§ 1. On Revelation of a Secret

It is easily understood that another's secret cannot be revealed without a proportionate cause; and that the sin of one revealing is more or less grave, according to the nature of the secret, or the gravity of the damage inflicted.

1185. PRINCIPLES. I. The obligation of preserving a natural secret is in general under grave matter. The matter is plain of itself, since this obligation arises either from charity or from justice.

Whence he who knowingly and unjustly manifests a secret is held to reparation of the damage. But a just cause of revealing it would be the necessity of avoiding damage threatening oneself or neighbor, which from the law of charity he is not held to undergo (IV, 49). See the things to be said n. 1198.

1186. II. The obligation of preserving a promised secret is diverse according to the diversity of the intention of those promising. Therefore it will be either grave or light, according to the intention of the one promising, who is not judged to have contracted a grave obligation unless this is established. The reason is that a mere promise of secrecy is a gratuitous contract, which therefore is subjected to the rules of a contract of this kind (cf. n. 1062).

Wherefore: a) A simple promise of silence does not oblige, per se, with grave damage of the one promising. b) Likewise, a promise of silence, even sworn, does not oblige against the common good and justice; where namely silence would yield to grave detriment of the community, to the condemnation of an innocent person, to grave sin of the one to whom the promise was made (for example if there were concealed a diriment impediment of a marriage to be contracted by the one to whom the promise was made); where finally the one promising is legitimately interrogated in judgment under the faith of an oath. c) He who seriously promised silence even with the loss of life, and can preserve it with the common good uninjured, very probably is held to stand by the promise. Yet the opposite opinion is also sufficiently probable, because it is licit for no one to squander life (III, 971; H. Ap., V, 18).

1187. III. The obligation of a committed secret is grave from its genus. Thus especially if the secret was committed from necessity or utility, as happens with physicians, notaries, advocates, or theologians consulted. For such a secret has the nature of an onerous contract, and it is of concern to the whole of society that it be guarded inviolably.

Hence, by reason of office and of the public good, men of this kind are often held to silence even with danger of grave proper damage. Nor are they released from silence by the authority of a judge legitimately interrogating, unless the matter is already known in another way, or unless there is present from elsewhere a just cause of revealing: for the judge cannot abrogate the right of nature (III, 970, 2).

IT IS ASKED. When does the obligation of preserving a secret CEASE?

Resp. 1. The obligation of a secret, even committed, ceases where revelation is necessary for the common good, for the safety of an innocent person, for the good of the one committing it himself.

Hence, a physician licitly warns some bride about the contagious disease of the bridegroom, if he, having been warned, would not desist from marriage. You licitly are silent about the true favorer of some crime, although another were accused, unless the guilty person unjustly strives to accuse the innocent.

2. The obligation of a secret, even committed, also ordinarily ceases if it is a question of avoiding grave proper damage. The reason is that your right prevails, and charity does not oblige with so great an inconvenience (see n. 1182).

Therefore you licitly reveal the author of a homicide if you have been suspected, provided another means is not present for freeing yourself.

In all these things, however, account must be had of the common good, which in some cases must prevail over one's own good and over the good of the one committing the secret. Thus, for example, an advocate, knowing the fortune of his client to be unstable, cannot warn his own brother, the creditor of the client. A physician, an advocate, to whom impediments of marriage are revealed for taking counsel, cannot reveal them to the parish priest, as we shall say n. 2065. An official to whom secrets of State are committed is not freed from the obligation of secrecy even by fear of death.

3. Revelation of a secret is likewise excused from sin, at least grave sin, where the consent of the one committing it is reasonably presumed; where the secret is (or is certainly believed to be) of slight moment; where finally it has been notably made common. Nor is it grave, probably, if the revelation is made to one upright person; provided that this person truly preserves the secret, and provided he is not such a one from whom the one committing it specially wished the matter to be hidden (III, 971).