Article — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Article I. On The Notion Of The Individual Systems
337. Notion. By the name of moral system is understood a method of indirectly obtaining practical moral certitude in practical doubt. For since in human life so many diverse cases occur, and since very often a man remains uncertain what must be done by him, lest he commit sin, hence from about the end of the sixteenth century diverse norms were devised for solving practical doubts. Thence were invented, or rather proclaimed, those reflex principles about which there was discussion in n. 332 sqq. Both the Holy Fathers and the older Scholastics defended no fixed moral system, but solved individual practical questions according to the maxim adduced above: "In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands"; or: "In doubts the safer part is to be chosen." Worthy of special mention is St. Thomas, who did not solve the controversy, then much agitated, whether one cleric can have several benefices, by recurring to the principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," but to the conscience of each benefice-holder and to the particular circumstances. Hence the Angelic Doctor concludes that it is licit to have several prebends, if the benefice-holder has a right intention and sufficiently satisfies the diverse offices.94 - The first who thought out some moral system, and indeed the system of Probabilism, was Barth. Medina, O. Pr., a Spaniard, who in the year 1577, against the arguments brought forward by Soto, Cajetan, etc., writes these things: "It seems to me that, if an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable."95 He himself acknowledges, however, that the ancient doctors taught otherwise. Behold his words: "The most learned Soto explains this rather difficult question (De iustitia l. 3, q. 6) in this way: for he says that, although in speculative matters and in the academy it is sometimes licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, nevertheless in moral matters and in things which pertain to the right of a third party, it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside. Sylvester thinks the same (under the word 'Opinion,' c. 2), Conrad (in the book De contract. q. ult.), and, what moves more, Lord Cajetan in his Summa (under the word 'Opinion')." - But the words of Cajetan in the cited place are these: "In things to be done, unless by choosing the safer part, it is not licit to take the opinion of anyone as the rule of action, since by the very fact that the operation to be regulated is committed to opinion, it is committed to an ambiguous rule, because every opinion is ambiguous, as being with fear of the other part. And because it is presupposed that the safer part is not chosen, it follows that the operation is committed to an ambiguous rule with respect to the case of sin, and by this very fact is exposed to the danger of sinning, which it is clear is illicit. And if there is question of mortal sin, it is clear that it is a mortal sin: knowingly to do an operation doubtful whether it is mortal; since such a one acting prefers to fulfill his will in such a work, even if it is mortal, rather than to abstain from it." From these words it follows that Medina thought, and indeed rightly, that Probabilism had not previously been expressly defended, but that theologians had rather taught that in doubt the safer part must be chosen. - The following moral systems are explained as being the better known:
94 Cf. Quodl. 8, a. 13, and 9, a. 15.
95 In 1, 2, q. 19, a. 6 (Venice 1580, p. 178 sq.).
338. 1. Rigorism or rigid Tutiorism teaches that the safer part must always be chosen, although the opinion favoring liberty is most probable. Thus Ioan. Sinnichius, a Louvain doctor (+ 1666), in his book Saul exrex lib. 1, c. 95, n. 357, and the Jansenists. - This system was condemned by Alexander VIII, who on 7 Dec. 1690 proscribed the proposition which Sinnichius seems to defend in the cited place: "It is not licit to follow an opinion, even the most probable among the probable."96 - And deservedly! For if certitude strictly so called were always required in order to act licitly, and it were not licit to follow a most probable opinion, human life would become truly intolerable. Against these Rigorists the words of St. Peter could be brought forward: "Now therefore why do you tempt God, to impose a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?"97 The system of absolute Rigorism is now altogether obsolete and is now held by no one.
96 Denz. n. 1293.
97 Acts 15, 10.
339. 2. Mitigated Tutiorism teaches that it is licit to follow the less safe opinion favoring liberty, provided, however, that it is most probable. Thus some Louvain doctors, for example Steyart (+ 1701), Opstraet (+ 1720), and certain others, for example Henry of St. Ignatius (+ 1719), Cardinal Gerdil (+ 1802). - This system indeed has not been proscribed by the Church, but in our days it is deservedly rejected by all. For even according to it human life is made too hard, and unbearable burdens are bound upon the shoulders of the faithful, because, if a man is always bound to follow the safe opinion unless the other opinion is most probable, a way is opened to many anxieties. Besides, according to the opinion of St. Thomas and of almost all theologians, probable certitude, or certitude so called in the broad sense,98 suffices for acting licitly. Moreover, if some opinion is manifestly more probable, it is now also morally certain, because then the reasons opposed to it are slight and therefore not to be attended to. For if truly grave reasons were opposed to this opinion, it would no longer remain manifestly more probable. Hence an opinion most probable is not always required for acting licitly.
98 Cf. above n. 326.
340. 3. Probabiliorism teaches that it is licit to follow the less safe opinion favoring liberty, provided that it is manifestly more probable than the opinion favoring law. This system was very commonly admitted before Medina (cf. above), and was not obscurely commended by the Supreme Pontiffs Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Clement XI, Benedict XIV, as will be clear below in n. 345.
341. 4. Equiprobabilism is contained in this proposition: "In the concurrence of opposed opinions equally or almost equally probable, it is licit to follow the opinion favoring liberty whenever the doubt is about the existence of the law; but in a doubt of fact about the cessation of the law, the law continues to oblige."99 The principal defender of this system is St. Alphonsus, who adopted it after the year 1761, although previously he taught pure Probabilism. Before St. Alphonsus this system was held by Eusebius Amort,100 Rassler, Antonius Mayr, and certain others;101 Billuart, O. Pr. (+ 1757), already attempts to solve the arguments of the Equiprobabilists. - Besides the Redemptorists, Konings, Marc, Ter Haar, Aertnys, Wouters, and also several others adopted this system, for example Scavini, Gousset, Pruner, Muller, Simar, etc., and from the Order of Preachers Moran,102 Saralegui,103 Beaudouin, etc.104 It agrees with Probabiliorism in this, that 1. a man ought to follow an opinion certainly more probable and favoring law, and that 2. he can follow an opinion certainly more probable and favoring liberty. But it differs from Probabiliorism with respect to opinions equally or almost equally probable, in which according to Probabiliorism the law must be observed; but according to Equiprobabilism a distinction is necessary by applying the principle of possession: if there is question of a doubt about the cessation of law, the law possesses, and therefore is to be observed (so also Probabiliorism teaches); but if there is question of the existence of law, then liberty possesses, and a man is not bound to observe such a law (Probabiliorism does not admit this). The matter becomes clearer by examples: On the night of Friday someone doubts what hour it is. It is equally probable that midnight has already passed and that it has not yet arrived. According to Equiprobabilism, then it is not licit to eat meats, because the doubt is about the cessation of law and therefore the law possesses. If entirely the same case with the same circumstances occurred on the night of Thursday, it would be licit to eat meats, because then liberty possesses. Another example: He who thinks that he has probably fulfilled the obligation of a vow he has made is not freed from the obligation. The reason is that a vow certainly made is not fulfilled by a doubtful fulfillment; therefore the vow possesses. Other examples: He who probably recited the Breviary, or paid the sacramental penance, or confessed his mortal sins, is again bound to perform those acts. The reason is the same: the law possesses, and a certain law is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment. Especially with respect to the confession of sins, Equiprobabilism differs from Probabilism, which does not oblige to confession if sins are: a) doubtfully grave; b) doubtfully committed; c) doubtfully confessed. Equiprobabilism, however, demands confession if mortal sins were doubtfully confessed, because then the law of confession possesses. On the contrary, he who with equal probability thinks that he made or did not make a vow is bound to nothing; he who with equal probability thinks that he did not commit some sin, or that the sin committed was not grave, according to the strict principle of Equiprobabilism is not bound to confession, because liberty possesses. In the two last cases, however, confession is counseled.
99 Cf. Aertnys-Damen, Theol. mor. I, n. 85.
100 St. Alphonsus himself cites Eusebius Amort for his system (Breve dissertazione dell' uso moderato dell' opinione probabile 1762, apud Wouters, de Minusprobabilismo p. 50). But that St. Alphonsus taught Equiprobabilism and not pure Probabilism, at least from the year 1762, is historically certain and is manifestly drawn from the letters of the Holy Doctor; cf. below n. 347.
101 Cf. E. Muller, Theol. mor. l. 1, § 81; Ter Haar, De systemate morali antiquorum Probabilistarum p. 21 sqq. (Paderborn 1894).
102 Theol. mor. I, n. 128 sqq.
103 Comm. al P. Laraga n. 96.
104 Tract. de consc. (1911) p. 99, 138.
342. 5. Pure Probabilism teaches: Whenever there is present an opinion truly and certainly probable concerning the licitness of some act, it is licit to follow it, even if the opposite opinion is truly and certainly more probable and safer. But the probability of some opinion or sentence is that property of it by which, on account of the motives by which it is supported, it merits the assent of a prudent man, although with fear concerning the opposite.105 This probability is divided in several ways:
a) Into internal and external. Internal probability is founded upon the very nature of the thing, its properties, causes, effects, and also upon the inconveniences of the opposite part. - External probability is taken from the authority of Doctors who hold this opinion. But such external probability is present not only if some opinion, with the Church tolerating it, is commonly or by most theologians held as probable, but also alpha) if five or six grave theologians think that opinion probable; beta) if even one Doctor of the Holy Church, such as St. Thomas, St. Alphonsus, or another altogether eminent author, such as St. Antoninus, holds it as probable. - Concerning intrinsic probability none can judge except men very learned and versed in moral matters. For often to other men not so learned in Moral Theology something seems intrinsically probable and licit which nevertheless in reality is not so; as is clear, for example, concerning craniotomy, which several held to be licit if otherwise it is not possible to come to the aid of the life of the mother. - But concerning extrinsic probability a moderately learned man can judge, if he rightly understands the state of the question and has diligently inspected the authors treating of this question.106 Extrinsic probability sometimes suffices for forming a right conscience and for acting licitly. For extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic probability, since grave authors would not consider some opinion probable except on account of grave motives. Hence the Angelic Doctor says that a man of little knowledge is made more certain concerning that which he hears from some learned man than concerning that which seems to him according to his own reason.107 The same is clear from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary approved by Gregory XVI on 22 July 1831: "Whether a confessor is to be disturbed who follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus in the practice of the sacred tribunal of penance for the sole reason that by the Holy Apostolic See nothing worthy of censure has been found in his works? In the negative." - Nevertheless, the authority of one author, who is not greater than every exception, does not suffice for gaining probability for some opinion. This is clear from the proposition condemned by Alexander VII: "If a book is by some junior and modern author, the opinion ought to be considered probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable."108
b) Into solid, doubtful, and slight. An opinion is called solidly or certainly probable when it rests upon a firm and grave motive; it is called doubtfully probable or even probably probable when one rightly doubts concerning the solidity of its motive; it is called slightly probable when it rests upon a light consideration, and therefore cannot draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.
c) Into absolute and comparative, or relative. Some opinion is called absolutely probable when its arguments, considered separately and in themselves, that is, independently from the opposite opinion, appear grave; but it is called comparatively probable when its arguments, compared together with the arguments of the opposite opinion, retain their gravity.109
Probabilism therefore teaches that it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, which retains its probability even after a comparison has been made with the opposite opinion. It is necessary to acknowledge that this system is very simple and very clear. For whenever it is established that some opinion is probable, either intrinsically or extrinsically, it is licit to follow it in practice, taking no further care about another opinion more probable or safer. Probabilism as a system was first introduced by Bartholomaeus Medina, O. Pr.110 Very many theologians favor Probabilism, both ancient and especially modern, whom it would be long to cite here all together. Thus, for example, from the Order of Preachers are cited: Ludovicus Lopez (+ 1596), Dominicus Bannez (+ 1604), Ioannes a S. Thoma (+ 1644), Bartholomaeus Ledesma (+ 1604), etc.; from the Order of Franciscans: Reiffenstuel (+ 1703), Sporer (+ 1714), Elbel (+ 1756), etc.; from the Order of Carmelites: the Salmanticenses. Almost all theologians of the Society of Jesus adhere to Probabilism, for example Toletus, Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Lacroix, Gury, Ballerini, Lehmkuhl, Noldin, Genicot, etc., and very many theologians from the secular clergy, for example Gopfert, Bouquillon, Schindler, Tanquerey, etc. The principal argument for Probabilism is the principle: "A doubtful law does not oblige."111
105 Thus Noldin, De consc. n. 223.
106 Cf. Aertnys-Damen l. c. I, n. 78.
107 S. theol. 2, 2, q. 4, a. 8 ad 2.
108 Denz. n. 1127.
109 Cf. Aertnys-Damen l. c. I, n. 75.
110 In his commentaries on S. theol. 1, 2, q. 19, a. 6. Medina poses the question: "Whether we are bound to follow the more probable opinion, the probable one having been set aside, or whether it is enough to follow a probable opinion?" - First he brings forward arguments for Probabiliorism and then responds: "Certainly the arguments seem excellent, but it seems that if there is a probable opinion, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable. ... An opinion is called probable from the fact that we can follow it without reproach and blame. Therefore it implies a contradiction that it be probable and that we cannot follow it licitly. For an opinion is not called probable from the fact that apparent reasons are adduced in its favor, and that it has assertors and defenders; for in that way all errors would be probable opinions; but that opinion is probable which wise men assert and the best arguments confirm, which to follow is nothing improbable." - Cf. also the work of the same author: Breve instruccion de como se ha de administrar el sacramento de la penitencia, Salamanca 1580. Sometimes already St. Antoninus is cited by authors as a Probabilist, but altogether falsely. Rather, St. Antoninus favors Probabiliorism, saying: "With a good conscience someone can hold one part of some opinion and operate according to it, which namely has notably equal doctors for itself ... when ... he forms for himself a good conscience and credulity concerning that which he believes as concerning the more probable part" (S. theol. P. 1, tit. 3, c. 10, § 10).
111 Cf. below n. 349.
343. 6. Lax Probabilism, or simply Laxism, teaches that it is licit to follow not only an opinion truly and certainly probable, but also an opinion probably or slightly probable. This system indeed seems to have been taught by Thomas Tamburinus (+ 1675), who explained his opinion in this naked and crude manner: "Absolutely I think, with Salas, Vasquez, Sanchez, Merolla apud Bardi (de consc. dist. 1, c. 6, to whom add Pasq. dec. 18), that it is enough in all cases that it be established probably that an opinion is probable; for then that truth, morally certain, will be sufficiently strengthened, directing me in about this manner: I here and now act prudently, because while I probably think that this is probable, I follow that judgment in practice prudently enough. For the fact that the opposite is evidently more probable does not cast down my opinion from its probability."112 Ioannes Caramuel (+ 1682), who was called by St. Alphonsus "the prince of the laxists," expressed the same opinion under these words: "If opinions are now probable which previously were not, now men do not sin, although previously they sinned, since every probable thing excuses from sin."113 Contemporary with Caramuel was another Probabilist indulging somewhat in Laxism, namely Antonius Diana, a Theatine (+ 1663), concerning whom St. Alphonsus writes:114 "Diana, in selecting opinions, for the most part inclines toward the benign part, and not rarely inclines more than is fitting." - Diana is a pure Casuist (he was called "the Atlas of the casuistic world"); he brings forward the opinions of almost innumerable authors and then solves individual cases in a casuistic manner. Although in other matters he is found not rarely too benign, nevertheless concerning sins of lust he sometimes defends rather rigid opinions. - Besides the authors cited, Ioannes Sanchez (+ 1624), Stephanus Bauny (+ 1649), Matthaeus Moya (+ 1684), whose work Quaestiones selectae was placed on the Index on 26 Feb. 1704, favored Laxism. Indeed, a work of the same author, which he published under the pseudonym "Amadaeus Guimenius" and whose title is Opusculum singularia universae fere theologiae moralis complectens adversus quorundam expostulationes contra nonnullas Iesuitarum opiniones morales (Lyons 1664), was proscribed by a special Brief of Innocent XI on 16 Sept. 1680 and therefore prohibited under pain of excommunication. - Among the Laxists Escobar y Mendoza (+ 1669) also is sometimes named, and in reality he defended some opinions too indulgent; nevertheless he did not merit the too vehement attacks made by Blaise Pascal in the Lettres Provinciales. - In present times no Catholic theologian favors Laxism. Besides, this system has been proscribed by the Church; for Innocent XI condemned proposition (3): "Generally, while trusting in intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided one does not go outside the limits of probability, we always act prudently."115 But Alexander VII, in the decree issued on 24 Sept. 1665, proclaimed: "That lax mode of opining is altogether foreign to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the Holy Fathers; and if the faithful were to follow it in practice as a right rule, a great corruption of Christian life would creep in." Hence, as St. Augustine says very well, "it is better to love with severity than to deceive with leniency."
112 Explicatio decal. l. 1, c. 3, § 3, n. 8.
113 Cf. E. Muller, Theol. mor. I, § 78, where this citation is found. This Caramuel taught several opinions which, while he was still living, were proscribed by the Church; for example: "It seems so clear that fornication according to itself involves no malice and is evil only because it is forbidden, that the contrary seems altogether dissonant from reason." Innocent XI condemned this proposition on 2 March 1679 (Denz. n. 1198).
114 Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 257. In mockery Diana was called "the lamb who took away the sins of the world" (so Concina, Apparatus ad Theol. christ. l. 3, diss. 1, c. 2, de Probabilismo).
115 Denz. n. 1153.
344. 7. The system of compensation or of sufficient reason. Since all the systems explained up to this point suffer no small difficulties, certain authors116 devised a new system, which they called the system of compensation or of sufficient reason. The hinge of every difficulty in all the systems is the question whether and how far a doubtful law obliges. Pure Probabilists say simply: a doubtful law in no way obliges, at least if there is question of the mere licitness of an act. But all other theologians do not admit this, conceding some obligation to a doubtful law, although they do not hold concordant opinions concerning the degree of that obligation. Probabiliorists assert: a doubtful law obliges unless the contrary opinion is truly more probable. Equiprobabilists contend for this same thing, yet at the same time admitting that a doubtful law then does not oblige, when the doubt turns upon the existence, not however upon the cessation, of the law, and the opinion is almost equally probable. The new system of compensation or sufficient reason wishes to define otherwise the limits of an obliging doubtful law. Against Probabilism it vigorously defends that a doubtful law obliges in some way, although imperfectly. But against the Probabiliorists it does not vindicate for a doubtful law as much obligation as a certainly known law has. For the obligation of a law must be measured from the degree of knowledge, and therefore a certainly known law obliges in a perfect manner; a law wholly unknown obliges in no way; but a law known in an imperfect manner obliges imperfectly. Therefore of itself it is not licit to act against a law imperfectly known, such as a doubtful law is. Nevertheless cases can easily occur in which there are grave motives for acting against a doubtful law, for example, a penitent favoring pure Probabilism absolutely wishes to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, or if a benign probable opinion is more advantageous for the spiritual salvation of the penitent than the more probable opinion, all the circumstances having been considered. In cases of this sort there remains the danger of transgressing the law at least materially. But since even a material transgression of law is something evil, it is not licit to expose oneself to such a danger without a sufficient reason. Hence in such a case the principles concerning cooperation in evil, or rather concerning the indirect voluntary, must be applied. For a cause is placed, from which a double effect follows: one good, namely liberty in action; the other evil, namely the danger of transgressing the law at least materially. But among the conditions required for cooperation or for the indirect voluntary there is required a grave and proportionate cause. The greater the evil effect foreseen is, the greater an excusing cause is required. Therefore, in order to know whether it is licit in a particular case to act against some doubtful law by following the less probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, the gravity of the law and the probability of the opposed opinion must be weighed. The graver the law is, and the more probable its obligation is in the actual case, the greater an excusing cause is required.117
This system of compensation or sufficient reason has been devised rather ingeniously, nor does it in any way lead to Tutiorism, as Gury118 and other Probabilists wish; on the contrary, this system certainly does not lead more to Tutiorism than pure Probabilism draws toward Laxism. For, as Tanquerey deservedly notes:119 "For just as the Probabilists avoid Laxism by rejecting the sufficiency of an opinion slightly probable, so likewise the Compensationists escape Tutiorism by asserting that a doubtful and uncertain law does not oblige except when a sufficient reason for transgressing it is altogether lacking, and that an altogether slight cause excuses from a very doubtful law." - Indeed, the Probabilists themselves of better reputation in practice never permit the violation of some doubtful but truly probable law without some sufficient reason. For it would be too absurd, without any motive, to care nothing at all about some truly probable law, indeed about one more probable.
116 Potton, De theoria probabilitatis, Paris 1874. L. Lehu also favors this system (Philos. mor. et soc. I [Paris 1914] 287). In addition Laloux, De actibus humanis; Boisdron, Theorie et systemes des probabilites; Mc Donald, The principles of moral science.
117 Cf. Potton l. c. 30.
118 Casus conscientiae I 61.
119 Synopsis Theol. mor. de conscientia n. 416.