Section — Wouters, Manual of Moral Theology
Section I. On the Injury of Truth, or on Lying
(St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 110, 111; St. Alphonsus, cf. Theologia Moralis, book III, nn. 157-171; Homo Apostolicus, tract 5, nn. 15 and 16.)
To truthfulness is opposed every act of manifestation discordant with the internal concept. If that act is contained in words, signs, or writings, it is called a lie; if it consists in deeds, it is called simulation. Hence what we are going to say about lying should also be applied to simulation.
I. Notion. A lie is customarily defined: speech contrary to the mind. It is said:
Speech; by this word is understood the ordering of concepts toward another, by means either of words, which hold the principal place among signs, or of other signs (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 1, ad 2).
Contrary to the mind, i.e. which is opposed to the concept of the mind.
Corollary I. For a lie there are required: 1° the will of saying what is false, i.e., insofar as false is taken here, what is contrary to the concept or what is held as false; 2° speech contrary to the concept. "The account of a lie is taken from formal falsity, namely from this, that someone has the will of uttering what is false; whence also a lie is named from this, that it is said contrary to the mind" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 1). But there are not required: 1° a concept false in reality, hence he lies who holds as false what he says, although what he says is true; 2° the will of deceiving, for "that someone intends to establish falsity in the opinion of another, by deceiving him, does not pertain to the species of a lie, but to a certain perfection of it" (St. Thomas, loc. cit.); nor 3° deception of the neighbor, as is clear in the accused person who, before a judge who was an eyewitness, denies the crime.
Corollary II. It is not a lie: 1° to say what is false, when the speaker holds it as true; 2° to say in jest things which are openly false, because the circumstances remove the ordinary signification of the words; 3° ironic or hyperbolic expressions, by which words are really transferred to another signification; 4° equivocal expressions, or those uttered with a broad mental restriction, as will presently be explained more fully; nor 5° is it a lie if I sufficiently show that I am unwilling to manifest the truth, because then the words from that circumstance again receive another meaning.
II. Division. A lie is distinguished as threefold: jocose, officious, and pernicious or damaging, according as it is done for the sake of pleasure or utility, whether one's own or another's, or with damage to a third party (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 2). But under the word pernicious lie there can also be comprehended a lie which is done with injury to God (cf. St. Thomas, loc. cit., a. 4).
III. Morality. 1. A lie is a sin, and is never licit. It is a sin, which is clear both from Sacred Scripture1 and from reason. For an act is illicit which is opposed to the end which has been appointed to the act by nature, i.e. by the Author of nature. But a lie, i.e. speech contrary to the concept, is opposed to the end which has been appointed to speech, i.e. to the ordering of concepts toward another (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 3). Then, "because man is a social animal, naturally one man owes to another that without which human society could not be preserved; but men could not live together with one another unless they believed one another as manifesting truth to one another" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 109, a. 3, ad 1). Nor is it ever licit, because the prior disordering, about which we have spoken, cannot be removed (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 110, a. 3; Quodlibet 8, a. 14; St. Alphonsus, III, 171).
Objection. An act with a double effect, when the things to be posited have been posited, is licit. But speech contrary to the mind sometimes becomes an act with a double effect, of which one, namely the defense of a secret, is intended, while the other is permitted.
Response. For an act with a double effect to be licit, it must be at least indifferent in itself, not disordered. But speech contrary to the mind is disordered in itself, or sinful, as follows from what has been said.
What if someone cannot hide without a lie a truth which must be positively hidden?2
Response. In the case, the obligation of hiding ceases, and the obligation of not lying prevails, because the intrinsic disordering of a lie cannot cease. But the case scarcely occurs except from the dexterity of the one asking and the weakness of the one responding.
If someone subjectively believes that he must positively hide a secret, and no possibility appears of doing this without a lie, from a perplexed conscience the lesser evil is permitted.
A lie as such, or insofar as it is opposed to truth, is only a venial sin. The reason is that the abuse of a sign and the deception to follow from it, as such only, i.e. without bringing damage to the neighbor or injury to God, involve only a slight injury of the social order.
A pernicious lie is grave from its kind, i.e. grave or slight according as it brings grave or slight damage to the neighbor. If it is pernicious to God, i.e. if it brings injury to God, it is grave.
Corollary. To lying pertains, as we noted above, simulation, which is had when "someone by certain signs of deeds or things signifies something contrary to that which is in him ... whence simulation is properly a certain lie consisting in exterior signs of deeds; but it does not matter whether someone lies by word or by any other deed whatsoever ... whence, since every lie is a sin, as was said above, it follows also that every simulation is a sin" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 111, a. 1; St. Alphonsus, III, 171). Moreover, a species of simulation is hypocrisy, "by which someone simulates the person of another, as when a sinner simulates the person of a just man" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 111, a. 2).
2 With respect to a secret, there is no obligation of positively hiding it, but only the obligation of not manifesting it; yet it can happen that a secret is in some way manifested unless it is hidden. Besides, accidentally there can be an obligation of positively hiding a secret, for example by reason of charity.
IV. Concealment of truth as such is not a lie, because it does not involve the will of saying what is false, but only the will of keeping silent about what is true. Moreover, truth is concealed not only by being silent, but also by speaking with some mental restriction; about this more must be said.
Notion of mental restriction. It is had when the speaker mentally restricts words to a meaning which they have either in no way, or which they have, whether from themselves or from the circumstances, besides another meaning.
Division of mental restriction. It is distinguished as twofold, broad and purely mental. It is purely mental when the speaker mentally restricts words to a meaning which they have in no way, so that in no way, i.e. neither from the words themselves nor from the adjuncts or circumstances, can it be perceived; as if, asked whether he had been in Paris, he affirmed it, understanding silently: "in mind." Broad mental restriction is had when the speaker restricts words which have a double meaning to the less obvious meaning, permitting the more obvious meaning to be taken by the hearer; as if, asked whether he knows something, he replies, "No," understanding silently: "with communicable knowledge." Broad mental restriction is also called equivocation or amphibology, which, namely, is had when the words uttered have a double meaning (St. Alphonsus, III, 151, 152; Homo Apostolicus, tract 5, n. 15).
Morality of mental restriction. a) Purely mental restriction is never licit. For it falls into a lie: namely, the words in the case in no way express the meaning which the speaker intends, while the expressed meaning is supposed to be opposed to the speaker's judgment; therefore there is speech contrary to the mind (St. Alphonsus, III, 152). There are added the propositions condemned by Innocent XI, namely:
26: "If anyone, either alone or before others, whether asked or of his own accord, whether for the sake of recreation or for any other end, swears that he has not done something which in reality he has done, by understanding within himself something which he did not do, or another way from that in which he did it, or any other true addition whatsoever, in reality he neither lies nor is perjured";2
27: "A just cause of using these amphibologies is present whenever this is necessary or useful for protecting the health of the body, honor, family property, or for any other act of virtue, so that the concealment of truth is then judged expedient and diligent";3
b) Broad mental restriction, with which equivocation coincides, is per se illicit; for it is opposed to sincerity, and in fact commonly leads the hearer into error. Yet it becomes licit if a just cause is present, and there is not from some other source an obligation of opening the truth, for example from the precept of a Superior. This is clear both from the example of Christ,4 and from the fact that in broad mental restriction the words also contain the meaning intended by the speaker, so that there is not speech contrary to the mind, or that intrinsic disordering which inheres in a lie (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).
Corollary I. Besides other applications of the doctrine explained which occur in different treatises, it is useful to report certain ones from St. Alphonsus:
"One in need, with goods hidden for his sustenance, can respond to the judge that he has nothing. Likewise an heir who has hidden goods, if he is not held from them to satisfy creditors, can respond to the judge that he has hidden nothing, understanding silently: from which he is held to satisfy" (III, 158).
"He who accepted a loan, but afterwards satisfied it, can deny that he accepted a loan, understanding silently: so that he must pay" (III, 159).
An adulteress, asked by her husband whether she has committed the crime, can deny it, understanding silently: in such a way that she must manifest it (III, 162).
A servant by order of his master can respond that he is not at home, understanding silently: for speaking with someone (III, 165).
One bound to a secret can respond to the one asking that he knows nothing, understanding silently: for example, with communicable knowledge (III, 153).
One asked to give or lend money can respond that he does not have it, understanding silently: money which he wishes to give or lend (III, 163).
One invited, who is asked whether the food, which is tasteless, tastes good, can respond that it is good; for responses of this sort need not necessarily be taken in an absolute sense (III, 160).
1 Cf. Waffelaert, Dissertation morale sur la malice du mensonge; Koenraedt, in N. K. Stemmen, 1925, p. 297; Gregorianum, 1920, pp. 11, 278; A. Kern, Die Luge.
2 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1176.
3 Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1177.