the jocose lie (mendacium iocosum); the officious or courtesy lie (mendacium officiosum), inspired by a desire to ward off injury or incon- venience, and the damaging or pernicious lie (mendacium damnosum sive perniciosum), dictated by a desire to injure others in life, property, or good name, perhaps even to prevent them from attaining eternal salvation.¹¹ In lies of this kind the predominant note is not the intention to deceive, but the will to injure others, spiritually or materially.

¹⁰ Prov. XXIX, 5; Acts XXIV, 1 sqq.

¹¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 2.

n. ¶12.

THE SINFULNESS OF LYING.—a) No statement or act that deserves the name of a “lie” in the formal and proper sense, can be justified by the end for which it is uttered or performed, be that end ever so noble or innocent. Consequently, all kinds of lies, including those told in jest, are strictly forbidden. This is the plain teaching of both the Old and the New Testament. Even if the eighth commandment: “Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbor,” referred only to false testimony in the narrower sense of the word, it is more widely applied in Lev. XIX, 11: “You shall not lie, neither shall any man deceive his neighbor.”¹² Again and again Holy Scripture warns men not to lie¹³ and threatens divine vengeance upon those who commit this sin.¹⁴ Among the “six things which the Lord hateth,” the Book of Proverbs mentions “a lying tongue.”¹⁵ The same book declares that “lying lips are an abomination to the Lord.”¹⁶

¹² St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 22: “Nor is any lie therefore to be thought not a sin, because we can sometimes benefit someone by lying.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 242).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 3: “Every lie is a sin.”—Ibid., ad 4: “A lie has the character of sin not only from the harm inflicted upon one’s neighbor, but from its own disorder. It is not lawful, however, to use any illicit disorder to prevent the harms and deficiencies of others. . . . And therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order that someone may free another from any danger whatsoever.”

¹³ Ex. XX, 16; cfr. Matth. XXVI, 59 sqq.

¹⁴ Ps. V, 7.

¹⁵ Prov. VI, 17 sq.

¹⁶ Prov. XII, 22; cfr. Ecclus. VII, 14; XX, 26–28; XXV, 3 sq.

n. ¶13.

Jesus Christ condemns lying, attributes it to the devil as the “father of lies,”¹⁷ and challenges His enemies to convict Him of any sin against the truth.¹⁸ St. Paul admonishes the Ephesians to “put away lying and to speak the truth.”¹⁹ St. James says: “Be not liars against the truth.”²⁰ St. John says that liars shall have their portion with whoremongers, sorcerers, and idolaters “in the pool burning with fire and brimstone, which is the second death.”²¹ The story of Ananias and Saphira, who brazenly lied to St. Peter and were struck dead on the spot, is too well known to require repetition.²² b) The sinfulness (malitia) of lying arises principally from the fact that a lie, being a contradiction between thought and speech, constitutes an abuse of language, which is the principal means of intellectual intercourse and was divinely bestowed upon men to enable them to communicate their thoughts to one another.

¹⁷ John VIII, 44; cfr. J. E. Belser, Das Evangelium des hl. Johannes, pp. 291 sqq.

¹⁸ John VIII, 46.

¹⁹ Eph. IV, 25; cfr. Col. III, 9.

²⁰ Jas. III, 14.

²¹ Apoc. XXI, 8; cfr. XXII, 15.

²² Acts V, 1 sqq.

n. ¶14.

Untruthfulness counterfeits this spiritual medium of exchange and, by making it impossible for men to live together in mutual trust and confidence, violates the divinely established order of things and the law of nature. Therefore the Apostle exhorts the Ephesians to “put away lying and to speak the truth,” because “we are members one of another.”²³

²³ Eph. IV, 25. Cfr. St. Augustine, Enchir., c. 22: “And indeed words were instituted for this purpose, not that through them men might deceive one another, but that through them each might convey his thoughts to the knowledge of another. Therefore to use words for deception, not for that for which they were instituted, is a sin.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 243).—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 3: “A lie is evil by its kind; for it is an act falling upon undue matter. For since words are naturally signs of thoughts, it is unnatural and undue for someone to signify that which he does not have in mind.”

n. ¶15.

Lying is sinful also for the reason that it violates or destroys the true dignity of man, which consists in his being an image of God. God is “the God of truth,”²⁴ and if we lie, we become dissimilar to Him, or rather like to the devil, who is a liar from the beginning and has not the truth.²⁵

²⁴ Ps. XXX, 6.

²⁵ John VIII, 44; cfr. John XIV, 6; XVII, 17; Apoc. III, 7, 14.

n. ¶16.

Finally, lying is sinful because it is opposed to charity or love of neighbor. It robs men of a good to which they have a just claim,—viz.: the truth,—and substitutes for that good an evil, i. e., error. Even if in some cases the truth is not esteemed as a real good, and error is not regarded as an evil, but rather as a service rendered to another, this does not change the nature of truth or of its contrary. Lying always embodies a violation of charity and involves contempt of others.

n. ¶17.

“You ask what costs you more dearly, falsehood or the truth? I answer: falsehood, because falsehood costs you your very ego, whereas the truth can at most rob you of happiness,” says the poet Hebbel. The well-known anecdote told of St. Thomas is purely legendary, but it conveys an important lesson. “Do you see that ox flying up there?” cried one of his fellow students. When St. Thomas strained his eyes to espy the strange phenomenon, his companion scoffed at his simplicity. The Saint censured him and said: “I would rather believe that an ox could fly, than that a Catholic would tell a lie.”²⁶ But St. Thomas might have known that it was a hoax. To test another’s wit is not deception. c) Though every lie is a sin, not every lie is a mortal sin.²⁷ The gravity or guilt of a lie is to be gauged by the general criteria of mortal and venial sin, by its subject-matter, by the objective and subjective importance of the truth involved, by the end or object aimed at, and by the circumstances of the case.

²⁶ A. Scherer and J. B. Lampert, Exempellerikon, Vol. III, 2nd ed., Freiburg i. B. 1908, p. 191.

²⁷ St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 2a 2ae, qu. 110, art. 4. Cfr. Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 167 sqq.

n. ¶18.

As regards the subject-matter, the denial of a revealed truth of great importance for the eternal or temporal welfare of man is always a mortal sin because it involves serious dishonor to God and a grave violation of charity and justice.

n. ¶19.

The end or purpose for which a lie is told may be serious or trivial. A jocose lie, or one told to get out of a scrape, may generally be classed as a venial sin.²⁸ But there are cases in which the objective and particularly the subjective momenta weigh heavily in the scale. A lie may be inspired by a totally corrupt motive and, aside from the scandal given, may have incalculable consequences. There are jocose lies that hurt keenly and others which partake of blasphemy, and though not every joking prevarication is a lie, yet every jocose lie, no matter how harmless it appears to be, is incompatible with the dignity of a Christian and the respect he owes the truth. It must also be taken into consideration that many of the “little white lies” of social intercourse are apt to cause grave temporal and spiritual damage to others. The motive of charity by which these lies are often inspired, may diminish their guilt, yet pious frauds can never promote the cause of truth or justice, the welfare of Church or State, or the true ends of scholarship or science.²⁹

²⁸ St. Augustine, Enarr. in Ps., V, n. 7: “There are altogether two kinds of lies in which the fault is not great, but which nevertheless are not without fault: when we either joke or lie in order to benefit someone. The former, in joking, is therefore not most harmful, because it does not deceive. For the one to whom it is said knows that it was said for the sake of a joke. The latter, however, is milder because it retains some benevolence.” (Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 86).

²⁹ Cicero, De Orat., II, 15: “Who does not know that the first law of history is that it dare say nothing false, and then that it not dare leave anything true unsaid? that there be no suspicion of favor in writing, no simulation?” These words were quoted by Leo XIII in his letter of Aug. 18, 1883, to Cardinal Hergenröther et al., as a norm for all Catholic writers of history.

n. ¶20.

Luther excused “fat lies” if the cause of the Gospel could be promoted thereby. Who invented the maxim: The end justifies the means?

n. ¶21.

Let us always remember the query of St. Paul: “Shall we do evil that there may come good?”³⁰ and the pious exclamation of holy Job: “Hath God any need of your lie, that you should speak deceitfully for him.”³¹ A Catholic must ever be firmly convinced that no lie can be of real advantage and that God will turn the damage which one fears from the truth into an advantage. “We know that to them that love God, all things work together unto good.”³²

³⁰ Rom. III, 8.

³¹ Job XIII, 7.

³² Cfr. Rom. VIII, 28.

n. ¶22.

When a conflict arises between duty and truth on the one side and various other interests on the other, the injury done to the soul by a lie cannot be compared to any temporary disadvantage. In a conflict between truth and charity, e. g., in the case of a sick person or a lunatic, a conscientious man will always, if necessary, find a way to disguise the truth so that it will not bear the character of a lie. In such cases it should be considered that, on the one hand, by lying to the sick we are apt to undermine their confidence in the physician and those who have them in charge, hinder a correct treatment, and run the danger that the patient may die unprepared, while, on the other hand, persons who have not the full use of reason are rendered suspicious and distrustful if those in whom they have confidence lie to them, and are thus often impeded in their progress towards recovery.

n. ¶23.

There is a well-known story told by the younger Pliny of the Roman matron Arria, who, having lost her son by sickness, and all but lost her husband, used to tell the latter in his convalescence, when he enquired about the boy: “Oh, he has slept well; he has had quite an appetite.” Then she would rush out of the room to hide her tears. Father Rickaby, commenting on this story, says: “I will not vouch for the objective morality of these replies: they may or may not be justified as broad mental reservations. But they are much more easily justified, if the whole harm of lying consists in the hearer’s unwillingness to suffer a deception rendered necessary by the state of his health. The same doctrine would justify other speeches of a much more objectionable character. It would, in fact, contain the reaffirmation of the old Greek position, that deceit is a medicine and a drug, and may be administered ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει, especially by persons in authority, wherever they judge that it will work a wholesome effect, and wherever the person deceived is not unwilling, or at least ought not to be surprised or complain, considering the circumstances. But this would be to throw the door open wide to the whole crowd of official, officious, and jocose lies. Untruths told for a purpose to enemies, to children, to subjects, to servants; pleasant fictions to gratify a friend; hoaxes unlimited, where we think the victim ought not much to mind,—these will be withdrawn from the category of lying, or will be registered as white lies and lawful. Worst of all, if the whole harm of lying is in the unpleasant effect wrought upon the deceived hearer, or in the scandal and bad consequences to society at large, it is not clear that lying is impossible to God; and our faith, based on the divine veracity, is shaken to the foundation. God, as Master, might bid the deceived listener bear the mortification and shame of being duped. He might by His providence prevent any scandal or general bad consequences to society; or, as Sovereign, He might impose or permit such consequences, as He sends or permits a pestilence. The Lord of life and death, who commanded Isaac to be slain, and who daily ‘taketh away the spirit of princes,’ is not to be restrained from being a deceiver by the mere reluctance of His creatures, unless there be some element in the divine nature itself which makes it utterly impossible for God to deceive and speak false. Undoubtedly there is such an element. It lies even at the root of the sanctity of God. God is holy in that, being by essence the fullness of all Being and all Goodness, He is ever true to Himself in every act of His understanding, of His will, and of His power. By His understanding He abidingly covers, grasps, and comprehends His whole Being. With His will He loves Himself supremely. His power is exercised entirely for His glory—entirely, but not exclusively, for God’s last and best external glory is in the consummated happiness of His creatures. Whatever God makes, He makes in His own likeness, more or less so according to the degree of being which He imparts to the creature. And as whatever God does is like Him, and whatever God makes is like Him, so whatever God says is like Him. His spoken word answers to His inward word and thought. It holds of God, as of every being who has a thought to think and a word to utter:— “‘To thine own self be true, And it must follow, as the night the day, Thou canst not then be false to any man.’”³³

³³ Rickaby, Political and Moral Essays, pp. 227 sqq.

n. ¶24.

Lies told for the purpose of injuring others are, as a rule, grievous sins, though subject to parvitas materiae. The guilt in such cases is not to be measured by the damage calculated or foreseen, but primarily and above all by the malice or lack of charity which inspired them. Even a slight injury may be done with great malice.

n. ¶25.

The principal circumstances to be considered in weighing the guilt of a lie are the scandal given and the importance of veracity as a pillar of social intercourse.

n. ¶26.

d) By frequent lying a man forms the habit of mendacity, which consists in the inclination and a certain aptitude to tell lies. This vice gradually entails not only absolute indifference to truth, but a real love of lying for its own sake, which sometimes results in a sort of obsession of the soul by the evil spirit. “Why dost thou glory in malice, thou that art mighty in iniquity? All the day long thy tongue hath devised injustice, as a sharp razor thou hast wrought deceit. Thou hast loved malice more than goodness, and iniquity rather than to speak righteousness. Thou hast loved all the words of ruin, O deceitful tongue.”³⁴

³⁴ Ps. LI, 3–6.

n. ¶27.

St. Augustine calls the controversy that was waged in his time concerning the ethics of lying “magna quaestio, latebrosa nimis,” and treats it as a problem for the solution of which the most learned men have labored in vain.³⁵ It follows that at the time when the Saint wrote, this part of Catholic moral teaching had not yet been fully developed. In practice, however, lying had been condemned absolutely and unreservedly by Clement of Rome, the Shepherd of Hermas, Justin Martyr, Lactantius, and St. Basil.³⁶

³⁵ De Mendac., c. I, n. 1; c. XVIII, n. 38.—IDEM, Contra Mendac., c. XV, n. 33 (Migne, P. L., XL, 487, 513, 541).—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 82 sqq.—Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 174 sqq.

³⁶ On the veracity of God, cfr. Pohle-Preuss, God: His Knowability, Essence, and Attributes, pp. 236 sqq.; Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 186 sqq.

n. ¶28.

READINGS.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 110–111, 115 (Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus, Vol. II, pp. 13 sqq.).—Th. Meyer, S.J., Inst. Iuris Nat., Vol. II, pp. 55 sqq.—F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 433 sqq.—Kössing, Ueber die Wahrheitsliebe, pp. 161 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 82 sqq.—G. Sodeur, Luther und die Lüge, Leipsic 1904, pp. 5 sqq.—H. Grisar, Luther (tr. by Lamond, London 1913 sqq.), Vol. I, pp. 335 sq.; II, 15 sqq., 49, 385 sqq., 392; IV, 28 sq., 41, 80–178; V, 537 sqq.; VI, 513 sqq.—H. Noldin, S.J., Summa Theol. Mor., Vol. II, pp. 649 sqq.—Jos. Rickaby, S.J., Political and Moral Essays, N. Y. 1902, pp. 215 sqq.—IDEM, Moral Philosophy, 4th ed., London 1918, pp. 224 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C.S.P., Christian Ethics, N. Y. 1919, pp. 141 sqq.—A. Vermeersch, S.J., in the Gregorianum, Rome, Jan., 1920.—J. Brodie-Brosnan, “Father Vermeersch on the Malice of Lying,” in the Irish Ecclesiastical Record, Sept., 1921, No. 645, pp. 266–274.

Vermeersch, Theologia Moralis

Arthur Vermeersch, S.J. — 4 passages

Vol. II, Bk. II, Tract VI: On the Virtue of…, Chapter III: On Lying

n. 703.

Notion and malice. 1. A lie is a false signification against the mind. The common people sense this, and the age-old authority of the Catholic school approves it. It is intrinsically dishonorable, because it contains an abuse of speech or of the faculty of signifying against the primary end of that faculty. Therefore, because the primary reason of dishonorableness is repeated neither from the right of the hearer nor from social detriment, the distinction cannot be admitted between lies socially useful and socially harmful, as though the latter alone were illicit, or between false-sayings, by which no truth owed to another is denied, so that they can be honorable, and lies, which deny the truth owed to another.

Yet a lie neither removes in the speaker the subordination of the faculties, nor of itself deprives the hearer of necessary truth; wherefore it is not in itself a grave sin, but contains a malice venial in its kind; so that gravity can come only from an added injury or violated religion.

That a lie be had, there is required a) formal speech, or that you reasonably be judged to will to communicate your mind, i. e. that in exercise you say that you are speaking. Thus while you recite a fable, while you write a poem, and while, compelled, you answer without a positive obligation of saying the truth, as such you do not speak formally; - b) speech against the mind, or by which you knowingly say things which are false, so that between the expressed judgment and the mental judgment there is discrepancy.
A lie is distinguished as jocose, which is ordered to delight; officious, by which one's own utility or another's is sought; and pernicious, by which another's damage is chosen or intended. The last can become grave from the damage inflicted.

n. 704.

To use words in a restricted signification which either is intended by the one interrogating himself or appears from the circumstances is not a lie. For then, as such, they enter the conversation, and there is no discord between the concept and the expressed thing. Thus a confessor, or a public person, when interrogated, is not judged except concerning the knowledge which he has acquired under another title; a merchant, as such, is interrogated about the goods which he has for sale. - There are also formulae which from custom have acquired a new force of signifying. Thus the words: "I do not know, he is not at home" are civil formulae for denying an answer, a visit.

But mental studiousness in narrowing, completing, or changing the obvious signification of a sentence uttered is ineffective for avoiding a lie. For what is kept silent in the mind, or is pronounced so low that it cannot be heard, is not part of external or significative speech. Cf. Laymann, L. 4, tr. 3, c. 13, n. 7.

n. 705.

But a lie ceases:

If the circumstances take away the formal signification of the words; as if in jest you say openly false things, or merely use formulae of courtesy, of consolation for the sick, or in our secular forum, you deny guilt or narrate a devised "system" of defense: the accused is not judged, in that artificial defense, to open his mind in exercise through the words which he utters, but to use, as it were, a military stratagem.

Yet this cannot be transferred to boys or adolescents who, while they are being instructed, ought to confess their moderate faults to those interrogating them. For it is necessary that they consent to the correction of defects which is directed to their own good. And noble sincerity itself, made superior to inconveniences, is part of right instruction, while this would be gravely harmed through false excuses.

If you use a sentence truly amphibological: for this either signifies nothing or signifies also a true sense. Speech, however, is not made equivocal on account of the diverse senses which one word can have. Thus he who, to one clearly asking about the presence of Peter, responds: "Peter is not here," uses no amphibology because est also signifies "he eats."
If against another's unjust aggression, when another resource is lacking, you defend your silence or secret by a false statement. For just as another's unjust aggression effects that an action, which otherwise would be homicidal, is not, as an action, anything except defense of oneself, so also it will be the cause why words which, uttered outside aggression, would be lies, now at the same time are defensive of a secret and as such only are intended and chosen. Nor is it required that the aggressor be conscious of his unjust aggression. For what is materially unjust can also be repelled by force.

As Genicot-Salsmans says, I, 416, all admit that manner of responding can be chosen which seems necessary for preserving a secret. They differ only in explanation.

Some, not a few today, therefore pervert the definition of a lie, which they say is a denial of truth owed;

Others therefore deny that a lie is so intrinsically evil that it can never become lawful;

Others call it a broadly mental restriction, although it does not appear how the use of a word according to a sense of which the known circumstances permit no suspicion can be called broadly mental.

It has seemed preferable to us, according to the example of St. Thomas in the question concerning the killing of an unjust aggressor, which they also attempted to solve either through a conflict of rights, or through a restricted statement of the intrinsic malice of homicide, simply to use the principle of double effect, concerning which see I, 131.

Genicot-Salsmans also concedes that the right of legitimate defense of truth to be concealed can be invoked here.

We have treated the matter broadly in the periodical Gregorianum, vol. I, fasc. 1 and 3.

This opinion brings this advantage, that it restrains abuses, since just defense supposes present aggression, while what others concede can find a proportionate excuse even in spontaneous speech.

He who uses amphibology never lies; but he can sin, insofar as either he intends another's deception or permits it without a proportionate cause. Only the immediate proportionate utility which is procured by ambiguity can be intended.
With deplorable ease officious lies are multiplied today, so that human commerce is full of falsities and deceptions. By these arts childish instruction is corrupted and the sense of one's own dignity is diminished. Zeal for simple sincerity must be restored by words and examples.

n. 706.

Summary

A lie is defined: speech against the mind; and it is intrinsically dishonorable, since it contains an abuse of speech against the primary end of the faculty of speaking. Yet because it allows the order of man in himself and toward others to remain substantially intact, its malice is not of itself except venial.

That formal speech be had, it is necessary and of itself sufficient that, the circumstances being considered, you be judged to will to communicate your mind. If then, between the word of the mouth and the word of the mind, discrepancy is had, a lie is committed, which, whether it is directed to delight, as jocose, or to the utility of the speaker or hearer, as officious, or to causing damage, as pernicious, is cleansed from fault by no mental studiousness of changing the obvious signification of the words, or mental restriction. But amphibological words, although they can be illicit from another source, nevertheless are not a lie; and if you intend only the necessary defense of secrecy, it is lawful to defend silence or a secret against an aggression objectively unjust, even if not conscious, by a false statement.

But a boy or adolescent ought to confess his faults that are not so grave to a parent or teacher who interrogates him.

Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis

Dominic M. Prümmer, O.P. — 5 passages

Vol. II, Tr. XI, Sect. I, Q. III, Ch. III, Art. IV, II. On Injuries By Words O…, § 2. On Lying

n. 166.

166. Definition. Lying is usually defined: voluntary speech against the mind. This definition, if rightly explained, seems better than others.²⁹⁷

It is explained. It is said 1: speech; but under the name of speech is understood any external sign whatever by which interior concepts are signified, whether this is done by words or nod or gesture or writing, etc. Nevertheless, lying is chiefly and almost always done by speech, and for this reason it is deservedly called a sin of the mouth and defined: voluntary speech against the mind. - It is said 2: voluntary speech against the mind,²⁹⁸ for if someone were to speak what is false from ignorance and without consent, it would not be a lie, but objectively false speech. St. Thomas writes to the point: "The notion of lying is taken from formal falsity, namely, from this, that someone has the will of enunciating what is false; hence also lying is named from the fact that it is said against the mind. And therefore if someone enunciates what is false, believing it to be true, it is indeed materially false, but not formally, because the falsity is outside the intention of the speaker; hence it does not have the perfect notion of a lie.... But if someone formally says what is false, having the will of saying what is false, although that which is said is true, nevertheless insofar as such an act is voluntary and moral, it has falsity of itself and truth by accident; hence it attains to the species of lying."²⁹⁹ Therefore he who affirms what is false, which he thinks true, errs; he does not lie. On the contrary, he who affirms what is true, which he thinks false, does not indeed err, but lies.³⁰⁰

Theologians dispute whether the intention of leading others into error pertains to the essence of lying. For four elements can be distinguished in a lie, namely: a) the will of saying what is false, b) speech discordant from the interior judgment of the mind, c) the will of deceiving another, d) the deception really following. Without any doubt this fourth element is not of the essence of lying; hence, e.g., an accused person whom no prudent man believes when he asserts his innocence lies if without mental restriction he denies the crime committed. Therefore the deception of another is sometimes the effect of lying, but not lying itself. The third element, namely, the will of deceiving, is commonly asserted by the Scotists to be of the essence of lying, but the Thomists deny it after St. Thomas, who teaches: "That someone intends to establish falsity in the opinion of another by deceiving him does not pertain to the species of lying, but to a certain perfection of it."³⁰¹ Therefore a true lie is present, even if the one lying certainly foresees that the hearer will by no means believe his fallacious speech. Waffelaert,³⁰² however, tries to prove that in fact there is no distinction between the Thomistic and Scotistic opinion, rightly understood. For by the very fact that someone knowingly and seriously speaks something false, he intends at least implicitly to deceive another. Hence if even this implicit will of deceiving is manifestly lacking, a lie is no longer present. Thus modern authors deservedly teach that there is no lie a) if someone openly says false things from jest; b) if he brings forth things false indeed, but only materially; c) if someone uses locutions manifestly ironic or hyperbolic, or even locutions which are not usually understood as the words sound; e.g., if a servant responds to one asking, "The master is not at home," he does not wish to say that the master truly is not at home, but that the master cannot be approached.³⁰³ Therefore even according to the Thomists, an implicit intention of deceiving pertains to the essence of lying, but an explicit intention is by no means required; it is only an aggravating circumstance.

²⁹⁷ Especially the definition given by Berardi (Praxis confess. I, n. 1095) and others seems defective: "A lie is false speech against the right which another has of knowing the truth or of not undergoing deception."

²⁹⁸ i.e., against one's own knowledge and conscience.

²⁹⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 1.

³⁰⁰ Cf. St. Augustine, Enchir. c. 8.

³⁰¹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 1.

³⁰² Diss. mor. sur la malice du mensonge (Bruges 1884) p. 16 sqq.

³⁰³ Cf. Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor. I, n. 916, and St. Thomas, S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3 ad 6.

n. 167.

167. Division of lying. According to St. Thomas and other theologians there are two divisions of lying:

On the part of the end there is distinguished the officious lie, the jocose lie, and the pernicious or damaging lie.

An officious lie (Nutzlüge) is that which is chiefly brought forth in order to be useful, namely, for one's own or another's utility, without directly harming anyone, e.g., lies of children lest they be punished on account of committed delicts.

A jocose lie (Scherzlüge) is that which is chiefly made for the sake of trifling and delighting, e.g., the tales of hunters.³⁰⁴ But those locutions are not jocose lies which, considered materially indeed, are false, but from the very mode of pronouncing can immediately be understood as false (and not as really true), e.g., narratives made by the so-called Münchhausen or by Don Quixote. St. Augustine writes to the point: "Therefore excepting jests, which have never been thought lies - for they have, from the pronunciation and the very affection of the one joking, a most evident signification of a mind by no means deceiving, even if not enunciating true things - whether this kind is to be used by perfect souls is another question, which we have not now undertaken to untie";³⁰⁵ and: "Lies are performed seriously by liars, not in jest; but when things which are not are said as jokes, they are not reckoned lies."³⁰⁶ Nevertheless in oral conversation jokes of this kind are better avoided, because they easily degenerate into true lies, although jocose.

A pernicious or damaging lie (Schadenlüge) is that which causes special damage. Indeed every lie (even a jocose one) causes damage to another, insofar as by its nature it is inductive of error in the minds of hearers. For error is always something evil. But that sometimes a lie causes no error in fact to the hearers is by accident, and does not prevent every lie from causing damage of itself. Certain lies, however, produce special damages to the neighbor, e.g., concerning knowledge, goods of fortune, goods of the body, etc., and for this reason they are called, in the strict sense, damaging or pernicious lies.

On the part of opposition to truth there are distinguished boasting and irony.

Boasting,³⁰⁷ as it is taken here, is a violation of truth by excess and can be defined: a vice by which someone externally raises himself above that which is in himself.³⁰⁸ It very often arises from pride or from vainglory.

Irony³⁰⁹ is not taken here for a figurative locution by which something is mockingly said through the contrary, but for simulation by which someone either asserts of himself something vile which he does not recognize in himself, or denies of himself something great which nevertheless he perceives to be in himself. Hence it is opposed to truth by defect.³¹⁰ The sin of irony is very often accustomed to occur in false beggars, who externally simulate the greatest need, although in reality they are by no means so poor.

³⁰⁴ Commonly Jägerlatein, tall stories.

³⁰⁵ De mendacio c. 14.

³⁰⁶ In Gen. q. 145.

³⁰⁷ Ἀλαζονεία (Aristotle, Ethic. lib. 4, c. 7), Großtuerei, Prahlerische Selbstüberschätzung, Aufschneiderei, gasconnade, bragging.

³⁰⁸ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 112, a. 1, and above I, 414.

³⁰⁹ Εἰρωνεία (Aristotle, l.c.), Kleintuerei, fausse dépréciation de soi-même; false undervaluation of one's self.

³¹⁰ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 113, a. 1.

n. 168.

168. Scholion. On simulation and hypocrisy. Simulation and hypocrisy can be reduced to lying. For it belongs to the virtue of truth that someone show himself externally through external signs such as he is. But external signs are not only words, but also deeds. Falsity in words is lying; but falsity in the signs of external deeds is simulation³¹¹ (Verstellung). But hypocrisy is a species of simulation; for it is the simulation of another person and notably the vice of him who does not have holiness, but nevertheless externally so conducts himself that he may be regarded as holy. Simulation and hypocrisy must be judged especially from the end of the agent. For often they are assumed as means for obtaining a very depraved end, e.g., the kiss of Judas. When a dishonorable end is absent, they are venial sins or even wholly lack culpability. For external deeds are not so clearly and certainly significative as words, but often are of ambiguous interpretation, and therefore they must be regarded as amphibologies, which sometimes can be permitted from a reasonable cause. Thus, e.g., from a grave cause a cleric can proceed in lay dress, although then many will regard him as a lay man.

The malice of lying.

³¹¹ Ibid. q. 111, a. 1.

n. 169.

169. Principle 1. Every true lie is intrinsically evil, so that it can be made honorable by absolutely no reason.

Thus, after St. Augustine and St. Thomas, is the most common opinion, with few Catholic theologians contradicting it. Clement of Alexandria,³¹² Origen,³¹³ St. Chrysostom,³¹⁴ St. Hilary,³¹⁵ and especially Cassian³¹⁶ seem to have taught that in a case of necessity, for averting the greatest damage, it is lawful to use a lie as a medicine. Here are the words of Cassian: "Therefore one must think about lying in such a way and use it in such a way as if the nature of hellebore [Nieswurz] were in it; if it is taken when a deadly disease threatens, it becomes healthful; but if it is received without the necessity of supreme danger, it is of present destruction.... Therefore when some grave danger threatens from the confession of truth, then refuges of lies are to be received, yet in such a way that we are healthfully bitten by the guilt of a humble conscience."³¹⁷ There are, however, several Catholic theologians³¹⁸ who explain the Fathers and older ecclesiastical writers as if they spoke concerning the liceity of mental restriction, not of lying properly so called.³¹⁹ Hence there would only be a dispute about words. Certain modern Catholic theologians distinguish between a moral lie, which is never lawful, and a psychological lie, or false-speaking, which in a case of necessity is lawful according to Bolgeni,³²⁰ Piat, O. Cap.,³²¹ Tanquerey,³²² and several Protestants, such as Luther, Grotius, Pufendorf, Martensen.³²³ Again there seems to be a dispute about words; because that which they call a psychological lie or false-speaking (fausseté), others call mental restriction. Nevertheless it would be much better if the expressions "psychological lie" or "false-speaking" were avoided. For in practice it is not so easy to distinguish between a psychological and a moral lie, and it sounds very bad if a Catholic theologian says that some lie is sometimes lawful. - These things having been premised, it is proved that lying properly so called is intrinsically evil:

From Sacred Scripture, which indiscriminately prohibits every lie. You shall flee a lie;³²⁴ Do not lie, nor let each one deceive his neighbor;³²⁵ Do not lie to one another.³²⁶
From the Holy Fathers. St. Cyprian,³²⁷ citing Prov. 12, 22, says that one must not lie, because lying lips are an abomination to the Lord. - But especially St. Augustine strenuously proved in his diverse writings³²⁸ that a lie is never lawful, neither for anyone's temporal safety, nor for preserving chastity, nor for the safety of the neighbor. But since lies seem to be approved in not a few places of Sacred Scripture, e.g., Jacob, who deceived his father Isaac; the midwives, who concealed the children of the Jews by a lie; Judith, who deceived Holofernes by a lie, etc., St. Augustine shows that the alleged deeds either are not lies properly so called, or are not to be imitated. St. Thomas assumed the doctrine of St. Augustine, and simply asserts: "Every lie is a sin";³²⁹ and, "We concede that lying is always a sin."³³⁰
From reason. a) Lying is repugnant to the natural end of speech: "For since words are naturally signs of understandings, it is unnatural and undue that someone should signify by the voice that which he does not have in the mind. Hence the Philosopher says³³¹ that 'lying is of itself depraved and to be fled; but the true is good and praiseworthy.'"³³² Therefore lying is an abuse of the voice.

b) Lying is repugnant to the natural commerce of men. For without truthfulness human society cannot stand in peace.

c) Lying is repugnant to the good of the neighbor hearing. As was said above, any true lie by its nature induces the hearer into error. Now to induce another into error is to harm him. If sometimes a lie does not induce into error, this is by accident, and therefore does not change its absolute culpability.

d) Lying is repugnant to the good of the speaker himself. For although an (officious) lie sometimes seems to be useful to the speaker himself, nevertheless in reality it harms, since it excites to many evils. Hence it is evident from experience that a lying man loses nobility of soul and often sins especially from cowardice or even from a cauterized conscience.

³¹² Strom. l. 7, c. 9 (Migne, Patr. graec. 9, 474).

³¹³ Strom. l. 6 (Migne, l.c. 11, 102).

³¹⁴ Hom. 3, n. 3 in 2 Cor. 1, 17 (Migne, l.c. 61, 408).

³¹⁵ Comm. in Ps. 14, n. 10 (Migne, Patr. lat. 9, 305).

³¹⁶ Collat. 17, c. 17.

³¹⁷ L.c., in Migne, Patr. lat. 49, 1062. This doctrine of Cassian seems taken from Plato, who taught that lying is sometimes salutary: ψεῦδος δὴ ἐν φαρμάκου εἴδει (De republ. l. 3 [ed. Didot n. 389]). Socrates and the Stoics spoke in the same way. On the contrary Aristotle calls lying from its very nature something evil: καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τὸ μὲν ψεῦδος φαῦλον καὶ ψεκτόν, τὸ δ᾽ ἀληθὲς καλὸν καὶ ἐπαινετόν (Ethic. l. 4, c. [13] 7, 6).

³¹⁸ Waffelaert, Diss. mor. sur la malice du mensonge p. 41 sqq.

³¹⁹ Especially it is not so clear what St. Jerome thought in this question. In his Commentaries on the Epistle to the Galatians c. 2, 11-12 he had written that St. Paul did that very thing concerning which he rebuked St. Peter, and therefore did not speak so according to truth. St. Augustine, vehemently moved by this, invites St. Jerome to sing a palinode in this matter (Ep. 67 among the works of St. Jerome; in Migne, Patr. lat. 22, 650), but he took this very badly and wrote rather vehement letters to defend his opinion; yet he expressly asserts that he does not wish to defend an "officious lie," as Augustine imputed to him, but that the holy Apostles committed simulation from a certain "honest dispensation" (Ep. 113; ib. 923). St. Augustine was unwilling to admit even this, and strenuously defended St. Paul (Ep. 116; ib. 936 sqq.). Therefore between St. Augustine and St. Jerome there exists rather a controversy about St. Paul's manner of acting than about the liceity of lying. Nevertheless it must be confessed that St. Augustine extended the words of St. Jerome to an officious lie. - Concina treats this whole matter excellently, both historically and theologically (In Decal. l. 5, diss. 3, c. 20 and l. 10, c. 5), and also clearly shows that St. Raymond of Pennafort is falsely cited as permitting an officious lie in grave necessity.

³²⁰ Mélanges théologiques de Liége, 4th series (1850-1851), p. 409-413.

³²¹ Appendix 4 to Theol. mor. by Van der Velden I, 524 sq.

³²² Theol. mor. De iust., n. 4105 sqq.

³²³ Die christl. Ethik II (1879), 245 sqq.

³²⁴ Ex. 23, 7.

³²⁵ Lev. 19, 11.

³²⁶ Col. 3, 9; cf. also Prov. 12, 22; Eccli. 20, 26.

³²⁷ Lib. 3 testim. ad Quirin. c. 104 (Migne, Patr. lat. 4, 807).

³²⁸ De mendacio, Contra mendacium, Sermons 81, 133, and 166 (Migne, Patr. lat. 40, 494-497 and 541-547).

³²⁹ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 3.

³³⁰ Quodl. 8, a. 14.

³³¹ Ethic. l. 4, c. 7.

³³² S. theol., l.c.

n. 170.

170. Principle 2. Lying, insofar as it is chiefly opposed to truthfulness, is a venial sin; but insofar as it is opposed to justice, religion, and other virtues, it is from its genus a mortal sin.

The reason of the first part is that the abuse of speech and the other disorders found in a pure lie do not seem to be so grave that they constitute a mortal sin. Thus also bears the common sense of the faithful, even those who fear God, who do not think that they have sinned mortally if they have told a purely jocose or officious lie. And truly it seems too harsh to condemn someone to the penalty of Gehenna who departed from this life with a jocose or officious lie. Concerning these lies St. Augustine says:³³³ "There are altogether two kinds of lies in which there is no great fault, but nevertheless they are not without fault, when either we joke, or lie in order that we may help. That first, in joking, is therefore not most pernicious, because it does not deceive. For he to whom it is said knows that it was said for the sake of a joke. But the second is milder, because it retains some benevolence."

The reason of the other part of the principle is that these virtues (charity, justice, faith, religion) of themselves oblige under grave matter. Hence without any doubt he commits mortal sin who by lying causes grave scandal and thus wounds charity, e.g., if a bishop should tell a pure and foul lie; or if someone by lying causes grave damage, because it is a grave wounding of justice; or if someone tells a lie with an oath, because he wounds the virtue of religion; or if someone speaks against the true faith, because he wounds the virtue of faith. - Therefore lies which, besides truthfulness, also wound other virtues, are from their genus mortal sins; but they become venial sins either from lightness of matter or from imperfection of the act.³³⁴ But when in Sacred Scripture it is said: You will destroy all who speak a lie,³³⁵ and: The mouth that lies kills the soul,³³⁶ such and similar places are to be understood of the pernicious lie.³³⁷

³³³ Enarr. in Ps. 5, n. 2 (Migne, Patr. lat. 36, 86).

³³⁴ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 110, a. 4. - The opinion proposed by Tanquerey seems too harsh: "Lying properly so called ... is of itself a grave sin" (Theol. mor., De iust. n. 411). But if under lying properly so called only a damaging lie is understood, the proposition is indeed true, but then that manner of speaking is not pleasing, because it is repugnant to the common usage of theologians. Mausbach also speaks less rightly in this matter (Kathol. Moraltheol. III, 59).

³³⁵ Ps. 5, 7.

³³⁶ Wis. 1, 11.

³³⁷ Cf. S. theol., l.c. ad 1.

Konings, Theologia Moralis

Anthony Konings, C.SS.R. — 6 passages

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. I, ARTICLE I: ON LYING IN GENERAL

n. ¶510.

- A lie is speech or signification against the mind with the will (at least implicit. Nouv. Rev. Th. T. 18. p. 479 sq.) of deceiving. - A threefold genus of lie is distinguished: 1° harmful, by means of which unjust damage is inflicted on someone; 2° officious, which is uttered for the sake of one's own or another's utility; 3° jocose, which is done from jest and for the sole sake of trifling.

Principles. - I. A lie properly so called is always intrinsically evil. The reason is, 1° because it is repugnant to right reason to use words against their natural end and institution; 2° because, if it were licit to deceive others in speaking, the order of society, which rests upon the mutual commerce of men, would be altogether overturned. Hence: Do not lie to one another.¹ - St. Thomas,² St. Augustine.³

II. A harmful lie is grave according to the measure of the damage which is inflicted on a neighbor; for this reason there follows from it the obligation of repairing the damage. - Thus all. St. Thomas.⁴

III. An officious lie is of itself a venial sin, because in it grave disorder is not apprehended. - Thus all. - A fortiori a jocose lie of itself does not exceed venial sin. Indeed sometimes that which is called a jocose lie is altogether free from all fault; because it is not a lie properly so called, but a jest used for the sake of recreation without the will, even implicit, of deceiving, and consequently our definition does not belong to it. But this alone can be admitted when such are the adjuncts of things that the hearers can easily understand that the speaker wishes only to joke. - Thus commonly.

n. ¶511.

You will resolve. - 1° Those do not lie who assert a false thing which they believe true, but only err. On the contrary, those lie who say a true thing which they judge false, because they speak against the mind.

2° Tropic, ironic, hyperbolic expressions are not lies, when they can and are wont easily to be taken as such by the hearers. Much less are parables lies, which Christ Himself used so frequently. - Nor are equivocations lies, if they do not impede the speaker's sense from being able to be known.

3° Those do not lie who compose fables, or from jest say things openly false, as is manifest.

4° To lying are referred formal simulation, hypocrisy, flattery, and vain boasting, which of themselves do not exceed venial sin; yet they can become mortal, or rather mortal sin can accede to them on account of another species of sin which supervenes.

Vol. I, TREATISE ON THE PRECEPTS O…, Ch. I, ARTICLE II: ON MENTAL RESTRICTION

n. ¶512.

- Mental restriction is an act of the mind diverting or restricting the words of some proposition to another sense than the natural and obvious one.

Mental restriction is 1° purely or strictly mental, if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, and this is properly called mental; 2° broadly or improperly mental, if the sense of the proposition can be gathered from the adjuncts, for example from the mode of responding, from received usage, etc.

To mental restriction are reduced equivocations or amphibologies, which are expressions having a twofold sense, but one more obvious and the other literal.

n. ¶513.

Principles. - I. It is never licit to use purely or properly mental restriction, nor amphibology not perceptible in a human manner; a fortiori it is not licit to swear with the same, because it is simply a lie. This is clear also from propositions 26, 27, and 28 condemned by Innocent XI, pp. XV and XVI.¹

n. ¶514.

- II. Sometimes it is licit from a just cause to use broad restriction, that is, improperly mental restriction, and equivocal words, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that this is not evil in itself, since the neighbor is not properly deceived, but his deception is only permitted from a just cause; on the other hand, for the good of society it is required that a means be present of licitly concealing a secret; but sometimes no other means is supplied besides equivocation or broad or improperly mental restriction. - I said: from a just cause; because if the use of such restrictions were permitted without a proportionate cause, no one could or would wish to believe another; and this would yield to the greatest damage of human society. - Thus the theologians most commonly. St. Alphonsus.¹ - Lacroix.² - Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Sporer, Elbel, and innumerable others.

But it is licit to use a broad restriction of this sort even with an oath; although then a greater cause is required, since the divine testimony is not to be usurped without judgment, and indeed the greater in proportion as the words furnish greater occasion of erring. But outside judgment, or unless there is question of entering an onerous contract, it is only venial to swear in this way without just cause.³

n. ¶515.

You will resolve. - 1° He is not free from fault who uses a restriction even not purely mental, or an equivocation perceptible in some way, 1) if he does this without reason, but from the sole intention of deceiving, because it is an abuse of signs; 2) if the one questioning has the right of inquiring or commanding confession of the truth and uses that right legitimately, because regularly in a subject there corresponds to that right the obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity.⁴ Add 3) if from this some damage of a neighbor would emerge which from the precept of charity we are bound to avert; 4) while onerous contracts are celebrated; in which case justice demands that naked words be uttered according to the mind of the contracting party.⁵

2° A confessor, questioned by a tyrant whether Titius confessed homicide, can and ought to respond: I do not know; because the confessor does not know this by communicable knowledge. Indeed even if the tyrant insisted and said: Do you not know this by communicable knowledge? He could still respond: I do not know. The reason is that the tyrant well knows that he does not have the right of questioning concerning this, nor does the confessor understand himself to know as a man, but as the vicar of God, and consequently by incommunicable knowledge.

3° A guilty man questioned by a judge not juridically, or not legitimately, can respond that he has not committed the crime, by understanding: one concerning which inquiry can be made, or which he is bound to confess.¹

4° All public persons questioned concerning things committed to their trust can use a restriction of this sort, as are secretaries, legates of princes, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever has office and reason of concealing some truth. For if secrets committed to these persons were violated, most grave inconveniences would follow from this in society.

5° A servant by command of his master can deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such speech is generally received by usage for signifying that he is not at home insofar as he can be seen or visited. Yet attend to the custom of places.²

Marc, Institutiones Morales

Clement Marc, C.SS.R. — 51 passages

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eighth Precept of the Decalogue

Thou shalt not speak false testimony against thy neighbor.

(Exod., 20, 16).

n. ¶1175.

The EIGHTH precept prohibits generally that we harm our neighbor by words; and since the harm which is inflicted by words injures him in the goods of reputation and honor, this precept explicitly prohibits that we ever speak false testimony against him; but it implicitly commands that, "simulation and deceits having been removed, we measure our words and deeds by simple truth" (Catech. Rom., P. III, c. 9, n. 2). Therefore the aforesaid precept is concerned with the offices which we have toward our neighbor, both as regards truth and as regards reputation and honor. Wherefore, in a threefold chapter, we shall treat: 1. of the injury of truth; 2. of the injury of reputation; 3. of the injury of honor.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eigh…, Chapter I: On the Injury of Truth

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 110 and 111; St. Alphonsus, III, 151; ed. G., I, p. 467; Lugo, disp. 14 and 15; Lessius, l. 2, c. II and 15; Salmanticenses, tr. 13, c. 4, and tr. 27; J. Malderus, Tr. de Restr. mentali; Thomassin, Traite de la Verite et du Mensonge; Raynauldus, de Aequivocatione et Restrictione ment. (opp., t. 14); Waffelaert, Dissertation morale sur le Mensonge et l'emploi des Restrictions mentales; Berardi, Theol. mor., II, n. 961.

n. ¶1176.

To injure truth by a lie is always wrong. Yet truth itself is not to be manifested inopportunely, lest we harm ourselves or others. Therefore, with discretion persuading, sometimes we can permit the error of our neighbor by using mental restriction. Moreover, truth often must be altogether kept silent, as often namely as it has become known to us under the law of secrecy. Hence we shall speak: 1. of lying; 2. of mental restriction; 3. of violation of secrecy.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eigh…, Ch. I, Article I: On Lying

n. ¶1177.

DEFINITION. A lie is a locution against the mind with the intention of deceiving.

Here, whatever per se has the force of manifesting that which is false is called locution, whether it is done formally through words, or equivalently through gestures, nods, deeds. Locution is made against the mind when the external word is dissonant or discordant from the internal word or judgment. The intention of deceiving imports the will of so enunciating the false that it may prudently be believed by the hearer. Whence, if the intention of deceiving or of saying the false is absent, either there is no lie, or it is not imputable. Thus he does not lie who, joking, utters the false in such a way that the hearers cannot be deceived; nor he who affirms the false which he believes true. On the contrary, he lies who says the true which he thinks to be false.

Note. Some today think and intend to prove that the definition of a lie handed down by all up to now is defective, and that a lie must be defined: a locution against the mind with the intention of deceiving him who has a right of knowing the truth.1 There is no one who does not see that these Authors stand apart from the common opinion, which considers the relation of lying to be essentially toward the true or toward illuminating the intellect of another, but not toward the rights of the subject. Cf. Ami du Cl., 1912, p. 358. Yet it must be confessed with St. Augustine that this is "a most difficult and most hidden question" (Enchir., c. 18).

DIVISION. A lie is threefold: officious, jocose, pernicious.

OFFICIOUS is that which is made on account of one's own or another's utility. JOCOSE, that which is made for the sake of one's own or another's delight. PERNICIOUS, that which is made with unjust harm of neighbor.

To lying is referred: SIMULATION, "by which someone intends through an external deed to signify something other than he has in mind": whence it is called a lie of deed; likewise HYPOCRISY, which is the fiction of a sinner simulating himself as just (III, 171).

n. ¶1178.

PRINCIPLES. I. Every lie is intrinsically evil. For it is against the natural institution and end of locution, which has been given by God to men so that it may be expressive of the mind and conformable to it. Whence it is said (Levit., 19, 11): Do not lie, nor shall each one deceive his neighbor. And (Coloss., 3, 9): Do not lie to one another.

II. A lie, whether officious or jocose, nevertheless does not exceed venial fault. It is opposed only to truthfulness, which virtue, per se, does not oblige under grave matter (cf. n. 402).

III. A pernicious lie is, per se, a grave sin. It is opposed not only to truthfulness, but also to justice and charity, or even to other virtues which per se oblige under grave matter (2. 2, q. 110, a. 4). Whence it is said (Prov., 12, 22): Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord. And (Wis., 1, 11): The mouth that lies kills the soul. And it must be noted that he who has injured justice through a lie is held to restitution.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eigh…, Ch. I, Article II: On Mental Restriction

n. ¶1179.

DEFINITION. Mental restriction is an act of the mind twisting or restricting the words of some proposition to a sense other than the natural and obvious one.

DIVISION. Mental restriction is one kind purely mental, which can in no way be perceived by others; another is not purely mental, which can become known from the adjacent circumstances (III, 152).

To mental restriction are recalled EQUIVOCATIONS or amphibologies, which are ambiguous locutions, having a double sense: either one less obvious, the other more common; or one literal, the other spiritual or mystical. Some are determinable, whose sense intended by the one uttering can be known from circumstances; others are indeterminable, whose sense intended by the one uttering can by no means be detected (III, 151; H. Ap., V). Cf. Berardi, II, n. 973.

To this likewise is recalled dissimulation, by which someone neither by word nor deed signifies that which he has in mind, but as it were cuts himself off or abstracts from it: as if someone, asked whether he has money, begins to speak about another matter.

n. ¶1180.

PRINCIPLES. I. It is never licit to use purely mental restriction or indeterminable equivocation. The reason is: 1. because they per se tend to the deception of neighbor, and therefore are true lies; 2. the use of them would be pernicious to human society, and from it human commerce would collapse; 3. it is established from Sacred Scripture (Eccli., 37, 23): He who speaks sophistically is hateful; and from propositions 26, 27, and 28 condemned by Innocent XI. Hence, a fortiori, it is never licit to swear with the same (cf. n. 608, q. 2).

n. ¶1181.

II. It is licit, from a just cause, to use a restriction not purely mental or a determinable equivocation. It is proved: 1. From the nature of the matter: for to use a restriction of this kind is not to lie, because then we do not deceive our neighbor, but from a just cause permit that he deceive himself; and moreover the sense of the speaker can be sufficiently perceived from the adjuncts; whence it is only a prudent concealment of truth. 2. From the example of Christ the Lord, who, when asked whether he would ascend to the feast day, responded: I will not ascend (John, 7, 8), and yet afterward he ascended. But he had said: "I will not ascend," namely manifestly, because the disciples wished that he ascend to manifest his divinity.

To the matter the Angelic Doctor speaks thus (2. 2, q. 110, a. 3, ad 4): "It is not licit to tell a lie for this, that someone may free another from any danger whatever; nevertheless it is licit to conceal the truth prudently, under some dissimulation." And this same thing, almost unanimously, all theologians teach, St. Alphonsus being witness (III, 152). Cf. Panzuti, II, n. 134; Junglas, Der rechtsgeschichtliche Hintergrund fur Liguori's Lehre vom Gerichtseid.

n. ¶1182.

Corollaries. 1. A just cause, so that we may licitly use restriction, is, in general, the necessity of preserving a secret; for this is required for the good of society, and sometimes by no other means can the secret be preserved.

Yet for permitting the use of restrictions not purely mental, sometimes a reasonable cause suffices, say for freeing oneself from the importunate and unjust interrogation of another, and any other honorable end. But it must be noted: a) that the greater cause is required, the more the words furnish an occasion of erring. Whence, if they furnish almost none, as are words equivocal per se, which have a double sense per se, the slightest cause excuses. b) A greater cause is required for equivocating with an oath than without it (III, l. c.).

But a just cause is not given when a SPECIAL LAW requires manifestation of the truth. Then it is not licit to use equivocation, but the truth is sincerely to be made manifest. The reason is plain of itself. But such a law is present in the following cases: a) When the precept of professing the faith externally urges. b) When the judge legitimately interrogates; because then the just precept of the Superior obliges, to which one must submit. c) The same obtains when a Superior legitimately interrogates concerning those things which regard the government of subjects; or a confessor concerning those things which he ought to know for rightly judging the penitent. d) Finally in onerous contracts, where strict justice requires that no injury be brought upon the other (H. Ap., V, 15).

n. ¶1183.

For practice, you conclude: 1. All public persons, interrogated concerning matters committed to their faith, can use mental restriction: such as ministers and legates of princes, secretaries, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, etc. For if secrets committed to persons of this kind were violated, most grave inconveniences would follow, as no one fails to know.

As often as someone is held to conceal the infamy of another, he licitly says: I do not know, namely with communicable knowledge. A fortiori, the confessor can do this, indeed is held to this, as is plain (III, 153).
The accused or a witness, not legitimately interrogated by the judge, can respond that he did not commit or does not know the crime, understanding, concerning which inquiry can be made, or which he is held to confess. Otherwise, if the interrogation is legitimate and juridical, as will be explained in the treatise on the Lay State (cf. n. 2315).
An adulteress interrogated by her husband can equivocally assert that she has not broken the marriage, which truly persists. And if she has confessed the adultery sacramentally, she can respond: "I am innocent of this crime"; because through confession it has now been taken away (III, 162).
He who has promised marriage, to which from some excusing cause he is not held, can deny the promise, namely that by which he is obligated. Likewise, he who was compelled to marriage can assert to the judge, even with an oath, that he did not contract, namely freely, as was proper (III, 159).
One asked to lend money can licitly say: Would that I had it! or: I do not have it, although he has it, understanding that he does not have it for lending, if the matter is thus (III, 163).
He who must cede his goods, needing hidden goods for support, can respond to the judge that he has nothing, namely which he is held to cede. Likewise an heir who without an inventory has hidden goods, if he is not held to satisfy creditors from those goods, can respond to the judge that he has hidden nothing, understanding: from the goods from which he is held to satisfy (III, 158).
A servant can, by command of the master, deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such a locution is generally received by use for signifying that he is not at home, insofar as he can be seen. Likewise he can respond: He has gone out, understanding: at a past time. Attend, in these matters, to the custom of places.
A seller before a notary can assert that he has accepted money which he has not yet received, but which he will receive shortly. For common use concedes this (III, 167).
A debtor who has satisfied the creditor, although nevertheless he cannot legally prove the satisfaction, can deny that he contracted any debt, understanding: so that I ought to pay (III, 159).
One coming from a place which is falsely thought to be infected by disease can deny that he comes from it, namely as infected by pestilence; because this is the mind of the guards. Likewise, he who is not held to taxes can say that he carries nothing, that is, from which he is held to pay.
One invited to a table, and asked whether the food is good, can respond that it is good, although in reality it is tasteless, understanding, for mortification and penance, etc., etc. (III, 160).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eigh…, Ch. I, Article III: On Violation of Secrecy

n. ¶1184.

DEFINITION. Secret or hidden matter in general is called whatever is occult. But here is understood whatever, either from its nature or from a special contract, must be preserved occult.

DIVISION. Besides sacramental secrecy, concerning which we shall treat later, a threefold secrecy is distinguished: 1. NATURAL or simple, which arises from the nature itself of things, from the fact namely that a thing known by chance cannot be manifested without damage or displeasure of neighbor; 2. PROMISED, which namely someone promised to preserve after accepting knowledge of the matter; 3. COMMITTED or rigorous, embracing namely those things which have not been revealed to someone except under an express or tacit pact of preserving silence.

A tacit pact is judged to be present when from the fact itself it is established that the matter is committed under secrecy, for example if recourse is had to a physician or to an advocate for remedy or counsel. To committed secrecy is reduced that which is revealed to a priest outside confession under quasi-sacramental secrecy.

It comes to be said: 1. of revelation; 2. of inquiry into and use of another's secret. For anyone has a right that his secret not be explored, manifested, and finally that no illegitimate use be made of it.

Etude sur la malice intrins. du Mens., by a professor of Theology (Paris, 1899); cf. Berardi, Theol. mor. (1905), II, n. 976.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eigh…, Ch. I, Art. III, § 1. On Revelation of a Secret

It is easily understood that another's secret cannot be revealed without a proportionate cause; and that the sin of one revealing is more or less grave, according to the nature of the secret, or the gravity of the damage inflicted.

n. ¶1185.

PRINCIPLES. I. The obligation of preserving a natural secret is in general under grave matter. The matter is plain of itself, since this obligation arises either from charity or from justice.

Whence he who knowingly and unjustly manifests a secret is held to reparation of the damage. But a just cause of revealing it would be the necessity of avoiding damage threatening oneself or neighbor, which from the law of charity he is not held to undergo (IV, 49). See the things to be said n. 1198.

n. ¶1186.

II. The obligation of preserving a promised secret is diverse according to the diversity of the intention of those promising. Therefore it will be either grave or light, according to the intention of the one promising, who is not judged to have contracted a grave obligation unless this is established. The reason is that a mere promise of secrecy is a gratuitous contract, which therefore is subjected to the rules of a contract of this kind (cf. n. 1062).

Wherefore: a) A simple promise of silence does not oblige, per se, with grave damage of the one promising. b) Likewise, a promise of silence, even sworn, does not oblige against the common good and justice; where namely silence would yield to grave detriment of the community, to the condemnation of an innocent person, to grave sin of the one to whom the promise was made (for example if there were concealed a diriment impediment of a marriage to be contracted by the one to whom the promise was made); where finally the one promising is legitimately interrogated in judgment under the faith of an oath. c) He who seriously promised silence even with the loss of life, and can preserve it with the common good uninjured, very probably is held to stand by the promise. Yet the opposite opinion is also sufficiently probable, because it is licit for no one to squander life (III, 971; H. Ap., V, 18).

n. ¶1187.

III. The obligation of a committed secret is grave from its genus. Thus especially if the secret was committed from necessity or utility, as happens with physicians, notaries, advocates, or theologians consulted. For such a secret has the nature of an onerous contract, and it is of concern to the whole of society that it be guarded inviolably.

Hence, by reason of office and of the public good, men of this kind are often held to silence even with danger of grave proper damage. Nor are they released from silence by the authority of a judge legitimately interrogating, unless the matter is already known in another way, or unless there is present from elsewhere a just cause of revealing: for the judge cannot abrogate the right of nature (III, 970, 2).

IT IS ASKED. When does the obligation of preserving a secret CEASE?

Resp. 1. The obligation of a secret, even committed, ceases where revelation is necessary for the common good, for the safety of an innocent person, for the good of the one committing it himself.

Hence, a physician licitly warns some bride about the contagious disease of the bridegroom, if he, having been warned, would not desist from marriage. You licitly are silent about the true favorer of some crime, although another were accused, unless the guilty person unjustly strives to accuse the innocent.

The obligation of a secret, even committed, also ordinarily ceases if it is a question of avoiding grave proper damage. The reason is that your right prevails, and charity does not oblige with so great an inconvenience (see n. 1182).

Therefore you licitly reveal the author of a homicide if you have been suspected, provided another means is not present for freeing yourself.

In all these things, however, account must be had of the common good, which in some cases must prevail over one's own good and over the good of the one committing the secret. Thus, for example, an advocate, knowing the fortune of his client to be unstable, cannot warn his own brother, the creditor of the client. A physician, an advocate, to whom impediments of marriage are revealed for taking counsel, cannot reveal them to the parish priest, as we shall say n. 2065. An official to whom secrets of State are committed is not freed from the obligation of secrecy even by fear of death.

Revelation of a secret is likewise excused from sin, at least grave sin, where the consent of the one committing it is reasonably presumed; where the secret is (or is certainly believed to be) of slight moment; where finally it has been notably made common. Nor is it grave, probably, if the revelation is made to one upright person; provided that this person truly preserves the secret, and provided he is not such a one from whom the one committing it specially wished the matter to be hidden (III, 971).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eigh…, Ch. I, Art. III, § 2. On Inquiry into and Use of Another's Secret

n. ¶1188.

PRINCIPLES. I. He who unjustly inquires into another's secrets, or extorts them, sins against justice, and cannot use a secret so acquired. The reason of the first is that he does injury to him who possesses a right to the secret. The reason of the second is that no one can licitly continue and perfect an unjust action. Whence you cannot use a secret unjustly acquired even for avoiding your own damage (III, 969; V, 70, 5).

He sins more gravely who extorts secrets with the mind of using them for the damage of neighbor. He sins only venially who in exploring secrets is led by curiosity.
The gravity of the sin must be judged according to the object of the secret, that is, according to the utility which the secrets have for the possessor, insofar as the privation of them brings harm to him, whether in goods of fortune or in his reputation. Nevertheless, the gravity of the sin cannot, for every inquiry, be stated from this rule. For sometimes this inquiry can be assimilated to revelation which is made to one discreet and taciturn man (cf. n. 1200, Question 4).

From these things you conclude: a) He sins who without cause (or without at least the presumed permission of the owner) opens and reads letters (or other private writings) which the owner hides, or has lost by chance, or has torn in such a way that the will of concealing their argument became known.

b) Postal officials of themselves always sin gravely by opening and reading letters. The common good, which from contract they promised to preserve, and the very strict civil law impose this grave burden on them. Cf. Linz. Quart. Schr., 1903, p. 42.

c) They sin gravely who deliberately take pains to hear an accusation of sins made in the confessional (Ami du Cl., 1905, p. 971; Linz. Quart. Schr., 1906, p. 353, 829). Nevertheless, if they use knowledge acquired in this way, so that, for example, they accuse a thief more securely before a judge, they do not by that very fact become the efficacious cause of the damage which the thief suffers from the sentence of the judge. Linz. Quart. Schr., l. c.

n. ¶1189.

II. It is licit, with a just cause or the permission of the owner, at least presumed, to inquire into another's secrets, and to use those acquired in this way. The reason is that no injury is given where the owner consents or reasonably ought to consent. But then he ought to consent when, on the part of the one inquiring, there is present a certain and stronger right: namely a just cause. Finally, it is plain that the use of a thing justly acquired cannot constitute injury.

But a just cause is the necessity of averting grave damage impending to the community, or to you or yours.

Hence, they can licitly open and read another's letters: 1. Public ministers, as often as the public good requires it, for example in time of war. 2. A Superior of a community, from legitimate custom, or from probable suspicion of evil, or even by force of the rule; excepted nevertheless are letters which are sent to Superiors of a higher order, or are received from them. 3. All, insofar as is necessary for protecting themselves or their own from unjust vexation of the writer. We say: from unjust vexation of the writer; for, as St. Alphonsus warns, "it is not licit for you to open the letters of another, for procuring your good, or for avoiding some evil, because this would be against the common good of human commerce; for authors permit this only for protecting oneself from unjust vexation of an enemy" (III, 969; V, 70). 4. All to whom the care of a minor subject is committed, for example parents, tutors, Superiors of a school. Except, as regards matters pertaining to the inmost conscience.

But husbands illicitly read letters sent to a wife. Say the same concerning masters as regards letters which are sent to their servants. Always except if they truly suspect something evil.

Note. a) Friends of friends, sisters of sisters, often do not sin by reading letters, because there is present a tacit consent of the other party to these things. b) If you have justly accepted knowledge of someone's secret, nevertheless you must preserve silence from charity, as often as damage of someone could proceed from revelation. Indeed, by revealing a secret of this kind, you will sin against justice if you understand that the hearers are going to use that knowledge for inflicting damage unjustly (V, 70, 6). Cf. the things said n. 948.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eigh…, Chapter II: On Injury of Reputation

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3; q. 73; St. Alphonsus, III, 962; ed. G., II, p. 354; Lugo, disp. 14, n. 10-134; Mazzotta, tr. 4, disp. 2, q. 2; Soto, l. 5, q. 10; Elbel, IV, n. 343; Lancicius, opusc. 19: de vitand. Judic. temer.; Berardi, Theol. mor., III, n. 460, Appendix.

n. ¶1190.

Things to be noted beforehand. REPUTATION is public opinion or estimation concerning someone's excellence. More commonly it is defined: the good estimation of many concerning the life and morals of someone.

The RIGHT TO REPUTATION can be either absolute, or conditioned or limited. The absolute belongs to him who has perpetrated no deed worthy of blame; for he possesses full ownership of his reputation. But he retains a limited right, or only possession of reputation, who indeed has committed crimes, but only occult ones. A right must be attributed to him not by reason of the person, but by reason of society, of which he is a member and ought to remain a useful member (Lugo, disp. 14, n. 97; Noldin, II, 643).

Both the living and the dead possess a right to reputation. As regards the living, it is plain. As regards the dead, this cannot be denied, for: a) the reputation which they had among the living endures, and they desire that its duration never cease; b) this reputation does not lack a juridical subject which holds it, because the rational soul does not lose existence. Yet reputation profits the dead less than the living.
The right to reputation is lost if someone's crime becomes notorious. Namely a crime can be NOTORIOUS by a threefold publicity: a) by publicity of law, if it is established concerning it either through the sentence of a judge, or through confession of the matter itself; b) by publicity of fact, if it was committed in a public place and before witnesses; c) by publicity of reputation, if it has become known to so many persons that it can no longer happen that it not be divulged among all. Now, behold the NORM which St. Alphonsus hands down concerning this matter (III, 976): "Doctors commonly judge it sufficient if in some COMMUNITY of 8 persons, four know it; or if of 100 persons, fifteen know it; or if of 1000 persons, about twenty know it, of more than two different families; but that it is public in some NEIGHBORHOOD of 40 persons if eight from different families know it; likewise, if in a TOWN of 5000 citizens forty scattered through it know it. Doctors add that a crime is called famous if the reputation of it wanders through the greater part of the town, community, neighborhood, or parish; likewise one is said to be defamed in a kingdom who has now been defamed in a court or in another illustrious place, from which reputation easily flows into the kingdom."

Further, concerning the reputation of neighbor there is given: 1. A NEGATIVE precept, namely of not injuring reputation; but it is injured interiorly, at least as it were inchoatively, through rash judgment, but exteriorly and strictly speaking, through detraction. 2. An AFFIRMATIVE precept, namely of defending the reputation of another when attacked and of restoring it when taken away.

Hence there is a fourfold article: 1. concerning rash judgment; 2. concerning detraction; 3. concerning the obligation of defending reputation; 4. concerning the obligation of restoring reputation.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eigh…, Ch. II, Article I: On Rash Judgment

n. ¶1191.

DEFINITION. Rash judgment is a firm assent, arising from slight indications, by which some sin or defect is attributed to neighbor.

Other internal acts approach rash judgment: 1. rash SUSPICION, which is a less firm assent and with fear concerning the opposite; 2. DOUBT, which is a suspension of the soul determining itself to neither part. Yet these grades are not rarely used promiscuously.

"Rashness in judgments, suspicions, and doubts has place when we consider that which is against, and not that which is for; and when we give to indications or reasons contrary to our neighbor more weight than they really have; whence either we judge probable what is only possible; or certain what is doubtful; or grave what is light; or continuous what perhaps was committed once; or finally malicious what perhaps was done inadvertently or even reasonably" (Berardi, Theol. mor., III, n. 499).

n. ¶1192.

PRINCIPLES. I. Rash judgment concerning a grave evil of neighbor is a mortal sin from its genus. The reason is that a grave injury is done to neighbor when, without cause, he is held to be wicked; since each one has a right that a false crime not be imputed to him (III, 973). Whence it is said (Matt., 7, 1): Judge not, that you may not be judged. And (1 Cor., 4): Judge not before the time (that is, of judgment). - "In confession, however, it is not necessary to explain the species of the evil judged, since all (rash judgments) are opposed to one commutative justice, in the lowest species" (III, 962).

Rash judgment is VENIAL: a) if someone has great probability for judging sinisterly about neighbor; b) if the evil which is attributed to neighbor is not gravely injurious, for example that a soldier blasphemed; c) if the judgment is made concerning someone unknown or indetermined among several, for example if he is a member of a certain group; d) if someone judges from involuntary subreption, as often happens, not perfectly adverting either to the gravity of the object or to the insufficiency of the reasons from which he judges (III, l. c.).

n. ¶1193.

II. Rash suspicion and doubt per se are sins only venial. Commonly all these are only a certain incitement to assent; for in some way a good estimation of neighbor remains in the mind: therefore no grave injury is done to him, since he is not totally disturbed from possession of good reputation.

Yet per accidens the sin is more probably grave, "if without indications a suspicion were made concerning the gravest sins, as it would be to suspect concerning a pious religious that he is a heretic, or that he has committed incest with his mother; or concerning a man commonly held as Catholic, that he is Jewish or atheist. The reason is that perhaps greater injury

is inflicted upon them by suspecting such things than if a certain judgment were had concerning ordinary grave crimes of theirs." Likewise, suspicions put on GRAVE guilt if they proceed from contempt or gravely sinful hatred, or if they are manifested to someone with grave damage of neighbor (III, 963, 965). Cf. the things to be said n. 1195.

n. ¶1194.

III. He who has rashly suspected or judged is held from justice to reform his suspicion and his judgment. This is plain from the things said: for every injury of justice must be repaired, insofar as can be done (cf. n. 726).

Note. 1. "If sinister suspicions are going to have practical consequences to the great burden of neighbor (for example if it were a question of a Superior who, without such suspicion, would be about to confer a benefice on such a priest; or of a master who on account of the suspicion would be about to cast a servant out from his own service with the servant's greatest damage); then it does not suffice to take care that those indications which are against not be increased by the imagination, and that those which present themselves spontaneously in favor not be voluntarily rejected; but it is moreover necessary that, according to the gravity and possibility of the matters, inquiries be made, so that the truth may be discerned."

"Suspicions and judgments against neighbor can in some way be sins, although they are not rash; and this happens when someone willingly thinks about the defects and vices of others (especially if he studiously inquires about them) without any reason and excusable motive; for thoughts of this kind are against charity (charity does not think evil: 1 Cor., 13), they beget aversions, and they have nourishment from some passion" (Berardi, l. c., n. 500, 503).

For practice St. Alphonsus warns: "In this matter let the confessor advert that many rude persons accuse themselves that they have judged rashly. It is necessary to make it so that they know: a) When sufficient moments are present for thus judging about some action, the judgment is not rash, but just, and therefore is not culpable. b) These, for the most part, are not judgments, but suspicions, which masters and fathers of families are sometimes held to have, so that they may impede some sin: for example lest servants steal, lest daughters sin by conversing with men, and other things of this kind. Only let it be adverted that they not communicate suspicions of this kind to others without necessity" (H. Ap., IX, 2).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eigh…, Ch. II, Article II: On Detraction

n. ¶1195.

DEFINITION. Detraction is the occult and unjust blackening of another's reputation. It is said 1. Occult, namely brought upon one absent, at least from the intention of the detractor: by which part it is distinguished from CONTUMELY, which takes honor away from one present. 2. Unjust: for if it were a just blackening of another's reputation, it would not be formal detraction (Polman, 2. 2, n. 489).

DIVISION. Detraction is called: 1. simply such, or defamation, when a true vice of neighbor is manifested without a just cause; if the manifestation is made for dissolving friendship and sowing discord among friends, it is called whispering; 2. calumny, or infamation, when a false crime is imposed on neighbor.

DETRACTION can be done directly or indirectly, according as namely it either is positively intended, or is foreseen as going to follow from an action or from some locution. But it is committed in various modes, which are customarily expressed in these verses:

Imposing, increasing, manifesting, turning to evil;

He who denies or is silent, diminishes, or praises tepidly.

The first four modes detract directly, the others indirectly. But all are, per se, of the same species, because all regard the same good of reputation. Yet not rarely other things are injured also through detraction, whether religion, piety, or chastity in words, or justice in goods of fortune.

CALUMNY differs in species from simple detraction, because it adds lying to detraction, and moreover is against the right which each one has that a false crime not be imputed to him.

Likewise a special malice is in WHISPERING. It agrees with detraction on the part of the matter, but differs on the part of the end; and therefore it is diverse in species and graver than detraction.

n. ¶1196.

PRINCIPLES. I. Detraction (whether it is infamation or defamation) is a mortal sin from its genus. From its nature it is graver than theft, which is mortal, since it injures the reputation of neighbor, which is a greater good than riches: according to that saying (Prov., 22, 1): A good name is better than many riches.

We have said: 1. Whether it is infamation, which is intrinsically evil, and therefore always illicit, as is established from proposition 44 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is probable that he does not sin mortally who imposes a false crime on someone in order to defend his own justice and honor."

Or defamation, which is namely unjust as often as neighbor possesses his good estimation either totally or partially, and can reasonably require silence. For then he has a right that a good useful for many things and, as is supposed, by no means harmful to others, not be taken away from him (see n. 1200, Question 1).

n. ¶1197.

II. The gravity of detraction is taken rather from the gravity of the injury in reputation, or in goods of fortune. The reason is plain from the unshaken principle which St. Thomas expresses: "Sins which are committed against neighbor must be weighed per se according to the harms which are brought upon neighbor: because from this they have the nature of fault" (2.2, q. 73, a. 3). To the gravity of the defect revealed one must attend only afterward.

Therefore to know whether detraction is a GRAVE or LIGHT sin, it must first be distinguished whether it carries with itself PUBLIC infamy, or is restricted to a FEW PERSONS. Then the gravity of detraction is taken: 1. from the nature of the defect which is narrated; 2. from the quality of the person detracting, whether he is grave, light, talkative; 3. from the quality of the person injured, whether he is of good or bad reputation, whether he is of such a condition that the defect revealed brings peculiar infamy; 4. from the quality of the hearers, whether they are discreet or talkative, etc. (Berardi, l. c., n. 482).

The number of hearers certainly makes for the greater gravity of detraction. Yet probably it does not multiply detraction, although it multiplies the sin of scandal. See the things said in the treatise on Sins (n. 332, Question 2).

n. ¶1198.

III. Sometimes it is licit to manifest the true crime of another. For the right of reputation founded in ignorance of a true crime can be elided by a stronger right, when namely a just or proportionate cause requires revelation of the crime; nor can the one defamed reasonably be unwilling (III, 968).

Therefore it is licit to manifest a defect of neighbor: 1. On account of a just cause. But the just causes are the following: a) The spiritual good of the delinquent, when namely for his amendment it is necessary that the matter be manifested to a judge, prelate, master, parent, etc. b) A notable good of the one revealing, for example for taking help or counsel in a grave matter, or for averting grave damage. c) The public good, for example for impeding evils threatening the Church, or the republic, or some community. d) The private good of the hearers and of others, for example that they may be freed from threatening damages; thus, if you know a thief to dwell with another ignorant of it, you can make him more certain, so that he may beware for himself.

"Whence, when it is a question of conferring an office, of contracting marriage, of receiving into Religion, of taking on a physician, preceptor, servant, associate, etc., it is licit to manifest (indeed sometimes one must manifest) the occult impediments, incapacity, crimes of another, whence notable inconvenience would deservedly be feared.

Under the due conditions. For it is required: a) That you not intend to defame neighbor, but to avert your own or another's damage; whence, if you can avoid the damage without diminution of the reputation of another, you are held to this. b) That the damage to be averted be sufficiently proportioned to the loss of reputation. It suffices indeed that the damage to be avoided be grave, although somewhat greater damage threatens the one defamed. Indeed, it suffices if you doubt about the gravity of your damage; because, in such doubt, favor must be given to the innocent. Yet except if you know the matter under a committed secret; because in that case a graver and more certain cause is required, as we have said (n. 1187). c) That you proceed cautiously, manifesting the matter neither more nor to more persons than is necessary, and exacting secrecy from him to whom you manifest it. d) That you did not accept knowledge of the crime through force or fraud, for example by opening letters, unless you would also have had a right to this (III, 969; 1. El. qq. ref., 40). Cf. the things said above n. 1188.

Note. The things which we establish here must be developed through those things which are said n. 494 concerning fraternal correction. In communities living under a rule, if it is a question of a matter of great moment, for the most part it is expedient that correction be made by the way of denunciation to the Superior as father. In religious Orders, this is especially valid for the time of visitation. This indeed, from its nature, is a paternal, not a judicial, inquiry. Nevertheless subjects are held to manifest those things which could yield to the damage of observance, or of the community, or of a private third party. Cf. Bouix, de Jure Reg., II, p. 478.

n. ¶1199.

IV. Detraction is not present when the crime of neighbor is notorious either by law, or by fact, or by reputation. The reason is that in these cases neighbor can no longer be said to be in possession of his reputation. Yet charity can persuade many things, indeed impose some things, as regards these.

a) If the crime of neighbor is notorious by publicity of LAW, it is licit to speak about it and to manifest it to others; because, in this case, the guilty person has lost the right to reputation through public authority; nor is charity injured, because the public good demands this, that bridles be thrown upon the wicked through divulgation of the sentence of the judge, and that others may be able to beware for themselves of evil-doers: provided the manifestation is not made from hatred nor from revenge. b) Likewise, it is licit to manifest if it is NOTORIOUS by publicity of FACT or REPUTATION; for such a manifestation is neither against justice, since reputation has now been lost; nor is it against charity (at least gravely), because the delinquent cannot reasonably be saddened from it. c) Similarly, it is not mortal to manifest a crime or offense which is not yet public (or is not public in such a place), but concerning which moral certainty is had that it is going to become public shortly (whether through evidence of fact, or through sentence of the judge); because it harms little, unless nevertheless from such anticipation grave damages would follow (III, 974).

We have said: it is not mortal, but it can be venial. To the matter the distinguished Berardi speaks thus (l. c., n. 481): "The poor," he says, "do not have a right to the substances of a rich man; and nevertheless the rich man from charity ought to assist the poor asking alms, as much as he can. Something similar happens in the case of a wretched man subjected to public infamy. He indeed does not have a right that we be silent; yet he asks in his heart, and perhaps earnestly begs, that we consult for his reputation as much as we can. Therefore silence and compassion are certain alms, which often we can furnish without any sacrifice, and from which therefore we are not easily excused... Further, to these we are held from charity, although ordinarily under light matter."

n. ¶1200.

Questions. QUAER. 1. Whether he sins GRAVELY who manifests in ANOTHER PLACE, to which divulgation has not yet come and is not shortly going to come, a crime public in one place?

Resp. If the crime is public by notoriety of law, it can be published anywhere without injustice; because the guilty person has been legitimately stripped of reputation by public authority, and indeed in punishment of his crime (H. Ap., XI, 13).

But if the crime is public only by notoriety of fact or reputation, there are three opinions. The first says that the manifestation is a grave sin against justice, because the delinquent still possesses his reputation elsewhere. The second holds that it is mortal against charity; for, although the guilty person has lost the right to reputation, nevertheless he would be greatly saddened knowing that his crime (of itself occult) is made public where it is still unknown. The third, more common opinion teaches that this is not grave, neither against justice nor against charity, because it conduces to the common good that evil-doers be known. This reason is very probable, provided it is limited to crimes which render a man pernicious and to be avoided by others, such as robbery, treacherous homicide, scandalous impurity, heresy, and similar things. And then, if the crime is public by notoriety of fact, because namely it was publicly committed, it is freely licit to speak about it; if by notoriety only of reputation it is public, great discretion is required (III, 974; 2. El. qq. ref., n. 12). "For this public reputation is easily feigned. But advert that an offense published in only one family or monastery cannot be called absolutely public; whence it cannot be manifested elsewhere, and not even in another monastery of the same Order which would have frequent communication with it" (H. Ap., XI, 12; Croix, 1, 3, p. 2, n. 1221).

QUAER. 2. Whether he sins MORTALLY who manifests an offense formerly public and now occult?

Resp. Per se, he sins mortally, at least against charity. Except if the offense had formerly been public by notoriety of law, or if it belonged to history.

As Noldin rightly observes (II, n. 653): To historiographers, from the general end of history, greater liberty is accustomed to be conceded, insofar as, without a peculiar reason of good, they can commit to writings the occult crimes of private persons of a past time. Yet it is necessary that they attend to two things: a) If descendants of some very ancient family still live, the principles established as regards detraction are to be strictly observed. b) The offenses of some state in species, for example the clerical, are to be recounted in such a way that the good which is hoped from the narration, by reason of greater scandal going to arise, does not become empty.

QUAER. 3. Whether it is MORTAL only to report the occult sins of another, as heard from others?

Resp. Negatively, "if you report in such a way that it is not probable to you that any infamy will arise from it, because the others are not going to believe."

"But if you report things heard before those who probably are going to believe from their own levity or malice alone, you indeed do not sin against justice, because you are not the efficacious cause of the damage, but you sin against charity, because each one is held to impede grave damage of neighbor, insofar as he conveniently can."

"Finally, if you report in such a way that the hearers probably and deservedly are going to believe (say if you assert that you have heard from a person worthy of faith), then you sin also against justice, because you give a sufficient cause of believing the evil... But if you report some very enormous crime of someone, say heresy, rebellion, sodomy, then you sin gravely, even if you say it doubtfully, because this suspicion alone greatly defames a man" (III, 977; H. Ap., XI, 15).

QUAER. 4. Whether it is a MORTAL sin to reveal the OCCULT crime of neighbor to one or another prudent and taciturn man?

Resp. Distinguish. Either the revelation is made for easing the pain of an offense, or without cause. If the FIRST, Doctors most commonly hold that such a revelation made without the intention of detracting is not sinful, at least gravely; and in this way servants disclosing injuries inflicted by a master, wives by husbands, sons by a father, etc., can probably be excused. If the SECOND, some with Busenbaum judge that it is mortal, because the injury of reputation before one person is judged grave, as is plain from rash judgment. Yet others sufficiently probably deny this: provided the one revealing does not act from malice, nor on the part of the hearer is further manifestation feared. The reason is,

because, since reputation consists in the common estimation of men, he is not judged absolutely defamed who has lost his reputation only before one or another.

Nor does the parity of rash judgment stand in the way; because the malice of rash judgment is not taken from the damage of infamy, but from contempt, malevolence, or injury, which is brought upon neighbor through imputation of a false crime (III, 973).

QUAER. 5. Whether it is a mortal sin to REVEAL the crime of a neighbor who is already defamed from another crime?

Resp. It is not grave if a crime very closely related to that on account of which he has already been marked with infamy is revealed; because from such revelation the infamy is not notably increased: as if you say of a public thief that he is perjured; of a notorious player, that he does not have care for his family.

Otherwise, if another diverse sin is revealed: because one infamous in one genus of vice has not lost the right of reputation in other virtues. Thus it is also grave, concerning a woman defamed in one adultery, to narrate another occult one (III, 976; H. Ap., XI, 14).

QUAER. 6. Whether it is licit to defame ONESELF?

Resp. Distinguish. 1. To defame oneself through the imposition of a false crime is never licit, because it is not licit to lie. If death or grave spiritual or temporal damage of another would follow from such infamation, the one defaming himself would sin mortally, because he would cooperate positively with death or damage.

But what if the guilty person were to confess a false crime for this end, that, the penalty of death being inflicted, he might avoid grave torments? Some deny that he sins gravely, because no one is held to preserve life with so great a torture, which would seem harsher than death itself; but they say that he sins lightly by reason of the lie. But others more probably affirm that he sins gravely, because the false confession would still be an illicit cooperation with his own unjust death (IV, 275).

"To defame oneself through revelation of a true crime regularly is not mortal; because it is not against justice, since a man is owner of his own reputation; nor against charity, because this does not oblige to conserving external goods, except insofar as one's own safety or that of neighbor requires this. Yet per accidens it can be mortal, as, for example, if your reputation is necessary for an office, or if damage of life to you, or of infamy to others, would follow from the same" (III, 983).

n. ¶1201.

From the things said you resolve: a) It is not mortal per se to reveal NATURAL DEFECTS of soul, body, or birth; because such defects are not moral; nor is it regarded as infamy among prudent persons that someone, for example, is stupid, illegitimate, one-eyed. But per accidens it can be grave, if namely great temporal damage would follow from it; or if you say concerning an honorable man that he was illegitimately born, or exercised a most vile office, etc. (III, 967; V, 72; 1. El. qq. ref., 54).

b) "It is not mortal to report mortal sins which, ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONDITION OF THE PERSON, do not notably injure his reputation: for example, if you say that a soldier thinks about revenge; that an adolescent is prodigal, given to loves, etc." (ib.).

c) It is not grave to speak ill of someone UNKNOWN or indetermined, for example that in such a place there are many wicked, drunk, impure persons; because thus grave infamy is brought upon no one in species.

d) "But they sin most gravely who detract from some Order or state of religious in common, or from a MONASTERY, by saying, for example, that life is bad in it, that regular observance is not kept, etc. (unless this is plainly notorious), because they do very grave harm; and they are held under mortal sin to restitution to the whole community, from which the remission of the Superior does not excuse" (III, 978).

e) "Similarly it is mortal, the person being kept silent, to name the monastery from which someone has committed a grave occult sin, for example adultery or fornication." The reason is that the religious of the same community are so conjoined among themselves that before outsiders they are judged as it were solidary, one for the others. Hence, the whole community is accustomed to be stained before the imprudent and simple.

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eigh…, Ch. II, Article III: On the Obligation of Defending the Reputation of Neighbor

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section E: On Truth, Question Three: On Lying, Article I: On Lying Itself · Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section E: On Truth, Question Three: On Lying, Article II: On the Species of Lying

We are held, from the precept of charity, to defend neighbor if he, with us present, is injured in his reputation. And since we can be lacking to this office in a threefold mode, namely by bearing ourselves negatively toward detractors, by rejoicing concerning detraction, and by cooperating with detraction, the following things must be established.

n. ¶1202.

PRINCIPLES. I. He who hears detraction, and does not impede it when he conveniently can, sins against charity. Nevertheless, he who is not the Superior of the one detracting is excused from mortal sin by many, and grave, Doctors, if on account of shame or fear he omits correction; provided that, beyond infamy, no other grave damage comes to neighbor from the detraction, and provided it is not established that the correction will be useful (H. Ap., XI, 17). "But this can be established with difficulty; indeed there is danger that the correction may rather increase or confirm the detraction." Yet he is not without fault who, when he easily can, omits efficacious correction (cf. n. 493).

But they are excused even from VENIAL sin who, adverting to the detraction, either depart, or turn away the conversation, show a sad face, according to that saying (Prov., 25, 23): A sad face dissipates the detracting tongue. The reason is that those actions are true corrections (III, 981).

But a SUPERIOR, both of the one infaming and of the one infamed, sins gravely by hearing detraction if he does not avert it when he conveniently can; because a special obligation lies upon him of correcting the detractor and of meeting the damage of the one infamed.

Nevertheless, more probably he does not sin against justice, neither the Superior of the one detracting, since he is not held to watch over the good of another not subject to him; nor the Superior of the one defamed, since it does not lie upon him from justice to attend to the temporal good of the subject. Except: a) if the Superior of the one detracting is a Bishop or parish priest (because these are held from justice to correcting subjects); b) if the one infaming and the one infamed are subjects of the same Superior, and the one infamed has recourse to him so that reputation may be restored to him: in which case he is held from justice, provided he can without fear of a graver evil (III, 979, 980).

n. ¶1203.

II. He who rejoices concerning grave detraction sins gravely against charity. The reason is that he is delighted concerning the grave damage of neighbor. But if he does not rejoice concerning the infamy of neighbor, nor concerning the detraction, but concerning the hearing of a new matter, or concerning the curious knowledge of the crimes of others, he does not sin gravely.

"Indeed, they say (the Doctors), that he does not sin gravely even if he is delighted in the detraction itself, not because of hatred or joy concerning another's damage, but from curiosity or vanity; and they deduce this from St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 73, a. 4), who teaches that it is grave only then when the detraction pleases him on account of hatred of him from whom detraction is made" (III, 979, Resp. 2).

n. ¶1204.

III. He who hears a detractor and cooperates efficaciously with him sins gravely both against charity and against justice. For he furnishes the one infaming an occasion of sinning, and is a true cause of the damage which is brought upon neighbor through detraction.

Nevertheless, "it is not a sin against justice, at least mortal, to ask the cause of someone's captivity, or to speak about it; for just as the captivity is public, so also the cause seems to have been made public" (III, 974, 9). Nor is it grave, if, having suspected something light about someone, you interrogate another, and beyond intention induce him to grave detraction (Sporer, tr. V, c. 4, n. 105).

Vol. I, Pt. II, Sect. II, Tractate VIII: On the Eigh…, Ch. II, Article IV: On Restitution of Reputation

n. ¶1205.

PRINCIPLES. I. The detractor is held both to restore reputation unjustly injured, and to repair other temporal damages following from the detraction and foreseen at least in a confused way. The reason is that he is the efficacious and formally unjust cause of all these (cf. n. 948 ff.).

We have said: 1. Reputation unjustly injured; otherwise, namely, if charity alone had been injured. Further, according to the truer opinion, he is held to restitution of reputation not only before immediate hearers, but also before mediate hearers (insofar as this is morally possible): if namely such divulgation, because it was known that the immediate hearers were talkative, was foreseen, and if the immediate hearers are judged likely to be lacking to the office of restitution.

Other temporal damages, say if the one defamed has been deprived of his office; if he is impeded from being able to provide for himself, etc. And it must be noted that the obligation of restoring reputation is personal; but the obligation of repairing damages which have arisen from defamation is real, and therefore it passes to heirs (III, 991, 996).

Note. a) Manifestation of another's offense, made with only material injury, because, for example, the detractor thought the offense was public, or because he did not advert to the malice of detraction, does not induce the burden of restitution, from defect of theological fault. Yet the one manifesting is held, as much as he conveniently can, to impede that another damage follow from his inculpable manifestation (III, 994). b) The defamer is not held to compensate with money the reputation which he cannot restore; because money is not equivalent to the reputation taken away (III, 1000). Cf. the things said n. 928. c) In defect of the first defamer, all those who cooperated efficaciously with the defamation are held to the same restitution (n. 977). d) It can happen that with respect to reputation to be restored the obligation is light, but with respect to damage to be repaired, the obligation is grave.

n. ¶1206.

II. Restitution of reputation must be made in one way by a calumniator, in another by a detractor. For this one narrated the true; but the other affirmed the false.

Therefore the CALUMNIATOR is held to retract the things said, even with an oath, if it is necessary; indeed, with the loss of his own reputation, if otherwise reparation cannot be made; for the condition of the innocent is better than that of the guilty, and the calumniator must impute to his own malice whatever he will suffer in his own reputation on account of the retraction. He who detracted from another through an infamous libel is held, so that restitution may be efficacious, to make it by contrary writings, or by public revocation. Likewise, the reparation ought to become known if it is known that the defamation has reached many, but it is unknown whom it has reached (III, 991, 995; H. Ap., XI, 22).

But the simple DETRACTOR cannot indeed afterward deny the offense which he inequitably manifested, because he would lie; nevertheless, he is held to provide for the reputation of the one infamed through other means, for example by speaking of him honorably, by excusing his errors and vices, by praising his good qualities; by saying that he himself had spoken evil inconsiderately, that he had erred. For not only those err who depart from truth, but also those who depart from rectitude, according to that saying (Prov., 14, 22): They err who work evil. "I," says St. Alphonsus (Praxis, n. 45), "am accustomed to give this counsel, that they say: I drew this out of my head, equivocating; because all words proceed from the mind (for which head is taken)."

n. ¶1207.

III. A just cause can excuse from the obligation of restoring reputation. The reason is that this obligation is affirmative and must be fulfilled through a positive act. But an affirmative obligation ceases on account of a just and proportioned cause; therefore...

But the just causes which excuse from restitution of reputation are the following:

Impossibility of restitution, when namely the occult evil unjustly revealed has come to public knowledge by another way; likewise, when the detractor cannot offer reparation without danger of a much graver damage threatening himself, as would be danger of life, liberty, or reputation much more necessary to himself or his own; likewise, on account of distance of places or some other impediment which renders reparation physically or morally impossible.
Uselessness, when, for example, it is judged that faith was not added to the detraction. Likewise, if the infamation has been destroyed by the sentence of the judge or by the common judgment of sound-minded persons; or if the detraction has so been handed over to oblivion that its reparation or re-

calling would be judged injurious; always preserved is the obligation of repairing other damages arisen from infamation, if there were any.

Just compensation; if namely the infamation was mutual and equivalent, when one of the detractors refuses reparation, the other more probably can, not indeed in revenge, but as a pledge of the reparation owed to himself, defer restitution until the other is at last prepared to satisfy; for the general principle is: "You are not compelled to render to another his right, if he refuses to render yours to you."
Presumed condonation of the one infamed, who can yield his right; as often namely as the infamation touched him alone, and reparation is not required either for avoiding scandal or for fulfilling his office. Otherwise, if the infamation redounds into others, or yields to the spiritual or temporal damage of neighbor (cf. n. 1200, Question 6). St. Alph., III, 997 ff.; H. Ap., XI, 19.

n. ¶1208.

IT IS ASKED. What must be done IN DOUBT whether oblivion of the offense exists or not?

Resp. 1. If it is a question of a true offense, it is not easily to be recalled into memory, since generally attention is given rather to the offense than to the detraction. Except unless there is evident danger lest that infamy return into the memory of men in another way.

If a false saying has been imposed, the infamation must always be revoked unless oblivion is established; for since the matter is not true, the revocation can import no properly so-called infamy. Except if a greater good of the one infamed persuades otherwise; or if certain damage threatens the detractor from the retraction (III, 998).

…and 11 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Merkelbach, Summa Theologiae Moralis

Benedict Henry Merkelbach, O.P. — 42 passages

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section E: On Truth, Question Three: On Lying, Article I: On Lying Itself

S. Th. II-II, q. 110.

857. A lie (mensonge; leugen) is directly opposed to truth by defect and therefore is speech against the mind. It is called:

Speech, and indeed external speech, which can be made by any external sign whatever, whether by word, writing, gesture, or deed; hence on the part of the act a lie is divided into a lie strictly so called, which is made by words or equivalent signs, and simulation, which is made by deeds, of which hypocrisy is a species, which chiefly is the simulation of holiness.

Against the mind, namely, that which proceeds from the intention of enunciating what is false; hence if someone enunciates what is false, erroneously thinking it to be true, falsity is not present except materially, nor is there a lie; in other words, he errs but does not lie. On the contrary, if someone enunciates what is true, erroneously thinking it to be false, he does not err but lies, because falsity is present formally, and accordingly a lie.

In this intention there is implicitly included the intention of deceiving, because the proper effect of a false enunciation is that another be deceived; but that someone explicitly intends to establish falsity in the opinion of another does not pertain to the species or essence of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it (a. 1).

858. Principle I. Every lie is a sin. - It is proved:

From the Scriptures (Ecclus. VII, 14; Prov. XIII, 5 and Col. III, 9; John VIII, 44; I John II, 21).

From the authority of St. Augustine and St. Thomas.

By reason, because a) it is essentially evil, as an act which falls upon undue matter. Namely, it is repugnant to the end of speech and of the faculty of speaking, which were established by the author of nature so that man might manifest his thoughts to man: for since voices by their nature are signs of concepts, it is unnatural and undue that someone signify by voice that which he does not have in his mind; from which disorder follows b) another, that a lie of itself by its nature induces the deception of the neighbor, and accordingly, once universal suspicion has arisen, brings harm to trust and security in social life and to the public good (a. 3).

n. 859.

859. A threefold lie: officious, jocose, pernicious. - On the part of the end (motive) or effect and fault, a lie is distinguished as officious, jocose, and pernicious, according as it is made for the sake of one's own or another's utility, of delight, or of inflicting special harm: the first is lighter than the second, and the second than the third; but the gravest of all is a lie which harms God in the matter of religion (a. 2 and 4).

n. 859.

An officious and jocose lie is venial from its genus, and is not mortal except accidentally, for example by reason of scandal, for a deception of small moment does not overthrow social life, but inconveniences it: for from deception of the neighbor about something of small moment concerning which it does not matter whether it be known, the neighbor is not harmed; but a pernicious lie is mortal from its genus on account of the evil joined to it, whether on the part of the matter, if it is made in doctrine of religion or of good morals or of some science, or in a contract, or on the part of the end, if it is said to the injury of God or to the notable detriment of the neighbor.

860. Principle II. Although it is never licit to lie, "nevertheless it is sometimes licit prudently to hide the truth under some dissimulation" (q. 110, a. 3, ad 4). - This is customarily done in a twofold way:

By amphibology or equivocation (dubbelzinnige uitdrukking), which is a speech having of itself a twofold sense: one, ordinarily more obvious and common, which the speaker foresees is to be perceived by the hearer; the other, less common, yet perceptible by the hearer from the circumstances, which the speaker intends to express, for example, I say no, I will, Peter is at home, this book belongs to Peter, etc.

By restriction (voorbehoud), which is a limitation made in the mind of some absolute affirmation or negation, or an act of the mind by which someone restricts or turns words in his mind to a sense other than the natural and obvious one. It is twofold: a) purely mental, when the limitation cannot appear externally, but the whole sense lies hidden in the mind and the truth can in no way be perceived, as if someone says that he has seen Rome, understanding in a picture, I did not break the vow, understanding in the previous year, I did not take your thing, thinking with the left hand, I did not do this, namely, that which I am now thinking, etc.; b) broadly mental or real, when the limitation can be gathered from the circumstances of things, persons, places, and received common usage, for example, if a priest or physician says: I know nothing about these things, understanding, which I can reveal; then by reason of the circumstances the speech is now made equivocal, and rather there is restriction of the utterance than of the mind. Now then:

I. It is never licit to use a purely mental restriction, because it is simply a lie, for the words neither of themselves nor from the adjoining circumstances in any way outwardly manifest the internal concept of the mind. This is clear from the condemnation of propositions 26 and 27 by Innocent XI.¹

¹ "If anyone, either alone or before others, whether interrogated, or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation, or for any other end whatever, swears that he did not do something which in reality he did, understanding within himself something else which he did not do, or another way from that in which he did it, or any other true addition whatever, he does not really lie nor is he perjured." - "A just cause for using these amphibologies is present whenever it is necessary or useful for safeguarding bodily health, honor, family goods, or for any other act of virtue, so that the hiding of truth is then judged expedient and studious."

II. It is licit to use real restriction and amphibology, provided that a just cause is present for hiding the truth, and another honest means is lacking, and deception of the neighbor is not intended.

It is proved: a) by the example of Christ. "But of that day no one knoweth... nor the Son," understanding: so as to manifest it (Mk. XIII, 32; Mt. XXIV, 36; cf. John XI, 11; VII, 8);

b) by reason: on the one hand, it is not a lie, because the words which are uttered, taken together with the circumstances of the speaker, the hearer, etc., which according to common estimation co-signify, signify the true sense which the speaker has in mind, although not clearly and distinctly; on the other hand, deception of the neighbor is not necessarily intended: for that speech has a twofold effect, one good, the hiding of truth which the speaker intends, the other evil, the deception of the neighbor which he only permits from a just cause. Hence the neighbor is not directly and necessarily deceived, but his deception is only permitted, which for a just cause is licit. For we are not bound to speak according to the mind of others if a just cause is present. But if this were not licit, there would not exist a way of licitly keeping secrets, which would be pernicious to human commerce, no less than lying, says St. Alphonsus, l. III, n. 152.²

² Real restriction is not something new, although the name is new. In ancient times it was known, although not so expressly; even by St. Thomas, as is clear from what he has concerning various sayings by Christ, and concerning the sacramental seal.

We said: from a just cause; for such utterances ordinarily are not licit, otherwise social life itself, which is founded upon mutual trust and mutual manifestation of truth, would totter. A just cause is an honorable end for preserving goods useful to the spirit or body; and this cause is required to be proportionate, that is, greater 1) the more the words furnish occasion of erring; 2) the graver the matter of error is; 3) the more numerous and greater are those to be deceived. A greater cause, for example, is required that someone use them publicly, or not interrogated, or asked by authority, than that he use them privately, or interrogated, especially if not by authority. But for swearing with real restriction or amphibology a greater and grave cause is required, out of reverence for the name of God.

n. 861.

861. Principle III. It is not always licit to hide the truth. - It is not licit to use any restriction or equivocation when some other special precept of faith, charity, justice, etc., demands the open confession of truth; in which case one who nevertheless used it would sin in two ways, both against truth and against the other virtue: a) when the precept of externally confessing the faith presses; b) when by reason of office we are bound to instruct someone and teach him true things lest he err, especially if for a price or stipend; c) when a judge legitimately interrogates, having the right of knowing the truth (to this right of knowing some truth there corresponds in another the obligation of confessing it, and in such a way that the truth be known by the hearer), or a superior concerning those things which pertain to the governance of subjects, or a confessor concerning those things which he must know in order rightly to judge the penitent; d) in onerous and mutual contracts, on account of a similar motive: for justice requires that no injury be brought upon another.

n. 861.

One who uses amphibology without sufficient cause violates the affirmative precept of truth, by which, on account of the good of society, we are obliged not to hide the truth without cause, or at least not to furnish occasion for the deception of the neighbor: for if this were always done and without reason, no one could any longer believe another without suspicion of ambiguity, which would tend to the manifest detriment of society. Yet such a person does not make a lie, because the utterance in some signification is conformed to the internal judgment of the speaker, provided that it remains equivocal when all the circumstances are considered. Hence if he confirms it by oath, he makes an unjust assertory oath, which of itself is venial; yet it can be mortal, if another virtue is gravely injured, for example commutative or legal justice, as in contracts and judgments.

n. 861.

But one who uses restriction without sufficient cause, besides this, makes a lie, because if sufficient cause is lacking, the circumstances do not sufficiently indicate the restriction added in judgment by the mind; hence one who in this case confirms it by oath makes perjury strictly so called.

862. Remarks. - 1. Let proposition 28 be noted among those condemned by Innocent XI,³ by which we know that all restrictions are illicit when an oath is required on account of the public good, whether by the Republic or by the Church, lest the unworthy be promoted, for example, in those to be promoted to sacred order (concerning birth, censures, irregularity), in those wishing to contract marriage (concerning a diriment impediment), in conditions for teaching in schools for an academic degree, etc.

³ "One who by means of recommendation or a gift has been promoted to a magistracy or public office will be able, with mental restriction, to furnish the oath which by mandate of the king is customarily required from such persons, no regard being had to the intention of the one requiring it; because he is not bound to confess a hidden crime."

We note that Catholics commonly admit broadly mental restriction as a necessary means of hiding the truth. Nor is it to be admitted what certain moderns have said for this end: that false-speaking is licit, or a psychological lie which harms no one but benefits the speaker or another, distinguishing it from a moral lie, which denies truth when it ought to be affirmed, and thus perverting the definition of a lie.⁴ Although practically in most cases broadly mental restriction and false-speaking return to the same thing as to the matter, nevertheless the doctrine must be held which says that every lie and false-speaking is illicit, both because it more easily excludes abuse, and because every false-speaking is against the essence of speech, and because broadly mental restriction, as being speech true in itself, can also be confirmed by oath, which is sometimes necessary. But false-speaking, even if it were said to be licit, cannot be confirmed by oath, because it is falsity.

⁴ Thus not only Grotius and Pufendorf, Protestants, but also certain Catholics, such as Bolgeni, Il possesso, c. 48; Dubois, Une théorie du mensonge; and the author of the little work: Étude sur la malice intrinsèque du mensonge par un professeur de théologie. Against these especially Waffelaert, Dissertation morale sur la malice du mensonge; and Vermeersch, in the periodical Gregorianum, I, wrote very well.

The comparison cannot be admitted which some, such as Fr. Vermeersch, institute between homicide licit from just defense on account of a good effect, and false speech or a restriction which is not sufficiently indicated by the circumstances, licit from just defense of a secret which otherwise could not be defended. For homicide is not always and essentially evil, because it is not against the essence of things but only against their natural condition, and therefore it is not always an illicit means but only the homicide of an innocent person; on the contrary, lying is essentially and always evil against the very essence of speech (in the same way as lust against nature, because it is against the very essential order of the generative organs); and therefore it is always illicit even for just defense, because evil things, even the least, are not to be done for the sake of good things.

It must be noted that penitents sometimes affirm that they had to lie in order to keep a secret. Then the confessor would try in vain to explain to the simpler the distinction between a lie and broadly mental restriction, which in the case is licit. Therefore, having asked what utterance they had used, let him simply tell them that such things are not lies, but licit responses which can be given on account of necessity, and whose sense in those circumstances does not deceive an upright and prudent man (for example, in a merchant).

863. Corollary. - False testimony is of itself a grave sin, as being a pernicious lie. It is directly prohibited by the eighth precept of the decalogue (Ex. XX, 16), and is hateful to God (Prov. VI, 16, 19) and very harmful to the neighbor (Prov. XXV, 18).

It has a threefold deformity: a) against legal justice, because it does not obey the command of a judge or superior legitimately interrogating, and for that reason it is apt to harm the good of the community; b) against commutative justice, if besides it causes unjust harm to the neighbor; c) against religion, if, as is customary, it is done under oath, because then it is perjury strictly so called. From this last head it is always a mortal sin, even in a slight matter; from the first and the other it is mortal from its genus. Hence in law it is said (Decr. l. V, tit. 20, c. 1): "A false-speaking witness is liable to three persons: first to God, whose presence he contemns; then to the judge, whom he deceives by lying; lastly to the innocent person, whom he harms by false testimony."

From these things it is understood that this is accidentally venial: a) from some inadvertence or insufficient deliberation; b) also from lightness of matter, if it is not done under oath and brings only slight harm.

A false witness is bound:

to revoke the testimony, and indeed if he said it only materially or from error, he is bound when revocation is useful to another and does not bring grave harm to himself; but if he said it formally and knowingly, he is bound, when revocation is useful to another, even with equal or greater inconvenience to himself, therefore even with danger of life if he has thrown an innocent person into the same danger, for in equal harm favor is rather to be shown to the innocent;

to restitution of the harm already following, he is bound; and indeed if he knowingly said false testimony and thus effectively brought harm upon another, he is bound simply. But when in good faith he gave false testimony, he is bound to restore if afterward he did not revoke it, although he could conveniently have done so and reparation would have been useful to another: for then he indirectly wills to be an efficacious cause.

Vol. II, Special Moral Theology: On…, Treatise: On the Cardinal …, Fifth Part: On the Virtues…, Section E: On Truth, Question Three: On Lying, Article II: On the Species of Lying

S. Th. II-II, q. 109, a. 4; q. 111, 112 and 113.

n. 864.

864. Diverse species of lying. - On the part of the act by which it is committed, lying is divided into lying strictly so called, which is made by spoken or written words, or equivalent signs, and simulation, which is made by deeds, of which hypocrisy is a species. - On the part of the very account of lying, it is divided into boasting, or a lie which transcends truth toward the greater and is opposed by excess on the part of the object, and irony, or a lie which falls short of truth toward the lesser and is opposed to truth by defect. Of these we must now speak specifically.

n. 865.

865. Simulation (veinzerij) properly so called or formal, is lying by deeds, by which someone through external actions intends to signify something other than what he has in mind, for example if someone displays signs of friendship from a hostile mind, as Judas did; from it is distinguished simulation improperly so called and material: it is dissimulation, or an ambiguous action for concealing the truth, which is licit from a just cause, whenever others can gather the mind of the one dissimulating from the circumstances. Thus Christ (Luke XXIV, 28) feigned that He was going farther, in order to excite the disciples to exercising hospitality.

n. 865.

Therefore not every fiction is simulation, but conversely every simulation is fiction.

866. Hypocrisy (huichelarij) is the simulation of another person, especially if a sinner simulates the person of a just man, and thus it is taken in the New Testament (Luke XIII, 15) and in theological speech, as the simulation of holiness which someone does not have (schijnheiligheid); from which differs the hiding of sin (or silence about it) by which someone, for example, is silent about it lest scandal be generated therefrom.

Hypocrisy is a mortal sin 1) when holiness is contemned, as in the Pharisees: for thus "that man is called a hypocrite whose intention is borne toward both, namely, that he does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy" (q. 111, a. 4); therefore he contemns holiness, not wishing to acquire it but wishing to persevere in sin, and yet at the same time he strives to please men by simulating it; 2) also when it proceeds from a mortally evil end, for example, to dissemble or spread heresy, to acquire a benefice unjustly, to obtain seduction and fornication, etc.

But if the intended end is light, not repugnant to charity, it will be a venial sin, for example, when someone delights in the fiction itself, or if he simulates greater holiness.

Of itself hypocrisy is directly opposed to truth, yet indirectly and accidentally it can be contrary to many virtues according to the remote end, or according to the instrument or means of the act, or something else of this sort.

…and 2 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Sabetti-Barrett, Compendium of Moral Theology

Aloysius Sabetti, S.J., and Timothy Barrett, S.J. — 4 passages

Vol. I, Tr. VI, On the Eighth Precept of t…, Chapter I. On Lying and Mental Restriction

n. 310.

A lie is speech against the mind, or, as St. Augustine says, it is "to say something knowingly otherwise than we think." If it is done by nods or by some deed, it is called simulation, which again is called hypocrisy when someone simulates the person of another, e.g., when a sinner simulates the person of a just man. - For a true lie it is not required that there be expressly the intention of deceiving, for as the same holy Doctor says: "Everyone who lies speaks against that which he thinks in his soul, with the will of deceiving." - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 110, art. 1. - St. Augustine, Enchir., chap. 18 and 22.

A threefold kind of lie is distinguished: 1st. harmful, by which unjust harm is inflicted upon someone; 2nd. officious, which is put forth for the sake of one's own or another's utility; 3rd. jocose, which is said from jest and for the sole sake of trifling.

n. 311.

But mental restriction differs greatly from a lie; it is an act of the mind turning or restricting the words of some proposition to another sense than the natural and obvious one; whence it happens that they are not true unless they are taken according to the sense which they have in the mind of the speaker. - But a twofold restriction is distinguished, namely purely or strictly mental, if the sense of the speaker can in no way be perceived, and this is called properly mental; and broadly or improperly mental, if the sense of the proposition can be gathered from adjuncts.

n. 312.

I say 1st. A lie properly so called is certainly something intrinsically evil, but does not exceed venial sin if it is jocose, or even officious; but if it is harmful, it will be a light or grave sin according to the quantity of harm inflicted. The reason for the first is both because it is repugnant to right reason to use signs of speech against their natural end and institution, and to wish, as it were, to destroy the unity of man; and because, the liceity of lying having been admitted, the order of society, which rests upon mutual commerce and trust, would be altogether subverted. But the reason for the second is taken from the common consent of theologians, from the persuasion of the faithful, and from the very nature of that repugnance with right reason, which certainly does not appear grave. Finally, the reason for the third is that in a harmful lie, besides the virtue of truthfulness, justice is injured, which obliges under grave or light matter according to the harm that is inflicted. - Cf. St. Augustine, books On Lying and Against Lying. - St. Thomas, loc. cit., art. 3 and 4.

I say 2nd. It is never licit to use purely or properly mental restriction, because, as is clear from its definition, this would be simply to lie. But sometimes it is licit from a just cause to use restriction broadly, that is improperly mental, when the sense intended by the speaker can be understood. The reason is that this is not evil in itself, since the neighbor is not properly deceived, but his deception is only permitted from a just cause; besides, for the good of society it is required that there be a licit means of hiding a secret; but sometimes no other means is available besides broad or improperly mental restriction. I said, from a just cause; because if the use of such restrictions were permitted without a proportionate cause, no one could or would wish to believe another; and this would redound to the greatest harm of human society. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, de secund. praec. Decal., nn. 151 and 152. - Lacroix, lib. 3, n. 287.

n. 313.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. They certainly err who place the malice of a lie either solely or primarily in this, that the right of the hearers is injured. For from this it would be deduced that God, against whom properly we have no right, could sometimes lie, which would plainly destroy our faith. Cf. Mazella, de Virt. inf., n. 698.

2nd. Figurative, ironic, and hyperbolic expressions are not lies, which as such can easily be, and usually are, taken by hearers. Much less parables, which Christ himself so frequently used.

3rd. They do not lie who write fables, or from jest openly say false things, because then words are put forth and understood with another superadded signification, but one easily admitted by those conversing.

4th. He who uses broad mental restriction is not without fault: 1st. if he does this without reason, but from the sole intention of deceiving, because it is an abuse of signs; 2nd. if the one asking has the right of inquiring or commanding confession of the truth, because regularly in a subject there corresponds to that right the obligation of confessing the truth without ambiguity. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 154.

5th. Yet all public persons questioned concerning things committed to their trust can use restriction of this kind, such as secretaries, legates of princes, leaders of armies, magistrates, advocates, physicians, surgeons, midwives, and whoever has the office and reason of hiding some truth. For if secrets committed to these persons were violated, most grave inconveniences would follow from it in society.

6th. Likewise a servant, by order of the master, can deny that he is at home, although he is present; because such a locution is generally received by usage to signify that he is not at home insofar as he can be seen or visited. Attend nevertheless to the custom of places. Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 165.

7th. It is licit to add an oath to a broad and not strictly mental restriction, because an oath follows the nature of the act to which it is added. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit., n. 151.

Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V

Gaudentius Bontempi of Brescia, O.F.M. Cap. — 1 passage

Tr. IV, Disputation XIII: On the O…, Sect. V, Friendship, Liberality, Epikeia, and the Opposed V…, Question II: On lying

Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibological Oath: On Mental Restrictions, and on Lying · Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibologi…, Ch. I, Origen, Hilary, John Chrysostom, Cassian, John Climacus, and Martin of Braga, concerning the licit use of a lie in extreme necessity, are reviewed · Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibologi…, Ch. II, Augustine's time, declared war on lying, are recounted. After Augustine, none of the Catholics favored lying · Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibologi…, Chapter III — A compendious narration of everything that St. Augustine writes in his Book on Lying · Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibologi…, Chapter IV — A compendium of the Book Against Lying, which St. Augustine wrote to Consentius · Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibologi…, Chapter V — How opportune Augustine's teaching is for settling the controversy concerning the deceitful oath will be made plain from the following propositions

THE INTERCOURSE of human society requires that the lips accord with the heart, nor that one thing be uttered by the mouth and another conceived in the mind; whence, since by the Author of nature the voice was instituted as the vehicle of the interior concept, if it displays something alien outwardly, it will suffer a grave injury to the right of nature, being both frustrated of its end, and defrauding the trusting expectation of the other hearer; whence this sin cannot be made honest by any circumstance; yet in lying one can propose to himself diverse ends, and by these the greater or lesser malice of the lie will be specified, and although it never passes out of the species of sin, yet within that species it can sometimes be venial, sometimes mortal. But these things will be made clearer from the definitions of the lie soon to be given; wherefore, that the truth may shine forth more clearly from the very lie, I shall weigh this matter concisely and elegantly through dubitations.

Concina, Theologia Christiana III

Daniele Concina, O.P. — 226 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibological Oath: On Mental Restrictions, and on Lying

Preliminary Remarks

I undertake to handle the most difficult question that exists in all of theology, one which I feel unequal to my own strength to treat. For, having often trodden similar paths, and, indeed, the more turbulent the water always becomes for one who stirs it. Having this intention in mind, of following in similar footsteps, and, in fact, having prescribed for myself this method, to explain only those things which theologians commonly hand down concerning the deceitful, equivocal, amphibological oath, and mental restrictions... , I had brought the treatment nearly to the halfway point. But, when I came to the explanation of amphibologies, mental restrictions, and equivocations, I found myself at once surrounded on every side, as it were, by Scylla and Charybdis, and by rocks and shoals. For that locution which some theologians call a purely mental restriction, others call a not purely mental restriction; and that speech which is, to me, a lie, is, to a good many more recent writers, merely amphibological. All this, however, I judge to be the origin of all the reefs, and of the difficulties: for, since there can be no room for right disputation, unless certain and clear notions of equivocations, amphibologies, and mental restrictions are established beforehand, and this cannot be done, given the distinctions, evasions, and technicalities of more recent writers, which render this matter exceedingly entangled, I resolved, in order to avoid these circuitous paths, to break off the course I had begun, and to unravel the web; and I took this counsel: that I should first of all begin a discourse concerning lying, and take up the whole controversy afresh. For it has proved of no small advantage to me, in the treatment of this controversy already conducted, that I have discovered nothing put forward by more recent theologians in favor of the licit use of amphibologies which had not already, before them, been employed by certain ancient Philosophers, and even by some of the Fathers, in patronage of lies. Nor does any other difference occur to me, weighing the foundations of each, than that the ancients, with candid sincerity, called those locutions "lies" which not a few more recent theologians call "equivocal," and "material," and "amphibological."

To prove this, and to open for myself an approach to resolving the questions concerning the deceitful oath, I have judged it worthwhile to preface a historical narration of the disputes concerning lying among the ancients, both Philosophers and Fathers. Indeed, an occasion for demonstrating this is furnished by the war which, twelve years ago, several literary men of our own Italy waged over the controversies concerning lies and amphibologies. Occasion for this fierce contest was given by Fr. Carlo Ambrogio Cattaneo, who, in Vol. I of his own Lectures, which he delivered from the pulpit to the people at Milan, and published in print, in Lecture 44, devised a new method of concealing the truth, whenever its manifestation would inflict some grave harm. For he says that Christians ought not to be at all anxious, nor ought they to rack their brains, so as to construct an amphibological, or equivocal, speech by an artful arrangement and disposition of words; but he encourages them to deny outright, with open brow and unblushing countenance, all pretense set aside, that they know the matter, or that they know the truth, which, if they revealed it, would subject them to grave harm. For, he says, that word "know" loses its own signification in such circumstances, and signifies nothing more than that name "know."

This most false doctrine Fr. Giuseppe Agostino Orsi undertook to attack — a man, moreover, of the human commonwealth, and of profound genius, endowed with exquisite erudition, and to whom, in writing, I have seen no equal, even in the most difficult questions, for facility and elegance. At present Secretary of the Sacred Congregation of the Index, after many published volumes distinguished for doctrine and erudition, he is writing a universal Ecclesiastical History, received with the applause of the learned. This most learned man, then, published a DOGMATIC-MORAL DISSERTATION, which was the beginning of a long war. For it produced for itself several adversaries, and also several comrades in arms, who all, joining battle with one another, sharpened their pens, wearied the presses, and, with several published volumes, filled all Italy. How well the die was cast in this literary conflict, with what abundance of arguments, with what erudition of every kind, with what elegance of style, and with what eloquence each pleaded his own cause, it is not my concern to make manifest — since their books speak for themselves, and report the sum of their doctrine. This one thing I confess: that I have profited not a little in this rugged controversy from his most learned works, and have borrowed from him certain things which contribute to a historical knowledge of lies. But, lest I detain the reader too long at the threshold, I proceed to the matter.

Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibologi…, Ch. I, Origen, Hilary, John Chrysostom, Cassian, John Climacus, and Martin of Braga, concerning the licit use of a lie in extreme necessity, are reviewed

I. So manifest from God is the depravity, and perniciousness, of lies, that not one of the wise can be found who has not proscribed liars as enemies of human society. The dispute has only been, both among the ancient Philosophers and among the Fathers, whether, to conceal a truth of the highest moment, whose manifestation would redound to the harm of the public good, lies are to be lawfully employed. Plato, easily the prince of all Philosophers, in his ten books On the Republic, or in the Dialogues On the Just, teaches in many places that, an exceedingly grave cause pressing, truth is lawfully to be concealed by a lie. I will here transcribe a few things out of many, following the version of Jean de Serres. In Book, or Dialogue, II, near the end, he writes this: "And so a true lie, which consists in this — that the mind is in error, thinking wrongly of some matter — is held in hatred not only by the gods, but also by men; but that lie which is expressed in words is useful only in this case, and does not seem worthy of hatred, if we use it against enemies, or even with those who are called friends, when, seized by madness, or some other kind of derangement, they attempt to do some evil — so that we may divert them from the deed, taking it up as a useful remedy." In Book III, a little after the beginning, he takes away the use of lying from private citizens, but grants it to magistrates, and to physicians: "For if it was rightly said a little before, that among the gods there is no place for lying, but that among men it is, as a kind of remedy, to be employed as useful — it is clear that this matter is to be granted to physicians, but taken away from the rest who do not profess that art; so that, furthermore, it may be lawful for Princes, if for any, to lie, whether for the sake of enemies, or of citizens, for the advantage of the state; but all others must abstain entirely from lying." He has similar things in Book V, and in other places. Plato is said to have drawn this error from Timaeus of Locri, and from Sophocles. He had very many followers, not only among the pagans, but even among worshippers of the true God, who upheld the licit use of lies.

II. The first among Catholic Doctors who wrote less cautiously concerning lying was Clement of Alexandria, who, in Bk. VII of the Stromata, has certain things which seem to favor lying.

III. Clement of Alexandria had as his disciple Origen, who did not obscurely, but openly, patronized lying, as his own Master had done. St. Jerome (Bk. I, Against Rufinus) reports his words, transcribed from Bk. VI of the Stromata, where he has this: "We ought not to say whatever comes into our mind to our neighbor... A Philosopher would cautiously say that a lie is sometimes useful to men, as a kind of medicine. But consider how God himself is sometimes to be thought, when it profits the hearer, to speak in ambiguous words, and to declare what he wishes through enigmas; so that both the dignity of truth may be preserved with him, and, if something harmful might result, were it to be brought forth naked before the common people, it may be covered with some veil, lest it be brought forth. But man, upon whom the necessity of lying rests, should diligently take care so to use a lie at times, in the manner of a condiment, or a medicine, that he keep its measure, lest, by using it too often, he lose the credit of his own honesty. Judith, too, made use of this against Holofernes, having long concealed the truth of her people, correcting it; and, above all, the Patriarch Jacob — of whom we read the blessings which he obtained from his father by a cunning device — unless we have lied in such a way that some great good may be sought thereby for ourselves, we are to be judged, as it were, enemies of him who says, 'I am the truth.'"

IV. Origen was followed by Hilary, in his commentaries on Psalm 14. "For a lie," he says, "is often necessary, and sometimes falsehood is useful — as when we lie about a hidden matter to a persecutor, or defraud one who threatens, of testimony against one in peril, or deceive concerning the difficulty of a sick man's cure; and it behooves us, according to the Apostle's teaching, to season our speech with salt, and to do our neighbor no harm, so that the crime of lying be reckoned by another's inconvenience." His Commentary on this Psalm, however, along with various considerations which the most learned Benedictine Editors prefix to this Psalm in their annotations, is defended, after much dispute, as being truly St. Hilary's. The occasion of St. Hilary's error was Origen, whose commentaries on the Psalms he translated from Greek into Latin.

V. St. John Chrysostom, no less than Hilary, seems to have embraced Origen's opinion not obscurely, Vol. II, Homily 7 on Penance, where he commends the lie by which Rahab withdrew the spies from the fury of their pursuers, in these words: "Worthy of all praise, then, is Rahab, an image of the Church. For when messengers were sent by the King to seek out the spies, if there were any who had entered her house, she said to them: If men have entered in to thee, respond..." 'No.' For if they had at first said 'no,' she would have provoked those who had come to a search. But she said, 'They have entered in to thee, and they have gone out this way: pursue, and you will overtake them.' O beautiful lie! O beautiful deceit — not betraying, but guarding, piety!"* I could adduce many other things, but I pass over them. Nor let anyone hold it against me that I assert a most celebrated holy Doctor of the Church not to be free of this blemish. Since, to establish this, no other path lies open to my own feebleness than that I flatter myself I can prevail over the applause and acumen of those who strive to defend Chrysostom's teaching as untainted by this light stain. Let them note, however, this much: that they gather water in a sieve, while they strive to show that Chrysostom does not patronize lying, on the grounds that in several other places he condemns lying by design, and expressly disowns it. For all writers, to a man, absolutely detest lying, and prove its malice by every kind of argument. The question turns on this: whether, urgent necessity of avoiding some most grave evil pressing — such as the death of men — a lie is lawful. Chrysostom affirms this, as I indeed judge. Whoever shall demonstrate the opposite will be, to me, a great Apollo.

n. VI.

VI. A disciple of St. John Chrysostom was John Cassian, who, whether he drank in this error from his own teacher, or from Origen, defended it more ardently than all his predecessors. Not incidentally, but with a deliberate pen, he treats this controversy in Collation XVII, ch. 17 and following, through fifteen chapters. From these many chapters I will glean a few things. What, he says, is to be thought of lying, and how it is to be used, is such that it has in its nature something of hellebore, which, if taken when death impends from disease, is salutary, but otherwise, without the utmost peril, is deadly. Thus we read that even holy men, and men of God, made use of a lie, as Rahab did, and others. When, then, some grave danger concerning the confession of truth is imminent, then recourse to lies is to be taken up. Ch. 20 speaks of a distinction, forgivable, in a confession of truth. From the examples of principal Princes, chief among God's own, he seems to give a commendation of lies. And ch. 19: this is nearly the perception of imminent death. He draws forth many authorities and examples, both from the Old and from the New Testament, from most approved men, adducing the necessity of it. By these, he says, the learned Apostle Paul is exhorted to descend, out of necessity, to feigned pretenses of the weak, and forgivably to acquiesce. For then a detriment of lying is to be undertaken, when, as we have said, a greater loss of confessing the truth is imminent, and the utility which is conferred by truth does not prevail to compensate for the harm which such things generate for us. Ch. 21 brings forth several testimonies from the Gospel itself, by which he contends that the use of lying is not only lawful, but even necessary. Ch. 22, 23, and 24 allege examples of several most holy Monks and Abbots, who lied because they judged it to belong to a more sublime virtue, to conceal their own continence by a humble lie, than to reveal it to superb human judgment. Ch. 25 again reviews, from several books of Scripture, countless examples of most holy Patriarchs and Saints collected, so as to confirm more strongly his opinion concerning the licit and necessary use of lies, as a kind of remedy. "It is impossible for us," he says, "to enumerate all — for who would suffice to run briefly through the whole? — how the Patriarchs, and innumerable Saints of God, some for the desire of a blessing, some for the safeguarding of life, some for the concealment of some mystery, some out of zeal for God, some for the examination of truth, took up, so to speak, the patronage of lying?"

These few arguments, which more recent theologians thrust upon us in favor of the licit use of equivocations, I have adduced to show that Cassian, in many instances, has touched upon and drawn out all of these, so as to show that lies are necessarily and honorably to be employed.

n. VII.

VII. Two other authors I recount, lest I be too prolix, who have patronized lying in this manner. John Climacus, on the twelfth rung of his Ladder, writes this: "When we have felt ourselves free from every vanity of lying, both in place and in habitual use, then at last, though not without fear, we may sometimes, cautiously, allow a lie to enter in." Martin of Braga (Bk. On the Four Cardinal Virtues, ch. 4) says: "Do not use lying, but where an honorable cause exists, you may be redeemed by a lie. Let the just man guard the secrets of fidelity, not by uttering falsehood, but by keeping guard over truth; and if perchance you are compelled, you will rather be excused than convicted of lying, since he who speaks does not betray what should be kept silent; but what should be spoken, he speaks."

n. VIII.

VIII. More authors favoring lying I could recount, but, lest excessive prolixity beget disgust in the reader, I will close this chapter with the words of Augustine, who attests that in his own time it was the common opinion which held that it was lawful to lie for the salvation of men. He has this (q. 68, on Leviticus): "This is to be held, that no one's authority, wherever a thing is decreed in Scripture, is of any account. But the ancient Fathers, while they lied, will be no occasion for the ignorant and heterodox to seize an opportunity for lying — for such audacious imposture has already many times been refuted. For that some of the holy Fathers, at times, in some most difficult controversy which in their time had not yet been discussed with due dignity, fell into some slip, no one denies; but the Fathers, while no one is harmed, are to be excused, as they pass by in passing."

n. IX.

IX. Hence it must not be inferred, that they are to be held of little account, or to be calumniated, and to be deceived, because with unanimous consent they defend some doctrine. But of this, elsewhere a fuller discourse.

Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibologi…, Ch. II, Augustine's time, declared war on lying, are recounted. After Augustine, none of the Catholics favored lying

I. Aristotle, Plato's disciple, rejected his master's error concerning lying (Bk. IV, Ethics, ch. 7), where he writes that a lie, by its own nature, is depraved, and detestable; truth, good, and worthy of praise. But, setting aside the pagans, I will bring forward Christian Doctors of our own profession.

II. First of the whole chorus will be Lactantius, who, in Bk. VI of the Divine Institutes, openly attacks lying, in these words: "The other things which a worshipper of God ought to observe are easy, being comprehended in these virtues: that he never deceive anyone, nor lie, for the sake of harming. For it is a wicked thing for one zealous for truth to depart, in any matter, from the truth he follows, whether to deceive, or to harm. In this path of justice, and of all the virtues, there is no place for lying." Wherefore that wayfarer, both true and just, will judge that Lucilius's saying — 'It is not mine to lie to a friend' — does not befit him, but rather he will hold it to be his own not to lie to an enemy either, familiar, or unknown, and will never allow that the tongue, the interpreter of the mind, should discord from the sense and thought within.

I do not deny that Lactantius does not speak absolutely of the controversy chiefly... concerning whether, to preserve human life, or to conceal secrets of the highest moment, it is lawful to lie. For the rest, I assert at the same time that Lactantius lays down principles which proscribe the use of any officious lie whatsoever, and condemn it — since he holds that one must lie neither to a friend nor to an enemy, and that it must never be permitted that the tongue, the interpreter of the mind, should discord from the thought within; and, finally, on this path of justice, that there is never room for a lie: he certainly excludes every case in which a lie could be lawful.

III. Similar things are taught by Eusebius of Caesarea, St. Basil, in his Shorter Rules, St. Prosper, in his book Against Cassian, where, ch. 9, he says: "You deceive us with two, and twin, depravities, mixing justices, as you understand them, by dividing them. By this rule you will be able to preach that they err equally who say that one must always deceive, and who determine that one must never deceive. But, that in neither should there be sin, as an evil cannot be made a good by dividing it between two — this is altogether an error of yours: falsity is not always to be shunned, nor truth always to be followed." St. Prosper here refutes two errors of Cassian: one, that he attributed the beginnings of grace sometimes to good works, sometimes to nature; the other, that he taught that one must sometimes use falsehood, sometimes truth.

IV. Ferrandus, Deacon of the Church of Carthage, in his letter to Count Reginus, has this: "Let your speech be, at least, 'yea, yea; no, no' — with an oath either intervening, or absent, let us strive to remain most certain in truth. For as we recall concerning charity that John said, 'He that abideth in charity, abideth in God, and God in him' — thus, likewise, if we wish to speak concerning truth, we shall find it stated similarly: for divine truth says, 'I am the truth.' Whence very truly it may be said: he who abides in truth, abides in God, and God in him. We do not lie, then, who abides in truth, and God in him abides. Let us, therefore, prefer truth to all temporal advantages, and we shall be found rightly to have preferred divine things to human ones."

V. St. Gregory the Great (Bk. XVIII, Morals, ch. 3): "Every lie is iniquity... for every iniquity is a lie, because assuredly whatever departs from truth departs from equity... Every lie is to be shunned with the utmost care; although sometimes some kind of lie is of lighter fault, if someone, by lying, tries to procure for another some advantage of life or of body — since it is written, 'The mouth that lieth killeth the soul'; 'Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie.' This kind of lie, too, perfect men avoid with the utmost care, so that no one's life is defended by their deceit, lest they harm their own soul while they strive to render another's life secure. Some, indeed, by the deceit of midwives, attempt to affirm this kind of lie not to be sin — for it is written, 'because the Lord built them houses'; that in this recompense it may the better be recognized what the fault of lying deserves. For that reward of theirs, which could have been repaid to them in eternal life for their kindness, was, on account of the admixed fault of lying, diverted to an earthly recompense — so that, in this life, which they wished to preserve by lying, they might receive the good things they had done, and might not further have the reward of their merit to expect. Indeed, if carefully weighed, they lied out of love of the present life, not out of intention of reward. For, by sparing the life of the infants, they contrived to cover their own by lying."

I will point out three others, since all subsequent writers have detested all lies. Ambertus, Bk. IX on the Apocalypse, explaining those words, "And to all liars their portion shall be in the pool burning with fire," having cited the authorities of Gregory and Augustine against lying, thus concludes: "One thing we must firmly hold: that no kind of lie remains unpunished, which is not here atoned for by penance, or by some work of piety." St. Gregory VII (Bk. IX, Epistle 21, to Alfonso, King of the Spains) says: "You are not ignorant, in your prudence, that lying is a sin, of which an account must be rendered even for an idle word in the strict examination. But not even a lie which is told for peace, with a pious intention, can be proven altogether free of fault." This I have touched upon beforehand, so that, since in the rest, without doubt, you may not hesitate to hold that to be a sin. Alexander III, in the chapter "Super eo," Extra, on abuses, prohibits, as it were a sacrilege, that among priests one should lie for another's life.

Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibologi…, Chapter III — A compendious narration of everything that St. Augustine writes in his Book on Lying

I. We have already indicated, in the preceding chapter, that, before Augustine's time, several authors defended as licit the use of lying in extreme necessity, for the preservation of human life, or the warding off of some other grave harm. Cassian, above all others, left no stone unturned to fortify this opinion with the authority of Scripture. St. Augustine, on the contrary, snatched the palm from all the impugners of lying. He proposes to himself all the arguments, or cases, of his adversaries, and, with the utmost acuteness of his own genius, discusses and turns them over, so that nothing is left untouched, nothing unresolved. Indeed, he himself devised all those objections, all those events, paradoxes, and sophisms, which more recent theologians treat, so as to show that lying can be favored, and all those same difficulties, lest he pass over anything. And, since I have judged it worth the effort to set before the eyes of readers the disputation of so great a Father, so that they may gather from this how far Augustine's teaching differs from more recent inventions — Augustine wrote this Book on Lying around the year 395, as the Benedictine Fathers observe. All, then, that is contained in this Book I will transcribe here, reduced to a compendium with such brevity as I am able. The proem of this Book begins with these words:

II. "Great is the question concerning lying, which often disturbs us in our own daily actions — lest we either rashly accuse of lying what is not a lie, or judge that one must sometimes lie for some honorable, officious, and merciful reason." Then (ch. 1), the state of the controversy having been set forth, and jesting words, whose signification is plain to all, being excluded (ch. 2) from the present question, he observes (ch. 3) that neither does one who asserts something false always lie, nor is one who states something true always free of a lie. For one is not guilty of lying who, uttering a falsehood, reckons it to be true. On the contrary, he is held a liar who speaks the truth, thinking it false. Wherefore he lies who, having something else in his mind, states, in words, or by whatever signification, what he reckons false. Ch. 4 inquires what act it behooves the whole Book to treat: namely, whether he who lies ought always to have the intention of deceiving; he there discusses other difficulties as well. Ch. 5 asks whether one may sometimes lie. Those who defend this oppose the examples of Sarah, of Jacob, and of the Egyptian midwives. They add the most grave inconveniences which sometimes follow upon the manifestation of some truth — such as death, and the affliction of the sick, who cannot be freed except by a lie — relying on which words, and on those examples adduced from the Old Testament, they answer that it is unlawful for anyone who thinks well [of a matter] to be manifested. On the contrary, those who hold that the ancient Fathers did not lie argue more forcibly from divine examples, that in every event to lie...

[several lines here in the source are too faint to reliably transcribe; the discussion continues concerning whether examples like Abraham's servant provide precedent for lying]

...examples are found which provoke to the imitation of lying. But the dissimulation of Peter, and of Barnabas, was not only not commended, but even censured, and corrected. From the guilt of this dissimulation he shows Paul to be immune, when he circumcised Timothy — where he brings forward much in Paul's defense.

III. The inconveniences, moreover, which they object would follow from the revelation of truth (ch. 6), the impugners of lying count as nothing. For, directing their mind to the divine Scripture, which threatens, "The mouth that lieth killeth the soul," they reckon it a perversion of order, to destroy one's own soul, so that another may live bodily. Nor does charity urge this, which bids us to love our neighbor as ourselves, not more than ourselves. For if he departs from the right order who seeks temporal death for another's bodily life, how much more does he exceed the rule of sound doctrine, who loses his own eternal life for another's temporal one? Those, however, who rage and are indignant, if someone is unwilling to destroy his own soul by a lie, so that another may live longer in the flesh — what if it be by our own theft, what if by adultery, that another might be freed from death? Is anyone bound to corrupt his own soul by a lie, so that another may live in the body? It is absurd. Therefore neither theft nor adultery is to be committed, however much it might free someone from death. What, if a man bears a noose, that another may be strangled, unless it is granted to him what he seeks — must one assent to it? What, if a ravisher demands debauchery, affirming that he will kill a man, unless it is conceded to him — will he then be a nefarious murderer? Therefore, in this question, nothing is to be attended to, except whether lying is, by its own nature, iniquitous. Since this has already been shown above, it will be the same as to ask whether, for another's salvation, one ought to be unjust, as if one were to ask whether, for another's soul's health, which cannot be preserved except by equity, one ought oneself to be unjust. But if he rejects this, so that not only another's, but even our own, temporal welfare we must prefer to it — who could call it into doubt that one must never lie at all?

IV. Since, however (ch. 7), chastity of body is itself more precious than life, it can be asked whether a man may rightly use a lie, by which he might avoid the loss of chastity — as if a ravisher should rush in, who might be avoided by a lie. It is easily answered that there is no chastity of body, unless it depends on integrity of mind; which being disrupted, the former must necessarily fall, even if it seems untouched. In no way, then, does the mind corrupt itself by a lie for the sake of its body, which it knows remains incorrupt, if incorruption does not depart from the mind itself. For what the body suffers by violence, without preceding lust, is to be called vexation rather than corruption. Not every corruption is shameful; but there is corruption there, if lust has consented. But, however excellent the mind is above the body, so much the more wickedly is it corrupted. Chastity, then, can be preserved wherever no voluntary corruption of the mind can occur, unless someone has procured it, or consented to it. For certainly, if a ravisher has assailed a body which can be resisted neither by force, nor avoided by any counsel, or lie, it must be confessed that chastity is not violated by another's lust. Wherefore, since no one doubts that the soul is better than the body, integrity of mind is to be preferred to integrity of body, which can be preserved in eternity. But who would say that the mind of a liar is integral? For lust itself is rightly defined as an appetite of the mind by which temporal goods are preferred to eternal ones. No one, then, can prove that one must ever lie, unless he can show that some eternal good can be obtained by a lie. But since each one departs from eternity as much as he departs from truth, and it is most absurd to say that one who lies, departing from truth, can, by so departing, arrive at some good — or, if there is such a good, whatever was not fulfilled will not be true, and therefore not good either, since it is false. Just as, then, mind is to be preferred to body, so too is truth to mind, since the mind ought to desire it not only more than the body, but even more than itself. If, however, Lot, being so just that he deserved even to receive Angels as guests, offered his daughters to be ravished by the Sodomites, so that the bodies of women rather than of men might be corrupted by them — how much more diligently, and constantly, ought chastity of mind be preserved in truth, since the male body is truly to be preferred to the female body?

V. Hence anyone may gather that one ought not to lie even with the intention of attaining eternal salvation; indeed he adds (ch. 8) that the door of eternal salvation is closed, if an entrance is opened by a lie. For the first foundation of salvation is faith. This surely wavers, if it is once granted that it is lawful for good men to lie. For how is one to be believed who thinks that one must sometimes lie? For he can lie even then, when he bids himself to be believed. For how can it be known whether he then also has some cause, as he himself thinks, for a false narration by way of officious lying — and this in such a way that even a man terrified could be restrained from lust by this means, or must be believed even in spiritual matters, judging that he consults his own interest by lying? Wherefore, either it is not to be believed that good men lie sometimes, or it is not to be believed that they are good, of whom we believe that they must sometimes lie. Of these three, the first is pernicious, the second foolish. It remains, then, that good men never lie.

n. VI.

VI. Thus this question (ch. 9), considered and treated from both sides, is nonetheless not a judgment easily to be rendered; but those are still to be diligently heard who say that nothing is so ill done that it must not be done in avoidance of something worse. Now it pertains to the deeds of men not only whatever they do, but also whatever, with consent, they suffer. Whence, if a case arose that a Christian man should choose to burn incense to idols, rather than consent to debauchery, which the persecutor threatened him with unless he did so — they seem rightly to ask why he should not likewise avoid the latter turpitude. That consent, by which he preferred to suffer debauchery rather than burn incense to idols, they say is not a passion but a deed: for, that he might not do this, he chose to burn incense. He answers, that if such consent is to be reckoned a deed, then those too are murderers who preferred to be killed rather than to bear false witness. Consent, therefore, is not to be called such, whenever we do not approve what is done to us; indeed, so far as it is in us, we forbid it to be done. He, then, erred, who, to prevent others from sinning against his body, burned incense to idols. But they reply: How is it not done with them, if, had they not done this, you would have done that? Augustine answers, that in this way we would be said to break down the door along with the housebreakers, if, by not shutting it, we did not prevent them from breaking it down. He proposes the question more precisely: ought he, then, to have suffered debauchery rather than burn incense? If you ask what he ought to have done, he ought to have done neither. For if I say he ought to have done one of these, I would approve one of them, whereas I condemn both. But if it is asked which of these he ought rather to have avoided, since he could not avoid both, but could avoid one or the other, I will answer: his own sin, rather [than to avoid another's]. Indeed, his own lighter sin is to be avoided rather than another's grave one. Finally, he concludes that the knot of the question turns on this: namely, whether a lie ceases to be a sin, when someone uses it to guard bodily chastity.

n. VII.

VII. If the discourse concerns pernicious lies, which injure another's reputation, Augustine answers (ch. 10) that it is never lawful for us to obscure another's good name, so as to prevent, whether of our own or of another's body, a rape, or other such evils, or graver ones, to be avoided — just as it is likewise never lawful to lie in a matter of religion. Indeed, one must not lie even in the doctrine of religion, so that someone might be more easily led to it. For, once the authority of truth is broken, or even lightly diminished, all things will remain in doubt — which, unless believed true, cannot be held as certain.

n. VIII.

VIII. This being firmly established, the discussion concerning other lies proceeds more safely (ch. 11). And so all lies which unjustly harm someone are to be removed, just as also those which, although they do not harm another, nonetheless profit no one, not even the liars themselves. Finally, those lies too are to be avoided which are called jesting, which liars therefore employ, so that they may please men, and render human conversation more pleasant.

n. IX.

IX. These kinds having been condemned without any doubt, the discourse (ch. 12) returns to officious lies, which harm no one, but profit someone. Concerning this kind of lie the whole controversy turns on this: namely, whether these lies harm him who utters them, so that they may profit another; and whether the harm which the liar suffers is compensated by the good which the lie obtains. He answers that a lie is never lawful, even if it harms no one, and profits someone: otherwise it would be lawful to steal a measure of wheat from a rich man, abounding in superfluous wealth, to give to a poor man, who would experience great advantage, since the rich man would feel no detriment; it would then also be lawful to bear false witness to conceal the poor man's theft. What could be said more perverse than this? But since it could be replied that this lie is therefore unlawful, because by it another's sin is concealed, it is consequently asked whether it is lawful to lie, when the lie harms no one, benefits someone, and conceals no sin. He answers: If, for this reason, we do not sin in lying, because we harm no one, and benefit someone, why do we not, on the same principle, examine the sin of lying itself when we say a false thing to conceal someone's sin, and thereby benefit and harm no one? Is it not lawful to conceal a sin? Where it is written, "Thou shalt not steal," is it not also written there, "Thou shalt not bear false witness"? Is it, then, lawful to conceal a sin, and yet not lawful to commit one? Or perhaps it is not false witness, except when someone lies in such a way as either to fabricate a crime against someone, or to conceal someone's crime, or in some way to oppress someone in judgment? If this is so, what then, if a murderer takes refuge with a Christian, or that Christian sees where he takes refuge, and is questioned about this matter by one who, seeking the man for punishment, is the slain man's avenger — must one lie? Or is it evil to lie to conceal another's sin, but not evil to lie to conceal the sinner? What, if, led before a judge concerning the very place where he is hiding, or where you know he is hiding, you are questioned? Will you say: I do not know, and I did not see what you know, and did see? You will, then, bear false witness, and destroy your own soul, so that the murderer not be destroyed. Should you, then, being led to death, being innocent, where you know a murderer to be hiding, knowingly answer to a judge who, though commanded by a greater power to seize him for death, yet is only the executor of the law, not its author? Will it not be false witness, because you lie for the innocent, since it is not the judge, but the executor of the law, who asks? What, if the lawgiver himself asks, or some other unjust judge, seeking an innocent man for punishment? What will you do? A false witness, or will you be a betrayer? Or will you remain doubtful between the crime of false witness and of betrayal? How much more strongly, then, how much more excellently, will you say: I will not betray, nor will I lie. This a certain Bishop of the Church of Tagaste, named Firmus, once did — firmer still in will than in name. Why should not we do the same, both before a judge, and outside judgment, that we may fulfill what is written: "Thou shalt not bear false witness," and avoid that punishment: "Thou wilt destroy all that speak a lie"? Sometimes, however, we are asked, not where he is, but whether he is, or is not, concealed in that place. Where, if we know he is, by keeping silent we betray him; or even if we testify that we will by no means say whether he is there or not, we equally betray him, as if we pointed to him with a finger. In this article, then, you ought to answer thus: He knows where he is; I will never show it; I will not lie here. This alone is a fitting response to distract the mind of the questioner elsewhere, and to turn it away from the place where the innocent man lies concealed. Then, indeed, whatever you suffer, so as not to betray him, will be shown to be not only blameless, but even praiseworthy.

n. X.

X. This much has been said, so that (ch. 14) it is plain that seven kinds of lying have thus far been sufficiently discussed. It remains now to speak of the eighth, and last, kind. This lie, he says, is when we lie to protect our chastity of body from another's violence. But before he renders judgment on this kind of lie, he undertakes to unfold, with a more severe examination, the testimonies of Scripture which condemn such lies. This is mature, and severe. He begins this discussion at ch. 15, and carries it on to ch. 19. He weighs the various interpretations by which the defenders of each opinion accommodated the texts of the divine Scriptures to their own opinion. From all these, weighed with the utmost diligence, he gathers this: that no one can show, from the divine Scriptures, that any lie is found which either ought to be loved, or ought not to be held in hatred, but is sometimes to be done, as something which you hate (ch. 18), so that what is more to be detested may be avoided. But men err in this, that they set precious things beneath baser ones. For, when you have granted that some evil is to be admitted, lest another, graver, be committed — not by the rule of truth, but by his own desire and custom, does each one measure the evil, and reckons that graver which he himself more shrinks from, not that which is truly more to be fled. This whole vice is born from a perversity of love. For since there are two lives of ours — one everlasting, which is divinely promised to us; the other temporal, in which we now live — when anyone begins to love this temporal life more than that everlasting one, he thinks no sins graver than those which take away this life, or take away from it some advantage unjustly, or wholly deprive one of life by death. And so men hate thieves, and robbers, more than the lascivious, the drunken, the luxurious, the abusive, and torturers, and murderers, if these inflict no injury upon them. But against all these are set opposite rules, which truth prescribes for us to be kept. This teaches us bravely and prudently to endure those sins which take away from us the goods of the body, and are not impeded from eternal life; for those alone sin who take them away, and those who suffer the loss of them scarcely sin at all. But whatever things are preserved for the sake of sanctity and religion, when those who wish to do injury attempt to violate them, are to be retained even at the cost of lesser sins — not, however, of injuries to others — if a condition is proposed, and the opportunity given. And then those sins already cease to be sins, which are undertaken for the avoidance of graver ones.

n. XI.

XI. Moreover, these are the things (ch. 19) which ought to be preserved by our free consent, for the sake of sanctity: chastity of body, chastity of mind, truth of doctrine. Chastity of body is not violated without our consent. For whatever happens to our body against our will, a greater force prevailing, is no impurity; and there can be some reason for permitting it, but none for consenting to it. Chastity of mind, however, consists in a sincere delight, which is not corrupted, except when we love, and desire, what truth teaches ought not to be loved, and desired. A sincere love of God, and of neighbor, is therefore to be guarded: for in this, chastity of mind is sanctified. But the truth of doctrine, of religion, and of piety, is not violated by a lie. The truth of doctrine, then, is to be guarded with the utmost care from lying, so that, if chastity of mind should be violated, it may have a source from which it can be repaired: since, once the authority of doctrine is corrupted, there can be no course, or recourse, to chastity of mind.

n. XII.

XII. Chastity of mind is guarded by sincerity of speech: which, even if it is less violated, when someone lies to guard chastity of body, is nonetheless violated, and that which is to be preserved in the chastity and sanctity of the mind is also violated. Whence we are compelled to know beforehand, not by the opinion of men, which is generally in error, but by truth itself, which is most invincible, that the sincerity, fidelity, or truthful speech of the mind excels above the chastity of the body, and is united with it. Chastity of mind is an ordered love, not subjecting greater things to lesser ones. For less can be violated in the body than whatever can be violated in the mind. When someone does violence to your body, you see that it is not your own, but another's, lust that breaks in. Beware, nonetheless, lest, by consenting, you become a participant: for bodily chastity is in no way corrupted, unless it is violated in... the mind, which not consenting, in no way is bodily chastity corrupted, whatever has been perpetrated on the body by another's lust. Wherefore, so far as it is in us, both are to be fortified and hedged about with holy morals, and wisdom, lest they be violated from without. But when both cannot be kept, but one or the other is subject to the danger of loss, no one fails to see that, in matters of sin, chastity of mind is to be preferred to chastity of body, and one's own fault is to be avoided rather than another's.

n. XIII.

XIII. Let it be asked, then (ch. 21), whether, all the testimonies of Scripture having been discussed, it remains established that one must never, absolutely, lie at all. Since no examples of lies worthy of imitation will be found in the morals and deeds of the Saints, so far as it concerns those Scriptures which are historical narratives referred to no figurative signification, such as are the deeds recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. All the words and deeds of the Lord in the Gospel, which to the less experienced seem to be lies, are figurative significations. Never, then, is one to lie — since, of the eight kinds of lies already recounted, not one is licit. Whoever, however, shall think that some kind of lying is not a sin, will shamefully deceive himself, since he will consider himself an honest deceiver of others.

Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibologi…, Chapter IV — A compendium of the Book Against Lying, which St. Augustine wrote to Consentius

I. In addition to the compendious narration of the Book on Lying, I have resolved to add a few observations of a similar kind, no diverting digression interposed, but to sketch, as it were, an image of each Book, so that readers may explore, with a single glance, St. Augustine's mind. Then I shall add a few observations to each Book. And, before I come to the matter, it is worth inquiring why St. Augustine entitled the Book which we treated in the preceding chapter "On Lying," while he entitled this one, which I now undertake to transcribe in compendium, "Against Lying." The reason for the different inscription Augustine himself sets forth (Bk. I, Retractations, last chapter): "The title of the latter is 'Against Lying,' but of the former, 'On Lying' — because through the latter the whole attack against lying is open; the former, however, is occupied for the most part in the disputation of inquiry." For, so that he might exhaust the controversy to its depths, in the former Book he disputed, as it were, problematically on lying: he brought forward the adversaries' reasons, not incidentally, but professedly, into the open, and set them in full light; he also gave responses, and showed whatever lies to be unlawful. In the present Book, however, Against Lying, he attacked the matter at close quarters, and undertook to rout all lies with a united hand. Occasion for publishing this Book was furnished to Augustine by the Priscillianists, whose more pernicious error was that it is lawful for a man, by lies, indeed even by perjuries, to conceal the profession of his own religion. Hence, feigning the religion of Catholics externally, they entered into commerce with Catholics, and, more securely under such a mask, waged war against evangelical truth. And since it was most difficult to drive these wolves, clothed in sheep's skins, from Christ's fold, certain Catholics, less prudent, so as to drive out one nail with another, feigned themselves Priscillianists, so that they might more easily detect the impious dogmas of these same men. To rout these errors, Augustine published his Book Against Lying.

II. And first he established (ch. 1) that neither are lies to be exterminated by lies, nor thefts by thefts, nor adulteries by adulteries. This is the impious opinion of the Priscillianists (ch. 2), which dishonors the holy Martyrs; indeed it takes away entirely their altogether holy martyrdoms. There are many kinds of lies (ch. 3), all of which we ought universally to hate, since none can be found which is not opposed to truth, just as darkness is opposed to light, iniquity to piety, and sickness to health. This opinion of lying once admitted, all human society is removed from the midst. For if the Priscillianists should suspect that we speak Catholic dogmas deceitfully, in order that we might catch them at something — I know not what — this I did then for this reason, that I might see whether even now he does so, lest I tolerate it. But what will he answer to one saying: whence, then, do I know that Priscillianists do not lie (ch. 5) in comparison with us? For the Priscillianist speaks thus, because he so believes, so that he does not lie; but the Catholic does not so believe, though he speak thus. Never, therefore, let us conceal what we think is true; certainly he would say such things to one so suspecting him: although one blasphemes unknowingly, the other knowingly. One must not lie, then (ch. 6). For if lies were lawful in a matter of religion, with the intention of enlightening heretics, adulteries too, committed with the same intention, could be considered chaste. It matters much, indeed (ch. 7), for what cause, for what end, with what intention someone acts; but those things which are agreed to be sins are to be done for no good end, under no pretext, however good the cause, as it were, nor with any good intention. A good intention can indeed sometimes diminish the malice of a sin (ch. 8), but it can in no way bring it about that a sin which by its own nature is a sin should not be one.

III. But, it must be confessed, human minds are so disturbed by a certain compensatory reckoning of sins, that some things are even thought (ch. 9) to deserve praise, and are rather called well done. For who would doubt that fornication is a great sin! And yet if there existed a cause for which Lot thought he ought to prostitute his own daughters to the fornications of the impious! What shall we say here? If we open this path, and commit lesser evils, lest others perpetrate greater ones, by a wide, indeed by no, boundary, all crimes will reign. But this error prevails chiefly then (ch. 10), when the discussion is of lies. For they reckon that those are not lies which are uttered for another's benefit, and they contend to demonstrate this by examples of Scripture. Which, however (ch. 11), are either not lies, or are mysteries; or, if they are lies, are in no way worthy of imitation. For if the sayings and deeds of the Prophets and Patriarchs are referred to those things which they were meant to signify (ch. 12), even certain sayings, or deeds, of the Savior himself in the Gospel, since he too deigned to become a Prophet of the Prophets, are found to have truthful significations. Very many of his sayings (ch. 13) have a figurative signification. But whoever says (ch. 14) that some lies are just must equally assert that some sins are just. What could be said more absurd than this (ch. 15)? For those things which are against the law cannot be just. But it is said, "Thy law is truth." That, then, which is against truth cannot be just. But who would doubt that every lie is against truth? Nor does the example of the Egyptian midwives, or of Rahab, help the defenders of lying (ch. 16). Since it was not the iniquity of the lying tongue, but the disposition of a merciful mind, that merited a temporal compensation.

IV. But someone will say: would not the midwives, and Rahab, have done better (ch. 17) by refusing to lie, showing no mercy at all? On the contrary, if those Hebrew women, that is, had shown no mercy, they would have obtained thereby, you say, an eternal reward, incomparably ampler than those houses which they made for themselves. And, you will say, even had they themselves died, they would have obtained the eternal Kingdom. But what is to be said of the woman of Jericho? Could she not have said to those asking: I know where they are, but I fear God, and will not betray them? Could she have said this to the Israelites, so that there was no deceit in it, since it would have been true, insofar as by God's mercy she was passing over to the city of God? But, you will say, they, having heard this, would have killed her, and searched her house, and would have found the hidden guests, whom she had carefully concealed. Would she not, by lying, have betrayed the guests hidden within, just as she would have by telling the truth? But would it necessarily have followed that, by telling the truth... , they would also have found those whom she had so carefully hidden? For that most cautious woman had foreseen, and had made provision, that they should freely refuse to entrust the little ones to the men of Jerusalem, nor did she lie by this. But see what would have happened, had she, without lying, said where they could hide, even though she would herself have been killed by her own fellow-citizens: her life would have had to end for the sake of a merciful deed, precious in the sight of the Lord, and his benefit toward them would not have been in vain. But you will say: what if, having come to that place where she had hidden them, they, by searching everything, had reached them — not only through the lie, but even through the perjury, of the most vile and shameful woman, of those who sought them? It can be said, in like manner: what, if they had refused to believe her when she lied out of fear? They would surely have obtained by that lie what she feared. And where, then, do we place the will, and power, of God? For by whom could they have been guarded, after the woman's lie, if, had she not lied, they could not have been guarded by him? Unless perhaps we have forgotten that this same thing happened at Sodom, where the males, inflamed with unspeakable lust toward males, could not even find the door of the house in which those they sought were hiding — since the just man, in a case altogether similar, refused to lie for the sake of his guests, whom he did not know to be Angels. And certainly that woman of Jericho could have given such an answer to those questioning her, as the just man gave in Sodom. But the just man refused to stain his soul with a lie for the bodies of his guests, for whose sake he was willing that the bodies of his daughters should suffer violence from an alien iniquity of lust.

V. The holy Doctor, however, warns that Lot is not to be imitated in that he offered his daughters to be ravished by the Sodomites. Whence it is established that not everything which we read to have been done by the Saints ought we to transfer into our own morals, or hold as just, ch. 9 of this Book. Let man do, then (Augustine continues, ch. 17), what he can, even for the temporal safety of men, so long as he does not sin — and when he comes to this point, where he cannot look after such safety without sinning, let him already reckon that he has nothing left to do, when he perceives that what remains to him is not to do rightly.

n. VI.

VI. "But, since we are men, and live among men, and I confess myself to be among the number of those whom compensatory sins (ch. 18) do not yet trouble, human feeling often prevails over me even in these matters, nor am I able to resist it, when I am told: 'Behold, a sick man is in danger from a grave illness, whose strength can no longer bear it, if the death of his dearest son, most beloved, is announced to him; if he asks whether he lives — whose death you know — what will you answer, when, whatever else you say besides one of three things — namely, that he is dead, or that he lives, or that you do not know — he understands nothing else than that you are unwilling to say that he is dead? It will avail just as much, even if in every way you keep silent. But of those three, two are false: that he lives, and that you do not know; these you can say only by lying. But the one true thing — namely, that he is dead — if you say it, and the death of the troubled man follows, it will be cried out that he was slain by you.' And who could bear that men, exaggerating how great an evil is thereby avoided, prefer a salutary lie, and call truth a murderer? (Or, that truth, which confers life, should be preferred to a murderous lie.) I am moved by these objections vehemently, but it would be a marvel if I were also moved wisely. For when I set before the eyes of my heart, however dim, that intelligible beauty from whose mouth nothing false has proceeded, although the more that truth shines forth radiantly and ever more clearly, the more my own weakness, trembling, is beaten back by it — nonetheless I am so inflamed with love of so great a beauty, that I despise, in comparison, all the human considerations that call me back from it. But it is much for that affection to persevere so far, that its effect does not fail in the moment of temptation. Nor let it delay me, as I contemplate that luminous good, in which there are no shadows of lying, that truth should be called a murderer of men — because, on account of our unwillingness to lie, and their dying upon hearing the truth. For if an impudent woman awaits debauchery, and, with you not consenting, dies, disturbed by a savage passion — will chastity be called a murderer in every place, and everywhere? Or, because we read, 'We are the good odor of Christ in every place, and in them that are saved, and in them that perish; to some indeed the odor of life unto life, but to others the odor of death unto death' — shall we also pronounce the odor of Christ a murderer? But since we are men, and, in such questions and contradictions, human feeling grows weary, therefore it soon..."

Here it is worth adding what follows. There approaches, then, of his own weakness, and gradually, imperceptibly, he insensibly slips into it — as one who admits, for the sake of safety, that a lie could sometimes be said, is led on, little by little, and bit by bit, by such increments, that he can no longer be entirely on guard against so great a pestilence, growing immensely from the smallest additions. Whence it is written: "He that contemneth small things, shall fall by little and little"; "And who is sufficient for these things?" (2 Corinthians 2:16). It is to be lamented, that this evil, by such brief approaches, and by degrees, so often more miserably leads to so great a heap of wicked lies — where, he adds, most providently it is written: "He that despiseth small things shall fall by little and little." What of the fact that such lovers of this life, so as not to doubt to prefer it to truth, wish us, so that man may not die — or rather, so that man, who is one day to die, may die a little later — not only to lie, but even to perjure ourselves, so that, forsooth, the vain safety of man may not pass a little sooner, and we take the name of our God in vain? And there are, among them, learned men, who even fix rules, and set limits, of when one ought, and when one ought not, to perjure oneself. O, where is that saying: 'Whither shall we go, and whither shall we hide ourselves from the wrath of thy face?' And what shall we do — if we not only readily commit such lies, but even dare, besides, to teach perjuries? Let the assertors, and defenders of lying, themselves see what kind, or kinds, of lying delights them to justify. At least let them grant that one must not lie in a matter of God; at least let them keep themselves from perjuries, and blasphemies. At least, where the name of God, where God as witness, where the sacrament of God is interposed, where the discourse is of divine religion, or is conferred — let no one lie, let no one praise it, let no one teach or command it, let no one say that a lie is just. As for the other kinds of lying, let each choose for himself what he thinks the mildest, and most innocent, kind of lying, in which it pleases him to lie. This I know: that even he who teaches that one ought to lie wishes himself to seem to teach the truth. For if what he teaches is false, teaching it he deceives, and deceiving he is deceived, knowing it! But if he wishes to be at pains, when he teaches falsely, so that he may find a pupil, he asserts that he teaches truth, where the discourse concerns doctrine — how, then, will it be a lie, if he teaches that lying is to be done? For if it is false that one must lie, how will any lie be from truth, the Apostle John crying out against it: 'Every lie is not of the truth'?"*

n. VII.

VII. "It is not true, then (ch. 19), that one must sometimes lie; and what is not true is to be persuaded to no one at all. But infirmity plays its own part, and, where it contradicts, proclaims that it has a case winnable with sympathetic crowds. But how, among men, who without doubt, if they are deceived, are turned aside from ruin, whether another's or their own, doth human feeling, when men are helped in their peril, not incline toward lying? If the crowd of my mortality would patiently hear me, I would respond something on behalf of the cause of truth. Certainly pious, true, holy chastity is only from truth: and whoever acts against it, assuredly acts against truth. Why, then, even if those in peril cannot otherwise be helped, do I not commit debauchery — which is therefore contrary to truth, because contrary to chastity — and, that one in peril may be helped, speak a lie, which is itself most openly contrary to truth? What has earned so great a favor with us, and offense, that chastity of body should so please, and truth offend — when all chastity is from truth?" But someone will say, this is for the perfect; solid food. "For many things are relaxed to weakness by way of pardon, although they do not please; and let chastity be not of the body, but of the mind, and let truth dwell in the mind, just as most sincere chastity." Let him say this, whoever does not fear the consequences that are to be feared, if lies of any kind are in any way admitted. "In no way, however, are they to be permitted to ascend so far that they arrive at perjuries and blasphemies; nor ought any cause whatsoever to be alleged for why one ought to perjure oneself, or, what is more execrable, why God ought to be blasphemed. For it is not the case that, because blasphemy occurs through a lie, therefore it is not blasphemy. For it can likewise be said, in this manner, that one does not perjure oneself, because one perjures oneself through a lie." Whoever, then, says that, for the sake of a man in danger, even..."*

n. VIII.

VIII. "But sometimes it is objected (ch. 20) that one ought to lie, even for our own temporal safety, when it is loudly proclaimed that eternal salvation is thereby also endangered by our lie, if it cannot otherwise be repelled — as, if someone, wishing to be baptized, is placed in the power of impious and unbelieving men, to whom access cannot be had, so that he may be washed in the laver of regeneration, unless the guards are deceived by a lie. From this most invidious outcry, by which we are compelled ... to lie for a man's eternal salvation, whither shall I flee? And chastity, too, is set before me by you. For why, if the guards, unless deceived, would admit us to baptize the man, but could be enticed into debauchery — do we not act contrary to chastity? And, if they can be deceived by a lie, do we not act contrary to truth, unless truth does not command it, since no chastity would be lovable to anyone at all, unless truth prescribed it? Accordingly, in order that a man might be baptized, if the guards be deceived by a lie — if truth so commands. But how would truth command that a man be lied for, in order to be baptized, if chastity does not command that a man be committed adultery with, in order to be baptized? But why does chastity not command this, except because truth does not teach it? If, then, we ought to do nothing except what truth teaches; since truth teaches that we ought not to do what is contrary to chastity, even for the sake of a man's baptism — how will it teach us to do, for the sake of a man's baptism, what is itself contrary to truth? But just as eyes too weak to gaze upon the sun nonetheless gladly look upon things illumined by it, so souls, already able to be delighted by the beauty of chastity, are yet not altogether able to consider truth by itself, whence the light of chastity shines — so that, when it comes to doing something contrary to truth, they shrink back and shudder, just as they flee from, and shudder at, doing something contrary to chastity. But the son who obeys the word that proceeds from his mouth will be so far from all falsehood, and there will be such signs, that, in order to help a man, he reckons no path closed to him through a lie, rather than that he should be compelled to pass through debauchery. And the Father hears him praying, that he may be able, without a lie, to snatch a man from ruin, that man whom the Father himself wills to be helped, by inscrutable ... Such a son, then, observes as much abstinence from lying as from sin. For the name of lying is sometimes used in the place of the name of sin."

n. IX.

IX. "Lies, then, are either to be avoided (ch. 21, or 22) by right acting, or to be confessed by repentance; but they are not to be increased by unhappily abounding in them, and by teaching them. But let him who thinks this the way choose it, whence he may help one in danger, of whatever sort of lies, and by whatever perjuries, provided that any kind of salvation for the man may be obtained — nonetheless, even among such men, let no cause lead us to perjury, and, if we shall have obtained this much at least, we shall judge these crimes at least equal to, or certainly not less than, debaucheries. For it must very often be considered that men provoke their wives, of whose adultery they are suspicious, to swear an oath — which assuredly they would not do, unless they believed that even those women who did not fear to commit adultery would fear to commit perjury. For indeed some unchaste women, who did not fear to deceive their husbands by a stealthy union, feared to deceive God, whom they had employed deceitfully as a false witness to the very husbands they had deceived... And if infirmity so far usurps for itself, that something is venially permitted to it which truth disapproves; nonetheless, so that you may inconcussedly maintain, in the divine religion, that one must never, absolutely, lie, hold fast — just as neither are adulterers to be sought out through adulteries, nor murderers through murders, nor sorcerers through sorceries, nor liars through lies, nor blasphemers to be sought through blasphemies — according to those things which we have disputed at such length in this volume, that we have scarcely arrived at that limit which we set for that place."

Diss. III, Equivocal, Ambiguous, and Amphibologi…, Chapter V — How opportune Augustine's teaching is for settling the controversy concerning the deceitful oath will be made plain from the following propositions

I. So that anyone may most easily perceive how opportunely I have prefixed Augustine's teaching against lying, before entering upon the most difficult controversy concerning the deceitful oath, it is worth setting forth beforehand certain general propositions, which are gathered, as it were, in summary, from St. Augustine's teaching, so that I may set them before the readers' eyes by a simple narration. Once I have explained these propositions, in comparison with the teaching of more recent authors, the discourse will return to them below.

First Proposition

II. All the difficulties which more recent writers turn over in their Books concerning equivocations and mental restrictions, and all the cases relevant to practice, St. Augustine brings under examination, both in his Book On Lying, and in that Against Lying. For, at the very beginning of the disputation, he attests that he wishes to institute a discourse concerning those expressions which greatly disturb the mind in daily speech; and he indicates the two chief purposes of his treatment: one, lest anyone wrongly condemn as a lie what is not a lie; the other, lest a lie be ever held lawful. "Great is the question concerning lying, which often disturbs us in our own daily actions; lest we either rashly accuse of lying what is not a lie, or judge that one must sometimes lie for some honorable, officious, and merciful reason" (Book on Lying, ch. 1).

Second Proposition

III. The hinge of Augustine's disputation, in the two Books cited above chiefly, turns on this: that reasons be given for the concealment of truth in matters of the highest moment, such as for the preservation of life, of chastity, and for the keeping of secrets. And Augustine himself, with his own divine genius, could find no remedies beyond these which follow. The first is silence: "For most often," he says (Book Against Lying, ch. 10), "we conceal true things, not by lying, but by keeping silent." The other is an open and unconcealed signification, by which someone protests that he knows the truth, but is unwilling to reveal it: "I fear God, I do not betray them. I will neither betray, nor will I lie." No other way of concealing truth did Augustine recognize — not internal restrictions, not material locutions, not amphibologies of words, not other inventions of more recent authors, wherever they may be found.

…and 186 more passages — all of them are listed on the topic page.

Slater, Cases I

Thomas Slater, S.J. — 9 passages (filed under the subtopics)

Slater, Cases I, The Eighth Commandment, Case 1. Essence of a Lie

Titius, a religious, is not rarely occupied in preaching the word of God and in giving missions to the people. Having returned to the monastery, he is accustomed to relate to the brethren marvelous things concerning what was seen and heard by him while he was outside the monastery. Almost all of them, however, are entirely fictitious, devised and uttered by Titius in order to increase the esteem of himself among the brethren and to delight them. Without scruple he also invents excusing causes in order that he may remain longer outside the monastery, and with them appeases the superior. He strongly maintains that he does not lie in acting thus, since he harms no one and the essence of a lie consists in the violation of another’s right to the truth. Hence it is asked:

Pt. III, Ch. III, Section I. Of the Definition of a Lie · Pt. III, Ch. III, Section II. Of the Evil of Lying · Pt. III, Ch. III, Section III. Of the keeping of Secrets without Lying

What is a lie, and how many kinds are there?

n. ¶3.

In what does the malice of a lie consist, and is it ever lawful to lie?

n. ¶4.

What is to be said of the case?

n. ¶5.

Solution

What is a lie, and how many sorts of lies are there?

n. ¶6.

A lie is a speech against one’s mind. Lies are divided into jocose, officious, and hurtful lies.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 464.

n. ¶7.

In what does the malice of a lie consist, and is it ever lawful to lie?

n. ¶8.

Some would put the malice of lying in the denial to others of that to which they have a right. Others would say that it lies in the deceit practised on others. The common Catholic teaching follows St. Thomas in putting it in the disorder which is intrinsically in saying that which is known to be false. We have from nature the power of communicating our thoughts to our fellow men, and this power is necessary for a social being like man. Those thoughts which are to be communicated to others should be communicated truthfully, and there is a perversion of right order, if this is not done; the virtue of veracity is violated. As lying is intrinsically inordinate and wrong, it is never allowed to tell a lie.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 465.

n. ¶9.

The case. Titius, a Religious, frequently goes out of the monastery to preach. On his return he has wonderful things to tell the brethren, but for the most part, they are pure fabrications, invented to amuse his brethren and to add to his own reputation. He says he does nobody any harm by these tales, and that therefore he does not lie. Titius is wrong. Hurtful lies are not the only species; there are also jocose and officious lies, and Titius is guilty of jocose and officious lying. He says what he knows to be false, and he says it with the intention of deceiving others, or else there would be no prospect of his lies adding to his reputation. Much more is this the case when he invents reasons to be laid before the superior in order to excuse himself for making a longer stay than necessary out of the monastery. In this he is guilty of officious lying. He is also imperceptibly lessening his own estimation of the virtue of truth, and accustoming himself to trifle with it.

Rickaby, Moral Philosophy

Joseph Rickaby, S.J. — 20 passages

Pt. III, Ch. III, Section I. Of the Definition of a Lie

"Let none doubt," says St. Augustine, "that he lies, who utters what is false for the purpose of deceiving. Wherefore the utterance of what is false with a will to deceive is unquestionably a lie." The only question is, whether this definition does not contain more than is necessary to the thing defined. The objective falseness of what is said makes a material falsehood: the will to utter what is false makes a formal falsehood (Ethics, c. iii., s. ii., n. 7, p. 33): the will to create a false impression regards, not the falsehood itself, but the effect to follow from it. If a person says what is not true, but what he takes to be the truth, he tells indeed a material lie, but at the same time he puts forth no human act (Ethics, c. i., n. 2, p. 1) of lying. If on the other hand he says what he believes to be false, though it turns out true, he tells a formal lie, though not a material one, and moreover, he does a human act of lying. But human acts are the subject-matter of morality. The moralist therefore is content to define the formal lie: the material aspect of the lie is irrelevant to his enquiry. A formal lie is saying what one believes not to be true, or promising what one intends not to perform: briefly, it is speaking against one's mind.

We shall show presently that to speak against one's mind is intrinsically, necessarily, and always evil. But when a thing is thus evil in itself, there is no need to bring into the definition of the act, from a moral point of view, the intention with which it is done. There is no use in prying into ends, when the means taken is an unlawful means for any end. If a person blasphemes, we do not ask why he blasphemes: the intention is not part of the blasphemy: the utterance is a sin by itself. But if a person strikes, we ask why he strikes, to heal or to slay, in self-defence or in revenge. So, if speaking against one's mind is a thing indifferent and colourless in point of morality, and all depends on the intention with which we do it, so that we may speak against our minds to put another off, but not to deceive him, then certainly the intention to deceive must be imported into the definition of lying. But if, as we shall prove presently, the act of so speaking is by no means indifferent and colourless, but is fraught with an inordinateness all its own, then the intention may be left out of the question, the act is to be characterised on its own merits, and speech against one's mind is the definition of a lie.

Then, some one will say, it would be a lie for a prisoner in solitary confinement to break the silence of his cell with the exclamation, Queen Anne is not dead. The answer is simple: it takes two to make a speech. A man does not properly speak to himself, nor quarrel with himself, nor deal justly by himself. Not that it would be a lie to deny the death of Queen Anne even in public: for speech is an outward affirmation, the appearance of a serious will to apply predicate to subject: but in this case there is no appearance of a serious will: on the contrary, from the manifest absurdity of the assertion, it is plain that you are joking and do not mean to affirm anything. This perhaps is as far as we can go in permission of what are called lies in jest.

Readings.—St Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 110, art. 1.

Pt. III, Ch. III, Section II. Of the Evil of Lying

Human society cannot go on, if men are to be allowed indiscriminately to lie to one another. Thucydides (iii., 83) gives as the reason of the extravagant length to which faction ran in Greece in his time: "For there was no power to reconcile the parties, no plighted word reliable, no oath held in awe." Even in trifles no one likes to be lied to, and we are not to do to our neighbour what we would not have done to ourselves. The laws of good fellowship require that we should "put away lying, and speak the truth every man with his neighbour: for we are members one of another." (Ephesians iv. 25.) This at least in ordinary circumstances. The same good fellowship requires that in ordinary circumstances we should respect the lives and property of our fellow-men.

But it is lawful to take life in pursuance of the just judgment of authority: it is lawful to seize upon property in self-preservation. These exceptions stand very harmoniously with the well-being of society, or rather are required by it, as we shall see later on. The law against lying, so far as it is founded on the general prejudice done to society by the shock of social confidence, and on the particular annoyance of the party lied to, may seem to admit of similar exceptions. Whoever has no reasonable objection to having life and property taken from him in certain contingencies, can he reasonably complain of any hurt or inconvenience that he may suffer from a lie being told him at times?

I put forward this difficulty, not as though it were without its answer in the principle of General Consequences: still it is a difficulty. Besides, if the whole harm of lying is in the unpleasant effect wrought upon the deceived hearer, and the scandal and bad consequences to society at large, it is a long way to go round to show that lying is impossible to God. He in whose dominion are all the rights and claims of man, is not to be restrained by the mere reluctance of His creatures to be deceived, or by the general bad effects of a lie upon the edifice of human credit. As Master He might impose this annoyance upon the individual, these bad consequences upon society: or by His Providence He might prevent their occurring, whenever He willed in His utterances to swerve from the truth. The only help for the argument for the Divine veracity on these grounds, is to urge with Plato that none of the motives which lead men to lie can ever find place in the mind of God: that a lie is a subterfuge, an economy, a device resorted to under stress of circumstances, such as can never serve the turn of the Supreme Being. But though God be inaccessible to human reasons for departing from the truth, may He not have higher reasons, mysterious, and unsearchable, for such a deviation? It is long arguing out this point. Better bring the discussion sharp round with the question: Is there not some element in the Divine Nature itself, which makes it impossible for God to speak false?

Undoubtedly there is such an element, deep down, even at the root of the sanctity of God. God is holy in that, being by essence the fulness of all being and all goodness, He is ever true to Himself in every act of His understanding, of His will, and of His power. By His understanding He abidingly covers, grasps, and comprehends His whole Being. With His will He loves Himself supremely. His power is exercised entirely for His glory—entirely, but not exclusively, for God's last and best external glory is in the consummated happiness of His creatures. Whatever God makes, He makes in His own likeness, more or less so according to the degree of being which He imparts to the creature. And as whatever God does is like Him, and whatever God makes is like Him, so whatever God says is like Him: His spoken word answers to His inward word and thought. It holds of God as of every being who has a thought to think and a word to utter:

To thine own self be true,
And it must follow as the night the day,
Thou canst not then be false to any man.

God's sanctity is in His being true to Himself. His veracity is part of His sanctity. He cannot in His speech, or revelation of Himself, contradict what He really has in His mind, without ceasing to be holy and being no longer God. But the sanctity of intellectual creatures must be, like their every other pure perfection, modelled on the corresponding perfection of their Maker. Holiness must mean truthfulness in man, for it means truthfulness in God. God's words cannot be at variance with His thought, for God is essential holiness. Nor can man speak otherwise than as he thinks without marring the attribute of holiness in himself, that is, without doing wrong.

n. 6.

To speak against one's mind is an act falling upon undue matter. Words are naturally signs of thoughts. Not that the words of any given language, as English or German, have any natural connection with the thoughts that they express; but it is natural to men, natural to every intellectual being, to have some mode of expressing his thoughts by outward signs; and once a sign is recognized as the sign of a certain thought, so long as the convention remains unrepealed, whoever uses that sign, not having in his mind at the time the thought which that sign signifies, but the contradictory to it, is doing violence to the natural bond between sign and thing signified, by putting forward the former where the latter is not behind it. And since the due and proper matter for the sign to be put upon is the presence in the mind of the thought signified, to make that sign where the opposite thought is present, is, as St. Thomas says, an act falling upon undue matter. The peculiar spiritual and moral inviolability of the connection between word and thought, appears from the consideration which we have urged of the archetype holiness of God. This then is the real, intrinsic, primary, and inseparable reason, why lying, or speech in contradiction with the thought of the speaker, is everywhere and always wrong.

n. 7.

Grotius (De Jure Belli et Pacis, I. iii., c. i., nn. 11, seq.) argues a lie to be wrong solely inasmuch as it is "in conflict with the existing and abiding right of the person spoken to." If right here means something binding in commutative justice (Ethics, c. v., s. ix., n. 6, p. 106), we deny that any such right is violated by what is called a simple lie, that is, an untruth not in the matter of religion, and not affecting the character, property, or personal well-being of our neighbour. For if a simple lie is a violation of commutative justice, it carries the obligation of restitution (Ethics, c. v., s. ix., n. 6, p. 107); that is, we are bound to tell the truth afterwards to the person that we have lied to, even in a matter of no practical consequence,—quite a new burden on the consciences of men. Again, if the bar to lying were the hearer's right, whoever had dominion over another's right might lie to him; the parent might lie to the child, the State to the citizen, and God to man, a doctrine which, away from its application to God, Grotius accepts. Lastly since volenti non fit injuria, the presumed willingness of the listener would license all manner of officious and jocose lies, as the authority of the speaker would sanction official fabrications. Thus, what with official, and what with officious speeches, it would be very hard to believe anybody.

n. 8.

By our rejection of Grotius' theory we are enabled to answer Milton's question: "If all killing be not murder, nor all taking from another, stealing why must all untruths be lies?" Because, we say, killing and taking away of goods deal with rights which are not absolute and unlimited, but become in certain situations void; whereas an untruth turns, not on another's right, but on the exigency of the speaker's own rational nature calling for the concord of the word signifying with the thought signified, and this exigency never varies. Untruth and falsehood are but polite names for a lie.

Readings.—St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 110, art. 3, in corp., ad. 4; ib., q. 109, art. 2, 3, in corp.; Ar., Eth., IV., vii.; Plato, Rep., 382, 389 B, C.

Pt. III, Ch. III, Section III. Of the keeping of Secrets without Lying

There are natural secrets, secrets of promise, and secrets of trust. A natural secret is all a man's own private history, which he would not have made public, as also all that he discovers by his own observation of the similar private history of his neighbours. If a man finds out something about his neighbour, and, after he has found it out for himself, the neighbour gets him to promise not to publish it, that is a secret of promise. Lastly, if one man comes to another, as to a lawyer, or a surgeon, for professional advice, or simply to a friend for moral counsel, and in order thereto imparts to him some of his natural secrets, those secrets, as they are received and held by the person consulted, are called secrets of trust. This latter kind of secret is privileged above the other two. A natural secret, and also a secret of promise, must be delivered up on the demand of an authority competent to inquire in the department where the secret lies. But a secret of trust is to be given up to no inquirer, but to be kept against all who endeavour to come by it, except where the matter bodes mischief and wrong to a third party, or to the community, and where at the same time the owner of the secret cannot be persuaded to desist from the wrong. This proviso does not hold for the seal of confession, which is absolutely inviolable.

The main art of keeping a secret is, not to talk about it. If a man is asked an awkward question, and sees no alternative but to let out or lie, it is usually his own fault for having introduced the subject, or encouraged the questioner up to that point. A wise man lets drop in time topics which he is unwilling to have pressed. But there are unconscionable people who will not be put off, and who, either out of malice or out of stupidity, ply you with questions against all rules of good breeding. This direct assault may sometimes be retaliated, and a rude question met by a curt answer. But such a reply is not always prudent or charitable, and would not unfrequently convey the very information required. Silence would serve no better, for silence gives consent, and is eloquent at times. There is nothing left for it in such cases but to lock your secret up, as it were, in a separate compartment of your breast, and answer according to the remainder of your information, which is not secret, private, and confidential. This looks very much like lying, but it is not lying, it is speaking the truth under a broad mental reservation.

Mental reservation is an act of the mind, limiting the spoken phrase so that it may not bear the full sense which at first hearing it seems to bear. The reservation, or limitation of the spoken sense, is said to be broad or pure, according as it is, or is not, indicated externally. A pure mental reservation, where the speaker uses words in a limited meaning, without giving any outward clue to the limitation, is in nothing different from a lie, and is wrong as a lie is always wrong. A good instance is Archbishop Cranmer's oath of fealty to the Pope, he having previously protested—of course out of hearing of the Pope or the Pope's representative—that he meant that oath in no way to preclude him from labouring at the reformation of the Church in England, that is, doing all the evil work which Henry VIII. had marked out for him in the teeth of the Roman Bishop.¹⁸ Even broad mental reservation is permissible only as a last resource, when no other means are available for the preservation of some secret which one has a duty to others, or grave reason of one's own, to keep.

¹⁸ Strype's Cranmer, i., pp 27, 28; ib., ii.,
Appendices 5, 6; ed. Oxon., 1812.

The point to make out is that no lie is told. To speak under a reservation is a lie, if it is speech against the mind of the speaker. But how can it be aught else than speech against the mind, when the heart thinks yea, and the tongue says nay? We answer that, in the case contemplated, the thought of the heart is, secrets apart, nay; and though the word on the lips is nay simply, yet we must not take that word as the whole locution, but as a mere text, to which the situation of the speaker and the matter spoken of form a commentary, legible to any observant eye. The word is an annotated text; nay in the body of the page, with secrets apart inscribed in the margin. The adequate utterance is the whole page, text and gloss together; that speech answers to the thought in the speaker's mind; therefore it is no lie.

The essential requisite is that the gloss, secrets apart, be not written in the speaker's private mind, but be outwardly and publicly manifest in the matter spoken of, which must be one that clearly admits of secrets, and in the circumstances of the speaker, who is driven into a corner, and obliged to answer something, and yet cannot by any prudent man be expected to answer out of the fulness of all the knowledge that he may possibly possess.

n. 6.

Nor let it be said that all confidence in the replies given to our questions is hereby destroyed. For most questions are in matters that do not admit of a secret. There the qualification, secrets apart, which may be said to attach to all answers, has no value and meaning: it is mathematically equal to zero; and we may take the answer in full assurance just as it reaches our ear. Again, when a person volunteers a statement unasked, he cannot be supposed to be reserving secrets. But when delicate subjects are touched on, and inquiry is pushed to extremity by an unauthorized questioner, secrets apart is the handwriting on the wall.

n. 7.

But why is not this qualification spoken out with the tongue? Sometimes it safely may be, and then it should be so added. But, as the addition is unusual, our taking the trouble to express it would often certify to the inquirer that his suspicions were correct, though we ought not to tell him so. Our aim then must be to give such an oral answer as we should return, were the suspicion quite unfounded. Our questioner, if he is a prudent man, will piece out our phrase with the addition, secrets apart; and he will understand that he can get nothing out of us either way, which is exactly what we wish him to understand. His unauthorized interrogatory has been met by speech that amounts to silence, arguing indeed our prudence, but leaving him as wise as before on the forbidden topic. If he is a thoughtless man, he is deceived, not by any intention or election of ours, but indirectly so far as we are concerned, an incidental deception which he has brought on himself.

n. 8.

This then is a convention that obtains, not of positive institution, but dictated by nature herself, that on a matter which admits of being secret, any answer elicited under stress of necessity must be so construed, as that any grave secret that may be touched, not being morally in the power of the respondent to reveal, shall be taken to remain reserved.

n. 9.

We may therefore sometimes avoid seeming to know what we know, or to be what we are. But we may never of our own proper motion step forward and court observation as being what we are not, or knowing what is against or beyond our knowledge. We may dissemble occasionally, but not simulate. The dissembler of a secret wishes for obscurity and silence: he wants to have the eyes of men turned away from him and their curiosity unroused. Whatever he says or does is to divest the idea of there being anything particularly interesting about him. But he who simulates—call him pretender, impostor, or quack—is nothing, if not taken notice of. The public gaze is his sunshine: obscurity gives him a deadly chill. His ambition is to appear out of the ordinary, being really quite within common lines: the dissembler is in some respect beyond the ordinary, but wishes not to show himself otherwise than as an ordinary mortal with ordinary knowledge. The pretender is on the offensive, challenging attention: the dissembler is on his defence against notice. "Simulation," says Bolingbroke, "is a stiletto, not only an offensive but an unlawful weapon, and the use of it may be rarely, very rarely, excused, but never justified. Dissimulation is a shield, as secrecy is armour: and it is no more possible to preserve secrecy in the administration of public affairs without dissimulation than it is to succeed in it without secrecy." (Idea of a Patriot King.)

Readings.—De Lugo, De Just. et Jure, 14, nn. 135, 141, 142; The Month for March, 1883; Lockhart's Life of Scott, v., 26.

The Casuist

Various; ed. S. Woywod, O.F.M., and J. A. McHugh, O.P. — 11 passages

Vol. III, Case VII: Is It Ever Permitted to Tell a Lie?

A young unmarried girl is criminally with child. Her mother sends her to a lying-in hospital in a distant city before anything is known by the neighbors of her condition. The mother pretends to her other children and to the neighbors that her daughter is employed in a store in New York. She tells them frankly that she is. After the birth of the daughter’s baby and before her return home, the mother tells the neighbors that her daughter does not like New York and is coming home. Finally the daughter arrives home and continues the deception, giving many details of her “store experience” in New York and what she thought of the city. Of course she had not been in New York at all. Is it lawful for the mother and daughter to say these things which they know are untrue, and to deceive others, even though their object in practising this deception is quite good and praiseworthy? Is it not making the end justify the means and doing evil that good ‘may come from it?