Chapter — Marc, Institutiones Morales

Chapter II: On Injury of Reputation

¶1.

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3; q. 73; St. Alphonsus, III, 962; ed. G., II, p. 354; Lugo, disp. 14, n. 10-134; Mazzotta, tr. 4, disp. 2, q. 2; Soto, l. 5, q. 10; Elbel, IV, n. 343; Lancicius, opusc. 19: de vitand. Judic. temer.; Berardi, Theol. mor., III, n. 460, Appendix.

¶1190.
  1. Things to be noted beforehand. REPUTATION is public opinion or estimation concerning someone's excellence. More commonly it is defined: the good estimation of many concerning the life and morals of someone.

The RIGHT TO REPUTATION can be either absolute, or conditioned or limited. The absolute belongs to him who has perpetrated no deed worthy of blame; for he possesses full ownership of his reputation. But he retains a limited right, or only possession of reputation, who indeed has committed crimes, but only occult ones. A right must be attributed to him not by reason of the person, but by reason of society, of which he is a member and ought to remain a useful member (Lugo, disp. 14, n. 97; Noldin, II, 643).

  1. Both the living and the dead possess a right to reputation. As regards the living, it is plain. As regards the dead, this cannot be denied, for: a) the reputation which they had among the living endures, and they desire that its duration never cease; b) this reputation does not lack a juridical subject which holds it, because the rational soul does not lose existence. Yet reputation profits the dead less than the living.

  2. The right to reputation is lost if someone's crime becomes notorious. Namely a crime can be NOTORIOUS by a threefold publicity: a) by publicity of law, if it is established concerning it either through the sentence of a judge, or through confession of the matter itself; b) by publicity of fact, if it was committed in a public place and before witnesses; c) by publicity of reputation, if it has become known to so many persons that it can no longer happen that it not be divulged among all. Now, behold the NORM which St. Alphonsus hands down concerning this matter (III, 976): "Doctors commonly judge it sufficient if in some COMMUNITY of 8 persons, four know it; or if of 100 persons, fifteen know it; or if of 1000 persons, about twenty know it, of more than two different families; but that it is public in some NEIGHBORHOOD of 40 persons if eight from different families know it; likewise, if in a TOWN of 5000 citizens forty scattered through it know it. Doctors add that a crime is called famous if the reputation of it wanders through the greater part of the town, community, neighborhood, or parish; likewise one is said to be defamed in a kingdom who has now been defamed in a court or in another illustrious place, from which reputation easily flows into the kingdom."

Further, concerning the reputation of neighbor there is given: 1. A NEGATIVE precept, namely of not injuring reputation; but it is injured interiorly, at least as it were inchoatively, through rash judgment, but exteriorly and strictly speaking, through detraction. 2. An AFFIRMATIVE precept, namely of defending the reputation of another when attacked and of restoring it when taken away.

Hence there is a fourfold article: 1. concerning rash judgment; 2. concerning detraction; 3. concerning the obligation of defending reputation; 4. concerning the obligation of restoring reputation.

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