The moral systems

226. For what it serves. The moral system must perform its office whenever there is a doubt concerning the obligation of a law which cannot be solved directly. Namely, when a founded doubt concerning the liceity of his action or omission and concerning the existence of a law, whether prescribing or prohibiting, arises for the agent, first of all he is bound seriously to inquire into its existence. But if he has arrived at certain knowledge of the law, he must observe it holily (n. 143). Yet innumerable are the circumstances of human life in which doubt concerning the obligation of a law and therefore concerning the liceity of an action arises, without its certain knowledge being able to be reached. Here the question offers itself: in what way, in circumstances of this kind, ought man to conduct himself according to the will of God? Namely, it is asked whether, from the will of God, the supreme legislator, even doubtful laws, concerning whose obligation it is not established with certitude, must be observed, or whether from the will of the same it suffices that laws be observed of whose existence we have certain knowledge. And if it is established that from the will of God it is not necessary that even doubtful laws be observed, it is further asked by what reason, while doubt concerning the obligation of the law remains, one can arrive at a practically certain conscience. For from doubt concerning the obligation of a law there immediately arises a practically doubtful conscience; but it is not lawful to act with a practically doubtful conscience. Therefore any moral system proposes to itself a twofold question to be solved: concerning the obligation of a doubtful law and concerning the way and method of arriving at a practically certain conscience when there exists doubt concerning the liceity of an action in general.

¹ Cf. Fr. Mannhart, De ingenua indole probabilismi (Augustae Vindel. 1759). Leimbach, Untersuchungen uber die verschiedenen Moralsysteme (Fulda. Aktiendruckerei. 1894). Ludwigs, Zur Frage uber das Moralsystem (Zeitschrift f. k. Theol. 1878 S. 1 ff.). Der Katholik, 1874, Probabilismus und probabilistische Systeme. Kirchenlexikon, Moralsysteme. Schindler S. 213 ff.

227. What it is. By the name of moral system is understood a complex of principles by the help of which, from speculative doubt concerning the obligation of a law, one can arrive at a practically certain conscience.

It is called a moral system: a. because it contains several principles cohering among themselves by a logical connection, by whose help the chief question of moral theology is solved; b. because it exercises a very great influence on the whole of moral theology and its character, since the principle of the system is a most fertile principle of moral theology, which supplies a norm of judging concerning the existence of a precept and therefore a norm of acting in very many questions.

228. How many there are. Moral systems are numbered as altogether six, which solve the proposed questions in a diverse way: absolute tutiorism, mitigated tutiorism, probabiliorism, equiprobabilism, probabilism, and laxism. In order that the formula by which each system is exhibited may be understood, this must be noted: whenever the existence or obligation of a law is doubtful, two opinions more or less probable are opposed to one another, of which one stands for the obligation of the law, the other for liberty from the law. The formulas of the individual systems are called their principles, which are customarily exhibited in this way:

1. Absolute tutiorism teaches: we must follow the safer opinion (for the law), even if the contrary opinion for liberty is most probable.

2. Mitigated tutiorism teaches: we must follow the safer opinion, unless the contrary opinion for liberty is most probable.

3. Probabiliorism teaches: we can follow the less safe opinion for liberty if it is more probable than the contrary opinion for the law.

4. Equiprobabilism teaches: we can follow the less safe opinion for liberty if it is equally probable as the opposite opinion for the law.

5. Probabilism teaches: we can follow the less safe opinion for liberty if it is truly probable, even if the opposite opinion for the law is more probable.

6. Laxism teaches: we can follow the less safe opinion for liberty even if it is only tenuously or doubtfully probable.

If we compare the principles of these systems with one another, these things are manifest:

a. All the systems can be referred to two classes, of which one contains tutioristic or antiprobabilistic systems, namely the two former, and the other probabilistic systems, namely the four latter. The former favor law more, the latter liberty more; the former are systems of the Jansenists, the latter systems of Catholics.

b. These two kinds of systems differ from one another especially in this, that tutioristic systems admit only a directly certain conscience and therefore reject the use of probable opinion and of reflex principles; but probabilistic systems admit an indirectly certain conscience and therefore also declare licit the use of probable opinion and reflex principles for forming an indirectly certain conscience.

c. Two of these systems, absolute tutiorism and laxism, are illicit, as being reprobated by the Church; but the other four are indeed licit, since they are not reprobated by the Church, yet only one can be true, because they mutually exclude one another.

A SUBJECTIVELY certain conscience that the proposed action is lawful is required before performing any action, as we have already seen. A great difficulty—a difficulty which has to be faced by all moralists—arises from this principle in consequence of the uncertainty as to whether many actions in the concrete are lawful. One need not consult the works of moralists to find out what difference of opinion there is among experts on many practical questions of morals. It will be sufficient to consult one’s own experience. In the conflict of rights and duties, and in the obscurity which exists as to the application of moral principles to concrete cases, we are frequently at a loss as to what course duty prescribes. The cases which are constantly submitted to the decision of courts of law, but which also belong to morality, illustrate the familiar truth that opinion and not certainty is very often alone attainable in the field of conduct. But if this be the case, what is a conscientious man to do? He finds himself in a difficulty; what the right thing to do under the circumstances may be is not clear. A young man has promised to marry a girl somewhat his inferior in social position; they are both satisfied that the union would be a happy one for both, but the young man’s parents will not hear of the thing, and strictly forbid him to see the girl again. Must he obey his parents, or may he follow his inclinations and keep his promise? He consults those whose knowledge and judgement he respects, and they give him contrary decisions. He goes to recognized authorities on morals, and finds the same difference of opinion.

This example is but a type of innumerable questions which constantly arise in everyday life. Is it possible to lay down any universal principle for the solution of such doubtful cases, so as to be able to act with a certain conscience ?

Catholic theologians answer this question in the affirmative, but they are not agreed as to what the principle is. A probabiliorist would tell the young man that he must obey his parents and break off the engagement unless the opinion that he may marry the girl in spite of the prohibition is distinctly ae more probable than the opposite. An equiprobabilist would say that he may marry the girl if the weight of opinion is fairly equal on either side. A probabilist would maintain that he may marry her if there is a solidly probable opinion which favours that course. The terms are technical, and their meaning should be carefully studied. - An opinion, as we have already gathered from St Thomas, is an adhesion of the mind to one proposition, but with a consciousness that the opposite may be true.

A probable opinion is one which rests on good and solid grounds, such as would incline a man of prudence and judgement to embrace it. If the intrinsic reasons of the opinion are the grounds for embracing it, we have an intrinsic probability; if authority is the ground, we have an extrinsic probability.

A more probable opinion is one which rests on weightier reasons than the opposite, but which leaves the opposite still probable.

A very probable opinion rests on such solid grounds that the opposite is not considered solidly probable.

A morally certain opinion excludes even slight probability in the opposite; it is an adhesion of the mind to a truth without any fear of mistake.

In this difficult question, the Catholic Church so far has been content to condemn extreme views, and allows her children to follow any of the moderate systems mentioned above. Alexander VIII¹ condemned rigorism, which required direct moral certainty in all cases about the lawfulness of an action, and denied that it is ever lawful to follow an opinion which is very probable among several. Laxism was condemned by Innocent XI, since it taught that one might lawfully act on a slight probability.² The systems which are known as Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, and Probabilism all have their adherents; the Catholic moralist is free to follow whichever he wishes.

To us it seems that probabilism is the true system, and if it be rightly understood, as it is taught by its moderate supporters, and not as it is misinterpreted by its opponents, we are convinced that it will recommend itself to practical common sense.

Its maxim may be formulated thus: When there is only question of committing sin or not, it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion, even though the opposite may be more probable.

The wording of the formula should be carefully weighed. The words “ when there is only question of committing sin or not ” limit the application of the principle to cases where the only question is whether by following such a course sin will be committed because a certain law, human or divine, will be broken. Probabilism, then, cannot be applied to cases where the validity of an act is in question, where some end must be obtained, or where there is question of the certain right of some other person which must be respected. In all these cases we are bound to safeguard the end by taking means that are sure and not merely probable. These are not so many exceptions to the use of probabilism; there is a certain obligation to use secure means to obtain the end in view in such cases, and so there can be no question as to whether probabilism is applicable or not. This will explain why Innocent XI condemned a proposition which asserted that it is not unlawful for a minister of the sacraments to follow a probable opinion about their validity when administering them; and another, which taught that a judge might use probabilism in giving sentence in a court of law; and a third, which excused an infidel who followed a probable opinion and remained in infidelity. In all these cases there is not merely question of sin, but the certain rights of others are at stake, or there is question of an end which cannot lawfully be exposed to risk.

Again, the words “ it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion ” should be noted. It is not a question as to what is more perfect, what the noble and generous thing to do may be. The rule merely asserts that there is no obligation under pain of sin to follow the more perfect course, if in the case there be one.

Finally, the words are added “ even though the opposite may be more probable.” For the greater probability of the other view does not make it certain, nor is the supposed greater probability a sure guarantee that the more probable view is the more true. It very frequently happens that an opinion which is considered more probable at one time is thought less probable or altogether improbable at another. Moreover, degrees of probability are very difficult to determine. What seems more probable to one theologian seems less so to another, or even to the same at a different time. And even if it be granted that one opinion is certainly and absolutely more probable, the opposite may for all that remain solidly probable.³ With these provisos the proof of the thesis is not very difficult.

¹ Prop. 3, condemned December 7, 1690.

² Prop. 3, condemned March 2, 1679.

³ Decree of March 2, 1679, props. 1, 2, 4.

I. Notion of a system. A moral system, as it is taken here,¹ is a general principle by which someone who, after due inquiry, is not certain of the honesty of an action or omission, forms a practically certain conscience for himself. The sense of this definition will be clear from the very state of the question now to be explained.

¹ A moral system taken in the broader sense is the whole science of morals constructed in suitable order through its first principles.

II. State of the question. The question concerns doubts which proximately and directly regard the morality of an action, but not other doubts. Therefore:

1. The question does not concern doubts which proximately and directly regard, for example, the validity of an act, the matter of the sacraments, etc. In these doubts, and generally whenever some good is to be obtained or some evil is to be avoided which does not depend on the dictate of conscience, the safer part or opinion, as it is called, must of itself be followed. Therefore this must of itself be chosen: first, in the conferral of the sacraments; second, in danger of one's own spiritual or temporal harm that must necessarily be avoided, such as, for example, danger of life or of formal sin; third, in danger of another's spiritual or temporal harm that must necessarily be forestalled. Hence, for example, a physician is held to apply the medicine which seems safer to him. I said "of itself," because if necessity presses and the safer part cannot be brought into practice, it is licit, for example in the ministration of a sacrament, to use even a thinly probable opinion (St. Alphonsus, I, 42-53). Moreover, all these things are developed more suitably and more abundantly in the respective treatises of Moral Theology and, as we said, do not pertain to the state of the question treated here.

2. But the question is what general principle there is by which, in a theoretical doubt about the honesty of an action, a practically certain conscience is obtained. In other words, we inquire to what extent he acts licitly who, after the truth has been inquired into, is himself not certain of the morality of an action or omission; or who himself is not certain whether or not there exists a law which prohibits the action or omission, or whether the opinion which favors the law, or that which supports liberty, is true. It is said:

a) To what extent he acts licitly. Therefore it is not asked what someone can or ought to impose on others in doubt, but to what extent the doubter himself acts licitly.

b) After the truth has been inquired into; since, if due inquiry has been omitted, it is not licit to have recourse to a reflex principle.

c) Himself. Hence we do not inquire to what extent someone licitly places an action about whose objective morality others are not certain; but we investigate to what extent he licitly places it who himself is not certain of its objective morality.

d) Is not certain, that is, he is either in a state of doubt about the objective morality of an action, or opines that it is objectively dishonorable.

Therefore we seek a certain and universal rule by which, when two opinions about the morality of an action concur, one of which favors the law and the other liberty, it may safely be judged when in practice it is right to follow the part of liberty and when we must fulfill the law.

Moreover, the proposed question is answered in different ways by different persons; and indeed these different answers, as was already said above, constitute the different moral systems.¹

¹ There are some who think that there is no need of a moral system. But those who think thus are mistaken and themselves unconsciously admit some system. For it is certain that very many doubts occur about the objective morality of actions. Hence the adversaries themselves must answer, and do answer, the question to what extent it is licit to act in doubts of this sort. Now that which they give as an answer to the question is their moral system.

III. Diverse systems. Seven are enumerated, namely: absolute Tutiorism, mitigated Tutiorism, Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism, Laxism, and the System of Compensation.

Absolute Tutiorism states: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is certain to me; or: The law obliges me unless I am certain that it does not exist.

Mitigated Tutiorism teaches: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is most probable to me; or: The law obliges me unless I hold it as most probable that the law does not exist.

Probabiliorism states: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is more probable to me; or: The law obliges me unless I hold it as more probable that the law does not exist.

Equiprobabilism professes: In doubt about the making of a law, it is licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty, provided this is equally or almost equally probable to me as the opposite opinion favoring the law. But in strict doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, the law is to be observed.

Probabilism contends: It is licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty, provided this is truly probable to me, and this even if the contrary opinion is certainly more probable to me; or: The law does not oblige me provided I hold it as truly probable that it does not exist, and this even if I hold it as more probable that it does exist. And these things hold even if the law certainly existed, provided it has probably ceased or has been fulfilled.

Laxism admits the use even of a thinly probable opinion.

The System of Compensation teaches that in doubts the safer thing is to be followed unless a relatively grave inconvenience excuses.¹

Absolute Tutiorism,² mitigated Tutiorism, and Laxism³ are commonly rejected; Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism, and the System of Compensation are sustained. We admit Equiprobabilism, which system indeed we now undertake to prove and to vindicate from objections.

¹ Thus Laloux, De actibus humanis; Potton, De theoria probabilitatis; Boisdron, Theorie et systemes des probabilites; Prummer, Manuale Theol. Mor., t. I, n. 351; McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, p. 254. The system of Cardinal d'Annibale deserves special mention; in his Summula Theologiae moralis (I, nn. 262 and 264), relying only on the principle of possession, he gives his vote, with respect to doubt about the existence of a law, rather to Probabilism; and with respect to doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, to Equiprobabilism. That system could be called the System of Possession, or Possessionism.

² Alexander VIII struck down the thesis: "It is not licit to follow an opinion, or among probable opinions the most probable one."

³ Innocent XI condemned this proposition, the third: "Generally, while, relying on probability either intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not go beyond the limits of probability, we do something, we always act prudently."

One who strictly doubts about the making of a law, in other words, one who holds it as equally or almost equally probable that the law has not been made and that it has been made, is not held to observe it. It is proved:

I. From the authority of St. Alphonsus. For this authority is such that it seems to create a grave presumption in favor of the system which he himself defended. But the holy Doctor defended the proposed thesis.

The major is confirmed by these things: first, the Church recognized St. Alphonsus as an outstanding master of Moral Theology, and repeatedly declared that he was a most safe and divinely given guide of directors of souls (n. 215). Moreover, these things ought especially to hold for the principal question of Moral Theology, that is, for the moral system; indeed the aforesaid praises and commendations seem scarcely capable of being honorably explained if St. Alphonsus had erred in choosing the moral system which extends most widely throughout the whole of moral science and, as it were, pervades it, and by force of which the innumerable doubts that occur in the said science are solved for practice. These points are confirmed by what the Vindiciae Alfonsianae report from the Acts of the Cause of Beatification:¹ "Already a decree had been issued concerning 'Nothing worthy of censure,' and already the heroic virtues of Alphonsus had been discussed. But nevertheless, by command of the Pontiff, a new Positio on the Virtues was instituted, and indeed on Prudence, not with respect to the exercise of that virtue, but because of some rules of morals contained in his works. Hence besides other particular questions, the moral system in particular and the doctrine on habitual sinners and recidivists were called back to a more severe weighing." Once these things had been carried out, Pius VII solemnly declared that the heroic degree of the virtues was established. In addition, the Sacred Penitentiary on 19 Dec. 1855 wrote back to a certain professor of Moral Theology that he, notwithstanding his oath to defend Probabiliorism, could follow and publicly hand on the doctrine of St. Alphonsus (n. 215). Hence several, and those distinguished, theologians confess that the system which St. Alphonsus embraced seems worthy of commendation.²

The minor is admitted by all.

Objection. When it was asked of the Holy See whether by the words of the Decree of 11 March 1871, by which St. Alphonsus is said to have "paved a safe way amid the tangled opinions of theologians, whether laxer or stricter...," whether, I say, by those words Equiprobabilism had been designated and commended before Probabilism, the response was that by those words the Sacred Congregation "had wished to condemn no opinion or prefer one to another, but only to designate a fact admitted by all, namely, that St. Alphonsus by his system took care to avoid both laxer and stricter opinions."

Response. This response did not proceed from legitimate authority, as was learned after diligent examination instituted at Rome. It is also absent from the authentic edition of the Decrees of the Sacred Congregation of Rites. It was given by the substitute of the Secretariat of the Sacred Congregation of Rites alone, in the name of the Secretary alone.³

II. From the authority of theologians. Theologians today almost commonly defend the thesis stated. Concerning the opinion of St. Thomas, there will be discussion later.

III. From reason. Preceptive and prohibitive laws are in the likeness of a spiritual bond, and therefore, in order that they obtain their effect, they must reach a human being positively; this cannot happen except through at least some knowledge properly so called of the making of the law. "Just as a rope," says St. Alphonsus, "does not bind unless it is applied to the thing to be bound by contact, so a precept does not bind except through knowledge of it" (I, 76). But in strict doubt, all knowledge properly so called of the making of the law is lacking. "Then," says St. Alphonsus, "...we do not have knowledge of the law, but only knowledge of the doubt or question whether the law exists or not" (I, 74). It is indeed known that each part, namely both the making and the non-making of the law, is equally probable; but no knowledge is had about the conclusion or term of the inquiry.⁴

Then, in strict doubt about the making of a law, that is, in strict doubt whether a law prohibits or permits some act, all knowledge properly so called about the ordinance of the law concerning the said act, or about the objective morality of that act, is lacking. Once this has been posited, that act in second act, as it is said, is situated with respect to me outside the order of morality, or is regarded as a merely physical act. But nothing prevents an act of this sort from being placed, provided a good end is added. Therefore in strict doubt whether some act is objectively permitted or prohibited, it is right to place that act for a good end.

So that the argument just brought forward may be more fully clarified, I note these things: by force of our rational nature we are, as regards being, in the moral order, that is, in first act we are bound by law; but as regards acting, by force of our rational cognition, we are constituted in the moral order, that is, in second act we are bound by law. Hence, since in strict doubt there is no knowledge properly so called about the morality of an act, as regards acting we are not in the moral order except insofar as by a higher law the obligation of always acting for an honorable end is imposed on us.

Nor should you object that perhaps that act is prohibited by the legislator. This is true; but that prohibition, if it has place, binds only my rational being; in other words, it binds me because I have a rational nature, but my acting is bound only by rational cognition.

Hence in strict doubt the act, as regards my acting, is not in the moral order; but it is merely physical, and must receive morality from the end.

Finally, if the discussion concerns positive law, the principle proved in n. 229 has force: in strict doubt the condition of that which is prior is better than the condition of that which is posterior. But moral liberty is prior to a positive preceptive or prohibitive law.

¹ Dissertatio, Proemium, n. 46.

² Thus, for example, Lehmkuhl, Theol. mor., I, 165; Noldin, De Principiis theol. mor., n. 239; Sweens, Theol. mor. fund., n. 700 sq.; Beauduin-Gardeil, cited work, p. 79.

³ Cf. Ter Haar, Ven. Innoc. P. P. XI de Probabilismo Decreti Historia et Vindiciae, p. 107.

⁴ Therefore neither do we deny that contradictory parts considered in themselves, or even compared, can retain the probability which they have from good reasons. But this is not the matter at issue. The matter concerns the parts insofar as they are contradictorily opposed, or insofar as they are simultaneous affirmation and negation with respect to one question of truth.

One who strictly doubts about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, in other words, one who holds it as equally or almost equally probable that the law has not ceased or has not been fulfilled, is held to observe it.

It is said "one who strictly doubts," or "one who holds it as equally or almost equally probable"; since it is commonly admitted that the obligation of observing the law is absent in broad doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, in other words, where it is more probable that the law has ceased or has been fulfilled. Besides, in doubt about the fulfillment of a law several principles are at hand, in view of which the fact of fulfillment can commonly be held as more probable. Principles of this sort are: What regularly, what ordinarily happens, is judged to have happened; from things commonly occurring a prudent presumption is made.¹ Likewise: In doubt every fact is presumed to have been done rightly;² or: In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act³ (St. Alphonsus, I, 26). With these points noted, the thesis is proved:

I. From the authority of St. Alphonsus. Although I would not wish to deny that this thesis is not to be valued as much as the first and third theses are to be valued, nevertheless it cannot be denied that it extends very widely and pertains to the whole system, so that what we said above (nn. 214, 225) about the authority of St. Alphonsus is also to be applied to this thesis. But the holy Doctor, who had previously adhered to the more benign opinion, after considering the matter better, revoked it (I, 29) and defended the stricter opinion (I, 26-34); which in any case is now commonly admitted even by the adversaries themselves.⁴

II. From the authority of theologians. Our opinion was formerly commonly admitted, even by those authors who adhered to Probabilism. The witnesses of this assertion are Suarez⁵ and Laymann.⁶ The fact that afterward several withdrew from this opinion does not prevent the consensus of ancient theologians from supplying us some argument.

III. From reason. First, in strict doubt the condition of the possessor is better; or, to abstain from the ambiguous word "possessor," in strict doubt the condition of that which is prior seems to be better than the condition of that which is posterior.⁷ But the law itself is prior to its cessation and fulfillment. Therefore, in strict doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, the condition of the law seems to be better (St. Alphonsus, I, 29-34).

The major is established by these arguments: first, our principle of its own accord pleases reason more than the contrary principle, which would have to be admitted by the adversaries, namely: in strict doubt the condition of that which is prior seems to be worse than the condition of that which is posterior. This spontaneous inclination of reason indeed seems to supply an argument for our doctrine. Second, a principle which favors stability, or a stable manner of acting, seems to be preferred to a principle which fosters mutability, or a changeable manner of acting. But our principle favors stability, while the contrary favors mutability. Third, there is added that the principle stated by us has force for the external forum. Why, precisely, would the contrary principle have to be admitted for the internal forum?

Then our thesis is proved from the fact that the thesis of the Probabilists is at least doubtful: namely, a law which has doubtfully ceased or has doubtfully been fulfilled obliges unless it is demonstrated, or certain, that it does not oblige. But no one who hears prudently will contend that that is certain.

The major is evinced from a principle admitted by all: in a practical doubt not entirely solved, the safer part is to be followed.

To prove the minor, it will be enough to advert to these things: first, the arguments of the adversaries, as we shall soon see, either involve a begging of the question, or are such that they themselves require further proof. Second, add that always very many, and those grave and distinguished, theologians supported the contrary opinion. Third, finally, our arguments seem to be of such a kind that not even the adversaries will deny them all probability. Once all these things have been attended to and well weighed, no one will have affirmed that the opinion of the Probabilists has been placed beyond doubt.

¹ Suppose someone, while praying Sext, doubts whether he has said Terce. In the case he can commonly hold it as more probable that Terce has been said, since from things commonly occurring a prudent presumption is made. But it commonly happens that Sext is not begun before Terce has been said.

² Suppose someone doubts whether he has confessed with true sorrow. In the case he can commonly hold it as more probable that true sorrow was present.

³ Yet this principle, which canonists and moralists commonly use, is very ambiguous; namely, it has force only insofar as it rests on another principle of presumption. But this happens when there is doubt about the manner in which an act has been placed; in which case it can be held as more probable that all those things required for validity were done. It is otherwise if the manner in which the act was placed is known, but it is disputed whether the act so placed is valid.

⁴ Cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 133-139, where those things which some formerly objected are refuted.

⁵ Suarez, treating the question whether one who has doubtfully fulfilled an oath is still held to fulfill it, responds: "It is beyond controversy that he is held," because "in doubt the condition of the possessor is better" (De Relig., tr. 5, bk. 2, cap. 33, n. 7); this solution is a mere application of our thesis to a particular case.

⁶ Laymann speaks thus: "But the latter part of the assertion is common" (Theol. mor., bk. 1, tr. 1, c. 5, § 3, n. 31), namely, that one who doubts whether he has fulfilled a vow or promise, or satisfied any other debt whatsoever, is held by the obligation.

⁷ In this sense St. Alphonsus and others take the principle of possession, insofar as it regards matter distinct from the matter of justice; but since others explain it otherwise, we have abstained from that designation, mindful of this: "It belongs to the wise man not to care about names" (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 1). With these points noted, those things which several theologians object concerning the nature of the principle of possession do not harm our argument.

One who forms the opinion, in other words, one who holds it as certainly more probable that a law exists, is held to observe it. It is proved:

I. From ecclesiastical documents. These, indeed, seem to be of such a kind that they create a presumption against the doctrine which teaches that it is licit to follow the certainly less probable opinion favoring liberty, or, what is the same thing, that there is no obligation of following the certainly more probable opinion favoring the law. It is useful to present the principal documents or edicts.

1. The Congregation of the Holy Office, by a decree issued on September 24, 1665, in the name of Alexander VII, not only condemned several laxer opinions, but also in the preface of the decree complains of "that extreme license of luxuriant minds... through which, in matters pertaining to conscience, a mode of opining has crept in which is wholly alien from Evangelical simplicity and from the doctrine of the holy Fathers, and which, if the faithful were to follow it in practice as a right rule, an immense corruption of Christian life would creep in." Now Stephen Gradius, who by command of the Congregation of the Index had drawn up a Votum concerning the decree that had been issued, expressly declares that by the mode and rule of opining disapproved by the Supreme Pontiff Probabilism is understood; and he adds that he had known this "on account of faithful knowledge of that time."¹

2. Benedict XIV, in the constitution De praeparatione ad annum Universalis Iubilaei (June 26, 1749), admonishes confessors that in doubtful matters they should diligently inquire into the truth "and then descend to that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms." But the less probable opinion is rather dissuaded by reason than persuaded by it. Therefore it is illicit to descend to it.²

3. Alexander VII, by his own exhortation, brought it about that the Dominican Order, from the year 1655, declared war on Probabilism and from that time waged it most strenuously.

4. The Congregation of the Holy Office, with the Supreme Pontiff Innocent XI presiding and present, on June 26, 1680, issued a decree by which "His Holiness... commanded that he himself (i.e., Thyrsus Gonzalez) freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable opinion thus known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable." Then it is enjoined upon the Superior General of the Society of Jesus that he permit the Fathers of the Society to attack the less probable opinion, and that he make known to all the universities of the Society that it is the mind of His Holiness that each one freely oppose the aforesaid system.³

5. Innocent XI, by his counsel and direction, brought it about that Thyrsus Gonzalez was elected Superior General of the Society, and this for the purpose of turning the members of the Society away from Probabilism. Then the same Pontiff wished that a decree be issued by the General Congregation which had elected Gonzalez as Superior, granting permission to all members of the Society to defend the stricter doctrine; and this was done. Moreover, Innocent XI indicated to Thyrsus Gonzalez that "he desired something more from the Jesuits against Probabilism than was prescribed by that decree."⁴

6. The Congregation of the Holy Office, at the end of the month of June 1693, by common vote took the counsel of asking the Supreme Pontiff Innocent XII to see to the publication of the work of Thyrsus Gonzalez, since in it the laxer doctrine was attacked; and the Supreme Pontiff satisfied this wish.⁵

7. Clement XI indicated to the Superior General of the Society that "the Superiors of the Society would do a thing most pleasing to His Holiness if they ensured that the Jesuits abstained from leading and defending the opinion which asserts that the use of the less probable and less safe opinion is licit."⁶

8. Finally, here must be referred all those things by which the Church has positively commended, and does not cease to commend, the doctrine of St. Alphonsus. And indeed: 1. The commendation of which we have spoken, as is evident to everyone, is opposed to the doctrine which the holy Doctor, whose doctrine is commended, finally rejected. But Probabilism, as we shall prove later, was rejected by St. Alphonsus. 2. There is added the fact that the Church at length declared that the heroic degree of the virtues of St. Alphonsus was established only when the Advocate of the cause had proved that, according to the opinion of St. Alphonsus, only a strictly doubtful law does not oblige, or that Probabilism was rejected by him;⁷ which certainly suggests that all those things by which the same Church afterward positively commended the doctrine of the holy Doctor favor Equiprobabilism and oppose Probabilism. But enough now concerning these matters, since from them, or from the authority of St. Alphonsus insofar as it rests upon them, we shall soon argue distinctly and specifically.

It is established, therefore, that the Church did not favor Probabilism, and inhibited it by edicts doctrinal, disciplinary, and mixed.

From what has been said there also follows, and I would like this noted in passing, how undeservedly several heterodox authors⁸ reproach the Catholic Church for having fostered and commended a doctrine more lax than is just: the Catholic Church, I say, which on repeated occasions disclosed a mind opposed to Probabilism, far from fostering and commending the aforesaid system.⁹

II. From the authority of St. Alphonsus. This authority, as we said above, seems to be such as to create a grave presumption for the system which he himself defended. But the holy Doctor also defended, to the best of his powers, the third thesis of Equiprobabilism.

The minor, which even now is denied by some, is established by these points:

1. First, there are at hand countless testimonies of the holy Doctor himself, several of which it is useful to present:¹⁰

a) Dell' uso moderato dell' opinione probabile (1765). There he teaches: "I have said so often that not only he who has evident knowledge of the law, but also he who, according to the light of reason, judges that the opinion standing for the law is notably or certainly more probable, is held to observe it, even if there is dispute among the doctors; just as in fact I myself have reprobated, in my moral work, several opinions formerly approved by many authors, as certainly less probable" (c. 3, n. 81).

b) Letter to Remondini (1769). "The Jesuits commonly defend that we can follow the less probable opinion; but I defend that, when it is known that the opinion favoring the law is more probable, we must follow this one, and that it is not licit for us to follow the less probable; concerning this matter the Jesuits have complained to me" (Lettere, II, n. 230).

c) Letter to Father Villani (1773). "In it (i.e., in the little work whose title is Dichiarazione del sistema) I shall make clear to all that I am the defender of the doctrine which asserts that the opinion favoring the law must be followed, if indeed this opinion is more probable, and that Probabilism is entirely reprobated by me. This one thing I say, namely, that a law does not oblige where the opinion supporting it is entirely doubtful" (Lettere, II, n. 284).

d) Theologia Moralis (7th ed., 1773). To this edition the holy Doctor added a Monitum,¹¹ in which he thus sets forth and proves his system: "I say that if the opinion which stands for the law seems certainly more probable, we are altogether held to follow it; nor can we then embrace the opposite opinion, which stands for liberty. The reason is that, in order to act licitly, we must in doubtful matters inquire into and follow the truth; but where the truth cannot be found clearly, we are held to embrace at least that opinion which comes nearer to the truth, such as the more probable opinion is."

e) Dichiarazione del sistema che tiene l'autore intorno alla regola delle azioni morali (1774). "Some reproach me, saying that I am a Probabilist. I again declare in this brief work that I am not a Probabilist, nor do I follow Probabilism; indeed I reprobate it... I say, first, that if the opinion which stands for the law appears certainly more probable, we are held to follow it for several reasons, the principal one of which is this, that in moral doubts we must follow the truth; wherefore, when we cannot clearly find the truth, we must at least follow that opinion which comes nearer to the truth, such as in this case is the very opinion which seems more probable to us. Therefore the truth itself, which obliges us to follow it, also obliges us to follow that opinion which stands for the law, when it comes nearer to that same truth" (n. 2).

f) Theologia Moralis (8th and 9th editions, 1779 and 1785). St. Alphonsus inserted in these editions the Monitum which he had added to the seventh edition, and so once again, from the obligation of following the truth, he deduces that the certainly more probable opinion must be followed (I, 54).¹² He repeats the same at I, 88: "For where we do not find certain truth, we must follow that opinion which approaches nearer to the truth."

Behold, then, certain testimonies which clearly show that St. Alphonsus rejected Probabilism.

2. Then our minor is confirmed by authority. For indeed almost all authors who are attached to no school testify that St. Alphonsus, at least from the year 1762 onward, supported Equiprobabilism.¹³

3. Lastly there is added the fact that the Church issued the "Decree concerning the doubt whether the virtues are established in a heroic degree" after it had ascertained that Probabilism had been rejected by St. Alphonsus (n. 225).

¹ Disp. de opin. probabili cum Honor. Fabri, c. 27; cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 19-21.

² The Supreme Pontiff indeed speaks about an opinion to be imposed on others; but these things hold a fortiori when there is question of the opinion which we ourselves must follow. Cf. Patuzzi, Regola prossima, t. II, pp. 91-94; Gonet, Clypeus, t. III, diss. De consc. prob., preface; Concina, Apparatus, t. II, p. 174 (ed. 1763).

³ That the aforesaid decree is opposed only to the less probable opinion or Probabilism, and by no means to the equally probable opinion or Equiprobabilism, is clear from the tenor of the decree itself, which speaks only of the more probable and less probable opinions, and in no way of the equally probable opinion. Besides, compare what we have disputed elsewhere concerning this matter (De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 24-35).

Forstmann, with Noldin, denies that "by the words with the more probable opinion thus known and judged the Supreme Pontiff intended the certainly more probable opinion" (Theol. Mor. Gen., n. 143). But it seems clear that the matters are being confused. The author adds: "Let us suppose that the Supreme Pontiff intended the certainly more probable opinion; then he did indeed attack Probabilism, but by this attack he did not yet condemn Probabilism." I grant these things freely; but a system attacked by the Supreme Pontiff, although not condemned, does not seem commendable. Forstmann indeed adds in the cited place: "For we can attack what we think good." But no one would admit that a moral system which the Supreme Pontiff held to be good or right was attacked by him.

⁴ De Minusprobabilismo, p. 35.

⁵ De Minusprobabilismo, p. 35.

⁶ De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 35-36.

⁷ Jansen, p. 34; Vindiciae Alf., I, n. 46; Berthe, Vie de S. Alf., II, p. 640.

⁸ Thus Dollinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten in der romischkatholischen Kirche seit dem sechzehnten Jahrhundert; Hermann, Romische und evangelische Sittlichkeit; Harnack, Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte; Hoensbroech, Die Ultramontane Moral.

⁹ Cf. Ter Haar, Ven. Innoc.

¹⁰ Although St. Alphonsus at first supported Probabilism, and published two dissertations, anonymous however, which favored the aforesaid system, one in 1749 and the other in 1755, nevertheless he followed that system more from obedience than from inward conviction. This is so true that, when the holy Doctor was in the greatest danger of life in 1756, this one thing caused him fear: that he had supported Probabilism. "In the year 1756," Melchionna, who had seen and heard the matter in person, narrates, "our blessed Father had fallen mortally ill during Holy Week. When he had recovered somewhat from the illness, our whole Noceran family came to him rejoicing. Then Alphonsus spoke thus: 'Having been brought into this greatest danger of life, there was nothing that kept me disturbed and anxious. This alone caused me fear, namely, that I had followed a probable opinion; but the obedience that had to be given to my director required it.'" Moreover, in the cited dissertations he never explicitly defended the certainly less probable opinion, and in the second dissertation he expressly excludes notable excess. Indeed, already from the year 1759 he began to contradict Probabilism. Cf. Gaude, p. 17 sq.

¹¹ How highly the holy Doctor valued this Monitum is clear from these things which he wrote to his publisher Remondini: "This notice is certainly brief, since it is contained in a single folio; but I value this folio more than any other that might be desired in the book, both because I spent much labor in composing it, and because it embraces my whole system in moral matters" (Lettere, III, n. 308).

¹² In the last editions of the Theologia Moralis, the holy Doctor deleted these words: "I say certainly more probable; because when the opinion for the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything but notably more probable. And in that case the safer opinion will no longer be doubtful (understand this of doubt strictly taken, as we shall say in the other question), but is morally or quasi-morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it comes about that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either slightly or at least doubtfully probable with respect to the safer one." These words, I say, which were found in the earlier editions, he deleted, and substituted for them the argument deduced from the obligation of following the truth. But he did this not because he held the things he had written to be false, but because they were less apt and less effective for his purpose than the argument from following the truth.

¹³ De Minusprobabilismo, p. 56.

Objection 1. The Church cannot positively approve a doctrine pertaining to daily practice which is against good morals and promotes illicit actions. But in St. Alphonsus the Church positively approved the doctrine of Probabilism.

Response. A twofold approval can and must be distinguished, one negative, the other positive. Negative approval is that by which the Church declared that the works of St. Alphonsus contain "nothing worthy of censure"; this approval imports only this one thing, that a doctrine has not been reprobated. Positive approval is understood as that by which the writings of the holy Doctor were adorned with the highest praises, and the Author himself was proclaimed by the Church as an illustrious master of Moral Theology and a safe guide of theologians.

Moreover, I freely admit that negative approval belongs to all the works of St. Alphonsus, even the earlier ones which are probabilistic; but the commendation which is called positive favors only Equiprobabilism, as was shown above (n. 232).

Objection 2. The Church cannot tolerate a doctrine pertaining to daily practice which is against good morals and promotes illicit actions. But the Church tolerates Probabilism; she could not do this if it were false, because she cannot tolerate a false doctrine which is against good morals and promotes illicit actions.

Response. The Church also tolerates Equiprobabilism and Probabiliorism; she could not do this if they were false, because even those doctrines which aggravate the yoke of the Lord more than is fitting must be said both to be dishonorable in themselves, or contrary to the divine ordination, and indirectly to harm good morals. Hence from tolerance as such nothing can be deduced in this case. But the tolerance of Probabilism does not prevent the Church from being opposed to Probabilism and from inhibiting it (n. 232); this, as it seems, continues to introduce some presumption against that system. Add what we have just said concerning the positive approval of the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, which favors only Equiprobabilism.

Objection 3. The supreme tribunal of the Church, i.e., the Sacred Penitentiary, in its solemn decrees admitted Probabilism as the practical norm for interpreting law. For in that decree given on February 11, 1661, by which it gave responses to a great number of questions concerning the obligation of denouncing a soliciting confessor, it gives this reason why in one question it affirms the obligation and in another it does not: that the opinion which denies the obligation "is not probable," or "is probable." This is nothing other than to acknowledge Probabilism, or solid probability, as the legitimate norm from which judgment is made concerning the licitness of acting.

Response 1. I deny the consequence; for this supposes that the word "probable" is taken in a logical sense, and in such a sense as also includes the certainly less probable. But neither point is proved, so that this word can be understood either of ethical probability (n. 215), or of logical probability, and indeed of such a kind as excludes the certainly less probable, according to what was said in the cited number.

Response 2. Even if we granted that the word "probable" is taken in the sense of the adversaries, nevertheless the consequence would have to be denied. For there is question of an odious law, namely of denouncing a confessor. Now, with the nature of a law of this kind considered, it was rightly answered that, according to the mind of the Church, a case which theoretically is probably not included under the law is practically not included under the law.

Objection 4. Probabilism was defended by countless and very grave theologians,¹ and is defended even now. But one who follows a doctrine which many and very grave theologians teach acts prudently; and one who acts prudently acts honestly.

Response. One who follows a doctrine which many and very grave theologians teach acts prudently if, after having seen the arguments of the adversaries, he holds it as certain that the system of the theologians whom he follows is true, I concede; otherwise, I deny. Let the reader see, therefore, whether, after considering the arguments brought forward against Probabilism, he can prudently judge that that system is certain and indubitable.

Objection 5. St. Thomas seems to favor Probabilism, since he requires knowledge in order that a precept oblige. But merely certain probabiliority does not import knowledge. "No one," says the holy Doctor, "is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept; and therefore he who is not capable of notice is not bound by a precept; nor is anyone ignorant of a precept of God bound to do the precept, except insofar as he is held to know the precept" (De Verit., q. 17, a. 3).

Response 1. From the fact that someone, especially formerly, i.e., before the controversy about the moral system arose, declares that no one is bound by any precept except through knowledge or notice of that precept, it cannot be deduced with certainty to which moral system, or even whether to any system, he adhered. For all will easily assert this, without attending precisely to this or that determinate sense of those words. Besides, this response being passed over:

Response 2. The holy Doctor, as is clear from the text brought forward, uses the words "knowledge" and "notice" interchangeably. Now even the state of one forming an opinion involves some notice, although imperfect (n. 215). This, moreover, the Angelic Doctor himself expressly affirms. "The more efficacious," he says, "the action of the agent is, the more quickly it induces the form; and therefore in intellectual matters we see that by one demonstration, which is efficacious, knowledge is caused in us; but opinion, although it is less than knowledge, is not caused in us by one dialectical syllogism, but several are required because of their weakness" (De Virt., q. un., a. 9, ad 11). Elsewhere (I-II, q. 67, a. 3) he distinguishes perfect and imperfect cognition, of which the former is obtained through a demonstrative means or argument, and the latter through a probable means. "It must be considered that cognition can be imperfect in three ways: in one way on the part of the knowable object; in another way on the part of the means; in a third way on the part of the subject... But on the part of the means, the cognition which is of some conclusion through a demonstrative means and through a probable means differ according to perfect and imperfect."²

Response 3. For the sake of completeness it is useful to report what St. Thomas notes in the treatment of a particular question, and what seems to favor us. The holy Doctor, asking "whether consent in delectation is a mortal sin," responds that "concerning this some have held different opinions: for some have said that consent in delectation is not a mortal sin, but only venial; but others have said that it is a mortal sin; and this opinion is more common and more likely" (I-II, q. 74, a. 8). Now, after reading the whole article (cf. also I-II, q. 88, a. 5, ad 2), no one will easily deny that, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, only the latter opinion, although he calls it merely more likely, is safe in practice. This being posited, the more likely or more probable opinion, for that is the same thing, seems to St. Thomas to be the one to be followed. The principal places to which different supporters of different opinions refer are these: Quodlibet VIII, q. 6, a. 13; II-II, q. 70, a. 3.

Objection 6. A doubtful law does not oblige. But a law which exists only certainly more probably is doubtful.

Response. A law doubtful with strict doubt does not oblige, I concede; a law doubtful with broad doubt, such as a certainly more probable law is, does not oblige, I deny, for the reasons brought forward.

You will insist: An unknown, unrecognized law does not oblige. But a law which is known only certainly more probably is truly unknown.

Response. A law entirely unknown or entirely unrecognized does not oblige, I concede; a law which is known by opinionative notice does not oblige, I deny, for the reasons brought forward.

You will urge: A law does not oblige unless it is known in the strict sense, as St. Thomas teaches. But the state of one forming an opinion does not import knowledge strictly so called, for this is strictly certain.

Response. I deny the major, and for the reasons brought forward I contend that even knowledge taken in the broad sense, i.e., opinionative cognition, suffices in order that a law oblige. Concerning the opinion of St. Thomas, enough has been said above.

Objection 7. It is repugnant that a certain obligation be induced by an uncertain law, because the effect cannot be more certain than the cause itself. But a law which exists only more probably remains uncertain.

Response 1. I turn back the argument: It is repugnant that a certain obligation be induced by an uncertain law. But a law which exists most probably or almost certainly is not altogether certain. Therefore not even most probable and almost certain laws oblige altogether certainly.

Response 2. I distinguish the assertion: It is repugnant that a certain obligation be induced by an uncertain law directly, I concede; indirectly, as happens if, for example, a law exists only most probably or almost certainly, i.e., by force of the principle explained in n. 232, or at least by force of the principle: In a practical doubt not solved, the safer part is to be followed, I deny.

Objection 8. An uncertain law cannot take away the certain right of liberty of determining oneself at will.

Response. The right of liberty, through the more probable law, directly becomes less probable. But the less probable right of liberty must yield to the more probable right of law, as follows from the arguments brought forward by us.

Objection 9. If the certainly more probable opinion had to be followed, each person would be held to institute a comparison between the various degrees of probability of each opinion; but this morally cannot be done by most people.

Response. This difficulty rests on the error which is called ignoratio elenchi. We require nothing else, nor by force of the system ought we to require anything else, except what is required by the Probabilists themselves, namely, that each person, before acting, inquire into the truth according to his powers or with proportionate diligence (n. 222). But if, after the truth has been inquired into with due diligence, it does not appear that the probability of one opinion surpasses the probability of the other, no obligation arises.³

Corollary. A law obliges if someone thinks or holds as more probable: 1. that the law exists; 2. that some person or case is comprehended by the law; 3. that the fact which founds the law has taken place. It obliges, moreover, in the cases set forth even if one who thinks that the law exists knows that extrinsic authority favors the more benign opinion more, provided, of course, that notwithstanding the extrinsic authority he holds the existence of the law as more probable (St. Alphonsus, Dell' uso moderato dell' opinione probabile, 1765; Lettere, III, 217).

¹ As regards the history of moral systems, it is useful to note these things:

1. With respect to the holy Fathers, I sincerely confess that, after looking over all their testimonies with an attentive eye, it remained doubtful to me whether they adhered to any moral system, and to which one, of course only implicitly. This one thing I observe: in view of the decree issued by Alexander VII in 1665, the doctrine of Probabilism is "wholly alien from Evangelical simplicity and from the doctrine of the holy Fathers" (n. 231). Let these things be said against those who have gathered certain things from the holy Fathers, otherwise few and ambiguous, of which several do not even deal directly with moral matters. Nor does any one of them state, and this is the state of the question, that the one acting can perform what he himself holds as more probably objectively illicit.

2. Then it must be noted that before Bartholomew de Medina, who in 1577 first stated this thesis: "If an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable" (Expos. in I-II D. Thom., q. 19, a. 6, concl. 3), Probabilism was commonly repudiated. The ancient Probabilists themselves expressly testify to this (cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 102-103).

3. After the year 1577, at which time Medina proposed the thesis cited above, very many theologians adhered to the new doctrine, and it gradually gained such strength that from the year 1620 up to the year 1665 it was received quite commonly. Yet it must not be judged that almost all after Medina, or from the year 1620 up to the year 1665, favored the new system; this is clear from very many testimonies of authors flourishing at that time (cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 105-113).

4. After Alexander VII in 1665 had overthrown many laxer opinions, and had called Probabilism itself "a mode of opining wholly alien from Evangelical simplicity and the doctrine of the holy Fathers," the system more benign than is just vanished more and more, and, chiefly through the work of the Supreme Pontiffs (n. 232), for a long time was quite commonly reprobated (cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 113-116).

From these things, which we have set forth more fully and confirmed with very many testimonies in our cited little work, from these things, I say, it is made out that the historical notice presented by several authors seems defective and not very accurate.

² By "probable means" the equally probable cannot be understood, since this introduces strict doubt and therefore excludes all notice. It remains that the more probable is understood, which therefore according to the mind of St. Thomas produces some cognition or knowledge, although imperfect.

³ Please see the remaining arguments and objections of the adversaries refuted in De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 95-132.

The true system of reflex principles will lie between the extremes of Tutiorism and Laxism. As already said, these two doctrines have been censured by the Church; but there are other systems that are moderate, and that are permitted by the Church and defended by theologians. These systems are:

(a) Probabiliorism, whose principle is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safc only when it is more probable”;

(b) Equiprobabilism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe only when it affirms the non-existence of the law, and is at least equally probable with the opposite”;

(c) Probabilism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it is certainly and solidly probable”;

(d) Compensationism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it is certainly and solidly probable, and there is a proportionate reason to compensate for the risk taken.”

What have been the vicissitudes of Moral Theology? - There have been various vicissitudes of Moral Theology, both as regards its didactic development and as regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases.

As regards its methodical form, various ages can be distinguished in it, and they are the following six.

The first age, from the beginning, in the time of the Apostles, was when moral doubts were resolved by the decisions of the Supreme Pontiffs, by the decrees of Councils, and by the opinions of the Fathers, who especially in their homilies and sermons to the people explained those things which are necessary for rightly informing morals and for salvation.

The second age succeeds a little later, when in the first centuries of the Church the use of canonical penance became established, and Penitential Books were employed. Special treatises on moral matters were gradually multiplied in this age, either together with speculative doctrines or separately, up to the twelfth century, when, after St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, who died in the year 1033, and after St. Bernard, first Abbot of Clairvaux, who died in 1153, Peter Lombard, called the Master by antonomasia, wrote the books of the Sentences, in the third of which he treats of the virtues and of vices; he died in 1164. Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 11, c. 11; Decree of Gratian, at the end.

The third age extends from the thirteenth century to the fourteenth. In this age sacred practical doctrine made great progress, especially through the work of William of Paris, who died in 1249, St. Bonaventure, O. Min., who died in the year 1274, St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P., who died in the year 1274, called the Angelic Doctor, St. Raymond of Pennafort, of the Order of Preachers, who died in the year 1275, and Peter Paludanus, O.P., who died in the year 1342, who for St. Alphonsus is a doctor of perfect knowledge.

The fourth age embraces the two following centuries, the fifteenth and the sixteenth; and it is distinguished by the notable saints who flourished in this age. Among others are celebrated St. John of Capistrano, O. Min., who died in the year 1440, St. Bernardine of Siena, O.S. Fr., who died in the year 1444, St. Lawrence Justinian, who died in the year 1455, St. Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, who died in the year 1459, Thomas Cardinal Cajetan, O.P., who died in the year 1534, a man of most subtle genius, Francis de Vitoria, O.P., who died in the year 1546, Dominic Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1560, Peter Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1563, Bartholomew Medina, O.P., who died in the year 1581, St. Charles Borromeo, who died in the year 1584, Martin Azpilcueta, called Navarrus, who died in the year 1590, Cardinal Francis Toletus, S.J., who died in the year 1596, and Louis Molina, S.J., who died in the year 1600.

The fifth age embraces the seventeenth and eighteenth century up to St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, and it is distinguished by many learned scholastic theologians who expressly expounded and illustrated moral questions in copious treatises. Among many others there excel Thomas Sanchez, S.J., who died in the year 1610, Francis Suarez, S.J., who died in the year 1617, Leonard Lessius, S.J., who died in the year 1623, Basil Pontius, O.S. Aug., who died in the year 1629, the Salmanticenses, O. Carm. Disc., from 1631 to 1722, Martin Bonacina, who died in the year 1631, Giles Coninck, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Ferdinand De Castro Palao, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Paul Laymann, S.J., who died in the year 1635, Francis Sylvius, who died in the year 1649, Augustine Barbosa, who died in the year 1649, Cardinal John De Lugo, who died in the year 1660, Peter Marchant, O. Min., who died in the year 1661, Antoninus Diana, Cleric Regular Theatine, who died in the year 1663, Zacharias Pasqualigo, Cler. Reg., who died in the year 1664, Hermann Busembaum, S.J., who died in the year 1668, Henry Pirhing, S.J., who died in the year 1670, Thomas Tamburinus, S.J., who died in the year 1675, Anacletus Reiffenstuel, O.S. Franc., who died in the year 1703, Claude La-Croix, S.J., who died in the year 1714, Patrick Sporer, O. Min., who died in the year 1714, Prosper Lambertini, Benedict XIV, who died in the year 1758, and Lucius Ferraris, Ord. Min., who died in the year 1760.

The sixth age takes its beginning from St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, who died in the year 1787, and extends down to our own times. St. Alphonsus, most outstanding in genius and doctrine as well as in sanctity of life, and divinely given for exterminating Jansenist errors and severities, wrote a Moral Theology in which he treats all questions learnedly, eruditely, and with the highest prudence, recounting almost all that had been handed down before him; hence he was deservedly adorned by the Church with the title of Doctor. Hence it happened that in more recent times Moral Theologians followed St. Alphonsus as leader and master. In our age very many compendia of Moral Theology have been published.

The name indeed is modest, but the works are certainly of notable merit. For in these compendia the whole doctrine of Moral Theology is handed down briefly and in order, and in them is contained, accurately set forth, not only the doctrine of the old theologians accumulated in the course of time, but also that which has been acquired for Moral Theology either from the more recent Acts of the Holy See and of the Sacred Roman Congregations, or also from the progress of the natural sciences. Nor indeed have more expansive treatments been lacking in this age, as can be seen in the treatises On Justice and Law and On Contracts of D. Carriere, and in the scholia, annotations, and dissertations of Fr. Anthony Ballerini, S.J. Zitelli, Enchirid.;

Hurter, Nomenclat.; D'Annibale, Summ., 4th ed., p. 1, n. 2 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction V.

As regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases, for several centuries each one defended his own opinion, according to the varying weight of the reasons, as seemed better to him. In the year 1572 Antonius Cordubensis first began to contend on behalf of law, because of the authoritative and obligatory prerogative of law, and accordingly he established that in doubt the safer part must always be held. But in the year 1577 Bartholomew Medina, professor at Salamanca, began, on the contrary, to contend on behalf of liberty because of the prerogative of its natural right, and accordingly he established that in doubtful matters he acts prudently and licitly who follows an opinion truly probable and favoring liberty, even after leaving aside the more probable opinion in favor of law. He was the first who reduced the doctrine concerning probable opinions into a system. From this Tutiorism and Probabilism arose.

In the following seventeenth century Synnichius, who died in the year 1666, brought Tutiorism down into Rigorism, while Caramuel brought Probabilism into Laxism: for the former denied that we can follow an opinion favoring liberty, even if it is most probable, which was condemned by Alexander VIII in the year 1690; the latter, on the opposite side, affirmed that we can follow an opinion even slightly probable, which was proscribed by Innocent XI in the year 1679. Hence in that same century Probabilism was widely diffused, and became a very common and very received doctrine in every school: of almost all the disciples of St. Thomas, of almost all the disciples of Scotus, of almost all the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, and of other theologians, with few exceptions.

But since many of these probabilists favored liberty too much, asserting that it was lawful to follow even an opinion that was probably and doubtfully probable, the Probabilists were divided among themselves, and there arose moderate Probabilism, standing in an opinion truly and gravely probable, and broad Probabilism, proceeding even to doubtful probability. Hence, while the Fathers of the Society of Jesus commonly remained in Probabilism, the Thomists passed over to Probabiliorism, requiring for liberty an opinion more probable than the opinion favoring law. Zitelli, in his Enchiridion, mentions as the head of the probabiliorists Francis Genet, who died in the year 1702.

In the eighteenth century, to overthrow broad Probabilism and Probabiliorism at the same time, St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori undertook to defend moderate Probabilism, establishing that it is lawful to use a probable opinion even in competition with one more probable for law, whenever the former has a certain and grave foundation. And for that reason the Holy Doctor called his system moderate Probabilism, against rigid Probabiliorists and lax Probabilists, Equiprobabilism, with aeque taken according to the nature of true probability, not according to equality of degree.

But since the word nevertheless was not free from ambiguity in itself, hence after St. Alphonsus another system arose, which the Redemptorist Fathers defend, namely the system of Equiprobabilism, by which it is established that it is lawful to follow an opinion favoring liberty when it is equally or a little less probable than the opinion favoring law; but that it is not lawful when the latter is much more probable than the former, which in truth falls back into Probabiliorism. La-Croix, vol. 1, prodromal book, Franc. Ant. Zachariae and Quaest. facti of Stephen De Champs; Zitelli, Enchir.; D'Annibale, p. 1, n. 8 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction II; E. E. M. n. 114, 119.

Note: 1. "That diverse species of probabilities are given.... A tenuously probable opinion is one which rests on some foundation, but not such as avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.... Probable is that which rests on a grave moment, either of intrinsic reason or extrinsic authority, which avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite. More probable is that which rests on a graver foundation, but still with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary is also judged probable. Most probable is that which rests on a most grave foundation, and for this reason the opposite is judged either tenuously or doubtfully probable.... An opinion or sentence morally certain is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable. Finally a safe opinion is one which withdraws from every danger of sinning; but the safer is one which withdraws more from such danger, although it may not rest on stronger reasons." L. l. c. But S. D. speaks more exactly about a most probable opinion, H. A. tr. 1. n. 65: "Unless we wish to confuse a most probable opinion with an absolutely certain opinion, it is necessary to say that the opinion contrary to the most probable is not tenuously probable, but doubtfully probable." The reason is that a most probable opinion "is within the limits of probability," and therefore "does not exclude every prudent fear." "But tenuous probability is not true probability, and therefore does not bring with it a prudent reason. But doubtful probability brings some prudent reason, although not altogether certain and stable." Cf. also Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 85. But lest there be quibbling about words, as far as concerns us, we recognize no opinions, as regards doctrine, within the limits of true probability except the probable opinion, the more probable, and the most probable. Below the probable there is only the non-probable, the improbable, of which there can indeed be various grades; above the most probable there is only the certain. The probable is immediately opposed, by an opposition of comparison, to the more probable; but mediately to the most probable; and likewise the most probable is immediately opposed to the more probable, but mediately to the probable, unless someone wishes really to confuse the most probable with the certain.

2. Various moral systems: Tutiorism: A moral system which establishes that in doubt the safer part is to be followed practically. One kind is absolute, and is Rigorism, which establishes that the safer part must always be followed. Another is mitigated, which establishes that the safer part must be followed unless the other part favoring liberty is most probable. Probabiliorism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion favoring liberty only when it is more probable than the opposite favoring the law. Therefore according to this system a doubtful law obliges, against the most common opinion and against reason. Equiprobabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion unless it is equally or almost equally probable as the opposite. It is indeed a right norm of acting, but not to the exclusion of probabilism, which is a moral system containing an altogether right norm of acting, embracing all the cases of a true probable opinion favoring liberty, when the question concerns merely the subjective honorableness of an action. Probabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion favoring liberty, although the opposite in favor of the law is more probable, whether a little or much more probable, where nevertheless the question concerns only the liceity of a human action. The reason is that when there is a truly probable opinion against a law, the law is doubtful, and a doubtful law does not oblige. Laxism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion even doubtfully and tenuously probable against the law. It was condemned by Innocent XI, proposition 3, condemned March 2, 1679.

With a practically probable conscience, which proximately directs the action really to be placed here and now, it is altogether unlawful to operate. - For only a subjectively certain conscience is the rule of morals. And in this sense that saying is consequently false: He who acts probably, acts prudently. L. 1. 1. n. 58. 69. 80. Therefore the whole question here concerns a speculatively probable conscience, which only remotely directs the action, stating the probable existence of a law: namely whether by means of some reasoning we can lawfully make the step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience, or, what is the same, whether, while a probable opinion stands concerning the honorableness of some action in general, we can form for ourselves a certain conscience concerning the honorableness of such an action in a particular and individual case, and thus licitly follow in practice a speculatively probable opinion. To resolve this question we establish the following propositions.

It is not licit practically to follow a tenuously probable opinion, the safer one being left aside. - The proposition is against lax probabilists. This is clear first from proposition 3 condemned by Innocent XI. Moreover, a tenuously probable opinion is an opinion resting on a slight motive; but a slight motive is a motive by no means sufficient to move a serious or prudent man to assent, and therefore it is not truly probable. Indeed that opinion is called truly probable which rests on such a motive that it is sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But if such an opinion is insufficient to move a prudent man to judgment about the non-existence of the law, it is impossible to form for oneself a conscience concerning the liceity of the action. L. 1. 1. n. 40; E. M.

It is not licit to follow a probable opinion concerning the objective truth itself of the thing, where the question concerns an end to be obtained absolutely, the safer one being left aside. Proof. He who is absolutely bound to the end is bound to choose those means which in no way bring into danger the end to be obtained. But a probable opinion, since it can be false, brings the danger of frustrating the end to be obtained absolutely. For the objective truth or existence of the thing will certainly not be had if the opinion concerning it is probable but false. Therefore. L. 1. 1. n. 42. To be obtained absolutely, "namely when someone is bound from justice or charity to avoid damage which is present in the thing itself," Suarez apud S. Alph. Op. Mor. ed. Rome, 1757, l. c. n. 33, or the danger of it. Then indeed "in doubt the safer way is to be chosen." C. Illud 5 de Cler. exc. The case must likewise be added in which someone is bound to the safer thing from some special positive law or precept, or contract, or vow. Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. n. 8, s. 6. n. 10; L. 1. 2. n. 10, l. 6. n. 918 p. ult.

You will resolve: It is not licit to follow a probable opinion, but we must altogether choose the safer one in all those things which are necessary with the necessity of means for salvation, where the fact itself, or the truth of the thing, alone is attended to. Hence we must embrace the safer religion. Prop. 4 condemned by Innocent XI; L. 1. 1. n. 43. In the conferral of the sacraments, the minister is bound to follow the safer opinion, unless necessity is present or the Church supplies; for here again the question concerns the truth of the thing. For sacraments would not be had unless those things were really placed which Christ instituted for their validity. Prop. 1 condemned by Innocent XI.

Unless necessity is present; "for in extreme necessity we can well use any opinion, not only probable, but even tenuously probable, for the value of the sacrament... provided the sacrament is conferred conditionally: because the condition sufficiently repairs the injury of the sacrament, if perhaps it is conferred invalidly, and on the other hand necessity is a sufficient and just cause for conferring the sacraments conditionally." L. 1. 1. n. 49. Unless the Church supplies; for "we can licitly use a probable opinion where the Church is presumed to supply, as can happen in the sacrament of matrimony to validate a contract only probably valid, if perhaps that contract is null because of an impediment which the Church removes by supplying, and in the sacrament of penance to supply the jurisdiction of the confessor, if perhaps it is lacking."

L. 1. 1. n. 50. A physician is bound to apply the safer medicines which can be had in the case; for here the question concerns the objective effect itself, that is, the health of the sick person, to be obtained absolutely. And certainly the physician is bound not only from charity, but also from justice, by reason of his office and tacit contract, to provide in the better way for the health of the sick person, from whom he receives a stipend. L. 1. 1. n. 44. A judge cannot judge according to the less probable opinion; for he is bound by divine and human precept to render to each his right. Prop. 2 condemned by Innocent XI; L. 1. 1. n. 47.

A hunter who probably judges that an object hidden in the woods is a man cannot strike, although he judges more probably that it is a beast. For on the one hand the neighbor has a certain right to his life; on the other hand greater probability does not make it so that, if it really is a man, he will not perish by the blow. L. 1. 1. n. 52, H. A. tr. 1. n. 33. When scandals and more grave evils threaten, the safer part is to be chosen, by which they may be avoided, so that the utility of all may be consulted. C. Illud 5 de Cler. exc. - Generally the safer things are to be chosen when, as regards charity, the danger of sinning formally must be avoided, and as regards justice, the damage must be avoided of him who is in certain possession of his certain right. E. M.

It is licit to follow the most probable opinion, and even the more probable, the safer being left aside, where the question concerns only the honorableness of the action. - The proposition is against rigid and mitigated tutiorists. The honorableness of the action, about which the question here concerns, is quite diverse from the effect itself of the action, or from the truth of the thing, about which in the preceding proposition. The honorableness of a human action depends on the dictate of conscience, which is the proximate rule of human acts; the effect of the action, or the truth of the thing, depends on the very fact of the action. The former is subjective, the latter objective. Proof of the 1st part from proposition 3 condemned by Alexander VIII in 1690: "It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probables"; the author of this proposition was John Sinnich (+ Oct. 8, 1666), a Louvain doctor and defender of Cornelius Jansen, whom other Jansenists followed. Hence it is clear that the rigid tutiorism of the Jansenists had already been reproved by the Church. And certainly no obligation is given of doing what is safer; for it suffices to do what is safe. Likewise no obligation is given always to forestall the danger of materially sinning, nor can it be given, for this would be morally impossible; only the obligation is present to avoid the danger of formally sinning.

Proof of the 2nd part. If it were not licit practically to follow an opinion in favor of liberty unless it is most probable, then either this most probable opinion is taken as morally certain, or, as the word sounds, as probable in the highest degree indeed, but not certain. In the first case mitigated tutiorism would fall back into condemned rigid tutiorism; in the other case it would fall into false doctrine against the Apostle saying that all that is not from faith, that is, from a certain persuasion of honorableness, is sin, Rom. 14:23. Thus among the milder rigorists are counted Antoine, De Consc. c. 4. q. 4, Gazzaniga, De Consc. prob. n. 140. 141, requiring for operating direct truth, or an opinion certainly and very probable, and much more probable, or more probable by many degrees, and far excelling. Proof of the 2nd part by the same reasons as the following proposition. - L. 1. 1. n. 40. 54; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 6. n. 8; E. M.

It is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer being left aside, whether equally probable or even truly more probable, where the question concerns only the honorableness of the action, by forming for oneself a conscience not directly, but from reflex principles.

The proposition is against probabiliorists and equiprobabilists. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted.

Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For it is very difficult even for the doctors themselves to establish which opinion is more probable, which notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, what to one and the same person previously appeared more probable, far more probable, afterwards, the matter having been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable.

Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is licit to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable opinion; or they say that it is licit to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not produce a certain obligation; the will without knowledge of the law cannot be bound by its obligation. The first cannot be said, for although the opinion is more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without a certain conscience it is not licit to act. But the other, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where there is true probability against the law, the law is already doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had.

Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more closely to truth. But this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more closely to truth, and a sentence can be false which bore before itself a certain greater appearance of truth. Moreover, here the question does not concern speculative truth but practical truth; the question does not concern adhesion of the intellect simply to truth, but the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of the law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

The second part is proved. Simple probabilism is proved.

Proof 1. The proposition established is clear from the authority of very many and very grave theologians, who not only hand it down, but also affirm it as common doctrine, such as Suarez, Lugo, Struggl, La-Croix, Pignatelli, Vasquez, Elbel, Castropalaus, Sporer, etc. Cf. these Instit. Mor. ed. 4. Hence S. Alph. in Dissert. de usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris, 2nd ed., Naples 1755: "We undertake to prove the last, more benign, and most common opinion, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one in favor of the law, whenever that opinion has a certain and grave foundation." And certainly, although many after the Jansenists defended probabiliorism, nevertheless by far the greater part of theologians embraced probabilism. But he who in practice follows a doctrine which very many and very grave theologians teach, and which the doctors commonly hand down, acts prudently; but he who acts prudently acts honorably. For this reason, in the Dissertation just cited, S. D. immediately adds: "Add to these especially the argument, namely that if the benign opinion had been false, it certainly would by no means have been commonly received everywhere by doctors as it truly was received; or at least the Church would not have tolerated it, permitting souls commonly to walk by this way of perdition, as the adversaries cry out, deceived by such blind guides." And, as the same S. Alph. has it l. 6. n. 460, par. Haec autem, "nor is it an obstacle that several opinions which are circulated are not condemned by the Church, and yet by others more commonly are reputed lax; for the Church does not condemn all opinions which regard particular cases, although it does not approve them; but opinions which regard the universality of consciences, the Church does not approve nor keep silent about, as S. Aug. said, Epist. 119: The Church of God tolerates many things, and yet those things which concern faith or good life, it neither approves nor keeps silent about." Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 669 toward the end, Hoc unum, etc.; Bouquillon Theol. Fund. de Consc. c. 2. a. 1. § 2.

Proof 2. He who in practice follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence acts prudently, and consequently honorably. But he who in practice follows a truly probable opinion, the more probable and safer being left aside, follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence. Therefore. - The major is clear of itself. For what is more honorable than to follow right reason and prudence, which is right reason concerning things to be done? And Benedict XIV, C. Apostolica Constitutio § 21, indeed hands down this rule of acting, namely that we should follow the opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Moreover, it is by no means consonant with right reason, and especially with divine goodness, to wish to oblige man to perform somehow that which remains prudently uncertain to man himself after diligent inquiry, whether it is required by the order or not; especially since doubts of this kind are very frequent because of the weakness of the human intellect itself. This would be to impose unbearable burdens. L. 58. 86; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 10 ad 1. But the minor is clear from the very nature and definition of a truly probable opinion, which is not changed by the concurrence of another opinion, although more probable and safer. And this S. Alph. himself openly affirms in the definition of the more probable opinion; for he says that its contrary is judged probable. Cf. 112. Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.; L. 1. 1. n. 79.

Proof 3. S. Alph. says this in his Op. Mor. Theol., 6th ed., Rome 1767: "There are two principles on which, relying, I defend the licit use of a probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to liberty, with which man has been endowed by God." Each of these principles is explained and proved at length by S. D. l. 1. n. 66 seq., H. A. tr. 1. n. 37 seq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer one, each principle is still verified, namely that the law is uncertain if the question concerns its existence, or that it is doubtful if the question concerns its interpretation, because it is obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated," L. 1. 1. n. 70, Turin ed. 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself despoiled of it because of an uncertain law: for antecedently to every law, each possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed on man. Therefore. L. 54 seq.

Now, that the law in that hypothesis is really doubtful or uncertain, so that it may prudently be regarded as such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability. For where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy the lesser; and this philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and S. Alph. expressly hands down, H. A. tr. 1. n. 29 and l. 1. n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same S. D. explains this in this way in the Dissertation ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has in its favor so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. But otherwise it must be said if the excess is not notable, and the opposed probability receives force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means deprived of its grave probability." Indeed the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other; but it is a worthiness of meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are already outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since then one opinion will be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence S. D. l. 6. n. 604, raising the question: "Whether a penitent can be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds," responds: "The common and to-be-followed opinion teaches that the confessor not only can, but is also bound under grave sin (where the question concerns grave matter, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118), to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor.... This common opinion standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how a confessor can with a safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly at least reflexively, as probabilist authors commonly think, who by following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one judge that they embrace an opinion reflexively more probable, as being confirmed by graver foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." S. D. has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118; and to this opinion he adds no limits except the following: namely that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not repute it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1. n. 87, where S. D. after Gerson says: "Theological doctors ought not to be quick to assert that some things are mortal sins where they are not most certain about the matter: Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 3; Pignatelli Cons. Can. tom. 8. cons. 15.

Proof 4. In order that law certainly oblige, it must be sufficiently promulgated, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 90. a. 4. But sufficient promulgation of law is not had if the law is not certain and manifest. Hence in canon law it is generally established: "In these things, concerning which the law is not found expressed, proceed, equity being preserved, always inclining toward the more humane part, according as you will see persons and causes, places and times, to require." C. Ex parte tua 11 de Transact. And in civil law it is decreed: "Whenever the interpretation of liberty is doubtful, response must be made according to liberty." L. 20 de R. I. "In a doubtful matter, to follow the more benign interpretation is no less just than safe." L. 192 de R. I. But the reason is that law imposes moral necessity, and therefore must necessarily bind the will. But it cannot necessarily bind the will except through knowledge. Therefore, knowledge of the law being excluded, the will remains morally free. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Now if a most probable opinion is present against the law, it is evidently clear that knowledge of the law is lacking. For certainty and evidence cannot be had with the greatest opposite probability; indeed not even with simple probability. Hence S. Alph. says: "To constitute a doubtful law, true probability to the contrary suffices." L. 1. n. 57, ed. 1762. 1763.

Confirmation 5. By the authority of S. Thomas. Law is a certain rule and measure. In order that a rule direct and a measure measure, it must be applied to the thing which must be directed and measured. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30. a. 4. Therefore law must reach the subjects whom it directs; but it reaches them through knowledge. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Accordingly law must be certain and evident. Therefore, if the law is uncertain, namely if its existence is not established, if the law is doubtful, namely if the meaning of the law is obscure, the obligation of the law ceases; a precept does not bind except through knowledge. S. Th. l. c. Hence those axioms: An uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation; A doubtful law does not oblige. For the effect cannot surpass the cause. These things S. Thomas says altogether generally, nor does he distinguish between a law having against it a less probable, or equally probable, or more probable opinion. Therefore the whole question from the Angelic Doctor is this: whether a law having against it a more probable, equally probable, or less probable opinion can be said to reach man through knowledge, to bind him by means of knowledge, through knowledge, through the power of knowledge. But knowledge is not given if true probability is against it. Hence every question about mortal sin is determined dangerously unless the truth is had expressly. S. Th. Quodl. 9. a. 15. And S. Alph. l. 3 after n. 139, Epist. Resp.: "But in order that some action be affirmed absolutely to be a mortal sin, a probable opinion is not enough, nor even a more probable one; for the more probable does not exclude rational fear of erring; whence it does not bring about that the law does not remain doubtful, and that the opposite cannot be true, if it is truly probable."

Confirmation 6. Innocent III allowed a spouse suffering from impotence a three-year trial, C. Laudabilem 5 de Frig., and did not prescribe that it must first be seen whether potency was more probable, or at least equally probable. In the eighteenth century, when certain Indians in the Kingdom of Paraguay who had been converted to the faith had several wives, and questions arose concerning the validity of their marriages, Urban VIII responded to John de Lugo, afterwards Cardinal: "Where the opinions of doctors concur as probable on each side, those opinions are to be followed which, for the condition of places and barbarian men, are more favorable." Urban did not say that the more probable opinions were to be followed, nor did he say where equally probable opinions concur, but absolutely where probable opinions concur. Carden. Cris. Theol. Diss. 2. § 553. E. M. 119.

Nor indeed is it of any force, in order to overturn all the aforesaid things in almost one word, to object against them that probabilism has already been condemned by Innocent XI. For Innocent XI only commanded that liberty be given to the Fathers of the Society to defend probabiliorism and to refute probabilism, if they wished. Cf. E. M.; Wirceburg. De Actib. hum. c. 4.

Since the authority of S. Alphonsus is very great in moral matters, and several more recent authors deny that S. D. stands for probabilism simply so called, but affirm that he teaches equiprobabilism, and rejects probabilism as lax doctrine; hence here especially we raise the question about the mind of the holy Doctor, although in the preceding article we have almost constantly used his opinions and even his words to establish the doctrine of probabilism.

E. M. Lest there be doubt in this matter, and that we may faithfully set forth the mind of S. D., we take his doctrine from the tract on Conscience in his work H. A., which he himself there, n. 79, declares that he wrote when near death. Now these things are had in n. 33. 77: "The third opinion, which is ours, says that when the opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as the opinion which favors the law, without doubt it can be followed licitly.... Here it is necessary that I warn something concerning my system, which must altogether be warned, and it is this: that when it is doubted whether the opinion favoring the law is equally probable or a little more probable, then the same principle has place, that a doubtful law does not oblige; for in such a case, the law itself does not cease to be strictly doubtful. For then, although some greater probability for the law might be present, since it is doubted whether this greater probability is present or not, the preponderance will be so slight and minimal that it must be counted for nothing before that saying commonly admitted by the adversaries themselves, that a little is reputed as nothing. But it would be otherwise when the excess were evident and certain, because then the opinion favoring the law will be certainly and much more probable; and therefore then, as was said from the beginning, the law is already morally promulgated, and therefore obliges, and is without doubt to be observed."

Two things must be investigated here. The first is what S. Alph. understands by an opinion evidently and certainly much more probable. For if he understands an opinion truly and properly probable, he is against us; but if he understands an opinion which passes beyond the limits of probability and reaches certainty, he will be for us. The other is what S. D. again understands by an opinion equally probable or a little more probable. For if that "a little more probable" denotes a slight excess of probability, as distinguished from a greater excess of true probability, again S. D. is against us; but if it denotes simply an excess of probability, S. D. will be for us.

As regards the first, the holy Doctor refers himself back to those things which were said at the beginning. At the beginning, n. 31, these things are had: "But whether it is licit to operate with a probable opinion, there are three opinions, the first of which is that someone can licitly follow an opinion even less probable in favor of liberty, although the opinion in favor of the law is certainly more probable. Authors of the past century held this opinion almost commonly, but we say that it is lax and cannot licitly be embraced. The reason is that when the opinion in favor of the law is certainly more probable, then the law is no longer doubtful by a strict doubt, as happens, as we shall explain later, when the opinions both in favor of the law and in favor of liberty are equally probable; but it is morally certain, since it has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true, whereas on the contrary the less probable opinion, which favors liberty, has such a foundation that it is not true, so that it remains tenuously, or at least doubtfully, probable before the safer opinion; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to follow it. For when it certainly appears to the intellect that the truth stands more for the law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault follow the less safe part: for then it would not operate from its own judgment, or its own belief, but from a certain effort which by its will it will make upon the intellect, removing it from that part which seems truer to it, and bending it toward that part which not only seems to it not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true."

Now from these things it is openly clear that S. D. by an opinion certainly more probable really understands an opinion morally certain. For he says that then the law 1. is not doubtful by a strict doubt, but is morally certain; 2. that the same law then has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true; 3. again, that the said law has against itself only an opinion which has such a foundation that it is not true; 4. that the less probable opinion opposed to the law is tenuously or doubtfully probable; so that it is imprudence to wish to follow it, and that it not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true.

Now a tenuously probable opinion is not a truly probable opinion; and the same S. Alph. teaches this, n. 65: "tenuous probability is not true probability, but is only a certain false or vain appearance of probability." Likewise a doubtfully probable opinion is not truly and properly probable, which we contend it is licit to follow even in concurrence with the more probable. For if it is doubtfully probable, it participates in the nature of doubtful probability, and therefore properly speaking is not probable. And certainly a truly and properly probable opinion is defined by the same S. Alph., l. c. n. 21, as "that which rests on some grave foundation apt to incline the assent of a prudent man." Therefore a doubtfully probable opinion will be an opinion which has a doubtfully grave foundation, and therefore does not merit the assent of a prudent man, who would be exposed to the danger of acting imprudently. "Doubtfully probable," says S. Alph. l. c. n. 65, "which no one can follow, but if it is not probable, it has only some prudent reason that it is true... the doubtfully probable has some prudent reason, although not altogether stable, that it is probable."

And hence it is clear that that opinion which it is imprudence to wish to follow, and which not only seems not true, but does not even show that it has a certain foundation by which it could be true, is not a truly and properly probable opinion. Therefore if the less probable opinion opposed to the certainly more probable is not truly and properly probable, the certainly more probable opinion by no means remains within the limits of probability, but already reaches certainty. The same is confirmed from the Dissertation inserted in Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 55 of the sixth and seventh editions, and related in the edition of P. Gaude p. 25 as a commentary on the doctrine of S. Alphonsus in the text, and in the Turin edition of 1846, where he thus explains that phrase "certainly more probable." "I said," he says, "certainly more probable, because when the opinion in favor of the law is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable. And in that case the safer opinion will no longer be doubtful (understand concerning doubt strictly taken... Cf. here 138), but is morally or quasi morally certain; at least it can no longer be called strictly doubtful, since it has in its favor a certain foundation that it is true. Hence then it happens that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either tenuously or at least doubtfully probable with respect to the safer; and therefore it is not prudence, but imprudence, to wish to embrace it," etc.

Note first that from S. D., if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is notably more probable, because a small excess either is not perceived by the intellect, or is not perceived without fear of erring. Hence, if an opinion is certainly more probable, it is also notably more probable. - Then note as regards that phrase, quasi morally certain, that to the holy Doctor in this matter, where the question concerns a certain moral estimation, a little is reputed as nothing. Moreover S. D. is not speaking of any probability whatever, but of that which appears certainly to the intellect, and he is speaking of one who, if he departed from this probability, would depart from his own judgment through a certain effort of the will, and would act against his conscience; to whom he therefore applies that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 14:23: What is not from faith is sin. Ibid. and H. A. tr. 1. n. 31. Finally S. D. calls that opinion lax which defends even a less probable opinion in favor of liberty without any distinction, namely one which has only some foundation of reason and authority; and therefore he distinguished by saying that someone cannot follow this less safe opinion when there is a great and certain preponderance in favor of the safer. Apolog. cont. il P. Patuzzi anno 1765. But the true doctrine of probabilism, which we follow, does not defend any probable opinion indiscriminately, but one certainly and gravely probable, which alone is truly probable. Likewise S. D. calls that doctrine lax which authors of the past century almost commonly handed down, namely in the latter part of that century, in which several lax opinions of probabilists were condemned by the Holy See; but certainly not Sanchez, Suarez, Lessius, Palaus, Laymann, Lugo, Pallavicini and very many others, whom S. Alph. himself, not only in his Moral Works, but in that very Dissertation on his moral system, approves and praises for his opinion. He himself defends this and repeatedly champions it, not against probabilists, but against rigid tutiorists, and affirms that for a series of many years it had without doubt been common among all. Breve Dissertaz. dell'uso moderato dell'Opin. Probab., Naples 1762, p. 48; Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 59. 68-73. 84.

As regards the other point, it is an evident thing that if S. D. by an opinion much more probable understands an opinion morally certain, or quasi morally certain against a tenuous or doubtful probability, by an opinion a little more probable he understands simply an excess of mere probability. For otherwise the holy Doctor himself could certainly not admit that a probable opinion can sometimes retain its probability and that someone can follow it, although the opposite is notably more probable, as he himself really admits several times. Cf. Comment. de Consc. et de Probabilismo n. 104 seq. But if it is asked why S. D. then designates that excess by saying "a little more probable," and not simply by saying "more probable," the reason is that S. D. considers the matter practically rather than speculatively, given the nature of the thing and the principles, and also the rigor of words, and thus distinguishes between a small and a notable excess of probability. A notable excess, truly such, of probability is had when it is evident and certain; and then, from S. D., probability reaches certainty. And this is indeed so, at least practically and regularly speaking; for such probability, at least practically, is confused with moral certainty, which in a certain broader sense is certainty. And in fact S. D. is speaking of a much greater probability that is certainly and evidently such. Certainly and evidently to whom? Not only certainly to the one opining, since all know well that one and the same opinion appears less probable to one and more probable to another, indeed even to the same person in diverse circumstances; but to all, or by the common judgment of the wise. And in fact if a proposition is much more probable certainly and evidently to all, or by the common judgment of the wise, it already really is, practically speaking, morally certain. For in things to be done we often use most probable and more probable opinions as though true, and as though morally certain, when greater certainty cannot be had. Every other excess, although perhaps notable, nevertheless if it is not so evident and certain, really cannot properly be called notable, since then there is doubt concerning such a notable excess, and the proposition which to one seems much more probable to another perhaps, indeed perhaps even to the same person, the matter having been weighed better, as S. Alph. himself confesses of himself, l. 1. n. 86, H. A. tr. 1. n. 78, appears much less probable. Therefore, if that notable excess of probability is so evident and certain, then it already reaches certainty, and by right and deservedly the opposite can only be tenuously or doubtfully probable. But if, although notable, it nevertheless is not so evident and certain, that excess really cannot as regards us be held as notable, but remains within the limits of equal probability or of a little greater probability. Certainly, if to the one opining alone a sentence seems notably more probable, or if doctors fall into various opinions concerning it, can it prudently be held as certainly and evidently more probable? Certainly not. Hence again it is clear that by that "a little greater" excess S. D. really understands simply an excess of probability.

Not only to the one opining. "Such an appearance (of greater probability)," says S. D., "cannot constitute a certain rule of operating, since it can deceive in many ways. For not rarely some opinion which will appear more probable to someone will appear less probable to another; indeed to the same person an opinion which yesterday was less probable will today appear more probable." Therefore that opinion which appears more probable to someone cannot be a true rule of acting, because "the law would be particular only for him to whom that opinion appears more probable. But this would certainly be against the nature of law, which for the common good must necessarily be universal and universally proposed, lest the people, who are bound to observe it, be frequently divided and perplexed concerning the truth to be embraced, while each preacher or confessor, from the diversity of opinions and according to his own sense, would often instruct the faithful." Nor is it of force to say that by following the benign sentence (namely the probable even in concurrence with the more probable in favor of the law), disparity can also intervene, since the same opinion can seem probable to one, improbable to another. It is not denied that this can happen; but it will always be true that, when some opinion is strong with solid probability and rests on a certainly grave foundation, it will be regarded as probable among the greatest part of the wise. And this will already be enough to preserve the universal uniformity of observance of the law, notwithstanding that among some particular person that opinion is not probable; for that which happens rarely does not take away universal conformity. Yet this does not happen concerning the estimation of more probable opinions, because since greater or lesser probability depends on moral motives, namely on the judgment and weighing of reasons, which some draw from one principle, others from another, it happens not rarely but commonly that what appears stronger to one appears weaker to another.... But that we become certain that some opinion... is truly more probable or has the required preponderance, this is morally impossible. For either that preponderance is small, and who will be secure that the opinion is truly more probable? For since the excess is moderate, it can with difficulty be perceived certainly. Or the preponderance is great, and who will be able to judge that it reaches a sufficient measure, so that the opposite is judged false or tenuously probable? And thus we would always have to act with practical doubt. Either I am bound to follow opinions more probable in themselves, and then when shall I know which opinion is truly more probable in so many cases, where grave reasons and authorities occur opposed on each side? Or opinions more probable to me, and the straits would be increased; for often I would have to judge my opinion to be probable against another opinion of several wise men. And then who will render me safe that my opinion is certainly more probable and more notable, with that notable preponderance which some of the adversaries require? How shall I become certain that I have understood the opposed reasons well and solved them well? that the dictate of conscience which I have formed for myself is sufficiently certain and safe? that I have not been deceived by my own sense, so that if I err, my error is truly invincible and inculpable?" S. Alph. Dissertation anno 1755, n. 3. 17. 42. 43. 48. 50.

And if it is asked why S. D. made this distinction between a little more probable and notably, much, evidently, certainly more probable, the reason is that S. D., as is clear from l. c. H. A. n. 31 and from the Apologia contra Patuzzi 1762, wished to oppose himself to those probabilists who extended probabilism even to tenuous and doubtful probability, and therefore contended that it is licit to act when any apparent reason is present, but not firm reason, or authority. Hence from the opposite S. D. established that someone must then follow the opinion certainly, evidently, notably, much more probable, which, as is clear, in comparison with the tenuously or doubtfully probable is by right and deservedly called morally certain by S. D. Therefore, since S. Alph. designated such an opinion in comparison with the doubtfully and tenuously probable by "notably more probable," what remained was that he designate any other more probable opinion in comparison with the truly probable by "a little more probable." Cf. Breve Dissertaz. etc. cited above at the end of n. 133, p. 51, Op. Mor. ed. Rome 1757, l. 1. n. 33. Behold the words of S. D. in the Apology of the year 1765: "I did not contend nor do I contend to found new systems, and I know well that no probabilist of solid doctrine hands down as licit the use of a tenuously or doubtfully probable opinion. But because many probabilists without distinction say that it is licit to follow a less probable opinion when it has some foundation from reason or from authority, therefore I wished to distinguish, establishing that it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion when the excess of probability in favor of the safer is notable and certain, because then the less safe opinion cannot be called certainly probable."

Omitting the treatise on Conscience in the work entitled H. A., and the moral Dissertation on this matter inserted in the Theologia Moralis, if we consult these very works of the holy Doctor, we shall certainly see that S. D. pursues with the greatest diligence not only the more common and more probable opinions, but also the less and much less probable and common opinions. Cf., for example, l. 3. n. 404, where after S. D. says that the negative is far more probable to him, he says that the affirmative is sufficiently probable. And ibid. n. 649 he says: "This second opinion seems to me certainly and far more probable. But whether the first is probable... I dare to call it neither probable nor improbable." Therefore S. D. thinks that there can be a probable opinion whose opposite is to someone certainly and far more probable. Cf. l. 6. n. 868 dub. 3, l. 3. n. 293, n. 520 q. 4, n. 547 par. Ceterum, n. 529, n. 700 q. II, where S. D., after in a certain question of justice he has called the first opinion more common and indeed very probable, but concerning the second opinion has very modestly said that it does not lack its probability, undertakes to demonstrate that probability broadly and diligently; finally resolving the objection, he openly affirms that this serves for practice; for he says: "For this is probability of right... which the debtor can well use." Cf. also here n. 136. Therefore if someone still wishes to contend that S. Alph. speculatively champions another system, diverse from true probabilism, he must certainly confess that practically S. Alphonsus is a true probabilist. And certainly, if, so that we may be bound to follow the more probable opinion from the system of S. Alph., that excess of greater probability must be commonly evident and certain, H. A. tr. 1. n. 77, you will hardly find perhaps one or another such opinion in moral matters, since, as we have already observed, where the question concerns probability, the judgments of the gravest theologians are very diverse, and therefore the excess then cannot prudently be held as evident and certain. Indeed, as Ithur. observes, Cas. 44. n. 5, "hardly any question is treated among doctors in which there are not both probabilists who against other probabilists embrace the stricter opinion, and probabiliorists who against other probabiliorists embrace the more benign opinion." - L. 1. 3. n. 293, n. 930. d. 1.

Therefore the doctrine which S. Alph. holds as lax is not true probabilism, which stands within the limits of true and proper probability; but it is that probabilism which passes beyond these limits and extends itself even to tenuous and doubtful probability. Hence S. D. does not say absolutely that that doctrine is commonly held, but almost commonly by authors of the past century; for in fact it was then held by several; but it would altogether wrongly be confused with the doctrine of true probabilism, truly commonly, indeed most commonly, handed down. Hence the same S. Alph. called this most common and most probable, Dissert. de Usu moder. opin. probab. 1755, which for almost two centuries exhausted the labors of so many wise men, which, if it had been false, the Church would not have tolerated.

And, if the matter were not so, where is that moral system which, in the Catholic Church, Clement XIII in the year 1791 answered to S. Alphonsus himself could be defended catholically? l. 1. n. 84. 85, p. 66, ed. P. Gaude. For before S. Alphonsus there was nothing middle between true probabilism and tutiorism or probabiliorism; nor then was equiprobabilism even counted among moral systems. But S. D. perpetually refuted tutiorism or probabiliorism. But S. D. asserts that he hands down only the common doctrine, l. 1. n. 59. 84. But S. D. perpetually taught: In order that there not be grave sin, it suffices that true probability be had; I understand that which rests on a foundation not tenuous, etc., l. 3 after n. 139, Epist. Resp. Therefore one must immediately note that S. D. very rarely employs this note, certainly, notably more probable, etc., which the Vindic. Alph., Appendix 1, Clavis Operum, etc., themselves noted; which indeed would be very strange if his system had been so little practical. On the contrary, nothing would have had to be expressed more frequently and more clearly in individual questions. The holy Doctor does not reject true and proper Probabilism, but broad Probabilism, namely extended even to tenuous probability, which the Church certainly did not tolerate. Cf. 136.

Are all opinions which S. Alphonsus reports and does not expressly reject, although he does not expressly approve them, held as probable by S. Alphonsus? - On this matter S. Alph. himself thus declares his mind: "I judged that the Medulla of Hermann Busembaum should be set before, not now that I might approve all the opinions of that author, but only that I might follow his method, which among the methods of other doctors seemed to me very suitable for setting forth moral matters.... Besides, kindly reader, I wish you to be warned not to think that I approve those opinions from the fact that I do not reprove them; for sometimes I shall faithfully set them forth with their reasons and patrons, so that others according to their prudence may judge of what weight they are. Then note that when I call some opinion truer, then I do not hold the contrary as probable, even if I do not expressly condemn it as improbable. Moreover, when I call one of the opinions more probable, no judgment having been given about the probability of the other, or I use this phrase, I do not dare to condemn, I do not therefore understand that I am calling it probable, but remitting the matter to the judgment of the more prudent." Monit. auct. ad lect. at the beginning of the work. And again l. 5. n. 76: "And here again I repeat what I protested at the beginning, namely that when I call some opinion uniquely more probable, I do not therefore understand that I call the contrary probable. Likewise, when I say of some opinion that I do not dare to condemn it, or to call it improbable, I do not therefore admit it as probable, but doubt concerning its probability. Likewise, when I call some opinion truer, I understand that the opposite does not seem to me to be strong with solid probability, although I do not altogether reprove it." Nevertheless it can in no way be denied that certain opinions are really held by S. D., at least implicitly, as sufficiently probable, which he not only reports, but also weighs their reasons, and even seems himself to add strength to them, if, after enumerating grave theologians, he says, for example, the Salmanticenses judge it probable, etc., or adds at the end, indeed Palaus says, Lugo adds, notes, etc. S. D. also holds as sufficiently probable opinions which he says are not improbable, l. 3. n. 1012. - E. M.; A. S. S. v. 1. p. 467 seq.

136 bis. Note: The oath of following the doctrine of S. Thomas does not obstruct the doctrine of S. Alphonsus M. de Ligorio being followed and handed down. S. Poenit. Dec. 13, 1855. E. M. 131.

You will resolve: Therefore it is false that where generally the discussion concerns speculative doubt about the liceity or illicitness of an action, in doubts the safer part must be chosen. And certainly in this Rule of Canon Law the question does not concern speculative doubt, in which by means of a reflex principle someone can form for himself a certain conscience, and thus choose a part altogether safe; but the question concerns either practical doubt, namely a practically doubtful conscience, with which it is not licit to act, or else the question concerns those cases in which the end must necessarily be obtained. But the question is above all about the external forum, in which often there is a special reason for following the safer course, in order to remove scandals, abuses, and offenses of the faithful; or about honorableness and the greater degree of merit, not about the necessity of salvation. L. 1. 1. n. 68. 79, H. A. tr. 1. n. 39; Struggl tr. 1. q. 5. n. 17.

33. "Probable conscience is that by which someone, relying upon a probable opinion, forms for himself a practical dictate of reason from certain reflex or concomitant principles, for acting licitly." L. I, n. 40. Thus, for example, Titius the confessor, relying upon a probable opinion, judges that he probably has jurisdiction. Then indeed he says, and this is the reflex principle: But, with jurisdiction truly probable standing, the Church certainly supplies it. Therefore, he concludes, and this is the practical dictate of conscience, I can validly and licitly absolve in the case; and he absolves.

34. "Various species of probabilities are given... An opinion slightly probable is one which rests upon some foundation, but not such as has power to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man... Probable is one which rests upon a grave moment, either of intrinsic reason or of extrinsic authority, which has power to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite. More probable is one which rests upon a weightier foundation, but still with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary also is judged probable. Most probable is one which rests upon a most weighty foundation, on account of which the opposite is judged either slightly or doubtfully probable... An opinion or sentence morally certain is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable. Finally, a safe opinion is one which withdraws from every danger of sinning. Safer, however, is one which withdraws more from such danger, although it may not rest upon firmer reasons." L. loc. cit.

35. But St. Alphonsus speaks more exactly of a most probable opinion, H. A., tr. I, n. 65: "Unless we wish to confuse a most probable opinion with an absolutely certain opinion, it is necessary to say that the opinion contrary to the most probable is not slightly probable, but doubtfully probable." The reason is that a most probable opinion "is within the limits of probability," and therefore "does not exclude every prudent fear." "But slight probability is not true probability, and therefore does not bring with itself a prudent reason. But doubtful probability brings some prudent reason, although not one wholly certain and stable." Cf. Sporer, Op. Mor., I, n. 185.

"Truth known without fear is called certainty. But truth probably known is called opinion. The adversaries wish that a truly probable opinion be only that which, after all things have been weighed on both sides, is known to be true, so that the opposite seems certainly false. But they err in terms; for this must be said of science, or of moral certainty, but not of probable opinion, which of itself carries with it that it be fallible, and that its contrary also be probable, that is, probably true"; St. Alphonsus, Scholastico-moral Dissertation, year 1749.

36. Now from probable conscience which is to be followed practically, probabilism arises. Probabilism is reduced to one proposition applied to human action, as regards its licitness, in a case of doubt: A doubtful law does not oblige. Behold what probabilism is, and it is nothing else except this. It is called probabilism because whenever there is against the law a truly probable opinion, the law is doubtful, and consequently does not oblige. Hence probabilism is also called the moral system by which, in doubtful matters, it is simply lawful, as regards the licitness of acting, from some reflex principle, to follow a truly probable opinion against the law.

37. It differs altogether from the other moral systems. It differs from rigid and mitigated tutiorism, because the former states: It is not lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty unless it is morally certain; otherwise the safer part must always be held in practice. The latter states: it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion unless it is most probable.

38. It differs from laxism, which is also called broad or lax probabilism, because lax probabilists say: it is licit to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable. Probabilism simply so called, or moderate probabilism, wholly excludes an opinion slightly probable and doubtfully probable, because these opinions are not truly probable. A truly probable opinion is only one which is gravely and certainly probable. For this alone is able prudently to move a prudent man to assent, in the doubt of some grave matter; and this alone truly rests upon a grave motive.

39. It differs from probabiliorism, because probabiliorists say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion probable for liberty when the other opinion for the law is more probable. - It differs from equiprobabilism, because equiprobabilists affirm that it is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion favoring liberty when the contrary opinion for the law is equally probable or a little more probable; but not at all when the contrary opinion for the law is certainly and notably more probable.

40. But from what has been said it is clear that probabilism is called minus-probabilism by its adversaries without any truth. For probabilists do not say that it is not lawful to follow any opinion except the less probable, as probabiliorists say that it is not lawful to follow any except the more probable, and equiprobabilists the equally probable; rather, they say that it is lawful simply to follow a probable opinion; not at all that it is not lawful to follow any opinion except the less probable.

41. These things having been set down, we must now speak of the directive force of probable conscience, and consequently of the truth of probabilism. And this will be declared and proved step by step in the following propositions.

42. Lest there be a cavil about words, as far as we are concerned we recognize no other opinions, as regards doctrine, within the limits of true probability, except the probable, the more probable, and the most probable opinion. Below the probable there is only the non-probable, the improbable, of which there can indeed be various grades; above the most probable there is only the certain. The probable is immediately opposed, by an opposition of comparison, to the more probable; mediately, however, to the most probable. Likewise the most probable is immediately opposed to the more probable, but mediately to the probable; unless someone should wish in fact to confuse the most probable with the certain.

43. But a twofold probability must be distinguished: intrinsic and extrinsic. The former is founded upon reasons taken from the thing itself; the latter upon the authority of doctors, and presupposes intrinsic probability, or at least causes it to be presumed. As intrinsic probability can be greater or lesser from the weight of reasons, so also extrinsic probability can be greater or lesser from the number and learning of authors.

44. It is wholly unlawful to operate with a practically probable conscience, which proximately directs an action really to be placed here and now. - For only subjectively certain conscience is the rule of morals. And consequently in this sense that saying is false: He who acts probably acts prudently. L. I, n. 58, 69, 80. Wherefore the whole question here is about speculatively probable conscience, which directs the action only remotely, by declaring the probable existence of a law; namely, whether by means of some reasoning we can by right make a step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience; or, what is the same, whether, with a probable opinion standing concerning the honesty of some action in general, we can form for ourselves a certain conscience concerning the honesty of such an action in a particular and individual case, and so licitly follow in practice an opinion speculatively probable. To resolve this question the following propositions are established.

45. It is not lawful practically to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable, the safer having been left aside. - This proposition is against the lax probabilists, according to whom it is licit to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable. - Proof of the first part. This first is established from proposition 3 condemned by Innocent XI: "Generally, when we do something relying upon probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the limits of probability, we always act prudently." - Besides, a slightly probable opinion is an opinion resting upon a slight motive; but a slight motive is a motive by no means sufficient to move a grave or prudent man to assent, and therefore it is not truly probable. Indeed, a truly probable opinion is called that which rests upon such a motive that it is sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But if such an opinion is insufficient to move a prudent man to a judgment concerning the non-existence of the law, it is impossible to form for oneself a conscience concerning the licitness of the action. - Proof of the second part. Nor indeed is it lawful practically to follow a doubtfully probable opinion. For a doubtfully probable opinion is an opinion resting upon a doubtful motive, concerning which, namely, one can prudently doubt whether it is truly grave and prudent, or sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But it is evident that a prudent man, in matters of grave moment, does not rely upon a motive of this kind; hence, if the matter in fact does not turn out well, all would justly and deservedly charge him with imprudence. But the moral goodness or malice of human acts is a graver matter than any temporal business whatever. - Besides, with slight or doubtful probability standing, it is impossible to form for oneself a practical dictate morally certain concerning the licitness of the action. For a slight or doubtful reason for liberty does not remove, nor can it remove, the certainty of the law. Wherefore, the law remaining morally certain, it must wholly be observed. - L. I, n. 40.

46. From the cited proposition condemned by Innocent XI nothing can be drawn against probabilism, both because in it there is question also of slight probability, and because it asserts too generally that we always act prudently when we do something relying upon probability. For slight probability is not true probability. Nor indeed is probabilism extended to the case where there is question of the truth of a thing and an end to be absolutely obtained. - To an opinion slightly probable there is opposed an opinion gravely probable; to an opinion doubtfully probable there is opposed an opinion certainly probable. But gravely probable and certainly probable is nothing other than probable, which, unless it rests upon a grave and certain foundation, is not truly probable. Wherefore the slightly probable and the doubtfully probable are wholly excluded from probabilism. - There are not lacking those who confuse an opinion doubtfully probable and an opinion slightly probable with one another. Practically, indeed, they are often confused; but speculatively, with attention to the nature of the thing, they are altogether distinguished from one another. La Croix, l. 1, n. 126.

47. It is not lawful to follow a probable opinion, concerning the very objective truth of a thing, where there is question of an end to be absolutely obtained, the safer having been left aside. - Proof. He who is absolutely bound to an end is bound to choose those means which least of all bring into danger the end to be obtained. But a probable opinion, since it can be false, brings the danger of frustrating the end which must be absolutely obtained. For the objective truth or existence of the thing will certainly not be had if the opinion about it is probable but false. Therefore. L. I, n. 42. To be absolutely obtained, "when, namely, from justice or charity someone is bound to avoid a harm which is present in the thing itself," Suarez apud St. Alphonsus, Op. Mor., Roman ed., year 1757, loc. cit., n. 33, or the danger of it. Then certainly "in doubt the safer way is to be chosen." C. Illud 5, De Cler. Exc. The case must also be added in which someone is bound to the safer course by some special positive law or precept, or by contract, or by vow. - Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 5, n. 8; s. 6, n. 10; De Censuris, d. 40, s. 6, n. 8, 9; L. l. 2, n. 10; l. 6, n. 918, p. ult.; L. l. 3, n. 700, p. 167, note, ed. P. Gaude.

48. Therefore it is not lawful to follow a probable opinion, but we must wholly choose the safer in all those things which are necessary, by necessity of means, to salvation, where the fact itself, or the truth of the thing, alone is considered. Hence we must embrace the safer religion. Proposition 4 condemned by Innocent XI; L. I, n. 43. - In the conferral of the sacraments the minister is bound to follow the safer sentence, unless necessity is present or the Church supplies; for again there is question of the truth of the thing. But the sacraments would not be had unless those things were really placed which Christ instituted for their validity. Proposition 1 condemned by Innocent XI. Unless necessity is present: "for in extreme necessity we can well use any opinion whatever, not only probable but even slightly probable, for the validity of the sacrament... provided the sacrament is conferred under condition; because the condition sufficiently repairs the injury to the sacrament if perhaps it is conferred invalidly; and, on the contrary, necessity is a sufficient and just cause for conferring the sacraments conditionally." L. I, n. 49. Unless the Church supplies: for "we can licitly use a probable opinion where the Church is presumed to supply, as can happen in the sacrament of matrimony for convalidating a contract only probably valid, if perhaps that contract is null because of an impediment which the Church removes by supplying, and in the sacrament of penance for supplying the jurisdiction of the confessor, if perhaps it is lacking." L. I, n. 50.

49. A physician is bound to apply the safer remedies which can be had in the case; for here there is question of the objective effect itself, that is, of the health of the sick person, to be absolutely obtained. And indeed a physician is bound not only from charity, but also from justice, by reason of his office and tacit contract, to provide in the better way for the health of the sick person from whom he receives a stipend. L. I, n. 44. - A judge cannot judge according to the less probable sentence; for he is bound by divine and human precept to render to each his own right. Proposition 2 condemned by Innocent XI; L. I, n. 47. - A hunter who probably judges that the object hidden in the forest is a man cannot shoot, although he more probably judges that it is a wild animal. For on the one hand the neighbor has a certain right to his own life; on the other hand the greater probability does not bring it about that, if in truth it is a man, he will not perish by the shot. L. I, n. 52; H. A., tr. 1, n. 33.

50. When scandals and graver evils are imminent, the safer part is to be chosen, by which they may be avoided, so that the utility of all may be consulted. C. Illud 5, De Cler. Exc. - Generally safer things are to be chosen, when as regards charity a danger of formally sinning is to be avoided, and as regards justice a harm is to be avoided to one who is in certain possession of his certain right.

"We cannot use a probable opinion with danger of spiritual or temporal harm to the neighbor whenever the neighbor is in certain possession of his right," St. Alphonsus, H. A., tr. 1, 33; Apology, year 1769, n. 4.

51. It is lawful to follow a truly most probable opinion, and even a more probable one, the safer having been left aside, where there is question of the honesty of the action alone. - This proposition is against rigid and mitigated tutiorists. The former say: It is not lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty unless it is morally certain; otherwise the safer part must always be held in practice. The latter say: It is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion unless it is most probable. - The honesty of an action, about which there is question here, is quite diverse from the effect of the action itself or from the truth of the thing, about which there was question in the preceding proposition. The honesty of a human action depends upon the dictate of conscience, which is the proximate rule of human acts; the effect of the action, or the truth of the thing, depends upon the very fact of the action. The former is subjective; the latter objective. - Proof of the first part from the third proposition condemned by Alexander VIII in the year 1690: "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions"; the author of this proposition was John Sinnigh, October 8, 1666, a Louvain doctor and defender of Cornelius Jansen, whom other Jansenists followed. Hence it is clear that the rigid tutiorism of the Jansenists has already been reproved by the Church. And indeed no obligation is given of doing what is safer; for it suffices to do what is safe. Likewise no obligation is given, nor can one be given, always to guard against the danger of materially sinning, for this would be morally impossible; there is only an obligation to avoid the danger of formally sinning. - Proof of the second part. The first part of this proposition is against rigid tutiorists, namely Jansenists; this second part is against mitigated tutiorists, favoring Jansen and his followers. Now, if it is not lawful practically to follow an opinion for liberty unless it is most probable, then either this most probable opinion is taken for morally certain, or, as the word sounds, for probable in the highest degree indeed, but not certain. In the first case mitigated tutiorism would fall back into condemned rigid tutiorism; in the other case it would fall into a false doctrine against the Apostle, saying, "all that is not of faith," that is, from a certain persuasion of honesty, "is sin," Rom. 14:23, unless recourse is had to a reflex principle, as is explained in the following proposition; and then it is lawful to follow any probable opinion whatever. Cf. following n. 52. - L. I, n. 40, 54; Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 6, n. 8; Antoine, De Consc., c. 4, q. 4.

52. It is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer having been left aside, equally probable, or even truly more probable, where there is question of the honesty of the action alone, by forming for oneself a certain conscience not directly, but from reflex principles. - This proposition is against probabiliorists, who say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion for liberty unless it is more probable. It is also against equiprobabilists, who say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion probable for liberty when the other opinion for the law is certainly or notably more probable. - There is again question of the honesty of the human action alone, that is, whether the human action is licit and consequently can be placed without sin. There is not question of objective truth, whether, for example, in conferring baptism the water is true water; nor is there question of an objective effect, whether grace is conferred by such a baptism; nor of a harm to be guarded against, whether, in hunting, for example, the harm necessarily to be guarded against and avoided, namely the killing of a man, is sufficiently guarded against by such a shot. In the former case the doubt and question is only about the licitness of the subjective action; in the others the doubt and question is about the suitability of the objective action for verifying the truth of the thing, for producing the effect, for guarding against harm. - It is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion, not directly by forming a conscience for oneself by the force of the opinion itself. "For for acting licitly probability alone does not suffice, but moral certainty concerning the honesty of the action is required." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 55, p. 25, ed. P. Gaude. But it is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion by forming for oneself a certain conscience by means of a reflex principle, by which "in practice the ultimate judgment morally certain is formed from that certain principle." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 36, p. 36, ed. P. Gaude. And thus an action which speculatively is only probably honest becomes in practice certainly morally honest. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit. But the fundamental principle of all is that of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus: "No one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept." Hence an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; and a doubtful law does not oblige, "because it is not sufficiently promulgated." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 61, p. 31, ed. P. Gaude. - Billuart, De Act. hum., diss. 6.

53. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted. - Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For even for these doctors it is very difficult to establish which sentence is more probable, which is notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, even what before appeared to one and the same person more probable, and much more probable, afterwards, when the matter has been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable. - Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is lawful to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable sentence; or they say that it is lawful to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not beget a certain obligation; since the will cannot be bound by its obligation without knowledge of the law. The first cannot be said, for although the sentence may be more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without certain conscience it is not lawful to act. But the second, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where true probability is had against the law, the law is now doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had. - Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more nearly to truth. But now this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more to truth, and the sentence which bore before itself some greater appearance of truth can be false. Besides, here there is no question of speculative but of practical truth; there is no question of the adherence of the intellect simply to truth, but of the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of a law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

54. Proof of the second part. Simple probabilism is proved. - Proof 1. The proposition established is clear from the authority of very many and very grave theologians, who not only hand it down, but even affirm it as common doctrine, such as Suarez, Lugo, Struggl, La Croix, Pignatelli, Vasquez, Elbel, Castropalaus, Sporer, etc. Hence St. Alphonsus in the Dissertation on the moderate use of probable opinion in the concurrence of a more probable one, second edition, Naples, 1755: "We undertake to prove the last, more benign, and most common sentence, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in the concurrence of a more probable one for the law, whenever it has a certain and grave foundation." And indeed, although several after the Jansenists defended probabiliorism, nevertheless by far the greater part of theologians embraced probabilism. But he who follows in practice a doctrine which many and very grave theologians teach, and which doctors commonly hand down, acts prudently; but he who acts prudently acts honestly. For this reason, in the Dissertation just cited, the Holy Doctor immediately adds: "Add to these things the most powerful argument, namely, that if the benign sentence had been false, it certainly would least of all have been received commonly by doctors everywhere, as it truly was received, or at least the Church would not have tolerated it, permitting souls commonly to go along this path of perdition, as the adversaries cry out, deceived by such blind guides." And, as the same St. Alphonsus has, l. 6, n. 460, par. Haec autem: "Nor does it hinder that several opinions which are passed around are not condemned by the Church, and nevertheless by others are more commonly reputed lax; for the Church does not condemn all opinions which regard particular cases, although it does not approve them; but sentences which regard the universality of consciences the Church does not approve nor pass over in silence, as St. Augustine said, Epistle 119: The Church of God tolerates many things, and yet those things which concern faith or good life it neither approves nor passes over in silence." Cf. L. l. 3, n. 669, toward the end, Hoc unum, etc.

55. Proof 2. He who follows in practice an opinion which remains within the terms of right reason and prudence acts prudently, and consequently honestly. But he who follows in practice a truly probable opinion, the more probable and safer having been left aside, follows an opinion which remains within the terms of right reason and prudence. Therefore. - The major is clear of itself. For what is more honest than to follow right reason and prudence, which is right reason of things to be done? And Benedict XIV, C. Apostolica Constitutio, Sect. 21, indeed hands down this rule of acting: namely, that we should follow the sentence which reason persuades and authority confirms. Besides, it is by no means agreeable to right reason, and especially to divine goodness, to will to oblige a man to perform at all costs that which, after diligent inquiry, remains prudently uncertain to the man himself, whether it is required by order or not; especially since doubts of this kind are most frequent because of the weakness of the human intellect itself. This would be to impose unbearable burdens. L. 58, 86; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 16 ad 1. But the minor is clear from the very nature and definition of a truly probable opinion, which is not changed by the concurrence of another opinion, although more probable and safer. And St. Alphonsus himself openly affirms this in the definition of a more probable opinion; for he says that its contrary is to be judged probable. Muzzarelli, Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome, 1807, p. 30 seq.; L. I, n. 79, p. 58, 59, ed. P. Gaude.

56. The Rev. Father Wouters replies, in De Minusprobabilismo, 2nd ed., Amsterdam, 1908, p. 128: "Let the major pass. I deny the minor. And indeed, an opinion which is more probably false than true, or an opinion to which as true not even a weak assent can prudently be given, indeed which is to be held by opinative assent as false, an opinion of this kind does not remain within the terms of right reason. But of this kind is an opinion certainly less probable." - But, once a confusion of words has been made, surely all things can be proved according to anyone's whim. For an opinion which does not include prudent assent, or which by opinative assent is simply to be held as false, is not a probable opinion, nor consequently is it a less probable opinion. Wouters himself, recognizing the weakness of his Reply, immediately adds: "I reply II: Granted, not conceded, that an opinion truly, but less, probable remains within the terms of right reason and prudence - since these words are ambiguous - relying upon the arguments brought forward in Chapter II, I deny that every opinion of this kind can be brought into practice." Wonderful! Are these words, right reason and prudence, ambiguous? But there is no time to refute that whole Chapter II, since this has already been done more than enough by others; indeed the whole work of Wouters has already been most abundantly refuted by others. But let Wouters hear St. Alphonsus: the Holy Doctor explicitly teaches: "For acting honestly it suffices to act prudently, and we are not bound to act more prudently. For that axiom is common and commonly received: He who acts probably acts prudently." Schol.-Mor. Dissertation for the moderate use of probable opinion, Sect. 1. And Theol. Mor., ed. P. Gaude, l. 1, n. 79, p. 59: "He who acts probably, etc., can be taken in two ways. If it is taken as resting upon other reflex principles, it is truly prudent and certain. But if it is taken as a direct principle, with reflection of judgment excluded, it is false." And was not the aforesaid principle used in the first way, reflection and reasoning having been made?

57. Proof 3. St. Alphonsus has this in his Moral Theological Work, 6th ed., Rome, 1767, in which the Holy Doctor explained more fully his sentence concerning probabilism and never afterwards changed it, Theol. Mor., ed. P. Gaude, p. XIX: "There are two principles upon which, relying, I defend the licit use of probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to the liberty with which man has been endowed by God." Both these principles are explained fully and proved by the Holy Doctor, l. 1, n. 66 seqq.; H. A., tr. 1, n. 37 seqq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer opinion, both principles are still verified, namely that the law is uncertain, if there is question of its existence, or that it is doubtful, if there is question of its interpretation, because obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists has been sufficiently promulgated, but the law has not been promulgated," L. I, n. 70, Turin ed., 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself stripped of it because of an uncertain law; for prior to every law each one possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed upon man. Therefore. - L. 54 seqq.

Now, that in that hypothesis the law is in fact doubtful or uncertain, so that it is prudently judged such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability; for where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy lesser probability; and this both philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and St. Alphonsus expressly hands down, H. A., tr. 1, n. 29, and l. 1, n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same Holy Doctor explains it in this way in the Dissertation, ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has for itself so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. Otherwise, however, one must speak if the excess is not notable, and the opposite probability receives its force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means destitute of its grave probability." Indeed, the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other, but is a suitability for meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are now outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since one opinion will then be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 604, raising the question: "Can a penitent be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds?" replies: "The common and to-be-followed sentence teaches that the confessor not only can but is also bound under grave obligation, where namely there is question of grave matter, H. A., tr. 16, n. 118, to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor... With this common sentence standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how the confessor can with safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly, at least reflexively, as the probabilist authors commonly think, who, in following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one, judge that they embrace a sentence reflexively more probable, as one confirmed by weightier foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." The same Holy Doctor has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A., tr. 16, n. 118, to which sentence he adds no other limits than the following: namely, that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not reckon it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1, n. 87, where the Holy Doctor, after Gerson, says: "Theologian doctors must not be easy in asserting that some things are mortal sins, where they are not most certain about the matter. Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." - Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 26, n. 3; Pignatelli, Cons. Can., tom. 8, cons. 15.

58. Proof 4. That a law may indeed oblige, it must be sufficiently promulgated, St. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 4. But sufficient promulgation of law is not had if the law is not certain and manifest. Hence in Canon Law it is generally established: "In those things about which an express law is not found, proceed, equity having been observed, always by declining toward the more humane part, according as you shall see persons and causes, places and times to demand." C. Ex parte tua 11, De Transact. And in Civil Law it is decreed: "As often as there is a doubtful interpretation of liberty, the response must be made according to liberty." L. 20, De R. I. "In a doubtful matter, to follow the more benign interpretation is no less just than safe." L. 192, De R. I. But the reason is that law imposes a moral necessity, and therefore must necessarily bind the will. But it cannot necessarily bind the will except through knowledge. Wherefore, knowledge of the law being excluded, the will remains morally free. St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 3. Now, if a most probable sentence against the law is present, it is evidently clear that knowledge of the law is lacking. For certainty and evidence cannot be had with the opposite maximum probability; indeed not even with simple probability. Hence St. Alphonsus says: "For constituting a law doubtful, true probability to the contrary suffices." L. I, n. 57, ed. years 1762, 1763.

59. Confirmation 5 by the authority of St. Thomas. Law is a certain rule and measure. In order that a rule may direct and a measure may measure, it must be applied to the thing which must be directed and measured. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 4. Therefore law must reach the subjects whom it directs; but it reaches them through knowledge. St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 3. Therefore law must be certain and evident. Wherefore, if the law is uncertain, namely if its existence is not established; if the law is doubtful, namely if the sentence of the law is obscure, the obligation of the law ceases; a precept does not bind except through knowledge. St. Thomas, loc. cit. Hence those axioms: An uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; A doubtful law does not oblige. For an effect cannot surpass the cause. These things are altogether generally in St. Thomas, and he does not distinguish between a law having against itself a less probable, or equally probable, or more probable sentence. Wherefore from the Angelic Doctor the whole question is this: whether a law, having against itself a more probable, equally probable, or less probable sentence, can be said to reach man through knowledge, to bind him through the mediation of knowledge, through knowledge, through the virtue of knowledge. But knowledge is not given if true probability is opposed. Hence every question about mortal sin is determined dangerously unless truth is expressly had. St. Thomas, Quodl. 9, a. 15. And St. Alphonsus, l. 3, after n. 139, Epist. Resp.: "But that it may be affirmed absolutely that some action is a mortal sin, a probable opinion does not suffice, nor even a more probable one; for the more probable does not exclude the rational fear of erring; whence it does not bring about that the law does not remain doubtful, and that the opposite cannot be true, if it is truly probable."

60. Confirmation 6. Innocent III granted a three-year trial to a spouse laboring under impotence, C. Laudabilem 5, De Frig., and did not prescribe that one must first see whether the potency was more probable or at least equally probable. - In the seventeenth century, when certain Indians in the Kingdom of Paraguay had been converted to the faith, who had several wives, and questions arose concerning the validity of their marriages, Urban VIII responded to John de Lugo, later Cardinal: "Where opinions of doctors concur on both sides as probable, the opinions more favorable to the condition of the places and of barbarous men are to be followed." Urban did not say that the more probable opinions were to be followed, nor did he say where equally probable opinions concur, but absolutely where probable opinions concur. Carden., Cris. Theol., diss. 2, Sect. 553.

61. As regards the first: the Rev. Father Wouters replies, p. 101: "I retort the argument. But neither did Innocent III prescribe that one must first see whether the potency was probable and remained probable. Therefore - thus one may reason, if the argumentation of our adversary coheres aptly - it is not necessary that the sentence be truly probable in order that it can be brought into practice; which is admitted by no one." - If Wouters' retortion has force, it has force against St. Alphonsus, whose aforesaid argument it is. - Behold what St. Alphonsus has, l. 1, n. 78, p. 57, ed. P. Gaude: "In cap. Laudabilem, De Frigidit. et mal., it is had that the Pontiff granted to a certain spouse, who was doubtful about potency for intercourse, that he should try it for three years. If a doubtful law must always be observed, as the adversaries wish, and then the doubt was turning on whether the woman was another's, how could the Pontiff permit the man, while she was living, to approach her and try intercourse for three years?" Evidently therefore the Holy Pontiff supposed a doubtful potency, and consequently one probable at least in some way; but certainly not one certainly, notably more probable, or equally probable. - The Rev. Father Wouters replies secondly: "The decree of Innocent III, of which Bucceroni speaks, does nothing for our matter. For we are inquiring what it is right to do in a doubt which regards the honesty or dishonesty of an action, whereas the doubt intended by Innocent turns immediately around the validity of marriage." But was there not consequently question of the licitness of conjugal intercourse? Does not the Pontifical response regard this? And does not St. Alphonsus speak of this? Hence the Holy Doctor concludes that a doubtful law does not oblige. - Because there was immediate question of the validity of marriage, can the argument perhaps be weakened, because the Supreme Pontiff could by his authority make valid a marriage invalid because of impotence? - Wouters replies, p. 102, as to the second: "What Bucceroni narrates about the response given by Urban VIII to Cardinal de Lugo, when those things which Thyrsus Gonzalez discussed concerning that matter have been seen (Fundam. Theol. Mor., pp. 429-437), will be urged by no theologian." Nevertheless it is urged also by Cardinal D'Annibale, Summ., P. 1, n. 263, note 5, ed. 4.

62. Is the proposition established above, n. 47 seqq., some exception to probabilism, as though a true case of probabilism? - Reply. Negatively. For, if probabilism is true, it must always be true, and must be verified in every case. And indeed probabilism regards the very formal or subjective honesty or turpitude of an action; by no means the objective or real existence or non-existence of the effect of such an action. But that thesis precisely regards this objective effect to be obtained or not obtained. Therefore, if someone in that case, where the effect is to be absolutely obtained, should use a probable opinion, he will certainly sin; but he will not sin precisely because he uses a probable opinion about the licitness of the action, but because he uses a probable opinion about the validity of the act, exposing himself to the danger of frustrating an effect to be absolutely obtained. Then this would be a case of probabilism: when a probable opinion were that it is lawful by one's action to expose to danger an effect absolutely to be obtained; which is not a probable opinion, but a false and erroneous one. For he who is bound to the end is also bound to the means, and he who must guard against evil is also bound to guard against its danger. And thus, for example, a minister of the sacraments following in their administration a probable opinion as regards their validity certainly sins, not at all because he follows a probable opinion as regards the licitness of the action; indeed on the contrary, because he follows an altogether improbable opinion as regards the licitness of the action; because, since the effect of the sacrament certainly to be obtained, namely the remission of sins and infusion of grace, depends upon true matter and true form, someone applying doubtful matter or form exposes it to the danger of lacking such an effect, and therefore inflicts proximate harm, and consequently sins. - L. Op. Mor., Roman ed., year 1757, l. 1, n. 33; Laymann, l. 1, tr. 1, c. 5, Sect. 2, 3; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 1, n. 266.

63. An exception, and a true and illogical exception to probabilism, is the limitation which some probabilists and equiprobabilists add to probabilism from the principle of possession: In doubt, the condition of the possessor is better. Wherefore, they say, a doubtful law, indeed, in doubt about the existence of the law, does not oblige, because liberty possesses. But a doubtful law in doubt about its cessation obliges, because the law possesses. Hence, if it is probable that you did not emit a vow, you are not bound by the vow. If you certainly emitted a vow, and it is probable that you satisfied it, you are still bound to satisfaction. But thus to admit probabilism by halves around the existence of law, but not the cessation of law, is to admit the principles and deny the conclusions. If a doubtful law does not oblige, precisely because it is doubtful, whenever it is doubtful it will not oblige. But the law is as doubtful in the doubt about its existence, namely about its first existence, as it is doubtful in the doubt about its cessation; for if its cessation is probable, by that very fact the very existence of the law becomes doubtful. But an obliging law is not a law which existed, but one which exists; nor is it a law which exists in the abstract, but one which in its present certain obligation binds us. But if a probable opinion is had about the cessation of a law, however this is understood, its obligation becomes doubtful, and its existence likewise becomes doubtful; namely, again, not the very existence of the law in the abstract, but its force of obliging in the concrete, in the particular case, here and now. L. I, n. 63, 78. And thus, although it is certain that a vow was emitted and once existed, if probably you have satisfied it, that certain vow, insofar as once existing, becomes doubtful insofar as obliging you here and now; and that saying has force: A doubtful law does not oblige. Possession indeed constitutes a prevailing right insofar as he who possesses, by possession itself, is shown, or at least presumed, to be lord of the thing which he possesses. But how can this be either shown or reasonably presumed when the opposite is established by true or grave probability? For then it is established by true and grave probability that the possession is not legitimate, which is the only one that can constitute a prevailing right. For if the bare fact of possession, without legitimate title, at least reasonably presumed, constituted that prevailing right, then all thieves and robbers could retain another's thing by a prevailing right of possession. - Troplong, Della Prescrizione, c. 2, del Possesso, a. 2228; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 1, n. 260, 268.

64. St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 112, par. Secunda vero, says: "When it is probable that the obligation of a law never began, or that it has been abolished, then the presumption for the law ceases, and liberty possesses." Behold, the limitation of probabilism by the principle of possession has been dealt with, which, from St. Alphonsus, has no force except from presumption. The Holy Doctor joins indifferently two cases, that the law never began, or that it has been abolished; and when either is probable, from the Holy Doctor, the obligation of the law is not present. - Likewise in n. 290 he says that a probable custom suffices for excusing from the law. Behold, again, no account is taken by the Holy Doctor of possession of the law. And then, distinguishing between doubt and probability, he very well says: "that in doubt about custom the precept possesses, whence a dispensation is to be sought; otherwise, if it is probable that the custom is present."

65. The very material fact of possession by no means constitutes a prevailing right in the internal forum, as regards the very right of dominion and ownership of the thing, but only as regards proof in the external forum, which must be instituted by the plaintiff against the possessor because of the aforesaid presumption of dominion. But presumption yields to truth. Hence, if someone has possessed in bad faith, even for a very long time, he must restore the thing even spontaneously and without proof and petition from the plaintiff. D'Annibale himself, who in ed. 4, p. 1, n. 264 seqq., follows the rule of possession, asserts in n. 256, note 5: "Justice forbids giving harm to him who is in certain possession of his right... I said, who is in certain possession of his right; for if the right of another is uncertain, either the condition of the possessor will be better, or at least, because no certain right of another is injured, there will be no obligation of restoring." Behold how D'Annibale himself requires certain and legitimate possession in order that it really constitute a prevailing right. And D'Annibale himself, loc. cit., n. 259, note 18, furthermore asserts: "Namely, certainty against true probability is not given." How, therefore, will the obligation of a law be certain if it is probable that that obligation has long since ceased? See also ibid., n. 169, 181. - L. l. 3, n. 212, par. Secunda, n. 290, 325, par. Infirmi, n. 483; l. 4, n. 47.

66. For the rest, D'Annibale asserts the law of possession in a threefold case, namely in a doubt: 1. whether it receives a restrictive interpretation; 2. whether it is just; 3. whether it has ceased. P. 1, n. 262. And in the preceding n. 261, note 30, and n. 263, note 1, he affirms that St. Alphonsus used this rule of possession perpetually. - But D'Annibale himself, cited n. 262, note 35, says: "except for the second case, in which all agree, in the others even those who seem to profess it depart from our rule." And among these he expressly cites and reports only St. Alphonsus! - And while the praised author notes this against Probabilism, that it must use exceptions of which his rule of possession does not stand in need, loc. cit., n. 266, he then frankly admits that his own rule is not perpetual, and fails in several cases which he enumerates, loc. cit., n. 269, note 30. - But the alleged exceptions of Probabilism, namely when there is question not of the honesty of the action alone, but of an end to be absolutely obtained and of the objective truth of the thing, loc. cit., n. 266, 256, note 5, are not truly exceptions. - Likewise what he says, loc. cit., n. 267, that a probabilist is compelled to answer contradictories, is by no means true. And it is certainly strange that a learned theologian found a contradiction in cited n. 267 regarding that very same case in which he himself had expressly affirmed a little before, namely n. 263, that it is lawful to follow either probable contrary opinion. - Finally he asserts, n. 264, that this rule of possession enjoys better right; in n. 269, that it is better than the others not only as regards the truth of the thing alone but also as regards practice; but immediately after, in the following n. 270, he affirms that it is lawful to follow truly and gravely probable opinions; and in n. 263, after he has expounded the various systems and has also established his own rule in n. 262, he says that it is lawful for each one to choose what pleases him more. - To avert contradiction, perhaps it can be said that the illustrious D'Annibale considered this rule of possession not for the case of true probability, but for the case of doubt, which he seems sufficiently to insinuate in n. 269; and thus it is wholly true that the theologians most commonly teach that rule, n. 268, and in this sense we also admit it, and explain it diligently below. And indeed that rule is enunciated in doubt.

67. Does probabilism truly provide a safe norm for forming a certain conscience for oneself? - The norm which probabilism provides for forming a certain conscience for oneself in doubtful matters is most safe. For probabilism in fact is nothing other than this principle: A doubtful law does not oblige, applied practically, with a probable sentence standing against the law in a practical case.

68. The principle itself, considered in itself, is most safe. St. Alphonsus himself sustains his whole moral system by nothing other than this principle. And if someone asks, says the Holy Doctor, "why a doubtful law does not oblige, we shall answer with this concise argument: a law not sufficiently promulgated does not oblige; a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated; because while the law is doubtful, the doubt or question is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated; therefore a doubtful law does not oblige. Whoever should wish to deny this argument," the same Holy Doctor continues, "would have to prove either that a law even not promulgated obliges, or that a doubtful law is truly promulgated, against that which St. Thomas and others commonly expressly teach; but he will never prove either of these propositions for all eternity," l. 1, n. 61, par. Posito igitur, p. 32, ed. P. Gaude.

"1. Whether a professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which St. Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology? - 2. Whether a confessor is to be disquieted who follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus de Liguori in the practice of the sacred tribunal of Penance, for this reason alone, that by the Holy Apostolic See nothing worthy of censure has been found in his works, with the note, namely, that this confessor reads the works of the blessed Doctor only in order to know his doctrine accurately, not weighing the arguments and reasons on which the various opinions rest; but judging that he acts safely from the very fact that he can prudently judge a doctrine which contains nothing worthy of censure to be sound and safe, and in no way contrary to Evangelical holiness? - Resp. To the 1st, in the affirmative, yet without this being taken to mean that those are to be censured who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors. But to the 2nd, in the negative, having regard to the mind of the Holy See concerning the approval of the writings of the Servants of God for the purpose of canonization." S. Poenit. 5 July 1831; Acta S. Sed. vol. 1, p. 497 ff.; Benedict XIV, On the Canonization of Saints, bk. 2, d. 28, nn. 5, 7.

"Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord. The undersigned suppliant, appointed by his Bishop to the office of Prefect of public Moral Conferences, on account of his own devotion and reverence toward St. Alphonsus de Liguori, greatly desires to hold, hand down, and defend in all things the doctrine of the same so great Saint, and to make this openly known in the diocesan calendar shortly to be published, as also pleases his aforementioned Bishop, who is very favorably disposed toward St. Alphonsus, by adhering to and observing the Decision issued on this matter under the date of 5 July 1831 by this Sacred Penitentiary. But with regard to this he is held back by some scruple, because when he formerly obtained academic degrees he swore the oath set forth below, that he would retain the doctrine of that same University, which follows probabiliorism and the opinions of the probabiliorists. Since these things are so, and since moreover the very distinguished Scavini, who took the same oath, in his Moral Theology dedicated to Our Most Holy Lord Pius IX, had the same St. Alphonsus especially as his guide, hence for the quiet of his conscience he most humbly has recourse to Your Eminence, and earnestly begs:

"1. That he be taught whether the aforesaid oath prevents him from following in all things and publicly handing down the doctrine of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, as is set forth above? Or 2. that he be dispensed from observing the same oath. - Resp. To the 1st, in the negative. To the 2nd, provided for in the first." S. Poenit. 19 Dec. 1855. But what doctrine the professors of Theology ought to hand down of the aforesaid University is clear from these words of the Constitutions: "The professors of Theology, both scholastic-dogmatic and moral, must adhere to the principles and to the system of St. Thomas according to his letter and his school." Cf. Scavini, Milan, 1874, bk. 3, n. 492.

"1. Whether a Professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which St. Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology? 2. Whether a Confessor is to be disquieted who follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus de Liguori in the practice of the sacred Tribunal of Penance, for this reason alone, that by the Holy Apostolic See nothing worthy of censure has been found in his works, with the note, namely, that this Confessor reads the works of the blessed Doctor only in order to know his doctrine accurately, not weighing the arguments and reasons on which the various opinions rest; but judging that he acts safely from the very fact that he can prudently judge a doctrine which contains nothing worthy of censure to be sound and safe, and in no way contrary to Evangelical holiness? - Resp. To the 1st, in the affirmative, yet without this being taken to mean that those are to be censured who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors. But to the 2nd, in the negative, having regard to the mind of the Holy See concerning the approval of the writings of the Servants of God for the purpose of canonization." S. Poenit. 5 July 1831. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 1, p. 497 ff.

"Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord. The undersigned suppliant, appointed by his Bishop to the office of Prefect of public Moral Conferences, on account of his own devotion and reverence toward St. Alphonsus de Liguori, greatly desires to hold, hand down, and defend in all things the doctrine of the same so great Saint, and to make this openly known in the diocesan calendar shortly to be published, as also pleases his aforementioned Bishop, who is very favorably disposed toward St. Alphonsus, by adhering to and observing the Decision issued on this matter under the date of 5 July 1831 by this Sacred Penitentiary. But with regard to this he is held back by some scruple, because when he formerly obtained academic degrees he swore the oath set forth below, that he would retain the doctrine of that same University, which follows probabiliorism and the opinions of the probabiliorists. Since these things are so, and since moreover the very distinguished Scavini, who took the same oath, in his Moral Theology dedicated to Our Most Holy Lord Pius IX, had the same St. Alphonsus especially as his guide, hence for the quiet of his conscience he most humbly has recourse to Your Eminence, and earnestly begs:

1. That he be taught whether the aforesaid oath prevents him from following in all things and publicly handing down the doctrine of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, as is set forth above? Or 2. that he be dispensed from observing the same oath. - Resp. To the 1st, in the negative. To the 2nd, provided for in the first." S. Poenit. 19 Dec. 1855. But what doctrine the Professors of Theology of the aforesaid University ought to hand down is clear from these words of the Constitutions: "The professors of Theology, both scholastic-dogmatic and moral, must adhere to the principles and to the system of St. Thomas, according to his letter and his school." Cf. Scavini, Milan, 1874, bk. 3, n. 492.

63.^† - 1. Absolute tutiorism, or rigorism, according to which the safer part, that is, the part favoring the law, must always be followed ⁴.

⁴ Namely, these hold that the safer part must be followed unless it is certain that nothing favors the law against liberty; whence according to them it is not licit to act according to the most probable opinion favoring liberty. This doctrine was condemned in the third of the thirty propositions proscribed by Alexander VIII.

2. Mitigated tutiorism, according to which it is licit only to follow the most probable part favoring liberty.

3. Probabiliorism, according to which the opinion favoring the law must always be held, unless the opposite is notably more probable ⁵.

⁵ Since according to St. Alphonsus a notably more probable proposition has against itself only a slightly or doubtfully probable one, here rather mitigated tutiorism is being described.

4. Equiprobabilism, according to which it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion unless it is as probable as the opposite, or nearly as probable ⁶.

⁶ Some have called St. Alphonsus de Ligorio the author of this system. But this neither ought nor can be so understood, as though the holy man at some time receded from the common system of probabilism, which he himself also defended most keenly. See the Dissertation On the Moral System of St. Alphonsus, which was delivered at the Roman College in the solemn restoration of studies in the year 1863, and is available at Rome from Io. Bencivenga.

5. Probabilism, according to which it is licit to follow a less safe and also less probable opinion, provided that it enjoys true and solid probability.

6. Laxism, from which it is always lawful to follow opinions even slightly probable; but this system too was condemned, as will be clear below.

Hence, according to the various opinions concerning the value of probability, theologians have obtained various names, so that they are called either rigorists, or mitigated tutiorists, - probabiliorists, - equiprobabilists, - probabilists, - laxists.

55. • The efficacy of probability is situated in its force for forming the ultimate dictate of conscience, practically certain. But from those things which we asserted in no. 39, certain conscience alone is the right rule of morals. In what way, then, can it happen that from even greater probability it is sometimes licit to act? Certainly this is not licit by force of probability alone. Therefore recourse must be had to some morally certain principle, so that certitude may be had. Therefore one must now discuss what probability avails for this end; namely, whether sometimes, with solid reasons favoring both the law and liberty, we can consider ourselves free from the very bond of the law.

That we may discuss and resolve these questions, we establish the following theses.

It is not licit to follow a probable opinion, nor a more probable one, with the safer one left aside, as often as there is an absolute obligation of obtaining some determinate end, which the use of a means probably unfit would bring into danger; then therefore the safer part must be followed.

56. • It is proved. Whoever is compelled to obtain an end absolutely and more certainly, is held to choose those means by which he is certainly going to attain the end. But the end can be obtained certainly only through the safer part: for by hypothesis the means, only probably apt, brings into danger the end which I am held absolutely to attain. Therefore it is not licit to use a means only probably apt, but more apt and the same safer means must be chosen ¹. Therefore the safer part must be followed.

¹ It must be denied that in these circumstances any probability remains for the opinion. For from what has been said above, no probability remains for liberty where a certain law militates against it. But thus the matter stands in the case. It is certainly a law that I cannot inflict injury on another; and therefore it is certainly a law that I am held to guard against a probable danger of another's harm, since it is injurious to bring a probable danger of harm to another. Therefore as often as from my action a probable danger threatens another, the action is manifestly illicit, as being opposed to a certain law.

52.^† Hence You Will Resolve. - 1. In those things which are necessary for salvation by necessity of means, you are held to follow the safer; for a most grave obligation urges everyone certainly to care for the eternal salvation of his own soul; therefore means absolutely safe and certain must be applied ². Therefore in matters pertaining to the Faith or to the true Religion, the safer opinion must necessarily be followed, opposite probability being set aside ³. Hence the following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI under no. 4: An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief ⁴. - St. Lig., no. 43.

² Hence if you are uncertain whether you were baptized, or if you prudently doubt whether your grave sins were duly expiated through confession, you are held to seek the grace of justification by suitable means.

³ This most grave obligation of natural law is violated by all those who, perhaps thinking themselves unfit for another examination, nevertheless confess that salvation can be obtained in the Catholic Church; but in the meantime neglect to embrace it, because they think they can be saved also in their own sect. For at least this can and ought to cast grave doubt upon them, that against the opinion of their own salvation they have the opinion of all Catholics; and therefore the obligation either of inquiring more diligently into the matter, or certainly of choosing the safer part, cannot be hidden from them.

⁴ Beware, nevertheless, lest you conclude from this that anyone, when faith is at issue, is obliged to adhere to an opinion, even a more probable one. For by the same Innocent XI the sentence was proscribed (prop. 21) that supernatural assent of faith, useful for salvation, stands with only probable knowledge of revelation, and with fear by which someone fears that God has not spoken. Therefore from that fourth condemned proposition you will conclude this one thing: that that unbeliever is not excused if, led by a probable opinion, he remains tranquilly in his sect; for he would fail in a grave obligation of solicitously applying those means by which he may reach the truth.

2. A hunter fearing lest by discharging shot at a wild animal he perhaps injure some man cannot fire, even if he judged more probably that the danger is absent; for this danger, if perhaps it is present, cannot be removed by a contrary probability, even a greater one.

3. A physician and surgeon are held to apply the safer medicines and remedies which can be had here and now; because by a tacit contract they have obliged themselves to obtaining the end more securely, insofar as it can be done. The same must likewise be said of all others who have contracted some obligation of this kind toward the neighbor ⁵. - St. Lig., no. 44.

⁵ Thus a judge is held to render a sentence according to the more probable reasons. On this matter you have proposition 2 condemned by Innocent XI: I think probably that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable.

4. The minister of a Sacrament, where its validity is at issue, unless the defect is supplied by the Church, or a case of necessity urges, is held, insofar as he can, to follow the safer part, with the less safe probable, or even more probable, one left aside; the reason is that otherwise he would expose the Sacrament to danger of nullity, and his neighbor to danger of spiritual harm. Hence deservedly the proposition was condemned by Innocent XI under no. 1: It is not illicit in conferring Sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the Sacrament, with the safer one left aside. - St. Lig., no. 48.

I said 1. unless the defect is supplied by the Church; for sometimes the Church can and is considered to supply that which is lacking for the validity of a Sacrament: and this indeed can happen in two sacraments, namely in the sacrament of Penance, if for a grave reason it is conferred with doubtful jurisdiction, or with probable jurisdiction, and in the sacrament of Matrimony, when it is celebrated with a doubtful impediment of ecclesiastical law, or even if the delegation of the assisting Priest is doubtful, as will be said in its own place. - St. Lig., no. 50.

I said 2. unless a case of necessity urges: because since the Sacraments are for men, they must be ministered to a man constituted in grave danger of life in the best way in which it can be done, even with mere probability, indeed with slight and very slight probability concerning their value. - St. Lig., no. 49, and others commonly.

It is not licit to follow an opinion slightly probable, with the safer one left aside ⁶.

⁶ ** However manifestly Father Gury opens his mind in this thesis; however Father Ballerini in the attached note said that the opposite doctrine is condemnable; indeed however the same Father Ballerini in the little Dissertation already reprinted several times On the Moral System of St. Alphonsus clearly professed that no one of sound mind could have adhered to this condemnable doctrine, namely with these words (final proposition): Certainly no one of sound mind, to speak with Dominicus Viva, taught or could teach that men act prudently and licitly if they rest on an opinion in no way probable, of which sort the adversaries whom the thesis of St. Alphonsus attacks are...; nevertheless both VV. (page 38) and their French Confrere (see Univers, May 8, 1873) do not hesitate to accuse both Gury and Ballerini, as though they profess this condemnable and foolish doctrine, on which account (ibid.) they furthermore traduce them as supporters of laxism, liberalism, and rationalism. Perhaps you will wonder, friendly reader, at these monstrosities; but you will be more stupefied that, although in the preceding words Father Ballerini proclaims that that condemnable doctrine which St. Alphonsus attacks could not have been defended except by those who lacked a sound mind, VV. accuse Ballerini not once, but again and again (see Additional Summary, cols. 499 and 507; and V., page 112), because he made a blasphemous jest against St. Alphonsus and in the alleged words traduced him as a man not of sound mind. And in these few things you have some specimen, candid reader, of what sort is the method by which VV. undertook to attack both Gury's Compendium and the added notes.

58. • It is proved. For a slightly probable opinion, as has been said, rests on light motives, which cannot attract the assent of a prudent man; whence from them it cannot be persuaded that the existence of the law is uncertain. But it is illicit to follow some opinion, with the safer one left aside, unless the law can be said to be invincibly unknown; but the law cannot be considered unknown unless by solid reasons it is proved to be uncertain. Therefore....

It is also clear from the third proposition condemned by Innocent XI: Generally, when trusting in intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided that one does not depart from the limits of probability, we do something, we always act prudently ⁷.

⁷ Another vice is present in the preceding proposition, on account of which it could be condemned, because namely while it always, and thus in every case, affirms the use of probability to be licit, it comprehends also those cases in which a certain law forbids it, as was said at the preceding thesis, no. 56, 57. Nevertheless if with most more recent authors by the name slight probability you understand that which is not equal to eliciting a prudent assent, and therefore cannot even cast prudent doubt on the existence of the law, the proposition will be condemnable also on account of the reason brought in the text. Dominicus Viva (On Proposition III Condemned by Innocent XI, no. 1) attributed this false opinion to Tamburini, Bresserus, and Amicus; but from mere lack of diligence. For 1. Tamburini (On the Decalogue, book 1, ch. 3, § III, no. 11) expressly cautions lest the probability of the other proposition be so great that it cast the opposite down from probability, and thus the intellect can prudently assent. 2. Bresserus (On Conscience, book 3, ch. 6, no. 77) discusses an opinion for which a reason of great moment militates. 3. Finally Amicus (Scholastic Theology, vol. 3, disp. 15, sect. 3, no. 49) speaks not of slight probability, but of slight assent, which he ascribes to a probable opinion having a more probable one against itself.

It is licit to follow the most probable opinion, and even the more probable one, with the safer one left aside, where there is question only of the honesty of the action.

59. • It is proved 1. As to the most probable. It is clear 1. from the condemnation of the proposition of Sinnichius, which is the third of the thirty-one proscribed by Alexander VIII and is of this sort: It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probable ones. Therefore it is licit to follow at least the most probable opinion. Besides, in this condemned proposition there is question of a less safe most probable opinion, since no one ever denied that it is licit to follow the safer most probable one. Therefore. - It is clear 2. from the fact that according to St. Ligorius and others, where a most probable opinion is given, the opposite proposition becomes slightly probable, as was said above (no. 52) in the definition of the most probable opinion. For it is not conceived how a solid reason can stand on one side, if on the other side a most grave foundation of thinking otherwise appears. Therefore with the most probable opinion standing, a very slight fear of erring remains, and therefore, if not absolute certitude, at least some broad moral certitude of the law's non-existence is had. Therefore, etc.

It is proved 2. As to the more probable. That must be admitted as true in which all theologians agree; for it cannot be supposed that all theologians have fallen into error by unanimous consent. Moreover, if you except the very few rigorists, all agree in crowds in admitting this doctrine, at least if there is question of an opinion truly more probable.

Moreover, if you wish to inquire into the intrinsic reason of this sentence, no other solid reason seems able to be brought except that by which the following proposition concerning the liceity of the use of moderate probabilism is accustomed to be proved, namely that the law, if perhaps it is present, is altogether unknown, and therefore that it cannot oblige.

It is licit to follow an opinion truly and solidly probable, with the safer one, equally probable or even truly more probable, left aside, where there is question only of the licit or illicit ⁸.

⁸ ** Thus also St. Alphonsus, who (Dissertation according to the Naples edition, year 1755), after, as he says (no. 1), to avoid ambiguities and equivocations, he set forth beforehand this definition of a more probable opinion: More probable is that which rests on a graver foundation, but also with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary is also truly probable, or gravely verisimilar, although less so; then (ibid., no. 3) writes: We undertake to prove the last, more benign and most common sentence, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one for the law, whenever the former has a certain and grave foundation. Concerning this thesis then (ibid., no. 52) he puts forward this judgment: Our sentence, namely that it is licit to follow a probable opinion for liberty, with the more probable one left aside, is far more probable, or most probable, indeed morally or in a broad way certain. This is clear from the arguments set forth above..... These arguments indeed are each strong enough to show the moral certitude of our sentence; much more when joined together. Moreover even the Authors of the Alphonsian Vindications concede, indeed contend, that St. Doctor never changed his sentence.

This proposition can be demonstrated by a threefold genus of arguments, namely 1. from reason; 2. from authority; 3. from the consequences which flow from the opposite sentence.

60. • From reason one can argue thus: There is no obligation unless it is certain concerning it; but it is not certain concerning the obligation of observing a law against which true and solid probability militates. Therefore there is no obligation of following the safer part, with the truly probable opinion left aside; therefore it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, with the safer, even more probable, one left aside.

I. THE MAJOR IS PROVED from the necessity of cognition for obligation. For he is not obligated who invincibly does not know that he is obligated. But in the hypothesis I invincibly do not know that I am obligated. Therefore I cannot truly and properly judge myself bound by obligation; therefore in reality I am not obligated.

61. • The proposition is confirmed from the doctrine of St. Thomas. For thus he himself says in the Disputed Questions on Truth, q. 17, art. 3: No one is bound by any precept except by means of knowledge of that precept... The same virtue is that by which a precept binds and by which conscience binds, since the precept does not bind except by virtue of knowledge. Whence thus: no one is bound except by virtue of knowledge; but, from St. Thomas, to be bound by virtue of knowledge is the same as to have a certain obligation. Therefore no one is bound unless his obligation is certain to him. - And indeed St. Ligorius chiefly uses this argument in Moral System, § II.

62. • II. THE MINOR IS PROVED, namely it is not certain concerning the obligation of observing a law probably not existing. For by hypothesis the law is uncertain, since true and solid probability is supposed against it; therefore also the obligation following from it is uncertain. For a greater degree of certitude cannot be given in the obligation than in the law from which it proceeds; otherwise the certain would arise from the uncertain. Therefore.

It is confirmed. A certain obligation, as effect of law, supposes a certain cause or law. For if the effect could be certain without the cause being certain, the effect could exist without a cause; which is repugnant. Therefore there is not a certain obligation where the law is uncertain, or probably not existing. Therefore.

63. Nor say that, the directly certain law being deficient, there exists another indirectly certain law producing a certain obligation. For if such a law could be feigned, either it would be a law of avoiding the danger of sinning, or a law of following the safer; moreover neither can be feigned.

1. Not a law of avoiding the danger of sinning. For 1. the objection can be turned back against the probabiliorists themselves; since, such a law being supposed, it would no longer be licit to follow even the solidly more probable, with the safer one rejected, because even then such a danger would be present. - 2. That law could not certainly exist, and therefore certainly oblige me, except insofar as there truly was a danger of sinning formally in the violation of the direct law which probably does not exist; moreover there is no danger of sinning formally, since that direct law, as uncertain, produces no certain obligation, as is clear from what has been said. Therefore if perhaps that wholly uncertain law exists, there will be only a material violation of the law: therefore no sin will be present.

2. Nor a law of following the safer. For 1. if such a law were feigned, it would be strong also against the adversaries, and would lead us into tutiorism, proscribed in the condemnation of the proposition of Sinnichius: It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probable ones. 2. That law of following the safer would suppose that it is not simply safe to disregard a law probably not existing: moreover this is false where there is question only of the licit or illicit. For it is safe enough to avoid sin and the danger of sin. Moreover sin and the danger of sin are avoided by not fulfilling a direct law probably not existing, as was said above. Therefore.

64. • It is clear from various heads, namely:

1. From the more common consent of authors through several centuries. For from the time when the dispute concerning probabilism arose, namely from the middle of the sixteenth century, innumerable authors at once from every nation, state, condition, and from all Religious Orders undertook its patronage, among whom not a few shine forth illustrious by the fame of doctrine, such as Suarez, Cardinal de Lugo, Lessius, Eusebius Amort, Bonacina, etc., and in more recent times St. Alphonsus de Ligorio. But if some among so great a multitude of Doctors perhaps seem to have extended the limits of probabilism too much ⁹, let us surely guard against a danger of this kind, yet retaining the limits of true probabilism, namely by not admitting an opinion as probable unless it rests on a solid foundation, or unless solid reasons militate for it, according as nearly all, even before St. Ligorius, understood probabilism ¹⁰. moral questions, which is sought from the principles of probabilism, was also very familiar to the most ancient Fathers of the Church, and indeed in matters of the gravest moment.

⁹ Beware, nevertheless, lest you think that the lax opinions which had to be rejected are generally due to probabilism (as certain persons have either imprudently or even fraudulently suggested) as their proper source. And indeed with slight trouble from those Authors who are accustomed to be sold as probabiliorists, a lengthy catalogue could be brought forth of those laxities, of which no one has yet been able to bring forth an example from the books of the probabilists.

¹⁰ And thus concerning an opinion which rests on a grave foundation, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, must be understood certain sayings of the old Doctors which St. Antoninus reports (Summa, part I, title 3, ch. 10, § 10). For after he set forth beforehand that sometimes there are contrary opinions among Doctors greatest in sanctity and knowledge in moral matter even necessary for salvation, and proved this by the example of St. Thomas, who holds that after a fall into mortal sin it is not necessary that someone immediately confess under precept when a supply of a confessor has been had, while nevertheless Hugh of St. Victor and St. Bonaventure are of the contrary opinion in this: but neither of their opinions is reproved, although the opinion of Blessed Thomas is more commonly held, which nevertheless seems less safe; then to confirm that which he had established, namely that with good conscience someone can hold one part of some opinion and operate according to it,... especially when someone applies diligence in inquiring and does not find something which sufficiently moves him to this, that it is illicit, he subjoins these things: Likewise Ulricus in the Summa says that if someone concerning some doubtful thing to be done consults those more skilled, about which he has no express authority, whether it is so or not: provided that he forms for himself a good conscience, even if the matter holds itself otherwise than that which he thinks and which was advised to him, he is excused, because he did what he could, and God requires no more. Likewise from the responses which seem to have been given by Albert the Great, it is had that a simple brother or any man can with salvation follow in counsels whichever opinion he wishes, provided that he follows the opinion of some great Doctor. Hostiensis also says...: Where there are diverse opinions and diverse judgments, the more humane and more equitable is always to be preferred.... William also in the gloss of Raymond says that in the niceties of law, where even the wise doubt, ignorance is excusable. Nevertheless if someone in good faith chooses that part or that, he ought not on this account to have a conscience too scrupulous. Likewise Peter de Palude says... that if a confessor doubted whether that, concerning which the one confessing neither repents nor confesses, were mortal, and the one confessing says that he did this by counsel of skilled men, concerning whom from life and knowledge it is probable that they would not advise except well, he can conform himself to that judgment. Geoffrey of Fontibus seems to think the same in these contrary opinions which are tolerated by the Church. Thus St. Antoninus; from which it is sufficiently clear how much those are deluded who ascribe the beginnings of this doctrine and practice to Bartholomaeus Medina, otherwise an excellent theologian from the Order of Preachers, as though he first introduced it. For from the things adduced above it manifestly shines forth that, as to substance, it preceded even the age of scholastic theology. And worthy indeed to be read is the Dissertation which Christian Lupus published on this argument (Works, vol. XI, diss. I), in which it is splendidly shown that the method of solving questions

65. • 2. From the doctrine commonly handed down in this time. For if the schools spread through the whole world are inspected, in very many of them the doctrine of moderate Probabilism will be found handed down and defended, especially at Rome, which rightly must be considered as the center of theological sciences, and where false doctrine, and indeed publicly, while the Church is silent, certainly cannot be taught. So likewise in all Italy, Spain, Germany, etc. - In France itself also the doctrine of St. Ligorius, which certainly altogether recoils from probabiliorism, is now received daily with almost unanimous applause.

3. From the approval of the Church, at least implicit, in the approval of the works of St. Ligorius. For the sacred Congregation of Rites solemnly declared that there is nothing worthy of censure in the works of the holy Doctor. Again in the decree of the Sacred Penitentiary (5 July 1831), approved by the Supreme Pontiff Gregory XVI, any professor of theology can follow and teach all the opinions which St. Ligorius professes in his Moral Theology, nor is the Confessor to be disturbed who follows the same opinions in the practice of the sacred tribunal of Penance ¹¹.

¹¹ To this pertain the words of our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX in the letter given to Peter Scavini on 7 April 1847: We vehemently congratulate you, because in composing these theological Institutions you had nothing more ancient than to propagate more and more the salutary doctrines of Alphonsus Maria de Ligorio, a most holy and learned man, and to imbue with them especially the minds of ecclesiastical youth.

66. • I. In the system of the probabiliorists there would follow a difficulty too grave for Confessors. For the Confessor would expose himself to the danger of sinning because of a defect of sufficient diligence in weighing the various degrees of probability, especially in the matter of restitution, when from two equally probable opinions he would follow one. For if he assumed the more benign sentence, he would sin by permitting that in which he apprehended a deformity probably existing. If he acted according to the stricter sentence, he would sin by imposing an uncertain yoke on the penitent ¹². Besides, although the stricter sentence appears more probable to him, when will he be certain that it is truly such, and that the opposite one does not seem more probable to another Confessor? Nor could anyone undertake the office of Confessor, unless perhaps he had been so versed in moral theology that he could certainly distinguish between more probable and less probable opinions: for the burden of doing includes the burden of knowing; but very few are able to furnish this ¹³. Hence there follows also that contradiction of Confessors who, though professing probabiliorism, nevertheless not rarely keep saying that they cannot apply the principles of probabiliorism rigorously ¹⁴ in the administration of the sacrament of Penance; and so they hold one thing in theory, but the wholly opposite in practice. Being constituted in anxieties, there are not lacking those who easily judge that to be more probable which at other times they would have held less probable. Would it not be better to establish and admit milder principles with so many most wise Doctors, and to lead them into practice more exactly?

¹² Hence one must repeat that Confessors imbued with the principles of probabiliorism, and otherwise of a timorous conscience, for the most part flee the sacred ministry of hearing confessions, harassed, of course, by dreadful anxieties, or certainly devote all their labor to cultivating in spirit certain little devout persons.

¹³ ** Concerning this matter St. Alphonsus thus says (Dissertation, edition of the year 1755, no. 17): Such appearance (namely of greater probability) cannot constitute a certain rule of acting, since it can deceive in many ways. For not rarely some opinion, which appears more probable to one person, will appear less probable to another; indeed to oneself an opinion which yesterday was less probable will appear more probable today.

And again (ibid., no. 42), giving the reason why a more probable opinion cannot oblige, he brings forward the same reason: For some opinion, which is more probable to me, will often be less probable to others; and therefore the law would be particular only for those to whom that opinion appeared more probable. But this certainly would be against the nature of law, which for the common good must necessarily be universal, and proposed universally, lest the people, who are held to observe it, be more often divided and perplexed concerning the truth to be embraced, while each preacher or confessor, from the diversity of opinions, would often instruct the faithful according to his own sense.

Then the holy Doctor solves the objection, showing that these inconveniences press only those who wish some obligation to arise from a more probable opinion. Thus he says (ibid., no. 43): Nor is it valid to say that, by following the benign sentence (what the benign sentence may be, see above, Note to thesis IV), deformity also can intervene, since the same opinion can seem probable to one person, improbable to another. It is not denied that this can happen; but it will always be true that when some opinion possesses solid probability, and rests on a certain grave foundation, it will be judged probable among the greatest part of the wise: and this will already be enough for conserving the universal uniformity of the observance of law, notwithstanding that among some particular person it is not probable; for that which rarely happens does not take away universal conformity. Yet this certainly does not occur concerning the estimation of more probable opinions; because, since greater or lesser probability depends on moral motives, namely on judgment and weighing of reasons, which some draw from one principle, others from another, it happens not rarely, but commonly, that what is stronger to one appears weaker to another.

Besides, the holy Doctor intimates the difficulties and inconveniences which would follow the necessity, if there were any, of determining certainly which opinion is truly more probable in preference to the opposite. Thus he says (ibid., no. 48): BUT THAT WE BECOME CERTAIN THAT SOME OPINION... IS TRULY MORE PROBABLE, OR HAS THE REQUIRED PREPONDERANCE, THIS IS MORALLY IMPOSSIBLE. For either that preponderance is small; and who will be secure that the opinion is truly more probable? For since the excess is modest, it can with difficulty be perceived certainly. Or the preponderance is great; and who will be able to judge that it reaches a sufficient measure, so that the safer opinion (in the present matter let us say, the opposite, or less safe one) is judged false or at least slightly probable? And so we would always have to act with a practical doubt.

Hence concerning the anxieties which the obligation both of knowing and of following the more probable things would bring, the holy Doctor brings forward these things (ibid.) from Ven. Father Segneri: Either I am held to follow the more probable things in themselves, and then when shall I know what opinion is truly more probable in so many cases, where grave reasons and authorities occur opposed on this side and on that? Or the more probable things for me, and the anxieties would be increased; for often I would have to judge my opinion to be more probable against another sentence of several wise men; and then who will render me safe, that my opinion is certainly more probable, and more notable with that notable preponderance which some of the adversaries require? How will I be certain that I myself have understood well and solved well the opposite reasons? That the dictate of conscience, which I formed for myself, is sufficiently certain and safe? That I have not been hallucinated by my own sense, so that, if I err, my error is truly invincible and inculpable?

But that the common sentence lacks these inconveniences, the holy Doctor thus continues (ibid., no. 50): But they do not expose themselves to that danger who follow an opinion certainly probable, although less so. Because after they have been made certain concerning the probability of the opinion, they are not held to apply greater diligence. For when some opinion rests on a grave and certain foundation, there is no longer a moral or prudent hope of finding certain truth; and therefore if they are mistaken, they are mistaken invincibly.

¹⁴ The principles of probabiliorism rigorously admitted, as they were defended by the older authors, for example Gonzalez, Antoine, Gennett, Sinnichius, etc., labor under another inconvenience, and one not slight, which also did not escape the eyes of St. Alphonsus (cf. Index of Authors, which Father Michael Haringer prefixed to St. Alphonsus' Theology, see Gonzalez, page LXV, Ratisbon edition 1846). For they do not deny, nor can they deny, that which is confessed among all and ought to be, namely (see above no. 39 with note), that for an act to be honest, a certain conscience concerning the honesty of it is altogether required. But on the other hand, to acquire this certitude concerning the honesty of the action, they neither wish nor are able to invoke for themselves any support from reflex principles, just as they attack it in adversaries. Therefore it is necessary that they borrow a certitude of this kind altogether from direct principles, or from the innermost and proper reasons of each matter. Hence that saying of Antoine (On Conscience, ch. 4, q. 1): It is not licit (to follow probable conscience), unless the probability is so great that it excludes every reasonable fear of falsity, and produces certitude at least relative: because, as I said in ch. 2, for not sinning there is required a certain judgment, at least by moral certitude, by which doubt and the fear of sin, at least reasonable fear, is prudently excluded. And again (q. 3, no. 4) he gives the reason, because an opinion only equally probable standing for liberty cannot bring moral certitude, which is at least required for not sinning. Nor otherwise does Gonzalez, at the very front of his work, assume for himself the task of proving that, for someone licitly to be able to follow a probable opinion favoring liberty..., it is altogether necessary that that opinion... be judged by him to be true by an absolute, firm, and non-fluctuating judgment: which certainly are the marks of certitude. Hence after he contends (disp. IV, § XII, in the title) that a certain and evident practical judgment is necessary for acting rightly, he adds (see Index, under Reflection) that the one acting must make the opinion his own by direct assent. But now, from the sentence of all (see St. Alph., Apostolic Man, tr. 3, no. 2, and Viva on proposition 3 of Alexander VIII, no. 2), a sentence at least morally certain differs from a most probable opinion in this, that the former excludes every prudent fear of the opposite, but the latter does not. Therefore from their sentence, not only by their words expressly, but also from the intrinsic force and nature of the system itself, it follows that not even the most probable opinion suffices for acting rightly. Hence that saying of St. Alphonsus (l.c.): I do not know how the aforesaid authors, by asserting that it is not licit to use in acting any but morally certain sentences, since thus in reality they utterly reprobate the use of probable opinions, although in words they seem to admit it; I do not know, I say, how they can be excused from the condemned proposition, which said (it is the third of the thirty-one proscribed by Alexander VIII): It is not licit to follow the most probable opinion among probable ones.

67. • II. A most troublesome difficulty for the faithful would follow. For in doubts there would be imposed on them an obligation of inquiring what opinion is more probable; since the obligation of operating according to the more probable includes the necessary duty of inquiring into it. But for the most part there is a moral impossibility of distinguishing between the more probable and the less probable; for even to the learned this is often very difficult. And indeed I ask, whether I am held to the more probable in itself or absolutely, or as to me or relatively? If the former, whence shall I know it? If the latter, again either there is question of intrinsic probability, or extrinsic. If of the latter, what school must be followed?... what Doctors must be consulted?... If of the former, the difficulty increases: whence shall I know whether I am sufficiently fit for this judgment? whether I am in invincible ignorance or not? Therefore being uncertain, and pressed by doubts, what shall I do? Shall I have recourse to Masters? But by hypothesis it belongs to me to judge. Therefore it becomes manifest how many and how great anxieties threaten the faithful from that necessity of following the more probable or the safer. - Segneri, little work on probability.

387. State of the question. While practical doubt remains concerning the liceity of an action to be performed, some reflex principle is necessary for forming a practically certain conscience, as we said above. But what is the universal and morally certain principle by whose aid practical doubt can be solved has been keenly disputed among Catholic doctors for many centuries, and is still much disputed today. For understanding this controversy, a few things must be noted beforehand.

1. When moral certitude, even broad certitude, cannot be obtained, the mind practically doubts whether the law obliges in such a case or not; now the law, or obligation, appears as most probable, or much more probable, equally probable, solidly probable, or slenderly probable, according to the weight of the reasons which are brought forward to prove the obligatory force of the law; and from this it is already given to understand how there can be diverse principles for solving doubt, according to the diverse degrees of probability.

Moreover, from the commonly received manner of speaking, the safe or safer part is called that which favors the law or obligation; but the part which favors liberty is called less safe. Wherefore, if it is asserted that the safer part is to be followed, by that very fact it is signified that the law is to be observed as truly obligatory.

388. 2. The reflex principles proposed by the various systems are not valid, according to all prudent men, except where the matter concerns only the licit or illicit; for if it does not concern only the licit, but the valid, or an effect necessarily to be obtained, generally the safer part is to be followed; which occurs especially in three cases: -

(A) When the matter concerns a means necessary for salvation; for since, eternal salvation having been lost, all goods are lost together, whatever may be the intimate persuasion of the soul, surely nothing is to be done from which eternity is endangered. Thus, where the matter concerns truths to be believed by necessity of means, for example, concerning faith in God incarnate, it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, as is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (4) by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679: "An unbeliever who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief."¹

¹ Denzing., n. 1021; which proposition was reproved at minimum as scandalous and pernicious in practice; cf. Viva, on this proposition.

389. (B) When the matter concerns the validity of a sacrament, as is clear from the condemnation of this proposition (1) by the same Pontiff:² "It is not illicit, in conferring sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of a sacrament, the safer opinion being left aside." Namely, in doubt whether such matter is sufficient for the validity of a sacrament, the minister is bound, on account of reverence for the sacrament and the good of the faithful, to apply the safer matter, if he has it at hand; but if this is lacking, and it is necessary to administer the sacrament, it is right to apply the doubtful matter, in order to provide, insofar as can be done, for the salvation of the faithful. - Yet an exception is given in a case in which the Church can and is reasonably presumed to supply the defect, as sometimes happens for jurisdiction required for the validity of absolution, or for merely ecclesiastical impediments of marriage, as we explain in its own place.

² Ibid., n. 1018.

390. (C) When the matter concerns the danger of temporal or spiritual harm, either one's own or another's, which we are bound to guard against or prevent from justice or from charity. Thus it is not licit, without necessity, to take food probably poisoned; nor to apply doubtful remedies to a sick person when other remedies certainly efficacious are at hand; nor probably to expose oneself or others, without sufficient reason, to the proximate danger of formally sinning; because in all these things probability does not remove some danger of inflicting an evil which, moreover, we are certainly bound to avert.

Outside these cases, when the matter concerns only the licit, there are various systems.

We now come to a consideration of the systems that have been devised for the purpose of insuring practical certainty in cases of speculative doubt, or, if we may express the same thought somewhat differently, to satisfy oneself whether an act, the morality of which is speculatively uncertain, is practically allowed or forbidden. 1. STATE OF THE QUESTION. —In all cases where a definite decision has to be made under conditions which do not admit of full certainty regarding the existence of a law or obligation, a man may act safely with what is called a probable conscience (conscientia probabilis ). Such doubtful cases owe their existence to the fact that law cannot regulate the actions of men in every detail, nor adequately express the will of the lawgiver, and hence a sphere is left open in which man may use his own judgment.

In every "case of conscience" there are two opposing opinions: one in favor of the law (opinio pro lege), the other in favor of liberty (opinio pro libertate). Neither is certain, but both are more or less probable (probabiles). Note that the discussion of such cases by Catholic moralists never turns on the question, which is the more perfect course to pursue? but merely, what is licit or not? In other words, in trying to solve so-called cases of conscience, theologians do not ask: "Which of the two actions is the more perfect?" but "Which of the two is one obliged to perform under pain of sin?" For example: I am uncertain whether or not to-day is a day of fasting. I have reasons for thinking that it is. But these reasons are merely probable. What am I to do if I cannot obtain reliable information? Am I obliged to fast? Or may I, on the strength of the reasons I have for thinking it is not a fast-day, absolve myself from the duty of keeping the fast? The question at issue is plainly one of licitness, not of greater perfection, for no one disputes that to fast would be the more perfect act.

2. GENERAL PRINCIPLE. —Aside from Laxism, it is a general principle that in case of doubt the pars tutior must be chosen, i. e., that course of action must be followed which most effectively excludes the danger of sin. Abstractly and objectively considered, the opinion in favor of the law (opinio pro lege) is the safer (opinio tutior scil. a periculo peccandi) for the reason that by following it one can best avoid the risk of sin. That the pars tutior must be followed in all cases is the teaching of Rigorism. The so-called Probabilistic systems, on the contrary, contend that the opinio pro lege does not always furnish moral certainty, that such certainty may also be afforded by the opinio pro libertate, and that in case of doubt one may, for good reasons (probabilitas), safely follow the latter.

The controversy thus narrows itself down to the question which of the two opposing opinions, —that favoring the law or that favoring liberty, —is safer to follow in case of doubt.

is not permitted to act upon a mere opinion, but when direct certitude is unattainable, should try to reach reflex certitude by earnest consideration and careful comparison. The conscience or dictate of conscience based upon such an opinion is called probabilis. The relation of the different conflicting opinions is determined according to the degrees of intrinsic or extrinsic probability which each can claim.

The difference between intrinsic and extrinsic probability is that intrinsic probability rests upon reasons contained within the opinion itself, whereas extrinsic probability is based on authority.

A probable opinion (opinio probabilis) may be based either on intrinsic or extrinsic grounds, provided these are good and solid.

If two contrary opinions have the same degree of probability they are called aequiprobabiles.

A more probable opinion (opinio probabilior) is one that rests on weightier reasons than its opposite, which in that case is still probable, but less so (minus probabilis, or simply probabilis).

When a probable opinion rests on such solid grounds that it is almost a certainty, it is called most probable (probabilissima). Its opposite can not, of course, be solidly probable, but, in the language of the schools, may be parum vel tenuiter probabilis.

From what we have said it follows that the probability of an opinion is measured by the weight of the intrinsic and extrinsic arguments on which it rests. The authority which creates extrinsic probability is that of theological experts or confessors.

4. THE SCOPE OF PROBABILISM. —Though, as we have seen, the claims of liberty may in all cases be asserted against those of the law, the sphere of liberty in Moral Theology is nevertheless greatly restricted, for the reason that the safer side (pars tutior) must always be chosen where it is absolutely necessary to attain a definite end, and where following an opinio probabilis or even probabilior would involve danger of frustration.¹ This is the case whenever faith or religion are involved, especially in the administration of the Sacraments,² in medical and surgical prescriptions, and when there is an obligation to protect the interests of one's fellowmen.³

¹ Cfr. J. P. Gury, Compendium Theologiae Moralis, Lyons and Paris, 1850, Vol. I, n. 55-56: saria "It is not lawful to follow a probable, or even a more probable, opinion after abandoning the safer one whenever there is an absolute obligation to attain some determinate end which the use of a probably unsuitable means would place in danger; therefore the safer course must then be followed."

² Cfr. Gury, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 57, 1 and 4: "In those things which are necessary for salvation by necessity of means, you are compelled to act more safely; for so great an end must be attained absolutely before all others, entirely by necessity, and therefore safe and certain means must be employed. Accordingly, in matters pertaining to that end or to religion, probability being rejected, the safer opinion must necessarily be followed. Hence the following proposition, under no. 4, was condemned by Innocent XI: 'An unbeliever who does not believe will be excused from unbelief when led by a less probable opinion.' [See Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1154]. Indeed, in such a case it would not be lawful to use even a more probable opinion after setting aside the safer one. A minister of a sacrament, where its validity is at issue, unless a defect is supplied or a case of necessity presses, is bound to follow the safer course insofar as he morally can, abandoning the less safe course, whether probable or even more probable, because otherwise he would expose the sacrament to the danger of nullity and his neighbor to the danger of spiritual harm. Hence the following proposition was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI under no. 1: 'It is not unlawful in conferring sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, abandoning the safer opinion.' " (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1151).

³ Gury, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 57, 2-3: "A hunter who fears that by firing a bullet at a wild animal he may perhaps injure some man cannot fire it, even if he judges it more probable that the danger is absent; for if the danger is perhaps present, it cannot be removed by the contrary probability, even though greater. A physician and a surgeon are bound to employ the safer medicines and means which can be had here and now, because by an implicit contract they have bound themselves to attain the end insofar as this can be done. The same must likewise be said of all others who have contracted an obligation toward their neighbor." —Cfr. the Propositiones Damnat. sub Innocentio XI., n. 2: "I judge it probable that a judge can render judgment according to an opinion that is even less probable." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1152).

Hence Probabilism may be applied only when there is question of the mere morality, i. e., the licitness or illicitness, of an act or omission (sola actionis honestas). In all other cases the pars tutior must be chosen. This is no argument in favor of Tutiorism, however, nor an exception to the general rule of Probabilism, because in such cases there is always present a direct speculative certitude, whereas Probabilism was expressly devised for cases in which no speculative certitude can be attained.

Absolute Tutiorism or Rigorism (tutiorismus absolutus sive rigidus) is based on the principle that the opinion which favors the law must be followed always, and that it is never lawful to follow a probable opinion, even though it be probabilissima, in favor of liberty.⁴ This system is untenable because it misconceives the problem at issue, ⁵ and has been formally condemned by the Church.⁶

⁴ Tutiorism was adopted by the Jansenists. Its foremost defender was the Irish theologian Joan Sinnichius (+ 1666).

⁵ Cfr. 1 Macc. II, 31 sqq.; IX, 44; 2 Mace. V, 25; VI, 11; Matth. XXIV, 20.

⁶ See the Prop. damn, ab Alexandro VIII. (Dec. 7, 1690), n. 3: "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1293).

In order to escape ecclesiastical condemnation a certain school of Rigorist theologians modified the fundamental tenet of Tutiorism by saying that one may decide in favor of liberty only if the opinion favoring that side is most probable (probabilissima). This system does not differ substantially from absolute Tutiorism and is useless for the solution of difficult cases of conscience. Its principal representatives are the Jansenists M. Steyaert († 1701) and J. Obstraet († 1720), Henry a Sancto Ignatio († 1719), and Cardinal H. S. Gerdil († 1802). ⁷ 6. LAX PROBABILISM OR LAXISM (probabilismus absolutus sive excessivus). —This system maintains that the opinion which favors liberty may be followed always, even when it enjoys but a slight or doubtful degree of probability (tenuiter vel dubie). The Church rejects Laxism for the reason that this system is incompatible with the dignity of the moral law.⁸

⁷ A sketch of Card. Gerdil's life will be found in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 471.

⁸ Cfr. the Prop. Damnat. sub Innocentio XI, n. 3: "Generally, whenever, relying upon either intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided the bounds of probability are not exceeded, we do something, we always act prudently." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1153).

Excessively lax propositions were taught by J. Sanchez († about 1620), ⁹ F. Amicus, S.J. (+ 165 1),¹⁰ St. Bauny, SJ. († 1649),¹¹ Thos. Tamburini, S.J. († 1675),¹² J. Caramuel, Ord. Cist. († 1682),¹³ J. Cardenas, SJ. († 1684),¹⁴ A. Diana, Ord. Theat. († 1663),¹⁵ Z. Pasqualigo, Ord. Theat. († 1664), ¹⁶ A. Escobar y Mendoza, S.J. († 1669), ¹⁷ M. de Moya, S.J. († 1684), ¹⁸ and others.

⁹ John Sanchez must not be confounded with Thomas Sanchez, S.J. (+ 1610). Cfr. Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 592, 893.

¹⁰ See the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p. 429.

¹¹ V. supra, p. 63.

¹² On Tamburini see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, p. 441.

¹³ Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 329 sq.

¹⁴ Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 332 sq.

¹⁵ Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 773.

¹⁶ Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. IV, 3rd ed., col. 298 sqq.

¹⁷ V. supra, p. 62.

¹⁸ Father Matthew de Moya was professor of Moral Theology in Murcia, Alcala, and Madrid. Under the nom de plume "Amadaeus Guimenius" he wrote a book entitled Adversus Quorundam Expostulationes contra Nonnullas Jesuitarum Opiniones Morales (Palermo 1657), in which he showed that the lax doctrines attributed to the Jesuits in a libelous pamphlet, Teatro Jesuitico, Apologetico Discurso con Saludables y Seguras Doctrinas Necessarias a los Principes y Senores de la Tierra, by Francisco de la Piedad (also a pseudonym), were taught long before by other writers. Both the Teatro and Moya's reply were put on the Index, where they remain even after the Leonine revision.

7. PROBABILIORISM. —This theory contends that if a man is in doubt regarding the existence of a law, he must nevertheless obey the same and may follow the opinion in favor of liberty only if that opinion is certainly more probable (certe probabilior) than its opposite. Hence the axiom, "In dubio stricto seu aequali pars tutior sequenda est," i. e., as long as the conscience is strictly in doubt, that is to say, while it suspends judgment without inclining either way, the law must be obeyed.

This principle is theoretically incontrovertible but useless for practical purposes, and therefore no longer has any followers. While all Catholic moralists admit that a man may safely follow Probabiliorism, most of them maintain that this system is of no value in the solving of doubtful cases precisely for the reason that in such cases no opinio probabilior is attainable. In practice Probabiliorism leads to Tutiorism, and "solves" only those cases of conscience which in reality are no "cases" at all, because the greater probability in favor of one side or the other can be easily perceived.

The most eminent defenders of this system are: Cardinal Cajetan († 1534),¹⁹ Alexander Natalis († 1724), ²⁰ Vincent Baronius († 1674),²¹ C. R. Billuart († 1757),²² D. Concina († 1756),²³ V. Contenson († 1674),²⁴ P. M. Gazzaniga († 1799),²⁵ J. B. Gonet († 1681),²⁶ J. V. Patuzzi († 1769), ²⁷ —all Dominicans —and the Jesuits Thyrsus Gonzalez de Santalla († 1705),²⁸ M. de Elizalde († 1678),²⁹ P. G. Antoine († 1743),³⁰ and P. Collet († 1770).³¹

¹⁹ On Cardinal Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio Gaetani) see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. III, pp. 145 sqq.

²⁰ On Alexander Natalis (Noel Alexandre), ibid., Vol. I, pp. 296 sq.

²¹ Not to be confounded with the famous Jesuit Cardinal Cesare Baronius. Brief sketches of both in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II, pp. 304 sq.

²² V. supra, p. 57.

²³ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁴ V. Cath. Encyc., IV, 330.

²⁵ V. Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 401.

²⁶ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁷ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁸ Gonzales was the thirteenth general of the Society of Jesus, and while holding that office, published his famous Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis, i. e. Tractatus Theologicus de Recto Usu Opinionum (Rome 1694). It is reproduced in Migne's Cursus Theologiae, Vol. XI. —Cfr. J. Salsmans, S.J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, pp. 635 sq.; Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten in der römisch-kath. Kirche, Nördlingen 1889, Vol. I, pp. 120 sqq. —For an account of the controversies that raged about the decree of Innocent XI on Probabilism see J. Brucker S.J., in the Paris Études Religieuses, 1901-02, and F. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz XI. über den Probabilismus, Paderborn 1904. —Latin text of the decree given by the latter, pp. 29 sqq. and by Lehmkuhl, Prob. Vind., pp. 81 sqq. For an English translation see p. 230, note 40, infra.

²⁹ V. Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. IV, 3rd ed., col. 286 sq.

³⁰ V. supra, p. 58.

³¹ Cfr. Buchberger, Kirchl. Handlexikon, I, 964.

8. SIMPLE OR COMMON PROBABILISM (probabilismus simplex sive benignus, communis sive latus). —This system teaches that whenever there is doubt concerning the mere lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act, it is permissible to follow a solidly probable opinion in favor of liberty, even though the opposing view be more probable (probabilior). But why may a more probable opinion be relinquished in favor of a less probable one? To this Probabilism answers as follows: If the opinion favoring liberty is truly and solidly probable (vere et solide probabilis), it must be because the law is doubtful or insufficiently promulgated (lex dubia aut non sufficienter pr omul gat a). Now a doubtful law is not binding (lex dubia non obligat), and therefore one is at liberty.

But this statement of the Probabilist position does not remove the logical and moral objection that Probabilism permits men to follow a less probable opinion (sententia minus probabilis sic cognita et iudicata) even though its opposite is perceived to be more probable.

"The wise practicians who established the moral system of the Jesuits," says a Protestant ethicist, "correctly perceived that probability plays a part in moral conduct, and that to reject Probabilism absolutely, would betray a hasty judgment. Were man permitted to follow the axiom, 'Quod dubitas, ne feceris' and to act only when he knows for certain and without doubt that he is right, he would frequently be unable to act at all; nor would abstention from action help him out of the difficulty, for the mere omission of an act also entails consequences and is equivalent to a definite decision of the will, which may be either right or wrong That a certain mode of procedure is absolutely right in all circumstances, and its opposite absolutely wrong, can be asserted only from the standpoint of an omniscient intelligence. Man is a short-sighted creature and can act only if he has the courage to make a false move and to do something which may prove objectively wrong, and which he would not do were he better informed. Nevertheless, his conscience absolves him from guilt if he has acted to the best of his knowledge and understanding in accordance with the most probable opinion. The only thing we reject in the teaching of the Jesuits is that they base probability preferably on authority and allow a man to follow an opinion which he himself must admit to be less probable." ³²

³² Ch. Sigwart, Vorfragen der Ethik, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1907, pp. 40 sq. —Cfr. Mandonnet, Le Decret d'Innocent XI. contre le Probabilisme, Paris 1903, pp. 79 sqq., 99 sqq.

"There can be no doubt," says St. Alphonsus, "that the Tutiorists in their excessive rigorism do much damage; but on the other hand the Probabilists, who follow an opinion which they recognize as less probable (but which I no longer regard as probable because the law in its moral sense is sufficiently promulgated), are also to blame for the loss of many souls." ³³ Neither the Fathers nor the early Schoolmen give any general rule for determining moral obligation in doubtful cases. But from the way in which they decided controversies it is evident that they were guided by the principle that a doubtful law does not bind. Thus St. Gregory of Nazianzus addressed the following challenge to a Novatian writer who had denounced second marriage as illicit: "Either prove that you are right, or if you are unable to bring proof, do not pass judgment. If the matter is in doubt, let humanity and convenience prevail." ³⁴ The first theologian who reduced Probabilism to a formula and attempted to demonstrate it systematically was Bartholomew de Medina, O. P. († 1581). In his commentaries on the Second and Third Parts of the Summa of St. Thomas, this learned writer, who is usually called "the Father of Probabilism," defends the proposition: "We are permitted to follow a probable opinion even if its opposite is more probable." ³⁵ This thesis was favorably received by the majority of Catholic moralists and met with no ex professo opposition until Father Andrew Bianchi, S.J., attacked it in his treatise De Opinionum Praxi Disputatio, published at Genoa in 1642.³⁶ The bitterest opponents of simple Probabilism were the Jansenists, especially Blaise Pascal, who, in his famous Lettres a un Provincial (1656), attacked Probabilism with vigor and grace of style. The result was that many theologians adopted Probabiliorism. In the ensuing conflict, which lasted nearly two centuries, Probabilism received its hardest blows from the Dominicans. Alexander VII (1665), Innocent XI (1679), and Alexander VIII (1690) censured a series of propositions which were mostly taken from the writings of Probabilistic authors.³⁷ At the instance of the last-mentioned Pope, a general chapter of the Dominicans, held at Rome in 1656, advised all members of that Order to espouse Probabiliorism.³⁸ Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, General of the Jesuits, tried to banish Probabilism from the Society by publishing an anti-Probabilistic work, Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis.³⁹ The so-called decree of Innocent XI, of June 26, 1680 (which in reality was merely a protocol of the Holy Office), strongly approved of his action.⁴⁰

³³ Letters, III, 355.

³⁴ Orat., 39, n. 19 (Migne, P.G., XXXVI, 358): "Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot do this, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and mildness prevail." —Cfr. Chr. Lupus, Dissertatio de Antiquitate, Auctoritate et Legitimo Usu Sententiae Probabilis (Opera Omnia, Venice 1729, Vol. XI, pp. 1 sqq.).

³⁵ "If an opinion is probable, it is lawful to follow it, even though the opposite opinion is more probable." (Expositio s. Scholastica Commentaria in D. Thomae S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 19, art. 6, Salamanca 1577. For a sketch of B. de Medina's life see D. J. Kennedy, O. P., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, pp. 143 sq. Modern writers are divided as to Medina's teaching on Probabilism. Echard (followed by Billuart) maintains that Medina's system differed greatly from Probabilism as expounded by its later defenders. H. Hurter, S.J., says of him: "He was numbered among the leading cultivators of Scholastic and moral theology of his age, and from this also gained a certain renown; he is said to have anticipated the system of Probabilism." (Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae Catholicae, Vol. III, 3rd ed., Innsbruck 1907, col. 144). Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 28 sqq.; Ter Haar, De Systemate Mor., pp. 17 sqq.; A. Schmitt, Zur Geschichte des Probabilismus, Innsbruck 1904, pp. 43 sqq.

³⁶ Andrea Bianchi, S.J., is perhaps better known by his Latin name, Blancus. He died at Genoa, March 29, 1657. His treatise De Opinionum Praxi Disputatio was published under the pseudonym "Candidus Philalethes." It is Tutioristic in tendency. —Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 31 sqq., 51 sqq.; Ter Haar, De Syst. Mor., pp. 18 sqq.

³⁷ For a list of these condemned propositions see Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1101, 1151, 1289, 1291; A. Rohling, Medulla Theol. Mor., pp. 479 sqq., St. Louis 1875.

³⁸ Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 42 sqq.

³⁹ V '. supra, p. 225, n. 10. —Cfr. A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Prob. Vind., pp. 83 sqq.; A. Koch, "Neue Dokumente zu dem Thyrsus Gonsalez'- Streit," in the Theol. Quartalschrift of Tübingen, 1905, pp. 95 sqq.

⁴⁰ Cfr. Mandonnet, Decret d' Innocent XL, pp. 73 sqq.; T er Haar, Das Dekret Innozenz' XI, pp. 29 sqq.; G. Arendt, S.J., De Conciliationis Tentamine nuper Iterate Aequiprobabilistas inter et Probabilistas, Rome 1902 (cfr. the Civiltà Cattolica, 1902, quad. 1253, pp. 574 sqq.). The "decree," the authentic text of which was published Apr. 19, 1902, by the Secretary of the Holy Office, reads: "A report having been made by Father Laurea of a letter directed by Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., to Our Most Holy Lord; the Most Eminent Lords said that the Secretary of State must write to the Apostolic nuncio of the Spains [directing him] to signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having received his letter favorably, and having read it with approval, has commanded that he [Thyrsus] shall freely and fearlessly preach, teach, and defend with his pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that in a conflict of a less probable opinion with a more probable, known and estimated as such, it is allowed to follow the less probable; and to inform him that whatever he does and writes on behalf of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness. Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus, as by order (de ordine) of His Holiness, not only to permit the Fathers of the Society to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those who assert that in a conflict of a less probable opinion with a more probable, known and estimated as such, it is allowed to follow the less probable; but also to write to all the universities of the Society, [informing them] that it is the mind of His Holiness that whosoever chooses may freely write in favor of the more probable opinion, and may attack the aforesaid contrary [opinion]; and to order them to submit entirely to the command of His Holiness." (Cfr. J. M. Harty in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, p. 445).

The present status of Probabilism may be described as It has never been either officially approved or officially censured by the Church, but was and is tolerated ⁴¹ and upheld by the majority of Jesuit theologians, though it is not the official teaching of the Society.⁴²

⁴¹ Cfr. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz XL, pp. 177 sqq.

⁴² For some of the leading arguments for and against Probabilism see J. M. Harty in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 444 sq.

Lately J. de Caigny, C.SS.R., published several books ⁴³ for the purpose of reconciling Probabilism with Æquiprobabilism. His arguments were met by G. Arendt, S.J.⁴⁴ 9. ÆQUIPROBABILISM (probabilismus moderatus). —Æquiprobabilism takes middle ground between Probabiliorism and simple Probabilism. It teaches that unless the opinions for and against the existence of a law have equal or nearly equal probability, it is not permissible to choose in favor of liberty. The leading principle of this system, which it shares with Probabiliorism, is this:

⁴³ Apologetica, etc. (see p. 235, infra); De Gemino Probabilismo Licito Dissertatio Exarata Conciliationis Gratia; De Genuino Morali Systemate S. Alphonsi Dissertatio Irenico-Critica.

⁴⁴ Apologeticae de Aequiprobabilismo Alphonsiano Historico-Philosophicae Dissertationis a R. P. J. Caigny, C.SS.R., Exaratae Crisis iuxta Principia Angelici Doctoris Instituta. Freiburg i. B. (Herder). —Fr. Lehmkuhl says towards the conclusion of his little book, Probabilismus Vindicatus (p. 126): "What I have said more often I now repeat: I recognize only a slight theoretical difference, and either no practical difference or scarcely any, between moderate or equiprobabilism and probabilism."

"In obscure matters the certainly more likely side, or the more probable side known and judged as such, is to be followed in favor of the law." However, if the opinions for and against the existence of a law have equal or nearly equal probability, and there is consequently a state of real doubt, it is permissible to follow the less safe opinion. Hence the axiom, "Lex stricte dubia non obligat. In other words, when there is doubt as to the existence of a law, liberty is in possession. When there is doubt in regard to the cessation of a law, the law remains in possession. Consequently, whereas simple Probabilism teaches that a man may always follow the opinion favoring liberty, if that opinion is based on good and solid grounds (opinio vere ac solide probabilis), even though he knows that the opposite opinion is more probable, Æquiprobabilism maintains that the less safe opinion may be followed only when it is quite or nearly as probable (aeque aut fere aeque probabilis) as its opposite, and only when there is question of an obligation arising, not ceasing.

/Equiprobabilism is regarded by some as an advance over simple Probabilism, in so far as it sets up a practical instead of a purely logical probability. ⁴⁵ The extrinsic reasons in favor of Æquiprobabilism are summed up by Archbishop Simar as follows: "This theory is the fruit of long scientific debates and has in its favor the presumption that, by dint of logical development, it is the golden mean between the two conflicting extremes of absolute Probabilism and Tutiorism. The followers of St. Alphonsus may point to the official declaration of the Church that, unlike Tutiorism and several forms of Probabilism, his teaching has never been censured. To these advantages must be added the great personal authority of the Saint, which deserves to be the more highly regarded because the problem in question was for him a vital one, which he investigated with the utmost conscientiousness and zeal, and also for the further reason that the conviction at which he finally arrived has stood the test of pastoral experience and triumphantly resisted innumerable attacks." ⁴⁶ The most prominent representatives of Æquiprobabilism are the Jesuits Christopher Rassler (+ about 1730) and Antony Mayr († 1749), Eusebius Amort of the Canons Regular of St. Augustine († 1775),⁴⁷ St. Alphonsus de' Liguori, founder of the Redemptorist Order,⁴⁸ Bishop Martin of Paderborn, Archbishop Simar of Cologne, and the moral theologians of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer.48a

It is unjust to charge that Probabilism and the allied systems permit man to act on the strength of a mere opinion and thus dispense him from the duty of regulating his life in accordance with the dictates of conscience, which must be the highest rule and measure of all morality. Probabilism, Probabiliorism, and Æquiprobabilism were all devised for the express purpose of enabling man to follow the voice of conscience in doubtful cases.⁴⁹ So far from undermining morality, these systems, as a whole, deserve great credit for having safeguarded the important principle of liberty against the attacks and snares of the Jansenists, Rigorists, and Talmudists.

⁴⁵ Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., I, n. 58: "For acting lawfully probability alone does not suffice, but moral certainty concerning the uprightness of the action is required." —Cfr. op. cit., I, 54: "If the opinion which stands for the law appears certainly more probable, we are bound altogether to follow it and cannot then embrace the opposite opinion which stands for liberty. The reason is that, in order to act lawfully, we must seek and follow the truth in doubtful matters; but where the truth cannot be clearly found, we are bound to embrace at least that opinion which approaches nearer to the truth, such as the more probable opinion." (Ed. Gaude, I, 25). —Cfr. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz' XI, pp. 8 sqq.

⁴⁶ Th. H. Simar, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, 3rd ed., p. 143. — The translator of this work thinks it but fair to note, however, that Lehmkuhl and others hold that St. Alphonsus never held Aequiprobabilistic principles. Lehmkuhl (Theol. Mor., ed. 11a, Vol. I, p. 118) illustrates the difference between the Saint's teaching and that of the Aequiprobabilists as follows: EQUIPROBABILISM says: With probability alone that a law exists, an obligation does not exist. With probability alone that a law has ceased, the obligation has not ceased. ST. ALPHONSUS says: With probability alone that a law exists, an obligation does not exist; with probability alone that a law has ceased, the obligation has ceased. —For an able defense of the Probabilist position see the same author's Probabilismus Vindicatus, Freiburg 1906.

⁴⁷ Cfr. Ter Haar, De Systemate Mor., pp. 20 sqq., 52 sqq. —On Amort, see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. I, pp. 434 sq. He was one of the foremost theologians of the 18th century. (Thos. J. Shahan, Cath. Encycl., Vol. I, p. 434). 48a See L. Wouters, C.SS.R., De Systemate Morali Dissertatio, new edition, "ad novum ius accommodata," Wittem (Holland), 1918.

⁴⁸ Æquiprobabilism "gained vigor and persistence from the teaching of St. Alphonsus, who began his theological career as a Probabiliorist, subsequently defended Probabilism, ... and finally, about 1762, embraced Æquiprobabilism. In a new dissertation he laid down the two propositions that it is lawful to act on the less safe opinion, when it is equally probable with the safe opinion, and that it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion when the safe opinion is notably and certainly more probable. In the sixth edition (1767) of his 'Moral Theology' he again expressed these views, and indeed towards the end of his life frequently declared that he was not a Probabilist." (Cath. Encyc., Vol. XII, pp. 442 sq.; cfr. Irish Theol. Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 24). —On the systema compensationis seu rationis sufficientis, which d'Annibale ascribes to Potton, O. P., and which has been latterly espoused by Prummer and some French moralists, see Vermeersch, Theol. Mor., I, pp. 306 and 313; K. Neuner, O. Cap., in the Kath. Kirchenstg. of Salzburg, 1924, No. 26.

⁴⁹ Cfr. Joseph Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, pp. 69 sqq.; A. Meyenberg, Die kath. Moral, 2nd ed., pp. 161 sqq.; Ter Haar, Vcn. Innoc. XL de Probabilismo Decrcti Histona, Rome 1904, pp. 126 sqq.

READINGS. —On the moral systems in general: K. Werner, System der Ethik, Vol. I, pp. 430 sqq. —W. Wilmers, S.J., Lehrbuch der Religion (ed. Lehmkuhl), 6th ed., pp. 537 sqq. —F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 114 sqq. —F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., pp. 168 sqq. —Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 68 sqq. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 441 sqq. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 478 sq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, Tournai 1905, pp. 213 sqq. —C. Gaudé, C.SS.R., De Morali Systemate S. Alphonsi, Rome 1894.

On Probabilism: F. Ter Haar, De Systemate Morali Antiquerum Probabilistarum Dissertatio Historic o-Critica, Paderborn 1894, pp. 77 sqq. —P. F. Mandonnet, O.P., Le Décret d' Innocent XI contre le Probabilisme, Paris 1903, pp. 99 sqq. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Probabilismus Vindicatus, Freiburg 1906, pp. 16 sqq. —L. Wouters, C.SS.R., De Minus probabilismo, Amsterdam, 2nd ed., 1908, pp. 17 sqq. —J. L. Jansen, Geschichte und Kritik im Dienste der "Minus probabilis," Paderborn 1906, pp. 14 sqq. —F. Mentré, Courot et la Renaissance du Probabilisme au XIXe Siècle, Paris 1908. —Chr. Lupus, Dissertatio de Antiquitate, Auctoritate et Legitimo Usu Sententiae Probabilis (Opera Omnia, XI, Venice 1729). —Dinneen, De Probabilismo Dissertatio, Dublin 1898. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 443 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, Moral Philosophy, pp. 152 sqq. —W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 215 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 303 sqq.

On Probabiliorism: Thyrsus Gonzalez, Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis, i. e. Tractatus Theologicus de Recto Usu Opinionum, Rome 1694. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 442 sq. —J. Biederlack, S.J., in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1890, pp. 186 sqq. —L. Wedff, "S. Alphonse est-il Probabilioriste?" in the Revue Thomiste, Paris 1904, pp. 129 sqq., 477 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, pp. 220 sqq.

On Æquiprobabilism: Vindiciae Alphonsianae seu Doctoris Ecclesiae S. Alphonsi de Ligorio Doctrina Moralis Vindicata a Plurimis Oppugnatoribus A. P. Ballerini cura et studio quorundam Theologorum e Congregatione SS. Redemptoris, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Bruxelles 1874. —J. De Caigny, C.SS.R., Apologetica de Æquiprobabilismo Alphonsiano, Tournai 1894. —G. Arendt, S.J., Apologeticae de Æquiprobabilismo Alphonsiano Historico-Philosophicae Dissertationis a R. P. J. de Caigny Exaratae Crisis iuxta Principia Angelici Doctoris, Freiburg 1897, pp. 65 sqq. —IDEM, Æquiprobabilismus ab Ultimo Fundamento Discussus, Rome 1909. —Vindiciae Ballerinianae seu Gustus Recognitionis Vindiciarum Alphonsianarum. Insunt Dissertationes Ballerini de Systemate S. Alphonsi et Altera Dissertatio de Probabilismo et Æquiprobabilismo eiusdem, Bruges 1873. —A. Ballerini, S.J., Opus Theologiae Moralis (ed. Palmieri), Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 606 sqq. —Le Bachelet, La Question Ligorienne, Paris 1899, pp. 25 sqq. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, p. 445. —Berthe-Castle, C.SS.R., Life of St. Alphonsus de' Liguori, Dublin 1905. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, pp. 223 sqq. —Sabetti-Barrett, S.J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 27th ed., New York 1919, pp. 163 sqq.

— The ineluctable necessity of a moral system. When, after a congruent investigation, the conclusion concerning the honesty of a future action or omission remains uncertain (we are solicitous in moral theology about this respect alone), by an ineluctable necessity the question is imposed upon us to be solved: by what certain practical judgment will our action be ruled? By a judgment, I say, practically certain, since a practically doubtful conscience cannot rule a human action, as we have seen, n. 346.

In vain would we try to decline that necessity. As vainly as if we wished to obtain for ourselves direct certainty concerning every matter.

Moreover practical certainty, which directly is lacking, will not be able to be obtained except indirectly, by appealing to some universal principle as the major of a syllogism, and by composing it with the speculatively doubtful judgment of conscience, and finally by collecting the syllogistic conclusion: Therefore I shall have to abstain from that action, or I can safely do it.

Let us suppose the principle of tutiorism, today to be deserted by all: The safer opinion must always be chosen. With this major let this minor proposition be joined: But the honesty of such an action is only probable, and therefore the opinion forbidding it is safer; this conclusion will follow: Therefore I must certainly abstain from this action.

In this way, where direct certainty was lacking, we obtain for ourselves reflex certainty, on account of which the very principles by which it is obtained are called reflex principles. But which principles are to be so called has come into controversy. And moral systems are called the diverse ways proposed in order that we may arrive from a speculatively doubtful judgment at a certain dictate concerning the honesty of an action. The name was perhaps given from this, that those opinions dominate the whole discipline of morals.

— Various moral systems. I. Rigorists, or antiprobabilists, or tutiorists, condemned every action unless its honesty was demonstrated to be at least most probable. Thus the milder ones opined, such as Fagnani and Habert, who wrote after Alexander VIII, on 7 Dec. 1690, among the propositions condemned and prohibited respectively as rash, scandalous, ill-sounding, injurious, proximate to heresy, savoring of heresy, erroneous, schismatic, and heretical, reproved this third proposition of the Baianists and Jansenists: "It is not permitted to follow a (probable) opinion, or among probable opinions the most probable" (Denz. n. 1293). Before, the stricter ones required an action certainly licit according to itself. The reason of the system was taken from the moral obligation, which they imagined, of avoiding every danger even of material transgression of the law. That system now has no Catholic defenders ¹.

II. Probabiliorists contend that the safer opinion must be followed, unless the speculative liceity of the action is manifestly and solidly more probable. They too argue from the necessity of avoiding the danger of violation of law even when not conscious. Yet they temper this principle of rigorism by this other reason: that an opinion certainly more probable is morally certain, because contrary probabilities mutually destroy one another, so that only the excess remains as a positive motive for deciding. They also call upon this reason: that it is consonant with the law of our intellect that, when evidence is lacking, we embrace that which is more like the truth. Billuart ² and the more recent school of the Friars Preachers defend probabiliorism; nevertheless several of our contemporaries of the same Order recede from it.

III. Equiprobabilists, who sometimes call themselves moderate probabilists, besides the use of a certainly more probable opinion, which they always concede, also allow, where the question is not about the cessation of a law or obligation but about its first existence or about the beginning of the obligation, the use of an equally probable opinion ³. They themselves rely upon the mutual destruction of contrary probabilities; but, when the probabilities are morally equal so that no positive reason, according to them, remains, then they say that the principle of possession must be used, so that you answer for the law or for liberty according as the law or liberty possesses. But the law is in possession when there is question of the cessation of the law, and by no means when there is question of its beginning. They add also that it is consonant with natural equity that, with equal balance, sometimes answer be made for law, sometimes for liberty ¹. The Fathers of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, Simar, C. d'Annibale, and some Fathers of the Order of Preachers defend equiprobabilism.

IV. The system of compensation or of sufficient reason, whose origin is ascribed by C. d'Annibale ² to Father Potton ³, O. Pr., does not permit the use of the principle, A doubtful law does not oblige, simply, but only then when a cause excusing from the obligation of the law is proportioned to the gravity and probability of the law: the more probable and the graver the law is, the greater cause is required in order that you may permit the danger of material transgression; that danger is an evil which can be permitted on account of a proportionate good effect, but not otherwise. Or otherwise: to a certain law corresponds a perfect obligation, but to an uncertain law an imperfect obligation, which is ended or terminated by the gravity of the motive for acting. Many in France adhere to this more recent system; R. P. Prummer, O. Pr., Manuale Theologiae moralis, I, nn. 351. 352, also favors it.

V. Pure or absolute probabilists affirm that an action is practically safe whose liceity, all things weighed, is demonstrated as solidly probable speculatively. By adversaries they are sometimes called broad, laxer, and more recently "minus-probabilists." Thus the Order of Friars Minor, thus formerly many Friars Preachers, thus now writers of the Society of Jesus.

There were those who, moved by excessive benignity or rashness, proposed opinions doubtfully, slenderly probable as practically safe. These have the name of laxists.

Yet no one professes laxism; but the Holy See, by proscribing these two propositions, proved herself alien from sayings which provide an occasion of laxity. They are: prop. 27, condemned (at minimum as scandalous) by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665: "If the book is of some younger and modern author, the opinion must be judged probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable" (Denz. n. 1127); prop. 3, by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679: "Generally, while relying on probability whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not go beyond the limits of probability, we always act prudently" (Denz. n. 1153).

Today most writers or professors in Belgium, France, Spain, and Italy teach simple probabilism, which Harnack in his Dogmengeschichte ¹ attacks sharply but ineptly: ineptly, I say, because the learned man did not even grasp the signification of the words in this matter.

The Friars Preachers have not formally deserted probabiliorism. But since, after the solemn approvals of the Holy See given to St. Alphonsus, that cause can be called desperate, they began to favor the equiprobabilists sufficiently, as is clear from the essays which appeared in the Revue Thomiste. Indeed, in his work La phil. morale de S. Thomas, R. P. Sertillanges simply rejects probabiliorism, and in c. XVI concludes in these words: "Equiprobabilism well understood can therefore pass by good right for a Thomistic solution."

We shall not discuss the very mind of St. Alphonsus. Several writers of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, v.g., Aertnys, though not all, admit that he, after he had used probabiliorist teachers, through part of his life gave his vote to pure probabilism; and indeed, at the very mature age of 53 and 59 years (1749 and 1755), he wrote two dissertations in which he very openly and with many arguments defended simple probabilism. Then there were those difficulties of the times which seemed to advise verbal changes of the system, less clear formulas; but the Holy Doctor himself was of such humility that by the very attacks he could have been led to temper or soften his opinion.

Wherefore C. d'Annibale, I, n. 263, note 10, seems to us to have better followed the mind of the Holy Doctor, where he writes that moderate probabilism, such as Suarez, Lessius, Laymann, Bonacina... de Lugo defended, whose doctrine for the Holy Doctor (§ 4, n. II) "how great it is, is perfect from every side," was never attacked by St. Alphonsus. "And the things which afterward he wrote and discussed for defending equiprobabilism, from the years 1748 and 1755 (V. § 11) up to the end of his life, those were written chiefly to defend moderate probabilism against broad probabilism"; - and likewise R. P. Aertnys, C.SS.R., De Conscientia, n. 94: "In his first dissertations St. Alphonsus strenuously defended against the Probabiliorists the thesis of Probabilism, 'It is permitted to follow a probable opinion for liberty, the more probable for law having been left aside.' From this opinion the Holy Doctor never receded; but, to avert from probabilism the danger of laxity, afterward he judged that this moderation should be added as part of his system: 'It is not permitted to follow the benign opinion, when the opinion for law is certainly and notably more probable,' because an opinion of this sort is already, as we have declared, morally certain, and the other is not truly and solidly probable but only doubtful or slight... That the distinction between an opinion a little more probable and much more probable must be ascribed to that motive which we brought forward above, St. Alphonsus clearly sets forth in his Apologia of the year 1765 in these words: 'I have never contended nor do I now contend to establish new systems; I know well that no Probabilist of solid doctrine holds as licit the use of an opinion slenderly or doubtfully probable. But because many Probabilists indiscriminately say that it is permitted to follow the less probable opinion when it has some foundation from reason or from authority, therefore I wished to distinguish, saying that it is illicit to follow the less safe opinion when there is much and certain preponderance on the side of the safer opinion; ... because then the less safe opinion cannot be called certainly probable' ¹. Therefore he distinguished with this counsel, that he might define the limits of certain probability and of moral certainty, and in that way preclude the use of opinions which are not true and solidly probable... From all these things I infer that Probabilism thus moderated, rather than accepted in the laxer sense, must be called common." Cf. more in d'Ales, Dictionnaire d'Apologetique, word Probabilisme, where a historical inquiry will be found, written by Fr. de Blic, S.J.

Finally this must be observed: approved writers of various schools today disagree less materially than formally. Thus C. d'Annibale proclaims safe in conscience the use of pure probabilism. Thus, from the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, Aertnys (l.c. n. 94. 95) professes that practically he thinks with several writers of the Society; but Marc, of the same Congregation, declares himself by no means hostile to the moderate probabilists of the Society (he calls such Suarez, Vasquez, Lessius, Laymann, Lugo) ¹. And R. P. Sertillanges, of the Friars Preachers, while he recently wrote these things: "Supported by this, that action cannot attain evidence; that prudence is preserved at a lesser price; that the criterion of the obscure is the probable; and that Providence, having cast us into the probable, must be content with it on our part, arguing thus, explicitly or implicitly, the mind finds it good to adhere to the opinion called prudent; the will follows, and finally determines adhesion" (2); while, I say, he was writing these things, what was he doing except repeating that celebrated saying of the probabilists, "He who acts probably acts prudently"? But they added that it suffices for honesty that we act prudently.

On their own part, however, the Wirceburgenses were already writing, De actibus humanis, n. 240: "Scarcely any prudent theologian will affirm his opinion to be manifestly and notably more probable, as long as he recognizes the opposite as truly and theologically probable; but if it ceases to be such, the question also ceases." Hence, although theoretically, or in the abstract, it is true that the solid probability of one part is not excluded by the greater probability, even in a notable degree, of the opposite part, nevertheless, psychologically, perhaps these two things will not be affirmed at the same time.

Wherefore we think that today, among approved theologians, scarcely anyone is found who would oppose this formula of conclusion: Whenever the question is immediately about the liceity of our action alone, he acts safely who embraces a solidly probable opinion. If in this way we practically agree, then also more easily, according to sound principles of philosophy, the concord of theologians, which Jansenism destroyed, now that this plague has been routed, will be restored.

¹ He finds a non-Catholic one in Habsack; cf. below here. Some in France and Germany (v.g., those who taught at the University of Tubingen), having repudiated any moral system, proposed to solve all cases by direct reason. These then either must be rigorists, or, for one moral system, invent as many systems as there are diverse ways by which they think they can arrive at certain moral conclusions.

² Dissertation VI, De actibus humanis.

³ I probably recited the breviary, probably not: since I was certainly obliged, I am still bound by recitation. Midnight has probably passed; probably not. If between Thursday and Friday, I can eat meat, because the doubt is about the beginning of the obligation; I cannot, if the doubt arises between Friday and Saturday, since the matter is about the cessation of the obligation. One doubting concerning his age of 21 years is not bound to fast; one doubting concerning the age of 60 years is bound.

¹ Thus d'Annib. I, 201. - (2) Cf. d'Annib. I, 263, note 1.

³ De Theoria Probabilitatis, Paris, 1874.

¹ Tom. III, 1910, pp. 748-756.

¹ Vindiciae Alphonsianae, I, 60.

¹ Institutiones morales I, 864.

² La philosophie morale de S. Thomas, c. 16, III, p. 549.

85. STATE OF THE QUESTION. 1. By a moral system is understood a complex of rules by which moral controversies, arising from probable opinions, are settled in practice.

2. The end of a moral system is to indicate how, in practice, one arrives at a morally certain conscience, so that each one may act safely.

3. The matter of a moral system is only those doubts in which the matter concerns the honesty of an action, as we said above.

4. Five moral systems chiefly are numbered, devised by authors, namely: 1. rigorism (or tutiorism); 2. probabiliorism; 3. equiprobabilism; 4. probabilism; 5. laxism. To these in our times has been added the system of compensation.⁴

86. 1. Rigorists are called those who admit reflex principles in no way, or only in a merely secondary way. They are also called anti-probabilists, because they reject every use of probability properly so called in a moral matter; and tutiorists, because they teach that in doubt the safer part is always to be followed.⁵ But they are divided, according to the grades of direct certitude which they require in order to act lawfully, into strict rigorists and mild rigorists.

a) The stricter rigorists require direct absolute certitude in order to act lawfully. Their dictum is: safer or certain.

Thus Sinnichius, Wendrochius, etc. This system was condemned through the following proposition proscribed by Alexander VII (the 3rd): "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, or even the most probable among probable opinions." Therefore at least a most probable opinion in favor of liberty is lawful, even if, by its nature, it does not go out from the limits of probability. The reason is that the opposite opinion rests on only a slight moment, on account of which natural right forbids liberty to be despoiled of its own right (cf. n. 40, rule 3).

Add that rigorism is: 1. alien to the evangelical spirit: for how could the yoke of Christ be called sweet, and his burden light, if we were bound always to follow the safer things? 2. contrary to the doctrine of the holy Fathers, as is clear from their testimonies, which St. Alphonsus reports; 3. very pernicious in practice: for it imposes an intolerable burden, increases sins, ensnares consciences, generates desperation, and builds unto gehenna (I, 60, 66, 82 ff.).

b) The milder rigorists teach that direct certitude is required in order to act lawfully, not indeed absolute certitude, but broad or moral certitude. These indeed permit the use of the most probable opinion, not because it is lawful to use a probable opinion, but because, in moral matters, a most probable opinion furnishes some broad certitude (H. Ap., I, 33). Their dictum is: safer or most probable.

Thus Fagnanus, Habert, etc. This system indeed has not been condemned, but we do not admit it. Cf. below the first Thesis (n. 91).

2. Probabiliorists teach that the safer opinion must be held, unless the opinion for liberty is manifestly and solidly more probable. Their dictum is: Safer or more probable.

Thus Billuart, Wigandt, and, among more recent authors, Pegues and others from the Order of St. Dominic. And the reason is that it is not lawful, they say, to incur a grave and founded danger of transgressing the law; which danger, they say, always threatens unless the opinion which stands for liberty is at least more probable than the other. But if the opinion which stands for liberty is truly more probable, they contend that there is only a slight danger of acting against the law, which danger can prudently be disregarded (Billuart, de act. hum., Diss. VI). Against them likewise Thesis 1 will be established.

3. Equiprobabilists teach that in the concurrence of two opinions equally or almost equally probable (of which one favors liberty, the other law), while the doubt stands concerning the existence of the law, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty; but while the doubt stands concerning the cessation of the law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed. Outside the limits of this broad equiprobability, the uniquely probable or certainly more probable opinion prevails, whether this opinion supports the law or liberty. Their dictum is: The opinion for which possession stands, provided that it is equally or almost equally probable.

Thus, after several older authors, St. Alphonsus and his disciples, Aertnys, Konings, and others from diverse schools, such as Gousset, Scavini, Del Vecchio, Muller, Martin, Pruner, Simar, Berardi, Sweens, Farges, Beaudouin, Beijsens, Valensise, Koch, etc. Their reason is that in the concurrence of equiprobable opinions we are involved in strict doubt; but a strictly doubtful law does not oblige, and in an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better. More concerning this system at n. 88 ff.

4. Probabilists (in general) teach that in the concurrence of a probable or more probable opinion which stands for the law, it is permitted to follow a probable opinion favoring liberty, provided that this opinion is truly probable. The dictum of the probabilists is: The more benign, provided that it is truly probable. Their reason is that it is not lawful to impose an obligation concerning which there is no certain evidence; now, there is no certain evidence concerning the law where the opinion for liberty is truly probable; therefore.

Bartholomew Medina, O.P. (1.2, q. 19, a. 6, Commentary on St. Thomas), was the first who, in the year 1577, published this opinion: "If an opinion is probable, it is lawful to follow it, although the opposite is more probable."⁶

This system is not sufficiently defined, nor is it circumscribed by certain limits. For, as it is commonly circulated: 1. it does not define whether an opinion favoring liberty ought to be relatively probable, or whether it suffices that it be absolutely probable; 2. while it grants the use of a less probable opinion, with the safer and even more probable one left aside, it does not define whether this has force concerning one a little more probable, or concerning one notably more probable. And this obscurity indeed is the cause why probabilists have entered upon a diverse way.

Some, teaching that it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion which favors liberty, understand solidly probable relatively, and therefore with only a probable, or a little more probable, opinion which stands for the law left aside. These agree in substantial matters with the equiprobabilists, and can be called moderate probabilists. Such are Suarez,⁷ Vasquez, Lugo, Lessius, Laymann, Sylvius, Palaus, Viva, Abelly, Reuter, Voit, etc. We shall not act against these when we are about to attack probabilism. Yet we note that this moderate probabilism, since it carries before itself some ambiguity, by not determining sufficiently the less probable opinion, does not sufficiently guard against abuses, as St. Alphonsus has already complained.⁸

But there are others, probabilists, who hold as sufficiently probable every opinion absolutely and in itself probable, without caring at all about relative probability; they also deny that the use of a probable opinion is to be confined within the limits of equiprobabilism, and therefore that an opinion becomes unlawful to which another certainly or evidently more probable opinion is opposed. Thus expressly Lacroix,⁹ Illsung,¹⁰ etc., whose doctrine comes under the name of absolute or common or pure, broad probabilism.

Finally, among probabilists, some reject the principle of possession, or do not admit it in the same circumstances as St. Alphonsus.¹¹

Now, just as probabiliorism is more rigid than is just, so absolute probabilism seems to be more benign than is right. The disadvantages under which it labors will be indicated below, where its refutation is treated (Theses II and III).

Note. Ter Haar treats at length the various kinds of the older probabilists (op. cit., p. 20-85). If we consider the mind of more recent probabilists, some (for example, Lehmkuhl) are to be numbered with the moderate probabilists, others (for example, Raphael a St. Joseph, Meffert, Ballerini) rather with the broad probabilists. It is especially to be lamented that several recent authors sometimes use more general and even rather obscure words, by which they seem now to approach absolute probabilism, now to recede from it. See examples in Vind. Alph., I, p. 480 ff.

5. Laxists taught that it is permitted to follow any opinions whatever, even slightly probable ones. Their dictum is: The more benign, provided that it is probable in some way. Thus Caramuel, the prince of the laxists, Diana, and others.¹²

This other extreme was condemned by Innocent XI in the 3rd proposition, which said: "Generally, while relying on probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided that one does not go outside the limits of probability, we always act prudently when we do something." This proposition was excerpted to the letter from Tamburini (Dec., I, c. 3, § 3, n. 3). But deservedly was it condemned: for slight probability cannot be called true probability, just as slight fortitude or slight skill cannot be called true fortitude and true skill, but ought rather to be called weakness and lack of skill (H. Ap., I, 30).

To these things is added that "that lax manner of opining is alien to the evangelical simplicity and the doctrine of the holy Fathers; if the faithful were to follow it in practice as a right rule, an immense corruption of Christian life would creep in." Thus Pope Alexander VII, in the decree issued on September 24, 1665.

6. The system of compensation, which certain more recent authors defend (Manier, Lehu, Potton, Boisdron), states the general principle: Every law always obliges to some extent; but its force of obliging increases or decreases according to the degree of knowledge which we have concerning it. A law perfectly known obliges fully; wholly unknown, it does not bind; but imperfectly known, it binds imperfectly. But in order that, while a law imperfectly known stands, we may enjoy liberty, there is required on our part, as an excusing reason, a relatively grave inconvenience, by which the wound is compensated that we, by using our liberty, probably inflict on the law and on the moral order. The reason for this system is that the merely material transgression of a law is already a certain evil; for through this we inflict a wound on the law or moral order, because the law is frustrated in its end intended by the Legislator.

This system is not pleasing. The reasons are: a) because, as we shall say below (n. 91), it supposes that law obliges antecedently to promulgation: which smells of probabiliorism, indeed even of tutiorism. b) Moreover, the rule handed down by those theologians seems very difficult, and in practice there will scarcely be place for it. For the inconvenience attached to the observance of the law will often be different for individual persons, indeed also for individual cases. Thus, for example, the gravity of the inconvenience in confessing a doubtful sin will be different both according to the different character of each penitent, and according to the nature of the sin to be accused, and often also according to the different character of the confessor before whom the accusation must be made. Hence that rule, on the one hand, furnishes occasion for many anxieties; but on the other hand, frequently exposes one to the illusions of self-love; and therefore it cannot be a prudent practical norm in resolving doubts. c) Finally, the foundation of this system is also preserved in our system of equiprobabilism, insofar as the number of laws which are prescribed to be observed in practice is most closely equated with the number of materially existing laws, and therefore the end of all laws in the universe is attained in the best way in which it can be attained.

Note. Cardinal D'Annibale (Summ., I, 270) judged that the rule for the solution of doubts was to be drawn solely from possession. If this system is well understood and accommodated to practice, it rather approaches the system of St. Alphonsus. For the Holy Doctor (cf. Gaude's Dissertation de mor. syst. S. Alph., n. 26) calls the principle of possession supreme, most universal.

87. Therefore, with the stricter rigorism and laxism excepted, the remaining systems can be sustained without the condemnation of the Church. Among these, equiprobabilism holds the middle way, of which St. Alphonsus is the distinguished defender (Vind. Alph., P. I, c. 3, Apologetic Dissertation, 143).

Historical question. That equiprobabilism is the genuine system of St. Alphonsus, which he definitively embraced at least from the year 1762, the Vindiciae Alphonsianae (I, p. 1-150), Gaude (de mor. syst. S. Alph.), Wouters (de Minusprobab., ed. 2, p. 49), and many others clearly prove.

1. Before the year 1762, in two dissertations which he inscribed FOR THE MODERATE USE OF PROBABLE OPINION IN THE CONCURRENCE OF A MORE PROBABLE ONE, and of which he published one in the year 1749 and the other in 1755, he supported simple probabilism. But truly, as is evident from his various writings, these dissertations, published without the name of the Holy Author, were nothing except certain trials, certain preludes, or preliminary contests concerning a most grave question. For before the year 1762 (let this be well noted), in all and each of the editions of his Moral Theology, indeed also in other works of lesser moment which he brought into the light under his own name, he constantly asserted that he was prescinding from that thesis: Whether it is lawful to follow the less probable, with the more probable left aside. Indeed, in various works of this time there appears so much the constant inquiry of the Holy Doctor into the safe way, that it is not difficult (so the Collationes Brugenses) to find support in them for various systems.

2. After the year 1762, once the brief Dissertation, in the Italian language, de usu moderato opin. probab., had been published, St. Alphonsus cast away his former hesitation, and constantly held those opinions which we shall set forth below. Much erudition and usefulness are brought, in relation to this question, by a comparison of the propositions of each edition of the Moral Work. Cf., on this matter, the preface of Father Gaude (I, p. xix), and especially the cited little work of the same author.

3. Although the system established by the Holy Doctor was received everywhere with great praise (cf. Berthe, Vita di S. Alfonso, II, p. 165), nevertheless the Saint himself never had an end of perfecting his work, so that he receded ever more from absolute probabilism, and found the middle way between probabilism and probabiliorism. Thence it came about that he made public his celebrated Monitum (1773) and the golden little work, Dichiarazione del sistema (1774). When these had been added to the eighth edition of the Moral Work, and the probabilistic dissertation of Father Zacharia, S.J. (cf. n. 6), had also been expunged, St. Alphonsus could exclaim: "Joyful now I shall die, because this last edition, the work complete in all respects, has come into the light" (cf. Gaude, de mor. syst., p. 38).

All these things, after the letters of the Holy Doctor were published and the excellent works of Father Gaude, lie open so clearly to theologians (even if, by reason of the controversy occasioned by Father Ballerini's dissertation on the moral system of St. Alphonsus, held in the Roman College in 1863, they remained doubtful for a while), that now "they think it must be acknowledged, nor can it be denied, that St. Alphonsus, at least from the year 1762, was an equiprobabilist and rejected common probabilism." "In vain," they say, "do the very writers of the Collationes Brugenses (1906, p. 400) assert that the older St. Alphonsus taught equiprobabilism... whence the genuine and definitive opinion of the Holy Doctor is not to be sought in writings from 1762 and earlier, as the new probabilists did and do. Thus Lehmkuhl is not free from this error in the little work Probabilismus vindicatus." To these sayings consent, besides the alumni of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, very many distinguished theologians, such as Bellesheim (Katholik, 1891, II, p. 245), who thus speaks: "The texts are thus clearer than the midday light, so weighty, that an opponent must be silent: St. Alphonsus truly taught equiprobabilism." The same testify Schneider (Liter. Rundschau, 1895, col. 202), Koch (Tubing. Quart. Schr., 1897, p. 70-126), Mausbach (Die kath. Moral, p. 181), Berardi (Theol. fund., 1905, I, n. 55), Tanquerey (I, n. 405), Sweens (Theol. mor., 688).

Finally let Genicot-Salsmans be heard, who in the last edition of Theol. mor. (1912) has these things: "In reality St. Alphonsus seems in his last works to have openly taught equiprobabilism, at least if we attribute to the words which he uses their native sense" (de Consc., n. 81-72). Cf. Wouters, de Minusprobab., p. 56.

Since these things are so, with the Collationes Brugenses we note that several probabilists do not always act critically when they at once recur to the probabilistic dissertations of the years 1749 and 1755. For in his letters the Holy Doctor clearly acknowledges that he made a retraction concerning common probabilism, which he previously professed, and this indeed, as he says, not for the sake of avoiding difficulty or persecution, but for the sake of conviction and conscience. Corresp. gen., n. 818 and Corresp. spec., n. 315.

Hence the defender of St. Alphonsus for the Concession of the title Doctor asserts without hesitation: "The Holy Author, from the year 1762, defended the system of EQUIPROBABILISM so openly, clearly, and constantly, that every reasonable doubt about this matter is excluded: which also the most ample Censor (that is, the Promoter of the Faith) concedes" (Act. Doct. animad., § 25, Resp. n. 239).

But this is not the place to dwell longer on the question of fact. It is better to approach the question of right, and to demonstrate that the rules handed down by St. Alphonsus concerning the manner of resolving practical doubt are true.

On The Various Moral Systems.⁹³

⁹³ Almost innumerable books have been written on this matter from three centuries ago. Among authors of our time there seem to stand out Lehmkuhl, Probabilismus vindicatus (1906), Wouters, De Minusprobabilismo 3 (1918), Mandonnet, Le Decret d'Innocent XI contre le probabilisme (1903); Thom. Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fundamentalis (ed. 3, 1903) n. 296-317.

337. Notion. By the name of moral system is understood a method of indirectly obtaining practical moral certitude in practical doubt. For since in human life so many diverse cases occur, and since very often a man remains uncertain what must be done by him, lest he commit sin, hence from about the end of the sixteenth century diverse norms were devised for solving practical doubts. Thence were invented, or rather proclaimed, those reflex principles about which there was discussion in n. 332 sqq. Both the Holy Fathers and the older Scholastics defended no fixed moral system, but solved individual practical questions according to the maxim adduced above: "In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands"; or: "In doubts the safer part is to be chosen." Worthy of special mention is St. Thomas, who did not solve the controversy, then much agitated, whether one cleric can have several benefices, by recurring to the principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," but to the conscience of each benefice-holder and to the particular circumstances. Hence the Angelic Doctor concludes that it is licit to have several prebends, if the benefice-holder has a right intention and sufficiently satisfies the diverse offices.⁹⁴ - The first who thought out some moral system, and indeed the system of Probabilism, was Barth. Medina, O. Pr., a Spaniard, who in the year 1577, against the arguments brought forward by Soto, Cajetan, etc., writes these things: "It seems to me that, if an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable."⁹⁵ He himself acknowledges, however, that the ancient doctors taught otherwise. Behold his words: "The most learned Soto explains this rather difficult question (De iustitia l. 3, q. 6) in this way: for he says that, although in speculative matters and in the academy it is sometimes licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, nevertheless in moral matters and in things which pertain to the right of a third party, it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside. Sylvester thinks the same (under the word 'Opinion,' c. 2), Conrad (in the book De contract. q. ult.), and, what moves more, Lord Cajetan in his Summa (under the word 'Opinion')." - But the words of Cajetan in the cited place are these: "In things to be done, unless by choosing the safer part, it is not licit to take the opinion of anyone as the rule of action, since by the very fact that the operation to be regulated is committed to opinion, it is committed to an ambiguous rule, because every opinion is ambiguous, as being with fear of the other part. And because it is presupposed that the safer part is not chosen, it follows that the operation is committed to an ambiguous rule with respect to the case of sin, and by this very fact is exposed to the danger of sinning, which it is clear is illicit. And if there is question of mortal sin, it is clear that it is a mortal sin: knowingly to do an operation doubtful whether it is mortal; since such a one acting prefers to fulfill his will in such a work, even if it is mortal, rather than to abstain from it." From these words it follows that Medina thought, and indeed rightly, that Probabilism had not previously been expressly defended, but that theologians had rather taught that in doubt the safer part must be chosen. - The following moral systems are explained as being the better known:

⁹⁴ Cf. Quodl. 8, a. 13, and 9, a. 15.

⁹⁵ In 1, 2, q. 19, a. 6 (Venice 1580, p. 178 sq.).

338. 1. Rigorism or rigid Tutiorism teaches that the safer part must always be chosen, although the opinion favoring liberty is most probable. Thus Ioan. Sinnichius, a Louvain doctor (+ 1666), in his book Saul exrex lib. 1, c. 95, n. 357, and the Jansenists. - This system was condemned by Alexander VIII, who on 7 Dec. 1690 proscribed the proposition which Sinnichius seems to defend in the cited place: "It is not licit to follow an opinion, even the most probable among the probable."⁹⁶ - And deservedly! For if certitude strictly so called were always required in order to act licitly, and it were not licit to follow a most probable opinion, human life would become truly intolerable. Against these Rigorists the words of St. Peter could be brought forward: "Now therefore why do you tempt God, to impose a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?"⁹⁷ The system of absolute Rigorism is now altogether obsolete and is now held by no one.

⁹⁶ Denz. n. 1293.

⁹⁷ Acts 15, 10.

339. 2. Mitigated Tutiorism teaches that it is licit to follow the less safe opinion favoring liberty, provided, however, that it is most probable. Thus some Louvain doctors, for example Steyart (+ 1701), Opstraet (+ 1720), and certain others, for example Henry of St. Ignatius (+ 1719), Cardinal Gerdil (+ 1802). - This system indeed has not been proscribed by the Church, but in our days it is deservedly rejected by all. For even according to it human life is made too hard, and unbearable burdens are bound upon the shoulders of the faithful, because, if a man is always bound to follow the safe opinion unless the other opinion is most probable, a way is opened to many anxieties. Besides, according to the opinion of St. Thomas and of almost all theologians, probable certitude, or certitude so called in the broad sense,⁹⁸ suffices for acting licitly. Moreover, if some opinion is manifestly more probable, it is now also morally certain, because then the reasons opposed to it are slight and therefore not to be attended to. For if truly grave reasons were opposed to this opinion, it would no longer remain manifestly more probable. Hence an opinion most probable is not always required for acting licitly.

⁹⁸ Cf. above n. 326.

340. 3. Probabiliorism teaches that it is licit to follow the less safe opinion favoring liberty, provided that it is manifestly more probable than the opinion favoring law. This system was very commonly admitted before Medina (cf. above), and was not obscurely commended by the Supreme Pontiffs Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Clement XI, Benedict XIV, as will be clear below in n. 345.

341. 4. Equiprobabilism is contained in this proposition: "In the concurrence of opposed opinions equally or almost equally probable, it is licit to follow the opinion favoring liberty whenever the doubt is about the existence of the law; but in a doubt of fact about the cessation of the law, the law continues to oblige."⁹⁹ The principal defender of this system is St. Alphonsus, who adopted it after the year 1761, although previously he taught pure Probabilism. Before St. Alphonsus this system was held by Eusebius Amort,¹⁰⁰ Rassler, Antonius Mayr, and certain others;¹⁰¹ Billuart, O. Pr. (+ 1757), already attempts to solve the arguments of the Equiprobabilists. - Besides the Redemptorists, Konings, Marc, Ter Haar, Aertnys, Wouters, and also several others adopted this system, for example Scavini, Gousset, Pruner, Muller, Simar, etc., and from the Order of Preachers Moran,¹⁰² Saralegui,¹⁰³ Beaudouin, etc.¹⁰⁴ It agrees with Probabiliorism in this, that 1. a man ought to follow an opinion certainly more probable and favoring law, and that 2. he can follow an opinion certainly more probable and favoring liberty. But it differs from Probabiliorism with respect to opinions equally or almost equally probable, in which according to Probabiliorism the law must be observed; but according to Equiprobabilism a distinction is necessary by applying the principle of possession: if there is question of a doubt about the cessation of law, the law possesses, and therefore is to be observed (so also Probabiliorism teaches); but if there is question of the existence of law, then liberty possesses, and a man is not bound to observe such a law (Probabiliorism does not admit this). The matter becomes clearer by examples: On the night of Friday someone doubts what hour it is. It is equally probable that midnight has already passed and that it has not yet arrived. According to Equiprobabilism, then it is not licit to eat meats, because the doubt is about the cessation of law and therefore the law possesses. If entirely the same case with the same circumstances occurred on the night of Thursday, it would be licit to eat meats, because then liberty possesses. Another example: He who thinks that he has probably fulfilled the obligation of a vow he has made is not freed from the obligation. The reason is that a vow certainly made is not fulfilled by a doubtful fulfillment; therefore the vow possesses. Other examples: He who probably recited the Breviary, or paid the sacramental penance, or confessed his mortal sins, is again bound to perform those acts. The reason is the same: the law possesses, and a certain law is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment. Especially with respect to the confession of sins, Equiprobabilism differs from Probabilism, which does not oblige to confession if sins are: a) doubtfully grave; b) doubtfully committed; c) doubtfully confessed. Equiprobabilism, however, demands confession if mortal sins were doubtfully confessed, because then the law of confession possesses. On the contrary, he who with equal probability thinks that he made or did not make a vow is bound to nothing; he who with equal probability thinks that he did not commit some sin, or that the sin committed was not grave, according to the strict principle of Equiprobabilism is not bound to confession, because liberty possesses. In the two last cases, however, confession is counseled.

⁹⁹ Cf. Aertnys-Damen, Theol. mor. I, n. 85.

¹⁰⁰ St. Alphonsus himself cites Eusebius Amort for his system (Breve dissertazione dell' uso moderato dell' opinione probabile 1762, apud Wouters, de Minusprobabilismo p. 50). But that St. Alphonsus taught Equiprobabilism and not pure Probabilism, at least from the year 1762, is historically certain and is manifestly drawn from the letters of the Holy Doctor; cf. below n. 347.

¹⁰¹ Cf. E. Muller, Theol. mor. l. 1, § 81; Ter Haar, De systemate morali antiquorum Probabilistarum p. 21 sqq. (Paderborn 1894).

¹⁰² Theol. mor. I, n. 128 sqq.

¹⁰³ Comm. al P. Laraga n. 96.

¹⁰⁴ Tract. de consc. (1911) p. 99, 138.

342. 5. Pure Probabilism teaches: Whenever there is present an opinion truly and certainly probable concerning the licitness of some act, it is licit to follow it, even if the opposite opinion is truly and certainly more probable and safer. But the probability of some opinion or sentence is that property of it by which, on account of the motives by which it is supported, it merits the assent of a prudent man, although with fear concerning the opposite.¹⁰⁵ This probability is divided in several ways:

a) Into internal and external. Internal probability is founded upon the very nature of the thing, its properties, causes, effects, and also upon the inconveniences of the opposite part. - External probability is taken from the authority of Doctors who hold this opinion. But such external probability is present not only if some opinion, with the Church tolerating it, is commonly or by most theologians held as probable, but also alpha) if five or six grave theologians think that opinion probable; beta) if even one Doctor of the Holy Church, such as St. Thomas, St. Alphonsus, or another altogether eminent author, such as St. Antoninus, holds it as probable. - Concerning intrinsic probability none can judge except men very learned and versed in moral matters. For often to other men not so learned in Moral Theology something seems intrinsically probable and licit which nevertheless in reality is not so; as is clear, for example, concerning craniotomy, which several held to be licit if otherwise it is not possible to come to the aid of the life of the mother. - But concerning extrinsic probability a moderately learned man can judge, if he rightly understands the state of the question and has diligently inspected the authors treating of this question.¹⁰⁶ Extrinsic probability sometimes suffices for forming a right conscience and for acting licitly. For extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic probability, since grave authors would not consider some opinion probable except on account of grave motives. Hence the Angelic Doctor says that a man of little knowledge is made more certain concerning that which he hears from some learned man than concerning that which seems to him according to his own reason.¹⁰⁷ The same is clear from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary approved by Gregory XVI on 22 July 1831: "Whether a confessor is to be disturbed who follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus in the practice of the sacred tribunal of penance for the sole reason that by the Holy Apostolic See nothing worthy of censure has been found in his works? In the negative." - Nevertheless, the authority of one author, who is not greater than every exception, does not suffice for gaining probability for some opinion. This is clear from the proposition condemned by Alexander VII: "If a book is by some junior and modern author, the opinion ought to be considered probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable."¹⁰⁸

b) Into solid, doubtful, and slight. An opinion is called solidly or certainly probable when it rests upon a firm and grave motive; it is called doubtfully probable or even probably probable when one rightly doubts concerning the solidity of its motive; it is called slightly probable when it rests upon a light consideration, and therefore cannot draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.

c) Into absolute and comparative, or relative. Some opinion is called absolutely probable when its arguments, considered separately and in themselves, that is, independently from the opposite opinion, appear grave; but it is called comparatively probable when its arguments, compared together with the arguments of the opposite opinion, retain their gravity.¹⁰⁹

Probabilism therefore teaches that it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, which retains its probability even after a comparison has been made with the opposite opinion. It is necessary to acknowledge that this system is very simple and very clear. For whenever it is established that some opinion is probable, either intrinsically or extrinsically, it is licit to follow it in practice, taking no further care about another opinion more probable or safer. Probabilism as a system was first introduced by Bartholomaeus Medina, O. Pr.¹¹⁰ Very many theologians favor Probabilism, both ancient and especially modern, whom it would be long to cite here all together. Thus, for example, from the Order of Preachers are cited: Ludovicus Lopez (+ 1596), Dominicus Bannez (+ 1604), Ioannes a S. Thoma (+ 1644), Bartholomaeus Ledesma (+ 1604), etc.; from the Order of Franciscans: Reiffenstuel (+ 1703), Sporer (+ 1714), Elbel (+ 1756), etc.; from the Order of Carmelites: the Salmanticenses. Almost all theologians of the Society of Jesus adhere to Probabilism, for example Toletus, Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Lacroix, Gury, Ballerini, Lehmkuhl, Noldin, Genicot, etc., and very many theologians from the secular clergy, for example Gopfert, Bouquillon, Schindler, Tanquerey, etc. The principal argument for Probabilism is the principle: "A doubtful law does not oblige."¹¹¹

¹⁰⁵ Thus Noldin, De consc. n. 223.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Aertnys-Damen l. c. I, n. 78.

¹⁰⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 4, a. 8 ad 2.

¹⁰⁸ Denz. n. 1127.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Aertnys-Damen l. c. I, n. 75.

¹¹⁰ In his commentaries on S. theol. 1, 2, q. 19, a. 6. Medina poses the question: "Whether we are bound to follow the more probable opinion, the probable one having been set aside, or whether it is enough to follow a probable opinion?" - First he brings forward arguments for Probabiliorism and then responds: "Certainly the arguments seem excellent, but it seems that if there is a probable opinion, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable. ... An opinion is called probable from the fact that we can follow it without reproach and blame. Therefore it implies a contradiction that it be probable and that we cannot follow it licitly. For an opinion is not called probable from the fact that apparent reasons are adduced in its favor, and that it has assertors and defenders; for in that way all errors would be probable opinions; but that opinion is probable which wise men assert and the best arguments confirm, which to follow is nothing improbable." - Cf. also the work of the same author: Breve instruccion de como se ha de administrar el sacramento de la penitencia, Salamanca 1580. Sometimes already St. Antoninus is cited by authors as a Probabilist, but altogether falsely. Rather, St. Antoninus favors Probabiliorism, saying: "With a good conscience someone can hold one part of some opinion and operate according to it, which namely has notably equal doctors for itself ... when ... he forms for himself a good conscience and credulity concerning that which he believes as concerning the more probable part" (S. theol. P. 1, tit. 3, c. 10, § 10).

¹¹¹ Cf. below n. 349.

343. 6. Lax Probabilism, or simply Laxism, teaches that it is licit to follow not only an opinion truly and certainly probable, but also an opinion probably or slightly probable. This system indeed seems to have been taught by Thomas Tamburinus (+ 1675), who explained his opinion in this naked and crude manner: "Absolutely I think, with Salas, Vasquez, Sanchez, Merolla apud Bardi (de consc. dist. 1, c. 6, to whom add Pasq. dec. 18), that it is enough in all cases that it be established probably that an opinion is probable; for then that truth, morally certain, will be sufficiently strengthened, directing me in about this manner: I here and now act prudently, because while I probably think that this is probable, I follow that judgment in practice prudently enough. For the fact that the opposite is evidently more probable does not cast down my opinion from its probability."¹¹² Ioannes Caramuel (+ 1682), who was called by St. Alphonsus "the prince of the laxists," expressed the same opinion under these words: "If opinions are now probable which previously were not, now men do not sin, although previously they sinned, since every probable thing excuses from sin."¹¹³ Contemporary with Caramuel was another Probabilist indulging somewhat in Laxism, namely Antonius Diana, a Theatine (+ 1663), concerning whom St. Alphonsus writes:¹¹⁴ "Diana, in selecting opinions, for the most part inclines toward the benign part, and not rarely inclines more than is fitting." - Diana is a pure Casuist (he was called "the Atlas of the casuistic world"); he brings forward the opinions of almost innumerable authors and then solves individual cases in a casuistic manner. Although in other matters he is found not rarely too benign, nevertheless concerning sins of lust he sometimes defends rather rigid opinions. - Besides the authors cited, Ioannes Sanchez (+ 1624), Stephanus Bauny (+ 1649), Matthaeus Moya (+ 1684), whose work Quaestiones selectae was placed on the Index on 26 Feb. 1704, favored Laxism. Indeed, a work of the same author, which he published under the pseudonym "Amadaeus Guimenius" and whose title is Opusculum singularia universae fere theologiae moralis complectens adversus quorundam expostulationes contra nonnullas Iesuitarum opiniones morales (Lyons 1664), was proscribed by a special Brief of Innocent XI on 16 Sept. 1680 and therefore prohibited under pain of excommunication. - Among the Laxists Escobar y Mendoza (+ 1669) also is sometimes named, and in reality he defended some opinions too indulgent; nevertheless he did not merit the too vehement attacks made by Blaise Pascal in the Lettres Provinciales. - In present times no Catholic theologian favors Laxism. Besides, this system has been proscribed by the Church; for Innocent XI condemned proposition (3): "Generally, while trusting in intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided one does not go outside the limits of probability, we always act prudently."¹¹⁵ But Alexander VII, in the decree issued on 24 Sept. 1665, proclaimed: "That lax mode of opining is altogether foreign to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the Holy Fathers; and if the faithful were to follow it in practice as a right rule, a great corruption of Christian life would creep in." Hence, as St. Augustine says very well, "it is better to love with severity than to deceive with leniency."

¹¹² Explicatio decal. l. 1, c. 3, § 3, n. 8.

¹¹³ Cf. E. Muller, Theol. mor. I, § 78, where this citation is found. This Caramuel taught several opinions which, while he was still living, were proscribed by the Church; for example: "It seems so clear that fornication according to itself involves no malice and is evil only because it is forbidden, that the contrary seems altogether dissonant from reason." Innocent XI condemned this proposition on 2 March 1679 (Denz. n. 1198).

¹¹⁴ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 257. In mockery Diana was called "the lamb who took away the sins of the world" (so Concina, Apparatus ad Theol. christ. l. 3, diss. 1, c. 2, de Probabilismo).

¹¹⁵ Denz. n. 1153.

344. 7. The system of compensation or of sufficient reason. Since all the systems explained up to this point suffer no small difficulties, certain authors¹¹⁶ devised a new system, which they called the system of compensation or of sufficient reason. The hinge of every difficulty in all the systems is the question whether and how far a doubtful law obliges. Pure Probabilists say simply: a doubtful law in no way obliges, at least if there is question of the mere licitness of an act. But all other theologians do not admit this, conceding some obligation to a doubtful law, although they do not hold concordant opinions concerning the degree of that obligation. Probabiliorists assert: a doubtful law obliges unless the contrary opinion is truly more probable. Equiprobabilists contend for this same thing, yet at the same time admitting that a doubtful law then does not oblige, when the doubt turns upon the existence, not however upon the cessation, of the law, and the opinion is almost equally probable. The new system of compensation or sufficient reason wishes to define otherwise the limits of an obliging doubtful law. Against Probabilism it vigorously defends that a doubtful law obliges in some way, although imperfectly. But against the Probabiliorists it does not vindicate for a doubtful law as much obligation as a certainly known law has. For the obligation of a law must be measured from the degree of knowledge, and therefore a certainly known law obliges in a perfect manner; a law wholly unknown obliges in no way; but a law known in an imperfect manner obliges imperfectly. Therefore of itself it is not licit to act against a law imperfectly known, such as a doubtful law is. Nevertheless cases can easily occur in which there are grave motives for acting against a doubtful law, for example, a penitent favoring pure Probabilism absolutely wishes to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, or if a benign probable opinion is more advantageous for the spiritual salvation of the penitent than the more probable opinion, all the circumstances having been considered. In cases of this sort there remains the danger of transgressing the law at least materially. But since even a material transgression of law is something evil, it is not licit to expose oneself to such a danger without a sufficient reason. Hence in such a case the principles concerning cooperation in evil, or rather concerning the indirect voluntary, must be applied. For a cause is placed, from which a double effect follows: one good, namely liberty in action; the other evil, namely the danger of transgressing the law at least materially. But among the conditions required for cooperation or for the indirect voluntary there is required a grave and proportionate cause. The greater the evil effect foreseen is, the greater an excusing cause is required. Therefore, in order to know whether it is licit in a particular case to act against some doubtful law by following the less probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, the gravity of the law and the probability of the opposed opinion must be weighed. The graver the law is, and the more probable its obligation is in the actual case, the greater an excusing cause is required.¹¹⁷

This system of compensation or sufficient reason has been devised rather ingeniously, nor does it in any way lead to Tutiorism, as Gury¹¹⁸ and other Probabilists wish; on the contrary, this system certainly does not lead more to Tutiorism than pure Probabilism draws toward Laxism. For, as Tanquerey deservedly notes:¹¹⁹ "For just as the Probabilists avoid Laxism by rejecting the sufficiency of an opinion slightly probable, so likewise the Compensationists escape Tutiorism by asserting that a doubtful and uncertain law does not oblige except when a sufficient reason for transgressing it is altogether lacking, and that an altogether slight cause excuses from a very doubtful law." - Indeed, the Probabilists themselves of better reputation in practice never permit the violation of some doubtful but truly probable law without some sufficient reason. For it would be too absurd, without any motive, to care nothing at all about some truly probable law, indeed about one more probable.

¹¹⁶ Potton, De theoria probabilitatis, Paris 1874. L. Lehu also favors this system (Philos. mor. et soc. I [Paris 1914] 287). In addition Laloux, De actibus humanis; Boisdron, Theorie et systemes des probabilites; Mc Donald, The principles of moral science.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Potton l. c. 30.

¹¹⁸ Casus conscientiae I 61.

¹¹⁹ Synopsis Theol. mor. de conscientia n. 416.

Judgment Concerning The Individual Systems.

Absolute Rigorism and Laxism have been condemned by the Church, as is clear from what was said above. Mitigated Tutiorism also must be rejected, since it is a) too hard; b) not sufficiently proved; c) impossible in practice, at least for simple faithful. For this reason this system has today become altogether obsolete. - Hence concerning the four remaining systems alone does judgment remain to be made here. With the greatest sincerity with which we can, we set forth the reasons and difficulties of each system.

96. Thesis. In the state of a true and strictly so-called speculatively practical opinion concerning the mere honesty and dishonesty of an action, remaining after diligent examination, man must, before he acts, form a practically certain conscience by force of a reflex principle; and this is different in the different opinions of theologians. According to the Probabilists, he can always do this from the principle: An uncertain law does not oblige, and so licitly do that which is less safe, even if it is more probable that the obligation exists or has not ceased; unless, however, it is very notably more probable, because then the law is practically certain (as was said in n. 80). According to the Probabiliorists and Equiprobabilists, not always; for if the law is certainly more probable, it must be observed, since it is now, as it were, practically certain, according to the principle: In uncertainties, the more truthlike is to be done.

It is proved: 1. Man must, before he acts, form for himself a certain conscience from a reflex principle, because this alone is the rule of acting (n. 78), and in the case it cannot be had except indirectly from a reflex principle.

2. He must act more safely and observe the law in the case in which it is very notably more probable, because then the law is equivalently or, as it were, practically certain, and the principle is valid: The more truthlike is to be done, as all now admit (n. 80).

3. On the contrary, he can do the less safe thing if liberty is more probable, from the principle: An uncertain law does not oblige, because in the case the law is more than strictly doubtful; in this all now agree.

4. One point remains controverted, namely, if the law is simply but certainly more probable, whether the principle An uncertain law does not oblige can be employed, or that other one must be employed: In doubts, the more truthlike is to be done.

The whole point of the controversy is situated in this: whether every opinion understood in the strictly so-called philosophical sense always is equivalent to practical certitude broadly so called.

A. The Probabilists deny this, and therefore they say: if it is only more probable that the law exists, although the reasons for the law are graver, nevertheless they are not practically certain, because grave reasons remain against it; and therefore it is certain that the law is uncertain, and we judge certainly that it does not oblige. This being posited, they form for themselves a certain conscience thus:

"That which, all things having been diligently considered, is not prohibited, is licit.

"But this action here and now to be placed certainly is not prohibited to me:

"for it is certain that an uncertain law does not oblige;

"but, although I rather think that this law exists and now obliges, and I adhere to this opinion, nevertheless I do not think this with certitude, even broadly so called, and therefore the law is uncertain for me;

"therefore it is certain that in the case it does not oblige me.

"Therefore this action here and now to be placed, all things having been diligently considered, is certainly licit for me."

B. On the contrary, the Equiprobabilists distinguish:

Either the opinion is a little more probable and the excess of reasons is slight; and then in practice it is doubtfully more probable, and almost or morally equally probable, in which case it is judged doubtful, and does not oblige on account of the principle: A doubtful law does not oblige. And then they form for themselves a certain conscience by a process similar to that above.

Or it is certainly more probable even by one degree (moral); and this in practice is impossible unless it is notably more probable and the excess of reasons is notable. Then, however, it is practically certain with certitude broadly so called and imperfect (n. 80). This the Probabiliorists also acknowledge.

The Probabilists observe, however, that many degrees of probability are found between equal probability, or strict doubt, and practical certitude; but it would be strange if in practice we could distinguish none of them with certitude, so that opinion would either be equivalent to doubt or equivalent to certitude, and in practice there would be no middle state between strict doubt and certitude. This seems incredible, they say, and it is nothing other than to eliminate one of the more principal states of mind.

Against this the Equiprobabilists object with St. Alphonsus:¹ That which is certainly more probable is notably more probable, otherwise the intellect could not certainly and evidently, i.e., without any hesitation, affirm that it is more probable. But that which is notably more probable is practically certain (n. 80).

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, Th. M., book I, nn. 56, 67, 77; and Diss. of the year 1762.

The Probabilists answer that the principle is not always and necessarily true, because, as it seems, a man of keen mind can certainly perceive that one thing is more probable than another, although nevertheless it is only a little, or at least not so notably, more probable. Yet often for many questions and minds that principle is verified; whence the fact that something is certainly more probable will ordinarily be a sign that it is notably more probable. Therefore present-day Probabilists, as being moderate (at least with their principles considered), and Equiprobabilists differ little in practice. For the former teach that a notably more probable law must be observed; the latter, however, teach that a certainly more probable law must be observed, but add that such a law does not exist unless it is notably more probable.

Hence it is clear that in practice this dispute is of lesser importance.

97. It is pleasing to relate various arguments and responses of the controversy, by which the question can in some way be judged.

I. The Equiprobabilists and Probabiliorists say: When something is certainly more probable, the contrary is no longer probable, and consequently we do not licitly do it.

The Probabilists respond, by distinguishing: The contrary is no longer probable in the strict and philosophical sense, i.e., worthy that we adhere to it by our judgment, granted; it is not probable in the broad and moral sense, i.e., founded on grave reasons, I subdistinguish: if the reasons are sought from the same principles on which the more probable opinion is founded, or if this latter notably exceeds it, granted; otherwise, I deny.

The objection contends that the probability of one proposition is elided by the probability of the other more probable proposition. But the elision of one probability by another does not consist in this, that one is destroyed by the other, but in this, that the other takes away its power of moving the intellect to prudent speculative assent. Yet the less probable opinion keeps its power of moving the intellect at the same time to judge that the opposite more probable opinion is not certain.

And St. Alphonsus himself at one time confessed this: "Our authors rightly respond that it is false: that the greater probability elides the lesser, unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the probable opinion has for itself so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable."1 2 Nevertheless we acknowledge that the Holy Doctor afterward no longer held this, but rather taught the contrary.

II. The very recent Equiprobabilists argue: In all things we are held sincerely to tend toward truth and conformity with the objective order and the eternal law, or with the divine reason and will establishing this order; and consequently, if it is impossible to arrive at that conformity certainly, we must tend as much as we can and embrace what comes nearer to it: in uncertainties, namely, the more truthlike is to be chosen. But he who chooses what he judges less probable does not sincerely tend toward truth and the eternal law, because he does not do this as much as he can. Therefore he does not do what he ought, and he sins.

a) To this some observe that the argumentation, if it is right, also proves - which nevertheless the Equiprobabilists deny - that one must adhere to an opinion a little more probable, because in it there is greater hope of conforming oneself to objective truth and to the eternal law. Indeed, logically it leads to tutiorism: for if there is an obligation to tend as much as we can toward conformity with a law prescribing good, which does not oblige for always, there will be a much greater obligation of tending toward conformity with a law prohibiting evil, which obliges for always. But this we shall never obtain better than by doing what is safer.

But, setting this aside, the Probabilists respond briefly thus:

In all things we are held sincerely to tend toward truth and conformity with the eternal law, I distinguish: i.e., we must endeavor to know the law and observe it once it is known as morally certain, granted; when we cannot know the law as morally certain, we must choose and do what is more probable, I deny. He does not sincerely tend toward truth and law who does not make serious efforts to know the law, granted; he who seriously endeavors but cannot know it certainly, denied.

b) But since the matter is of greater moment, a fuller response can also be brought forward. Before we hand it down, it must be noted: a) with St. Alphonsus,² with respect to us the eternal law is not a proper law, but only the natural law, i.e., our reason (which is a participation in us of the eternal law), obliges us; whence in the major of the argument nothing else is said except that in all things we are held to follow reason, and if it says nothing certain, we are held to follow what is more probable; b) the major can be understood of direct principles alone of reason and of the eternal law, or also of indirect and reflex principles. This being posited, the Probabilists respond thus:

² Th. M., I, n. 72. "The eternal law with respect to men is not a proper law; for the proper law with regard to them is natural law." Cf. n. 77.

1. If there is question of direct and reflex principles together, nothing is stated except what all admit, namely, that we cannot act except that which certainly seems licit or conformable to law, i.e., we cannot act except with a certain conscience (directly or indirectly) concerning the honesty of the action; which conscience, nevertheless, can also be formed from indirect principles.

2. If there is question of direct principles alone, I respond: In all things we are held sincerely to tend toward conformity with right reason and the eternal law and the divine will, and if we cannot conform to them certainly, we are held to do this as much as we can, I distinguish: if there is question of truth to be sought and of acts of the intellect, granted; for it would be absurd, for example, in dogmatic and speculative questions to choose what is less probable, or not to inquire what is more probable; and similarly it would be absurd in moral questions not first to seek, as far as morally possible, direct certitude concerning the existence of the law, as was said in n. 88. If there is question of acts of the will and of things to be done, I subdistinguish: if right reason, the eternal law, the will of God certainly prescribe, granted; if they do not prescribe, or not certainly, denied.

For right reason and the eternal law do not always oblige that we conform ourselves to them, but if they prescribe; and the will of God obliges only if He wills us to will something; moreover it is required that we know this certainly. Besides, as was said, since the same reason and eternal law also dictate that an uncertain law does not oblige, if we do not follow an uncertain law although more probable, we shall still be conformed to the eternal law and to reason according to higher principles through a reflex judgment.

III. They insist: The will, in order to operate prudently, must follow the judgment of the intellect. But the will following the less probable opinion does not follow the judgment of the intellect, but rather brings force and compulsion upon the intellect, so that it does not follow its own judgment, but is bent away from the part which appears more truthlike to a part which it does not have as true, contrary to its own nature.

It can be answered: There is a confusion between the speculative and practical order. The will cannot rightly and without fault bend the intellect to adhering to the less probable part as true - as certain Probabilists erroneously said - but it is not held to observe the more probable law, because this is not certain. And yet it follows the judgment of the intellect, which not only judges that such reasons are graver and that one must adhere to them, but at the same time judges that they are not certain, and consequently that the law does not oblige. And the will is conformed to this judgment of the intellect and to the higher law, and thus it brings no force upon the intellect.³

³ More recent Probabilists defend their system as if its necessary and only foundation were the principle: Under the influence of the will, the intellect can both physically and also reasonably and prudently restrain the judgment, namely, assent to the more founded opinion, and adhere to the less founded. This principle the adversaries very easily prove to be contrary to all sound philosophy, unheard of among the older scholastics, repugnant to psychological experience, and opposed to right reason and prudence; whence they boast that they overturn Probabilism without much effort. The older Probabilists spoke otherwise and more wisely, saying that the intellect prudently, indeed necessarily, cannot embrace anything except that which appears more founded; but that a law even truthlikely existing does not oblige, because for that reason it does not become morally certain. Let Laymann be heard, Th. M., book I, tr. 1, c. 5, n. 6: "Although every part of a question, if it is probable, can produce the assent of those opining, speaking absolutely, nevertheless it cannot do this in every intellect. For if the opposite part of the question seems more probable to you, or if you perceive greater weights of reasons on that side, although you can then restrain every assent, nevertheless, on the hypothesis that you wish to assent to one part or the other, it is necessary that you assent to the more probable; but to the other, which appears less probable to you, you then cannot assent. For if you assent to the less probable, or judge it true, by that very fact you judge the opposite false; which cannot happen while that opposite appears to you more probable or more truthlike, because the judging intellect according to specification is not altogether free, but is determined by the reasons and motives of the proposed object. Nor is St. Thomas opposed to this doctrine, I-II, q. 17, a. 6, where he says that, in those things apprehended which do not convince the intellect, it is in our power to assent or dissent. For this is true absolutely, because the intellect can be moved by command of the will so that, omitting the consideration of the reasons for one part of the question, it considers and evaluates the reasons occurring for the opposite part. But with the hypothesis standing, or in the composite sense, while, I say, one part of a contradiction appears more truthlike than the opposite part, the intellect cannot dissent from the former and assent to the latter, because that would be done without reason, indeed against reason..." And n. 7: "These things... show that it is licit to follow a probable opinion in acting. But that this can be done, even if to the one acting himself speculatively it appears less probable, and the opposite more probable, must be shown from this, that that speculative opining, by the very fact that it is uncertain and perhaps false, cannot be the rule of operation. Consequently the one acting must follow another rule, and that a certain one; namely, that in doubtful questions concerning morals anyone can operate according to an opinion which learned men defend as probable and safe in practice. Nor indeed does he then act against his own conscience, since conscience is not some speculative opining, but a practical certain judgment concerning what is to be done." In the same way Suarez, De Vol. et invol., disp. X, sect. 1, n. 5; Lessius, de Act. Hum., q. 17, a. 6; Pallavicini, in I-II, disp. 8, q. 6, a. 4, n. 9; Vasquez, in I-II, disp. 67, c. 1, n. 4.

From the arguments brought forward each one will be able to form some judgment for himself. But as to practice, as we have said, it does not matter much which system is chosen, provided that Probabilism is understood as truly moderate and is contained within the just limits of sound prudence.

100. What system of probability it is licit to use. - Here the following things are to be attended to:

1. In the direction of his own moral life, each one can use probable opinions according to the mode of one of the three systems: Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, or Probabilism. For although of itself and generally it will be more conformable to reason and more prudent to follow Probabiliorism rather than Equiprobabilism, and Equiprobabilism rather than Probabilism, nevertheless ordinarily we are not held to act more prudently and more safely (this belongs to counsel and perfection), but only safely and prudently. But Equiprobabilism or Probabilism in practice is sufficiently safe and prudent, because it removes the danger of sinning formally, unless for those who certainly saw that such a system was false, in which case they would have to follow the stricter system.

2. In the direction of others, we cannot impose, but only persuade to, our own system, or one or another probable opinion, because priests are not legislators and do not command; unless per accidens, if the other consents in this, or if otherwise some particular danger would follow for him.

3. Hence in practice the three systems do not differ so very much as to application, if the morals of the faithful of the whole Church are considered. We have already seen that what is certainly more probable is rather often notably more probable and practically certain for all (n. 96). Moreover, what some call more probable, others call less probable; what some call less probable, others hold equally or more probable; what appears equally probable to some, appears less probable to others. Besides, if one inspects not only what is strictly licit, but also what is expedient or more fitting, as often happens in practice, the differences will be still smaller.

1. Letter of November 2, 1753, to St. Alphonsus. - "We have received the first volume of your Moral Theology, dedicated to Us, and We give thanks to you for the honor shown to Us by this dedication, and also for Our Encyclical Letters opportunely inserted in the aforesaid Work. We make certain to you that We shall read your Work, when leisure shall be given to Us for this; for We cherish the due esteem of your merit, diligence, and fair judgment."

2. Another Letter, dated July 15, 1755. - "We have received your letters dated the eighth of June, together with the second volume of your Moral, and with several other books, which, although they are of lesser bulk, nevertheless will be of the greatest utility for the salvation of souls. For this gift We give thanks, especially because you have dedicated your moral Work to Us; when We had run through this cursorily, We judged it to be most choice and certainly about to be most approved and most useful to the whole society of men. We shall turn it over calmly, and We trust that the things to be read will be worthy of the things read."

3. How highly Benedict XIV valued the merit, diligence, and fairness of Alphonsus in deciding controversies is clear from the things which the most learned Pontiff hands down in the golden Work On Diocesan Synod.¹ - It is also established from the fact related by Father Tannoja² in these words: "So great was the esteem which the same Pontiff Benedict XIV had conceived concerning his wisdom, that when he was asked by the learned Neapolitan missionary and distinguished servant of God, Don Joseph Jorio, to state his opinion concerning the cursing of the dead, he abstained from opening it by himself, and answered: 'You have your Liguori; consult him.'"

1. Letters in the form of a Brief, August 4, 1767, to St. Alphonsus.³ - "We have most gladly received your book against the errors which at the present time have infected almost all Europe; both because it is yours, whose genius and doctrine and zeal for God, greatly burning, We know well from several other writings of yours....

Moreover, Venerable Brother, We greatly love you, because, by no means content to profit your one Church, whatever time remains to you from your episcopal charge, you do not suffer it to perish, but spend it all in labors of this kind, whose utility is not circumscribed by the boundaries of your Diocese, but is extended to the universal Church. We pray God that He give you firm health, and add life and strength, by which you may be able happily to complete several other things which perhaps you have begun...."

2. From the Acts of Beatification.⁴ - "Having returned to Rome" (Alphonsus), "he was embraced most lovingly by the Supreme Pontiff and was deemed worthy of a conversation of three hours. When, among the most grave affairs of the Church concerning which he himself was being consulted by the Pontiff, he had related that the Book which he had recently published on the utility of frequent Communion had been attacked, the Pontiff burned with zeal; and, showing that most holy practice to be very useful for souls, and confirming it by his own experience, he ordered him to refute the adversary; as indeed he did shortly at Rome, and offered the published response to the Pontiff himself."

3. Brilliant testimonies of the Supreme Pontiffs Clement XIV and Pius VI are extant; nevertheless, since these regard certain dogmatic works of the Holy Doctor, we abstain from reviewing them. - Let it suffice here to allege what the praised Father Tannoja⁵ reports concerning Pius VI: "When the Advocate Vincent Picerni had dedicated to him, in the year 1798, the Defense of the System of Alphonsus, he testified in the answering Brief given to the same Picerni that he had greatly rejoiced over it."

These things having been premised, let us proceed to setting forth the weightier judgments.

1. Decree on the Revision and Approbation of the Works of Venerable Alphonsus.⁶ - "... A full relation having been made both of the aforesaid printed Works and of all the other manuscripts, ... NOTHING worthy of censure was found in them.... These things having been related to Our Most Holy Lord, His Holiness benignly assented. May 18, 1803."

2. Decree on the Doubt whether it is established concerning the Virtues in heroic degree.⁷ - "... The great opinion concerning the chaste and holy morals of Venerable Alphonsus, which took hold among all persons whatsoever, ... was always more and more increased.... It shone forth ... in the ministry of the word of God among the rude and abandoned people, while he imbued them with the precepts of the divine law; in the chair of morals, among the moderators of consciences, while he poured forth an abundance of doctrine; ... in the pastoral office among the flock committed to him, while by vigilant guardianship he nourished it with salutary pastures.... But with how excellent a right men made so much of him, the present judgment of the Apostolic See manifests. For an inquiry having been instituted concerning his particular actions, ... and a discussion having been made concerning any exceptions whatsoever, even the smallest, which could have been opposed to the more perfect exercise of the Christian virtues, and again renewed, ... all the difficulties seemed so to vanish that nothing further could be opposed as still needing to be weighed.... But this Decree" (His Holiness) "ordered to be published and to be referred into the acts of the Sacred Congregation of Rites, on the Nones of May, 1807."

3. Decree on the Doubt whether one can safely proceed to Beatification.⁸ - "The omnipotent word of God, who calls the stars that they may shine in the firmament of the militant Church, called His Venerable servant Alphonsus that he might gleam with the light of apostolic virtues. He answered that divine voice, and sent forth, as a radiance, virtues worthy of an Apostle, ... when, both by voice and by writing, in the middle night of the age, he showed to those wandering the way by which, rescued from the power of darkness, they could pass into God's light and kingdom.... But surely the Pastors of souls also, and preachers of the divine word, and pious and learned men also, will understand how much ornament and protection has been established for them in imitating Alphonsus Maria. Since, therefore, Our Most Holy Lord Pius

Pope VII ... has declared that the virtues of this most luminous star of the militant Church are to be held heroic, ... he rightly pronounced: That one can proceed safely.... And he ordered this Decree to be published among the people ..., December 21, 1815."

4. Brief of Beatification, of September 6, 1816.⁹ - "For stirring up emulation of the better charisms, the Lord always renews in the Church the greatest examples of virtues. But now, besides so many others who in our memory have been seen to flourish with a manifold array of virtues, it is established that the Venerable servant of God Alphonsus shone in a wonderful way.... Like an arrow in the hand of the mighty, he rushed upon vices.... Hence it is indeed wonderful how many hatreds he extinguished, how many straying persons he led back to the right path, and even to Christian perfection, by word, example, and multiple Writings...."

5. It is also certainly established that Pius VII advised the Bishops of the Pontifical Dominion that the moral Theology of Blessed Alphonsus be handed down in their Seminaries.¹⁰

1. Letters to the Typographer Hyacinth Marietti, dated February 19, 1825.¹¹ - "That the filth of evil books, with which, by a calamity of our age never enough to be deplored, all regions overflow, may do less harm, no slight part is played by the number of Writers outstanding in piety and doctrine, whom God, for the guardianship of Religion and morals, by the counsel of His merciful Providence, never fails to oppose to the audacity of the lost. Among these, since especially the most holy and likewise most learned man, Blessed Alphonsus de Liguori, is numbered by the best right, ... (whose writings) are most firm protections against every depravity: you have indeed deserved very well of Religion, and, if it knows its advantages, of the universal society of men, who have placed your work and industry in gathering and publishing the Works of a Writer of this kind...."

2. Don Gaume testifies that at the same time similar Letters in the form of a Brief were given by Leo XII to the Bishop of Marseille.¹²

1. Letter given (when he was still Major Penitentiary) to the Bishop of Marseille.¹³ - "There is indeed reason why I vehemently congratulate Your Lordship concerning the most pious counsel by which you strive to foster among your flock veneration toward Blessed Alphonsus; whom we behold not only as having brought, by the splendor of virtues, an illustrious honor to the Episcopal Order in our age, but also as having shone forth by sound doctrine and according to God, so many volumes on this matter having been published, in which we are admonished by venerable judgment that there is nothing worthy of censure. This now remains, that these your wishes for the good of the sheep, from the protection of Blessed Alphonsus himself, be heaped up with the desired outcome."

2. Decree on the Doubt whether it is established concerning Miracles, December 3, 1829.¹⁴ - "To Blessed Alphonsus Maria de Liguori God gave the knowledge of the Saints, and honored him in labors; he who ... unto extreme old age ... studied ... by most salutary Books, elaborated by him, to enkindle the minds of the faithful toward contempt of the deceitful age and toward the love of eternal glory.... The Name of this Blessed Man, both by his brilliant deeds and by his volumes filled with piety and doctrine, has been diffused everywhere among the nations, and has been invoked in adversities...."

3. Decree on the Doubt whether one can safely proceed to Canonization, May 16, 1830.¹⁵ - "Among the Workers whom the heavenly Householder at no time ceased to send for cultivating His vineyard, Blessed Alphonsus labored very much for instructing the people by word and by writing...."

1. Bull of Canonization, of May 26, 1839.¹⁶ - "Holiness and Doctrine, according to the sentence of the Apostle of the nations, ought to adorn every Bishop.... But for renewing this eminent example of an excellent Bishop, Alphonsus Maria Liguori seemed to have been given divinely to the Church in the preceding age; he who, since ... he was wonderfully powerful especially in sacred doctrines, was called to the very greatly impeded office of the Episcopate....

This however is altogether wonderful: that, although in the function of the apostolic office he was detained by perpetual occupations, and weakened and tormented his members by every harshness of sufferings, nevertheless he could busy himself with such eagerness in studies of sacred things, and spend so much time, that by learned and equally laborious Works published into the light, he wonderfully helped the Christian commonwealth. Indeed, that he might devote himself and all the accounts of his life to divine worship, he emitted a most arduous vow, and of a kind almost new, that he would spend not even the smallest bit of time idly, but in perpetual action. He indeed wrote very many books, whether for defending the doctrine of morals, or for the full instruction of the sacred Order, or for confirming the truth of the Catholic Religion, or for asserting the rights of this Holy Apostolic See, or for stirring up the sense of piety in the souls of Christians. Moreover, in these one may admire an unusual force, abundance, and variety of doctrine, singular documents of ecclesiastical solicitude, and an exquisite zeal for Religion. But this above all is worthy of note: that, although he wrote most copiously, nevertheless after diligent examination had been instituted, it was found that his Works can be run through by the faithful WITH AN ENTIRELY UNOFFENDING FOOT."

2. Decree of January 10, 1840.¹⁷ - "Among the greatest lights and ornaments of the Catholic Church, St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori shines forth; he who, distinguished by doctrine and holiness, and inflamed with the highest charity, serving only the glory of God and the spiritual salvation of men by wonderful examples of all virtues and by very many most learned and most pious Works, after a life most holily spent, now crowned, possesses the palm, and triumphs with God in heaven."

3. Response of the Sacred Penitentiary, of July 5, 1831.¹⁸

Consultation. - "Most Eminent one. Louis Francis Augustus, Cardinal de Rohan-Chabot, Archbishop of Besancon, strives to foster wisdom and unity of doctrine among all those of his diocese who have care of souls. Since certain of them attack the Moral Theology of Blessed Alphonsus Maria de Liguori as too lax, dangerous to salvation, and contrary to sound morals, he asks the oracle of the Sacred Penitentiary, and proposes to it the following doubts of one professor of Theology to be solved:

"1°. Whether a professor of sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which Blessed Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology?

"2°. Whether a Confessor is to be disturbed who follows all the opinions of Blessed Alphonsus de Liguori in the practice of the sacred tribunal of Penance, for this reason alone, that by the Holy Apostolic See 'nothing worthy of censure was found in the Works'? - The Confessor of whom there is question in the doubt does not read the Works of the Blessed Doctor except to know his doctrine accurately, not weighing the moments or reasons upon which the various opinions rest; but he thinks that he acts safely, by that very fact that he can prudently judge that doctrine which contains 'nothing worthy of censure' to be sound, safe, and in no way contrary to evangelical holiness."

Decision. - "The Sacred Penitentiary, the things set forth having been weighed, judged that answer should be made to the Most Reverend Father in Christ, Cardinal of the Holy Roman Church, Archbishop of Besancon:

"To the 1st question: IN THE AFFIRMATIVE, without however judging from this that those are to be reprehended who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors.

"To the 2nd question: IN THE NEGATIVE, account being taken of the mind of the Holy See concerning the approbation of the Writings of Servants of God for the effect of Canonization.

"Given at Rome, in the Sacred Penitentiary, July 5, 1831.

"A. F. De Retz, Regent of the S. P.

"F. Tricca, Secretary of the S. P."¹⁹

4. Another Response of the Sacred Penitentiary, of June 8, 1842.²⁰

Consultation. - "Most Blessed Father. The Bishop of Le Mans ... most humbly represents: Nearly all younger spouses do not wish to have a more numerous offspring, and yet they are morally unable to abstain from the conjugal act.... The aforesaid Bishop of Le Mans, foreseeing that immense evils will arise from this, and disturbed with anxiety, solicitously asks Your Beatitude: ... 2°. If the act is to be held as morally evil, whether spouses not accusing themselves of it can be considered as constituted in that good faith which excuses them from grave fault? 3°. Whether the manner of acting of Confessors is to be approved who, lest they offend married persons, do not interrogate them concerning the mode by which they use the rights of matrimony?"

Response. - "The Sacred Penitentiary, the proposed questions having been maturely weighed.... To 2 and 3 it answers: that the aforesaid Confessor should recall to mind that saying: holy things are to be treated holily; and should also weigh the words of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, a learned man and most expert in these matters, who in the Practice of Confessors, 1. 4, n. 41, says: 'Moreover, concerning the sins of spouses with respect to the conjugal debt, ordinarily speaking, the Confessor is not bound, nor is it fitting, to interrogate, except wives, whether they have rendered it, in the more modest manner in which he can.... Concerning other things let him be silent, unless he has been asked.' And let him not omit to consult other approved authors."

1. Letters to Father Hugues, C.SS.R., dated November 25, 1846.²¹ - "If ever at another time, now certainly it must be cared for with every zeal and industry that by salutary writings vices be routed, and virtue, religion, and piety be stirred up and fostered in the souls of all.... Therefore We greatly commend the pious labor undertaken by you, and We add courage to you, that with ever greater eagerness you spend your work in promulgating more and more from day to day the most salutary writings of St. Alphonsus, whose reading can greatly profit not only the Christian people, but also ecclesiastical men, especially those devoted to the care and rule of souls. For indeed the books of that most holy and most learned Man ... abundantly supply all the best admonitions, counsels, and precepts, which are especially conducive to guarding and procuring the salvation of souls...."

2. Letters of April 7, 1847, to Don Scavini.²² - "We vehemently congratulate you, because in composing these Theological Institutions you held nothing more ancient than to propagate more and more the salutary doctrines of the most holy and most learned Man Alphonsus Maria de Liguori, and to imbue especially the souls of ecclesiastical youth with them. Therefore We greatly commend the counsel undertaken by you...."

3. Letters to the Typographer Marietti, June 12, 1847.²³ - "In so great a number of depraved books which daily come forth into the light in this age, you certainly seem to Us worthy of the greatest praise, beloved Son, by whose work and expense a Typography has been open there for several years, which publishes books, or again commits them to the press, most useful and opportune especially for defending Religion and for fostering piety. But in publishing these, you rightly judged that St. Alphonsus de Liguori should go before the others; to him indeed, as there was wonderful gentleness toward neighbors, so there was never-weary zeal for the salvation of souls. We indeed praise that you have now begun to publish a new edition of the Works of the same holy Bishop...."

4. Response of the Sacred Penitentiary, of December 19, 1855.

Petition. - "Most Eminent and Reverend Lord. The undersigned suppliant, named by his Bishop to the office of Prefect of public moral Conferences, because of his own devotion and reverence toward St. Alphonsus de Liguori, greatly desires to hold, hand down, and defend in all things the doctrine of this so great Saint, and to make this public in the Diocesan Calendar soon to be published (as also is pleasing to his much-praised Bishop, very favorable toward St. Alphonsus); adhering to and observing the Decision published on this matter by this Sacred Penitentiary under date July 5, 1831. But as to this he is held back by some religious scruple,

because, when he long ago obtained academic Degrees, he furnished the Oath as below, that he would retain the doctrine of the same University (which follows Probabiliorism and the opinions of Probabiliorists). - Since these things are so, and since moreover the very renowned Scavini, who emitted the same oath, in his Moral Theology dedicated to Our Most Holy Lord Pope Pius IX, had the same St. Alphonsus especially as Leader; hence, for the quiet of his conscience, he most humbly has recourse to Your Eminence and urgently supplicates:

"1. That he be taught whether it is an obstacle to the aforesaid oath to follow the doctrine of St. Alphonsus de Liguori in all things and to hand it down publicly, as is set forth above? Or 2. that he be dispensed from observing the same oath...."

Response. - "The Sacred Penitentiary, the things set forth having been maturely weighed, judged that answer should be made to the beloved orator in Christ to the proposed doubts, as it answers: To the first, In the negative. - To the second, Provided for in the first.

"Given at Rome, in the S. Penitentiary, December 19, 1855."

5. Response of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition, July 18, 1860.

Petition. - "Most Blessed Father. Bishop N. in France ... humbly asks ... 2° Whether those impeded from going to Rome in person are bound to go at least by letter or procurator, in order to obtain absolution from cases reserved to the Apostolic See? ..."

Response. - "Thursday, July 18, 1860. In the general Congregation of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition held, ... the Eminent and Reverend Lords ordered it to be rescripted: ... To the second Doubt. Let him consult approved Authors, among whom St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori...."

6. Another Response of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition, of July 18, 1860.²⁴

Petition. - "Most Blessed Father. The present Bishop N. in France ... asks ... 2° Whether" (the Bishop) "at least has the aforesaid faculty" (namely, outside Italy, whether by himself or by a delegate, of absolving from an occult excommunication which a Confessor contracted by absolving, outside the article of death, an accomplice in a shameful crime) "in the case in which, because of imminent danger of scandal or of another grave evil, recourse to the Holy See cannot be made at an opportune time? - 3° Whether, in the same circumstances, he has the faculty of absolving a priest who would not be of his diocese? - 4° Whether, in absolving from the aforesaid excommunication because of an urgent cause, he ought to impose upon the penitent the burden of recurring, the impediment ceasing, to the Holy See, under penalty of reincidence? - 5° Whether he can delegate the aforesaid faculty for a fixed time, or for a fixed number of cases, or only for the case set forth? ..."

Response. - "Thursday, July 18, 1860.... To the II, III, IV and V Doubt. Let him consult the Decretals of Clement III ... and approved Authors, among whom St. Alphonsus de Liguori, book 7, chapter 1, doubt 5, On Censures, nn. 84 to 92...."

7. Response of the S. C. of the Council, of August 29, 1860.²⁵

Petition. - "Most Blessed Father. Henry ... most humbly asks: 1° Whether a priest who has received a stipend richer than usual can, in favor of a pious work, hand over to another priest only the ordinary stipend, retaining entirely the part which surpassed the ordinary tax? - 2° Whether the same priest can substitute another priest for himself, under this law, that he remit some part of the ordinary or extraordinary stipend in favor of a determinate pious work? - 3° And insofar as in the negative in each case, whether a priest so acting is held to restitution? - 4° Whether a priest asking from another a condonation of this kind ought first to hand over to him the whole stipend? - 5° And insofar as in the affirmative, whether acting otherwise he is held to restitution?"

Response. - "August 29, 1860. Let him consult Theologians, especially St. Alphonsus de Liguori, tract XIII, On the Sacrament of the Eucharist, chapter VII" (or book 6, tract 3, chapter 3, n. 321 and following), "and Benedict XIV ... in like sentences he agrees...."

8. Response of the Sacred Penitentiary, of December 18, 1860.²⁶

Petition. - "18. In what way ought Parish Priests to conduct themselves in the celebration of the marriages of those who notoriously have fallen into ecclesiastical censures?"

Response. - "Let the Parish Priest consult the Ordinary, who, account being taken of things and circumstances, and all things having been weighed which are handed down by approved authors, and especially by St. Alphonsus (book 6, tract 1, chapter 2, n. 54), should declare those things which he will have judged to be more expedient in the Lord...."

9. Decree Urbis et Orbis of March 23, 1871, concerning the Concession of the Title of Doctor.

"Among those who did and taught, and whom Our Lord Jesus Christ called to be great in the kingdom of Heaven, St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori is deservedly to be numbered.... But what he completed by holy operation, he also taught by words and writings. For he himself, by learned Works, and especially by the treatments of Moral Theology, drove off and removed the darkness of errors widely diffused by Unbelievers and Jansenists. Moreover, he elucidated obscure things, and declared doubtful things, since among the entangled opinions of Theologians, whether laxer or more rigid, he laid down a safe way by which the Moderators of the souls of Christ's faithful could walk with unoffending foot...."

10. Apostolic Letters in the form of a Brief, of July 7, 1871, concerning the Confirmation of the Title of Doctor.

"He wrote very many Books, filled with sacred erudition and piety, whether, among the entangled opinions of Theologians, both laxer and more rigid, for fortifying a safe way by which the Moderators of the souls of Christ's faithful could walk with unoffending foot; or for forming and instructing the Clergy; ... This moreover can most truly be proclaimed: that there is no error even of our own times which, at least in greatest part, has not been refuted by Alphonsus. What of the fact that those things which have been sanctioned by Us, both concerning the Immaculate Conception of the Holy Mother of God, and concerning the Infallibility of the Roman Pontiff teaching from the chair, are found in the Works of Alphonsus both set forth most brightly and demonstrated by most valid arguments?

"Since these things are so, ... by Our Apostolic Authority, by the tenor of the present letters, We confirm, or, insofar as there is need, again attribute and impart to Him, the title of DOCTOR in honor of St. Alphonsus Maria de Liguori; in such a way indeed that in the Universal Catholic Church he is always to be held as Doctor.... Moreover, We will and decree that the Books, Commentaries, little Works, and finally all the Works of this Doctor, like those of the other Doctors of the Church, may be cited, brought forward, and, when the matter demands it, used not only privately, but publicly in Gymnasia, Academies, Schools, Colleges, Lectures, Disputations, Interpretations, Addresses, Sermons, and all other Ecclesiastical studies and Christian exercises...."

1. Letter to L. J. Dujardin and J. Jacques, C.SS.R., translators of the works of St. Alphonsus into the French language, August 28, 1879.

"... To say nothing of the Moral Theology most celebrated everywhere on earth and offering a safe norm which moderators of conscience may follow, ... We even congratulate you also on your undertaking for this reason: that since the Holy Author often glories in his writings that he followed the doctrine of the Angel of the Schools, from the homage of this more recent Doctor of the Church toward him there accrues new praise and glory to the doctrine of St. Thomas, which commends more gravely also that restoration of Christian philosophy which We most zealously urged, by Our recent encyclical letters, to be measured according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor." Acta, t. XII, p. 273.

2. Letters to the renowned Ernst Muller, author of Moral Theology, March 13, 1880.

"... We have gladly recognized ... that you have furnished what you signify in the letters: that after the holy Fathers of the Church you followed as chief leaders the two most outstanding Doctors, St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Alphonsus de Liguori.... For besides distinguished expertise and prudence in moral matters, each vindicates this to himself, that the doctrines which they approve, holding a middle way between extremes, are equally distant from relaxed indulgence, which loosens the reins for sinners, and from importunate rigor, which converts the sweet yoke of Christ into an intolerable burden."

I. We understand the excellence of the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus in this sense: that, if you take together all the titles of pre-eminence, he is easily the chief of all who have written on moral matters up to this time. For:

1° Among those whom we call the great Moralists, he is the most recent. Therefore he was able to investigate and weigh the excellent sayings and reasonings of the other Doctors; and he investigated and weighed them most diligently, most patiently, with a mind free from every preconceived opinion, and illumined by the heavenly light which he obtained by his prayers and virtues.

2° He brings into the open the opinions of all the distinguished Doctors who have treated of moral matters, so that he can supply the place of the other Authors who wrote before him.

3° Scarcely, or not even scarcely, is another Doctor found who has written so much, and so particularly, concerning moral matters.

4° An indefatigable practice of the sacred ministry, prolonged for many years, especially in missions, which furnish a harvest of very varied and very intricate cases, preceded his writing; this practice is lacking in many Authors, but is scarcely found in any other so abundantly as in our Saint.

5° He was of a most acute genius, so that, being scarcely sixteen years old, he obtained the laurel of both laws in the University of his native land.

6° He excelled very greatly in holiness of life; and this indeed must be considered of very great moment in a writer on moral matters, since to saintly Authors this is before all other things dear to heart: that they teach nothing which is not most consonant both with the doctrine and with the sense of the Church; nothing which, whether by too great laxity or by too great rigor, could even lightly hinder the glory of God and the salvation of souls; nothing which they have not meditated upon after fervent prayers sent beforehand to God, and, according to that humility and prudence which are theirs, after others have been consulted, maturely and without excited or inordinate affection. While the illustrious De Wit¹ contemplates this holiness of life in Alphonsus, he addresses his reader most beautifully in this way: "You see how the whole Work inwardly nourishes and pervades the spirit of sanctity, and how much confidence those things deserve which the man of God thinks, teaches, affirms, as one who, joining to the greatest industry of labor the perpetual exercise of prayer and heroic virtues, was also suffused with heavenly light."

7° He has been declared Doctor of the Universal Church by the oracle of the Pontiff; but no one is declared Doctor of the Church unless his eminent doctrine has been approved by Apostolic judges.

8° The moral doctrine of no Author has been commended by so many and such great praises of so many Roman Pontiffs. See above p. LXXVI sq., where the praises of the Roman Pontiffs concerning the moral writings of St. Alphonsus are displayed in one view.

9° No one's moral doctrine has been received with such confidence in the whole Catholic world, as far as it extends, and reduced into practice, and this because:

10° No one's moral doctrine has been endowed with so great an authority by the Church herself, as will be clear from the things to be said.

II. The authority of the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus in the Church. - The moral doctrine of no Author enjoys in the Church so great an authority as that of St. Alphonsus; for the moral doctrine of no Author has been approved by the Church in the way in which his has been.

With Vittozzi² we distinguish a twofold approbation which can be given by the Church to the Writings of some Saint: one negative, the other positive. - Negative is

that judgment of the Church by which the doctrine of some Saint is declared immune from every theological censure whatsoever, without however anything being decreed concerning its merit or excellence. But if the judgment of the Church is borne also upon the merit and excellence of the doctrine, it is called positive. - Positive is subdivided into tacit, or usual, and express. Tacit or usual "is called that which is made by long use, and is established as it were by the glory of the name by which one has filled the Christian world."¹ Express, which is also called solemn, is that which is declared in the public acts of the Church by set words. - Express is subdivided into general, special, and most special. General "consists in this: that the writings of someone are generally received, and are permitted to be read in public Schools or Churches, and are commended to the faithful as useful, true, and Catholic. And in the number of writers of this kind they hold the first place who ... have been adorned ... with the excellent title of Doctors."² "Moreover, a general declaration of this kind has a threefold effect: for, first, it removes from the authors the suspicion of voluntary heresy; secondly, it grants to the faithful the faculty of reading the books of those who have obtained such approbation, indeed it also praises their reading as useful and fruitful; thirdly, it commends the authors to that degree that, if anyone shall appeal to them for proving a sentence, he is protected at least by a certain probability, even 'other reasons' being excluded, until the contrary is proved."³ - Special consists in this: that the works of some Saint in a certain matter are declared to be preferred to the writings, taken separately, of the rest in this kind, and his doctrine on this subject is declared Catholic and free from error, although not as a rule of Faith. An example of special approbation of this kind is furnished by the writings of St. Augustine on Grace and Free Will against the Pelagians and Semipelagians, as being more often commended to the Christian world either by the Supreme Pontiffs or by Councils, either naming them expressly, or using them by their act and example for defining dogmas.⁴ - Most special is had if the little work of some Father or Doctor is proposed by the Church as a rule of Faith to be held by all. Thus the letter of St. Cyril of Alexandria with the twelve anathemas against Nestorius was approved, and the synodical Letter of St. Leo the Great to Flavian against the Eutychian heresy.⁵ There are some who add to these another approbation besides, namely that given by Paul III, in the Brief Pastoralis officii cura, dated July 31, 1548, to the book of the Exercises of St. Ignatius, by which all and singular things contained in that book are approved, praised, and fortified by Apostolic authority. - By others negative is also called permissive; positive special is called elective; most special definitive. - These things having been premised:

Question 1°. Which of these approbations belongs to the Moral Doctrine of St. Alphonsus?

Response 1°. Negative, as is clear from the Decree of the S. R. C. dated May 18, 1803, confirmed by Pius VII (p. LXXVII under 1).

Response 2°. Positive tacit; for, among other reasons, Pius P. P. IX was moved by this reason to admit the cause of the concession of the title of Doctor in honor of St. Alphonsus: that, as he says in the Decree dated March 23, 1871, "the nations tell forth his wisdom and the Church proclaim his praise."

Response 3°. Positive express general, as is established from the concession of the title of Doctor of the Church; and among other causes of this concession the Supreme Pontiff mentions that "among the intricate opinions of Theologians, whether laxer or more rigid, he paved a safe way, by which the Moderators of the souls of the faithful could walk with unoffending foot" (p. LXXXII. 9, 10).

Question 2°. What may be concluded, A) and what may not be concluded, B), from those various approbations given by the Church to the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus?

Response to A). I. From the negative approbation you conclude:

1° No moral sentence which St. Alphonsus defends was, at the time when he wrote,⁶ worthy of any censure, except perhaps one then universally unknown.⁷ The list of the principal theological censures, and their sense, see, if you wish, in Scavini.⁸

2° The sentences of St. Alphonsus not only, like those of the other Authors whom the Church has not declared immune from every censure, are simply tolerated, but are also positively permitted. The matter is illustrated by examples by the illustrious Grandclaude,¹ and is clear from the Decisions and Responses of the S. Penitentiary in the years 1831 and 1855 (see p. LXXIX. 3 and LXXX. 4), by which it is declared: 1) that a professor of sacred Theology is safe; 2) that a confessor is not to be disturbed who follows all the sentences of St. Alphonsus, led by his authority alone; 3) that it is lawful for a Professor to follow the doctrine of St. Alphonsus in all things and to hand it down publicly, without his needing a dispensation from the oath furnished of defending Probabiliorism and the sentences of the Probabiliorists. Nor let the word "to be disturbed" in the Response of 1831 delay anyone; for by that word, in Roman style, not mere toleration but positive permission is indicated; see this in St. Alphonsus himself,² and it is clear from the context itself of the Response. For the S. Penitentiary was not more severe toward the confessor than toward the professor, whom it calls safe.

3° With the exceptions to be excepted in the Response to B), "those sentences which St. Alphonsus de Liguori expressly taught, held, followed, or simply called probable, are to be held as truly probable,"³ namely at least extrinsically; that is, the authority of the Saint is so great that by itself alone it renders some opinion truly probable. This follows from the Response just cited of the S. Penitentiary, dated July 5, 1831, where to the question: "Whether a Confessor is to be disturbed who follows all the opinions of Blessed Alphonsus de Liguori in the practice of the sacred tribunal of Penance, for this reason alone, that by the Holy Apostolic See 'nothing worthy of censure was found in the Works'?" the Response was: "In the negative." But if a confessor is not to be disturbed, but on the contrary is safe, who follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus, although he does not perceive their intrinsic value, or their intrinsic probability, and follows them only on account of the authority conferred on them by the negative approbation of the Church, it is evident that from that approbation the opinions of the Saint obtain true probability, and at least extrinsic probability. For the Church cannot permit anyone to follow opinions which are not truly, and at least extrinsically, probable.

4° This at least extrinsic probability is not extended only to the whole body of the moral doctrine of the Saint, but also to each and every one of his opinions. For the Confessor of whom there is question in the Response just cited of the S. Penitentiary does not reduce into practice the whole body of the moral doctrine of St. Alphonsus in the tribunal of S. Penitence, but all his opinions taken distributively.⁴

5° It will be lawful also to teach and to bring into practice those opinions of St. Alphonsus which may be contrary to the more common, or even to the common, sentences of theologians. This clearly follows from 3° and 4°.

6° An attack upon the opinions of St. Alphonsus will be unlawful unless it is modest and is made with a preface of honor. This follows from the things which Benedict XIV hands down.⁵

II. From the positive tacit approbation you conclude:

The opinions of St. Alphonsus today must be called universally common, as having been universally received in the Christian world.

III. From the positive express general approbation, or from the title of Doctor of the Church conferred on the Saint, you conclude that his doctrine is eminent.⁶

Response to B). 1° It is not lawful to conclude that the individual sentences of the Saint either a) are intrinsically probable; for the approbation given to them is not most special or even special; or b) are, or will always remain, extrinsically probable. For the authority of the Church, by which they become extrinsically probable, cannot be invoked in favor of those sentences of the Saint against which there stand Pontifical Decrees or Declarations of the Sacred Congregations, furnished with those characteristics which we shall enumerate in the Treatise on Laws.

2° It is not lawful to conclude that the authority of the Saint is exclusive; for in the Response of the S. Penitentiary dated July 5 (see p. LXXIX. 3) it is expressly said that those are not to be reprehended who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors.

3° It is not lawful to conclude that no new force or probability has accrued to the sentences of the Saint from the approbation of the Church; for there has accrued to them:

That for any action to be honest a certain conscience concerning its honesty is required, all theologians admit; but by what manner such certainty can or ought to be had, when only probable reasons appear on this side and on that, this is what troubles them not a little. Namely, theologians ask to what side he can or ought to turn himself who, a doubt having arisen concerning the liceity of the action which he is about to place, and diligent inquiry having been made, has found it not certainly but only probably licit. Moreover, for solving this question they enter upon a twofold way; for some teach that certainty in this case can be had only directly; but others hold that it can, and therefore ought, to be obtained indirectly, namely by force of another principle; and therefore the former drive the agent to embrace the safer part, while the latter permit that indulgence be granted to liberty. The first are called either anti-probabilists, because they say probabilities in moral matters are of no use, or tutiorists, because they always incline to the safer part, or finally rigorists, because they impose more burden than is necessary or even accommodated to human shoulders. But the others are called by a certain generic name probabilists, because they hold that practical utility can be derived from probabilities.

But the patrons of each opinion, agreeing as to their substantial principle, admit various degrees: the former indeed in relation to the certainty which they will to have directly, and the latter in relation to the probability upon which they remotely rely; and therefore the first are split into absolute and mitigated tutiorists, and the second into probabiliorists, equiprobabilists, and probabilists simply. Wherefore there have properly been five systems: absolute tutiorism, mitigated tutiorism, probabiliorism, equiprobabilism, and probabilism. There is added laxism, which can scarcely be called a system, and scarcely merits the attention of a prudent man. Concerning each there will briefly be said something.

Absolute tutiorism requires certainty in every way, or absolute certainty, that the law either never existed, or has already fully ceased, before it permits anything to liberty; and therefore, even if you bring forward in favor of liberty a most probable opinion, you are bound to follow the law. For thus the patrons of this system argue: "Just as an opinion, whether less probable, or even less than probable, can be true, so on the other side, an opinion more probable, or even most probable, can be false. Therefore, as long as one remains within the limits of probability, the danger of erring is not fully obviated." Moreover, that this system is altogether to be rejected is clear both from the fact that it surpasses human strength, and from the condemnation made by Alexander VIII of the following proposition: "It is not licit to follow an opinion, even the most probable among the probable." Cf. Viva, on prop. 3, among the 31 condemned by Alexander VIII.

Mitigated tutiorism differs from the preceding system in this, that in place of absolute certainty it demands the greatest probability, and therefore only then permits the part favoring liberty to be followed when a most probable opinion stands for it. But although this system has not been positively condemned, nevertheless it is easily overthrown; for that most probable opinion which is required either makes the conscience certain or it does not: if the first, the aforesaid condemned proposition and the reason of the condemnation are urged; if the other, it would now become licit to act from a conscience not certain, which cannot be admitted.

Probabiliorism, as at least it is defended by those who wish to distinguish themselves from tutiorists and seek protection from reflex principles, teaches that it is licit to follow the less safe part, namely the part favoring liberty, provided you bring forward for it an opinion manifestly and solidly more probable; and therefore you are bound to follow the law not only when a lesser, even if solid, probability stands for liberty, but also when the opinion which favors it is equally probable as that which favors the law. The chief reason of this system is taken from this, that by following the more probable opinion, we much less incur the danger of sinning. But if reflex principles are admitted, the simple probabilist will avoid the danger of formally sinning as well as the probabiliorist; but if they are not admitted, one must finally come to absolute tutiorism.

Equiprobabilism holds that only then is it licit to follow the less safe part, namely the opinion favoring liberty, when the opinion which stands for the law is only equally or almost equally probable; but if this is certainly more probable, adherence must be given to it. The patrons of this system add that this is valid if that equal or almost equal probability regards the existence of the law; but if the doubt is concerned with the cessation of a certain law, then you are bound to follow the law, however much the opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as that which favors the law. But this addition pertains rather to the application of the system than to its substance, and there are many among simple probabilists who either suppose or explicitly admit this limitation. The principal foundation of equiprobabilism is taken from the authority of St. Alphonsus, which indeed is very grave; but by what right this opinion is attributed to him will be said below.

Probabilism indeed teaches that the safer part must always be followed when there is question of attaining some determinate end; but when there is question only of the licit and the illicit, it holds that someone can follow an opinion less safe and also less probable, provided it enjoys true and solid probability. Wherefore the probabilist seeks not two judgments, but only one; namely he asks whether the opinion which favors liberty is solidly probable, every comparison with that which favors the law having been left aside, and as soon as he knows that there is present in favor of liberty a solid probability, he is exempted from the law by force of a reflex principle. It must be noted that this system is called by some simple, and by others moderate probabilism, so that they may distinguish it both from equiprobabilism and from laxism; but since from the things said confusion of this sort is not possible, we shall abstain in this book from any added term.

Laxism, no distinction having been made between solid and slight probability, always exempts from the law as often as any opinion whatever is brought forward against it, even if it is only slightly probable. This system was condemned, as is clear from prop. 3, proscribed by Innocent XI, which reads thus: "Generally, when trusting in probability whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the boundaries of probability, we do something, we always act prudently." But the reason of the condemnation is open; for since slight probability is that which does not merit the assent of a prudent man, by force of it the law cannot be said to be uncertain. Cf. Bouquillon, n. 287 and seq.

to follow a probable or more probable opinion concerning the objective honesty of an act.

[From the distinctions prefixed it is plain that probability is here understood by us insofar as it affects, not the intellect in speculative matters, but conscience in things to be done. Moreover actions are determined and imposed by law. Law, therefore, as it ought here to be considered, is the will of a superior concerning what he wills or wills not to be done, made manifest to the subject. If the law be altogether and invincibly unknown through defect of promulgation or of cognition, the action repugnant to it is called material sin, or matter of sin; but if the law be known, or vincibly and culpably ignored by the agent acting against it, the sin is formal, because the will of the inferior contradicts the will of the superior, and thus is inordinate and evil. It happens however not rarely that the subject can neither affirm nor deny the existence of the law, opposite arguments contending for it and against it. Then the law is merely probable or doubtful; and since obligation is an effect of law, the question is raised whether the subject is then held to obey such a law, or is immune from it.

We must therefore treat solely, in the present question, of the licit or illicit alone, that is, of the honesty of an action against a probable or doubtful law posited. This must always be held before the eyes in this dissertation, lest certain confusions be incurred which would render the matter inextricable, and of which there will be mention below.

The systems which have issued concerning probability can be reduced to three heads, namely tutiorism, probabiliorism and probabilism. — There can be added a certain system lately arisen under the name of compensative probabilism.

1° Rigid or absolute tutiorists are those who, in the conflict of two opinions whereof one favors the law and the other liberty, will that the side of the law always be embraced, professing this principle: « In doubt the safer side is to be followed. » From this doctrine it follows that even a most probable opinion favoring liberty cannot safely, that is licitly, in practice be preferred. And in truth many of the Jansenian sect, with Nicolaus for leader, required in every case moral certainty of the honesty of the action, that conscience be unhurt. But when Alexander VIII had condemned the following proposition: « It is not licit to follow the opinion, even though most probable among probables, » several, withdrawing from their pristine rigor that they might avoid the pontifical censure, conceded it licit to follow an opinion against the law provided it be most probable, because then the action is most probably honest, and as such opposed to no rules of prudence. These later tutiorists are called benign.

2° Probabiliorists hold it licit to follow the less safe opinion, provided it be truly, that is notably, more probable. If the opinion favoring liberty be only lightly more probable, they permit it not to be preferred, because, say they, in morals little is reputed as nothing. Of the truth of this system our Billuart above endeavored to give demonstration.

3° Probabilists teach it licit to follow the less safe opinion although it be not notably more probable. They are divided into three classes: 1° Rigid probabilists, or equiprobabilists, assert that election is not free unless the opinions for the law and against the law be equally probable. 2° Benign or moderate probabilists hold it licit to follow the opinion less safe and less probable, provided it be truly and solidly probable. 3° Lax or laxer probabilists taught that it is ever lawful to follow the opinion less safe and probable, even should its probability be slight or most slight, « provided one go not beyond the bounds of probability ». This system was condemned, as will plainly appear below.

4° The system of compensative probabilism, which will be set forth more fully below, consists in this. Since the law is doubtful, or existing only probably, if such a law binds, in favor of liberty it is not licit to solve the doubt, unless first the advantages and disadvantages which must arise have been pondered and weighed, whether one act according to the law or against it. If the advantages which the agent acting against the law will enjoy surpass, or at least equal, the inconveniences thence arising, it is licit to use liberty; otherwise the law prevails. — This pseudo-probabilism will be weighed in its own place, and we shall demonstrate its emptiness, the question of probabilism being first exhausted, to which truly it does not belong.

The various systems opposed to moderate probabilism will sufficiently be overthrown by the demonstration of the proposition which enunciates the whole doctrine of the probabilists. Whence

I. In this whole work I shall first of all recall before the readers' eyes the theses condemned by the Church, that they may be able in advance to guard themselves from the danger of erring. The following, in the controversy of Probabilism, the Roman See proscribed under Alexander VII and the Venerable Innocent XI, Supreme Pontiff:

1. If a Book be that of some more recent and modern author, its opinion ought to be considered probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the apostolic See as improbable. — Proposition 27 of Alexander VII.

2. It is not illicit, in conferring the Sacraments, to follow a probable opinion regarding the validity of the Sacrament, leaving aside the safer one, unless law, convention, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbid it. Hence it is only in the conferring of Baptism, of priestly or episcopal Orders, that a merely probable opinion must not be used. — Proposition 1 of Innocent XI.

3. I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable. — Proposition 2 of the same.

4. In general, when we do anything relying upon probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability, we always act prudently. — Proposition 3 of the same.

5. An infidel who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused of infidelity. — Proposition 4 of the same.

6. It is probable that the precept of charity towards God does not, of itself, rigorously oblige even once in every five years. — Proposition 6 of the same.

VI. Very many of the unskilled confound the safer opinion with the more probable, and the safe with the less probable. Hence the Probabiliorists are called by the unskilled crowd Tutiorists and Rigorists. But this is a putrid calumny, born of ignorance — and that a supine ignorance. An opinion standing for the law is safer, but not on that account more probable. For that opinion is called safer which more removes a man from the danger of sinning. If, however, it be sometimes asserted that such an opinion binds a man to its execution, it will be false and improbable. More safely, surely, will a man keep chastity if he never look upon or address women; and more safely will he abstain from usury if he enter into no contracts. But if you would absolutely bind men to abstain from converse with all women, and from every contract, the opinion is utterly improbable and false. For the safer opinion and the more probable opinion flow from diverse principles: the latter from a greater approach to the truth, and from graver weights of reasons; the former from a greater withdrawal from the danger of sinning.

I. It is an article of faith that the Gospel of Christ contains the sole and pure truth, with the exclusion of any falsity whatsoever; and that this Gospel is the certain and safe rule which God has assigned to us for the directing of our conscience.

This first proposition is an article of faith, and is placed beyond the hazard of any disputation or cavil whatsoever.

II. The Probabilists teach the licit use of both of two contradictory propositions, of which, if one is true, the other must of necessity be false. For both cannot be true, as all confess.

This second proposition is the very state of the question. It is a most luminous truth of fact, which can be called into controversy by no one, unless the state of the question be destroyed.

III. Therefore the doctrine of Probabilism is antievangelical, since it teaches the licit use of the falsity which is contained in one or the other of the opinions, and which wars as an enemy against the Gospel. This consequence is legitimate, and flows necessarily from the two first propositions.

IV. Assuredly the evangelical law is the extrinsic and remote rule of moral operations; and the intimate and proximate rule is the reason of the mind, by which the evangelical law itself is proposed. But since that law is a law of truth, as is of faith, those who lay down that the rule of conscience is a falsity, and a falsity known as such, teach an antievangelical error. Who will deny this? This the Probabilists teach by the force of their system; which I prove by explaining the second proposition.

V. I confess that it is not certainly established for us which of the two opinions is true. For it can happen, though very rarely, that the opinion which seems to us more probable is false, and the less probable true. What follows from this? This surely: that if, after mature diligence, the Antiprobabilist errs in choosing falsity in the place of truth, the error is worthy of excuse. For the Antiprobabilist venerates and champions truth as the certain and evangelical rule — that truth alone is the norm of our conscience. And he does not contradict this principle if, through his own weakness, he is deceived in selecting the opinion which he certainly judges nearer to the truth.

VI. The Probabilist, on the contrary, knowingly and willingly lays down, in the place of a system and principle, that the use of contradictory opinions is licit — of which, if one is true, the other must be false. The Probabilist knows certainly and evidently, as all know, that one or the other of the contradictories is false. Therefore, when the Probabilist lays down as a principle the licit use of contradictory opinions, he errs dogmatically; because he establishes as the rule of conscience a known falsity — one, that is, which he certainly knows to be contained in one or the other of the contradictory opinions. For although he does not know which of the two is true, he nevertheless evidently knows that in one or the other falsity is contained. Therefore, in the place of a system, by establishing the licit use of both contradictory opinions, he systematically teaches the licit use of falsity, even of known falsity. But nothing wars more hostilely against evangelical truth than falsity. The Probabilist therefore errs in two ways. First, dogmatically, as has been shown, because he lays down as his system the licit use of a known falsity contained in one or the other of contradictory propositions; secondly, morally, against prudence and against the duty of finding the truth, when he selects the less probable opinion — that is, the one less near to truth and more neighboring to falsity — in view of the more verisimilar, as the rule of his conscience. But of this second point below. For now the discourse is of the error alone, which can be called dogmatic.

VII. The Probabilists can twist their wits and stuff in patchworks of distinctions; but they will never give a simple and perspicuous answer to the aforesaid demonstration. The first proposition is an article of faith, repeated a thousand times in the Scriptures. Thy law is truth. The law of truth was in his mouth. Psalm 118: All thy commandments are truth. Thou hast commanded justice thy testimonies, and thy truth exceedingly. Zacharias adds, chapter 8: Love ye only truth and peace. God delivered the truth to his people to be guarded. A just nation, keeping the truth, says Isaias, chapter 26. The people of God manifests this truth; Isaias repeats it in chapter 38: He shall make thy truth known. And along this path of truth the sons of God walk. 3 Kings 3: Walking in truth. This David chose, Psalm 118: I have chosen the way of truth — by no means the way of probability. By this truth we become holy: Sanctified in truth. These men are prepared to champion the truth, says Paul, 2 Corinthians 13: For we can do nothing against the truth, but for the truth. This is the rule of sanctity: In the sanctity of truth, adds the same Paul to the Ephesians, chapter 4. Christ came into the world that he might teach us this truth, Paul continues, 1 Timothy 2: Who will have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth. His elect he calls sons of truth, James chapter 1: He hath begotten us by the word of truth. For God is truth. It is truth which frees us from sin, as is added in John chapter 8: You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free.

VIII. The privation of truth is the mark of the reprobate, as is found in the first book of Machabees: There is no truth in them. These are they, says Paul, 1 Timothy 6, who are destitute of the truth; and he adds, 2 Thessalonians chapter 2: They believed not the truth; nay, they will turn away their hearing from the truth: 2 Timothy 4, turning themselves away from the truth; Titus 1; they resist the truth: 2 Timothy 2. They are destitute of the love of this truth: They received not the love of the truth: 2 Thessalonians 2. They do not acquiesce in the truth: Romans chapter 2. They speak not the truth: Jeremias chapter 9. Who detain the truth in injustice [Romans 1]; and by the depravity of their opinions they transform it into a lie: They changed the truth of God into a lie: Romans chapter 1. Forgetfulness of the truth has filled the earth, says Isaias: Truth hath been made into forgetfulness. So it is, cries Osee, chapter 4: There is no truth upon the earth. This truth men attempt to obscure and to whittle down: Truths are decayed from among the children of men: Psalm 11.

II [IX]. And what greater diminution of the truth can there be, than if that be rejected which more approaches the truth, and that be chosen which stands farther from the truth — that is, which is judged less true — while God commands the contrary? Thou hast commanded thy commandments to be kept most diligently: Psalm 118. Finally God, in Ecclesiasticus 37, gives this precept: Before all thy works let the true word go before thee, and before every action a steady counsel — no less true, and no less steady.

IX. Hence, then, the argument is constructed. It is an article of faith that the evangelical law, which Christ Jesus gave us as the certain, safe, and indefectible rule of our conscience, contains pure and sole truth, and rejects and detests all falsity. This, as I have said, is a truth of faith. The Probabilists defend, and that most pugnaciously, the licit use of contradictory opinions, in one or the other of which they know certainly and evidently that an antievangelical falsity is contained. Therefore the Probabilists certainly and evidently teach that a known falsity, by the force of their system, is the rule of a right conscience. Therefore the Probabilists champion an antievangelical doctrine.

X. The second proposition is most evident, since it is the very argument subjected to the disputation. Do the Probabilists deny the licit use of the more probable opinion? Do they deny the licit use of the contrary less probable opinion, concerning the very same action, and in respect of the same person? Would that they denied it — for then they would repudiate Probabilism, and devote it to the Furies. Not only do they by no means deny it; rather they most expressly affirm it; and in the name of them all, Fr. Antonio Casnedi thus addresses Christ, in tome 2, in the very dedication of his work: Since thou art the Master of truth, thou condescendest so far to human ignorance, that in thy tribunal of truth inculpable error equals truth itself. For thou dost not accuse it, but excusest it; thou dost not punish it, but rewardest it — holding thy very law for no law, and thy no-law for law, if the law be invincibly unknown as no law, and the no-law as law.

XI. This doctrine, as we have seen above in chapter 3, all the Probabilists commonly admit and defend. Therefore the second proposition of our demonstration is most evident: namely, that the Probabilists teach that the use of falsity, clothed in the cloak of Probabilism, is licit; and that this falsity, and error itself covered with the cloud of ignorance, enters the gate of Paradise, and is crowned by the Father of truth with the eternal reward of glory. But this doctrine, to my weakness, and saving better judgment, appears evidently false, antievangelical, and full of scandal.

XII. It is my pleasure to confirm what I have said by a sensible example. There are two cups of wine, in one of which poison lies hidden; but I do not know in which one determinately it resides. If I were to hand both cups to two men to drink, I should surely be guilty of homicide: since I know for certain that in one or the other a mortal poison is contained. There are two contradictory opinions, in one of which is contained the transgression of the divine Law, and therefore the guilt of eternal damnation. You do not know, indeed, which is determinately true; but you know most certainly that in one or the other falsity is contained. You propose that both be followed — the one by Peter, the other by Paul. This proposition contains the state of the question which all the Probabilists defend. Let us hear one above all, Fr. Paul Laymann, the most moderate of all the Probabilists, who in book I, treatise I, chapter 5, writes as follows: I judge that it will be nothing alien to reason, if a Doctor who is consulted signify to the one consulting him that an opinion is defended as probable by certain learned men, and that he may accordingly follow it — although the same Doctor certainly persuades himself that such an opinion is speculatively false, so that he himself cannot follow it in practice. For since the one consulting, in a doubtful matter, has the right of conforming himself to an opinion which is defended by certain learned men, notwithstanding that some others contradict it and judge the opinion speculatively improbable, the Doctor is not forbidden to indicate this very right to the one consulting him; and hence it comes about that a learned man can give opposite counsels to diverse persons according to opposite opinions, discretion and prudence however being preserved. Here you have, in few words, the whole secret of Probabilism laid open. You judge a proposition which treats of mortal sin to be certainly false speculatively, that is, absolutely, in itself. If you certainly judge it false, you also certainly judge it to be antievangelical, and therefore proscribed by God; since all falsity is disapproved by God. It is not lawful for you to follow it, says Fr. Laymann; yet it is lawful for you to urge it upon others. What? You can urge upon others what is not lawful for you? Where then is the oracle of Christ: What thou wilt not have done to thyself, do not to another? Where is the love of the truth, which you are commanded to follow, and to teach to others?

XIII. I come now to the last proposition set forth by me. A learned man can give opposite counsels to diverse persons according to opposite opinions. The learned man evidently knows, as we have said, and absolutely recognizes, that in one or the other of the opinions the poison of falsity is contained; yet he offers and urges both, to diverse men, to be followed. Therefore, knowingly and willingly, he kills one of those consulting him with the poison of falsity. You are deceived, they say. The poison of falsity, smeared over with the varnish of Probabilism, loses its power of killing. Is it so indeed? That falsity covered by invincible ignorance becomes harmless, I myself confess. But that falsity evidently known is vicious, no one can deny. Fr. Laymann, and with him all the Probabilists to a man, teach these two paradoxes — monstrous enough, in truth. The first: that you can urge upon another an opinion which you know to be certainly false in itself. The second: that you can offer opposite counsels to diverse men according to opposite opinions, while you know most certainly that in one or the other opinion the poison of falsity lies hidden. For to one of those men you urge a doctrine antievangelical in itself — as is every false doctrine. But an antievangelical doctrine does not raise to heaven; it thrusts down to hell. Who does not most evidently gather from this, that this Probabilism reduces the Gospel of Christ to pure and unmixed Scepticism, Pyrrhonism, and Academicism?

I. What has been said hitherto would suffice, and more than suffice, for overthrowing and exterminating Probabilism. But the more luminous the truth is, the more cavils, evasions, hiding-places, and sophistical distinctions do they need who strive to obscure and assail it. Wherefore we too are compelled to prolong the discourse, and to confirm what we have said by the authority of the Supreme Pontiffs.

II. Alexander VII, in the year 1665, on the 24th day of September, published this decree: "Our most holy Lord has heard, not without great grief of his soul, that several opinions, relaxative of Christian discipline and bringing destruction upon souls, are partly being revived after having grown obsolete, and partly newly brought forth; and that that extreme license of luxuriant wits grows greater day by day, through which, in matters pertaining to conscience, a manner of opining has crept in which is wholly alien to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers — and which, if the faithful were to follow it in practice as their right rule, an immense corruption of Christian life would burst forth. Wherefore, lest at any time the way of salvation, which the supreme truth, God, whose words endure for ever, has defined to be narrow, should be widened — or rather perverted — unto the destruction of souls: the same most holy Lord, that in his pastoral solicitude he might call back the sheep entrusted to him from such a spacious and broad way, along which men go to perdition, into the right path, committed the examination of these same opinions to several ..." and so forth.

III. Let this decree be compared with the preceding demonstration, and it will forthwith appear that Probabilism wars against evangelical doctrine no less than darkness against light. Three things are to be weighed in the Alexandrine decree. First, the condemned propositions, of which there is now no dispute. Second: a manner of opining has crept in into the Theology of morals, that is, in matters pertaining to conscience. This manner was intruded by the extreme license of luxuriant wits. This manner of opining, or of probabilizing, is wholly alien to evangelical simplicity — that is, to the spirit and sincerity of the evangelical law — and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers. What follows from this? If the Faithful, if the Pastors and Directors of souls were to follow this manner, an immense corruption would burst forth upon Christian life. The third point is that this manner of opining probabilistically thrusts Christian souls into the broad and spacious way which leads to perdition. Wherefore the most holy Pontiff, that he might call them back into the path of salvation, which God has defined to be narrow, condemned several opinions. He declared the probabilistic plant poisonous — that is, alien to the evangelical law and the doctrine of the Fathers; and he reprobated many of the fruits proceeding from it.

IV. Hence it is plain, clearer than the noonday light, that in this decree the Pontiff discourses, not of particular opinions only (for these opinions he condemns one by one), but of the probabilistic system itself. A manner of opining has crept in, which, if the Faithful followed it as their rule, they would slide down into the way of perdition. Now the rule of forming conscience is Probabilism, as Terillus proves at length in his treatise on the rule of morals. The rule is, as the Probabilists themselves confess, a benign one. But the Pontiff declares that this rule wars against the Gospel and the doctrine of the Fathers. Let the Probabilists explain to us: what other manner, what other rule alien to the Gospel and to the doctrine of the Fathers, has crept into the Theology of morals, besides Probabilism? Let them point out to us another manner, another system, another rule.

V. All this is evident in the obvious sense of the decree. Add to this that, as all the Historians confess, Probabilism had been denounced to the Supreme Pontiff. Moreover Stefano Gradi, Prefect of the Vatican Library, and a near contemporary of Alexander VII, testifies — both in a votum published by order of the sacred Congregation, and in a disputation published at Rome in the year 1670 against Fr. Honoré Fabri — that the Pontiff, by those words a manner of opining, etc., branded Probabilism. For the Pontiff, having received so many letters against Probabilism from the Bishops of France and of Belgium, had conceived (says Gradi), as an excellent reporter of the things of God, an impulse toward measures altogether grave and severe in this whole matter (of Probabilism), and toward cutting off the evil, as he said, utterly at its fountain and root, by publishing an express constitution ... Nor was anything nearer than that he should do it; and he would without doubt have done it, had not Cardinal Pallavicino intervened in his counsel, to whom that matter seemed to demand a more careful deliberation than could be dispatched quickly, as it appeared it would be; and that it would be much wiser if, the fuller censure being deferred for a while, the opinions themselves should in the meantime be struck down by name, as was done ... and a preface was added, which, though under a veil of words, makes truly manifest the mind of the one decreeing, as alien from this way of philosophizing about morals — which for that reason, as you see, he called a manner of opining contrary to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the holy Fathers.

VI. That Alexander VII by these words (a manner of opining, etc.) branded Probabilism, is attested also by the whole Gallican Church congregated in general Assembly in the year 1700, in these words: "Now, that we may come to another head of the faith — namely, to moral Theology, corrupted in these latest times by the depraved license and subtlety of wits — we think the words of Alexander VII of happy memory should be set first ... a manner of opining has crept in, etc.; in which sentence he not only complains that errors have increased, but also — and this is the chief point — he willed it to be noted that the very method of treating the matter had been introduced, whence we might see that a corruption of morals would not only follow, but would even, as it were with a charge made, burst in upon us — one which we could scarcely restrain. Nor was it enough for the most holy Pontiff (let the Probabilists weigh these words) to have uncovered this new method of making sport of conscience and of wrapping up the truth — that is, the very fountain of the evil — but he pursued also the rivulets of the deadly doctrine," and so forth.

VII. Finally, after many things, that Assembly published this solemn edict against Probabilism, the fountain of all laxities:

"Far be it from us to approve the error of those who deny that it is lawful to follow, even among probable opinions, the most probable. But for the right use of probable opinions we recognize these rules prescribed by the Law.

"The first is that in doubts concerning the business of salvation, where equal weights of reasons offer themselves to the mind on both sides, we should follow that which is safer — or that which is in that case (mark it well) solely safe; and that we should hold this not in the place of a counsel (as the Probabilists say), but of a precept, Scripture saying: He that loveth danger shall perish in it. This is the first rule.

"The second: that concerning probable opinions about Christian doctrine we should follow what the ecumenical Council of Vienne decreed concerning the virtues infused in baptism both in infants and in adults, in these words: We have judged that this opinion, as more probable, and more consonant and concordant with the sayings of the Saints and of the modern Doctors of Theology, is to be chosen. And it is evident that this judgment of the Council pertains the more to the direction of morals, the more the sanctity and salvation of the Faithful depend upon these very things, etc.

"That therefore in practice it should be lawful for us to follow an opinion which not even they themselves would judge should be chosen as the more probable — this is new, unheard of; this was brought forth by certain known authors only in this last (mark it well) century, and set up by them as the rule of morals; it is repugnant to that saying of Vincent of Lérins, etc. This is the beginning of the evils, and the head of all the aforesaid corruptions. This was censoriously branded, in the censures of the Apology of the Casuists, by our predecessors, men strong and religious." See Tome 2 of the Apparatus, book 3, dissertation 2.

I. Two decrees this supreme Pontiff published, by which Probabilism is overthrown: the one in 1679, directed to the universal Church; the other in 1680, given to the General of the Society of Jesus, in which he perspicuously declares that he detests Probabilism. See Tome 2 of the Apparatus, book 3, dissertation 3, chapter 2.

II. In the former decree four propositions are condemned, which are as it were the four hinges of Probabilism. I shall weigh them in few words. The third is this: In general, when we do anything relying upon probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability, we always act prudently.

III. The Probabilists answer that the thesis was condemned on account of those two words, in general and always: because, they say, Judges and Confessors cannot use a less probable opinion. A futile response. For the Pontiff condemned separately the use of the less probable opinion in Judges and in the administration of the Sacraments. Others cavil that a slight probability is not true probability. A vain evasion. For in the proscribed thesis it is said: provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability. Therefore the use of true probability stands condemned.

IV. The other condemned proposition is this: I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable. Before the birth of Probabilism no theologian, so far as I know, taught this thesis. It is a legitimate offspring of Probabilism. Before the Pontiff's decree the Probabilists commonly defended it, as the Salmanticenses testify, treatise 29, chapter 1, point 4; and Fr. Camargo attests that about seventy Probabilists maintained, before the decree, both that a judge can use the less probable opinion, and all the rest. Therefore, by the testimony of seventy Probabilists, the use of the less probable opinion is condemned absolutely no less in respect of all men than in respect of judges. And with good reason did they assert it. For this is the single foundation of Probabilism: He who acts probably, acts prudently; therefore he acts licitly. Hence this principle either stands everywhere, or nowhere. They rejoin that he acts prudently who follows an opinion practically probable, not he who follows an opinion speculatively probable; and that the less probable opinion in the tribunal is only speculatively, not practically, probable. Why? Because practical probability regards the licit or the illicit; speculative probability meditates rights and laws. An opinion which decides to whom estates, fiefs, and fields are owed is not practical. A most amusing fiction! The judge, then, adjudging the estate to Peter according to the more probable opinion, judges according to an opinion speculatively, not practically, probable?

V. Terillus — easily the prince of reflex Probabilism — answers that the judge is bound to pronounce sentence according to what appears to him truer, every human affection being excluded. But why are not the judges of souls also bound to do the same? By no means, replies Fr. Terillus, On conscience, question 24, number 26, page 476, in these words: I answer that there is a disparity, because the Confessor forms the dictate of his own conscience dependently upon the dictate of the conscience of the penitent. For the penitent does not sin, nor is he excused from sin, through the judgments of the Confessor, but only through his own judgments. Therefore the Confessor, who must judge concerning the sin of the penitent, must look to the opinion which the penitent has followed in good faith; which opinion, even if directly less probable, excuses the penitent from sin, and therefore determines the Confessor to say that that opinion, though directly less probable, frees from sin the man who follows it in good faith. But the judge does not regulate his own judgment by the judgment of the litigants: otherwise he would have to pronounce sentence in favor of both. And so the judge regulates his own judgment and his own sentence by those things which seem more probable to himself, not to others; and therefore he must follow those things which he himself, all things weighed, judges to be more probable.

VI. Many of the Probabilists complain when we cry out with raised voice that these are unheard-of and portentous paradoxes. But I most humbly beseech them, and earnestly beg, that, prejudices laid aside, they be willing seriously to weigh whether this doctrine can be joined — I do not say with the Gospel, but with common sense. The Confessor forms the dictate of his conscience dependently upon the dictate of the penitent? Who can bear to hear this? The Confessor sitting in the tribunal either is, or is not, a judge. Who will deny that he acts the person of a judge? Therefore, as judge, he cannot depend upon the judgment of the penitent. If Confessors depended upon the judgment of their penitents, and not upon the laws of the Church and the divine law, penitents would always have to be absolved, and never bound. For no Catholic approaches the tribunal who does not have a dictate by which he judges that he ought to be absolved. For if they judged themselves unworthy of absolution, they would assuredly not approach it.

VII. Another disparity between the Judge and the Confessor the Probabilists commonly assign. The judge, they say, cannot follow the less probable opinion, because, if it be false, the evil is not avoided which thence befalls Caius, who loses his cause. On the contrary, if the less probable opinion which the Theologian follows be false, no evil follows: for the violation of the law is then material; and, on the other hand, God suffers no harm. So teaches Terillus, On conscience, question 24, number 53: God is incapable of all harm; he can only be dishonored through offense. But every offense is manifestly avoided through the good faith of the agent, reasonably established. And a man, in the case of the objection, is not bound to judge in favor of God; though the judge is bound to pronounce sentence for the more probable part. Terillus is followed by La-Croix, Viva, Segneri in his epistles, and the other Probabilists.

VIII. I am compelled, against the end of brevity that I set before myself, to transcribe the principal words of the Probabilists themselves: because readers would in no way believe that these paradoxes could have been devised by Theologians. God is incapable of all harm. True enough. Therefore so much diligence is not to be applied that his offense may be avoided, as must be applied that the temporal losses of a single man may be averted? What, I ask, is more unworthy of Christian ears? This response, the more common it is among the Probabilists, the more inept it is, and the fuller of scandal. For, this being granted, iniquity might be drunk like water, since God suffers no harm from it. How horrendous this is, everyone sees. That response is refuted on two heads. 1. The violation of the law, however material, is a grave evil in itself. That it is not imputed to you as fault, as the Probabilists contend, is per accidens, on account of invincible ignorance — if indeed it be present; but in reality it is a real transgression of the divine law. And this is a far graver harm than the evil inflicted upon Caius by the loss of his estate. Therefore, if the Judge sins, more gravely sins the Theologian using the lesser probability. 2. The Probabilists are evidently deceived when they say that this transgression is material in the Theologian, but not in the Judge. Tell me: why is the transgression of the law formal in the Judge? Because the Judge does not apply all diligence and industry to avoid the transgression of the law. Well and rightly said. But is not all diligence and industry morally possible perhaps necessary, absolutely and apart from any circumstance whatever, that the offense of God may be avoided? If you use the lesser probability, you do not apply the aforesaid diligence: because you not only neglect, but positively repudiate, all the probability that lies before you. Therefore you sin, just as, by the definition of the apostolic See, the judge sins. Therefore the use of the less probable opinion makes criminal in equal measure every Theologian who neglects to avoid the danger of the divine offense, as it makes criminal the judge who neglects to decline the danger of injuring the right of Caius. What do you mutter? Is greater diligence in finding the truth required in the judge of temporal things than in the judge of eternal salvation? Is this the prudence of Probabilism — to make more of temporal detriment than of the loss of eternal salvation? Is it not a monstrous prudence which in the least things, such as earthly things are, demands the utmost diligence, and in the greatest things, such as eternal things are, a lesser solicitude? Would God be too severe if, in the settling of controversies over his law, he commanded his judges the use of the greater probability — while those Princes are not severe, nor Rigorists, but benign, who command their judges that in controversies about eaves-drippings, about a beam, about an estate, they embrace the more probable doctrine? The whole of holy Scripture commands that we search the divine law, and love it above gold and topaz. The Probabilists, on the contrary, will have us love the civil law, which declares the rights of contracts, of estates, of sales, more than the law of God, and embrace the greater probability in these causes. This is the benign probabilistic Theology. Although it be more verisimilar to you that your action violates the law of God and offends God himself, provided it be probable that you will not violate the law, you act prudently and holily in performing the action which you more probably judge to violate the Law and to contemn God. On the contrary, a civil judge would be unjust and criminal if he applied this rule.

IX. The last disparity, finally, devised by the Probabilists is this. A pact intervenes between judges and the Commonwealth, that judgments be pronounced according to the more probable opinion. But by this pact Theologians and Confessors are not bound. But whence do the Probabilists prove this pact? Their prince answers, question 24 On conscience, number 15, Terillus: For this presumed will, from the very constitution of nature, is equivalent to a pact, and has the force of a pact. This pact the other Probabilists obtrude, especially Fr. Paolo Segneri: they obtrude this pact, I say, as the last anchor to which they tie their shipwrecked Probabilism.

X. This anchor is of straw, and chimerical. That pact, limited to civil judges alone, is fictitious. Nay, I say that this pact has been implanted by the author of nature in all men. This pact is a fruit of the divine light signed upon the countenance of all souls. The civil Commonwealth elects its judges. The ecclesiastical Commonwealth elects its judges — Bishops, Parish priests, Confessors, Theologians. Whence, I ask, do the Probabilists have it that the civil Commonwealth, but not the sacred, enters into a pact that judgments be pronounced according to the more probable opinion? Whence does the knowledge of so great a secret shine upon them? What foundation urges that this pact be instituted in the lay Commonwealth, but not in the sacred? Does the Commonwealth, insofar as it is sacred and ecclesiastical, make less of truth and justice than the lay and civil Commonwealth? In the first centuries of the Church, Bishops and Parish priests were chosen as judges of civil causes among Christians. The same often happens even today. Do those judges, outside of confession, judge according to the more probable opinions, but in the sacred tribunal according to the less probable? Will they free, in the sacred forum of penance, from restitution, from usury, from simony, the litigant whom in the lay tribunal they judged liable to restitution, or guilty of usury, according to the more probable opinion? If civil Principalities and Commonwealths impose on their chosen judges the burden of embracing, in controversies of temporal things, the greater probability, does the Catholic Church absolve her judges of eternal things from that burden? If the civil Commonwealth chooses judges more learned and more skilled, does the Church choose men less learned, less skilled, less upright? Holy Scripture, Exodus chapter 18, cries out: Provide out of all the people able men, such as fear God, in whom is truth — it does not say, probability. Likewise Ecclesiasticus [recte Osee] chapter 7 [recte 4]: Woe to you for ever and beyond, because there is no truth in you.

I. The first and universal extrinsic rule of morals is the eternal law of God. The second rule, proximate and formal, intrinsic, is the reason, or practical dictate, of our conscience, as has been shown above. About this first proposition there is no dispute. That an action may be honorable, it must be consonant with both laws, as St. Thomas perspicuously teaches, I-II, q. 21, art. 1: In those things which are done through the will, the proximate rule is human reason, but the supreme rule is the eternal law. Whenever, therefore, a human act proceeds to its end according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is right; but when it is bent aside from this rectitude, then it is called sin. Now it is manifest from the premisses that every voluntary act is evil by this, that it recedes from the order of reason and of the eternal law; and every good act accords with reason and the eternal law.

II. The eternal law of God is a law of truth: Thy law is truth; all thy commandments are truth. Truth alone is the single rule of an honorable conscience — truth alone, I say, known either evidently and certainly, or probably and obscurely. When falsity appears to us under the aspect of truth, the rule is false, and the operation is not honorable, but vicious. If the falsity be invincible, the vicious action is not imputed to fault; but it never becomes good and meritorious, as has been shown above.

III. The third ineluctable principle is expressed in the holy Scriptures themselves — namely, the most grave commandment of inquiring after and investigating the truth. Nothing is more frequent in Scripture than this most grave precept, by which all are bound to learn and to meditate the law. It is said in Deuteronomy 6: And these words which I command thee this day shall be in thy heart; and thou shalt tell them to thy children, and thou shalt meditate upon them sitting in thy house, and walking on thy journey. David continually prays, and promises that he will investigate the law: Set before me for a law, O Lord, the way of thy justifications, and I will always seek after it. Give me understanding, and I will search thy law. Matthew 28: Teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you. St. Paul, Ephesians 4 [recte 5]: Become not unwise, but understanding what is the will of God. Not to be long: a thousand times this most grave precept of learning, meditating, searching, and not forgetting the law of truth is repeated to us. These things being laid down as certain, I press the Probabilists thus.

IV. If you hold the truth of the Law evidently, are you not bound to fulfill it? They say yes. Then you must say the same when you judge it more probable that the law exists. A clear knowledge of the law imposes the duty of fulfilling the law, as all confess. Therefore, according to the degree of knowledge, such will be the degree of obligation. Therefore, when the law more probably obliges, the burden of keeping the Law presses.

V. He who acts according to the lesser probability, the greater being repulsed, evidently violates the most grave precept of investigating, learning, and meditating the law. For he who acts according to the less probable opinion knows and reckons that his operation is more contrary than conformed to the law; he knows that he is receding from the law more than approaching it. Therefore he does not inquire after the law with sincerity of soul. Would you sincerely and with deliberate mind search for a treasure, if you abandoned the way which would more probably lead you to the finding of it, and selected the opposite way, which would less lead you to, and more lead you away from, the finding?

VI. If a sick man chose a medicine which he knows to be more probably poisonous than wholesome, would he be free from sin? They answer that these examples are inept: since, if the medicine be poisonous, it brings death, no good intention of the mind availing; but an opinion about the honesty of an action, even if false, excuses from mortal sin, by the benefit of invincible ignorance. Below I shall show that this probabilistic invincible ignorance is a portent monstrous in the extreme. Dismissing, then, the chimerical disparity which the Casuists are wont to assign between the recounted examples and the less probable opinion, I press the Probabilists thus.

VII. Let the Probabilists explain to us. Do they dare themselves to affirm that this sick man desires and loves his health with a sincere and efficacious mind? They would show themselves fools if they affirmed it. But why does that sick man not love or desire health with a sincere mind? Because he repudiates the medicine which he more probably judges to be more suited to the acquiring of health. Therefore, by the same reasoning, the Probabilists do not seek with a sincere mind the observance of the law of God, if, the greater probability being repudiated, they select the lesser. Whatever, then, be the case with the distinction between a medicine and an opinion, we now press the Probabilists to answer whether he studies to fulfill, with a sincere and efficacious mind, the most grave precept of finding and learning the truth, who in obscure matters rejects what is more verisimilar and embraces what is less verisimilar. From another side I press them.

Titius, a priest, always instructs and directs the faithful committed to his care according to probable opinions. Hence he preaches that they need not be solicitous about directing their intention to God, for he says it is solidly probable that an intention once had in life and not retracted suffices to give form to all the works of the whole life. Nor, he says, need they be solicitous about gaining indulgences, for the same intention once had and not retracted suffices for gaining any indulgences whatever, provided that the prescribed works are fulfilled, even if the indulgence attached to them is unknown. Hence it is asked:

1. How do probabilism, equiprobabilism, and probabiliorism differ?

2. Is the use of probabilism lawful in every matter?

3. Within the limits of lawful matter, is it always and for everyone better to use probabilism?

4. What is to be said about Titius’s manner of acting?

1. See approved authors. 2. See the answer to this question, p. 54. 3. Even when probabilism may be applied, is it well always to apply it for everybody? No, it is not. There is room for prudence on the part of the confessor as to when a probable opinion is to be used.

The confessor indeed has no legislative authority and can not impose on his penitents an obligation which does not exist. But if the penitent is willing to do what is more generous and more perfect, the confessor should encourage him, and he would act very imprudently if by insisting on a probable and contrary opinion he caused the penitent to adopt a less perfect course of action than he had been prepared to follow. Occasionally when he knows his penitent and thinks that it will be for this benefit, the confessor may laudably urge him to act in a generous way, even though there is no obligation in the matter.

4. What about Titius' way of acting?

It may be hoped that the case is a fictitious one, and that no priest was ever so foolish and ignorant as to misapply probabilism in the way that Titius is said to have done. Probabilism is specially meant to settle doubts of conscience, and for use in the confessional. It is not intended to furnish matter for pastoral instruction and sermons. The preacher and instructor, without exaggerating obligations, should always propose a high ideal to his hearers and exhort them to follow it. As Rodriguez says: “By this discourse we easily see how important it is that in our spiritual exhortations we speak of that only which is perfect in a sovereign degree. If we preach, for example, on humility, it must be that humility which is most profound, and which reaches to contempt of oneself. If we preach on mortification, it must be on that which subjects all our passions to reason; if we preach on conforming our will to God, we must recommend a conformity which leaves us no will but that of the Almighty, which resigns our will entirely to His, and which establishes all its content and joy in the accomplishment of the divine will. . . . Because you are weak I must propose to you the most perfect kind of virtue and devotion, that by your aiming at what is best you may be able to perform at least what is of strict obligation.”¹

1 Practice of Religious Perfection, vol. i, chapter viii.

Titius tells his people that they need not trouble themselves about directing their intention to God, for it is solidly probable that an intention elicited once for all will suffice to direct all the actions of one's life to God if it is not retracted. This is probably true, bearing in mind the clause “if it is not retracted.” But it would most likely be understood to mean that there was no necessity for thinking about God oftener than once in a lifetime, which is, of course, altogether false. Besides it is only an opinion, and those who acted upon it might lose a great deal of merit if it is not the true opinion. Titius adopted the wrong tone in his instructions; he should not be content with the minimum, even if he tells his people what the minimum is, but he should exhort them frequently to renew their intention of pleasing God, so that they may be the more secure and may reap the greater reward.

Titius followed a probable opinion about the intention which is necessary for gaining indulgences, but here again it is only probable; it is not certain that it would suffice for gaining all indulgences as he says. So in this matter also Titius acted imprudently and from a wrong point of view, and he should correct what he said. For it is not certain that probabilism may be used in the matter of indulgences, inasmuch as indulgences are a grant made by the Church on certain conditions, and anyone who wishes to gain them must satisfy the conditions laid down.²

2 Bulot, Compend. Theol. Mor., vol. ii, n. 1002.

This book deserves a welcome as an honest attempt to grapple with the difficulties of moral science. How great those difficulties are is generally recognized, and by none more fully and freely than by those who have tried to overcome them. Modern theories in history and science have directed renewed attention to the fundamental problems of ethics, and it is fitting that readers who are interested in the subject should be able to study the Catholic answer to those problems in the mother tongue. Students of theology, too, will benefit by being able to consult an English author, who goes over the ground rendered so familiar to them by our Latin text-books. There are many such works published in other modern languages, but as yet the English language is singularly deficient in them.

These, however, were not the reasons that induced Dr. McDonald to publish his essay. He tells us in his preface that while it is his main object to explain and defend the traditional system of morals which has been taught for centuries in the Catholic schools, yet he claims to have arrived at some important conclusions which are not to be found elsewhere. “If it were otherwise,” he says, “I should not have thought of writing or publishing.”

In the course of teaching moral theology, he noticed a considerable difference between the general principles formulated in the treatises on Human Acts, Laws, and Conscience, and the special conclusions arrived at afterwards when treating of the particular ’ virtues. These special conclusions he regards as the true rules of moral conduct, and as furnishing the material for that wider synthesis which forms the substance of the earlier and fundamental treatises. Hence these special conclusions should furnish a test for the validity and accuracy of the general principles laid down in the treatises on Human Acts, Law, and Conscience.

I quite agree. A general principle of morals which breaks down when applied to particular cases does not deserve to rank as a principle. It makes a pretense of being a rule of conduct, while in practice it furnishes no guide to conduct at all. If, then, the contention be true, that some of the general principles of the fundamental treatises of moral theology as found in our text-books do not harmonize with the doctrine on special virtues, all moralists will welcome the demonstration of its truth, and will be thankful for an accurate and plain statement of the general principles which should be substituted in place of the old.

No theologian would pretend that the common doctrine found in our text-books on the fundamental treatises of moral theology has reached its final, definitive, and perfect stage. Progress is still possible, and no doubt progress will be made in the method of presenting the doctrine, in the enunciation and ordering of the principles, and in other ways. And if we are to advance, some one must attempt the task, some one must act as pioneer of the way. This is another reason why this book deserves a welcome. But if the advance is to be on secure lines, it is no less necessary that the critic should be on the look out, and should perform his task honestly and fearlessly.

This is what I propose to do in this article. For the great bulk of the book, inasmuch as it presents in a good English dress the common doctrine of the Catholic schools, I have nothing but praise and a sincere welcome to offer. It is with two or three of those special conclusions at which Dr. McDonald has arrived, and which he says are not to be found elsewhere, that I propose to deal. I may say frankly at the outset that I do not agree with them; and so I find my place among those many students of morals, who, as he tells us in his Preface, the author foresaw would question and deny the success of his attempt in the direction of novelty.

In the remarks which I have to make I shall strive to be as impersonal as possible; I shall look at the doctrines criticized from the purely objective point of view, and I am sure Dr. McDonald will not resent the friendly and honest criticism of a fellow-worker in a field of knowledge, as difficult as it is interesting.

A good practical test of the morality of an action is the effect which it produces. Adultery, theft, selfishness, are seen to be morally wrong because of the evil consequences which they produce. What, however, is to be said of the moral quality of an action which produces both good and bad effects? The administration of chloroform renders the subject insensible to pain, but it also deprives him of the use of reason for the time being; craniotomy preserves the mother but it kills the child. How are we to judge of the morality of such actions as these which produce effects of opposite moral quality? Dr. McDonald discusses and rejects the test which is commonly given in our text-books of moral theology. He translates the principle as formulated by Father Lehmkuhl thus : —

It is lawful to perform an action which produces two effects, one good, the other bad,—provided (1) the action, viewed in itself is good or at least indifferent; (2) the agent does not intend the evil effect, but only the good (it is well to add in some cases: and provided there is no danger of subsequent evil consent or intention); (3) the good effect is produced as immediately as—that is, not by means of—the bad; (4) and there is a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect. (Page 149.)

He then proceeds to criticize the principle in this manner : —

There is not one of these four conditions that does not present difficulties to my mind. Let us take them in order :—

(1) ‘‘The action’’—that is, as I understand it, the external action—‘‘viewed in itself, must be good or at least indifferent.’’ But is not the whole question at issue this: how is one to know whether this action is good in itself, when its effects are good as well as evil? You tell me that it is to be considered lawful—which is the same as good— if, among other things, it is good in itself; and I do not see how this makes me a whit the wiser. (Page 149.)

Dr. McDonald misunderstands the principle which he impugns. The whole question at issue is, of course, the morality of the action which produces both good and bad effects. We wish to know whether the administration of chloroform, for instance, is a good action; whether craniotomy is lawful; whether, to take a third example given by Dr. McDonald, it is lawful to walk to the fields in summer time for the sake of exercise and relaxation, in spite of the fact that at each step we crush the life out of many lowly forms of sentient being. The principle tells us that such actions will be morally good if certain conditions are verified. The first is that the action viewed in itself, that is, apart from its effects, must not be bad. This is not the whole question at issue, as Dr. McDonald asserts that it is; the question at issue is, whether the action remains good, even though it produce an evil effect. We can examine the morality of the action apart from its evil effect, and this is what the principle tells us to do. Thus, in the last instance quoted from Dr. McDonald, it is possible to walk in the fields without destroying sentient life at all, or at least we may conceive of its being done; the question is, whether it remains a lawful action in summer time, when it cannot ordinarily be done without destroying animal or insect life. The action of walking in the fields, even in summer time, is ethically good, or at least indifferent, viewed in itself, apart from consequences, and thus it satisfies the first condition laid down in the principle. This is a distinct step towards the solution of the question concerning the morality of walking in the fields in summer time; when we have got thus far, we are something more than a whit the wiser. For, if the question were whether I may tell a lie to save another’s life, or in other words, whether a lie is lawful when it produces a good effect in spite of its also producing a bad one, the question would at once be settled in the negative by the application of our principle; the first condition would not be satisfied, because to lie is bad in itself. Dr. McDonald proceeds : —

(2) ‘‘The agent must not intend the evil effect, but only the good.’’ But, according to the doctrine laid down in the last chapter, the question of intention or subsequent consent does not arise. We want to test whether a certain external action, regarded in itself, is morally good or bad; and I think I have shown that external acts, as such, do not depend for their morality on any concomitant or subsequent act of the will. (Page 149.)

Dr. McDonald misunderstands the second condition as seriously as he misunderstood the first. We are not concerned here with the mere external action regarded in itself. We want to know whether it is lawful to walk in the fields in summer time. The action is regarded as a complete human act, therefore as a voluntary act, as one issuing from free will, therefore as necessarily informed by a certain intention, an intention which may be good or bad. To walk in the fields in order wantonly to destroy sentient life is a bad action, because informed by a vicious intention ; to walk in the fields for recreation, or to till them, is good. With a view to settling whether in a concrete case walking in the fields is a good and lawful action, the principle lays down the condition that the intention must not be bad. This has nothing to do with the disputed question whether the intention can change the nature of the external act.

The third condition is: “The good effect must be produced as immediately as — that is — not by means of the bad.”

Criticizing this condition Dr. McDonald asks: “Is this universally true?” I answer, Yes, if in the circumstances the evil effect remains evil, for we must not do evil that good may come of it. To amputate a diseased leg in order to save life is not evil, and so the example does not show that the condition laid down is false, though the Doctor seems to think that it does. And though he here implies that when chloroform is administered, the good effect is obtained through the evil, he does not prove it; and even if that were proved, he would still have to show that to produce unconsciousness by administering chloroform when there is good reason for it, is evil. Dr. McDonald refers us to another work of his for a criticism of the terminology of the fourth condition, and then briefly subjoins:

The ‘‘weighty reason’’ required is the good effect which must also be produced by the action. . .. Now it is not much addition to one’s sum of knowledge to be told that an action is wrong which does not produce any but an evil effect; nor does it help much to be informed further that the good effect produced must bear some proportion to the evil. (Page 150.)

I shall have something to say to this further on.

After his polemic against the principle of a double effect, Dr. McDonald inquires whether the distinction between direct and indirect causality may not serve as a basis for the test which ought really to be applied in all cases of mixed results. He rejects this suggestion, but in his discussion on this point he falsifiés the meaning of the distinction as commonly used by theologians, and confounds it with the distinction between per se and per accidens. When theologians treat of the lawfulness of direct and indirect killing, the distinction does not merely refer to the direct or indirect causality of the external act; it has special reference to the intention.¹ Dr. McDonald, indeed, rules the question of intention out of court, but such is not the practice of moral theologians when they discuss the questions with which the Doctor is here occupied, and inasmuch as those questions are concerned with human acts, acts necessarily informed by some intention, not with the merely physical external acts of the body, as he seems to suppose, it is difficult to see the reason for abstracting from the intention.

¹

Finally, the Doctor proposes a principle of his own in substitution for the principle of a double effect. He states it thus: —

“That is said to be intended directly in any action which is intended primarily and for its own sake. Its correlative is indirectly, which is said of that which is intended only by reason of another and as it were accidentally. . . . In morals, he directly intends homicide who commands it; indirectly, he who posits some cause of it, such as drunkenness, from which it follows.”—Lexicon Scholasticorum Verborum.

An external action is to be considered morally good, even though it should produce a bad as well as a good effect, provided (1) it does not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated; and (2) the good effect produced is sufficient to compensate for the bad. (Page 158.)

The chief reason why Dr. McDonald wrote his book was, it will be remembered, to remedy a defect in other authors. As he says, just before the statement of his new principle: —

I am convinced that when they come to practical work our theologians retain their sound common sense and forget or neglect the general principle which they were at such pains to establish at an earlier period, when treating of what I may call the metaphysics of moral science. (Page 157.)

Unless I am very much mistaken this procedure will be necessary in the case of Dr. McDonald’s own principle. In fact, he himself virtually acknowledges as much. On two conditions, he says, an external action will be morally good, even though it produces a bad as well as a good effect; first, it must not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated. But which are those beings which by nature are not to be subordinated? Unless this is known, it will not be possible to apply the general principle. It will only be a general rule of conduct in so far as it enables us to decide the morality of particular cases. However, Dr. McDonald confesses that there is no general rule that can be given.

It is reasonable to ask [he says] how one is to decide whether and how far any being is by nature subservient to another. I know of no general rule that may be applied; one has to go through the different essences in nature, examine their circumstances, compare them, and then decide whether and how far they are independent or subservient. (Page 163.)

To go through the different essences in nature, examine their circumstances, and compare them, is the work of a theologian, and not an easy task even for him; so that there will be no slight difficulty in discovering whether the first condition is verified in a particular case.

The second condition is, that the good effect produced should be sufficient to compensate for the bad. Now this seems identical with one of the conditions ordinarily required by theologians in the common statement of the principle of a double effect. “ There must be a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect,’ says Father Lehmkuhl, quoted above. Dr. McDonald would seem to have forgotten his criticism of that condition in the former connection: “Nor does it help much,” he wrote, “to be informed that the good effect produced must bear some proportion to the evil” (page 150). If it did not help much there, I cannot see how it can help much here. Furthermore, he confesses that here also no general rule can be given for deciding whether the good effect is sufficient to compensate for the bad (page 165). The circumstances must be balanced in particular cases, certain allowances have to be made; what those allowances are is a question which the writer on ethics has to face when he comes to treat of the separate virtues; in doing this he must draw liberally on the light supplied by other practical sciences. The work, evidently, is not child’s play; in any case the result will not help us much.

I am afraid practical moralists will not find Dr. McDonald’s principle of much use. It is as difficult to decide whether the conditions laid down are verified, as to decide the moral quality of the external action.

Moreover, unless I seriously misunderstand the Doctor’s meaning, the principle is inadequately formulated. As laid down it would allow actions to be done which are certainly wrong. For example: I am in poverty, and I have the opportunity of relieving my wants and those of my family by stealing £5 from a wealthy neighbor. This action produces a good and a bad effect; it relieves my want, though to be sure it also deprives my neighbor of a sum which he will hardly miss. The action will be lawful, according to Dr. McDonald, on condition that it does not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated, and if the good effect is sufficient to compensate for the bad. Both these conditions would seem to be verified by my action. I subordinate money to human wants, as by nature it should be subordinated; the good effect is out of all proportion to the bad. The money in my hands goes to feed my family, in the hands of its owner it would go to feed his dogs.

I must confess I do not see why this is not a legitimate application of Dr. McDonald’s principle; it is with the purpose of excluding such applications of the principle of a double effect that theologians require, as a first condition, that the action in itself should be good, or at least indifferent; but Dr. McDonald rejects that condition as involving the whole question at issue.

Besides the principle of a double effect, Dr. McDonald adversely criticizes the common doctrine about penal laws. However, his chief objections to that doctrine are not new; they appear to me to have been abundantly answered by such classical writers on Law as Suarez and Laymann. Besides, I should very much doubt whether the Doctor’s rather strict views on this point are at all general in the land of potheen. It will be more interesting to pass on to his criticism of the fundamental principle of Probabilism and Equiprobabilism alike, the principle that doubtful laws do not bind the conscience.

This principle is capable of being understood in several ways. All theologians hold that doubtful laws bind in some sense. Thus, in a case of practical doubt as to the existence of a law I am bound to make due inquiry, and I am not at liberty to act until I can, directly or reflexly, form a certain conscience on the question. Dr. McDonald strives to show that there is no general law which obliges one in doubt to acquire certainty as to the rightness of his action before he proceeds to act. (Page 199, sqq.) But surely the law which forbids us to act with a doubtful conscience binds us to do this. Quod non est ex fide peccatum est. If I doubt whether it be a day of abstinence or not, and eat meat without taking any pains to form a certain conscience, I commit a sin, and that whether it be a day of abstinence or not. For the very fact of my eating meat in spite of my being doubtful whether it is not forbidden by the Church shows that I am prepared to break the law of the Church about abstinence, and this is a sinful disposition, which is externated by my eating meat, which act therefore is a sin, whether there be a prohibition to eat meat on that day or not. This explains why it is always a sin to eat meat with a doubtful conscience, even when the doubtful law does not exist. How would Dr. McDonald explain this on his assumption that doubtful laws bind directly and of their own force? A law which does not exist cannot bind. Dr. McDonald’s argument, therefore, seems destitute of force. The fact that the sin committed by one who acts in doubt is of the same species as would be the sin committed against the doubtful law if it existed, does not show that a doubtful law binds the conscience; it only proves that there is a general law which prescribes that we must form a certain conscience before we act.

Moreover, a doubtful law may in a certain sense be said to bind after due inquiry has been made, and the doubt cannot be directly solved. If, after forming my conscience in this case I act against the law which really exists, I commit a material sin, but I am excused from formal guilt. All theologians, I think, also admit this. The doubtful law is said in such cases to bind imperfectly, in actu primo, not perfectly and in actu secundo. Dr. McDonald hardly seems to admit the validity of this distinction as applied to the obligation of law, and almost violently attacks the defenders of probabilism, who use it in the exposition of their system. His remarks, however, show that he has misunderstood its history and meaning.

I do not know [he writes] when or by whom this distinction between first and second act was introduced into treatises on the binding force of laws. St. Alphonsus took it, apparently, from Cardinal Gotti; and the curious in such matters may inquire whether the learned Cardinal is responsible for first transferring the terms in question from the treatises on actuality and activity, where they were found originally and where they serve some purpose, to treatises on law and its obligation, where they are almost without meaning. (Page 206.)

But surely treatises on law and its obligation are treatises on actuality and activity. This appeared so evident to Suarez that he took it for granted at the beginning of his great treatise on Laws.²

² Lib. I., c. iv., n. 3.

There can be no objection, then, to using the distinction, in actu primo and in actu secundo, of the different phases in which we may consider the obligation of laws. Such classical authors as Suarez and Sylvius used it in this sense long before Gotti wrote. The very term obligation is derived from physical activity, as St. Thomas explains in a celebrated passage: —

The command of some ruler stands in relation to binding in voluntary matters by that mode of binding which can befall the will, just as bodily action stands in relation to binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never induces necessity in another thing except through the contact of the coercion itself with the thing upon which it acts; hence no one is bound by the command of any king or lord unless the command reaches the very person to whom it is given; and it reaches him through knowledge. Hence no one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept; and therefore one who is not capable of knowledge is not bound by a precept, nor is anyone ignorant of a precept of God bound to fulfill the precept, except insofar as he is bound to know the precept. But if he is not bound to know it and does not know it, he is in no way bound by the precept. Just as in bodily things a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge.

It is difficult, then, to see what ground Dr. McDonald has for objecting to a distinction which is in accord with the nature of things, and which has been consecrated by the usage of centuries in the schools. His subsequent remarks, however, show that he has seriously misunderstood the meaning in which the distinction is used.

APOLOGY
FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE JESUITS
SENT TO HIS LORDSHIP THE BISHOP OF ARRAS ON THE OCCASION OF HIS CENSURE OF THE BOOK OF A GERMAN CASUIST

The alleged lax moral teaching of the Jesuits is the most plausible means that the Innovators and their other enemies have employed to discredit them and to estrange upright persons from them. This means has often succeeded for them. Many persons, judging the sincerity of others by their own, cannot persuade themselves that anyone would wish to defame an entire Society by reproaches which, if supposed false, would be atrocious and horrible calumnies.

With this prepossession, they enter blindly into the sentiments of those who speak ill of the Jesuits, and even join themselves to them, believing that they earn merit before God by assisting a zeal whose sole aim, it seems, is to arrest the course of a pernicious doctrine, by discrediting everywhere those who pass for its authors. It is thus that the prejudgment forms and imperceptibly increases, until it passes into the minds of many as a constant truth against which the accused can no longer be admitted to justify themselves.

But if these persons, either a little better instructed or a little more attentive, wished, before pronouncing so decided a judgment in a matter of this importance, to consult the rules of prudence and charity more than they do, I believe that the scruple of a rash judgment might arise in their conscience. I am persuaded that they would at least suspend for some time the sentence which they pronounce without hesitation against an entire Society, which has perhaps rendered some services to them themselves, and which, constantly for more than a century, has served the Church in every part of the world with some success and with some advantage to Religion.

Would it then be possible, say these persons, whose intentions are often very upright, would it be possible that so many people of every rank, of every condition, and of the holiest professions should all be calumniators; or that, without knowledge of the cause, they should every day carry themselves away, in public and in private, into cruel invectives against a body that was innocent of the frightful excesses with which they reproach it? But let them permit me to ask them in turn whether they can easily persuade themselves that a Society such as that of the Jesuits is only a collection of villains and abominable persons. For there is no middle ground here; and if they are such as they are depicted in the libels published against them, they must be regarded as monsters within Christianity.

In vain do their most declared enemies, through an affected moderation, sometimes contrast the regularity of this Society with the detestable doctrine they attribute to it. They live well, says one of their most venomous adversaries, but they teach badly. This contrast is a chimera. To live well and to undertake to ruin the doctrine of the Gospel throughout the earth by a detestable Moral Theology are two things that cannot be reconciled. It has indeed been seen at various times that certain leaders of a heretical party constantly maintained, in order to gain followers, the appearance of a severe virtue. But a Society as extensive as that of the Jesuits, which preserved the integrity of morals for more than a century while applying itself to corrupting them among Christians throughout the earth, would be a prodigy without example and beyond probability.

It is in no way natural to reserve severity for oneself while teaching laxity to others. The contrary happens every day to several of those who appear most animated against this alleged corrupted Moral Theology of the Jesuits. The world is witness to it. Worldly though it is, it is scandalized by it and makes sport of it. Many upright persons groan over it. But after all, judging things by the lights of good sense, it will always be less surprising to see Rigorism preached by those who live in laxity than it would be to see laxity preached by those who practice Rigorism. It is easy to do the first, and it is very much the fashion in the time in which we live. There is no attraction in the second. One gains nothing thereby either on God’s side or on the world’s. It would be to damn oneself at great cost, without being able to reimburse oneself for anything; it would be to enter hell by the narrow gate. Such a project was never in accordance with the ideas of self-love, and, to have conceived it, the Jesuits would all have to be different from the rest of mankind.

This presumption alone appears decisive to many persons in the subject at issue; but I do not wish to avail myself of it to the point of making it the sole proof of the Jesuits’ innocence in defending them against the execrable undertaking imputed to them, of undertaking to ruin everywhere the Moral Teaching of Jesus Christ. What I intend solely is thereby to put all equitable persons who might be prejudiced in a better state to judge soundly of so important a fact, to engage them to suspend for a moment their judgment between the two parties, and to dispose them to receive, with a spirit of charity and equity, the declaration I shall make in the name of the Society of Jesus on the point of Moral Theology. It is for the same end that I am going to add some reflections on the occasion and the origin of the accusations made against it in this matter, and on the means that have been used to support them and to render them plausible to an infinity of persons to whom their atrocity alone had at first rendered them incredible.

Until the time of Baius and Jansenius, the Jesuits were in possession of the reputation of persons perfectly orthodox in matters of Faith and Moral Theology. They could produce on this subject the praises which the Sovereign Pontiffs have so many times bestowed upon their Society, and in particular upon several of their principal Doctors. The heretics of France, England, and Germany could further serve them as witnesses in this regard. According to these Protestant Doctors, to attack the doctrine of the Jesuits was to attack that of the Roman Church. At that time the reproaches of laxity and semipelagianism were common to the Society of Jesus and to the congregation of the faithful. It was a very great honor to this Society to see itself, together with the Church, the object of the calumnies and persecutions of heretics; and nothing contributed more to increasing the esteem and affection that true Catholics had for the Jesuits.

But as soon as the Theologians of this Society had risen up against the innovations of Baius, had denounced them to the Sovereign Pontiffs, and had obtained their condemnation - and much more still when the errors of Jansenius had been anathematized by the Church - then the supporters of this heresy and all the partisans of Jansenius suddenly turned against the Jesuits and began, more than ever, to take them to task.

This was a stratagem to cause the public to mistake the issue. These Innovators were continually pressed hard concerning the fact of Jansenius, over which they persisted in their revolt against the Church and against the Ordinances of the King. To be ceaselessly on the defensive was for them a disadvantageous and very inconvenient course. This, therefore, is again what determined them to attack the Jesuits and to bring suit against them concerning their alleged corrupted Moral Theology.

Then appeared that fine System of the policy of the Jesuits, who have among themselves, it was said, two sorts of Directors: severe Directors and accommodating Directors; the one sort to attract persons of virtue, the other so as not to repel sinners - an infallible means of making themselves masters of every conscience, a secret of the Society which no one until then had penetrated, and whose use turned upon the doctrine of probable opinions.

Since this was a pure counteraccusation to which all the Author’s wit, whatever efforts he might make, could give no plausibility, this idea at first amused many more persons than it persuaded. It even scandalized several who believed that raillery could not be permitted in a subject of this nature. Nevertheless they continued; and, by making various extracts from the books of the Society - some faithful, some unfaithful, some capable of shocking the ordinary run of people who do not examine matters deeply, although there was nothing in them but what was orthodox - they succeeded in giving some color to what had at first appeared a pure chimera.

They did not stop there; and those whom the condemnation of the doctrine of Jansenius had consternated, profiting from the impression that these first attempts had made against the Jesuits, took courage again. They stirred up on every side, especially in Flanders and in France, in every Town and even in the countryside, persons who began, in rivalry with one another, to cry out against the corrupted Moral Theology of the Jesuits. Nothing was seen but libels scattered everywhere, but persons who, dispersed throughout all assemblies and private companies, let themselves loose against the Jesuits. The pulpits of truth, destined to preach charity to the peoples, became in several places theaters of the most venomous calumny. Mechanisms were set in motion to bring into this plot entire bodies of Ecclesiastics from the most considerable cities of the Kingdom. The diversity and multiplicity of the Jesuits’ employments, and the blessings God bestows upon them therein, having at all times raised up many jealous rivals against them, they saw new adversaries rise against them in the Universities and in several religious orders.

One individual of their Society was perhaps the person who caused them the greatest harm in this persecution. In defiance of his Provincial, he caused a Book entitled Apology for the Casuists to appear, in which, taking his position very imprudently upon several particular cases, he drew upon himself the just censure of several Prelates. They did not fail to make all the Jesuits answerable for a work which the wisest and most learned among them were themselves the very first to detest and which was authentically disavowed. Everywhere this book and these censures were used to confirm the idea of the Jesuits’ Moral Theology which the partisans of Jansenius were spreading everywhere. The libels most filled with falsehoods and the grossest calumnies were received with applause and found credence everywhere. The Apologies of these Fathers, however solid they were, were scarcely regarded and produced hardly any other effect than to give occasion for replies even more insulting and calumnious than the first works written against them. All the censures of Rome which branded most of these libels were mocked, and no more account was made of the Decrees of the King’s Council which condemned them to the fire.

But at last the storm was calmed with time. Composure returned after this violent and impetuous fire. Wise persons for the most part soon perceived that passion and cabal had more part in this persecution than true zeal. Those who knew the Jesuits, or who until then had entrusted to them the direction of their conscience, bore witness to themselves that the Moral Theology of these Fathers was not such as it was depicted in the satires published against them. The Parish Priests of Paris and Rouen, who had made the greatest noise, came back for the most part and were sorry to have seconded, contrary to their intention, the passion of a party whose evil designs they recognized.

The greater part of the Prelates of France and Flanders have shown since that time, by the conduct they have maintained toward the Jesuits, that they did not have of their doctrine the ideas which people had endeavored to give them; and they have often borne witness that they had no persons in their Dioceses who labored for the spiritual good of the peoples with more usefulness, more edification, more disinterestedness, and more submission to their Orders.

The most distinguished persons in the Kingdom did not recognize them in the frightful portraits made of them: the intercourse they had had with them; the education that several had received from them; the conduct of those among these Fathers whom their employment obliged sometimes to appear at Court, where, whatever care one takes to dissemble, one is soon known for what one is; their constant application in their most arduous functions; their zeal for the most dangerous Missions - all these ideas, which calumny had not yet been able to efface, rendered the most violent efforts of their Adversaries almost useless.

The Lords of the Court, the Magistrates, and the Nobility of all the Provinces were seen to entrust their children, as before, to these Fathers, to raise them in Letters and in the fear of God, and to render them the honorable testimony that nowhere were the two better united. Their College of Paris, despite all contrary intrigues, did not cease to be as it were the Seminary of all the most distinguished children in the Kingdom. Several of those who were the least attached to them followed the example of the others in this regard, themselves contributing, as if in spite of themselves, to justify them by their own conduct; and everyone agreed that this was the most solid Apology that could be made in their favor against the continual and horrible satires of their enemies.

Notwithstanding all this, the agitations have recommenced for some time past more vigorously than ever; and the Jesuits were often warned that a new storm was forming against them. In fact, severe blows have been dealt them during the last few years. They have tried to parry some of them. They have done so with equal force and modesty; and they have had the consolation of seeing that equitable and well-informed persons have always rendered them justice against Adversaries who do not become discouraged, and who are as constant in the persecution they have stirred up against them as in their revolt against the Church.

Nevertheless, neither do I wish to draw advantage for the defense of this Society from this new presumption furnished me by the character of most of those who for fifty years have made so harsh a war upon it, while they secretly prepare other devices against the Church itself. The sole use I intend to make of it, as also of the first, is to prevent people from relying too readily upon witnesses who must be so suspect, and upon certain others whom they have prejudiced by their artifices and by the clamor they have deliberately raised on every side; and to obtain from those who will read this defense some attention to what I am going to say in what follows.

All Christian Moral Theology can be reduced to two articles. The first comprises what is expressly contained in Scripture, in Tradition, in the Commandments of God and of the Church, in the Councils, and in the Decisions of the Holy See. The second contains an infinity of other cases which are not evidently decided by these first Rules and concerning which, for this reason, there is division among the Doctors in the Schools. One may further include in this number the explanation sometimes given to the Commandments of God or to Scripture, on the occasion of certain particular difficulties which arise in the dealings that men have with one another and which concern the extent of their duties, whether toward God, toward their neighbor, or toward themselves.

I do not believe that the Jesuits need an Apology on the first article; and I think they will not be reproached with ever having taught that adulteries, robberies on the highways, blasphemies, and other similar sins are permitted. It is true that they have been accused of having permitted Idolatry in China; but they have always said that Idolatry was a crime, and the question was reduced to knowing whether what they permitted was actually Idolatry.

It is therefore only the second article that is at issue, that is, things which are not evidently contained in the rules of our Faith, concerning which it is claimed that they always fall into laxity. Here are some propositions whose examination will clarify the truth or falsity of this accusation.

The Jesuits, in matters of Moral Theology, have always followed, in conformity with one of their Rules, the common opinions of the Catholic Schools.

If this proposition is true, it alone suffices to place the doctrine of this Society beyond all suspicion. Now it is a fact which the Jesuits boldly advance: that what ought to be regarded as the doctrine of their Society has always been a doctrine common in the Catholic Universities.

Since this proposition is the solid foundation upon which the justification and conduct of the Jesuits in matters of doctrine must be supported, it is appropriate to apprehend it well and explain it well, so that it may not be believed that, in a proposition too general and capable of having various senses, they are preparing evasions for themselves in order to elude the reproaches their adversaries make against them.

First, this does not mean that the Society of Jesus has a determinate opinion on each point of Theology which is also the general opinion of all the Schools and all the Catholic Universities. That could not be, because upon an infinity of questions opinions are divided there. But in this very division the opposed opinions are often equally common, and it is said of both the one and the other that they are a common doctrine in the School, because the affirmative and the negative are maintained indifferently.

When, therefore, the Jesuits say that their Society has always professed to follow the doctrine commonly received in the Schools and in the Catholic Universities, this means that in each question of Theology it has always kept to the opinions which were current in the School, and which were ordinarily followed there by the Catholic Doctors.

Second, when the Jesuits advance that the doctrine of their Society has always been the common doctrine of the Schools and Catholic Universities, they do not mean that no individual member of their body has ever departed from it, nor that none of their Theologians has ever maintained any proposition worthy of being reproved and censured. They are far from either thinking it or saying it. That would be to give themselves a praise which befits only Holy Scripture and the Church inspired by the Holy Spirit. There is within Christianity neither School nor University several of whose Doctors have not been subject to these weaknesses and these wanderings of the human mind. The Body of the holy Fathers itself, the most respectable body in the Church, is not exempt from this stain. Saint Augustine, saint though he is, has propositions of lax Moral Theology; some could be shown in Saint Jerome and in several other Fathers. And the Jesuits have no difficulty in making such an admission with regard to some of their Theologians. But what they advance without fear, and of which they are ready to furnish the proof, is that the doctrine received and authorized in their Society, that which is commonly followed there, is the same as that which they found was taught in the other Catholic Schools and Universities when they entered them, and that they can no more than the others be reproached for having departed from it.

Here, then, is a means altogether suited to the purpose and a very just rule for determining the truth or falsity of the reproach of lax Moral Theology made against the Jesuits. Has anything been commonly taught in their Society other than what has been commonly taught in the Catholic Schools and Universities? If a difference can be shown in this respect between their School and the other Catholic Schools, condemnation must be pronounced against them; if it cannot be shown, from that moment they are justified.

Some particular cases may be produced in which some of their Theologians have been mistaken; the same will be produced from the other Societies, and I dare advance that a greater number will be produced. Since these mistakes of certain individuals do not take from the other bodies the quality of being orthodox in the matter of Moral Theology, what injustice would it be if they caused the Society of Jesus alone to lose it? Here, then, once again, is the fixed point upon which everything must turn in this matter.

Let the adversaries of the Jesuits attack them on this point and press them as vigorously as they can. They must necessarily make an opening in them at this point; otherwise, it will always be the most manifest injustice to wish to distinguish them from all the other Societies by the shameful character of laxity in Moral Theology.

I add some other propositions which will serve to develop further the general proposition I have just made.

When a Jesuit Theologian has adopted some particular opinion rejected as bad in the Catholic Schools, the greater part of the Theologians of the Society have been against it; and, generally speaking, this Theologian has been neither the only nor the first of the Theologians to have departed on that point. I shall later descend into some detail which may serve as proof of this proposition. The Jesuits again boldly expose it to the criticism of their most vigorous adversaries: let them only take care to apprehend it correctly. But if this fact is true, if, when it is advanced by the Jesuits, it is left without its falsity being shown, calumny is disarmed, and the truth of the fundamental proposition I made at the outset is perfectly established: that the doctrine of the Society, that is, the doctrine authorized by the common sentiment of the Jesuits, is the same as that of the other Catholic Schools; and that, consequently, it is wrong to affect to establish a kind of opposition between the doctrine of the Jesuits and that of the other Catholic Doctors.

When some opinion has been condemned by the Church or by the Holy See, by whatever authority it had previously found itself supported, there is no Society whose superiors have taken greater care than the superiors of the Jesuits have done to ensure that it was not taught in their Schools; and it has scarcely happened that any individual has done so, and has done so with impunity.

This proposition is likewise submitted to the examination of those who will be willing to take the trouble to make it, provided that, as has sometimes happened, they do not go and make the Popes say things they have not said, and that they keep precisely to their censure, without extending it according to their caprice and following their own fixed notions.

To these three points in justification of the conduct of the Jesuits in matters of doctrine, upon which they consent to be put to the severest test, I do not see very well what could be opposed, unless perhaps that, for them, it is not a sufficient means of justification to have followed the common doctrine received in the Catholic Schools, because this very doctrine, common though it is, is a lax doctrine.

It will no doubt not be for the Jesuits to reply to such an answer, all the more because in this very proposition they win their cause on the capital point. For the essential part of the injustice done to them, and that which must be most keenly felt by them, is that people affect to distinguish them from all the others and to regard their Theology as the sole source of corrupted Moral Theology. Now, this answer being supposed, they are merged into the crowd. Here are the School of Saint Thomas, that of Scotus, that of the Sorbonne, and all the other Catholic Universities placed in the same rank. It will no longer be said that lax Moral Theology and the Moral Theology of the Jesuits are the same thing. They will no longer be made solely answerable for the laxity of Christians. They came after the others, and it is a misfortune for them to have drawn from sources already poisoned; and they will no longer need anything but a reform which will be common to them with all the Doctors who until now have passed for Catholics. But these are among those paradoxes in which the character of the Innovating spirit appears too visibly for them to need to be refuted.

The Jesuits do not intend to stop here with these general justifications, however solid they may be. They wish to make an authentic declaration of the sentiments of their Society upon certain particular points concerning which calumny has most cruelly outraged them. They wish to make known to the whole Church that they take, as one of the rules of their doctrine, the condemnation of that great number of propositions in matters of cases of conscience pronounced by Popes Alexander VII, Innocent XI, and Alexander VIII. Moreover, they maintain that none of these condemned propositions has ever been the doctrine of their Society; that most have never been taught by any of their authors; that those which have been taught by some, as it has happened that several other non-Jesuit Theologians maintained them, they disavow; that since the Briefs of the Popes they have always watched to ensure that they were no longer taught in their Schools; and that they are resolved to do in this regard what they have always constantly done since their Society was established, namely, to yield to no Ecclesiastical body in the submission they owe to the Orders of the Church and of him who is its visible head upon earth.