Theft and Unjust Damage

^{1 2} "Thou shalt not steal." Ex. 20:15.

This precept, insofar as it is negative, prohibits every act by which the neighbor's right in goods of fortune is injured; and insofar as it is affirmative, it commands that to each one be rendered his own right which he has in goods of fortune. To the seventh precept the tenth must be joined: "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house ... nor anything that is his."³ For just as external acts are prohibited by the seventh precept, so by the tenth internal acts are prohibited, namely the will of harming the neighbor in goods of fortune. Therefore the virtue which this precept regards is commutative justice, insofar as its object is the neighbor's right in goods of fortune; and since this right is called right of ownership, there must be treated: a. ownership in goods of fortune; b. injury of ownership in goods of fortune; c. reparation of injured ownership.

¹ Concerning the sixth and ninth precepts of the Decalogue the matter is treated in a fascicle edited separately.

² Ioan. de Lugo, De iustitia et iure, tom. I. Lud. Molina, De iustitia et iure, tom. I. L. Lessius, De iustitia et iure, l. 2, c. 1-16. I. Reuter, Theologia moralis, pars III, De iustitia et iure. L. Carriere, De iustitia et iure, 3 tom. (Lovanii: Fonteyn, 1845-1847). I. Vogler, Iuris cultor^3 etc. (Parisiis: Mequignon, 1833). P. H. Marres, De iustitia^2 (Ruraemundae: Romen, 1879). D. Delama, Tractatus de iustitia et iure^3 (Tridenti: Monauni, 1889). G. I. Waffelaert, Tractatus theologici de virtutibus cardinalibus, Tr. II, De iustitia (Brugis: Beyaert, 1885). Ballerini-Palmieri, Opus theol. morale^3, III, n. 1-550. A. Lehmkuhl, Theologia moralis^10, I, n. 884-1044. I. E. Pruner, Die Lehre vom Rechte und von der Gerechtigkeit (Regensburg: Manz, 1858), 2 Bd. Ios. Schwane, Die Gerechtigkeit u. s. w. (Freiburg: Herder, 1873). Georg Crolly, De iustitia et iure (Dublini: Gill, 1877), 3 vol. K. Kiefer, Die Tugend der ausgleichenden Gerechtigkeit (Eichstatt: Bronner, 1908).

³ Ex. 20:17.

Real sacrilege is also committed in three ways:

(a) By treating with irreverence sacred things, such as the sacraments, Holy Scripture, relics, sacred images.

It is a sacrilege to administer or to receive the sacraments in a state of mortal sin, to quote the words of Scripture for the purpose of making an obscene joke, to treat sacred images and relics with contempt.

(b) By theft of sacred objects. Sacrilegious theft is committed by stealing a sacred object from a sacred place, or a profane object from a sacred place, or a sacred object from a place that is not sacred, according to an old decree of canon law.¹ In the first of these cases a double sacrilege is committed, local and real, as when a chalice is stolen from the tabernacle; in the last case real sacrilege only is committed, as when a chalice is stolen from a priest’s room. Local sacrilege only is committed in the second case, and, indeed, according to a probable opinion, then only when the object stolen belongs to the sacred place, or has been entrusted specially to the sacred place for safe keeping. If a thief picks a pocket in church, his sin probably has not the malice of a grievous sin of sacrilege, although it may be grievous as against justice.

(c) By committing the sin of simony, the treatment of which is reserved for the next chapter.

¹ c. 21, C. 17, q. 4.

THE wide term injustice may be used to designate any violation of justice, whether it be legal, distributive, or commutative. Sins against legal justice are committed by doing anything against the common good of the society to which one belongs, or by neglecting to do what the common good requires to be performed. Such sins may be committed by rulers and by subjects, more frequently, however, by the former, inasmuch as the common good is specially entrusted to their care and guardianship. As the separate members of a society constitute that society, it is obvious that there is not a perfect and adequate distinction between a society and its members, In legal justice, therefore, which regulates the relations which ought to subsist between men and the society to which they belong, there is something wanting to the complete distinction of persons required in order that the obligations of strict justice may subsist between them. A violation, then, of legal justice is not a sin against justice in the strict and full sense.

Distributive justice prescribes that the ruler divide common burdens and emoluments among his subjects. according to their capacity and merits. Before they are assigned to each one, no one has a strict right to any determinate share of them, and so a distribution of burdens and favours which is not according to merit is not against strict justice. A ruler who in his distribution of offices and burdens shows undue favour to some to the detriment of others’ sins indeed against strict justice if he thereby cause damage to the community, for strict justice and the implicit agreement which he made on assuming his office forbid him to do that. If, however, no special injury accrues to the community through his showing undue preference for some of his subjects, he commits a sin which is called acceptation of persons, but he does not sin against strict justice. On the other hand, one who violates particular or commutative justice deprives another of his strict right. Such a sin is called an injury, which may be defined to be the violation of the strict right of another against his reasonable will.

Such an injury is formal if it is committed knowingly and - wilfully, otherwise it is material.

A personal injury is committed against rights which are intrinsic to the person, such as the right to life, liberty, good name, and honour. A real injury is committed against the property of another.

Personal injuries are treated of elsewhere under the Fifth and Eighth Commandments; here we consider more especially real injuries done to the property of another.

There are three different species of real injuries—robbery, theft, and simple damnification. Robbery, besides injury to property, includes also a personal injury, which consists in violence offered to another by forcibly depriving him of what is his. Simple damnification is the causing of damage to the property of another without taking away any of that property. Theft is the secret taking away of the property of another against his reasonable will. . No action is an injury unless it is against the reasonable will of the injured person, scienti et volenti non fit injuria, according to the twenty-seventh rule of law in the Sixth Book of the Decretals. The reason is obvious; because a person may as a rule renounce his rights, and then an action contrary to them ceases to be a violation of justice. It is no longer a depriving another of what is his; it has ceased to belong to him. There are, however, some rights which are inalienable, and actions against these will be contrary to justice even if the party wronged give his consent. No one can validly renounce his right to life, and so the private killing of another, even with his consent, except in lawful self-defence, is always murder. Similarly, marital rights of married people are inalienable, and, even if the husband consent, a wife’s adultery is always adultery. The maxim, then, must be understood of rights which the owner can validly forego, and it asserts that no injury is done by acting against rights which the possessor with full knowledge and with perfect freedom does forego.

THEFT, as we have seen, is the secret taking away of what belongs to another against his reasonable wish.

Not only the taking away, but also the keeping of what belongs to another against his reasonable wish is theft, as when a borrower fails to return what has been lent him on the day appointed, to the disappointment of the lender. Moreover, the use of, or any unlawful dealing with, the property of another against his wish is theft, as when a tramp makes himself at home for the night on another’s premises, or when a passenger travels on the railway or tram without paying his fare.

In order that a sin of theft may be committed, the owner of the property must be unwilling that it should be thus dealt with by the thief; there is no theft committed by using another’s property if the user knows that the owner would not object. Moreover, he must be reasonably unwilling, and so a man who is in danger of dying from starvation, or who is in extreme necessity of any other kind, may take or use what is necessary to save life, even if the owner be unwilling that he should do so. The reason of this is that, by the primary intention of our Creator and Lord, material things were created for the preservation of human life, and no rights of ownership can prevail against the higher claim of one who is in extreme necessity.

The sin of theft is of itself grievous, as is clear from the fact that it is against justice and charity; and St Paul classes it among the sins which shut the kingdom of heaven to the sinner. However, like other sins of injustice, it is sometimes venial on account of light matter, and a practical question here arises as to when theft is a mortal sin, and when it is only venial. The same question is put in other words when we ask, What amount must be taken to constitute a mortal sin of theft? .

Theologians are agreed that we must distinguish between the absolute sum, the taking of which is as a general rule 1 x Cor. vi 10. necessary and sufficient in all cases to constitute grave matter, and the relative sum, which will be sufficient for grave matter, regard being had to the loss of the owner. The general principle on which the quantity required for grave sins depends is the damage caused by the theft. For it is a grave sin to cause grave damage without a just reason; but in the case of very rich persons or companies we must consider not only the personal and particular damage done to them by theft of what belongs to them, but also the harm done to society. It may well be that a rich millionaire would not be appreciably worse off for the loss of a hundred pounds or of ten times that sum. The damage done to him by a thief taking a hundred pounds would be relatively less than if sixpence were taken from a day labourer. However, we must also consider the harm done by theft to the community and to the security of property. The malice of sin is not measured merely by the harm done to the individual; the harm done to society and other considerations also enter into the estimate. We must, then, besides considering the damage done to the owner of stolen money, weigh also the harm which theft does to society, And if grave harm is caused to society by stealing a certain sum of money, if the security of property would be seriously imperilled unless the theft of a certain sum were forbidden under pain of mortal sin, that sum will be the absolute quantity required for a mortal sin of theft, What the precise sum is must be left to the judgement of experts, who will consider all the circumstances of time and place, for, as values are perpetually changing, the sum required for a mortal sin of theft will also change. Under present circumstances, in civilized countries where similar conditions of commerce prevail, the common opinion of theologians fixes one pound sterling as the absolute sum required for a grave sin of theft. This will serve, therefore, as a measure of the gravity of theft from very rich people, or from companies with large resources.

However, a mortal sin of theft may be committed by stealing a much less sum than one pound if the theft cause great harm to the owner of what is stolen. The loss of a day’s wage or of a sum which is sufficient for the support of a labourer and his family for a day, is a serious loss for a workman, and so, as the common opinion holds, the theft of such a sum from a labouring man is a grave sin. Something between this and the absolute sum will be grave matter if stolen from persons whose wealth is between the two extremes.

Matter which in itself is grave may become light on account of special circumstances. Thus although grave necessity does not excuse theft, yet it may lessen the sin and cause to be venial what would otherwise be mortal. In the same way, less unwillingness on the part of the owner may lessen the sin. A father is less unwilling as a rule that a little of his money should be taken by a member of his family, especially if it is for a good purpose, than by a common thief. On this ground some divines say that in thefts from parents a double quantity is required for grave matter. Also when a number of small thefts are committed, which in the aggregate amount to grave matter, a larger sum is required for a mortal sin than when it is all taken at once. For the loss is not felt so keenly, and so the owner is not so unwilling.

That small thefts may coalesce and constitute grave matter is certain, for by a number of small thefts grave harm may be done, and the opposite opinion is implicitly condemned by the 38th proposition condemned by Innocent XI. Small thefts coalesce if the intention of the thief is to take a considerable sum, but for some special reason he takes it in small quantities at different times. Similarly, if a number conspire together to steal from another, they will all commit grave sin if grave damage be inflicted, even though each one only obtains a small sum. Also, when the proceeds of pilferings are hoarded, grave sin will be committed when grave matter is reached, or even if the proceeds be spent and do not coalesce by accession as in the preceding case, the different pilferings will coalesce and constitute one moral act of injustice if the interval be not notable—not over two months—as some theologians say. On the other hand, small thefts committed at wide intervals of time, and which do not coalesce on account of any of the reasons given above, do not constitute one moral act, and remain so many venial sins of theft.

The theft of something of small money value, but whose loss is very keenly felt for reasons of affection or association, will be a venial sin against justice, but a mortal sin against charity, if it was foreseen that its loss would cause very serious pain to the owner.

I. Notion. Theft, taken in the broader sense, is taken for every unjust injury in goods of fortune. Taken in the stricter sense it is defined: the occupation of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling. It is said:

1. Occupation, that is, taking away with the intention of making the thing one's own, or at least of treating it as one's own. Hence he is not guilty of theft who takes wine away from someone so that he may not become drunk, or a sword so that he may not kill someone.

2. While the owner is unwilling, namely with respect to the occupation. Therefore I note that, morally speaking, he is now not unwilling if, being asked, he would consent, provided he would not do this on account of the petition alone, but on account of, or also on account of, a good affection toward the person taking it away. If, however, the owner is unwilling with respect to the mode, that is, with respect to occupation without express permission, you are not excused from venial sin (St. Alphonsus, III, 700, question 1).

3. While reasonably unwilling, again with respect to the occupation. Moreover, in general the owner is irrationally unwilling if he refuses to yield a thing which is owed either from justice or from piety (n. 779); otherwise, if it is owed from charity alone. Hence a poor man is guilty of theft who, placed in necessity that is simply grave, occupies the owner's thing; but not a wife who, placed in a similar necessity, against her husband's will takes goods necessary for herself (St. Alphonsus, III, 519).

II. Division. Theft is distinguished into simple theft and robbery. Simple theft is when a thing is taken away while the owner is ignorant of it, or at least without physical or moral force. Robbery is when theft is committed while the owner is present and positively resisting, with force being employed, whether physical or moral, for example unjust fear. Each is called sacrilegious if a sacred thing is taken away.

III. Morality. 1. Theft is a grave sin from its genus, or grave or light according as it regards grave or light matter. Theft which regards grave matter is a grave sin, as is clear both from Sacred Scripture¹ and from the reason alleged where injustice in general was discussed (n. 978; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 59, a. 4; q. 66, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, III, 518). Nevertheless:

a) "It is not mortal, speaking per se, to steal any sum whatever with the intention of restoring immediately, for example within a quarter of an hour" (St. Alphonsus, III, 531). But

b) "It is grave, although not in the species of theft, if the thief knows that from the loss of a small thing a very great annoyance will follow for the owner; for example, because he was greatly attached to it, and a similar thing cannot be recovered: unless, however, the thing is of no importance at all" (St. Alphonsus, III, 526).

2. Simple theft and robbery differ in species, since robbery adds to theft the species of personal injury. Sacrilegious theft adds to both the species of sacrilege² (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 4; St. Alphonsus, III, 518).

3. It remains to determine what matter is grave. Now:

a) Matter both relatively grave and absolutely grave must be established. It is said:

α) Matter relatively grave, that is, matter which is grave considering the condition of him from whom it is taken away. For the gravity of theft also depends on the gravity of the damage which is inflicted on someone. But the gravity of damage is different according as the condition of him on whom it is inflicted is different (St. Alphonsus, III, 527). Here, however, it can be asked whether, in establishing matter relatively grave, account must also be taken of the owner's special and reasonable affection toward some thing which in itself is of lesser value, for example toward a collection of letters from a dear person. Now it seems this must be affirmed, because on account of the special affection the thing is of greater value to the owner, so that for this reason it could be sold for more, and therefore greater damage is inflicted on him.

β) Matter absolutely grave regards the quantity by which the thief is enriched, rather than the damage inflicted on the neighbor. It is called absolutely grave because it is always held as grave, even with respect to the very rich. And it must be admitted, because the act of occupying and having another's thing as such, according to its proper concept, that is, with abstraction made from the damage which is inflicted on the neighbor, involves disorder; in a word: justice forbids inflicting damage on someone and occupying and having another's thing, or, to use the words of St. Alphonsus, "the precept of not stealing obligates not only that grave damage not be inflicted on the neighbor, but also that no one be enriched from another's thing" (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 28). Moreover, if the aforesaid act involves disorder, with abstraction made from the damage inflicted, one must finally arrive at grave matter, even if the individuals from whose goods someone is enriched do not suffer grave damage.³

b) For matter grave, whether relatively or absolutely grave, a greater sum is required the smaller the value of money is; hence for grave sin a greater quantity is required now than formerly, and a greater quantity, for example, in North America than in Europe. Finally a greater quantity is required the less unwilling the owners are judged to be.

c) Considering the things we have just noted, the matter can be more determinately stated for our regions in this way:

α) With respect to a poor person: 1 florin; with respect to workers: 3 florins; with respect to citizens of middle fortune: 5 florins; with respect to the rich: 10 florins. The reason is that the assigned sums, with respect to the assigned persons, are judged to inflict grave harm. With respect to the very rich, absolutely grave matter holds; but the sum of 25 florins can be held as absolutely grave matter.

If there is question of a sacred thing, the gravity of the matter must be judged from the dignity and rarity of the thing. Hence, as regards relics, grave matter is lacking "if someone steals some very small thing, not deforming the relic itself, nor diminishing its esteem: unless it is some notable or rare relic, as for example of the Holy Cross" (St. Alphonsus, III, 532).

β) For spouses and children of the family, a sum twice as great can be established, so that, for example, the child of rich parents would sin gravely if he stole 20 florins from his parents. Indeed, if there is question of spouses, a latitude somewhat greater than for children is admitted. The reason for these things is "that the parent (and spouse) is less unwilling, and the child is something of the father" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 32), and spouses constitute one thing. Moreover, sometimes they are in no way unwilling, or are unwilling only about the mode, so that there can be no question of theft. Finally spouses and parents easily condone thefts committed by the spouse and by children if they have been consumed, so that there is no obligation of restoring (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.). If there is an obligation, compare what was said about the mode of restoring in n. 1016.

Note moreover that a wife and children of the family do not steal by taking secretly what is necessary for food and clothing, if the father refuses to grant these things. But as regards those things which are judged to be required by children for recreations fitting to their condition, great prudence is needed if these are denied by the parents. For children are usually more inclined to squander money, whereas parents often have excellent reasons for denying what is desired.

γ) As regards servants, if there is question of money or of a thing carefully guarded, the same quantity as for outsiders suffices. But it is commonly admitted that, by stealing eatables and drinkables, they do not easily arrive at grave sin, provided they themselves consume them, and do not sell them or carry them out of the house, and there is no question of a thing diligently guarded (St. Alphonsus, III, 545; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 34).

δ) As regards religious, in eatables and drinkables what was said about servants holds; in other thefts from the goods of the monastery, a greater quantity is required for grave matter than in thefts by outsiders, but a lesser quantity than in thefts by children (St. Alphonsus, IV, 24).

Here, however, note that the diverse opinions of theologians about the quantity required for grave sin are not to be explained to the people or to penitents.

Corollary I. Considering the notion of theft, sometimes very small things can be secretly taken without sin, for example one apple or another from an orchard by someone passing by, etc.; as regards very small things, owners for the most part are not judged to be unwilling. If, however, the orchard, etc., is fenced in, the owner is reasonably unwilling with respect to entrance into his territory.

Corollary II. He who cuts wood in another's forest or pastures animals in another's pastures:

1. Does not sin if the forests or pastures belong to some commune, and there is question of inhabitants of that commune, unless, as regards forests, great devastation is done. Otherwise the prohibition can be held as merely penal, and even as such it is not judged to extend to dry branches.

2. Sins if the forests or pastures belong to some private person, or at least have been leased by a private person. Nevertheless, commonly owners are judged to grant that dry branches may be collected (St. Alphonsus, III, 529). For the rest, in these matters custom must also be attended to.

Corollary III. He who, from money entrusted to him by a society, steals a sum with the intention of returning it, sins, because the owners, on account of the danger of damage, are reasonably gravely unwilling. But what quantity is required for grave sin depends in great part on the gravity of the danger.

¹ Zech. 5:3; Hab. 2:16; Exod. 20:15; 1 Cor. 6:10.

² According to others, both robbery and sacrilege constitute one species of sin, as if coalescing from two, yet distinct from simple theft.

³ Others argue from the grave damage which, according to the contrary opinion, would threaten society or even individual persons; but an intrinsic reason of strict injustice is lacking. Others judge that in the case posited the right of the republic is gravely injured. But the private owner alone, and not the republic as such, enjoys a strict right in the goods of others.

I. One sins gravely by minor thefts:

1. When someone commits a light theft with the intention of committing a grave one if the occasion were present (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 7, ad 3).

2. When someone steals light things with the intention of arriving gradually at grave matter. In the case the thief already sins gravely by the first theft; namely, although the execution of the individual thefts is externally light, nevertheless insofar as it is subject to a gravely evil intention, it is gravely evil. Nonetheless, those several little thefts seem to be morally united from that intention and therefore to coalesce into only one sin in number (St. Alphonsus, III, 533).

3. When someone, after minor thefts retained either in themselves or in equivalent, finally and advertently completes grave matter; and it is all the same whether the retained thefts were committed against the same owner or against diverse owners. The reason is that the act of retaining another's thing in itself contains disorder, and therefore, if there is question of grave matter, grave disorder (n. 1028). In this hypothesis the thief sins gravely by that very theft which completes grave matter, unless he has the intention of restoring at least the last little theft quickly. But if, after grave matter has been completed, he again commits a minor theft, according to some he increases and continues the prior mortal sin and therefore sins gravely; according to St. Alphonsus and others, he does not sin gravely unless he reaches another new grave quantity (III, 538). In the case, however, it is posited that the new little theft was not intended from the beginning; but if this had happened, there would indeed be an increase and continuation of the prior mortal sin.

4. When someone, after minor thefts not indeed retained, but following at a brief interval and committed against the same owner, completes grave matter. I have said at a brief interval, because then they are apt to inflict grave damage and therefore the owner is gravely unwilling; not so if they are separated by a longer interval. For the rest, the greater the quantity taken away on individual occasions is, the greater the interval required so that they do not coalesce (St. Alphonsus, III, 530).

If there is question of a quantity which is near to grave matter, St. Alphonsus requires an interval of at least two months (III, 530).

5. When several, by conspiracy, each take light things from someone, which together constitute grave matter. The reason is that the total damage is imputed to each one (St. Alphonsus, III, 535, 536). But "if several, either simultaneously or successively, commit several small thefts against someone, which taken together gravely harm him, then, if one does not know about the other, no one sins gravely" (St. Alphonsus, III, 535). If each one is moved by the example of another, by reason of scandal they sin against charity, and indeed gravely if the matter is grave. Moreover, more probably they also sin against justice, insofar as they cooperate in injustice by giving an example that will be followed, as was said about indirect scandal (n. 548). But by reason of this injustice one is not held to restitution, because for this it is required that someone have been an efficacious cause, not merely an occasional cause, of the damage.

6. Finally, as is clear, theft light in itself can become grave by reason of damaging, as if someone steals an instrument of lesser value, for example a tailor's needle, which someone needs in order to be able to support himself.

I. Necessity excuses, as follows:

1. Extreme necessity excuses to this extent, that it is licit to take away what is necessary for succoring the necessity, even a thing of great or extraordinary value. For the division of things proceeding from a human fact can have force only to the extent that it does not prejudice the primary end of things, which is to provide for the life of men. But it would prejudice that end if it were illicit, in extreme necessity, to consume another's thing, or, if only use is necessary, to use it (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 7; St. Alphonsus, III, 520).

2. Quasi-extreme necessity excuses to this extent, that it is licit to take away ordinary things, but not extraordinary and choice things. The reason is that such necessity differs little from extreme necessity. Many exclude extraordinary and choice things, because otherwise the character of private ownership seems to be too much restricted, and public order to be exposed to danger more than is fitting (St. Alphonsus, III, 520; cf. St. Thomas, loc. cit., ad 2).

Corollary I. He who is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity is per se held to ask for another's thing before he occupies it. For the rights of private ownership ought to be judged restricted only to the extent that the primary end of things demands it. But that end does not demand that the owner lack the faculty of assigning the thing by which the necessity of the neighbor may be relieved; but given that faculty, the petition of the neighbor must precede. There is added that otherwise all beggars who lack necessary things could steal what belongs to another, without acquiring it for themselves by begging; and this would necessarily harm order (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, question 2). Make exception: 1° if a determinate thing is absolutely necessary for someone, either because another cannot be obtained, or because another would not suffice; for then there can be no question of assigning the thing, since it has already been assigned. Make exception 2° if the owner is foreseen as about to refuse the petition, because no one is held to what is useless (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Corollary II. What is licit for relieving one's own necessity is also licit for succoring another's necessity. Yet if someone can succor the needy person from his own goods, he is held to that from charity, rather than to steal another's goods (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 15).

Corollary III. If it is asked from what virtue someone is held to succor one who is in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, I respond: he is held from charity to succor him spontaneously; if he does not succor him spontaneously, he is held from justice not to impede the needy person from providing for himself (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, question 3).

3. Grave necessity (a fortiori common necessity) does not excuse. This is clear first from proposition 36 condemned by Innocent XI: It is permitted to steal, not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity. The reason, moreover, is that the primary end of things, which is that life be provided for, does not demand such a restriction of private ownership. There is added that the contrary doctrine would give occasion to innumerable takings away of another's things. Nevertheless, it is licit for a poor man, for relieving grave necessity, to steal some light thing, "judging probably that the wealthy owner, from mercy, is not unwilling, at least with respect to the substance. But the use of this epikeia ought not to be easy, nor in grave matter; because then the rich would also be reasonably unwilling with respect to the substance" (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, at the end).

4. An obligation of restoring after the necessity has passed is present as follows:

a) If the occupied thing still exists, it must be restored, because only the use, not ownership, was necessary (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, question 5).

b) If the thing has been consumed, the one taking it away is held to restitution if he was not absolutely poor, that is, if he had goods of his own or hope of obtaining them; for it sufficed to receive the thing as a loan. The contrary must be said, for the contrary reason, if he was poor both in thing and in hope. And this holds sufficiently probably even if someone had unjustly stolen the thing before the necessity. The reason is that the obligation of restoring contracted from unjust acceptance is extinguished by the very fact that the thief makes the stolen thing simply his own and consumes it (St. Alphonsus, III, 520, questions 4 and 5).

II. Hidden compensation consists in this: that the creditor, without the debtor's knowledge, procures for himself from the debtor's goods that to which he has a right. It is just and licit, provided the due conditions are observed. It is required:

1. That there be a strict right, and that it be liquid or exigible.

2. That there be a certain right. If it is doubtful, the condition of the possessor is better. Yet some judge that compensation has place when the doubt regards not the fact, for example injury to reputation, which is supposed to be certain, but the right, namely, in the hypothesis posited, the right to compensation through goods of fortune, so that, for example, someone certainly defamed could compensate himself with money for reputation not repaired (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 544, with the editor's note).

He who has secretly compensated himself with a doubtful right is held to restore the thing if he began to possess in doubtful faith; otherwise, if he proceeded in good faith and cannot overcome the doubt (n. 992).

3. That the debt cannot conveniently be obtained by another way. Namely, one secretly compensating himself per se, although only venially, "sins against common justice, while he usurps for himself judgment of his own thing, with the order of law passed over" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 66, a. 5, ad 3). He sins only venially because, provided the thing is owed, public order is not gravely disturbed.

Moreover, insofar as it can be done, a thing of the same species as the thing owed is to be taken; likewise, insofar as it can be done, care should be taken that another, for example a servant, not come under suspicion of theft; finally one must beware lest the debtor pay again, for example by remitting the debt, as it were (St. Alphonsus, III, 521; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 10, n. 21).

Corollary. Hidden compensation is often illicit, namely because the required conditions are lacking. Hence the confessor should be very prudent in permitting it; wherefore proposition 37 condemned by Innocent XI is to be noted: "Male and female domestic servants can secretly steal from their masters to compensate their labor, which they judge greater than the wage which they receive."¹ This proposition was deservedly condemned, both because sometimes they so judge too lightly, and because a wage per se less than the work rendered can per accidens be just (n. 917), and because, even if the wage is less than just, there is not always a just cause for obtaining what is owed to oneself by this reason, but per se a greater wage ought first to be asked (St. Alphonsus, III, 522-524).

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1187.

Condonation of the domestic thefts of wives and children of the family cannot be presumed in all cases (see 1903).

(a) Thus, if the things stolen are articles of food and drink (or tobacco), and were consumed by the members of the family, there is no duty of restitution, since the father or husband is then unwilling, not so much that these things should be taken, as that they should be taken furtively.

(b) If the things taken do not fall under the class of eatables and are still in the possession of the thief, they should be restored. Hence, if a son steals money from his father in order to have the means for debauchery, he must give back that money.

(c) If the things taken were not eatables, but were of great value and have been consumed or alienated, it will depend on circumstances whether restitution is obligatory or not. Thus, if the father thinks much of the son who took the money and the family does not miss it much, condonation may perhaps be taken for granted; but if the son is not on good terms with his father, or if the theft is very harmful to the family, restitution may be due.

Theft and Robbery.—Having considered the injuries to person committed by homicide, mutilation, imprisonment, etc., we shall now take up the injuries to property committed by theft and robbery. Private ownership of property is allowed by natural and divine law, and it is necessary when, as at present, human affairs cannot be well managed under another system. It has its limits, however, since it is subordinate to the public good, and charity requires that those who have the goods of this world share them with those who are in need (see 1210 sqq.). The chief titles to private ownership are the following:

(a) original titles, which are those by which one takes possession and dominion of goods that have never had or have not now an owner, and these are reduced to two, namely, occupation (i.e., the taking possession of a material thing) and accession (i.e., the union of a material thing with one’s property);

(b) derivative titles, which are those by which one obtains dominion, through transfer of right, of the goods that belong to another. These titles are produced by the law itself (as in prescription), or by the law and the free will of man (as in inheritance from testament or from intestate), or by the free will of man (as in contracts).

Theft.—Theft is the secret taking of what belongs to another, with the intention of appropriating it to oneself, against the reasonable wishes of the owner.

(a) It is a taking, that is, a carrying away of goods. But theft also includes the receiving or keeping of property, since the harm done is the same as when the goods are carried away. Hence, he who does not restore borrowed or deposited or found objects, or who does not pay back a loan, when he could and should, is a thief.

(b) It is a secret taking, that is, the property is taken away without the knowledge of the owner or lawful possessor, even though he be present. In this respect theft differs from robbery.

(c) It is the taking of property. This includes not only corporeal things (e.g., books, money, jewelry, clothing), but also incorporeal things (e.g., patents, trademarks, copyrights), and even persons if they are looked on as possessions. Hence, plagiarism or infringement of copyright or man-stealing or kidnapping (i.e., the carrying off of another’s slave or child) are forms of theft.

(d) It is the taking of property that belongs to another, that is, of goods of which another person is the owner, or lawful possessor as usufructuary, guardian, depositary, etc. Hence, one can steal from oneself by taking one’s goods by stealth from the bailee with the design of charging him for their value or of depriving him of their use to which he has a right.

(e) It is the taking away of goods with the intention of appropriating them to one’s own possession, use or enjoyment to the exclusion of the rightful owner. Hence, strictly speaking, it is not theft to carry away property with the intention of borrowing it for a time or of destroying it; but these are acts of unlawful possession or of unlawful damage. It is obligatory to take an object from another, if this is necessary to prevent the commission of a crime (e.g., to take away and hide the gun with which another intends to kill).

(f) It is against the wishes of the owner. This refers to the substance (that is, the conversion of the property to one’s use), not to the mode (that is, secrecy with which it is done). Hence, if the owner is unwilling that the property be taken, he who takes it is guilty of theft; if the owner is not unwilling that it be taken, but is unwilling that it be taken without his knowledge, he who takes it in this way sins at least venially, but is not guilty of theft in the strict sense.

(g) It is against the reasonable wishes of the owner or possessor; for no injury is done if he does or should consent to the loss. The owner does consent if the person who takes the goods is acting according to a general and recognized custom (e.g., when a servant takes things left over from her employer’s table, which it is certain the latter does not wish to keep); the owner should consent, if justice forbids that he prevent the taking (e.g., when a starving man is taking food from one who has plenty), or if domestic duty commands that he should give the thing taken (e.g., when a wife takes from her husband’s pockets the needed money he denies his family, for a wife and family have the right to receive from the head of the house support according to their station and means). But the owner is not bound to consent to the loss of his goods from the mere fact that he misuses them to his own spiritual disadvantage, or owes them in charity to the taker. Hence, it is theft to take a flask from the pocket of one who drinks too much, or to steal a book from one who is harmed by reading it, or to filch money from a rich man because one is poor and he will not give an alms.

Unauthorized Use of Another’s Funds.—What is the guilt of one who uses for his own purposes the money of another entrusted to him for other purposes?

(a) There is no theft, for it is supposed that the purpose of the user is to make only a temporary loan of the money.

(b) There is an act of injustice, if the permission of the owner cannot be presumed; for the rights of an owner are violated when one converts his property to uses displeasing to him. Thus, if the prospect is that the owner may never get his money back or that he will lose profits by the use made of it, the guilt of unjust damage is incurred, at least in intention (e.g., a depositary uses a deposit to buy stocks on margin, or a company official makes an unauthorized loan instead of investing the amount for the company’s benefit).

(c) There is no sin, if the permission of the owner can be reasonably presumed; for to him who willingly consents no injury is done. Thus, if one who is managing the funds of another has the chance to make a large amount of money today by using those funds for himself but cannot get in touch with the owner, the latter’s consent can be presumed, if he will suffer no present loss and it is absolutely certain that his funds will be returned tomorrow. But on account of the risk that is ordinarily present, this case would be rare.

Comparison of Theft and Robbery.—(a) They differ in species, for theft contains injustice to an owner in his property, but robbery, which is an unjust and violent taking of what belongs to another, contains injustice both to property and to person. The unwillingness of the owner in the case of theft is due to his ignorance of his loss; in the case of robbery it is due to intimidation or force. (b) They differ in gravity, robbery being according to its nature the more serious kind of stealing; for the robber does a twofold injury, and the owner’s unwillingness to be robbed is greater.

Kinds of Theft and Robbery.—(a) There are many varieties of theft, the differences arising from the circumstances in which the stealing is done. Thus, he who steals from the Church is guilty of sacrilegious theft; he who uses the public goods for his private ends commits peculation; he who takes from his parents practises domestic thievery.

(b) There are also many ways in which robbery or rapine is committed. The following persons are guilty of robbery: pirates, bandits, highwaymen, burglars, usurers, profiteers, venal judges, unmerciful creditors who deprive debtors of necessaries, debtors who escape payment by fraudulent bankruptcy, profiteers, laborers who extort unjust wages, those who force subordinates to contribute graft, and blackmailers. Two forms of robbery are described in Scripture as sins that cry to heaven for justice, namely, defrauding laborers of their wages (James, v. 4) and oppression of the poor, which happens especially when one denies their rights to those who are unable to defend them. The following persons are also classed as thieves: pickpockets, spongers, smugglers, forgers, counterfeiters, embezzlers, and those who misappropriate funds entrusted to them.

In the civil law theft is also known as larceny, and is defined as the unlawful severance of personal property from the possession of its owner. The following kinds of larceny are distinguished:

(a) in respect to the manner of perpetration, a theft is larceny when the property is taken from the possession of the owner by one who had no possession, whether the latter be a stranger or a custodian; it is embezzlement when committed by one upon whom the owner had conferred temporary possession on account of a fiduciary relationship between them; it is false pretence when committed by one who procures permanent possession or ownership through fraudulent representations;

(b) In respect to the matter or quantity stolen, theft is called petit larceny when it falls below a certain sum fixed by the law, grand larceny when it exceeds that sum.

The Sinfulness of Theft.—(a) From its nature theft—and, much more, robbery—is a grave sin; for it is opposed to the virtues of charity and justice, it is expressly forbidden in the Seventh Commandment (“Thou shalt not steal,” Exod., xx. 15), and it excludes from eternal life (“Neither thieves nor extortioners shall possess the kingdom of God,” I Cor., vi. 10). The thief attacks the sacred right of the individual to his property, and imperils the peace and stability of society itself. Theft is a grave sin, even when it is committed by little and little, as happens when a merchant gives underweight habitually: “A deceitful balance is an abomination to the Lord” (Prov., xi. 1). The proposition that restitution for a large sum taken in parts at different times is not a grave duty was condemned by Innocent XI (Denzinger, 1188). Canonical penalties for theft include exclusion from acts and offices, censures, and deposition (Canon 2354).

(b) From the imperfection of the act theft may be only a venial sin, for example, when the thief is a kleptomaniac and steals without advertence, or when he is invincibly ignorant that the thing taken is not his own or is of great value, or from the smallness of the matter involved (e.g., when the thing taken has little value, or the owner is opposed rather to the stealthy manner of taking than to the taking, or is only slightly unwilling to lose the goods).

Theft of a small amount may be a mortal sin (see 187). This may happen: (a) on account of the internal or subjective circumstances, as when the thief intends to steal as much as he can or a large amount here and now, or when he intends to steal a small amount here and new but to keep this up every day until he has stolen a considerable amount, or when a child steals a small sum from its parents and falsely thinks that the theft is gravely sinful in itself; (b) on account of external or objective circumstances, as when the amount taken today is small but constitutes, with amounts previously taken, a large sum, or when the thief foresees serious consequences from his act (e.g., that the person from whom the goods are taken will fall under suspicion and be discharged or arrested). It should be noted, however, that the consequences of the theft do not necessarily make the sin grave precisely as it is a sin of theft (e.g., in the case just given the theft was a venial sin, but the unjust damage was a mortal sin), or even precisely as it is a sin of injustice (e.g., if one steals a picture of small value, foreseeing that the owner will be afflicted beyond measure at the loss, the sin against justice is small, but the sin against charity is mortal).

The determination of the amount that constitutes grave matter in theft or robbery (or in unjust damage) is a very difficult task, because the factors upon which the injury depends are to some extent doubtful and vary in particular cases. Hence, there is a great diversity of opinion among moralists on this subject, and it will frequently be uncertain in an individual case whether a theft is mortally or only venially sinful in itself. But on account of the spiritual and temporal interests that are concerned it is necessary to give at least general rules for direction that will enable one to distinguish between grave and venial theft, and to know when the duty of restitution is serious, when light.

Moralists are in agreement on the following points:

(a) the standard for measuring gravity of matter is not an invariable one, but will differ according to circumstances of times and places. Thus, money has much less purchasing power today than it had before the Civil War, and the same amount will not go so far nor last so long in the United States as in some countries of Europe. Hence, other things being equal, it is less harmful to steal the sum of $10 in 1958 than it was to steal the same sum in 1858, less harmful to steal that amount from an American than to steal its equivalent from a European;

(b) the standard for a particular country and period is to be interpreted morally, not mathematically; for it depends on the opinions or estimates of the prudent, which after all are only approximations and subject to revisions. Hence, it would be absurd to draw such a hard and fast distinction between grave and venial theft—for example, to decide from the amounts alone that he who stole $50 is certainly guilty of mortal sin and fit for hell, while he who stole $49.99 is guilty of venial sin only and not fit for hell. The figures given by moralists for grave matter are averages, and hence they cannot be expected to suit each individual locality or moment or injured person. But, being based on actual conditions, they are serviceable. If a sum stolen is much above or below them, they indicate truly the theological species of the sin; if it is only a little above or below them, they afford a basis for probability, or at least show that there is room for doubt.

Moralists are also at one in measuring the injury of theft by the following considerations:

(a) it should be estimated by the property loss, that is, that theft should be deemed a grave sin which in view of all the circumstances and the common opinion indicts a notable loss on the owner in his property rights. This is a matter of common sense, for every one can see that it is a very different thing to steal a cent and to steal $100.

(b) it should be estimated by the personal injury, that is, by the unwillingness of the proprietor to suffer the loss. This is also clear, since the unwillingness of the proprietor is one of the ingredients of theft, as was explained above in the definition, and everyone will readily grant that an amount which would be notable if stolen from a stranger, would not be notable if stolen from an indulgent parent.

There are two opinions about the estimation of the property loss.

(a) Thus, an older opinion held that the standard should be an absolute one, that is, that the loss should be determined independently of the wealth or poverty of the person injured, since the financial situation of this person is a purely extrinsic circumstance of the theft. The rich man has just as much right to his $10 as the poor man has to his $10, and it is therefore just as injurious to deprive the former of the sum as it is to deprive the latter. What is a mortal theft in one case is a mortal theft in every case.

(b) A later opinion, which seems to be the common one today, distinguishes two standards: an absolute one, which fixes one highest amount that is always grave matter on account of its magnitude, however wealthy the loser may be, and a relative one, which proposes a scale of lower amounts that are grave matter on account of the economic condition of the persons stolen from. It is argued that a relative standard should be set up, since the injury of theft is certainly felt more by those who have less means to fall back on; and that an absolute standard is also necessary, since without it the property of the rich would not be sufficiently safeguarded and the peace and order of society would be endangered.

Opinions on the Amounts that Are Grave Matter.—(a) The older opinion, according to which there is only one invariable standard for all classes and conditions, regards as grave matter the amount necessary to support for a day, according to his state and obligations, a man whose financial condition is midway between wealth and poverty; for the loss of a day’s support is usually looked on as a serious loss, and a standard for all should be taken from the average. This daily support amount may be reckoned from the amount of daily wages or income. In the United States in 1955 the average daily wage was between $14 and $15, but, if only skilled laborers or those who are in moderately prosperous circumstances are considered, the average would be considerable higher. Perhaps it would range between $25 and $30. Or if we strike a medium between the highest and the lowest figures given by the advocates of two standards, we should arrive at approximately $30 or $35.

(b) The common opinion today fixes the absolute amount, which is grave matter even when theft is from the wealthiest person or society as the equivalent of a week’s wages for the head of a family living in fairly good circumstances but dependent upon his work for its support. As to the actual amount, authors differ. Thus, Father Francis Connell, C.SS.R., wrote in 1945 in American Ecclesiastical Review (p. 69): “To lay down a general norm in view of actual conditions and value of money, it would seem that the actual sum for grave theft would be about $40.” In 1946, writing in the Homiletic and Pastoral Review (p. 694), Father Joseph Donovan, C.M., stated: “It is hard to see how less than $100 could be absolutely grave with the chances of a higher amount being probably so.”[*] This sum was criticized as being excessive and did not meet with ready acceptance by all moral theologians. On page 127 of the third printing of his Outlines of Moral Theology (1955), Father Francis J. Connell, C.SS.R., suggested $75 as a reasonable absolute sum considering the value of money at the time, and, as a practical norm, the sum has been acceptable to most confessors and authors. Relatively grave matter corresponds with the amount needed to support a worker and his family for a day or, according to some, the amount required for the support of the worker alone. Relatively grave matter would range from about $5 from a poor person on relief, through $20-$35 from skilled laborers and persons in comfortable circumstances, to $75 from the wealthy. The latter sum constitutes the absolute standard. For a general norm to establish relatively grave matter, then, an acceptable procedure is to take the daily earning power or expenses of those who do not belong to the wealthiest classes, but who just barely make a living by reason of their work or charity.

[*] This is not to suggest that the authors cited hold to the “week’s pay norm” as the standard. Father Connell, for example, defines the absolute as “a sum which is so large that society would suffer much if it could be stolen without grave sin even from the richest or from a wealthy corporation” (op. cit., pp. 127-128). The interest in citing the authors is to show the precise sums suggested by them at various times regardless of the norm used in arriving at the particular amount suggested.

What is grave matter in theft of sacred objects? (a) If these objects have a value that may be measured by money (e.g., the gold or jewels that enter into a reliquary), grave matter is estimated by the material value, just as in profane objects. (b) If these objects have no monetary value (e.g., sacred relics), grave matter is judged from the dignity or rarity of the object. Thus, it would be a serious sin to steal even the smallest splinter from the True Cross.

It was said above (1898) that the gravity of theft is estimated, not only by the property loss, but also by the personal loss, that is, the reluctance, unwillingness or sorrow of the owner at the deprivation of his goods. This does not mean that a greater unwillingness on the part of the owner increases the gravity of the theft, if the owner’s unwillingness is excessive or unreasonable (e.g., it is not a mortal sin of theft to steal a dollar from a miser, if the miser on account of his love of money feels the loss as keenly as another person in his place would feel the loss of $40). But a less unwillingness of the owner diminishes the injury, and hence increases the amount necessary for grave matter. There are three reasons especially that diminish the unwillingess of the owner at the loss of his property.

(a) Thus, by reason of the persons who steal, the owner is less unwilling when these persons have a greater claim on his affection (e.g., his children or wife), or when custom permits them to some extent a greater freedom than is granted to others (e.g., servants, employees).

(b) By reason of the things stolen, the owner is less unwilling when these are things of less value, like crops, that are produced mostly by nature and are left exposed, such as fruits growing by the wayside, branches and pieces of fallen timber lying on uncultivated land.

(c) By reason of the manner of the theft, the owner is usually less unwilling when goods are taken gradually and on several occasions, or piecemeal, than when they are taken all at once.

The Common Opinion on Domestic Thefts and Grave Matter.—(a) In theft from one’s parents about double the usual quantity is required. But in an individual case the parents may be just as unwilling, and with good reason, to be despoiled by members of the family as by outsiders, and in such a case the rule would not apply. Hence, in considering thefts by children one must bear in mind the ability of the family to suffer the loss, the number of the children, the uses to which the stolen goods are put, the liberality or thrift of the parents, the affection or dislike which the parents have for the child who steals, etc. Thus, if poor parents are denying themselves in every way in order to rear and educate a large family, thefts from them are a serious matter.

(b) In theft from one’s husband even a greater amount is required. But there are exceptions, as when the husband is especially unwilling to have his property stolen by his wife, for example, when the money she takes is devoted, not to the benefit of the family or other useful purposes, but to vanity or sin, or to the great detriment of the husband or family (see 1799).

Theft from One’s Wife or Minor Child.—(a) According to the law in the United States, a wife cannot steal from her husband nor the husband from the wife, but this principle has reference to the common property of which husband and wife are joint tenants (Robinson, Elementary Law, Sec. 563). Both husband and wife may have also their own separate property, and in that case either of them is guilty of injustice if he or she damages or takes without leave the goods of the other.

(b) According to American law, the father has the right to the earnings of his minor children who live with him and receive their maintenance from him; but the law gives the father no right over the separate real or personal estate of these children. Hence, a parent would be guilty of theft if he unlawfully took or used the individual property of his child.

The Common Opinion on Thefts Committed by Employees.—(a) If the things stolen are small articles which the employer customarily supplies for his help (e.g., food and drink for domestic servants, pencils and paper for his clerks), the theft is not serious as a rule. But there are exceptions, as when the employee gives or sells to others these articles, or when he uses or wastes them to such a degree that the employer suffers a considerable loss. And one should also consider such circumstances as the great or small value of the services given by the employee, his good or bad standing with the employer, etc.

(b) If the thing stolen is not meant for consumption (e.g., furnishings of the home or office, merchandise of the store, tools or machinery of the factory) or is of a very precious kind (e.g., rare wines or expensive brands of tobacco), grave matter is of the same amount as when an outside person does the stealing. In fact, the guilt of the employee is more serious on account of his abuse of confidence or violation of contract. The property of employers would be subject to constant risk, if employees were permitted greater liberties than outsiders.

Theft of Things about Whose Loss the Owner Is Less Concerned.—(a) Vegetation that Belongs to the Public and Is Left Unprotected.—If these things are of minor importance (e.g., wild fruits or berries, broken twigs, branches, etc., in public lands), it seems that it is not theft to take them, at least when one is poor and a member of the community; for laws against such acts are generally regarded as penal. But one sins, and may even sin gravely, when extensive damage is done to public property (e.g., by cutting down trees, carrying away flowers and plants, injuring shrubs, etc.).

(b) Vegetation that Belongs to Private Parties and Is Left Unprotected.—If only a small quantity is taken (e.g., an apple or a bunch of grapes hanging over a public highway taken by a passerby), it seems no theft is done, unless the owner or law expressly forbids. But it seems to be a venial sin to take more (e.g., as much as a hungry person can eat), and a mortal sin to take a quantity whose market value is equal to grave matter.

Travelling Without Paying Fare.—Is it theft to ride in public conveyances without paying the fare?

(a) If one rides without payment or ticket, it seems that theft is committed, unless the company is willing to give a free ride. It may be said that the company suffers no loss on account of one passenger who has not paid for his transportation, since the same number of cars and the same expenses would be required even without that passenger. But since the owners are unwilling to furnish their service gratis, he who takes it without pay is guilty of theft.

(b) If one rides without payment, but uses the ticket of another, there is no injustice if the rules of the company permit this (e.g., A buys a round-trip ticket, but gives the return ticket to B), but there is fraud if the rules of the company and the agreement of the purchaser make the ticket non-transferable (e.g., B uses the half-rate ticket which A had received as a personal privilege from the railroad company).

Small Thefts Which Amount to a Large Sum.—Small amounts stolen may accumulate into a large amount. This happens in the following ways: (a) the thief takes small sums on different occasions from the same person or from different persons, and continues at this until he has stolen a considerable amount; (b) the thief conspires with other thieves to steal on the same occasion from one person or several persons, and, though the sum he steals is small, the sum taken by the whole group is considerable. Similarly, petty damages or vexations may accumulate into a mortal injustice. Thus, if Claudius, aiming to break down the health, sanity, success, reputation, business, etc., of Balbus, plans and carries out a systematic campaign of small injuries daily repeated for years, Claudius is guilty at least in purpose of serious damage.

Small thefts that grow into a large theft are mortally sinful in the following cases:

(a) they are mortally sinful by reason of the previous intention when one steals a little now and a little again, but has it in mind from the outset to steal a total sum that will be grave matter, or when one conspires with others to steal a notable sum although one’s own share will not be a notable amount. In these cases the purpose is to commit a grave injustice, either against an individual (if all is taken from one person) or against society (if portions are taken from various persons), and hence one is internally guilty of grave sin, even though one has not yet performed it externally. Examples are merchants who use false weights and measures, or who adulterate their commodities with small portions of water, etc., and thus make large profits by minute cheating;

(b) they are mortally sinful by reason of the subsequent intention when one had no purpose to steal a large amount, but adverts to the fact that a small theft here and now committed will constitute grave matter if added to previous petty thefts, or that the amount of stolen goods now possessed is large, and nevertheless resolves to go ahead with the theft or to retain the stolen goods. This does not mean that a number of venial sins coalesce into a mortal sin (see 189), but only that the object of a sin which is slight in itself becomes serious on account of the circumstance that it is morally connected with previous sins. The last act in a connected series must not be taken singly, but in connection with the acts that precede, as is seen in the violation of a fast or in omission of parts of an hour. In the cases now considered, therefore, grave injustice is actually and purposely done, and mortal sin is committed, even though there was no thought of this in advance.

The case of young men who are educated free of charge in the expectation that they will go on to the priesthood and who do not persevere.—(a) If they act in bad faith (i.e., if they enter the college or seminary merely to get their education, or to avoid work, or if they remain after they have abandoned thought of the clerical state), they are guilty of theft and bound to restitution.

(b) If they are not in bad faith (i.e., if they wish to try out their vocation, or if they begin with the intention to persevere), they are not guilty of injustice. This is true, even though they are rejected on account of idleness or other faults, provided there was no intention to defraud.

In the following cases small thefts which added to others make a large sum seem not to be the cause of grave loss, and hence not mortally sinful:

(a) the small theft of one person following on the small thefts of others, when there is no bond of example, advice, conspiracy, etc., to unite the various thefts; for none of the thieves can be held responsible for the part of the loss caused by the others. Example: Titus, knowing that Balbus has been cheated by various persons to the amount of $9 and that $10 will be a serious loss to Balbus, proceeds to steal $1 from Balbus:

(b) the small thefts of several persons who steal together, and who influence one another only by example; for example is an occasion, not a true cause of the imitator’s act (see 1447, 1763). Example: Sempronius and Claudius go into a store together and find that there is no one around. Sempronius thereupon steals a number of articles and leaves. Claudius notices this and steals other things, which will make the total loss serious.

Moral Connection between Repeated Acts of Theft.—The moral connection between repeated acts of theft by one person is necessary, as was said, in order that these acts unite into one grave sin. This moral connection does not exist, however, if the series is broken by interruption or revocation.

(a) Thus, the connection is broken by interruption when there is a long interval between small thefts, because thefts that are small and infrequent do not inflict severe loss on individuals or society. This supposes, of course, that there is no intention to practise small thievery habitually in order to become enriched by it, but that one steals now and then as opportunity or necessity occurs, or (according to some) that one intends to steal only small amounts and at long intervals.

(b) The connection is also broken by restitution or revocation. It is clear that, if the thief has given back his former thefts, they should not be computed with later thefts; and it seems also—though some do not admit this—that, if he has sincerely resolved to give back things taken before (e.g., things which are useless for him), there is no moral connection between the past thefts and a theft he is committing now.

Interval of Time between Acts of Theft.—The interval of time that breaks the connection between small thefts cannot be determined with mathematical exactness, but the following rule seems to be accurate enough: thefts combine to form a great theft only when considerable property is taken by degrees, but within such a brief period of time as to be of notable advantage to the thief and of notable disadvantage to the loser. Some moralists think that six months is a long space, sufficient to prevent union between thefts, but that two months is too short a space to prevent the union; others, on the contrary, believe that the amounts stolen should be taken into consideration; and hence that the following intervals between thefts separate them into distinct venial sins without coalescence:

(a) a period of one year between thefts, each of which almost amounts to grave matter, when the property is kept (e.g., when a dressmaker who has kept not a little of her patron’s material of a twelvemonth ago does the same thing again this year);

(b) a period of two months, when the matters are almost grave, but the property is not kept (e.g., when a thief who beat a restaurant out of the price of a very elaborate meal at the beginning of January does the same thing at the beginning of March). But it is hard to see how one could have the habit of stealing in this way and not have the intention of stealing a large amount, for a person who steals what is almost grave matter every two months or so must realize that he will shortly be enriched to a considerable extent by his dishonesty. Moreover, the interval of two months might be needed by the thief for avoiding suspicion;

(c) a period of one month, when the thing stolen falls far short of grave matter (e.g., a meal of simple fare plainly cooked and served);

(d) a period of about two weeks, when the matters are very small (e.g., when a thief takes a few secret sips from a wine bottle on each of his fortnightly visits to a certain house, or carries away some trifling object as a souvenir). These thefts would not surpass five or ten cents a month;

(e) some authors think that one week or perhaps even one day will prevent coalescence between extremely small thefts; and surely there are some paltry objects (e.g., a pin or needle, a match, a small lump of coal, a piece of string) which would not total a large value even after many years have passed.

Species and Number of Petty Thefts that Coalesce into Grave Matter.—(a) If the thefts proceed from a previously formed purpose of stealing by installments a large sum, each of them is a mortal sin, but they do not form numerically distinct sins, unless there was a revocation of the intent (see 214, 215).

(b) If the thefts did not proceed from a previously formed plan, those that preceded the culminating theft (i.e., the one whose addition makes the quantity grave) are so many separate venial sins of theft. The culminating theft is a mortal sin, if the thief adverts to the fact that he has now stolen a notable sum; otherwise it is a venial sin. The act, after the gravity of the matter has been noticed, is the initial mortal sin, if it means consent to the grave injustice done (e.g., retention of the ill-gotten goods, intention not to make restitution); it is an additional mortal sin, if it means a renewal of consent to the grave injustice previously done (e.g., the theft of a new small amount with the purpose of keeping it as well as the rest).

Sum Required for Grave Matter in Petty Thefts that Coalesce.—(a) According to one opinion, it is always larger than the sum required for grave matter in a theft of the same amount on a single occasion; for the owner does not feel the loss so much when his goods are stolen in small amounts and at different times. Thus, a man is less unwilling to have $100 stolen from him through pilferings of cents and dollars over a period of a year or two than to have it all stolen from him on one day.

(b) According to another opinion, grave matter for petty thefts is not larger than grave matter for large thefts of the same amount, if the petty thief had the intention all along to accumulate a notable sum. But some who are of this opinion make an exception for the case when the petty thief steals not from one but from several owners, for in this way the loss is distributed and less harm done. Grave matter in this case, they say, is the same as absolutely grave matter.

There are various opinions on the amounts required for grave matter in the case of petty thefts that coalesce. (a) If all the thefts are against the same person, the usual opinion fixes grave matter at one and one-half times or twice the amount fixed for large thefts. Some authors limit this to cases wherein the thief had not the purpose from the beginning to steal a great amount (see 1915), and some state that the amount for large thefts which is considered is the relative, not the absolute sum. (b) If the thefts are against different persons, some think that grave matter is the same as the absolute matter of one large theft, while others make it one and one-half times or twice that amount. Here again some moralists limit these increases in the sum for grave matter to cases wherein there was no purpose from the beginning to steal a notable amount.

Theft from Joint Owners.—Is it a grave sin to steal a considerable amount of property that belongs to joint owners? (a) If the amount taken is absolutely grave, the sin is serious for the reasons given in 1898 sqq.; (b) if the amount taken is relatively grave (e.g., because a community is very poor, or because the owners are only two or three and the individual loss is heavy), the sin is serious; (c) if the amount taken is not relatively grave, as happens when an organization is not poor and has many members or when the loss will be so distributed among the joint owners as to be little felt by them individually, the sin is not serious.

Restitution in Cases of Theft.—(a) Restitution is owed for the property stolen. He who stole a serious amount but gave back part, retaining only what is light matter, is bound under venial sin to restore the rest. Confessors should urge restitution even of small amounts, when possible, in order to deter men from theft, and it may sometimes be useful to require children to seek a condonation from their parents for a similar reason. (b) Restitution is owed also for damage caused by the theft (see 1895). Thus, if one steals the tool of a poor farmer, which is of little value in itself but which brings on him a serious loss, one is responsible for the loss as well as for the tool.

Cases of Doubt.—(a) Doubts of Law.—The rules given by moralists on grave matter in thefts are not to be regarded as certain and authentic, since they are only the opinions of theologians, and have no obligatory sanction from the Church. They are reasonable and well founded, indeed, but in spite of them there will occur cases wherein it is doubtful whether a theft is mortal or venial (see 1896). It is no disgrace to be ignorant in such difficult cases, for St. Augustine himself admitted that he did not always know where to draw the line. Hence, confessors should not feel obliged to decide with finality in every instance whether the sin committed was in itself grave or light; on the contrary, it will sometimes be necessary to avoid a definite answer, while calling attention to the sinfulness of all theft and the duty of restitution. But the obligation of restitution should not be imposed as certain, where the doctors disagree.

(b) Doubts of Fact.—The application of the rules for grave matter will also be at times very difficult on account of uncertainties about circumstances of time, person, etc. In such cases one must have recourse to the systems for decision in the presence of a doubtful conscience. If a thief does not know from whom he stole, it may be doubtful whether the matter is relatively grave or only light; but the presumption then will be that the loser was a person of average means. Again, when there is a strong likelihood that an owner was not greatly unwilling, one must insist that the thefts cease for the future, but one cannot always impose restitution. If a petty thief does not know how much he stole, or whether all the thefts were from the same person, or whether the intervals between the thefts were great or small, or whether he had the intention from the outset to take a large sum, the confessor will have to form an opinion by questioning the penitent on the time of his last confession, the amounts he generally took, the general frequency of the thefts, etc.

Conversion of Others’ Property.—The conversion of property owned by others or held by them may be permitted, or at least tolerated, when the owner or possessor would be unreasonable if he objected as in the following cases:

(a) in extreme necessity, for according to natural law each one has the right to preserve his life by using the temporal things of the earth (see 1571). In danger of death things necessary for escaping the danger become common property, and no injury is done by the person in danger if he uses the goods of another person to save his own life;

(b) in certain cases when occult compensation is the only way in which one can defend or secure one’s right to property, for it is not wrong to take what is one’s due, if this is done without harm to the rights of others.

Conditions for Lawful Occupation of the Goods of Others in Extreme Need.—(a) The occupation must be necessary for securing one’s own or another’s natural right to some supreme good, such as life or what is almost the equivalent of life (e.g., freedom from cruel restraint, escape from fearful disease). A supreme good is at stake, then, when one is in extreme, quasi-extreme, or most grave need (see 1236), that is, exposed to the certain or very probable peril of losing life, limbs, liberty, sight, chastity, etc.; occupation is necessary when there is no other way (e.g., by begging) to avert the danger.

(b) The occupation must be made without detriment to the rights of others. Hence, one may not occupy more than is really necessary to escape the danger; one may not occupy at all if the owner is situated in an equal danger (e.g., one may not take the plank from a man in danger of drowning in order to save oneself); one may not retain the thing taken, if the danger has passed (e.g., one who commandeered his neighbor’s car in order to escape from a thug must return the car). The neglect to ask permission, however, does not exceed a venial sin and does not impose the duty of restitution, if there is a real reason for occupation. One may not take the goods without permission, if this can be obtained without too much difficulty; nor forcibly, if possession can be had peaceably.

Restitution for Occupied Goods.—Is the occupier bound to restitution for occupied goods that were consumed (e.g., food and drink), if he afterwards becomes able to pay for them?

(a) If the occupier had no prospect at the time of ever being able to pay for what he took, he is not bound to restitution—not because of possession, since the thing has perished, nor because of the taking, since there was no onerous contract, nor because of injury, since he acted within his rights. The owner cannot complain at this, since charity obliges him to give of his own free will to one who is in supreme need and not to expect that the alms be paid back, while justice forbids that he impede the appropriation of what is needed by the person in distress. It seems, however, that a case of this character would rarely happen, and, if it did happen, the more decent thing would be to pay for what was used. Some moralists think that more probably there would be an obligation of justice to do this, since occupation is lawful only in so far as it is necessary.

(b) If the occupier had the prospect at the time of being able to pay for what he took, he is bound to restitution; for one should not occupy more than is necessary, and, if a loan suffices to tide one over a difficulty, it is not right to expect a gift. Hence, men who raid bakery shops in times of food shortage, are bound to make restitution to the bakers when able.

Occupation in the Case of Merely Grave Necessity.—Is it lawful to occupy in merely grave or ordinary necessity?

(a) This is not lawful, for otherwise the doors would be opened to thefts without number, and both the security of property and the peace of the public would be at an end. Innocent XI condemned the proposition that it is permissible to steal in great need (Denzinger, n. 1186). (b) Such occupation is less sinful than to occupy without necessity, and indeed the theft may be only venial if one is in grave need and has vainly sought work or charity to relieve the difficulty, as when a poor man who is not able to give his children all the food they need steals provisions now and then.

Occupation of a Large Sum by One in Dire Need.—(a) One opinion holds that even for the sake of avoiding death this is not permissible, for one has no right to extraordinary means for the protection of one’s life.

(b) A second opinion maintains that this occupation is lawful, under the conditions given in 1921; for life is more precious than even a large sum of money, and in such extreme need property right yields to the right to life.

(c) A third opinion distinguishes between the case in which extreme necessity is proximate or urgent (e.g., an unarmed Watchman is threatened with instant death if he does not hand over at once the money he has in charge) and the case in which it is only remote (e.g., the doctor tells a poor man that he will die shortly from tuberculosis unless he goes to a more healthy altitude, but the patient is too poor to follow these instructions). In the former case the person in need may take what is necessary (on account of the reasons for the second opinion and also because the civil laws allow this), but he is not bound to do so (on account of the reasons for the first opinion); in the latter case, more probably he has no right to occupation, for this would be prejudicial to the public welfare and is moreover strictly forbidden by civil laws (see 1571, 1253).

Lawfulness of Receiving Support from a Thief.—Is it lawful for the wife and family to receive support from the head of the family, when he is a thief?

(a) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are not thus deprived of their goods or of the prospect of restitution. This happens when the actual support does not come from the stolen property, and the thief is able to make restitution from other property that belongs to him, or the wife and children earn as much for the family by their work as they receive in support. In this case the family may take from the thief even things that are not necessary for their support.

(b) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are deprived of restitution, but the obligation of restitution has ceased on account of grave necessity (see 1797). This happens when the support does not actually come from the stolen property, but the thief is unable to make restitution from his own property without depriving his own family who are in grave need. In this case the family may take from the thief only such things as are necessary for them according to their station in life.

(c) It is lawful when the persons stolen from are deprived of their goods, but the right to occupy these goods has arisen on account of the extreme necessity of the family (see 1920 sqq.). This happens when the support comes from the stolen property itself. But the family may use only what is really necessary for the relief of their dire distress.

How many kinds of injury are there in the goods of fortune? There is chiefly a threefold kind, namely theft, robbery, and simple damaging. Theft properly is the hidden taking away of another's thing, when the owner is reasonably unwilling. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 60, a. 3. Taking away: so that he may have it for himself; not so that he may burn it, throw it away, or destroy it. Those participate in the malice of theft, and therefore are reduced to theft, who accept even another's thing taken away by another, or simply detain another's thing, or usurp another's thing; for that acceptance is a certain continuation of theft, and "to detain that which is owed to another has the same character of harm as unjust taking." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, a. 3. And the same harm is had if someone occupies or usurps another's thing as though his own. When he is reasonably unwilling; otherwise the right of another is by no means violated. - But robbery is the taking away of another's thing by force or violence brought upon the person. L. 1, Cod. de Vi bonorum raptorum. Hence robbery adds to theft a distinct species of the sin of injustice, because to the owner who is reasonably unwilling and wishes to preserve his own thing force and personal injury are brought. Finally, simple damaging is when, while the owner is reasonably unwilling, some damage is inflicted without anything being accepted or retained by the one inflicting the damage. - Inst. l. 4, t. 1, 2, 3; L. 1, C. de Usucap. pro empto; L. 2, C. de usucap. pro donato; L. 518; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, aa. 3, 4, 9. "If some private thing is taken away from a private person, it is called theft; if it is secretly taken from the public by him to whom a public office has been entrusted, it is called peculation; they call it kidnapping if a free man or another's slave is led away into servitude; but if a sacred thing is taken away, it is named sacrilege." Roman Catechism, 5. The unjust taking away of animals is cattle-theft. "Labeo says that theft is said from furvus, that is, black, because it is done secretly and in darkness, and generally at night; or from fraud, as Sabinus says; or from carrying and taking away; or from the Greek speech, which calls thieves phores; indeed the Greeks also said phores from pherein, that is, from carrying. § 1. Hence the mere thought of committing theft does not make a thief. § 2. Thus he who denies a deposit is not immediately also held for theft, but so if he has concealed it for the cause of intercepting it. § 3. Theft is fraudulent handling of a thing for the sake of making profit, either of the thing itself, or even of its use or possession; this is prohibited by natural law to admit." L. 1, de Furtis ff.

"Cattle-thieves are properly held to be those who withdraw cattle from pastures or from herds, and in some way plunder them, and practice the pursuit of driving away as though an art, leading horses from droves or oxen from herds. Certainly, if someone has led away a wandering ox, or horses left in solitude, he is not a cattle-thief, but rather a thief." L. 1, 3, de Abigeis Dig.

What is the malice of theft? - Theft is a sin mortal from its kind. It is proved, because theft from its generic concept, and apart from another malice, is gravely opposed to justice, indeed to common peace and tranquility; therefore it is a sin mortal from its kind. For "through theft a man brings harm to his neighbor in his goods; and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, a. 6. Meanwhile, nevertheless, it is certain among all that theft admits smallness of matter, and because of this it is often a sin only venial in the individual; as, e.g., if a poor person steals something small. St. Thomas, Quodl. 6, a. 6; 2. 2, q. 66, aa. 3, 5, 6; L. 700; E. M. "Those also are to be placed in the number of thieves who, when they have been hired for some private or public office, furnishing no or little work, neglect the duty and enjoy only the wage and price." Roman Catechism, 9. To theft is reduced any fraud or defrauding, which is the lesion and diminution of another's goods or rights, accomplished by deceitful circumvention. Robbery differs in species from theft, because theft includes in its nature the ignorance of him to whom injury is done, but robbery includes violence. In theft the thing is accepted by cunning, deceit, fraud. In robbery the thing is accepted by one's own power, coercion or violence having been made to the person. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66, aa. 4, 5, 8, 9. Cf. here 1289.

What is grave matter in theft? - The matter of theft is one kind absolutely grave, another relatively grave. Matter of theft absolutely grave is that which according to itself, and apart from the state, or wealth or poverty, of him from whom it is taken, gravely conflicts with justice, by inflicting grave damage on society. But matter of theft relatively grave is that which is grave not precisely according to itself, but by relation to the person from whom it is taken, and inflicts on him a relatively grave detriment. - L. 526.

What if in theft the necessity of the one secretly taking is grave? The matter of theft, though more grave, can become relatively light because of the grave necessity of the one taking, in which without the secret taking of another's thing he would have to lead a most miserable life, as La-Croix, l. 3, p. n. 955, and Struggl, de 7 Praec. Dec. 13, teach with Laymann and Sporer. The reason is that the owner cannot reasonably be gravely unwilling if a miserable man in such a case takes as much as is necessary to relieve such grave necessity in some way.

How much determinately is required in grave thefts of sons of the family? - Several theologians require for grave theft by sons a sum twice greater than for strangers, and others extend this quantity of matter even much more. But since a universal and absolute rule concerning the gravity and lightness of similar thefts cannot be given, it must be taken 1. from the state, wealth, liberality, and greater or lesser affection of the parent toward the son; 2. from the plurality, age, and other circumstances of the children; 3. from the end and use of the thing taken. The reason is that from these heads it is ordinarily accustomed to happen that the father is more or less unwilling against the theft of the son. Prov. 28:24; L. 528, 543, 544.

How much determinately is required in grave thefts of wives? For grave theft by wives, several theologians also require a greater quantity, and indeed twice as much as for theft by sons. The reason is that between husband and wife there is a greater conjunction and moral identity, especially in order to common goods, than between father and son; therefore against the theft of a wife the husband is ordinarily judged to be less unwilling. Nor are several and grave theologians lacking who extend this quantity of matter even more broadly, and assert that the wife does not sin mortally, even if annually she secretly takes a twentieth part of the revenues for honest uses; which sum St. Alphonsus, 540, H. A. tr. 10, n. 33, judges excessive, at least speaking universally. Therefore, since here also a universal and absolute rule cannot be established concerning the gravity or lightness of similar thefts, this must be taken 1. from the state, wealth, liberality, and greater or lesser affection of the husband toward the wife; 2. from the greater or lesser dowry, from the wife in order to household economy, and from other circumstances. The reason is that from these heads it is ordinarily accustomed to happen that the husband is more or less, or at least can be, unwilling against the theft of the wife. L. 539, 542.

How much determinately is required in grave thefts of servants? "Concerning thefts of servants, doctors commonly say that small thefts which are made by servants from foods which are not customarily guarded carefully never reach grave fault, provided they do not sell them or carry them outside, and provided they do not take them in extraordinary quantity, or, it must be added, if they were not things of extraordinary price." L. H. A. tr. 10, n. 34; l. 3, n. 545. And this holds especially if the owner does not furnish them due sustenance. But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, no greater quantity is required for grave sin, because owners are then not less unwilling toward them than toward others. Indeed thefts of this kind are punished more severely by civil law because of the defect of fidelity which intervenes in them. But if these things are by no means guarded, indeed if the servants themselves have the administration of things, several and grave theologians require still a greater quantity than for strangers; this must be judged 1. from the state, wealth, liberality, and affection of the owner toward the servant; 2. from the labor, utility, and necessity of the servant himself, and from the greater or lesser liberty which is given to him in administering the things committed to him. Tambur., Exp. Dec., l. 8, tr. 2, c. 3, par. 4, n. 1; L. 539, 545, 546.

Whether in extreme necessity it is licit to take secretly another's things. In extreme necessity, namely when no other way appears for preserving oneself, it is licit to take secretly another's things which are simply necessary for preserving life. The reason is 1. because against a taking of this kind the owner of the thing cannot be reasonably unwilling. 2. Because the division of goods, in whatever way it occurred, cannot derogate from natural or divine right. But according to the natural order instituted by divine providence, lower things are ordered to this, that from them relief be given to the necessity of men. Wherefore a right belongs to each one to provide for himself when he labors under extreme necessity. Therefore in such a case all things become common; and thus one accepting another's thing for relieving himself accepts a thing truly common, which he makes his own, just as happened before the division of goods. Therefore he does not commit theft. Nor indeed is he bound to ask or accept the thing as a loan; otherwise now nothing would ever become common. But because he has a right to that thing from justice, he can, if he is prevented, even take it by force. St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 32, a. 7, ad 3; q. 66, a. 7; L. 520, 623, 624.

"Whether those cutting wood in a forbidden forest sin and are bound to restitution? Doctors commonly teach that if the grove belongs to the whole community, its inhabitants who cut wood against the prohibition do not sin at least gravely, indeed not even venially according to Sanchez, etc., and are bound to restore nothing unless they make great destruction, but are bound only to the penalty after sentence; for such a prohibition is judged purely penal." L. 529, 614; l. 1, n. 145. The same holds concerning fields of the whole community as regards pasturing animals. L. ib. "Consequently those are free from all, or certainly from grave, fault who cut single bundles on single days for the use of the family, and the poor who cut besides two bundles each week for selling." D'Annibale, p. 2, n. 253, ed. 4. One must stand by the usages of places in this matter, Gousset 983. "In private forests, the poor are free from all, or at least from grave, fault who gather from them, indeed even cut down shrubs and brushwood necessary for fire; for not undeservedly you would say these are owed to them from charity, especially if the owners know and are silent, provided they do not devastate by cutting down, nor cut small trees or branches of trees, unless perhaps dead ones, nor carry away their poles or those of vineyards, nor tear down hedges." D'Annibale, l.c.

"Whether it is licit to eat grapes in another's vineyard? - Covarruvias, Valerius, Ripa, etc., apud Lugo d. 16, n. 33, affirm, provided one does not carry away the grapes, and they adduce Deut. 23:24, 25. And the same thing that is said concerning grapes and ears of grain, says Abulensis apud Cornelius a Lapide, understand concerning apples and other fruits." L. 529. St. Alphonsus in the same place says this opinion is sufficiently probable, and adds: "Moreover, probably," says Lugo, "by the law of nature it is licit to eat one or another cluster of grapes, that is, one or another grape; and in like manner he concedes eating from another's orchard one or another apple. For to prohibit this seems very harsh and contrary to humanity." Nor indeed would someone sin gravely if he ate up to satiety, provided he carried nothing away. - L. H. A. tr. 10, n. 24; D'Annibale, l.c.

What is to be judged concerning remnants of tailors? - If the remnant is a notable part, they are bound to restore it to the owner, if he pays the due price of labor. The reason is that the owner would be reasonably unwilling. If the remnant is of lesser moment, and is expressly reclaimed by the owner, they are also bound to restore, if he pays the due price of labor, for the same reason. If the remnant is of lesser moment and is not expressly reclaimed by the owner, then it can be retained, because owners commonly know that tailors retain similar moderate remnants, and therefore also often pay a lower price for the labor. L. 568.

How does he sin who takes away from another a small thing very dear to him, or a thing of greater moment which he does not care about? - Resp. To the 1st: He sins mortally against charity, yet not in the genus of theft against justice. The reason is that such a person unjustly gravely saddens another, yet in the goods of fortune he does not inflict grave damage. Hence, if such a thing perishes, the thief is not bound to restore to the owner as much as that owner valued the thing, but only the value and common estimation of the thing in itself. Resp. To the 2nd: He sins only venially if the owner cares little about it, as if it were of small moment; but if the owner does not care about it at all, and holds it as neglected and abandoned, he does not sin even venially. The reason is that injury is inflicted on the owner in the goods of fortune insofar as he himself is unwilling; therefore, since in the former case he is lightly unwilling, and in the latter in no way unwilling, in the former a light injury is inflicted on him, and in the latter none.

Whether there is an obligation of restitution from unjust taking; what in a case of doubt? It is undoubted that from the unjust taking of another's thing an obligation of restitution arises. For if another's thing has been unjustly accepted, it is possessed either by no title or by an invalid title; and therefore that thing cries out for its owner.

Inst. l. 4, t. 1, 2; St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 6; L. 548. But one thing can be asked here: Whether someone unjustly accepts another's thing when he begins possession with doubt concerning his right. Now in truth, he could begin possession here in two ways: 1. By despoiling another, without any title of itself able to transfer ownership; and in this case, since the peaceful possession of another gives a morally certain right, the despoiler is bound to restitution. 2.

By accepting a thing under another title, e.g., of purchase, donation, etc., from another concerning whom it is doubted whether he is its owner; and then one is bound to inquire into the truth of the matter, and, if doubt perseveres, "he must restore," says Father Gury, 652, "according to the proportion of the doubt, to the probable owner, or to the poor, if the owner is unknown. The reason is that possession begun with doubtful faith does not favor him, and therefore he cannot retain the whole; nor from another source does he seem bound to restore the whole, since he doubts whether the thing is another's and not his." But even if that doubt is not merely negative, but positive, he seems to be held to nothing; for he can then form conscience from reflex principles: no one is evil unless proved, etc.; nor from another source can a certain obligation be imposed which certainly is not established. Moreover, he can use the right of him to whom he succeeds by title of purchase, donation, etc. Wherefore, if that one possessed the thing in good faith and therefore could retain it, the one who succeeds him will also be able to retain the same thing for himself. Lugo d. 17, n. 83. Finally, he can retain the thing by title of occupation or possession until the owner appears; and if he does not appear, it can rightly be presumed that no owner is present, if, e.g., someone found a gem on the shore of the sea and doubts whether the thing belongs to no one, or was lost by some traveler. Cf. here 1334. But to what one retaining and continuing possession with doubt concerning his right is bound, cf. 1352-1354. - St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 62, a. 6; L. 547, 625; Gousset 939, 1028; d'Annibale, ed. 4, p. 2, n. 121.

Whether he who in good faith bought a stolen thing can return it to the thief in order to recover his own price? Resp. Negatively, if the owner appears, reclaiming his own thing from him; for then he must render it to him, even with the loss of his own price, because by natural law the owner can seize his own thing wherever he finds it. Nevertheless an action is given to the buyer against the thief. C. A. 333. Except according to C. I. and C. G. if the thing was bought in a public market, or from one who is accustomed to sell things of this kind; for then the buyer is not bound to render the thing to the owner unless the price is paid. But this disposition of law, according to several, has force also in the forum of conscience, because it is very useful to the public good, to the tranquility of possessions, and greatly favors commerce. Cf. 1333; Bouvier, de Possessore bonae fid.; Carrière 1041; Gousset 1027.

If the owner is indeed known, but unaware of the thing, the first opinion, "very probable," denies, "because the thing snatched from the hand of the thief has now obtained a better state; and therefore if he were to return it to the thief, he would throw it into a worse state, and thus would inflict injury on the owner." The second opinion, "perhaps more probable," affirms, "because you are not bound to preserve the thing for the owner with your own damage." But since each one has a right to guard against his own damage, there certainly "is not forbidden to him that action which of itself is necessary and direct for repairing his own damage, although indirectly and accidentally damage comes to another.... Yet it must be noted that this opinion can have place only when no other way of recovering his own price is available to the buyer except by restoring the thing to the robber." L. 569.

If the thief, or another seller, does not appear, or does not wish to render the money, the buyer, once the owner is known, cannot sell the thing to others, nor turn it to his own uses in order to keep himself indemnified, because he is not the owner of the thing; but he must render it to the owner, notwithstanding the loss of the price. He preserves recourse against the seller. But if he cannot find him, the damage must be undergone by him. Cf. 1351; C. A. 333.

What are just causes for dispensing in diriment impediments? Some causes are honorable, others are notorious, for avoiding scandals. Formerly they were taken more strictly, today more broadly, because of changed circumstances of the times. Honorable causes are: 1. the age of the girl, who, having already passed the twenty-fourth year of age, has thus far not found a man of equal condition whom she can marry; 2. defect of dowry, if the girl has none, or not enough, to be able to marry a man of equal condition in her own place where she dwells; 3. narrowness of place, i.e., if the woman therefore cannot find a man of equal condition in the place of origin or domicile, by reason only of the female petitioner; 4. grave enmities to be settled between the parents, blood relatives, or relatives by affinity of the man and woman; 5. lawsuits to be ended concerning matters of great importance arising between the man and woman, or between their parents; 6. poverty of a widow who is burdened with numerous offspring; 7. prerogative of royal dignity; 8. preservation of an illustrious family; 9. preservation of goods in the same family; 10. excellence of merits toward the Church; 11. Christian virtues, which probably would not be found in another man; 12. a more generous alms to be poured into pious works.

Notorious causes are: 1. excessive familiarity, suspicious and dangerous, and also cohabitation under the same roof which cannot easily be impeded; 2. infamy of the woman, arising either from true or false suspicion, whence the woman is compelled either to remain defamed or unmarried, or to marry a man of unequal condition; 3. copulation having followed between those wishing to contract, and legitimation of offspring; 4. danger of civil marriage; 5. danger of mixed marriage, or marriage before a non-Catholic minister; 6. danger of incestuous concubinage; 7. cessation of public concubinage; 8. removal of grave scandals, lest they fornicate again, lest enmities flare up; 9. danger of incontinence for a younger widow; 10. revalidation of marriage. Benedict XIV, Response to the Archbishop of Tours, September 26, 1754; A.S.S., vol. 2, p. 62; Instruction of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, May 9, 1877; L. 1129, 1130; E.M.

Dispensation was said to be without cause when none of these causes was present which are usually alleged as canonical; or when, no proper cause having been alleged, dispensation is usually sought and granted from certain rational causes, namely because of a more abundant Composition in degrees somewhat remote, or in more remote degrees because of a cause of public good moving the mind of the Pontiff, or also because, since the cause is shameful, it is not expedient to reveal it. Those causes are called canonical which, from the style and approved custom of the Curia, are regularly accustomed to be admitted for matrimonial dispensations. By no means, however, is one prohibited from setting forth other causes also, by which either other causes may be strengthened, or even the defect of others supplied, e.g., deformity of the girl, infirmity, etc. Reformed Forms of the Apostolic Datary; E.M.

After the Constitution Sapienti consilio of Pius X, June 29, 1908, matrimonial dispensations are distinguished as of greater degree and of lesser degree. The former are granted from a legitimate cause; the latter from reasonable causes approved by the Holy See. "19. Dispensations of lesser degree are from impediments: "a) of consanguinity and affinity of the third and fourth degree of the collateral line, whether equal or unequal, that is, of the fourth degree mixed with the third, and of the fourth or third mixed with the second; "b) of affinity in the first degree, and in the second simple or mixed with the first, where this impediment proceeds from illicit intercourse; "c) of spiritual kinship of any kind; "d) of public honesty, whether through betrothals or through marriage, concerning which there has already been dispensation and it has been dissolved. "20. Dispensations of greater degree usually granted, when a legitimate cause intervenes, are from impediments: "a) of consanguinity of the second degree of the equal collateral line, and of the second or third degree touching the first; "b) of affinity of the first and second degree of the equal collateral line, and of the second or third degree touching the first; "c) of crime from adultery with promise of future marriage. "21. Dispensations from lesser impediments are all granted from reasonable causes approved by the Holy See. But when granted in this way, they will have force just as if they had been imparted by motu proprio and from certain knowledge; and therefore they will be subject to no challenge either by vice of obreption or of subreption." Order to be observed in the Roman Curia, Particular Norms, chap. 7, a. 3.

As regards simple vows emitted in some Religious Congregation, dispensation is given by the Sacred Congregation of Religious with this formula: "Since he feels himself wholly unequal to sustaining the burdens of common life, etc."

1. Ioannes Iacobus, without any scruple, carries off the goods of another, saying that God alone is the Lord of all things, and that God created other things on account of man, namely on account of all men. Wherefore there is no property, but all things are common.

Q. What as to the case?

R. 1. Exterior things can be considered in two ways: in one way as to their nature, which is not subject to human power, but only to divine power, to which all things obey at a nod. In another way as to the use of the thing itself; and thus man has natural dominion of exterior things, because through reason and will he can use exterior things for his own utility, as if made on account of himself. For the more imperfect are always on account of the more perfect. And thus it is plain that, although God is the Lord of all things, nevertheless this does not exclude dominion and property of things in man. For thence it follows only that God alone has dominion over exterior things as to their natures, that God alone has principal dominion of all things. But God himself ordered, according to his providence, certain things to the bodily sustenance of man; and on account of this man has natural dominion of things as to the power of using them. For this is dominion, and nothing else: The right or faculty of using one's own thing for any use permitted by law, and this for one's own advantage. S. Th. 2.2. q. 66. a. 1; I. M. 838, 866, 867.

2. But although exterior things were created on account of man, from this nevertheless it does not follow that man also does not have dominion of things; indeed, the contrary follows. For if they are on account of man, these goods are man's, although they are not principally his, as is gathered from what has just been said. Moreover, although exterior things were created on account of man, from this nevertheless it does not follow that all things are to be possessed in common, and that nothing is to be possessed as proper; but from this it follows only that the distinction of possessions was not made naturally, but was naturally superadded to natural law, rational nature itself inclining and impelling toward that division and individual appropriation. First indeed, because each one is naturally more solicitous in procuring something which pertains to himself alone, than that which is common to all or to many, because each one, fleeing labor, leaves to others that which pertains to others. Secondly, because human affairs are treated in a more ordered way, if each has his own care of procuring some thing incumbent on him. But there would be confusion if anyone indiscriminately procured anything. Thirdly, because by this the state of men is preserved more peacefully, while each one is content with his own thing. S. Th. 2.2. q. 66. a. 2.

3. Ioannes Iacobus, therefore, a communist, is a true thief, and is held to restitution of all the things which he carried off. For to restore what has been unjustly taken away is of necessity of salvation, since to preserve justice is of necessity of salvation, and to restore what has been unjustly taken away is an act of commutative justice. S. Th. 2.2. q. 62. a. 1, 2.

2. Gordiana, a very rich matron in Italy, orders Veronica the maidservant to send all the linens of the house to Paris, that they may be more carefully cleansed, cleaned, and repaired. Veronica pretends that she is obeying the mistress exactly. But she hands over the linens to be cleaned and repaired to her sister, who cleans and repairs all things as carefully and exquisitely as would be done at Paris. Hence Veronica keeps for herself the excess of money which she would have had to spend.

Q. 1. What is the proper malice of theft? - 2. What as to the case?

R. To the 1st. "It must be said that three things concur for the ratio of theft; the first of which belongs to it insofar as it is contrary to justice, which gives to each one what is his, and from this it belongs to it that it usurps what belongs to another. But the second pertains to the ratio of theft, insofar as it is distinguished from sins which are against the person, such as from homicide and adultery; and according to this it belongs to theft that it be concerning a possessed thing. For if someone takes that which belongs to another, not as a possession, but as a part, as if he amputates a member, or as a connected person, as if he carries off a daughter or wife, it does not properly have the ratio of theft. The third difference is that which completes the ratio of theft, namely that what belongs to another be usurped secretly; and according to this the proper ratio of theft is that it is a secret taking of another's thing.... Concealment sometimes indeed is the cause of sin, for example, when someone uses concealment for sinning, as happens in fraud and deceit; and in this way it does not diminish, but constitutes the species of sin; and thus it is in theft. In another way concealment is a simple circumstance of sin; and thus it diminishes the sin, both because it is a sign of shame, and because it removes scandal." S. Th. 2.2. q. 66. a. 3; I. M. 1289.

To the 2nd. Veronica is guilty of theft. For she secretly usurps another's thing. That excess of money is not hers, but the mistress's. For from the mistress she receives money for a determined end, not for another. Therefore the money not applied to this end remains proper to the mistress. How could the maidservant, not applying money to this end, against the manifest will of the mistress, make it her own? Wherefore that exceeding money must be restored to the mistress. - But as to the linens to be sent to Paris, Veronica can simply obey the mistress and send the linens to Paris. Nevertheless she is not held to obey in a thing so insane, especially since, as appears from the case, the mistress seems altogether content as to that cleanliness and repair of the linens. But Veronica, then sparing money, spares it for the mistress herself. G. 569, 570.

3. Placidus, a servant in the house of the king, steals 40 lire. At Easter time he confesses his sin, and when he himself had shown difficulty concerning restitution, the confessor absolved him, because, he says, those are not lacking who assign this as grave matter with respect to a king, as is to be seen in Scav. ed. 12.ª Mediol. 1874. l. 2. n. 697. note.

Q. What as to the case?

R. Placidus could not be absolved without the obligation of restoring being imposed on him, since from elsewhere he was excused by no other legitimate cause. For that sum is not light, but grave, insofar as it is matter of theft. With respect to a king, relative matter is not so much to be attended to as absolute matter; since relative matter, as commonly happens as to kings and ordinaries, would overstep the limits. For otherwise thieves stealing from kings could easily grow so bold that they would not sin mortally, which is repugnant to the public good. For truly then thieves could do the same as to private persons who are very rich; and they could do the same still more in public Administrations, indeed also in private Administrations of Commercial Companies. Nor indeed can any probability be reconciled to that opinion from the authority of Scavini, for the learned theologian holds that quantity as too exorbitant. Cf. Commentarios Theologico-Morales, Commentar. Octav. de Materia gravi in furto.

4. "Whether money which is withdrawn from the priests of idols who are converted, when abandoning pagan temples, in order to use the same to procure their existence, has the quality and character of a stolen thing.

R. According to those things which are proposed, it is not lawful; for nothing is brought forward which can excuse the guilt of theft in the case of which there is question." S. C. de P. F. 21 Jan. 1788; Collectan. n. 2109.

Here one must treat only of injuries in goods of fortune, namely of theft and its species. - For concerning other injuries, namely in goods of the body, of honor, and of reputation, enough has been said in the Treatise on the fifth and eighth precept of the Decalogue.

One must treat 1. of the nature and gravity of theft; 2. of the causes excusing from theft.

A twofold cause is assigned: 1. necessity; 2. hidden compensation.

1. The reason for doubting in this matter is that in the present day it seems necessary to exceed the limits predefined both by the older Theologians and also by St. Alphonsus, book 3, nn. 527, 528, because from their age down to ours no slight difference is perceived concerning the value of money. For all now complain that the prices of things have increased notably in comparison with past times, or, what comes to the same thing, that the value of money has decreased. Whence grave matter in theft must now reach a greater quantity of money. But on the contrary it seems that one must not depart either from the opinion of the old theologians, which is always to be held in the greatest account in a moral matter, or, and much less, from the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, which has had special approval from the Holy See. Moreover, although it must be conceded that according to the variety of times a variety has also been introduced in the value of money, nevertheless, if a proportion of this sort had to be observed, since now the prices of things have increased immensely, the grave quantity in theft would also have to be increased immensely, which would cede to evident damage of Society. To resolve this question we inquire into three things: 1st. How many kinds of grave matter are to be distinguished in theft? 2nd. What in our age is to be judged in theft matter both relatively and absolutely grave? 3rd. What must be judged concerning the proposed reasons for doubting?

2. As to the first question it is enough to note that, properly speaking, grave matter in theft is always relative, nor can it be absolute. The reason is that, as the Angelic Doctor says, 2.2, q. 73, a. 3, "sins which are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed in themselves according to the harms which are brought upon the neighbor, because from this they have the nature of fault. But the harm is so much the greater as the good taken away is greater." This notwithstanding, theologians commonly distinguish in theft absolute grave matter and relative grave matter. Relative grave matter is that which is grave, attention having been paid to the conditions of the person in particular, to whom in fact grave harm is brought. This is altogether consonant with the doctrine of St. Thomas just set forth, l.c., and q. 66, a. 6, ad 3. But as regards absolute grave matter, Scavini, Milan ed. 1874, book 2, n. 697, says: "the theft will be absolutely grave when, independently of the damage which the owner suffers, in the judgment of men it is considered of itself to suffice for constituting mortal sin." This definition is either inexact, as being incomplete, or in reality says and explains nothing; because, if precision and abstraction are made from the neighbor's damage, no judgment of grave matter can be formed. And if the common sense of men judges this or that matter grave, it judges so because in this or that matter it considers grave harm to the neighbor. Otherwise that judgment of common sense would be a judgment without foundation and sense. Absolute grave matter, according to the common doctrine of Theologians, ians, is matter which is grave with respect to all, of whatever condition they themselves may be, whether they are poor or rich; whether they are individual or moral persons, as that which in any conditions of status always brings grave harm to the neighbor, for such a place or time. It is said, for such a place or time, because the same thing in this place or time, on account of abundance, is valued little, and consequently its taking away inflicts slight damage; but in another place or time, on account of rarity and necessity, it is valued more highly, and consequently the taking away of the same thing brings grave damage. Hence that also is inexact which the same Scavini adds, l.c.: "But it is plain that the determination of matter absolute and in itself, for judging concerning the gravity of sin, ought then only to have place when the state and condition of the damaged person is unknown." And he asserts this absolutely grave matter to be about five or six libellae.

3. Lugo aptly says, De Iust. et Iur., D. 16, S. 2, n. 23: "And indeed it cannot be denied that the malice of theft is respective, nor has anyone denied this. For although they say that there can be some grave matter of theft that is absolute, and another respective..., nevertheless they do not will that it be grave without any respect to damage to the neighbor; but they only signify that there is some matter of such a sort through which grave damage is inflicted upon all, and therefore, such matter standing, there is no need to examine and weigh the condition of the person suffering the damage, since it is established that every person, of whatever condition he may be, suffers grave damage from a theft of this sort. Nor can it be denied that there is some matter which is not grave with respect to all, but with respect to one person is slight, and with respect to others is grave.... For the gravity of malice is taken from the gravity of the damage inflicted; but the gravity of damage proceeds from the greater need by which the neighbor needs that thing. Wherefore, since not all equally need the thing which is taken away, it follows that they do not suffer an equally grave injury either, and therefore one person will be able to suffer a slight injury, another a grave injury, through the theft of an equal sum."

4. As regards the second question, there is a twofold criterion or rule for judging and determining matter relatively grave. For one criterion is intrinsic, the other extrinsic. Let us speak first of the intrinsic. That which reasonably and, speaking in itself, brings grave displeasure to our neighbor is a grave sin against charity; and if justice enters into it, it is a grave sin against justice, which obliges more strictly than charity. The Angelic Doctor uses nearly this reasoning, 2.2, q. 66, a. 6, to prove that theft in itself is a mortal sin. "Mortal sin," he says, "is that which is opposed to charity, according as it is the spiritual life of the soul. But charity consists principally indeed in the love of God, and secondarily in the love of neighbor, to which it pertains that we will and work good for the neighbor. But through theft a man inflicts harm upon his neighbor in his goods, and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish. Whence theft, as contrary to charity, is a mortal sin." Moreover, to deprive some person and his family of daily sustenance, necessary according to his own condition, reasonably brings grave displeasure to our neighbor, who sees himself and his own deprived of the things necessary for life according to his own state. Whence it evidently appears that the harm is grave, counting in sustenance not only food, but also clothing and habitation. "Commonly the Doctors say," says St. Alphonsus, book 3, n. 527, "that in theft that is grave matter which would suffice someone according to his condition in a day for the sustenance of himself and his family; in which, as La-Croix well observes, n. 985, with Sporer, Gomez, and others, not only food is computed, but also clothing and habitation." And here it must be noticed that in sustenance of this sort, speaking in itself, there ought also to be comprehended honorable pleasures and lawful recreations fitting to one's own condition, without which human life neither can be, nor in fact is, and of which also someone would be deprived with altogether reasonable displeasure. For man does not live only on bread and meat, water and wine, in a strict measure, nor does he live solitary; but physically he also lives by other things, and by a measure conveniently good and considered together, if not always superabundant; but morally he lives in his own family and in society; and therefore expenses of pleasure, for the sake of honorable and suitable recreation and also of due honor, must at least sometimes be sustained. Theologians seem implicitly to understand this in that sustenance of the family which they call congruous and suitable to one's state.

5. But as regards grave sin, although deprivation of sustenance in the sense explained is certainly and among all grave, nevertheless a smaller quantity still suffices for grave sin, according to the principle established. For if someone were deprived of daily sustenance necessary only for his own individual life, and not also for the life of his own family, he would certainly experience grave and reasonable displeasure. Indeed, for constituting grave sin from the principle already established it is not necessary that someone be deprived of that whole which is necessary for the daily sustenance of his own individual life, as this sustenance has just been explained, but it suffices that he be deprived only of a notable part of it. For indeed, would not someone feel grave and rational displeasure if even for one day he were deprived of necessary food, or clothing, or habitation, or for that reason could not fulfill the offices of his own status and condition?

6. Wherefore considering, 1st, what at present and as regards Italy is spent for the sustenance of life by the poor, by workers, by various persons of civil and noble condition, what is spent daily in Colleges and Seminaries, in religious Communities, in families which live decently and suitably, but also with due economy; considering, 2nd, the stipends of workers, doctors, advocates, public officials, and the profits of merchants, the pensions of students in Colleges and Seminaries, the dowries of Nuns, the incomes of ordinarily rich persons; it seems possible to establish at present and as regards Italy, and perhaps also, at least more or less, for other regions of Europe, the following matter relatively grave: 1st, for the poor, 1 libella, and less, according to the degree of their poverty. 2nd, for workers and artisans, 1 libella, 2, 3, according to the various crafts and arts, more or less lucrative. 3rd, for persons of civil and ordinary condition, who live from incomes, or from the exercise of merchandising and commerce, or of a liberal profession, 4 libellae, 5-6, 7, according to the various degree of convenience of life. 4th, for ordinary rich persons, 8, 9-11, 12 libellae, and for ordinary moral Bodies, 10-20 libellae, according to the degree of riches. 5th, finally, for extraordinarily rich persons, such as reigning and non-reigning Princes, Nobles and Merchants and very rich Businessmen, moral Bodies and Societies possessing exorbitant Capitals, relatively grave matter cannot be designated; recourse must be had to absolutely grave matter. And indeed, when a private Prince, for example, possesses 50 and 100 millions, and daily spends 30 libellae and more for letters and telegrams alone, it is an evident thing that the theft of 10, 20, 30 libellae certainly will not deprive him in any way of suitable sustenance. Therefore to assert that matter of this sort is relatively grave for them is merely arbitrary, and in no way confirmed by the enunciated intrinsic criterion and rule for judging concerning relative gravity.

7. But let us make a step to the extrinsic criterion and rule. Since here there is question of a moral judgment in a moral matter, such criterion and rule is contained in the authority of Theologians. "Moreover," says St. Alphonsus, l.c., "for making a just measurement of this gravity, the Salmanticenses rightly say, De Rest., c. 5, n. 12, that the judgments of the wise contribute greatly, whose greater authority in this point seems to me to constitute greater probability. Wherefore I have taken care diligently to gather here the diverse opinions of Doctors," etc. But recent theologians, with few exceptions and a slight difference of which account cannot be taken in moral matters, agree altogether in the matter assigned. For in this they agree, that for the regions of Europe, matter relatively grave at present is almost twice greater than that which St. Alphonsus established for his own time. Moreover, the Holy Doctor, book 3, n. 528, no distinction having been made between the lowest, middle, and highest degree of riches, assigns: 1st, for the poor, 1 iulius, 54 centesimi; 2nd, for workers, 2 iulii, 1 libella, 8 centesimi; 3rd, for artisans, 2 1/2 iulii, 1 libella, 35 centesimi; 4th, for those moderately rich, 4 iulii, 2 libellae, 16 centesimi; 5th, for those absolutely rich and for very wealthy merchants, 6 iulii, 3 libellae, 24 centesimi; 6th, for the very richest magnates, 1 aureus, 5 libellae, 38 centesimi; 7th, for a very wealthy Community, 1 1/2 aurei, 8 libellae, 17 centesimi; 8th, for Kings, 2 aurei, 10 libellae, 76 centesimi. But the Holy Doctor adds, l.c., n. 527, that very many doctors extend this quantity up to 3 aurei, 16 libellae, 14 centesimi. And this quantity, as is plain, is, as it were, half the quantity assigned. For a iulius is worth 54 centesimi of a libella. But an aureus is worth 5 libellae, 58 centesimi. Cf. Finardi, Prontuario del Commerciante, etc., Rome 1862. That we may pass over others, for the sake of brevity, the most learned Joseph D'Annibale has these things in Summula Theolog. Moral., Part 2, n. 201, 2nd ed., Milan 1882: "Let me have St. Alphonsus before my eyes, the price of things having almost doubled from that time in which he lived. And so, for the present value of coins, I would say that the damage which does not reach about one libella is always slight in itself, even if to a beggar; on the contrary I would say that damage which exceeds about 30 libellae is grave in itself, even if inflicted upon the very richest person, or upon a King. Between these the damage must be measured relatively, that is, from the persons: therefore I judge it grave, 1st, for the poor, that is, for a beggar, or worker, or artisan, damage of 1 libella or 2 1/2; 2nd, for merchants, according to each one's fortune, whether lowest, middle, or highest, 2 1/2, or 4, or 8; 3rd, for the rich, according as nothing, or little, or much, or very much remains to them from their own revenue, expenses deducted, 3 and perhaps less, or 4, or 7, or 10. Finally as regards moral persons which have the body of a College, damage is grave which is reckoned at 10, or, if they shall have been wealthy, at 20." This question was debated in the present year 1887, on the day 24 Jan., in the Conference of Cases of Conscience at S. Apollinaris before the Most Eminent Cardinal Vicar of the City, and the same opinion was defended by the Resolver and approved by the Censors present; and the Censor who at the end, according to custom, made the recapitulation, set forth the whole doctrine which is explained in this Commentary.

8. Let us come to absolute matter. As for relative matter the damage of individuals is attended to, with all particular circumstances considered, so for absolute matter the damage of Society itself ought especially to be considered. And, this once admitted, then it is easily understood how absolutely grave matter is always grave, namely grave for all, without distinction, although there is question of extraordinarily and exorbitantly rich persons. This principle being established, absolutely grave matter seems to be that which exceeds thirty libellae, the quantity designated by the praised Joseph D'Annibale. But someone will object: how can thirty libellae more or less bring grave damage to Society, if they do not bring grave damage even to an extraordinarily rich individual, such as are great bankers or merchants of monies in Europe, to whom the loss of 30 and even 300 libellae and more in their commercial operations is scarcely perceptible and is immediately compensated by so many and so great other profits? It is responded that it is common doctrine with relation to fornication that it is prohibited in all cases by natural law itself on account of the uncertain education of offspring. Although in some particular case, which is not very difficult to be verified, both the father and the mother, otherwise very rich, agree between themselves that the offspring be educated in due manner; indeed even that they themselves immediately undertake the care of a suitable education, and therefore with sincere and efficacious will promise a marriage to be entered at once, fornication would always remain prohibited by natural law; because if it were lawful and permitted in some particular case, the gravest danger would always be present of disordered license with immense damage to the offspring. In like manner, although a determined quantity, already sufficiently great in itself, does not bring grave harm to some individual in particular, nor even for the same individual is there at least danger of further grave harm, nevertheless it is itself sufficient for constituting a grave and most grave danger for Society itself, and, speaking in itself, also for individuals themselves. Wherefore, absolutely speaking, it will always be grave matter in any case. For if the grave damage of the individual and of society is considered, there is need to take account not only of expenses necessary for the sustenance and decorum of one's own state, but also of slight thefts, which are sufficiently frequent not only in thieves by profession, but also in the very persons of one's own family, community, society; but especially in persons to whom the administration of others' goods has been entrusted, especially of public dominion and utility. "Namely," says the most distinguished D'Annibale, l.c., n. 257, note 20, "it is very difficult for the things of owners to be administered by others so faithfully that something does not adhere to the hands of those handling them." Therefore, such danger being posited, not only is it evident that the designated quantity is sufficient for constituting absolutely grave matter; but also perhaps that quantity can, not without reason, seem excessive and to be restricted to narrower limits. For where the gravity of sin does not deter, and the hope of a greater, sufficiently notable profit invites and incites to a new theft, many men, and commonly by far more, would commit it, and our fortunes would be most gravely injured, unless they were deterred by fear of graver sin. Hence it is plain why, although the excess of the faculty of the most wealthy King over the faculties of an ordinary rich man, or even of a Marquis or Count, is far greater, beyond any proportion, than the excess of the rich man over the faculties of a citizen or common man, nevertheless there is not required so great a proportionate excess in a grave theft made against a King over a theft made against a rich man as in this latter with respect to a theft made against a common man. And this doctrine seems conformable to the doctrine just related of the Angelic Doctor concerning the gravity of theft, which he declares absolutely, saying: "But through theft a man inflicts harm upon his neighbor in his goods, and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish." But cf. also Lugo, l.c., n. 29 ff.

9. Nor indeed should the authority of Cardinal de Lugo be objected, as asserting, l.c., n. 21, that a quantity absolutely grave cannot be constituted in theft. For Lugo, l.c., does not assert this, but a very different thing, namely "that it cannot be defined what are the borders of each matter, namely slight and grave, so that short of such a sum it is slight, and beyond that it is grave." It is surely one thing that this quantity cannot be mathematically defined, another that absolutely grave matter cannot even be determined morally, with a certain moral latitude, namely a little more or a little less; and this is what Cardinal de Lugo himself attempts to effect in the following paragraphs. Cf. n. 29 ff., where he designates the universal reason of the malice of grave theft, namely absolutely grave. Cf. also n. 35.

10. Nor likewise should it be objected that from the discourse made it would follow that any theft whatever is grave, since from any slight theft whatever a most grave detriment of Society and of individuals could be feared. For men are not so allured to these smaller thefts, from which they take little profit, as they are allured to those other greater ones, in which profit appears not contemptible, if they could be done without grave sin, as the same Lugo has, l.c., n. 33. But the assigned quantity of thirty libellae, more or less, surely brings profit not contemptible, more than enough alluring to steal.

11. Finally, the authority of Lugo is still objected against the assigned quantity of 30 libellae as absolutely grave. For Lugo asserts this quantity to be 100 aurei, l.c., n. 21. If therefore in the time of Lugo this was the absolutely grave quantity, in our time certainly it ought to be greater still. It is responded that the assertion is altogether false. For Lugo does not say that for his own time that was the absolutely grave quantity, but that that was a quantity evidently and certainly grave, which is very different; and he asserts this indeed by a kind of near exaggeration. For in that same number he does not speak of matter to be determined absolutely, so that he determines it, but he speaks only of the difficulty of determining that grave matter and much more of defining the limits of that grave and slight matter, on account of the difficulty itself of finding in this matter some rational principle and some fixed rule. Hence in the following numbers 22-29 he relates various opinions of Theologians, and various rules assigned by them, which he weighs, and shows to be insufficient. But before he brings forth in n. 29 his own rule and rational principle, so that the malice of grave theft, namely absolutely grave, may be understood, he openly declares that in reality he does not depart from the opinion of others, attention also having been paid to the decrease of money at that time; and he says at the end of n. 28: "Wherefore I shall not reluctantly agree with the aforesaid in the matter itself, that in order with respect to Kings and wealthy Magnates a theft of one aureus be required; with respect to the rich, six or seven argentei; with respect to artisans, four; with respect to the poor, the value of daily food, or the average wage which in a time midway between winter and summer is given to a digger." An argenteus is the same for Lugo as a iulius or regalis, nn. 22-26; but an ordinary regalis is worth 26 centesimi of a libella. But since he takes an argenteus for a iulius or regalis, and says in n. 26 that one Ducat contains eleven reales or iulii, by regalis he understands not the ordinary regalis, of bronze, real de vellon, but the silver regalis, real de plata, of about twice greater value and about equivalent to a iulius. And in n. 31 he establishes still more definitively that the theft of one aureus is absolutely grave, on account of the danger of grave detriment which is in it: "for," he says, "from several thefts of one aureus made to you by diverse persons, your family affairs would truly suffer most grave detriment." Likewise in n. 32 he affirms the same thing altogether clearly, extending that absolutely grave matter not to 100 aurei, but to one or two aurei. Finally, in n. 35, discoursing again concerning the difficulty of defining precisely the limits of grave and slight matter, although he speaks hypothetically and only for the sake of example, he certainly brings into the midst not 90 or 80 aurei but 6 iulii. This can also be confirmed by the authority of St. Alphonsus, who in n. 527 counts Lugo among authors who "with respect to the very richest Magnates... say that one aureus suffices for grave matter." But from the opinion of Lugo, n. 29, with respect to these very rich persons, relatively grave matter is not to be required, but absolutely grave, which he then establishes according to this rule and principle; namely, "some things are prohibited not on account of precisely the damage which they bring when they are done once, but on account of the damage which they would bring if, being repeated more often, they were lawful.... Thus therefore in the present matter it seems to be said that although the theft of one aureus or half made only once would not bring great detriment, especially to a rich man, and therefore considered according to itself would not seem sufficient for inducing eternal damnation; nevertheless consequently it would bring great detriment, because if such theft were slight and could be done without grave sin, thefts of this sort would be multiplied, from the frequency of which the greatest detriment would follow even for the rich and princes." And from these things it is more than sufficiently plain how false it is to assert that matter absolutely grave from Lugo is the sum of 100 aurei, namely greater than 500 libellae, since an aureus is equivalent to 5 libellae, 38 centesimi.

12. Let us come to the third question. The reason adduced, that one depart from the limits designated by ancient Theologians and by St. Alphonsus, is excellent. For since the value of money has changed, and has been diminished, and notably diminished, the damage at present brought upon the neighbor in equal circumstances is much less than that which it was before. And in the matter of theft it is precisely this damage, grave or slight, which renders the matter grave or slight. St. Alphonsus himself, l.c., n. 527, says that the gravity of the matter of theft "is to be measured respectively according to the circumstances of person, thing, place, and time." Lugo has the same, l.c., nn. 24, 25. But what is asserted against this, that it is not lawful to depart from the doctrine of the ancient theologians and of St. Alphonsus, whose works received special approval from the Apostolic See, truly has no place in our case. For we do not depart from their doctrine and principles even by the breadth of a nail, although the conclusion is different, because the circumstances are different, as the same St. Alphonsus and Lugo teach that they ought to be. Finally, what is added, namely that grave matter in theft would assume nearly enormous proportions if attention had to be paid to the changed value of money and the price of things, is most false. A certain recent theologian, indeed, relying upon a certain catalogue of prices which is found in a certain Ordinance of the Police of the City of Bourges in France, in the year 1598, from a comparison of the aforesaid prices with the prices of the same city in the year 1883, found the proportion to be one to thirteen. And hence he deduced that grave matter for a king is at least 150 libellae. This assertion is a very true exaggeration, and without any solid foundation. It does not suffice to compare the price of a few wares and the stipend of some workers which are found in that Ordinance of the City of Bourges. But in order that we may come to a seriously deduced and founded conclusion, it is necessary to examine and weigh the whole present State of Society in relation to public and private riches, in relation to the value of money and all necessities of life. And first indeed, the poor, who live from the goods of the rich, are in the present day as many as before and perhaps more and much more than before. If money is more abundant, taxes also and revenues are greater, at least in an equal if not greater proportion. The stipend of public officials has increased, but certainly it has not increased thirteen times nor ten times, nor much less relatively to the stipend of the time immediately past. But the necessities of life in the present day have increased; and money, if, attention being paid to commerce and present industry, it is more fruitful than before, certainly the increase is not thirteen times greater, but scarcely by a third or half. Cultivation of fields, on the contrary, in many places is much less fruitful, and in some almost abandoned. But attention being paid to the evolution of Commerce, the loss of Capitals on account of cessions of goods, fires, shipwrecks, etc., is much greater than before. And although there is now greater activity, circulation, and quasi-motion of riches, notwithstanding this, those who now are extraordinarily and exorbitantly rich do not seem truly to be richer than those who were extraordinarily rich in past times, as can easily be deduced from their great works and foundations of beneficence, of most splendid buildings, Monasteries, Hospitals, etc., which they erected and founded. Finally, if according to that Ordinance of the City of Bourges a pound of beef and a hen today is of thirteen times greater price than before, a proportion of this sort is not true for all cities and towns of Europe, indeed not even of the same France, as is established from catalogues of prices which are published in public Journals. And thus, for example, in the City of Bourges the best hen of all is bought for 3 libellae and 90 centesimi; at Turin it is bought for 2 libellae and 40 centesimi. Cardinal Lugo himself observed this for his own time; for he says, l.c., n. 24: "I saw at Madrid that the common price of one hen was eight argentei, while nevertheless at Salamanca, while I was studying there, it was commonly bought for two argentei." Besides, how many other things there are which previously were bought at a much dearer price, but today are had at a cheap price, as it is easy to discern in the transmission of letters, in the carriage of goods, in journeys, in things made by machine art, in fuels necessary for illuminating and burning, etc. Therefore the excess of grave matter in theft in the present day can by no means be enormous. All things well weighed, perhaps it scarcely reaches double, as can also be confirmed from the stipend of Masses, which either by custom or by diocesan Statutes has increased about twofold. And thus in the time of St. Alphonsus and Benedict XIV, the stipend of manual Masses was 10 solidi; but that of founded Masses was 26 or 27 solidi, cf. Benedict XIV, Instr. 56, n. 19 ff.; but today it is 1 1/2 or 2 libellae for various places. Nearly the same must be said concerning the stipend of soldiers, doctors, etc. In the year 1856 the Sacred Congregation, for the furnishing of support, decreed the sum of 6 ducats monthly, about 30 libellae, etc. Cf. Bizzarri, Collect., etc. Moreover, in the time of Molina, who died in 1600, the variation of money was from 1 to 6. De Iust. et Iure, tr. 2, D. 685, n. 2. In the time of Lugo, who died in 1660, the variation of money was from 1 to 3. De Iust. et Iur., D. 16, n. 25. St. Alphonsus also affirms a variation from 1 to 2, book 3, n. 383. Nor indeed did these Doctors increase grave matter of theft for their own time in this proportion. Therefore that the grave matter of theft must be increased according to the reasoning of the change in the value of money, in the same proportion, is proved neither by reason nor by authority.

431. The right which is inherent in man of possessing goods of fortune can be injured in two ways: by damage unjustly inflicted, by which the thing of the neighbor is destroyed or made worse; and by theft, by which another's thing is unjustly taken away. We shall treat of the former where Restitution is treated, by defining the conditions required for a damaging action so that place may be given to reparation; now we must treat of theft, especially by setting forth two things: 1. its nature and gravity; 2. causes excusing from the occupation of another's thing.

³ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 66; Soto, lib. V, q. 3; Lugo, disp. XVI; Sayrus, lib. IX, cap. 15; Lessius, lib. II, cap. 12; Sporer-Bierbaum, Tr. V, n. 779-882; Billuart, diss. XI; St. Alphonsus, n. 518-546; Carriere, t. III, n. 981-1020; Marres, lib. II, cap. II, n. 158-190; Ball. P., Tr. VIII, n. 274-331; Lehmkuhl, n. 928-943; Noldin, n. 403-419.

432. I. Notion and various species of theft. 1. Notion. Theft, if it is considered generically, is the taking of another's thing, with the owner reasonably unwilling.⁴ - It is said: (a) Taking, that is, either the carrying away, or even the detention, of another's good; for, as St. Thomas says,⁵ "to detain that which is owed to another has the same character of harm as an unjust taking"; and this taking indeed is done with the mind of retaining the thing for oneself; for if it were done with the mind of soon returning it to the owner or preserving it safely, it would not be theft; and with the intention of using and enjoying the thing; thus it is distinguished from damaging, by which the goods of another are destroyed without any profit.

⁴ Some add the word unjust; but this is involved in the words "with the owner reasonably unwilling"; others add hidden, but undeservedly, because then robbery could not be called a species of theft.

⁵ St. Thomas, 2. 2., q. 66, a. 3.

(b) With the owner reasonably unwilling, and under this head theft is truly unjust; for if the owner were not reasonably unwilling, e.g., if a wife took some money from her husband lest it be dissipated in games or feasts, there would be no injustice nor theft.

433. 2. Species. Three species of theft can be distinguished morally: (a) theft simply, namely the hidden usurpation of another's thing, insofar as it is done while the owner is absent or at least ignorant; (b) robbery, that is, the open and violent taking of another's thing, while the owner is present and unwilling; for then a new malice is added to theft, namely an offense inflicted upon the person possessing, which must be declared in confession; (c) sacrilege, if the thing taken away is sacred, or dedicated to God, because a new malice is found here, namely a sin against the virtue of religion; - some indeed think every theft committed in a sacred place to be sacrilegious, although the thing taken away is not sacred; but more probably, with Lugo,¹ it is denied, unless that thing in some way pertains to the church, or at least is under its custody as a deposit, loan, etc. - Other species indeed are distinguished by jurists, but they do not change the moral species of the act.²

¹ Lugo, De Justitia, disp. XVI, n. 19; de Poenit., XVI, n. 470.

² For France, Cod. pen., art. 379-409. - As regards various modes of stealing (chantage, vol a l'americaine, au poivrier, a la roulotte, au bonjour, a la carre, a l'amitie, a l'esbrouffe, etc.), see E. Nicolay, Histoire des Croyances, superstitions, moeurs, usages et coutumes, Paris, 3rd ed., t. III, p. 355-389.

434. II. General principle concerning the gravity of theft: Theft is a sin against justice mortal from its kind.

(A) For primarily it is opposed to justice; above (n. 74), it was proved that the right of dominion over external goods flows from the natural law, and is morally necessary both to the individual and to society; now such a right is openly violated when another's thing is taken away with the owner reasonably unwilling; therefore...

(B) But secondarily and consequently it is opposed to charity, insofar as it brings sadness to the neighbor, disturbs peace, introduces quarrels, contentions, and hatreds; - and also to the good of the community, since it tends to destroy concord among citizens, necessary for the good of society, and to shake the security of rights.

Deservedly, therefore, it is numbered by the sacred authors among sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven: "Neither thieves... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God."¹

¹ I Cor., VI, 10.

435. Yet that sin admits smallness of matter; for he who steals one or two asses does not gravely offend private right, nor greatly disturb public peace.² - But even small thefts must altogether be reproved as something unworthy of an upright man, both because they lead to greater ones, and because they reveal a depraved inclination of mind.

² It is certainly astonishing that there are men who vehemently reprehend small thefts committed by servants, and at the same time do not hesitate to steal thousands of coins by frauds! Each is evil, but the second is worse: "For in that in which you judge another, you condemn yourself" (Rom. II, 1).

1. Since the right of ownership is founded on the natural law and sanctioned by positive divine and human law, it follows that every man is in duty bound to respect the property of his fellowmen and to abstain from unjust interference with property rights. This is a duty of commutative justice (iustitia commutativa), and is violated by all deeds of injustice (iniustitia sive iniuria), i. e., by every voluntary violation of the property rights of another against his reasonable will (iuris alieni violatio). He who renounces a right of his own free will, loses it, and he who appropriates it, cannot be accused of injustice. But if one is compelled by violence, force, stratagem, or fear to give up a right, especially an inalienable right, he does not lose it, but suffers violence.¹

¹ Reg. Iuris in VI° Decr. Bonif. VIII, n. 27: “No injury or fraud is done to one who knows and consents.”—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., I, n. 589: “No injury is done to one who knows and wills, because one who wills yields his right and therefore does not preserve the right; hence it is of the essence of injury that it be exercised against one who is unwilling. Except certain cases in which a man cannot yield his right, however willing; thus a married man cannot by his consent prevent the violation of his wife from being adultery strictly so called. See condemned proposition under Innocent XI, n. 50: ‘Intercourse with a married woman with the husband consenting is not adultery, and therefore it is sufficient in confession to say that one has committed fornication.’” —(Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1200).—Ibid., n. 590: “1. Injury is done to one consenting as a result of force, deceit, or fear unjustly inflicted, because he does not give consent freely, but only to redeem himself from unjust harassment; 2. He who kills one who is willing does injury not only to God, but to the slain man himself, because the right to life cannot be renounced unless God, who established it, has first consented; 3. He who strikes a cleric does injury to him even though he consents, because he cannot renounce the privilege of the canon which pertains to clerical status; 4. A usurer does injury to a borrower paying usury, just as a seller does to a buyer conceding an excessive price for merchandise; 5. Torturers did injury to martyrs, even though the martyrs desired death and endured it willingly.”

Injustice is either formal or material, according as it is inflicted with or without knowledge and free will.

It is direct if fully intended; indirect, if merely an unintentional consequence of some other action.

It is grave or slight, according as it results in a grave or slight injury.

The gravity of a sin committed against the property rights of another is measured not only by the damage inflicted,² but likewise, and mainly, by the malice involved, the injury inflicted, and the danger arising from the deed to society.³

² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 73, art. 3: “Sins committed against one’s neighbor are to be weighed, in themselves, according to the harms inflicted on one’s neighbor, because from this they have the character of fault. The harm is greater in proportion as the good taken away is greater.”—Ibid., qu. 74, art. 2: “A sin against one’s neighbor is more grievous in proportion as greater harm is inflicted on one’s neighbor through it. But the harm is greater in proportion as the good which is taken away is greater.”

³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 59, art. 4: “A mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity, through which the soul has life. Now every harm inflicted on another is of itself contrary to charity, which moves one to will the good of another. And therefore, since injustice always consists in harm to another, it is manifest that to do what is unjust is, by its kind, a mortal sin.”—Ibid., qu. 66, art. 6: “A mortal sin is one that is contrary to charity, insofar as charity is the spiritual life of the soul. Charity, however, consists principally in love of God, and secondarily in love of neighbor, to which it pertains that to one’s neighbor we will and work his good. But by theft a man inflicts harm on his neighbor in his goods, and if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish. Hence theft, as contrary to charity, is a mortal sin.”—Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 589: “What matter is judged grave in injury? That which by its nature or common estimation is capable of causing another a distress difficult to allay or of dissolving mutual charity.”

Slightness of matter (parvitas materiae) may, of course, render a sin against the property rights of another merely venial, but in itself (in genere suo) this sin is mortal.⁴ For injustice in its innumerable forms is, as a rule, not only inspired by immoral motives and uncontrolled passions, but it grossly violates the justice and charity which every man owes to his neighbors, and is the source of many other sins, e. g., lies, treason, and perjury.

⁴ Is. V, 8–10; XXXIII, 1; Amos VIII, 2–10; Mich. VI, 10–15; Hab. II, 6–14; Zach. V, 3; I Cor. VI, 10 sq.; I Thess. IV, 6.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 118, art. 4: “Avarice, insofar as it is opposed to justice, is by its kind a mortal sin; for it belongs to avarice that a person unjustly take or retain the goods of another, which pertains to robbery or theft, which are mortal sins. Yet it happens that in this kind of avarice something is a venial sin because of the imperfection of the act.”—Ibid., qu. 66, art. 6, ad 3: “Reason apprehends that which is small as though it were nothing. And therefore, in matters that are very small, a man does not reckon that harm is being inflicted on him; and he who takes them can presume that this is not against the will of the one whose property it is. And for this reason, if anyone furtively takes such very small things, he can be excused from mortal sin. If, however, he has the intention of stealing and of inflicting harm on his neighbor, even in such very small things there can be mortal sin, just as there can be in thought alone through consent.”—Cfr. J. P. Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 589: “Injury is of itself gravely opposed to natural right, because it harms the natural and absolute independence of the man whose strict right is violated.”

It is of the greatest importance that every property right be kept sacred. On the other hand, the danger of violating justice is very great, partly because of the sophistry of selfishness and partly because of the difficulty of perceiving the limits that in many concrete cases separate justice from injustice, and hence it is one of the principal duties of priests to awaken and nourish in the souls confided to their care a delicate appreciation of right and justice, based upon the fear of God.⁵ “To inspire a detestation of [theft and robbery],” says the Catechism of the Council of Trent, “and to deter the faithful from this wicked enormity, parish priests shall bestow all care and diligence.”⁶

⁵ J. E. Pruner, Kath. Moraltheol., Vol. II, 3rd ed., p. 179.

⁶ Catech. Rom., P. III, c. 8, qu. 8: “To inspire a detestation of [theft and robbery] and to deter the faithful people from this wicked deed, parish priests shall bestow all care and diligence.”

II. The principal way in which the property rights of others may be violated, besides sinful coveting of their possessions, is damaging them unlawfully (damnificatio) by theft or robbery.⁷

⁷ Ex. XX, 15, 17; Deut. XXV, 13 sqq.; Prov. XX, 23; Matth. XV, 19; XIX, 18.—Cfr. Catech. Rom., P. III, c. 8, qu. 3–6.

1. When property is destroyed or injured, not appropriated, that act is called damnificatio iniusta sive dolosa. It is qualified as “non lucrosa,” because the wrong-doer gets no benefit from his act.⁸

⁸ Sporer-Bierbaum, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, 2nd ed., tr. 5, n. 791: “Unjust damaging, or damage unjustly done, is said to be the secret or violent destruction or deterioration of another’s property against the owner’s will. Hence it is called unprofitable damaging, because no gain or advantage thereby comes to the one causing the damage.”—Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, p. 380.

a) To this category of sins belong all real injuries done intentionally or through criminal negligence to the property of others against their reasonable will (invito domino); hence α) All injuries done to the movable or immovable goods (bona fortunae) of others, e. g., houses, tools, crops, etc., and β) All damage inflicted on public institutions or utilities, such as streets, sidewalks, railways, bridges, water works, etc.

b) The sinfulness of the acts just enumerated is determined by the extent of the damage done (damnum emergens), by the foreseeable consequences (lucrum cessans), by the malice inspiring the perpetrator, by the personal relationship existing between the parties concerned, and by the degree of carelessness shown.

The intentional damaging or destruction of religious statues or paintings on buildings or along public highways is not only a crime against justice, but a sin against religion, and if the articles are blessed or belong to the Church, it is also a sacrilege.⁹

⁹ See this Handbook, Vol. IV, pp. 231 sqq.

If the owner of a building sets it on fire or causes some one else to do so (crimen incendiarii), in order to obtain the insurance, he not only inflicts damage, but also commits the sin of fraud.

Simple damnificatio, in contradistinction to the unjust appropriation of the property of others, generally consists in an uncharitable act of destruction bringing no advantage to the destroyer. In such cases the moral evaluation of the sin offers no difficulties. There is a more complicated case, however, which arises out of the intricacies of modern business. Not infrequently a mer- chant seeks and obtains advantages for himself at the expense of his competitor, and nothing is more common than the charge of unfair competition raised by the loser against the winner in the mad race for profits. By the introduction of spinning machinery thousands of weavers lost their jobs and suffered serious damage, yet the inventor of the spinning jenny and those who bought and used his patents were entirely within their rights when they employed this product of human ingenuity for their own enrichment. Every new improvement in machinery might be called an injury to him who is compelled to use the unimproved model, but it is no unjust damnificatio in the moral sense.

Injury done to another without a bad intention, and without culpable negligence, must be regarded as accidental; it is for the positive law to determine whether and to what extent one who unintentionally inflicts an injury on another is to be held liable for the damage done.¹⁰

¹⁰ Linsenmann, Lehrb. d. Moraltheol., p. 596; Cronin, The Science of Ethics, II, p. 381.

2. The unjust appropriation of the property of another (acceptio iniusta), in which may be included the retention of ill-gotten goods (retentio iniusta), may take place secretly and furtively (theft), or openly and violently (robbery), or deceitfully (fraud), by charging an excessive rate of interest on loans (usury), by the careless incurring of debts, by fraudulent bankruptcy, and by refusing to pay wages, interest, or rent due to others.

A) Theft is the secret taking away of the property of another against his reasonable will. It may be simple or qualified. Species of qualified theft are sacrilege and the embezzlement of public funds (peculatus).

“Three things,” says St. Thomas, “combine together to constitute theft. The first belongs to theft as being contrary to justice, which gives to each one that which is his, so that it belongs to theft to take possession of what is another’s. The second thing belongs to theft as distinct from those sins which are committed against the person, such as murder and adultery, and in this respect it belongs to theft to be about a thing possessed: for if a man takes what is another’s, not as a possession but as a part (for instance, if he amputates a limb), or as a person connected with him (for instance, if he carries off his daughter or his wife), it is not strictly speaking a case of theft. The third difference is that which completes the nature of theft, and consists in a thing being taken secretly; and in this respect it belongs properly to theft that it consists in taking another’s things secretly.”¹¹

¹¹ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 3: “Three things combine in the definition of theft. The first belongs to it insofar as it is contrary to justice, which renders to each his own, and from this it belongs to theft that it usurps what belongs to another. The second belongs to the definition of theft insofar as it is distinguished from sins against the person, such as homicide and adultery; and accordingly it belongs to theft that it concerns a possessed thing. For if anyone takes what belongs to another not as a possession, but as a part (as if he amputates a limb) or as a connected person (as if he carries off a daughter or wife), it does not properly have the definition of theft. The third difference is what completes the definition of theft, namely that what belongs to another is usurped secretly, and accordingly the proper definition of theft is that it is the secret taking of another’s property.” Cfr. Gury, I, n. 591.

a) The sins against the seventh commandment are as various as the social connections of men and their economic condition. Unfortunately small thieves are often punished, while big ones not only go scot free, but are honored as leaders of society. Theft is by its very nature and according to the teaching of Sacred Scripture always a sin, for two reasons: “first, because of its opposition to justice, which gives to each one his due . . . ; secondly, because of the guile or fraud committed by the thief when he lays hands on another’s property secretly and cunningly.”¹²

¹² St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 5: “If anyone considers the definition of theft, he will find two reasons for sin in it: first, because of its opposition to justice, which renders to each his own, and thus theft is opposed to justice insofar as theft is the taking of another’s property; secondly, because of the guile or fraud which the thief commits secretly and, as it were, by ambush in usurping another’s property. Hence it is manifest that every theft is a sin.”—Gury, I, n. 592: “Theft, by whatever name it may be called, is of itself gravely opposed to the natural law, as is evident both from reason and from Sacred Scripture, in which it is numbered among the sins that exclude from the kingdom of heaven. Sacrilegious theft and robbery are graver sins than simple theft and constitute a different species of malice: the former because, in addition to justice, it violates religion; the latter because it adds to injustice an injury to the honor owed to one’s neighbor. Other methods or other objects of theft, however, do not change its species, because by them the nature of the damaging is not changed.”

b) The degree of sinfulness which stealing involves is determined, first, by the greater or less value of the property stolen (pretium absolutum, relativum, affectionis),¹³ and, secondly, by the personal relation of the thief to his victim and the gravity of his obligation to avoid this particular sin. Hence, even though the stolen object be of little value, theft is a mortal sin if the thief, either by reason of his office or by contractual stipulation, is under a particular obligation to protect the victim against property damage. On the other hand, an important or valuable object is required to render a theft mortally sinful if the thief is bound to his victim by the ties of consanguinity, friendship, or marriage. Generally speaking, therefore, the so-called domestic thefts (furta domestica), i. e., those committed by married people against each other, or by children against their parents, must be judged leniently, provided the stolen object is of no great value, because the violation of justice involved in such an act may be presumed to be less invito domino than in ordinary cases.

¹³ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 5.

Thefts committed by servants against their masters or employers are more serious, because they involve infidelity and a breach of trust. Note, however, that if servants steal foodstuffs which are not usually kept under lock and key, and not extraordinarily rare or costly, the fault may be extenuated, provided, of course, they do not sell them or take large quantities.¹⁴

¹⁴ Prov. XXVIII, 24; Matth. XV, 4–6.—Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 526, 539 sqq. (ed. Gaudé, II, 36, 48 sqq.).—Gury, op. cit., I, n. 595: “It is asked what matter is required for thefts by wives, children, and servants to become grave. Answer: 1. It is certain among all that, on the part of wives and children, more is required to constitute grave matter than on the part of strangers, because the head of the household is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling, in the former case than in the latter. They say that more probably a sum twice as great is required for these than for strangers, but no general rule can be assigned; for this generally depends on various circumstances of persons or conditions; 2. For servants it depends also on the greater lib- erality or tenacity of the masters, on the quality or location of the thing stolen, e. g., whether it is edible or not, guarded or open, etc. According to many, petty thefts committed by servants in food and victuals which are not usually carefully guarded do not generally amount to mortal sin, provided these things are not sold or carried out of the house and are not of extraordinary value. But if servants steal money or things diligently guarded, a greater quantity is not required for a grave sin, because masters are no less unwilling, and such thefts are punished more severely by civil law.”—Catech. Rom., P. III, c. 8, qu. 9: “Nor are servants and unfaithful custodians of their masters’ property distinguished from thieves; indeed, they are more detestable than other thieves, who are shut out by keys, because nothing at home can be sealed or locked against a thieving servant.”

c) What is the sum required for a grave sin of theft? This is a question which cannot be answered in mathematical terms, but must be gauged by the moral law. Broadly speaking, that is a notable sum of money which is required to supply a man and his family with the necessaries of life for one day. But the amount of one’s possessions and the sum needed for his daily support, are not the only measure for the magnitude of a theft. There must be a certain objective limit beyond which every theft or robbery is a mortal sin, regardless of the wealth of the victim, for the property of the rich, too, needs to be protected against unjust violation. Therefore, in the case of the very wealthy, materia gravis is a sum large enough, on the one hand, to constitute an incitement to theft, and, on the other, to expose the fortune of the victim to considerable danger if it were frequently repeated.

The casuists have long ago endeavored to determine just when the matter of a theft becomes sufficient to constitute a mortal sin. “Since about the time of De Lugo (+ 1660),” says Fr. Slater, “it has been a common opinion among theologians that it is a grave sin of theft to rob a workingman of a sum which is sufficient to support him and his family for a day. The reason for this doctrine is obvious and satisfactory. For that quantity will be sufficient for a mortal sin, whose theft causes a notable injury to the owner, an injury which ordinary men of prudence and sense consider serious, and which is sufficient to upset them considerably. This is the test which is applied in other matters where there is question of the grave breach of a moral law which admits of parvity of matter. . . . In the same way, when we wish to know what sum is sufficient for a grave sin of theft, we consider how important it is for maintaining peace among men that property should be secure; what quantity of money or commodities is looked upon as considerable with a view to the use that can be made of them; and what quantity will, with reason, cause the owner serious concern and chagrin if he is unjustly deprived of it. Now, to a workman, or indeed to any one who has to earn his living, the loss of what will support him and his family for a day is a serious matter; it practically means that he has worked a whole day for nothing, and such a loss causes most men, with reason, to be seriously put out.”

But what about rich men, wealthy companies, governments, etc.? “In such cases we must have recourse to other considerations in order to find what quantity will constitute a grave sin of injustice when stolen. Here we consider, not so much the loss caused to the owner of the property, as the wrong done to public order and to the security of property. . . . The public weal requires that theft of a considerable sum must be forbidden in all cases, as a grave violation of justice, by the natural law. A prohibition, under pain of venial sin, not to steal a considerable sum of money, would not be sufficient to safeguard the right of property. In other words, theft of what is commonly at a certain time and place considered a notable sum of money, will be sufficient to constitute a mortal sin of theft, even when the owner of the property stolen is not sensibly the worse off.”

After reviewing the opinions of recent moralists as to the quantity which public interest requires for a grave sin of theft, Fr. Slater, making due allowance for the depreciation of money, the higher standards of comfort, and, in consequence, the relatively less value attached to money by the working classes throughout the civilized world, independently of its purchasing power, sees “no reason for increasing the quantity which the greater number of modern theologians assign as the absolute sum required for a mortal sin of theft. That quantity is about twenty shillings, and if we attach much importance, as we should do, to the opinions of such classical moralists as Lugo about such a question, the sum will rather be below than above twenty shillings.”¹⁵

¹⁵ Slater, Questions of Moral Theology, pp. 99–115.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 527 (ed. Gaudé, II, 37).—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 593: “Grave matter in theft cannot be rigorously determined. According to the common opinion, which seems altogether to be held, this matter is to be regarded not absolutely in itself, but relatively to the various conditions and necessities of men, so that graver matter is required for a grave sin in theft against a rich man than against a poor man. The reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, depends chiefly on the greater or lesser deprivation, distress, and resistance of will suffered by the one against whom the theft is committed; indeed, everyone sees that the same matter causes now slight, now grave distress according as the owner from whom it is taken is rich or poor. Nevertheless, regard must be had to the resistance of will as it is commonly and reasonably found among men, not in relation to men attracted by a greater or lesser love of money. . . . Yet some absolute matter must be determined that can never be exceeded without grave fault; otherwise, if a complete proportion had to be observed among all conditions, a very great quantity would certainly be required as grave matter in a theft committed against a very rich man, which everyone sees would result in harm to society.”

The Compendium Theologiae Moralis of Sabetti-Barrett, S. J., which is, we believe, used in most of our ecclesiastical seminaries, following Palmieri, Gury-Ballerini, Ojetti, and others, gives about thirty-five dollars as the absolute sum required for a mortal sin of theft.¹⁶ This is a probable opinion and may be safely followed.

¹⁶ Comp. Theol. Mor., 29th ed., p. 369.

d) The object of a theft may be materia gravis not only in itself, but also per accidens, namely, if a number of petty sums are stolen from one and the same person on different occasions, or from several persons. Innocent XI expressly condemned the proposition that “A man is not obliged under pain of mortal sin to make restitution of that which he has stolen in small sums, even though the total amount be considerable.”¹⁷

¹⁷ Prop. damnat. sub. Innoc. XI, n. 38: “No one is bound under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken by a few thefts, however great the total sum may be.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1188).—Cfr. Gury, Vol. I, n. 596 sq.—In determining when there is objective coalescence of small thefts, so that ultimately what is called gravis materia is stolen, theologians seek some connecting link that will bind together the petty pilferings and give them unity; for without such a bond of union they will remain isolated thefts, and will, in consequence, have merely an objective malice against justice, which corresponds to them as individual unjust acts. The intention with which the small thefts are accomplished is pointed out as one means of bringing them into moral connection with one another. When a thief intends from the beginning to arrive at a considerable amount, but, for convenience sake, takes the large sum little by little, then, no matter what length of time intervenes between the different acts of robbery, and no matter whether the objects already stolen are attained or not, there is objective coalescence, and an externally grave sin against justice has been committed. Dr. Harty says on this subject: “It seems to me to be necessary to limit this teaching in some way. Is the intention of which theologians speak a subjective intention, an internal act of the will? If so, the question arises at once: How can an internal intention bring about an objective union between different acts? A mere subjective element cannot create an objective bond of union, cannot unite a number of petty injuries so as to make them one grave injustice. Just as, accord- ing to the opinion which seems the more common in the schools, an internal intention does not directly change the objective justice or injustice of an act, so too, it would seem, an internal intention cannot of itself provide an objective change in the relations of two or more acts of theft to one another; at most it regulates the subjective responsibility of the agent. A suggested solution of this difficulty is that the intention of which theologians speak is not a mere internal intention, but rather an intention which is externated by the different acts which follow from it; but I doubt if this solution, taken by itself, is sufficient to overcome the difficulty of the case, because each individual act of theft externates only an intention which corresponds to itself; nor does the whole series of acts, of necessity, externate any internal connecting intention, as can be seen from two examples, in one of which a certain number of acts of theft are performed without any initial intention of doing so, and in the other of which the same number of thefts are committed at equally long intervals in execution of an initially arranged determination. The difference between the two cases is purely internal. Perhaps the intention, which serves as an objective link between the various small thefts, is an intention which has a separate externation—separate in the sense that it must be distinct from that obtained by the mere repeated acts of stealing. This will frequently be expressly made, and frequently, too, it will be implicitly contained in the modus agendi of the agent. Such an externated intention would supply an objective bond which neither an internal intention nor an intention externated merely by repeated acts can give.” (Irish Theological Quarterly, Vol. II, n. 7).

Besides the objective and material value of the stolen object, there must be taken into consideration such subjective circumstances as the heartlessness or incorrigibility of the thief. He who intends to steal an object of considerable value, but succeeds in stealing only a petty one, commits a mortal sin. So does he who successively steals small sums in order gradually to obtain a large one, and he who co-operates with others in committing grand larceny, no matter how small his personal share in the booty may be.¹⁸

¹⁸ Gury, Vol. I, n. 598: “On the part of the thief, the taking of a slight thing becomes a grave sin in three ways, namely: 1. Through the intention of arriving at grave matter; 2. Through multiplication, if petty thefts amount to a grave sum; 3. Through conspiracy, when several conspire among themselves and the petty thefts of the individuals, taken together, constitute grave matter.” —Ibid., n. 599: “If a thief intending to arrive at a grave sum through petty thefts renews this intention each time he steals, he sins gravely each time. But if from the beginning he intends to steal some determinate sum through petty thefts, v. g., so that he may not be detected, more probably he commits a single sin, because there is a single moral act; for all the particular acts tend determinately toward effecting one thing.”

e) As the appropriation of the property of others is unjust only when it is done against the reasonable will of the owner (rationabiliter invito domino), the taking of things in extreme necessity and occult compensation (v. infra, pp. 366 sq.) are not thefts.

A theft committed in extreme need is the appropriation or use of the property of another by a person who needs that property to save his life or something nearly as valuable as life (e. g., the integrity of the body or liberty).

He who in a state of extreme necessity takes as much of another’s goods as he actually needs, either for himself or for others in the same predicament is not guilty of theft and not bound to make restitution, provided he is actually indigent and has no reasonable hope of ever becoming prosperous.¹⁹ He is merely exercising a right granted to him by the moral law of nature, which ordains that in extreme necessity all things are common property. In such a case, therefore, the consent of the owner may be presumed, and if he protests, his protest may be disregarded as unreasonable, and hence there can be no theft because one of the essential notes of theft is lacking.

¹⁹ Busembaum, Medulla Theol. Mor., l. III, tr. 5, c. 1, dub. 1, n. 2: “He who takes from another as much as is necessary for himself or another placed in extreme necessity neither steals nor is bound later to restore what has thus been consumed, provided he was needy in fact and in prospect.”

St. Thomas explains this with his accustomed lucid- ity as follows: “Things which are of human right cannot derogate from natural right or divine right. Now, according to the natural order established by divine Providence, inferior things are ordained for the purpose of succoring man’s needs by their means. And therefore the division and appropriation of things which are based on human law, do not preclude the fact that man’s needs have to be remedied by means of these very things. Hence, whatever certain people have in superabundance is due, by natural law, to the purpose of succoring the poor. . . . Since, however, there are many who are in need, while it is impossible for all to be relieved by means of the same thing, each one is entrusted with the stewardship of his own things, so that out of them he may come to the aid of those who are in need. But if the need be so manifest and urgent that it is evident that the present need must be remedied by whatever means be at hand (for instance, when a person is in some imminent danger, and there is no other possible remedy), then it is lawful for a man to relieve his own need by means of another’s property, by taking it either openly or secretly; nor is this, properly speaking, theft or robbery.” And again: “It is not theft, properly speaking, to take secretly and use another’s property in a case of extreme need, because that which a man takes for the support of his life, becomes his own property by reason of that need.”²⁰

²⁰ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 7: “Those things which are of human law cannot derogate from natural law or divine law. Now, according to the natural order established by divine providence, inferior things are ordained so that by means of them human need may be relieved. And therefore the division and appropriation of things proceeding from human law does not prevent human need from being relieved by means of such things. And therefore the things which some possess in superabundance are, by natural law, due for the support of the poor. . . . But because there are many who suffer need and it is not possible from—” “the same thing to relieve everyone, the stewardship of his own goods is entrusted to each person’s discretion, so that from them he may relieve those suffering need. But if necessity is so evident and urgent that it is manifest that the present need must be relieved from whatever things are at hand (for example, when danger threatens a person and he cannot otherwise be relieved), then a person may lawfully relieve his need from another’s goods, whether taken openly or secretly, nor does this properly have the character of theft or robbery.”—Ibid., ad 2: “To use another’s property secretly taken in a case of extreme necessity does not have the character of theft, properly speaking, because through such necessity that which one takes to sustain one’s own life is made one’s own.”—Ibid., ad 3: “In a case of similar necessity a person may also secretly take another’s property in order to aid a neighbor who is thus in need.”

f) The conditions under which a man may make use of this right are the following:

α) His own need, or that of the person for whom he takes the property, must be extreme (necessitas extrema), or at least very grave (necessitas gravissima sive quasi extrema); β) He must have no other means of livelihood; γ) The owner of the property in question must not be in equal need or likely to be subjected to equal need by the taking away of his property; δ) The needy must have the intention of taking only what he absolutely requires at the moment and of making adequate restitution if he is able.²¹

²¹ Prop. damnat. sub Innoc. XI, n. 36: “It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity but also in grave necessity.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1186).—Cfr. Gury, I, n. 601: “A poor person placed in extreme necessity may not take more than is necessary. Hence, if the use alone of a thing, v. g., a horse, suffices, the obligation of restoring it remains when the necessity ceases. If one in extreme need has elsewhere, in fact or in probable prospect, the means from which he can pay, he cannot take another’s property except with the burden of restitution, because the necessity then does not require the thing to be taken gratuitously, if it is relieved by a thing received on loan or lent for use. But one who in extreme want has consumed another’s property is bound to nothing after using the thing, if he has no hope that he will ever be able to restore it, even if afterward he arrives at a better condition.”

g) Akin to taking another’s property in extreme need is occult compensation (compensatio occulta), i. e., the secret appropriation of something to which one has a just claim (debitum ex iustitia), but which one cannot obtain by ordinary means. This is permissible only: (1) if the justice of the claim is indisputable, (2) if occult compensation is the only physically or morally possible means of obtaining one’s own, and (3) if there is no reason for apprehending injury to a third person, e. g., suspicion of theft, or scandal.²² These three essential conditions, which must be present together to render occult compensation licit, hardly ever actually concur, especially since there must be an absolutely certain claim of justice; mere promises or claims of equity do not suffice.²³ Occult compensation is always of doubtful moral value because it is an act of self-help, and no man is an impartial judge in his own case. Therefore Saint Thomas says: “He who, by stealth, takes his own property, if this be unjustly detained by another, sins indeed, yet not because he burdens the retainer, and so he is not bound to restitution or compensation; but he sins against general justice by disregarding the order of justice and usurping judgment concerning his own property. Hence he must make satisfaction to God and endeavor to allay whatever scandal he may have given his neighbors by acting in this way.”²⁴

²² St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. III, n. 521–524 (ed. Gaudé, II, 33 sqq.); cfr. Gury, I, n. 602–604.

²³ Cfr. Prop. damnat. sub Innoc. XI, n. 37: “Male and female domestic servants may secretly take from their masters to compensate for their labor, which they judge greater than the wage they receive.” (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1187).

²⁴ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 5, ad 3: “He who secretly takes his own property when it is unjustly detained by another does indeed sin, not because he burdens the one who detains it, and therefore he is not bound to restore or compensate anything, but he sins against general justice by usurping judgment concerning his own property for himself while disregarding the order of law. And therefore he is bound to make satisfaction to God and to take care that any scandal of his neighbors, if it has arisen from this, be allayed.”—Cfr. Janssen, Der hl. Alfons von Liguori gegen Hoensbroech, pp. 103 sqq.

To steal the intellectual property (ideas, writings, or inventions) of another is called plagiarism. It is a sin if the owner is injured thereby. There is also a sort of ideal plagiarism, which is committed if one seeks to appropriate to himself the reputation or glory of another, but it is often difficult to separate that which is the property of an author or inventor from that which he owes to the intellectual labors of his fellowmen. In the words of Dr. Linsenmann, no matter how firmly we stand on our own feet, the ground which we occupy has been prepared for us by others.²⁵

²⁵ Linsenmann, Lehrb. d. Moraltheol., p. 526.

B) Robbery (rapina) is the act of openly taking away the property of another from his person or in his presence, against his will, and under constraint of fear or force. It differs from theft by the circumstances described and is a more grievous sin for two reasons: first, because it violates personal liberty and, secondly, because it inflicts upon the victim ignominy and injury.²⁶ If violence is employed after theft has been committed in order to ward off persecution, the crime of robbery is superadded to that of theft. Robbery may be perpetrated without the application of violence by embezzling documents, giving false testimony, perjury, bribery of judges, withholding a laborer’s wages, and similar sins.

²⁶ St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 66, art. 4: “Theft and robbery have the character of sin from the fact that the taking is involuntary on the part of the one from whom something is taken. But the involuntary is spoken of in two ways, namely through ignorance and through violence. And therefore robbery has one character of sin and theft another. Therefore on this account they differ in species.”—Ibid., art. 9: “Robbery and theft have the character of sin because of the involuntary on the part of the one from whom something is taken, yet in such a way that in theft it is involuntary through ignorance, whereas in robbery it is involuntary through violence. But something is more involuntary through violence than through ignorance, because violence is more directly opposed to the will than ignorance. And therefore robbery is a graver sin than theft. There is also another reason, because through robbery not only is harm inflicted on someone in his goods, but it also tends toward a certain ignominy or injury of the person, and this outweighs the fraud or deceit that belongs to theft.”

Related to robbery is extortion, i. e., the act or practice of obtaining from another money or other valuables by violence, threats, or compulsion, more specifically the taking of money by an official under color of his office, either when none is due, or in excess of what is due, or before it is due. Extortion approaches fraud if the threat is not applied directly to the unjust appropriation of property, but in order to compel some act or omission which entails a disadvantage to others, for instance, signing a receipt or omitting to bring suit.

C) Fraud (fraus) is an act of deliberate deception, practiced for the purpose of securing something to the prejudice of another.²⁷ Fraud is practiced in numerous forms in legal transactions and contracts, especially in sales, by deceiving the buyer as to the value, the quality or quantity of the object sold, by counterfeiting money and weights, etc. It is a very serious sin, whether regarded in its nature or in its consequences.²⁸ In its nature, because it implies deception and hypocrisy, lying, heartlessness, and injustice, all clothed in the garb of honesty and therefore difficult to discover. In its consequences, because he who commits fraud undermines the social order by destroying mutual confidence and creating distrust. Holy Scripture says that those who wrong and defraud others fall into the pit they themselves have dug, and that their iniquity will be visited upon their own heads and they will “not possess the kingdom of God.”²⁹

²⁷ St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. III, c. 11 (n. 75): “David says: ‘Like a sharp razor you have wrought deceit’ (Ps. 51, 4); reproaching the traitor’s wickedness, because an instrument of this kind is used for a man’s adornment and often wounds.” (Migne, P. L., XIV, 166).—St. Thomas, l. c., qu. 77, art. 1: “To employ fraud in order that something may be sold for more than the just price is altogether a sin, insofar as one deceives one’s neighbor to his detriment.”

²⁸ Lev. XIX, 35 sq.; Deut. XXV, 13–16; Prov. XX, 23.—Cfr. Tertullian, De Idololatria, c. 1: “The nature of fraud, I think, is that someone seize what belongs to another or deny what is owed to another, and surely fraud committed against a man is the name of the greatest crime?” (Ed. Leopold, P. I, 30).—St. Ambrose, De Offic., l. III, c. 9 (n. 65): “All fraud is shameful. Indeed, even in cheap things a deceitful balance and fraudulent measure are accursed. If fraud is punished in the marketplace of saleable things, in the practice of commerce, can it be regarded as blameless among the duties of the virtues?” (Migne, P. L., XVI, 163).

²⁹ Ps. VII, 15–17; Prov. XI, 24; XX, 17; Jer. XXII, 13; 1 Cor. VI, 8–10; 1 Thess. IV, 6; cfr. 1 Pet. II, 1.

Though minor frauds are not per se mortally sinful, yet they may become so by dint of circumstances and are to be avoided all the more because they almost invariably lead to other and more grievous acts of deception. It is this sort of iniquity which the Holy Ghost has particularly in view when He says that it is visited upon a man’s children and children’s children to the third and fourth generation.³⁰ “Those who commit frauds,” says the Angelic Doctor, “do not design anything against themselves or their own souls, but through God’s just judgment it happens that what they plot against others recoils on themselves, according to Ps. vii, 16: ‘He is fallen into the hole he made.’”³¹

³⁰ Ex. XXXIV, 7.

³¹ Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 2a 2ae, qu. 55, art. 5, ad 3: “Those who commit frauds do not, from their intention, devise anything against themselves or against their own souls, but through God’s just judgment it happens that what they plot against others recoils upon them, according to that saying (Ps. VII, 16): ‘He has fallen into the pit that he made.’”

Order of the Section. - As many as there are kinds of justice, so many are the opposed kinds of injustice. These must be treated in order. Therefore we shall assign two shorter titles to the injustice which is opposed to legal justice and to distributive justice; but we shall reserve the third title for violations of commutative justice and their consequences.

Usefulness. - In this title chiefly the error must be set aside which, having followed the "individualism" of the nineteenth century, almost dispenses citizens from offices toward the republic; and a right estimation concerning the obligation of taxes must be acquired by us.

In our work we have abstained from the name of social justice, lest we increase the confusion under which not a few labor, who practically equate legal justice with a particular virtue. For while for some social justice is the same as legal justice, others, by that word, better call together the complex of virtues which come into use in society.

Nature and Accusation of Sins. Every sin contains a material violation of legal justice. For every sin is forbidden by law at least divine. Yet that malice regularly is not to be declared, both because, when the sin has been indicated, it is already sufficiently understood, and because for the most part it will not be formal. For this requires an action done from contempt of the common good, which therefore is opposed to legal justice by a formal reason and, as such, is to be indicated. Since that virtue lacks a special matter, a material violation is not specified by it. Acts specially harmful to the common good, for example betrayal of the fatherland, will have to be indicated as such, as gravely opposed to piety and charity.

On Taxes to Be Paid. 1. In difficult circumstances of the republic, it belongs to a good citizen that he bring aid to his city even by monies liberally offered. How much more will he pay just taxes, according to his proportionate part, to the ruling treasury! Wherefore this rule must always be inculcated, that taxes be contributed according to the sufficiently general usage of upright persons; and today not a few republics labor under such manifest need that a reasonable contribution does not seem able to be denied without sin against piety. Yet, considering the quantity which could be subtracted, and considering the pecuniary penalties by which frauds are punished, grave sin will rarely be certain; but we do not deny that one can sin gravely.

2. But from the common opinion, there is no obligation of conscience positively to declare things subject to tax. Wherefore commutative justice is not violated by those who, in making instruments of sales, indicate a price below the true one, or do not manifest all movable goods which pertain to the inheritance. And where this practice has sufficiently prevailed, not even truth is offended by that lesser declaration. Yet he who uses false certificates of physicians, etc., to increase the debts of an inheritance, will be guilty of a lie. Moreover, observe that a notary has not been constituted to protect the rights of the treasury, so that, with justice uninjured, he can be a participant in fraud. But if an oath is requested, religion itself per se will oblige that you respond sincerely according to the just mind of the one asking.

Wherefore where an oath is requested merely to protect the rights of heirs, not at all to protect the rights of the public treasury, it can be sworn that nothing has been concealed by him who was conscious of no thing iniquitously concealed, so that the rights of the heirs have remained intact.

But if a sworn declaration is requested for the utility of the treasury, that obligation, today sufficiently odious, nevertheless cannot tend to this, that from it religious men be compelled to bear an unequal burden of taxes. Wherefore according to the reasonable mind of the one asking, and therefore without perjury, he will have responded who, under oath, declares accurate indications which have been made according to received usages.

3. Moreover, before the proportionate part to be paid by each has been defined by the officials set over this, no right seems to have been acquired for the treasury.

4. When that definition has been made, the question concerning the obligation of justice of paying just taxes is probably controverted. Certainly power is not lacking to the civil prince to oblige citizens to pay the just part of taxes. But already before our age, to many the mind of the legislator seemed to be no other than that of fining detected defrauders. Today the intention of obliging conscience becomes less probable. Therefore, unless the general persuasion of the region is different, and this must be trusted, we shall deny a strict obligation of justice. Yet those will violate justice who use unjust means.

Nor can those be excused who wish to exercise fraud as an art: both because, from the intention of using force against officials, they bear a mind contrary to justice; and because they expose themselves to dangers of ruin and penalties, and thus offend charity toward themselves and their family.

5. But those who, by corrupting officials set over taxes, have obtained immunity for themselves, are formal accomplices of those officials who violate the duties of their office, so that they are guilty of injury against the republic. Just taxes are supposed.

6. But insofar as by withdrawing their goods from the treasury they are an indirect cause why others are burdened more, they commit no injustice toward those persons: neither commutative nor distributive. Not commutative, because the greater burden of others, if any results from this, follows no unjust action toward others. Not distributive, since they do not themselves have the positive care of equal partition.

It is useful to add this. If they could be more secure concerning the reasonable use of public monies, upright and Catholic men would contribute monies more willingly and would act more scrupulously in this matter.

Today, the ease with which theologians excuse tax frauds from sin is not rarely presented as scandalous. But of what kind is that scandal: of the little ones, or Pharisaic? Let them observe first that by Catholic theologians those arts are condemned as strict injustice by which those who conduct purchases and agreements for the city assign to themselves part of the public monies; and every dilapidation of the common patrimony; indeed, already the very sloth by which public offices are conducted without true solicitude for the common utility; so that, if heed were paid to moral theology, the treasury would gain many more monies than it loses on account of the benignity of theologians. If besides you weigh the unjust place into which, in more than one state, Catholics are thrust down, so that they are in great part excluded from public offices, and that full liberty of conscience of living according to the precepts of the Catholic religion is denied to them, which is offered so liberally and rashly to the haters and disturbers of social peace; if you consider in your mind the laws which Catholics must tolerate, by which, for example, public monies, and therefore monies contributed by Catholics themselves, are destined for the scholastic propagation of irreligion: with what face will men who are witnesses, and perhaps authors, of such abuses accuse theologians of excessive indulgence, and demand that for laws often unjust, obligations of conscience be urged which they themselves generally repudiate?

— Yet to the State which exercises the business of transporting letters, goods, persons, a just price from commutative justice is owed by those who, for example by taking an ordinary place, tacitly enter with it into a contract of carriage. A just price, I say, not that which it seeks beyond this on account of monopoly, as it is accustomed to do in selling tobacco, etc.; that is to be paid as a tax.

Nor will he be accused of injustice who, contrary to "postal" laws, enclosed in customary letters certain things forbidden or specially to be taxed, nor he who, after paying the price of an inferior class, should make a journey in a coach of a superior class. For provided that the lowest price of carriage or journey is paid, those accidental frauds are judged to be urged only by penalties. Except if someone has used an unjust means. Cf. Prummer, II, 85.

On Military Service. The obligation of military service has the true nature of a tax. The laws by which it is imposed are commonly held as penal, the more so because they seem to recede sufficiently from the equality of justice. Where those are designated by lot who must earn stipends, those who by fraud evade service do not violate commutative justice, even if by accident, from the disposition of law, another must be substituted. For they are prohibited by no right of this person from taking thought for themselves. He who by agreement has obligated himself to occupy the place of another in the camps, if he has fled, per se is held for the whole damage which from this is suffered by those with whom he has agreed. Yet unforeseen conditions of intolerable cruelties or of very grave spiritual danger can furnish a just cause for deserting military service; and then, with the contract rescinded, only the price in proportion to the time which remains would have to be refunded. Indeed he is freed from this obligation if the other, for whom he is substituted, nevertheless remains exempt, since then he has truly furnished the promised immunity. Similarly, from commutative justice he is held to earn stipends who has bound himself to the State by free enlistment.

But in time of war, those who desert the military station are punished by a graver penalty; nor, in a just war, do they seem to us able to be excused from grave impiety toward the fatherland.

But the very grave penalties by which they would be punished if they returned will easily dispense them from the obligation which they would otherwise have of returning to the camp.

— 1. The material violation of legal justice which is contained in every sin need not be accused distinctly; the formal violation would have to be: this is committed by him who acted from an intention contrary to the common good. But acts specially harmful to the common good, such as betrayal of the fatherland, are to be noted as such, as gravely opposed to piety and charity.

2. On Taxes. By not paying taxes in that way in which they are customarily paid by good citizens, a sin against piety toward the fatherland is easily committed, besides the notion of scandal; yet the sin will rarely be grave, on account of the slight effect of an individual defraudation.

But the legislator, both civil and ecclesiastical, can urge the obligation of conscience by his precept; indeed, he can exact just taxes from commutative justice. Yet a positive obligation of declaring things liable to tax is generally not admitted; nor is a right judged to have been acquired for the treasury before it has been defined what each must pay. Indeed, when that determination has been made, the obligation of justice is not yet demonstrated. But justice itself forbids that you corrupt public officials; nor do those seem able to be excused from grave sin who wish to exercise fraud as an art.

3. To the State which exercises a business, for example of transporting letters, goods, persons, the just price, not that which besides it exacts in the manner of a tax, must be paid, commutative justice itself wills. Yet accidental frauds of using a coach of a superior class, etc., seem to be punished only by penalties.

4. A law which binds citizens to military service is held as penal. Yet those who, in a just war, desert the military station which had been committed to them gravely offend piety toward the fatherland.

Private persons who, by withdrawing themselves or their goods from the treasury, have been the cause per accidens why others are more burdened, do nothing which is injurious to these.

Usefulness. - The frequent omission of offices demonstrates how useful it is to recall, even in a few words, the duties in conferring offices and in exacting taxes.

On Acceptance of Persons. One sins by the vice of acceptance of persons when, in the distribution of common goods, in conferring public offices, attention is paid to those conditions of the person which, for the matter at issue, would plainly have to be neglected.

Here offices or public functions properly so called are to be distinguished, which are exercised in their proper name for the common utility by those who hold them; and certain secondary offices, by which officials properly such are merely helped, such as their secretaries or copyists attached to their persons.

1. The former offices today are in the private dominion of no one. They belong to the republic. Therefore in the first place they are to be conferred in that mode which the common good demands; then, with the common good saved, according to the rules of distributive justice. Wherefore strictly they are to be conferred on the more worthy, that is, on him whose nomination, all things considered, will more profit the republic. Although others think it suffices that they be attributed to the worthy: their opinion rests upon an antiquated regime in which all magistrates were judged to represent one Prince, who through others did what he could not do by himself, so that it sufficed for him to procure through others that moderate diligence by which he himself was held in acting. We do not deny extrinsic probability to that opinion.

2. As to the latter offices, it is enough to choose worthy persons, who do not harm the common good and truly merit the public stipends.

3. In either case, those who assume the unworthy where worthy persons are present sin against commutative justice toward the state, and they will have to repair the damages brought from this to the state or to private persons.

4. But no restitution is owed to those who are passed over, unless, from a competition having been announced, the victor acquired a right to nomination.

Moreover it must be noted that competitions can be made in two ways: so that the qualified may be discerned, from among whom then one may be freely chosen by the Superior; or in such a way that a strict right of obtaining the office is assigned to the victor. Only in the latter case is commutative justice violated toward competitors merely passed over. If the one elected is so unworthy that he receives a stipend without cause, that stipend will have to be restored to the republic.

— But by an inequitable distribution of burdens, for example of taxes, commutative justice itself is violated toward private persons; for citizens have a strict right not to be despoiled of their goods beyond what they must contribute.

— 1. One sins by the vice of acceptance of persons when, in conferring public offices or distributing common goods, attention is paid to those conditions of the person which, for the matter at issue, would plainly have to be neglected.

Today, offices which belong to the republic are, from distributive justice, to be conferred on the more worthy; this canonical law also expressly sanctions concerning parish priests. But secondary offices, by which the principal official is assisted, are to be conferred at least on the worthy.

For the republic has a strict right that, if they are present, worthy persons be assumed, and that public monies not be squandered.

Private persons who have been passed over cannot complain of injustice against commutative justice, unless the competition was announced in that manner which confers a strict right on the victor.

But by an inequitable exaction of taxes, commutative justice itself is violated. For this forbids that citizens be despoiled of their goods.

Notion. Violation of commutative justice receives the proper name of injury, and it is distinguished as personal and real, according as it directly regards the person, that is, goods of soul or body, or extrinsic goods. Each can be damnose, or a simple lesion without damnification, as if someone should take money from a chest where it was lying idle and then replace it in its place. Material injury is had whenever an action or omission lesive of right is committed; formal injury, however, when someone wishes to be injurious. Both can be per se conjoined, or per accidens separated, as if someone unknowingly kills a person, or if someone takes as another's what was his own.

Conditions of Injury. That an injury be committed, it is required and suffices that the right of one not consenting be violated.

"For injury is not done to one consenting." As no one can be unjust to himself, so neither to another who gives spontaneous consent to an action per se unjust; for he seems to act in this one's name. Besides, the active use of a right is a faculty: we use a faculty when we will. This principle is universal, so that it suffers no exception.

Nor is it an obstacle that there are inalienable rights: it is one thing to transfer one's right to another, another thing not to oppose one's right. Transfer is proper to an alienable right; non-opposition can be common to every right.

But in application, patrimonial rights are to be distinguished, whose disposition or active use can be in the power of another than the subject of the right, and rights strictly personal, whose disposition, inseparable from the person, is in the power of no one unless in the power of him whose right it is. The opposition of the former can be in the power of the tutor of an incapable person, while the others, during incapacity, are always judged to be opposed. Wherefore it is whole and entire for an adult to abandon a ship too full with certain danger of death; but no one can, in the same necessity, throw a sick infant into the sea. - Certain recent writers have imagined that consent concerning an inalienable right is invalid.

But that consent is not always given honestly, nor can it remove other malices besides the note of injustice.

Finally observe that, for the action of another to be injurious, it is not required that the owner oppose his right by a positive act, but it is enough that he does not positively consent.

— But unjust arts are two: violence and frauds. Yet between each there is this difference, that force brought upon a person in himself or in his goods is always per se unjust, while frauds are not unjust when, through them, aid, for example of knowledge, which is not owed from justice is merely denied.

But those things are per se opposed to justice which take away the free action or option of another by positive deception.

Unjust damnification is not made by omission, unless the other per se or from contract has a right to the action which prevents damage. Thus, for example, children or animals are to be guarded from justice lest they inflict damages on others.

Applications. 1. You ask concerning an action by which another is impeded from obtaining a good. Is it unjust? That future good is either owed from justice or merely hoped for. Its concession and acquisition can be honest, or be forbidden by moral law. These things posited:

1. The attainment of a good which is owed to someone from justice cannot be impeded by a voluntary action positively and per se without a sin of injustice and an obligation of restitution.

2. An action by which the attainment of a merely hoped-for good of another is impeded cannot be unjust from the object: hope is not a right. Therefore every injustice will have to be drawn from the mode, if the mode contains some violation of right. Unjust modes are force and fear unjustly struck into a person; lesion of reputation by detraction or calumny; damnification of another's thing, for example of a statue by which someone wished to compete for a prize; the lie itself, if and insofar as by deception it takes away freedom of action, as if someone, deceived about the time, can no longer appeal from a sentence or vindicate a prescribed right.

3. But if attainment of a temporal good is forbidden by a moral precept, no right to it which could be violated can exist, although the mode can be unjust. Suppose someone has detained a prostitute by force: he will not have to restore anything to her for the lost gain of the infamous commerce.

— But the mode can be unjust both with respect to him who hoped for the good and with respect to him from whom the good was hoped. Suppose beggars who hoped for alms from pilgrims. By force brought upon them or upon the pilgrims they can be disturbed from their hope. In the former case, no condition of injustice and restitution is lacking: according to the proportion of the hope, restitution must be made to them. In the latter case, he alone who wished to confer the good has been affected by injustice. Wherefore restitution is owed directly to him alone; but to the one hoping it is not owed except so far as it is necessary that satisfaction be made to the former. Now, in the case brought forward, the pilgrims are not judged to have had an absolute and persevering will of giving alms to those poor persons, so that nothing is to be restored to them. On the contrary, a will of bequeathing a thing by testament is thought absolute and constant. Wherefore the execution of the legacy is owed to him who would have been legatee by him who by force or fraud, not by mere prayers, impeded the testator from writing the legacy in the testament. But if the legatee was unworthy to receive the legacy simply or from such a testator, he will not have been unjust who revealed the unworthiness, even occult, to the testator.

2. Is he injurious who did not prevent the damnose effects of his own non-blameworthy action, for example if you neglect to extinguish a fire which arose from your non-voluntary negligence?

Injury and the obligation of restitution are to be affirmed, if a proportionate inconvenience does not excuse the author of the damage. For commutative justice forbids that our action deprive another of his things, and therefore commands that we restrain the damnose efficacy of the same, as long as we morally can. Yet because the cause was not blameworthy, already a relatively grave inconvenience excuses: that is, one which, considered in relation to the imminent damage and the faculty of impeding it, is not to be held as slight.

Wherefore, if the evil which you clearly say about Peter is understood of Paul, that present effect of your past action must be corrected from justice. Thus Molina, Iust., t. 5, d. 40, n. 3; Lugo, Iust., d. 15, n. 6; Lessius, however, c. 11, n. 119, obligates from charity alone, because the cause of the confusion was not your speech but the error of others. This opinion is probable, if no occasion of erring was given by you. Yet, the involuntary error of the hearers being supposed, that damnose effect of your action seems to have to be impeded from justice, on account of the reason just made in this way. Therefore we think agreement must be given to Molina and Lugo.

Note. We do not so treat of injuries in this chapter that we pass over in silence connected licit acts. Thus, while we mention forbidden homicide, at the same time we explain the right of bloody defense; beside theft we place the right of necessity; no less than of the possessor in bad faith, we propose to treat of the possessor in good faith. Hence there will also be place in the Appendix for saying a few things on the action of public power and on the right of war.

Highest General Principle. Private persons, as such, in their mutual relation, are equally inviolable; and this without any consideration of merit or demerit, consent or dissent. Wherefore no malice, no formal or virtual renunciation, can take away or diminish that inviolability. Therefore:

1. No one can assume another person as a means for himself.

2. No evil of neighbor can be intended or chosen by another, but only permitted for a just cause, so that all evils of another which follow, as effects, upon someone's voluntary action, can be excused either in no way or only by the principle of double effect.

3. A conflict of rights, as it is called, cannot arise except concerning rights over a thing and alienable goods, which can be possessed by several and can pass from one person to another.

These things, as it were, dominate the whole present argument.

Yet another perpetual principle, already demonstrated before, remains: no injury is done to one consenting.

The division of personal injuries is from the object. Some injuries touch immaterial goods: supernatural grace, truth, the use of reason, honor, reputation; others harm the body.

I. What Injuries Are To Be Considered. An injury inflicted upon goods can be more damnifying or lucratively injurious; it can be committed secretly or with force applied; the thing which is the object of the injury can be sacred or profane. Hence various characters of injury are to be distinguished juridically, for example as regards reserved cases, which nevertheless, as injuries, are of the same moral species.

It is manifest that personal injuries (as in robbery), reasons of sacrilege, or scandal can accede.

Juridically, theft is the hidden taking away of another's thing, while the owner is reasonably unwilling. Hidden, i. e. without force; of another's thing: taken away at least according to law; unwilling: as regards the substance; reasonably, i. e. with all circumstances weighed, the owner or the one having the right being unwilling.

He does not steal who, in extreme necessity, for himself or for another takes as much as is necessary; or, in quasi-extreme necessity, as much as the other would have to give from charity; or in grave necessity, he who, after a fruitless petition, has taken some modest thing.

Nor does he steal who, using hidden compensation, without the debtor knowing, takes away another's thing, but one owed to himself. The debt must be of commutative justice, sufficiently certain that it would be assigned to the creditor by a judge. There is need of moderate difficulty in obtaining the thing otherwise, lest the invasion of another's thing be condemnable as a light injury; and care must be taken that the compensation not be damaging to the debtor.

Charity moreover commands that the damage be avoided which another, for example a servant who would be accused of theft, would suffer.

II. Gravity. Theft by its genus is grave, as contrary to charity among men. Yet light matter brings it about that the injury is indicated as morally imperfect. Therefore that the injury be light, it is necessary that at the same time: a) it bring no grave privation to the injured owner. Matter is estimated as relatively grave which deprives someone of a seventh part of weekly income, in such a way, however, that for him who has no family to support, the quantity can be doubled. But matter modest in the aspect of theft can, as damnifying, become grave, as if it takes away a necessary instrument of work; - b) nor is the thing taken away in itself, i. e. in such a defined society, of universally notable utility; - c) nor is the injury apt to have a grave repercussion upon common security. By the two latter considerations absolutely grave matter is defined. Before the war, by a perhaps more benign opinion, this was estimated at one hundred lire or coins of similar common use (100 marks, pesetas, shillings, l., dollars, florins). Although now, in regions where paper money alone is already used, this is rather distant from the metallic money to which before the war it was equivalent, nevertheless the third consideration seems to prohibit us from estimating the grave quantity according to the value of gold money. Wherefore we would not think that the absolutely grave quantity can be increased beyond double or triple, even if the prices of most things are more than tripled, and we judge that it must be estimated at about 100 lire, not however reprehending those who think that it should be increased, for example, by half.

Consideration of absolutely grave matter comes into use when there is question of physical or moral persons whose daily income is represented by an absolutely grave quantity, or by half of that sum, where there is no burden of family.

A more benign estimation of matter is permitted: a) on account of personal or real considerations which render the injured person less unwilling; b) on account of the mode of injustice, which, creating difficulty, would lessen the danger of many abuses. Thus, on account of the former considerations, a greater quantity is required in exposed things, in things which the owner wholly neglects, and in thefts of connected persons. Wherefore they admit that for a wife and children of the family the customary matter can be increased at least double, but for a religious, if there is question of the things of the monastery, at least by half. Poor persons who, for their own uses, gather wood in forests, sin more lightly, provided they do not harm the forests; domestic servants also sin more lightly, not as regards money enclosed in a chest, but in other things in which the reason of frailty in part excuses the delict. On account of the other consideration, a greater quantity is required in small thefts which coalesce. Then, according to the cases, they permit that the matter be increased by half, or double, or that absolutely grave matter alone be considered.

III. Coalescence of Small Thefts. Moreover small thefts and modest damnifications coalesce: a) on account of the unity of the injured subject, unless, with the smallness of the thing or the interval (15, 30, 60 days) considered, the former things have almost fallen from memory when the delict is repeated. Rather slight small thefts in consumable foods almost do not coalesce; - b) on account of the moral unity of the action, even if the things pertain to several. Yet it is not established that mere damnifications done to several coalesce; - c) on account of the unity of intention of him who intends to steal a great value through several minute things; - d) on account of the unity of collection, if a great quantity is morally preserved; - e) on account of the unity of conspiracy of several.

Moreover grave sin is committed from the beginning, if the intention of stealing or damnifying gravely was then had; otherwise, when the guilty person notices that grave matter is being completed and does not conceive the proposal of restoring. He who, after grave matter has been completed, steals some light thing, either continues the same sin, or commits a new light one, according to the distinction or unity of the acts.

If a pious work is injured, relatively grave matter will have to be estimated from the detriment of the end.

IV. Restitution on Account of Real Injustice, at Least Material Injustice. 1. What possessors of another's thing must restore.

Principle. Unless they are excused by the privilege of a just law, possessors, as such, must satisfy real rights and execute the promises of agreements. If they have been formally unjust, they must repair damaging injuries. Hence:

a) A possessor in good faith can use the privileges of positive law; unless he has acquired the thing by usucapion, he must restore it in the state in which it is found, when another's right has been established. If he has usefully consumed the thing for himself, he will have to restore the utility received from the thing itself, at least so that the owner recover the value which the thing had when it was consumed. - Say the same about fruits received from the thing; yet often, from positive law, a possessor in good faith can make these his own by perception. - If you attend to opinions, he is compelled to repair no damages. If he sold the thing, since as seller he will have to provide eviction to the buyer; as possessor of the price, he is at least to be persuaded to restore to the owner deprived of his thing the price existing with him.

b) A possessor in bad faith is responsible for a fortuitous event, unless the thing would have perished by the same identical disaster, or at least at the same time, in the owner's possession; - he cannot use the privileges of positive law, except prescription which, independently of good faith, has a public cause; - he must restore the thing with all non-industrial increases; - concerning the thing consumed or alienated, he must make the owner indemnified; - indeed he must restore the value which the thing had when it was consumed; - he must repair all damages foreseen at least in a confused way; - he must provide eviction to the seller [source reads venditori; the legal context seems to require "buyer"].

Observe nevertheless that fruits of consumable things are not properly such.

Since many things often are not established, let the value of the thing be restored as it was when consumed, with compensation of use added, and, if the thing was consumable, with modest interest.

If several have successively possessed the thing: he who has it or destroyed it owes the thing first; the robber succeeds; each one first owes the fruits which he has received; each one owes damages (in solidum or separately) with which he has cooperated.

Necessary or economically useful expenses can be deducted from the quantity to be restored.

c) A possessor in doubtful faith must investigate the truth from justice with that care which agrees with the importance of the thing, the degree of doubt, and the hope of success.

Once inquiry has been made, he must satisfy the certain right of others, according to the rules of a possessor in good or bad faith, according to the case. If the certain right of no one appears, while the doubt remains, he need restore nothing; and if he himself, or his author, began to possess in good faith, he will be able to acquire the thing by usucapion according to the path of positive law. - But he who by his negligence has been the cause why the thing cannot be restored to the owner, which he can occupy only as belonging to no one, will have to destine it to common utility.

He who, doubting concerning his own right, has deprived a possessor who is not in bad faith of his possession, must be charged with certain injustice. And in doubt we are prohibited from making the condition of him who has the right worse. Nor are real fruits or connected gains acquired by a possessor in doubtful faith.

2. What damnifiers must restore. An unjust damnifier must restore as much as the damage which from his action has been unjustly inflicted.

Except damage not foreseen or, at least from presumption, condoned.

Wherefore, if merely a right to a thing or to hope has been injured, the quantity to be restored must be estimated from the value of the hope; in the absence of a better computation, let it be estimated at half the thing.

Fruits are to be restored, with expenses deducted. Yet it will be enough to restore a thing of modest value and for which another is easily substituted.

On account of presumed condonation, a modest alms extorted by fraud is not to be restored. Great liberality must be restored at least to true poor persons.

77. Preliminary Note. The unjust taking away of a thing is either simple or qualified. In the first sense it is the same as theft. In the other sense there is added a certain quality changing the species. Qualities of this kind are two: that of a sacred thing and that of force employed in the unjust taking away. Therefore there are three species of unjust taking away, namely simple theft, real sacrilege, and rapine. It will be better to discuss sacrilege below, when local and personal sacrilege also will be treated. - Ancient authors, besides the qualified thefts just enumerated, assigned from Roman law certain others, namely 1. peculate, by which someone steals something from public goods or converts it to his own private uses; 2. plagium, by which someone abducts a man, whether free or slave, into servitude; 3. cattle-lifting, by which someone steals cattle in pastures. - All these indeed have only historical value; in confessional practice judgment must be made about them in the same way as about simple theft. Nevertheless some things will be said specially below, n. 84, concerning peculate or concerning thefts in public things.

Rapine is the unjust taking away of another's thing while the owner is present and unwilling, upon whom grave violence or fear is inflicted. Therefore rapine includes a twofold injustice: one real, the other personal; for another's thing is unjustly taken away, which constitutes real injustice; besides, by fear or violence a most grave injury is inflicted upon the person of the present owner, which constitutes personal injustice. Whence it is clear that rapine is a much graver sin than simple theft. Consequently it is also punished by civil tribunals much more gravely than theft. But rapine is not only a graver sin than theft, but is also specifically distinguished from theft, because it includes an injustice distinct in species.⁷ But with respect to the restitution of goods carried off by rapine, the same things are valid which will be said below, n. 80 sqq., concerning the restitution of goods taken away by theft.

For the sake of clarity, all things that must be said in this chapter we divide into three articles: 1. on the nature and gravity of theft in general; 2. on certain thefts in particular; 3. on causes excusing the taking away of another's thing.

⁷ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 66, a. 4 and 9.

91. Definition. Unjust damaging is an action by which someone causes damage to another, without himself taking material profit from it. Therefore the damager causes damage to another and is not himself enriched; but the thief causes damage to another and is himself enriched. Hence, e.g., he who burns another's garment is a damager; but he who takes another's garment away for himself is a thief. Other things being equal, damaging is usually a graver sin than theft, because it often proceeds from hatred of neighbor, whereas theft is usually caused by disordered concupiscence of money, or by the neediness of the one stealing, and by other motives which are not as gravely sinful as hatred of neighbor.

902. Lesion of another's right happens through injury, both material and formal, as we said in n. 722. - Concerning formal injury we shall now treat.

Moreover, formal injury is twofold: 1. lucrative, which happens, for example, through theft, through unjust usurpation, and is called generically unjust acceptance of another's thing; - 2. non-lucrative, which is inflicted upon one's neighbor without advantage of the one inflicting, for example through fire, slaughter, and is damaging strictly so called. Concerning these in two chapters.

St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 66; St. Alphonsus, III, 518-546; ed. G., II, p. 27 seq.; H. Ap., X, n. 14-34; Lugo, disp. 16; Lessius, l. 2, c. 12; Sporer-Bierbaum, tr. V, n. 779; Lehmkuhl, I, 1109; Noldin, II, n. 414; Aertnys, l. III, n. 285; Tanquerey, II, n. 431; Berardi, Theol. mor., III, n. 242.

There must be treated: 1. concerning the nature and gravity of theft in general; - 2. concerning certain thefts in particular; - 3. concerning causes excusing from the delict of theft.

903. Definition. Theft is: the carrying away of another's thing, while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

It is said 1. Carrying away of another's thing, namely with the mind of having it as one's own. Hence he does not commit theft who takes away a thing by jest, or on account of the good or advantage of the owner; for example wine lest he become drunk, a heretical book lest he read it. - 2. Owner, under which name comes he to whom any strict right whatever belongs, for example the right of usufruct, of deposit. - 3. Reasonably unwilling, for if the owner is presumed to consent, or if he cannot, by force of right, dissent (for example when a thing is taken away by title of necessity or compensation), the carrying away of another's thing is not theft.

904. Principles. I. Theft is from its genus a mortal sin. This is certain from 1 Cor., 6, 10: Neither thieves ... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God. The reason is that by theft commutative justice is injured, which of itself obliges under grave matter. Add that, if men everywhere stole from one another, human society would perish, as the Angelic Doctor observes (l.c., a. 6). - Theft nevertheless admits smallness of matter.

905. II. Grave matter of theft must be determined from the gravity of the damage that through it is inflicted upon one's neighbor. Thus commonly, from the Rule of the Angelic Doctor (2. 2, q. 73, a. 3): "Sins that are committed against one's neighbor are to be weighed of themselves according to the harms that are inflicted upon one's neighbor; because from this they have the character of fault" (cf. n. 337, II).

Hence: a) The matter must be measured relatively, namely so that attention is given to the various conditions of men, places, and times, and to the varied value of money; for the end of the right of property for a private person (namely that he enjoy life in peace) can be more or less impeded and injured. - b) Some absolutely grave matter must also be determined, that is, matter that never, without grave fault, can be stolen even from the very richest; this is required by the end of the right of property as regards society: otherwise the greed of thieves would grow excessively, and society itself would certainly suffer grave damage. For the crowd scarcely attends to venial sins.

906. On this account the following Rules are established:

Rule 1. Matter is judged relatively grave when it would suffice for the injured person according to his condition for daily sustenance of himself and his family.

Therefore, with consideration given to the present value of money (which is at least twice lower than in the time of St. Alphonsus), and with attention given to the common estimate of more recent theologians (whose opinions here become intrinsically more probable), we judge that the following grades can be established, as a general norm in the principal places of Europe:

a) With respect to beggars, grave matter would be the value of one franc, or 20 asses; and less, if some poor person gains less by his daily begging. - b) With respect to ditch-diggers and similar workers, about 2-5 francs. - c) But with respect to craftsmen and merchants of slender fortune, 4-8 francs. - d) With respect to the moderately rich, or those who live from their own revenues, 8-10 francs. - e) But with respect to the absolutely rich, for example with respect to merchants sufficiently wealthy, 10-20 francs. - f) With respect to magnates, 30 francs and above.

In doubt, for example if you do not know to whom the damage was done, theft of 8-10 francs is reputed grave; because the damage is presumed to have been inflicted on one moderately rich. - Thus today commonly. Cf. Gousset, Theol. mor., I, 980; Crolly, III, n. 272; Konings, n. 695; Aertnys, l. III, n. 285.

Rule 2. Absolutely grave matter is that which, of itself and independently from the damage that the owner suffers, is commonly reputed to have notable utility or value.

Hence St. Alphonsus (III, 528) assigned as grave, with respect to kings, a sum exceeding 2 aurei, or about 10 francs. But today, with circumstances changed, 30-40 francs seem to be assigned, or even more, in places where the value of money is lower. Thus for England 1 1/2-2 golden pounds, in North America 7-10 dollars, can be named absolutely grave matter.

Note. 1. The relatively grave matter indicated above regards of itself theft that is committed by one action against one and the same person. As regards little thefts that inflict damage either upon one person by diverse actions, or upon diverse persons at one time, see n. 908.

2. In sacrilegious theft, if the thing, as regards physical species, is estimable by price, conclude in the same mode as for a profane thing; if otherwise (for example in sacred relics), consider its dignity, rarity, or attend to the special prohibition of the Church (cf. n. 583, 1342).

3. Theft with respect to a community (for example a commercial society), that it may be grave, ordinarily must reach the matter indicated for the absolutely rich. Others require absolutely grave matter. Except if the community is poor or small. - Say the same if a religious community is injured. Cf. St. Alphonsus, III, n. 528; IV, n. 25, with the notes added beneath.

907. In domestic thefts, i.e. of children, wives, and servants, more is required for grave matter than in thefts of strangers. - The reason is that, with respect to those persons, the owner is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling.

Often also he is unwilling more as regards the mode, i.e. that the thing is taken secretly; or as regards the end, for example that it is taken for playing, drinking, etc.; than as regards the substance of the thing stolen (H. Ap., l.c., n. 32).

1. A child under paternal power sins gravely by stealing a quantity twice greater than that which for strangers would constitute grave sin.

Nevertheless less is required if the father is tenacious, if the son has not yet reached adolescence, if the money is spent for dishonorable uses (III, n. 543).

Note. a) A son more often sins gravely by abuse of money than by thefts. b) Even if the theft was grave, the son is not held to restitution if he has already consumed it: because the father is presumed to condone it. Except if from the adjuncts something else is certain, or if co-heirs have been gravely injured (Conf. dir., X, 14). Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 76. - c) As regards members of a religious community, the rule established for children under paternal power cannot be applied: for their condition is not the same, whether with respect to their Superiors, who are not judged to condone as easily as parents, or with respect to the goods themselves, which will never be handed over to religious to possess. See IV, 24; Lugo, de Just., disp. 3, n. 172.

2. A wife sins gravely (in almost the same mode as a son), if she steals a notable sum, while the husband is unwilling, even from dowry or common goods; because although the half part looks to her, nevertheless the husband has the usufruct of that part.

Note, however, that one must act more mildly with wives if the things taken away are expended for the use of the family or relatives. See other things in n. 870.

3. Servants by stealing sin unequally: a) If they steal foods that are not accustomed to be carefully guarded, they sin only venially, provided they do not sell them or carry them outside, and provided they do not take them in extraordinary quantity, or things of extraordinary price. - b) But if they steal other things, for example money, clothing, linen things, etc., no greater quantity is required for grave sin than in thefts of strangers; because owners are not less unwilling toward them than toward others. Indeed, such thefts, by law, are to be punished with a greater penalty, on account of the perfidy that is committed against owners, who entrust domestic things to servants (cf. n. 705).⁰¹

908. Theft light of itself can in many ways become grave (cf. n. 905), but especially: 1. through intention of arriving at grave matter; - 2. through grave damage coming from a light theft; - 3. through conspiracy; - 4. through multiplication.

I. Through intention of arriving at grave matter the thief sins gravely, for example a merchant using false weights, as often as by stealing some very small thing he renews, at least implicitly, his purpose.⁰² The reason is that an external act takes its malice from the internal act, which is gravely sinful. - Say the same concerning him who steals a small quantity with the mind of taking away a notable quantity if he could. But he is held to restitution only under light matter, because the matter is not grave.

II. Through grave damage, which the thief foresaw would come from his light theft, he likewise sins gravely. Thus, for example, to take away a needle from a tailor can be grave matter, if he could not have another by which he would be able to procure a living for himself (H. Ap., X, 22).

He who takes away from an owner a small thing very dear to him, for example a rare and singular flower, first fruits from a tree destined for honoring some distinguished man, and at the same time foresees that the owner will be gravely afflicted from such a loss, sins gravely against charity; but against justice lightly, unless perhaps grave damage is foreseen as to follow from it.

III. Through conspiracy, little thefts are committed when several persons, by common counsel and consent, at the same time or successively, steal some small thing from one or several. - Now, little thefts of this kind are grave sins if, taken together, they constitute matter either relatively or absolutely grave: for then the individual thieves truly and efficaciously cooperate in the whole damage.

We said: by common counsel, because if individuals act independently of one another, whether they were ignorant of, or knew, the damage inflicted by others, then none of them is the cause of the whole grave damage (III, 535 seqq.).

If several, moved by mutual example, commit light thefts, the individuals sin against charity by reason of scandal (and indeed they sin gravely if the total damage is grave, and they could easily have impeded it); but more probably they are not held to restitution solidarily as regards the whole; because example is not a cause directly influencing another's damage, but only an occasion (cf. n. 949, 2nd Cond., and 989). Nevertheless each one, as is clear, is held as regards his own part (III, 537; II, 45).

IV. Through multiplication, light thefts can coalesce into grave matter and induce a grave obligation of restoring.

Light thefts can coalesce physically or morally. Physically, if the things are preserved, so that the heap becomes grave matter. Morally, if the things are indeed consumed, but the thefts are repeated within a brief interval of time. For small little thefts ordinarily an interval of 15-30 days, for greater little thefts an interpolation of two months, prevents the little thefts from coalescing morally (III, 530).

The assertion is proved. 1. It is certain from the thirty-eighth proposition condemned by Innocent XI. - 2. As regards little thefts physically coalescing (whether they injure one or several), there can be a physical union, one heap, from which the thief is enriched unjustly and beyond measure. - As regards little thefts morally coalescing, there is something one in the genus of morals, from which notable damage can arise for a private person, or, if diverse persons have been injured, notable damage for the community and right order. Lugo, l.c., n. 37.

Note. The matter required in small thefts, that it become grave, is not always the same: 1. If they happen to the same person at diverse times, or to diverse persons (if they are few) at the same time, the matter is grave if it exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - 2. If they happen to a few diverse persons by diverse occasions, the matter is judged of itself grave if it is twice greater than the sum commonly required for grave theft. - 3. Finally, if they happen to diverse persons in a great number, absolutely grave matter is required, or twice greater than absolutely grave, according as the thefts were committed once or by diverse occasions (III, 530). Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 1115.

909. It is asked: Whether he sins gravely who, after grave matter has been completed, steals still some other light thing?

Resp. It is disputed. The more probable opinion, however, denies, unless, an interruption having been made, for example by the will of restoring, the thief reaches, or intends to reach, another new grave quantity. The reason is that the little theft with respect to taking is certainly light; but with respect to detention it seems to constitute one sin with the preceding: for sin is not multiplied when the purpose of not restoring is renewed or confirmed, but only when it is morally interrupted, as we said in the treatise on Sins (n. 328, Rule 3). Cf. III, 538.

910. From these things you will resolve: 1. Tailors, and their servants, sin gravely against justice, where they reach grave matter, by retaining for themselves or selling fragments of cloth still useful to the owners, which remain over. - Except if somewhere

a custom flourishes that less is paid, and the fragments remain to the tailors; or if it is certain that wealthy owners do not wish fragments to be restored to themselves, or care little about them.

2. Those who dig coal are prohibited from carrying it away for their own use unless a certain price has been paid. - Nevertheless, those who sometimes carry away coals necessary for their family, although they are to be reproved, do not seem to be compelled to restitution; for in mines there is so great an abundance of coals that owners are scarcely to be judged altogether unwilling, and ordinarily they do not employ solicitude to detect thieves of this kind. - It must be said otherwise concerning those who frequently do this, or take away a great quantity of coals deposited on the banks of rivers or elsewhere (Konings, 703, 8).

3. Those who cut wood in the forests of their own community (or neighboring community) do not sin, nor are they held to restitution, unless they make great destruction with damage to the community; because a law strictly prohibiting every cutting of wood is judged to be penal: hence only the penalty is to be paid, and indeed after the sentence of a judge. - But otherwise in the forests of private persons, unless the matter concerns some rather small tree, or dried woods, for which the owner's consent can be presumed (III, 529, q. 1). - As regards the poor, it is certain that they can gather dried woods not only for burning, but also for selling, if they are in grave necessity. Cf. Gopfert, II, n. 148, where there are many things.

4. Those who eat fruits in the vineyards or orchards of others can easily be excused, provided they carry nothing outside, and the fruits are not rare and of great price. That this is probably licit is gathered from Deut., 23, 24 (likewise Luke, 6, 1), and from the law of charity which among Christians mitigates the rigor of right. - This at least is certain, "that in thefts of exposed things, as are fruits beside roads and woods in forests, that the theft be grave, greater matter is required" (H. Ap., X, 23). Yet we would add this: that the value of fruits, even exposed ones, in the common estimation, has much increased today.

911. Note. The confessor, in small thefts, indeed ought not to urge restitution, yet neither should he easily dissimulate, but according to the condition and capacity of persons should always enjoin some restitution, to be made to the creditors themselves or to the poor. For otherwise, when they are dismissed with impunity, penitents become more prone to little thefts of this kind, and they make a step toward greater ones (Lessius, l. 2, c. 12, n. 50; Ami du Cl., 1903, p. 97).

The carrying away of another's thing does not have the character of theft if the owner cannot be judged reasonably unwilling. But he cannot be judged reasonably unwilling if the neighbor takes the thing either by reason of necessity or by title of compensation. - Hence two paragraphs.

912. Things to be noted beforehand. 1. One necessity is extreme or quasi-extreme, or gravest; another grave; and another common (recall the things said in n. 480, 3).

2. The right to life is prior to the right to property.

3. The rich person from charity alone is held in ordinary cases to provide for his neighbor: therefore he must give, not hide the things that the neighbor needs. - But from justice the rich person is held not to impede the poor person by violent means from using his right; if he has impeded him, he is liable to restitution.

4. Here it must be asked: when does the poor person use his right legitimately?

913. Principles. I. It is not licit to steal another's things in grave necessity, nor a fortiori in common necessity. The reason is that then the owners are reasonably unwilling; and otherwise an easy entrance would lie open to plunderings. It is confirmed from the thirty-sixth proposition condemned by Innocent XI. Except with Viva (Theses damn., prop. 36, n. 10), if from the adjuncts, for example from the piety of a wealthy owner, his consent is prudently presumed.

914. II. Anyone constituted in extreme necessity can steal another's thing, as much as suffices for freeing himself from such necessity. Thus commonly with St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 66, a. 7). - The reason is that the primary end for which God created things is the conservation of human life; hence the right of property must yield to the right to life (cf. n. 216). - The case is excepted in which the owner himself, by the taking away of his thing, would be reduced to equal necessity. For then the rule has force: "In an equal cause, the condition of the possessor is better"; and therefore the owner would be unwilling by right (III, 520, q. 3).

Hence it is inferred: 1. One constituted in extreme necessity is not held to seek the thing from the owner, if that thing in species is absolutely necessary to him; for then he has the right of vindicating it for himself.

2. If the thing that someone needs in such necessity is of great value, nevertheless, according to the truer opinion, he can vindicate it for himself; because he has the right of taking whatever is actually necessary for the conservation of his life. - Yet the rich person is not held to give that precious thing from justice, which does not impose the burden of providing for a neighbor; nor from charity, which does not oblige with so great a loss, as was said in n. 488, 2. - But from piety he would be held to give to a father or son; and from justice he is held not to impede positively the poor person from the use of his right (St. Alphonsus, l.c.).

We said: as much as suffices, etc. For thus the order of justice requires, which indeed uses its own right, but does not go beyond it.

Hence: a) If only the use of the thing suffices, for example of a horse for fleeing, when the necessity ceases there remains the obligation of restoring. - b) If the one in extreme need has elsewhere in reality or in probable hope something from which he can pay, he cannot take another's thing except with the burden of restitution: because necessity then does not require the thing to be received gratis when it can sufficiently be relieved by a thing received by loan or commodatum. - c) But if the one in extreme need has nothing elsewhere in reality or in hope, after he has consumed another's thing he is not held to restitution, even if he has come to a better condition. - The same must probably be said if the thing was stolen; because, if it had existed with the owner, the needy person could have taken and consumed it without obligation of restoring (III, 520, q. 4 and 5).

915. III. The same things are valid for him who is in gravest or quasi-extreme necessity. For this necessity is equated with extreme necessity. In such necessity someone can provide for himself from another's goods through ordinary means, but not through exquisite and extraordinary means. Thus St. Alphonsus (III, 520) and others commonly.

But such gravest necessity is judged to exist when someone is in probable danger of undergoing death, for example from assassins, unless he hand over such a sum of money; or of losing some principal member, say an eye; or of falling into perpetual captivity, or into perpetual illness, or of incurring infamy. For it is not necessary that evils of this kind actually be inflicted; it suffices that they threaten proximately and morally certainly, indeed that a certainly probable danger of them threaten.

It is asked: Whether it is licit to steal another's thing in order to come to the aid of the extreme necessity of one's neighbor?

Resp. affirmatively: the reason is that then you bear the role of one showing indulgence and you show that you love your neighbor as yourself (St. Thomas, l.c., ad 3). Indeed piety and, grave inconvenience being excluded, charity itself can sometimes obligate you to this. - "But if you could have bestowed your own thing, and you gave another's, it seems that you are held to restitution; because you could not determine another's thing when your own was at hand." Thus St. Alphonsus, II, n. 33. Cf. the things said in n. 489, q. 2.

Notion. Occult compensation is the act by which someone takes that which is owed to him, while the debtor is unaware.

916. Principle. Occult compensation, with certain conditions concurring, is just and licit. It is 1. just, because he who secretly compensates himself does injury to no one, but takes only what is his own; - 2. licit, because, with the conditions observed, the order also of legal justice and charity is observed (III, n. 521).

917. The conditions are: that commutative justice, legal justice, and charity remain uninjured.

1. Let commutative justice not be injured: a) Therefore let the debt be strict, certain, and demandable; for compensation would be unjust if the debt were either not strict, i.e. from charity or gratitude alone; or uncertain, i.e. only probable, because in doubt the condition of the possessor is better; or not yet demandable, because "he who has a term, owes nothing."⁰¹ - b) Let damage to the debtor be excluded, that is, let him not be exposed to the danger of paying again (or of living in erroneous conscience). This can be excluded, for example, by fictive condonation. - c) Let damage to a third party be avoided; hence do not take away a thing loaned or pledged.

2. Let legal justice not be injured: wherefore the creditor must first, if he can, demand in court, namely for preserving public order.

Nevertheless, if this is neglected, there will be no need of restitution, nor will there be grave sin; indeed not even light sin, if through the judicial way expenses, hatreds, or other grave inconveniences would have to be undergone.

3. Let charity not be injured: let precaution be taken lest one's neighbor receive detriment, for example lest someone undergo an unjust accusation and condemnation of theft, etc.; which nevertheless you are not held to avoid with your own great inconvenience (n. 949). Cf. H. Ap., X, 21; Lugo, disp. 16, n. 87.

Compensation can be made also in another species, if it cannot be made in the same; provided the debtor undergoes no detriment from deprivation of some determined thing, for example a horse, a precious thing, etc.

918. It is asked: Whether servants, workers, officials of the government can steal something to compensate their own labor, which they judge to be greater than the salary concerning which they agreed?

Resp. Negatively, generally speaking, as is clear from the thirty-seventh proposition condemned by Innocent XI. - The reason is that they would act against the pact by which they consented to the lesser price (III, 522-524).

We said generally, because (up to the lowest price) a servant, worker, etc., can compensate himself: 1. If he was compelled by necessity to consent to a notably unequal price. Yet except if the owner had already found others justly for the same small price, or if out of mercy alone he had taken on the servant who asked. - 2. If he increases the works from the will of the owner, whether express or tacit; because then the rule must be observed, namely that every worker is worthy of his wage. But otherwise, if he increases from his own choice; because then he is judged to condone his labor, to conciliate for himself the favor of the owner. - 3. If the owner is judged to consent to compensation, as, for example, can happen with drivers hired at a lower price; for since he knows that he will be defrauded by very many, he is not to be presumed to wish to deprive honest drivers of the due salary, because he guards himself against dishonest ones.

Note. 1. Let confessors not easily permit compensation, as a thing full of dangers. But indeed, to compensation already made, to which no condition required by commutative justice was lacking, it is licit to connive to this extent, that the penitent not be bound to restitution. - 2. What compensation is just can sometimes be left even to the judgment of the creditor, if namely he is God-fearing and prudent, and the danger of self-love is absent; which nevertheless will happen very rarely (Konings, n. 710; Aertnys, l. III, n. 298).

St. Alphonsus, III, n. 582-588; ed. G., II, p. 73 seqq.; H. Ap., X, n. 60; Aertnys, l. III, n. 341; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 1160; Genicot, I, n. 514; Noldin, II, n. 430; Tanquerey, II, n. 587; Berardi, Theol. mor., III, n. 305.

919. Notion. Unjust damaging, in the strict sense, is an act by which, through formal injury, damage is inflicted upon one's neighbor, without any advantage of the one inflicting (cf. n. 948 seqq.).

General Principles. I. Unjust damaging is a sin from its genus grave. The reason is clear. Hence, no otherwise than theft, it admits smallness of matter that excuses from grave sin (cf. n. 904).

II. Formal damaging does not extend more broadly than foresight, at least confused, of the damage inflicted itself. The reason is clear from the things said in n. 724.

This species of injury will bring with itself very many things to be investigated and weighed in Dissertation III, where we shall treat of restitution. - In this place it will be enough to have discussed three cases in which injury is accustomed to appear doubtful, namely: 1. concerning a thing abandoned or put away in danger; - 2. concerning privation of a hoped-for thing, or concerning one impeding the obtaining of a just good; - 3. concerning unjust distribution of offices.

920. QUAER. 1. Whether you ought to prefer another's endangered thing, deposited with you or in any way committed to you, to your own thing, so that you are held concerning the damage if you have not preferred it?

Resp. Dist.: the contract or act by force of which you have another's thing either yields to your utility alone, or to the utility of the other alone, or to the utility of both. - If the first, for example if you have received the thing by commodatum, i.e. so that you may use it, you must prefer it to your own; unless yours is more precious, but in this case you are held to make the owner of the other thing unharmed, because the thing perished for your favor alone. - If the second, for example if you have received the thing by deposit, it must be subdistinguished: a) if the other thing is far more precious, you must preserve it; nevertheless, you can demand compensation of the whole damage that you have suffered in preserving it. - b) If your thing is almost equally precious, according to some you are not held to prefer another's thing to your own, since you retain this for the utility of the other alone; according to others, you are obligated to prefer the thing of another, since with respect to that thing the reason of justice intervenes, but with respect to your own, the reason of charity alone. - If the third, for example if as a broker you have been hired at a price to sell another's thing, there are those who think that, other things being equal, you can prefer your own thing; because charity does not oblige that in equal necessity you prefer another's thing to your own; but others judge that some compensation is owed to the other party, which is more equitable

seems more equitable. Here the Codes of commerce are to be consulted (III, 752; Lessius, l. 2, c. 7, n. 27).

QUAER. 2. Whether he is guilty of unjust damage who again commits another's thing, which he has withdrawn from danger, to the same danger, in which it afterward perishes?

Resp. Some, very probably, affirm, because that better condition which another's thing had obtained has become a certain quasi-accession for the advantage of the owner. Others, no less probably, and perhaps more probably, deny, whenever the avoidance of one's own damage requires that the thing be put back in its own place; for thus no injury is done, because no one is held to preserve the thing for the owner with his own damage.

Therefore, if you have taken away another's thing found in the road, and afterward you know that you will suffer damage if you retain it, you can rightly put it back in the same place and permit another to carry it away, although by doing this you put the thing into a worse state; for then the taking by the thief occurs from his own malice, and your cooperation is only permissive of another's detriment, which you are not held to avoid with your own damage (III, 569).

STATE OF THE QUESTION. It is asked whether he is an unjust damager who impedes another from obtaining a just good. For a man can be damaged not only in the goods which he actually possesses, but also in those which he hopes for, such as, for example, spiritual goods, whether supernatural or natural, and temporal goods of a benefice, alms, a legacy, etc.

NECESSARY DISTINCTIONS. 1. These goods which one's neighbor hopes for are often owed to him from justice, because concerning them he possesses a right in a thing or a right to a thing; sometimes also they depend upon the merely free will of those conferring them.

2. One's neighbor can be impeded, lest he obtain hoped-for goods, in many ways: a) directly or indirectly, according as an impediment is placed with the intention or with the mere foresight of inflicting damage; b) efficaciously or not efficaciously, according as the action of impeding obtains in itself a greater or lesser force; c) by just or unjust means, according as the means employed in themselves tend against something to which he has a right; for example, if someone impedes his neighbor by fraud, most importunate prayers, calumny, or force, he uses unjust means, because one's neighbor has a right to liberty in acting and to the preservation of reputation. But if someone has recourse to persuasion, counsel, or non-importunate prayers so that his neighbor may be turned away from obtaining the hoped-for good, there can be no question of injustice, since neither the liberty of the giver in willing and acting nor the reputation of the one aspiring to the benefice is injured.

Note. Those means must be directed against the neighbor; but if they are directed against the benevolent giver of the hoped-for good, then they will be formally unjust toward the one hoping for the benefit only if they directly redound to his damage; for example, if the benefactor is struck with fear, lest he ever confer a benefit on anyone.

921. PRINCIPLES. I. To impede another efficaciously, even by non-violent means, from obtaining a good owed to him from justice is unjust damaging, whether it is done directly or indirectly, without a just cause. The reason: in this case it is verified that your action is the true cause of the damage inflicted on your neighbor. See what will be said in nn. 949 and 979 concerning an effectively unjust action and concerning unjust counsel.

From these things conclude: If someone without cause moves a father by prayers to this, that he deprive his son of a due inheritance, he is the author of the damage which the son suffers. - Generally, in whatever way truly efficacious impediments are set against the strict rights of a third party, there is injustice, which obliges to restitution.

II. To impede one's neighbor efficaciously from obtaining a good to be conferred from free will will be unjust damaging only then, if it is done by unjust means. The reason is that, as regards goods of this sort, another does not have a right, since they are to be conferred freely.

We said 1. It will be unjust damaging. But the magnitude of the damage to be repaired here must not be measured from the magnitude of the goods which were expected, but rather from the hope itself which the neighbor had. Therefore in practice such a damager will always be bound to less.

2. Only then ... if it is done by unjust means. There will be no unjust damaging if someone acts from hatred or vengeance; there will be only a lesion of charity.

Conclude from what has been said: a) He is not held to restitution who, although he does this from hatred, without deceit or force moves a testator not to leave an inheritance to a friend; who dissuades a Bishop from conferring on someone a simple benefice, for which a competition is not used; who by lies impedes the treasury from obtaining a sentence favorable to itself for juridic fault (III, 583, 588). Cf. Lehmkuhl, Cas. Consc., nn. 690-694; Ami du Cl., 1903, p. 297.

b) But he is held to restitution who calumniates a poor person, lest he obtain alms; a servant, lest he be admitted to service, etc. He is held, even if he only foresaw these inconveniences, provided the privation of the hoped-for good is to be ascribed to his calumny.

c) He is held to restitution who suppressed another's open letters, or retained them so long until he himself or others anticipated the writer in obtaining, in his place, the good which he expected. The same must more probably be said of him who, although he delivered the letters in due time, used the knowledge which he had acquired from them, so that he might anticipate or impede the writer (III, 585). See what is to be said in n. 1188.

III. To impede someone from averting the damage of one's neighbor is unjust damaging if it is done by unjust means, or if he who is impeded has been deputed by office to avert the damage. The reason for the first is clear from the preceding principle. The reason for the second is that, from the fact that he must avert the damage by office, the neighbor has a strict right to this, that you not turn him away, even by persuasion, from fulfilling his office.

Note. Here it is always supposed that the means employed place an efficacious impediment (cf. n. 980).

It is asked. If someone impedes another, even by unjust means, from obtaining a good which cannot be accepted or conferred without sin, whether he must restore?

Resp. Negatively, provided the acceptance or conferral is sinful on the part of the thing, for example the donation is prodigal, the testamentary disposition is illicit. The reason is that, although there is sin in the fraud or calumny employed, nevertheless no new malice of injustice is joined to this by reason of the impediment placed, since the neighbor possesses neither a right to the good which he seeks, nor a right not to be impeded by any means whatever from obtaining this good. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 1162.

922. An unjust distributor of public offices injures principally distributive and legal justice, and subsequently commutative justice (cf. n. 400).

It is asked. Whether he who chooses an unworthy or less worthy person is held concerning the damage that follows?

1. With respect to the society: a) He who chooses an unworthy person is held concerning the damages which thence come upon the community and were foreseen. The reason is that, by force of a quasi-contract between himself and the society, and often by force of the stipend which he receives, there lies upon him an obligation from justice to procure the good of society, and consequently not to choose an unworthy person. - b) He who chooses a worthy person, while passing over a more worthy one, more probably is held to nothing toward society, even if perhaps he has sinned gravely. The reason is that the society is not judged to bind electors by so rigorous a title, namely by the title of strict justice, to choose the more worthy (III, 585; IV, 106).

2. With respect to those to be chosen: a) More probably he is held to nothing toward the worthy or more worthy person passed over, if no competition has been instituted. The reason is that he has violated no one's strict right. b) It must be said otherwise in the case of a competition, as is very commonly taught against some, whose opinion nevertheless St. Alphonsus does not dare to condemn as improbable (IV, 109; H. Ap., XIII, n. 37).

The reason for doubting is that public offices and benefices are instituted solely or principally for the common good; and therefore they are not conferred as prizes promised to those competing in a contest, which are instituted principally as rewards of merits. - A fuller discourse concerning these matters will be given in n. 2240. Cf. Noldin, II, 454.

Here only injuries in goods of fortune are to be treated, namely theft and its species. - For enough has been said concerning other injuries, namely in goods of the body, of honor, and of reputation, in the Treatise on the Fifth and Eighth Precepts of the Decalogue.

It must be treated 1° concerning the nature and gravity of theft; 2° concerning the causes on account of which theft ceases to be such.

693. Definition. - Theft, taken generically, is the taking away of another's thing while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

Division. - Theft is thus distinguished:

1° Theft simply, if it is done secretly. - 2° Robbery, if it is done while the owner is positively resisting (morally or physically). - 3° Sacrilege, if it is done concerning a sacred thing.

694. Principles. - I. Theft, by whatever name it is called, is a grave sin from its kind, because of itself it is gravely opposed both to charity and to justice, and in Sacred Scripture it is numbered among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of heaven. For thus the Apostle Paul says:¹ Neither thieves, ... nor the rapacious shall possess the kingdom of God.

II. Sacrilegious theft and robbery constitute a species of malice diverse from theft: the former because besides justice it violates religion; the latter because to the unjust taking away of another's thing it adds injury inflicted upon the person. But the other modes, or the other objects of theft, do not change the species, because through them the nature of the damaging is not changed.

695. Questions. - A. Concerning theft grave of itself. - Query 1° What matter is judged grave in thefts of outsiders?

Resp. 1° According to the common opinion, this matter is not to be looked at absolutely in itself, but relatively to the various conditions and necessities of men, so that a graver matter is required for grave sin in theft against a rich man than against a poor man. The reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, depends especially upon the greater or lesser privation, pain, and reluctance of the will which he from whom it is stolen suffers; but now no one fails to see that the same matter causes sadness now light, now grave, according as the owner from whom it is taken is rich or poor. - Thus commonly with S. Alph.² against some, who contend that matter, whether grave or light, must be looked at absolutely in itself, and that it consists in that which is required for the daily support of an honorable man or of one moderately rich.

Yet some absolute matter must be determined, which it is never licit to pass beyond without grave fault; otherwise, if complete proportion had to be preserved among all conditions, surely the greatest quantity would be required for grave matter when someone steals from a very rich man. But this would certainly yield to the harm of society. - Hence:

Resp. 2° According to S. Alph.,¹ and with attention to the circumstances of this region and of our times, it will be grave approximately - relatively 1) to beggars, $0.50, and less if some poor man would not collect so much daily; 2) to diggers and similar laborers, $1.00; to artisans and merchants of slender fortune, $1.25; 3) to those moderately rich or living from their own incomes, $2.00, but less if from their own they live wretchedly; but relatively to the absolutely rich, for example merchants sufficiently wealthy, $2.50 or $3.00; 4) to a wealthy community, $5.00, or even, if it is very wealthy, $7.50; 5) to the very rich, $10.00, which sum indeed can be judged absolutely grave.

In practical doubt, generally that which does not reach $2.50 or $3.00 is not to be reputed grave.

Resp. 3° The value of a sacred thing, as to the physical species estimable by price, for example of a chalice, is the same as that of a profane thing; otherwise, as in Relics, its dignity and rarity must be considered,² or the special prohibition of the Church (n. 1730).

696. • Query 2° What matter is required, so that thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

Resp. 1° It is certain that in thefts of a wife and of children more is required than in thefts of outsiders; because the father of the family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling, in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as to the mode (that it is taken secretly) than as to the substance;³ but no general rule can be assigned. For the matter must generally be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions. Thus S. Alph.⁴ with others resolves that a son does not sin gravely who steals two or three scuta from a rich father (today and among us, I think, he would say $10 or 15).

Resp. 2° For servants it depends also upon the greater or lesser liberality of the masters, upon the quality or situation of the thing stolen, for example if it is edible or not, guarded or open, etc. According to the common opinion, through small thefts committed by servants in foods and edible things which are not usually kept carefully, generally one does not arrive at mortal sin, provided these things are not sold or carried out of the house, or taken in extraordinary quantity, or are of extraordinary price.¹ But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, a greater quantity is not required for grave sin, because masters then are not less unwilling toward them than toward others.

Query 3° Must the circumstance be explained by a son, that he stole from his father?

Resp. Negatively, because theft regularly is not directly and gravely opposed to piety, as for example hatred is. I say: regularly; for it is otherwise if the father would suffer much from it concerning his state. Scav.²

697. Questions. - B. Concerning theft grave by accident. - Query 4° In how many ways does theft of matter light of itself become grave by accident?

Resp. 1° By the intention of arriving at grave matter (n. 703. 2°); 2° by conspiracy, where many conspire among themselves and the little thefts of individuals gathered together constitute grave matter (n. 701. 702); 3° on account of grave damage coming to the owner from a light theft (n. 703. 3°); 4° by multiplication, concerning which in the questions n. 697-700.

Query 5° Do multiplied small thefts suffice to constitute grave matter?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively - whether it is a question of thefts committed against the same person, because united they can easily bring grave damage upon the owner; or it is a question of thefts committed to the damage of diverse persons, because, if not to individuals taken singly, certainly they bring grave damage to the community. Cf. prop. 38 condemned by Pius V.

Resp. 2° By multiplication they coalesce into grave matter either physically or morally. Physically, if they are conserved and the heap becomes grave; for then another's property is retained in a notable quantity. Morally, if indeed they are consumed, but between them there intervenes an interval which is morally or proportionately estimated as brief. - S. Alph.,³ Lugo.⁴

698. • Query 6° Do small thefts also coalesce if a great interval is placed between them?

Resp. Negatively, according to the more common opinion. The reason is that, when a great interval has been posited, small thefts are not judged to be morally united by the common estimation of men, nor therefore do they constitute one object in the genus of morals. Moreover, then grave damage inflicted upon the owner does not appear, since he can scarcely perceive it; and thus he is not judged gravely unwilling.²

Query 7° When is the interval judged great?

Resp. To S. Alphonsus³ the opinion teaching that thefts no longer coalesce beyond the space of two months is more pleasing, even if they were approaching matter as it were grave. But if it is a question of little thefts whose matter each time is very small, he considers a month or even a fortnight as a great interval. - Except, as I said above n. 697. q. 4° and 5°, if an accumulation is made or there is the intention of arriving at a grave sum.⁴

699. • Query 8° When does matter become grave in small thefts?

Resp. 1° If small thefts are made from the same person at diverse times, or by diverse persons at the same time, the matter will be grave when this exceeds by half the sum commonly required for grave theft. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° If small thefts are made from diverse persons, and discontinuously, grave matter of itself will be judged present when it is double the sum commonly required for grave theft.⁴

Query 9° Does retraction of the will prevent following little thefts from being united with preceding ones?

Resp. 1° Affirmatively, if the retraction was efficacious, that is, if in fact the things previously taken have been restored, because once separated they now no longer exist here and now. - Thus commonly.

Resp. 2° Again affirmatively, if the subsequent theft were done from some particular motive; for then it would not seem efficaciously to destroy the preceding will of restoring. Or even if the thief expressly and seriously proposes again at the same time to restore the things previously stolen; which, nevertheless, can scarcely be admitted in practice, since one who seriously proposes restitution does not here and now repeat thefts. - Negatively, however, where this will seems in some way to be revoked by a new theft; for in this case nothing prevents a notable sum from being retained, and the thefts coalescing into one.

700. • Query 10° Does he sin gravely who, after grave matter has been completed, still steals some light thing?

Resp. It is disputed. An opinion, very probable, denies it, the intention of arriving at a new grave sum being set aside. The reason is that that little theft does not seem to be referred to the grave sum already completed, but rather to a new one, which the thief then begins and pursues. - Thus S. Alph.¹

701. • Query 11° Does he sin gravely who by a light theft completes grave matter begun by others with the same person?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if he did not know that little thefts had been committed by others, because he is not conscious of grave damage inflicted upon the owner. - Thus all.

Resp. 2° Negatively, at least more probably, even if he knew that nearly grave damage had been perpetrated by others, nevertheless with the case of conspiracy set aside. The reason is that this man taking a little thing neither is per se the cause of grave harm, nor is he the cause that the others accepted other things. Therefore the grave damage which the owner suffers ought in no way to be imputed to him. - Nor say that such a thief sins as gravely as a murderer inflicting death by a light blow upon a man already struck by others with innumerable light wounds; for death is owed to this last wound, which otherwise would not have followed. But the matter is otherwise in the case of theft; for by the last little theft no notable calamity or damaging is added. - Lugo,² and others commonly, against Bonacina and others.

702. • Query 12° If many, without common counsel but by example, commit light thefts, so that the total damage is grave, do individuals sin gravely?

Resp. More probably negatively by reason of justice, although they can sin against charity. The reason is that example is not a per se cause, but only an occasional cause, of the damage. - Thus S. Alph.³ and others more commonly against some.

703. Resolutions. - 1° "Probably," says S. Alphonsus,¹ "those who would eat fruits in others' vineyards" or orchards, "provided they are not rare and of great price, can be excused at least from grave sin, if they do not carry them out in great quantity; for in this kind of things, which are too exposed, a greater quantity is required for constituting grave matter."

2° If a thief, intending to arrive by little thefts at a grave sum, renews this intention as often as he steals, as often as he steals he sins gravely. The reason is that the external act derives its malice from the internal act, which is gravely sinful.² Say the same of him who steals a small quantity with the intention of taking a notable quantity. Recall what was said n. 225. 8°. a).

3° He who takes from an owner a trifling thing very dear to him, for example a rare and singular flower, the first fruits from a tree destined to honor some special man, and foresees at the same time that the owner is to be gravely afflicted by such a loss, sins gravely against charity; but against justice lightly, unless perhaps grave damage seems likely to follow from it.

4° Merchants using false weights sin gravely, although each time they defraud in small matter; because they intend to arrive at grave matter, or certainly know that they will arrive at it.

5° Tailors and their servants sin lethally against justice, when by retaining for themselves or selling fragments of cloth which remain over, otherwise still useful to the owners, they have arrived at grave matter. Except unless in some place a custom prevails that less be paid and the fragments remain to the tailors; or unless it is established that wealthy owners do not wish the fragments to be restored to them, or care little about them.

6° They must be accused of theft who by deceitful beggary (not those who truly beg with exaggeration), or by going about with fabricated reasons, draw money from citizens. Yet those are not to be condemned who have a certain modest amount of money placed in a savings bank, in order to provide for old age and infirmity, lest they be forced to withdraw into a public poorhouse, or so that funeral expenses may be paid, meanwhile collecting alms from private persons whoever they may be, or from pious societies.

collecting alms, so that provision may be made for daily necessities. Indeed, that little money which they keep saved would shortly be spent, and they themselves would be a burden either to pious societies or to hospices. It must be said otherwise if they have money which is sufficient for the support of life. These things likewise can be understood of those who deposit a modest sum of money with a friend, when they betake themselves to a hospice, so that, if afterward it happens that they leave it, they may not lack every aid, or, if they die, their bodies may be committed to burial.¹

7° Concerning youths educated gratis in seminaries, or at the expense of private persons, with that hope that they will serve the ecclesiastical ministry, it must be held that they commit fraud if they enter seminaries without the intention of dedicating themselves to sacred duties, and with this purpose only, that they may be imbued with letters or indulge leisure; and therefore that they are bound to repair the damage. It is not necessary, however, that they be altogether certain of their vocation; for holy leisure is conceded to them for this reason, that they may have more mature counsel concerning so great an undertaking. But they ought neither rashly to enter nor to remain in sacred buildings after they have cast off hope and purpose. But if by their own fault they bring it about that they are held unworthy, they do not seem for that reason bound to make restitution, whenever the mind of defrauding was lacking; for donors are not to be judged to have placed the condition of restitution on account of sluggishness or other customary faults.²

8° Those who dig out coals are prohibited from carrying them away for their own use, unless a certain price has been paid; nevertheless, from the convenience of the thing, it easily happens that each one takes the coals necessary for his family. That custom indeed must be reprehended, but restitution does not seem to be exacted, since there is so great an abundance of coals there, and the owners are scarcely to be judged altogether unwilling; for they do not use solicitude to detect thieves. Those who carry away some coals for their own use from the banks of canals and rivers, where coals are deposited from boats, sin, and indeed gravely if they take a great abundance; not so if a few, especially those which lie scattered here and there. Moreover those who have been accustomed through the whole winter, or another long time, thus to take coals for themselves are guilty of grave theft, and ought to make satisfaction according to an equitable estimation of the damage. But often it is very difficult to send the price safely to the owners. The same must be said concerning those collecting wood which another cut for his own use, or carrying away what another procured for himself; for it is a grave fault of theirs to take an abundance for themselves without the owner's permission.¹

A twofold cause is assigned: 1° necessity; 2° hidden compensation.

Necessity is one thing extreme, another grave, and another common. Extreme is called that in which life itself is endangered, or a most grave evil threatens; grave, however, that in which life is led very burdensomely; common, however, that in which poor beggars commonly are situated.

704. Principles. - I. A man can in the extreme necessity of himself or of his own use another's goods, as much as is sufficient for freeing himself from such necessity, supposing that other means licit of themselves and morally possible are not present. The reason is that the division of goods, in whatever way it has happened, cannot derogate from the natural right which belongs to each one, that he provide for himself while he labors under extreme necessity. Therefore in such a case all things become common; and so one taking another's thing in order to help himself takes a thing truly common, which he makes his own, as happened before the division of goods. Therefore he does not commit theft. - S. Thom.,² S. Alph.³

II. In order that someone may be able to steal another's things, grave necessity does not suffice, nor a fortiori common necessity; for in these circumstances owners are reasonably unwilling, and otherwise an easy entrance would lie open to plunderings. It is confirmed from Prop. 36 among those proscribed by Innocent XI, p. XVI.

705. Resolutions. - 1° It is not licit for a poor man placed in extreme necessity to take more than is necessary for himself.⁴ Hence if the use alone of the thing suffices, for example of a horse, when the necessity ceases the obligation of restoring remains.

2° If one extremely in need has elsewhere, in reality or in probable hope, whence he can pay, he cannot take another's thing except with the burden of restitution; because necessity does not demand that he be relieved by the ownership of a thing, who can sufficiently be relieved by a thing received as a loan for consumption or for use.¹

3° But one who in extreme poverty consumed another's thing is bound to nothing after the use of the thing, if he had no probable hope that he would ever be able to restore, even if afterward he comes to a better condition.²

4° The things which are said concerning extreme necessity can also be said concerning necessity quasi-extreme or most grave. But such necessity is judged to be present when someone is in probable danger of incurring death, of losing some principal member, of falling into perpetual captivity or infamy, or of undergoing a very hard penalty or a most grave or perpetual illness. For in these cases extreme necessity is already morally present.³

5° A rich man hiding his things, or using other industry, lest he succor a poor man, when the poor man's necessity has ceased, is not bound to restitution, because on the one hand the rich man is bound from charity only in this case; on the other hand necessity, even extreme, confers upon the poor man a right to the use of another's thing only so long as the necessity itself presses.⁴

6° But one who by force would impede a poor man from taking some thing for himself in such a case would sin against justice, as will be clear from the things to be said below, and would be bound to compensate the damages thereby coming to necessary heirs; but if none have come to these, when the necessity has ceased, and thus the poor man's right, the burden of restitution also ceases.⁵

706. Questions. - Query 1° Can someone steal the thing of another not only for succoring his own necessity, but also another's?

Resp. Affirmatively, with S. Thom.⁶ and others commonly. The reason is that then he in some way bears the place of the needy person, and shows that he loves his neighbor as himself. Except, however, if he could have given his own thing; in which case he seems bound to restitution, if he gave another's thing, because then he could not determine another's thing for fulfilling the precept of almsgiving when his own was at hand.¹

707. • Query 2° Can he be said to be situated in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity who is to be killed by robbers unless he hands over such a sum of money, or he upon whom perpetual or most grave captivity threatens, or another similar misfortune?

Resp. Not a few affirm with S. Alph.² and Lugo.³ The reason is that that necessity consists in a most grave or extreme danger which threatens when someone has been reduced to the greatest misery, or is just now about to die, not only from want of food, but from any other cause. Hence in these cases it is licit to provide for oneself from another's goods.

Query 3° In what necessity is it licit for a wife and children of the family to receive food from a husband or father who is a thief?

Preliminary note. a) The necessity of the wife or of the children of the family can be either extreme, and that either temporal or spiritual, as for example if daughters are exposed to danger of prostitution, or sons to injustices, unless they are nourished by the father who is a thief; or quasi-extreme, suppose grave danger either of an illness morally certainly mortal, or of an unjust, grave, and morally irreparable infamy; or grave, that is, such in which the things necessary for a justly acquired state would be lacking.

b) That from which the family is nourished will be either that very thing which has been taken by theft, or the same in species, for example money of the same value, or something else.

c) The thief will be able to restore from goods already justly acquired, or not.

d) The wife and children of the family can be nourished from their own goods or not; and likewise they earn something for the family or nothing at all. These things having been noted beforehand:

Resp. 1° If the family is not nourished from the thing stolen or from a thing the same in species, and nevertheless the thief can restore from goods already justly acquired, it licitly receives from him even those things which are not necessary either for life or for state. The reason is that then neither is another's thing received, nor is impotence of restitution induced in the thief from what is received. - Resolve the same, although the thief cannot restore from goods already justly acquired, and although wife and children spare their own goods, provided that a) by their labor they earn for the family as much as is furnished to them in food by the thief, and b) they are not nourished from the stolen thing itself or from a species the same as it. The reason is that by receiving what they earn they do not induce in the thief a greater impotence of restitution.

Resp. 2° In necessity, whether temporal or spiritual, and whether extreme or quasi-extreme, if they do not have their own things, they can receive, even from the stolen thing, everything which is required for relieving that necessity. This is clear from principle I. n. 704.

Resp. 3° In grave necessity they can receive that which is necessary for state, provided a) they cannot provide for themselves from their own goods (and indeed the wife, even if she could); b) they receive nothing from the stolen thing or from a species the same as it; c) the creditors of the thief are not situated in the same necessity. The reason is that grave necessity of oneself or of one's own excuses from restitution, as will be said below. - It is said: they receive nothing, etc. For from money which is the price of the sale of a stolen thing, or from a thing bought by stolen money (n. 960. q. 2°), or from coins or things belonging to others which the thief has mixed with his own in the way I said n. 673. b). 2), they can receive, since those things are the thief's.¹

Hidden compensation is the recovery of a thing owed to me through occupation of a thing of the debtor, done without this debtor's knowledge.

708. Principles. - I. Hidden compensation can sometimes be just and licit, if it does not lack the required conditions, that is, if no injury is done to the debtor, nor any disturbance of the order of right follows, nor of the Republic. But these three can be present. And 1° No injury is done to the debtor; for by hypothesis in such compensation you receive only that which is certainly yours, or what is owed to you from strict justice. - 2° There is no disturbance of the order of right, since it is supposed either that the judge cannot be approached, at least not without notable inconvenience, or that he cannot restore his right to the injured party. For that is not said to be omitted which would be sought in vain. - 3° There is no disturbance or damage of the Republic; for enough is provided for it by the cautions to be placed in the conditions. - Thus S. Alph.,¹ Lacroix,² etc.

709. • II. But the required conditions are the following: 1° That the debt be from justice, morally certain, demandable. From justice, not from charity alone or gratitude. - Certain; for in doubt the principle is valid: The condition of the possessor is better. Therefore in doubt compensation is illicit and unjust. - Demandable ("due").

2° That the debt cannot be recovered otherwise, at least not without grave inconvenience. For if the creditor can by mere petition or recourse to a judge obtain what is owed to him, by compensating himself he does injury to the public power, and therefore sins against legal justice (n. 712).

3° That the thing be taken in the same species, if it can be done. Otherwise the debtor's thing is exchanged without his consent, and therefore unjustly.

4° That it be done from a thing of the debtor. Otherwise it would be done with damage to a third party, as would happen if it were done from a thing deposited with the debtor or lent to him for use.

5° That damage to the debtor be guarded against, namely by taking care that the debtor or his heirs not be exposed to the danger of paying twice, if perhaps they are going to restore. Hence if that case is in some way foreseen, they must be warned in some manner, for example through a fictitious renunciation or condonation, etc. But if, after the compensation has been made, they restore, it will have to be restored to them again.³

710. Questions. - Query 1° Can servants, workers, officials of the government, municipality, etc., judging that the salary is below the work furnished by themselves, use hidden compensation?

Resp. Negatively, at least speaking generally, with the common opinion. It is established 1° from proposition 37 condemned by Innocent XI, p. XVI. 2° From reason; for they would act against the agreement, since they consented to the lesser price, and from elsewhere nothing is owed to them except the price concerning which agreement was made. Besides, if that were licit, the way would be opened to innumerable thefts; for servants would easily persuade themselves that wages are less than just, and thus no security would remain for masters. - The same must also be said, from parity of reason, concerning all workers, artisans, and merchants who would wish to recur to compensation under the pretext of the cheaper price for which they hired out their works or sold their wares.

I said: at least speaking generally; because a servant can compensate himself up to the lowest price. 1° If he is compelled by force or fear to consent to an unequal price. 2° If compelled by necessity he consented to it, provided nevertheless that the master would not have found other servants already justly, that is, within the limits of a just price, at least the lowest, at the same cheap price, or did not receive this one asking from mercy. 3° If unwillingly he is burdened with works not owed. 4° If the master is judged to consent to compensation, as for example can happen in the case of those who among us are called "horse-car conductors"; namely, it is supposed that by most masters those men are hired below the lowest price for this reason, that they know that they are to be defrauded by most, and that the masters are not willing (which besides they would will unreasonably) to deprive honest conductors of due salary because they protect themselves from dishonest ones. But in determining their salary, "conductors" should especially attend to the number of hours which they spend in the service of their masters, and to the salary which is given by the hour to workers of their condition. Meanwhile they must be exhorted to seek another trade, on account of the danger of injustice to which they expose themselves.

Query 2° At least can a servant who increases the works owed compensate himself?

Resp. 1° Negatively, if he acts thus by his own choice, because then he is judged to condone his work in order to conciliate the favor of the master to himself.

Resp. 2° Affirmatively, if he increases the works from the will of the master, whether express or tacit, because then the worker is judged worthy of his wage by right.¹ - But what compensation is just can sometimes be left also to the judgment of the servant, if he is fearful of God and prudent, and the danger of self-love is absent; which nevertheless will happen very rarely.²

711. • Query 3° Can he use hidden compensation who is condemned by a judge to pay a debt which he certainly did not contract, or to which he certainly has already made satisfaction?

Resp. Affirmatively, because the sentence of the judge is unjust, as being founded upon a false presumption of fact, and therefore cannot bind in conscience. For although one must always stand by the sentence of the judge in matter of law, unless it is a question of a law or sentence evidently unjust, it is otherwise, scandal being set aside, if the judge certainly errs concerning a fact which from error he thinks true. From another source, moreover, the judge does not have the faculty of transferring dominion; nor can one who has obtained a favorable sentence, even after the error has been detected, keep the thing adjudged to him. - Thus commonly.

712. • Query 4° Does he sin gravely, and against justice, who compensates himself without first having recourse to the judge?

Resp. 1° He does not sin of itself against justice, provided he takes only as much as is owed to him; nor therefore is he bound to restitution. The reason is clear, because, this compensation having been made, equality is restored between him and the debtor. I said: of itself; because sometimes detriment could follow for the debtor from deprivation of some determinate thing, for example a horse, a precious thing, etc. - Lugo,² and others.

Resp. 2° Nor does he sin gravely, speaking generally; because ordinarily from this inversion of order neither grave scandal nor grave disturbance of the Republic follows. - Lugo.³

Resp. 3° He does not sin in any way if recourse to the judge is difficult, if there is danger of scandal, or extraordinary expenses, etc., because then recourse is morally impossible.

Admonition. - Confessors should not easily advise compensation, and should rarely even permit it. But to compensation already made, to which none of the necessary conditions is lacking, it is licit so far to connive, that the penitent not be bound to restitution.

To recover one's own thing, even by employing moderate force, is licit, whether when the unjust robber is caught in the very delict, or when the thing has not yet been put in safety; indeed it is licit if it has been put in safety by the robber, provided it is movable and still exists in species. For in the former hypothesis you use the right of defense (n. 471. 1°); in the other, neither is the right of the robber injured nor is the order of right passed over. Mar. p. 333. n. 185.

S. Th. II-II, q. 66.

390. Injury in the external goods of fortune is committed by theft. This sin supposes that external things are possessed by private persons as exclusively their own, so that dominion over them does not belong either to all in common or to the community in the name of all. Hence one must speak

1. of the right of privately possessing external things,

2. of the nature and gravity of theft,

3. of the causes excusing the taking of another's thing.

S. Th. II-II, q. 66, a. 3-6 and 8-9.

403. Theft, taken generically, is the unjust taking of another's thing, for the sake of gain, the owner being reasonably unwilling. It is said:

1. unjust taking or usurpation, i.e., either removal, or voluntary detention, since to detain is equivalently to take, and he who detains while he can and ought to return morally takes: "to detain," says St. Thomas, a. 3, "that which is owed to another has the same nature of harm as unjust taking"; and thus to theft are reduced: not paying debts, snatching something away by fraud or deceit, not restoring a thing found;

2. of another's thing, belonging to another by right of dominion, whether perfect or imperfect; whence theft is committed even against a depositary, borrower for use, lessee, etc., if you take away from them a deposited, lent, or leased thing;

3. for the sake of gain, i.e., with the intention of retaining the thing and receiving profit, whether for oneself or for another: for if it were done with the intention of returning the thing to the owner, or safely preserving it, or destroying or lending it, it would not properly be theft; and thus it is distinguished from simple unjust taking or damage, by which no profit is obtained but the good of another is destroyed without advantage;

4. the owner being reasonably unwilling, which is added for the sake of greater explanation, because it is already included in the word: unjust. For if the owner were not unwilling, or if he were unwilling but not reasonably, because there is a just cause of taking away, there would be no injustice, nor theft strictly so called: thus if a poor man in extreme necessity takes, or if a maidservant gives to him; or if someone accepts under the title of compensation, or takes a sword or book from one who is now about to abuse it; or if a wife takes for her honest support, or lest the husband dissipate it in games or feasting.

A double species of theft is distinguished:

1. theft simply, or strictly so called (vol; diefstal), the hidden taking of another's thing, while the owner or the one who keeps the thing is absent or ignorant: this is negatively involuntary for the owner, through ignorance;

2. robbery (roof), or the open and violent taking of another's thing, while the owner is present, seeing, and, insofar as he can, resisting and struggling: this is positively involuntary for the owner on account of violence, whether physical and properly so called, or moral and improperly so called, namely, grave fear unjustly inflicted, as if a robber threatens death in order to extort money. This differs in species from simple theft, because it adds a new malice diverse in species: there is not only real injury in goods, but also personal injury against the person and his honor or liberty, to whom violence is brought or fear. Hence one can sin mortally in the species of robbery, and venially in the species of theft, as if you take a slight thing from a distinguished man who is present and gravely resisting; and vice versa.

Moreover theft, and say the same of robbery, can be simple, - or qualified, to which there is joined a certain circumstance, whether

a) changing the species, by reason of religion, namely, sacrilegious theft, whether the thing is sacred (real sacrilege), or it is taken from a sacred place provided it had been handed over to the custody of that place (local sacrilege), or a sacred thing is taken from its own sacred place (real and at the same time local sacrilege); or

b) notably aggravating. Thus formerly in law they distinguished peculatum, he who steals from public goods, to which the falsification of money pertains; plagiatum, he who abducts a man constituted in slavery; abigeatum, by which someone steals cattle in pastures. In present-day law other distinctions are usefully made in order to diverse penalties.

404. Principle I. Theft is a sin against justice, mortal from its genus. - For:

1° In itself and immediately it is against natural law and is opposed to commutative justice, and in the Decalogue (Exod. XX, 15) it is placed where grave precepts are enunciated (Mt. XIX, 18). For the right of dominion over external goods is derived from the law of nature and is legitimate, indeed necessary both to the individual and to society; but this right is openly violated by theft, since another's thing is taken away while the owner is reasonably unwilling.

2° Mediately and consequently it is opposed a) to charity, insofar as it takes away a good from one's neighbor and brings sadness upon him, and is apt to disturb peace and introduce quarrels, contentions, and hatreds;

b) also to the good of the community and of legal justice, since it tends so as gravely to disturb the tranquility of citizens and the public peace, necessary for the common good of society: "if men everywhere stole from one another," says St. Thomas, a. 6, "human society would perish."

Hence the Apostle says, I Cor. VI, 10: "Neither thieves... nor robbers will possess the kingdom of God."

Nevertheless theft admits lightness of matter, if the matter is divisible and admits more and less: for he who steals a few cents does not gravely offend private right, nor greatly disturb public peace, nor is the owner reasonably very unwilling or unwilling except against the manner of taking; - and similarly he who takes away a thing of greater moment from an owner who does not much care about it, or who in fact is known not to be very unwilling.

S. Th. II-II, q. 66, a. 7.

410. Notions. - From the treatise on charity (I, n. 905) let us recall that a threefold necessity is distinguished in temporal things:

1. Extreme necessity is that in which the necessaries of life are lacking, or there is certain imminent danger of perpetually losing a good equal to life which nature wills to be common to all, for example, health, the use of reason, liberty, integrity of members, a bodily sense. To this is morally equated quasi-extreme necessity, which is in a very probable and almost certain danger of losing the aforesaid goods, because it brings a proximate danger of falling into extreme necessity, for example, a lethal disease. As St. Thomas says, it is an evident and urgent necessity.

2. Grave necessity is present in a double case: a) as to external goods, when a notable loss of goods is imminent, such as loss of state, office, dignity, or reputation, in one word of goods which nature did not will to be common to all, and for preserving which therefore it did not will the means to be common; b) as to life and personal goods morally equivalent, when the danger is not imminent, but only probable, which namely cannot be avoided without great difficulty.

3. Common necessity is that in which ordinary begging poor persons are placed, who, unless they are helped, lead a troublesome life, but nevertheless are able to provide necessary things for themselves.

411. Principles. I. He who is placed in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity can, and of itself ought, from another's goods, even while the owner is unwilling, take as much as is necessary for him to escape this necessity; unless however the owner is placed in the same necessity.

For according to the order of the Creator and natural law, temporal things were instituted by the primary intention of nature for assisting the necessities of all men; by a secondary intention, so that they be divided into private possessions and thus be managed better, more orderly, and peacefully. But the secondary law of nature cannot derogate from the primary right, and those things which are of secondary intention cannot harm the primary intention. Therefore the division of possessions cannot impede assistance being given to men's necessities. Now if a man in extreme necessity could not take from others' things as much as is required for escaping necessity, the order of the Creator in the primary intention would be frustrated and a human deed executing the secondary intention would prevail over the primary end. Therefore.

And indeed a) the right to life, bodily integrity, the use of reason, or liberty, prevails over the right of property which is ordered to preserving those things;

b) hence in extreme necessity all goods are said to be common, not indeed absolutely all, but necessary goods, nor always as to dominion, but at least as to use, insofar as namely they are required for preserving life or health or integrity;

c) whence an owner cannot impede urgent necessities being assisted from his goods, and if he attempts this by force, he is an unjust aggressor;

d) unless however the owner himself is in the same necessity or by the taking away of the thing would fall into the same, because in an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better, and therefore the right of the owner prevails. Whence in a fire it is unlawful to snatch away another's ladder to save oneself, if he himself is about to perish without it; in a shipwreck, to snatch away a plank already seized by another which he himself needs.

Hence 1) in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity, it is not lawful to take away more than is necessary: for since urgent necessity bestows the right of taking, when this ceases that right ceases; whence if the use of the thing suffices, for example, of a horse for fleeing, of a gun for defending oneself, when the necessity has passed the thing itself, insofar as it still exists, is to be restored to the owner. And if by another way one can obtain the thing, for example, by borrowing or by seeking alms, regularly he cannot take it.

2. In a case of necessity if the consumption itself of the thing was necessary, nevertheless when necessity has ceased, the thing is to be restored in equivalent by him who possesses other goods or has hope or proximate power of possessing them, because only the loan of the thing, not dominion, was necessary to him; - on the contrary not by him who is needy both in thing and in hope, at least if the thing is not very notable.

3. When a poor man is existing in extreme necessity, another also can take away another's thing for relieving the necessity, provided he is not bound to assist the poor man from his own things: for what someone could do through himself can also be done through another, who then acts in the place of the needy man; whence a mother not having nourishment can take milk for a child about to perish from hunger. - The custodian of things is excepted, who can take away the owner's things only if the owner is bound to give.

4. In a case of necessity, it is lawful even to steal a thing of the greatest value, provided it is apt for removing the necessity and, as far as possible, as soon as morally can be done, is restored. Nevertheless in no way, not even from charity, is the owner bound to hand over such a thing; because no one is bound to assist another, just as neither to preserve his own life, with the greatest expenses or by extraordinary and exquisite means.

For the reasons which hold for extreme necessity are not present:

a) not for guarding external goods, because nature does not confer an absolute right except to the necessaries of life and integrity;

I. The question to be treated. - Sins against external goods are committed by theft, robbery, fraudulence, usury, and other unjust damaging acts, which are prohibited by the seventh precept of the Decalogue and are customarily explained sufficiently in moral theology. In practice, a special difficulty usually arises in the case of restitution; therefore we judge it opportune that this be inspected, especially as regards compensation in material goods.¹ We do not indeed deny that even from injuries committed against other goods, and from other precepts toward the neighbor besides the seventh, there can arise an obligation of restitution; nevertheless in practice, even then the principal obligation is usually reduced to material compensation in real goods, or at least frequently has that joined to it.

¹ Moralists may be consulted where they treat of restitution, especially St. Alphonsus in Th. M., l. III, tr. 5, c. 2; Marc, Aertnijs, Tanquerey, Genicot, Noldin, Prummer, Vermeersch in their manuals; Waffelaert in his work De Iustitia; Reuter, Neo-conf., n. 232-235; Berardi, Praxis-conf.; Aertnijs, Th. P., n. 84-87.

II. Principles and rules to be regarded in the case of restitution. - The confessor ought especially to have these before his eyes:

1. First of all let him attend to this principle: to dispense in these matters and to concede delay does not belong to the confessor himself, but only to the owner. Hence excuse from restitution or delay is to be defined by sole and true necessity, unless the circumstances were such that the confessor could prudently presume the consent of the creditor to delay, or reasonably interpret the intention of the owner.

2. Let him diligently ask what is the nature, the adjuncts, and the conditions of the case, so that he can define whether, how, and how much must be restored, how long the injustice lasted, whether it has already been declared in confession, why it has not yet been restored, etc.

3. When a more difficult case occurs, let him not resolve it immediately, but ask for delay to examine the matter more deeply or even to consult others, and let him enjoin the penitent afterward to return to him. But if the penitent cannot conveniently do this, let him be ordered to consult another learned and God-fearing man; and if he promises that he will do this and shows himself prepared to execute the decision and to perform those things which would be imposed on him, he will be able to be absolved.

4. If, inquiry having been made, the obligation of restitution remains doubtful or uncertain, it cannot strictly be imposed on the penitent; although sometimes a certain partial compensation to be made from equity can opportunely be advised for the various adjuncts.

5. If the obligation of restoring is certain and no cause excusing from it appears, but the penitent, although able, raises difficulties, let the confessor warn him that the sin is not forgiven unless restitution is made, because it is no less evil to retain another's goods against the will of the owner than to take them away, since it is a continued taking away; and consequently that the penitent must choose between these two: whether he prefers to undergo the eternal punishment of hell, or rather to lack the thing belonging to another.

6. When the debtor asserts that he cannot restore either altogether or at least immediately, let the confessor diligently examine the alleged impossibility, and let the one asserting not be believed unless he efficaciously proves it; nor let him be absolved unless he seriously promises that he will restore as soon as he will be able and will make an effort toward this. Namely only grave and ineluctable difficulty is a sufficient cause. Hence the debtor a) is bound to diminish superfluous expenses, to labor insofar as the decency of his state permits, to employ parsimony in food, clothing, and necessary expenses; b) if he objects that he will suffer gravely in reputation, let there be suggested a manner by which reputation may be cared for; c) if there is no sufficient cause of temporary delay, this cannot be conceded; but if there is a sufficient cause of delay alone, definitive remission cannot be conceded; d) if the whole cannot be restored at once, let it be returned by parts as soon as possible.

7. Therefore let the confessor beware lest he be credulous as to difficulties which penitents of this kind are wont to oppose: for some pretend impotence to restore, but often it is weakness of will rather than incapacity or weakness of powers; others with every effort solicit delay; but let the confessor know that it is not in his power to concede delay, because it is not only illicit to snatch away another's goods but equally illicit to retain them.

8. Namely, as moralists teach, the following are unworthy of absolution: a) those unwilling to restore when they can do this; b) those not able to restore, but neglecting to obtain for themselves the faculty of restoring; c) those delaying restitution much without an excusing reason, or committing to the heir a restitution which they themselves can do by themselves; d) those able to restore in full and restoring only a part.

9. But if the penitent certainly is in good faith, either because he believes that he owes nothing, or because he thinks that he is bound only to a part, not to the whole or in solidum, or because he judges it enough that he restore by several payments, although he could do so by one, if there is no probable hope of fruit to follow from warning, which nevertheless is not easily to be presumed, let the confessor leave him in ignorance; but if the penitent doubts or asks, the confessor cannot be silent.

10. In certain cases he will reasonably be able practically to presume total and absolute condonation, namely as regards children of a family and spouses who have snatched away things not of great value and have now consumed them; likewise for thefts of servants as regards edible and drinkable things, at least ordinary ones, not sold to others but consumed; indeed as regards other things if the master has rebuked or expelled the servant convicted of theft and has said nothing about restitution; likewise concerning small thefts of the poor committed against diverse persons, or against one person but not very frequently.

11. Ordinarily let him not absolve one who holds another's thing with himself unless he first has restored it, namely on account of the danger in which otherwise he lives of delaying restitution, or of consuming the thing and converting it to his own use. But if someone already seems so constituted and firmly disposed that he is deservedly believed soon to satisfy, he will be able to be absolved, but by fixing for him the space of time within which he is to restore and the manner in which he is to accomplish this; for indeterminate promises easily perish.

But one who, previously warned, did not restore, regularly is altogether to be dismissed for a time, absolution being delayed until he has restored, because although he may say that he proposes restitution, nevertheless there will easily be doubt concerning this disposition, and too much danger of relapsing and of changing the purpose.

III. There are various practical modes or means by which restitution can be made more opportunely, namely:

1. Through the public or postal course, so that, whether by means of an inscribed letter or by means of an order or check (mandat, cheque), he sends the sum under a fictitious name. But if the sum is owed to some society, it is better, for sufficient security, to write at the same time to the treasurer and to the president or syndicate.

2. By testament, if the dying person without any infamy can leave a legacy to such and such a person. And if it cannot be done without infamy, it must be seen whether an heir or fiduciary legatee can be constituted.

3. By a fictitious donation, provided that gifts are not compensated by gifts, and that they bring true profit or utility to the creditor, so that he is truly rendered unharmed: for it would not suffice, for example, that he be invited to drink or eat superfluously, or that sweets be given to him.

4. By undue labors useful to the creditor, for example by setting vines for a farmer, making a trip with a wagon for a master, whitening either linens or other things for him, laboring beyond what is owed with the master's profit and without pay. This manner is often practical for servants or workers. Nevertheless let mere favors without true utility not be confused with labor.

5. By alms, whether given to the poor or to priests who will celebrate Masses; nevertheless this is valid only for cases in which either it is impossible to restore into the hands of the creditor, or he must be presumed content with this manner of restoring. Nevertheless let the confessor beware lest he ask alms of this kind for himself or for his own convent. But if the sum is not very great and the debtor is of slender fortune, for restitution he will be able to give alms even of the kind he is otherwise accustomed to give; thus likewise he can remit to some poor debtor of his as much as he is bound to give to the poor: namely it is easier to yield that which one does not yet have than to deprive oneself of that which he now holds.

6. Through a trustworthy third person. It is not opportune that the confessor spontaneously offer himself for exercising this office of mediator; indeed, when asked by the penitent, let him not easily undertake the burden, and let him attend lest the seal be violated. To avoid this, sometimes he will be able to make restitution through another priest, or transmit it from another place. Indeterminate restitutions, for example those to be performed for the poor, he should ordinarily leave to be made by the penitent; restitutions to be made to a determined person he will easily be able to undertake in a case of necessity lest the reputation of the penitent be injured, but let him require the testimony of the creditor concerning the thing or sum restored, which he may transmit to the penitent.

Thus let the confessor himself not incur suspicion.

Especially A. If the injured person is not certainly known, inquiry is to be made diligently concerning him. But doubt remaining after diligent inquiry:

1. if the doubt is among a few, the thing or its price is to be divided among them, nor can it be given to the poor; thus, for example, money lost or taken from one of three or four persons;

2. if the doubt is among several of the same place, restitution is to be made to them, if morally it can be done: thus merchants defrauding in weight, measure, or quality of goods ought to restore by increasing weight and measure, if the same buyers are accustomed to return; otherwise, if it cannot be done in another way, let restitution be made to the poor or to pious works of the same place in which the injustice was committed; thus in war, if unjust requisitions have been made and it is unknown who suffered damage;

3. if the doubt is among many scattered persons or among altogether unknown persons, so that there is no probability that restitution can be made to the true owners, restitution is to be made to the poor or to any pious causes.

B. If the injured person has died, restitution is to be made to heirs or to those having care, nor can the goods be expended for the poor or in Masses for the deceased² (who otherwise is no longer the owner of the goods), unless the heirs consent or there are absolutely none.

² Thus the Sacred Penitentiary, 7 Feb. 1899.

C. If a community or society has been injured, restitution is to be made to this society itself, unless it is essentially evil and pursues only an altogether evil end, so that it cannot have the right of possessing. Excepting this case, therefore, restitution cannot be made to the individual members but to the administrators of the society. Nevertheless it is better to warn several of the administrators or members, lest restitution be defrauded by an unfaithful administrator. This also holds concerning an insurance society, although on account of a contract of reinsurance entered among several societies, it is impossible to know which society in fact suffered damage. In this last case certain theologians have said that restitution is to be made to the poor or to pious causes. But as Vermeersch notes,³ this is not the practice of the Sacred Penitentiary; hence Genicot says:⁴ "Practically it seems to suffice that restitution be made to the administrators when the injured person cannot be better detected, and if this is regularly done, a certain compensation among the various societies exists." Therefore restitution is by no means to be made to the poor, unless it cannot be done otherwise; nevertheless one who in good faith in this case has already restored to the poor would not seem to be disturbed.

³ Th. M., II, n. 494.

⁴ Th. M., I, n. 658, VII.

D. If restitution must be made to the State or municipality, restitution can be made through official administrators or those set over taxes, provided that sufficient care is taken lest they keep it for themselves, for example by warning several. It can also be done by destroying titles of public debt issued by the State or municipality, or postal stamps, provided that they belong to the government; but not by destroying banknotes, because they are only protected by the State. Nor can it be made to those who have been unjustly injured in goods by the civil power, as sometimes religious or Catholic schools are, unless the injustice committed against determinate persons is altogether indubitable and has not been repaired or condoned; nor can restitution be made to the poor under the pretext that civil society ought to assist them, because it satisfies that obligation in another way, nor does it belong to private persons to dispose of public goods by private authority; unless nevertheless no other way lies open by which restitution could securely come to the public treasury.

IV. Corollary. - Therefore confessors err:

1. who never or almost never ask concerning the sin of injustice;

2. who generally say nothing concerning restitution but pass over it in silence;

3. who from those unable to restore do not require a firm and efficacious purpose of restoring, nor impose on them the obligation of seriously striving and employing apt means so that they may restore as soon as possible;

4. who, after hearing the declaration of a sin or of adjuncts which can induce the obligation of restoring, from negligence do not examine whether it must be made;

5. who do not warn concerning restitution to be made, even when the obligation is certain and there is no serious reason for doubting the capacity or probity of the penitent;

6. who too easily and without grave reason either suppose good faith in the penitent, or fear that the warning will not be useful;

7. who too easily either presume condonation, or admit an excusing reason of delay or impossibility, or even exempt from the obligation of restitution;

8. who think that in light matter no obligation of restitution is given, when on the contrary it is owed under venial sin, and must in some measure be urged, if otherwise there would be danger that the penitent would fall into grave injustice or would multiply light matters greatly;

9. who do not care about light matters added to one another and coalescing into one grave matter, although nevertheless they can induce grave fault and a grave obligation of restoring, not only by reason of intention, but also by reason of grave damage inflicted on one person, and by reason of notable detention or accumulation even from things belonging to several;

10. who, when the injured person is unknown, do not care to inquire concerning him or to institute inquiry, and at once pronounce that restitution is to be made to the poor;

Theft in general is the taking away of another's thing, the owner being reasonably unwilling. But it is called simply theft if it is done secretly; robbery, if it is done openly with force inflicted upon the owner; sacrilege, if it is done concerning a sacred thing.

I say. Every simple theft is a grave sin from its genus, because it is opposed to justice, which obliges under grave sin, and because in the Scriptures, e.g., I Cor. vi, 10, thieves are excluded from the kingdom of God. But sacrilegious theft and robbery constitute a diverse species of malice: the former because, besides justice, it violates religion; the latter because it adds an injury inflicted upon the person to the unjust taking away of another's thing. But other modes or other objects of theft do not change the species, because through these the nature of the damaging is not changed.

Question 1. What matter is to be considered grave in theft, considering the circumstances of this our region?

Before response is made, certain things must be premised:

I. It is very difficult to determine this matter rigorously, as is clear both from the acknowledgment itself of the Doctors and from the lack of some measure. But it is altogether necessary that what appears more equitable be determined, lest the salvation of souls and the existence of property be brought into danger. Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 21 and seq. - Baller., note (a), p. 527.

II. According to the common opinion, which seems altogether to have to be held, this matter is to be regarded both absolutely and relatively. Matter absolutely grave is that which it is never licit to touch without grave fault, since its taking away is always considered gravely injurious with respect to all. The reason is that if complete proportion had always to be preserved among all conditions, certainly a very great quantity would be required for grave theft where someone stole something from a very rich man: but this would surely turn to the damage of society. Yet it is necessary that the matter of theft be considered also relatively, and the reason is that the gravity of theft, like the gravity of any injury, depends especially upon the greater or lesser privation, pain, and reluctance of will which he suffers against whom the theft is committed. Yet attention must be paid to reluctance of will as it is commonly and reasonably had among men, but not with respect to men drawn by a greater or lesser love of money. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 526. - Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 28 and 29. - Baller., note (b), p. 527. - Slater, Questions on Moral Theology, pp. 144 and seq.

These things having been noted beforehand, now to the question:

Response. With respect to this matter absolutely grave, authors vary much, so that it is most difficult to determine the matter definitively. But these things seem certain to us: first, that the same or almost the same sum is not to be assigned as had been assigned by ancient authors; second, that the value of money is in no way immutable; that in various regions that value varies: that the matter is to be determined from the quantity of money existing in some region; from its commutative force; from the price of labor; from the moral estimation of men. These things are clear to us from the rather usual manner of acting of some persons, e.g., many European workers come to us, here support themselves by their own labor and send no small sums of money to their own, or carry them with themselves to Europe; but others, otherwise not poor, who now receive a half pension for an office now resigned on account of age or illness, betake themselves to foreign nations, where they can live comfortably, because they receive food, etc., at a cheaper price. The distinguished author Palmieri says: "I have heard other learned men who, on account of the price of money very much diminished day by day, would now wish absolutely grave matter to be that which equals more or less one hundred francs, to whom we assent without difficulty." - Gury-Ballerini, Edit. a. 1898. - "They do not seem to depart from the true who at least below 100 lire do not acknowledge matter of theft absolutely grave." Thus Ojetti, Synopsis, under the word Furtum. This opinion pleases us; indeed, since the value of money among us is different from that among foreign nations, it seems that one does not err who assigns the sum of about 35 dollars for our region.

But relatively grave matter seems to be established thus: a fourth part of a dollar or thirty cents for the needy who beg; one dollar for ordinary laborers; two for mechanics; and three for ordinary rich persons. The reason is that the taking away of such matter seems respectively to involve grave damage.

Question 2. What matter is required so that the thefts of wives, children, and servants become grave?

Response 1st. As regards wives, a case of grave matter in theft is held with difficulty, both because, as was said elsewhere, among us they make one person with husbands as regards common goods, and because these are not ordinarily considered reasonably unwilling regarding donations and other expenses, even secret ones, which are not altogether prodigal. But if a wife uses common riches prodigally, that quantity is required for the gravity of theft which suffices for inflicting grave damage upon the husband, which must be judged from the circumstances. But then it is more commonly taught that she is held to restitution either from paraphernal goods or by working more diligently or by taking care of the family estate. Cf. Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 169.

Response 2nd. It is certain among all that in thefts of children more is required for constituting grave matter than in thefts of strangers; because the father of the family is less unwilling, or at least less reasonably unwilling in the former case than in the latter, and often he is unwilling more as regards the manner, namely that it be taken secretly, than as regards the substance. Wherefore many theologians say that for them a sum twice greater than for strangers is required; but no general rule can be assigned, for the matter will generally have to be defined from the various circumstances of persons or conditions. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 32.

Response 3rd. For servants it also depends upon the greater liberality or stinginess of masters, upon the quality or situation of the thing stolen, e.g., whether it is edible or not, guarded or exposed, etc. According to many, by small thefts committed by servants in foods and eatables which are not usually carefully kept, generally one does not arrive at mortal sin, provided these are not sold or taken out of the house or are of extraordinary value. But if servants steal money or things carefully guarded, no greater quantity is required for grave sin, because the masters then are not less unwilling toward them than toward others. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 34. - Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 168.

Question 3. Do small thefts coalesce for constituting grave matter?

Response. Affirmatively, whether they have been committed against the same person or against several, provided nevertheless that a great interval is not placed between them. For in the former case those little thefts, easily united by reason of time, certainly inflict grave damage: besides, proposition 38, which reads thus, was condemned by Innocent XI: "One is not held under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken away through a few thefts, however great the total sum may be." - But in the other case there would be grave damage inflicted upon society, whose order would be disturbed if those little thefts committed against different persons, and repeated with a brief interval, were not prohibited under grave sin. Cardinal de Lugo adds another reason, namely that each owner in particular is then gravely damaged, not indeed formally, but radically. - I said provided that a great interval is not placed between them; for little thefts which would be committed rarely bring no grave harm either to society or to private persons. But according to the truer opinion a great interval is computed as the space of two months. Yet except the case in which from the beginning there is the intention of arriving at a notable sum, because then the little thefts always coalesce, however long the interval may be by which they are separated from one another. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 530 and seq. - Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 37 and seq. - Vogler, n. 133.

Question 4. How is the gravity of matter in small thefts to be computed?

Response. It seems that it must be said more equitably and more commonly that if the little thefts are committed against the same person, whether physically or morally one, for instance some railway company, and at the same time discontinuously, namely more often than every two months, but not on one day or on the same occasion; or if they are committed against diverse persons indeed, but at the same time, namely on one day, on one and the same occasion or under the same circumstances, then the matter is considered grave when it exceeds by one half the sum required for grave theft. - But if both concur, that is, if the little thefts are committed against persons altogether diverse, and at the same time not on one and the same day or occasion, then the matter will be judged grave when it is twice greater. Yet observe that since these little thefts are committed against persons altogether diverse, the common measure of grave theft in each aforesaid case must not be taken from relative but from absolute gravity; for the damage then is brought not upon one, but upon several individuals or particular societies without grave injury to each one, as is supposed. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 530. - Baller., note (c), p. 531.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. If, after an efficacious retraction of preceding little thefts, whether that efficacy was effective or only affective, but nevertheless true and serious, another little theft is committed from some new motive or from some different occasion, this does not seem to coalesce with the preceding ones.

2nd. He who after grave matter has been completed still steals some slight thing either sins only venially, or if gravely, only in that sense insofar as the same mortal sin already committed terminates in this later little theft. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 538. - Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 12, n. 44. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 43.

3rd. He who by a slight theft completes grave matter begun by others against the same person, excluding the case of conspiracy, sins only lightly. Nor should you say that he sins gravely who by a light blow kills someone already wounded by others; for life is something indivisible, and the whole is destroyed by this light blow. Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 53 and seq. - Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 12, n. 52.

4th. Merchants using false weights sin gravely, although on individual occasions they defraud in small matter; because they intend to arrive at grave matter, or certainly know that they are going to arrive at it.

5th. Among thieves are to be reckoned those who wander about, draining citizens of money by feigned reasons. But if they are truly poor, yet exaggerate or lie about their hardships, they will indeed sin against truthfulness, but not against justice. - Cf. Kenrick, tract. 3, n. 176.

6th. "Concerning youths educated gratuitously in seminaries, or at the expense of private persons, with the hope that they may serve in the ecclesiastical ministry, it must be held that they commit fraud if they enter seminaries without the intention of dedicating themselves to sacred offices, and with this plan only, that they be instructed in letters or indulge leisure; and therefore they are held to repairing the damage. But there is no need that they be altogether certain of their own vocation; for holy leisure is granted to them for this reason, that they may deliberate more maturely concerning so great an undertaking; but they must neither enter rashly nor remain in sacred buildings after they have cast away hope and purpose. But if by their own fault they bring it about that they are held unworthy, for that reason they do not seem obligated to restore, whenever the intention of defrauding was lacking: for donors are not to be considered to have placed a condition of restoring on account of idleness or other customary faults." - Thus Kenrick, n. 178.

I say. Although common necessity, namely that which ordinary beggars suffer, certainly does not excuse from theft, because otherwise access would lie open to many plunderings and thus society would be overthrown; nevertheless in extreme necessity it is lawful to take from another's goods only so much as is sufficient for freeing oneself from such necessity. The reason is that the goods of life are of a higher order than the goods of fortune, and therefore by the division and appropriation of things it is not prevented that assistance be given to man's necessity. Therefore dominion is not to be so understood that even he who is placed in extreme necessity is excluded from the use and enjoyment of the thing; and consequently he, taking away secretly or openly a thing common under this aspect, makes it his own, as happened before the division of goods. Indeed not only with his own hands, but also through another, as through a procurator, he can take that thing, without any malice of theft being contracted. - Cf. St. Thomas, 2-2, q. 66, art. 7. - St. Alphonsus, n. 420. - Lessius, lib. 2, cap. 12, dub. 12.

Question 1. Whether in grave necessity it is lawful to take from another's goods as in extreme necessity?

Resp. It is much controverted, both concerning the solution itself and concerning the force of the argument which those who deny derive from proposition 36 condemned by Innocent XI, which reads thus: "It is permitted to steal not only in extreme necessity but also in grave necessity." For it is not clear whether this proposition was condemned on account of the word grave, or rather on account of the verb to steal. - But as regards the solution of the question, it seems that one must say that the whole matter depends on the force which is attributed to the word grave; wherefore if that necessity is so grave that it is to be called quasi-extreme or most grave, as several Doctors speak, then the same thing is to be held concerning it as concerning extreme necessity; otherwise, if it is less grave, so that it reaches common necessity. But this quasi-extreme necessity is judged to be present when one is in probable danger of incurring death, of losing some principal member, of falling into perpetual captivity, or of undergoing a most grave or perpetual disease. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 520; and Hom. Ap., n. 15. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 154. - Lessius, loc. cit. - Ballerini, note (a), p. 534; and note (a), p. 536.

Question 2. Whether he who is about to be killed by robbers, or to whom perpetual or most grave captivity or another similar misfortune threatens, unless he hands over a great sum of money, can secretly take it, if otherwise he cannot free himself from so great a necessity?

Resp. Affirmatively, according to the more common and more probable opinion, provided that the rich man is not constituted in equal necessity through such taking away, and that the poor man takes only that of which he stands in absolute need. The reason is that, as all admit, extreme necessity is the cause why in this case goods become common to the needy man with the rich man; therefore the community of goods extends as widely as the necessity itself, and the needy man can assume for himself as much as is necessary for relieving this necessity. - Nor should you say, 1st, that the poor man cannot provide for himself through an unusual and extraordinary means; for a means of this sort perhaps is unusual and extraordinary relative to common necessity, but not to the present necessity, as we suppose. - Nor should you say, 2nd, that the rich man in this case is not bound to give with so great a loss to himself, therefore neither can the poor man take; for the answer is that the rich man indeed is not bound to give, because he is obliged from charity alone, which does not urge with so great an inconvenience, but he is bound from justice not to prevent the poor man from using his own right and occupying goods absolutely necessary for himself in such straits. - Nor, finally, should you say, 3rd, that the privilege of secretly taking another's things in extreme or quasi-extreme necessity is not to be extended to cases arising from the mere malice of men; both because that limitation rests on no solid foundation, and because it lacks the weight of authority. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 520. - Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 146 and seq.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. It is not lawful for a poor man placed in extreme necessity to take away more than is necessary for himself. Hence if the mere use of a thing suffices, for example, of a horse, when the necessity ceases, the obligation of restoring remains. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 15.

2nd. If an extremely needy man has elsewhere, in reality or in probable hope, whence he can pay, he cannot remove another's thing except with the burden of restitution; because necessity does not require that ownership of the thing accrue, when he can be sufficiently relieved by a thing accepted by loan or for use. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 19.

3rd. But he who, in extreme want, has consumed another's thing, is held to nothing after the use of the thing, if he had no probable hope that he would at some time be able to restore, even if afterward he should come to a better condition. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., ibid.

4th. A rich man hiding his own things, or using some other device so that he may not aid the poor man, when the poor man's necessity ceases, is not held to restitution, because he sinned only against charity. But if by force he prevents the poor man from taking some thing, then indeed he sins against justice; but when the necessity ceases, and thus the right of the poor man, the burden of restitution also would cease. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, Hom. Ap., n. 20. - Lugo, disp. 16, n. 142.

THEFT and Robbery, allied by a close bond, spring from Avarice; both lie in wait for the advantages of peace and of Justice: Theft indeed fraudulently and secretly; Robbery openly and violently. The former is committed either by taking unjustly, or by detaining unjustly, or lastly by circumventing with guile. In either case every law is violated, and indeed the law of nature is transgressed, whose clear voice is: Do not to another what you would not have done to yourself. Likewise the Written Law of Exodus 20. forbids the unjust handling of another's property: Thou shalt not steal: but the Law of grace forbids theft all the more strongly, since it commands each one to give his own to the poor. Yet if, under the pressure of necessity, whereby things return to the common use, or by the command of the supreme Lord of all things, at whose nod all things are licit, another's property is handled — as befell the sons of Israël when they made off with the golden vessels of the AEgyptians — there is no sin, but rather merit of obedience is heaped up; though this merit, however agreeable to each, few attain. These matters I shall discuss, after I have given some preliminary warnings about dominion.

V. No one is bound under pain of mortal sin to restore what has been taken away by a number of small thefts, however great the total sum may be. This is the 38th of Innocent.

Titius, since he frequently used the railway in making journeys, bought a six-month ticket; after that period of time had elapsed, he made journeys in the same way for a month without renewing the ticket or otherwise paying the price of the journey. When he had disclosed these things in confession, the confessor asked what price was owed to the company; Titius answered him that the sum would be about two pounds sterling. Having heard these things, the confessor considered within himself whether Titius was bound under grave sin to restore two pounds sterling to the railway company. Hence it is asked:

1. What matter is required to constitute a grave sin against justice?

2. In England, on account of the lesser value of money, is a larger sum required for grave matter than among other nations of Europe?

3. Do small thefts coalesce, and how?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What matter is required to constitute a grave sin against justice?

According to St. Thomas (II-II, question 59, article 4) the sin of injustice is mortal because it is against charity, which is the life of the soul. But sins against charity are only venial if the matter be light. Matter against charity will be grave if the act causes another serious sadness, or tends notably to disturb peace and harmony. Justice, it is true, looks rather at objective relations than at subjective dispositions, and so although charity will always serve as a measure of the gravity of sins against justice, yet in estimating the gravity of these sins we must take as our norm an ordinarily constituted person, not such as are specially sensitive. Loss of property in such a quantity as would cause serious trouble to an ordinarily constituted person will be a serious loss, and the theft of it will be a serious sin against justice. The theft of what would suffice to support the owner of the property and his family for a day would ordinarily be a serious loss to him, and would be grave matter. This rule serves for ordinary cases; for a measure of the gravity of theft from very rich persons or from wealthy companies we must have recourse to other considerations besides the foregoing. For theft does injury to the community and to the security of property, as well as to the individual owner. Even if the individual owner does not suffer loss which is serious for him, yet the harm which theft does to the community and to social security may be notable, and if it is notable, the theft will be mortally sinful. What sum is notable on this account will depend on circumstances of time and place. Although the precise sum can not be determined with mathematical exactness, yet, according to the common opinion, a sum of about one pound sterling is at present sufficient to constitute a mortal sin of theft, when it is taken even from the richest.

2. Is a larger sum required to constitute grave matter in England than in other countries on account of the less value of money there?

The affirmative has been maintained by some theologians. However, the conditions of modern commerce tend to equalize the value of money; or, in other words, the whole world is now one big market for money and the chief articles of commerce. If either money or goods are cheaper in one country than in another, trade is attracted thither, and trade soon tends to equalize prices. Hence there is no very notable difference now in the value of money in the different civilized countries of the world. Prices of different articles are, indeed, different in different places, and this fact makes trade profitable; but the general cost of the same standard of living is much the same all the world over.

3. Do small thefts coalesce, and how?

Small thefts certainly coalesce, as is clear from Proposition 38, condemned by Innocent XI. Small thefts coalesce, owing to the intention of the thief finally to steal a large sum, or owing to conspiracy among many, each of whom steals something ; also owing to the hoarding of small sums stolen at short intervals.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. i, p. 396.

4. The case. Titius traveled on the railway for a month after his season ticket had expired, without paying his fare. He thereby defrauded the railway company of two pounds. He took that value which belonged to somebody else, against that person's reasonable wish. He therefore committed theft, and as the matter is grave, he is bound under grave sin to make restitution of that sum to the company.

The following case has been submitted to us for a solution: Mr. C., a draughtsman, is told by his employer to try to remember and make a sketch (that is, to steal the idea) of a drawing which was being submitted for sale by another draughtsman. Would it be wrong for Mr. C. to do so?

Solution.—All theologians are agreed that an author or writer or architect or draughtsman has a strict right to the fruits of his genius. And this right of ownership in the fruits of one's intellectual labor is founded in the law of nature. For if it be a law of nature that men should have an exclusive right to the fruits of the labor of their hands, with much more reason ought they to have an exclusive right to the fruits of the labor of their brains. And if the good of civilized society requires that a man be secured by law in the peaceful possession of whatever property he has acquired by his industry, with much more reason must we hold that the good of civilized society requires that men be secured by law in the peaceful possession of that higher and more valuable kind of property, namely, the results of intellectual and artistic talent. There is nothing that is more intimate to a man—or, to speak more properly, there is no kind of property so intimately and closely connected with a man—as the fruits of his own genius. For these are the fruits of the creation of his own mind, and had no existence before he brought them into being; and therefore the fruits of his intellectual industry belong to him and are part of his being in a way that no other kind of goods and chattels can be said to be. Consequently, it has always been maintained by theologians and jurists alike that an author or inventor or painter, or any other intellectual worker, is entitled to exelusive ownership in the results of his intellectual labor as long as he does not hand over his rights to the public, or part with them by sale or free gift to another. And this strict right of an author or inventor or other intellectual worker to the fruits of his genius imposes a grievous obligation on all other persons to respect this right, and to avoid all invasion of it. It is not allowed to steal another's ideas, any more than it is allowed to steal his lands, and any such theft must be made good by adequate restitution.

“Now all concede that every person has full ownership of the fruits of his intellect so long as he has not made them public property; for nothing can be more our own than what we acquire by our mind’s own labor. And indeed, if external things bear fruit for their owner, a fortiori internal faculties, which flow immediately from our essence. Therefore, one who stole and published another’s manuscripts or inventions without the author’s permission would sin against justice and be bound to repair damages; since he violates a twofold right belonging to the author: that the work written by him not be published against his will, and that the profit to be derived from it not be diminished” (Tanquerey, III., 39).

Judge Kent (American Law, Vol. II., n. 365) says:

"Another instance of property acquired by one's own act and power is that of literary property, consisting of maps, charts, writings and books; and of mechanical inventions, consisting of useful machines or discoveries produced by the joint result of intellectual and manual labor. As long as these are kept within the possession of the author, he has the same right to the exclusive enjoyment of them as of any other species of personal property; for they have proprietary marks, and are a distinguishable subject of property. But when they are circulated abroad and published with the author's consent, they become common property, and subject to the free use of the community."

Mr. C, therefore, is not allowed, in conscience, to use the ideas of his fellow-draughtsman in the interest of his employer. His fellow-draughtsman, by offering his designs for sale, does not relinquish his right to them. For another to steal them or to use them against their rightful owner's and creator's will is to transgress the seventh commandment, and full pecuniary restitution must be made to the original designer or draughtsmen for any loss he may have suffered before the sin can be forgiven.

Caius, who for thirty years has staid away from the Sacraments, resolves on the occasion of a mission to go to confession. To the question why he had not been to confession so long, he gave the following answer: “I was employed in a large provision house which belonged to a rich Hebrew. Like all others there employed I took home provisions, such as flour, sugar, coffee, etc., without the knowledge, and, of course, against the will, of the employer. This has been going on for thirty years. Had I gone to confession I should have had to stop these pilferings, and so could not have cared for my household as abundantly as before. Now, however, I have been pensioned and do not need the help any longer, and therefore I come to confession.”

The missionary asks: “Is Caius obliged to make restitution? or are there excusing circumstances, as, for instance, great and to an extent unjustly acquired wealth of the employer; or the thought of additional compensation in view of unsufficient wages? Such excuses were not, however, present in the man’s mind, he was con- — scious of committing theft.”

To the first question, is Caius obliged to restitution, we must reply with an unconditional yes. In our case both conditions which create the obligation of restitution are present. For thirty years he has committed one theft after another, and thus caused his employer injury which it is his duty to make good. Even if the individual pilferings were not serious in themselves, yet his intention, as also the aggregate of the matter, puts beyond question the seriousness of the injury and of the guilt. The other condition, unjust acquisition of another’s property, is also present. For Caius possesses all the stolen goods in aequivalenti, i. e., in his property. During all these years he was enabled to lay aside that part of his salary which otherwise would have been employed in purchasing provisions, or he has used it for the good of his household, and thus has enriched himself at the expense of his employer. The surplus gained in this manner he can not call his own, it is the fruit of his pilferings and ought not to remain in his hands,

But the missionary asks, further, whether there are mitigating circumstances. Let us keep in mind the penitent’s confession: Caius was conscious of stealing. His only excuse is that the others did likewise. This, however, can not make an unjust act a just one, unless possibly the silent consent of the employer may be supposed. But he did not approve; the thefts took place without the knowledge, and against the will, of the owner, as Caius himself avows.

Could not the idea of secret compensation excuse? Of course’ Caius had no such idea; but that would make no difference. For if some one has been wronged there remains for him the claim for compensation, until he has received it, or voluntarily renounced it. But let us not forget that he who would thus secretly compensate himself, apart from other conditions, must be morally certain of the justice of his demands. Is this so with Caius? In the casus nothing’ points to an insufficient salary, indeed the pension granted by his former employer would demonstrate his liberality. To take refuge in a presumable condonation by the employer appears likewise to be excluded, as the proprietors of large commercial establishments are little inclined to such leniency.

To the missionary, in his proper desire to assist his penitent as much as possible, the idea occurs that the Hebrew had for the greater part unjustly acquired his wealth. Is this certain? And even if it is: the flour, sugar, etc., belonged to the Hebrew and therefore he is injured in his property. But let us suppose—and Caius probably can throw light upon this subject—dishonest transactions have taken place. Then the next question is, how is Caius concerned? Either he positively co-operated or he did not. In the former case he is obliged to restitution to the defrauded; in order, of course, after the employer in whose name he acted. Nevertheless this would open a way which at least will materially facilitate the performance of restitution. For Caius must make restitution to the injured, but has the right to claim indemnification from the Hebrew. Let him therefore give the unjustly acquired property to those that were cheated. The latter are, however, numerous and to a great extent unknown; besides, most of them were probably not seriously injured and therefore Caius in his difficulty may let the poor take their place. The confessor accordingly should impose upon Caius the obligation to give alms as generously as his circumstances permit; thus restitution will be made gradually as far as possible. If Caius has not positively co-operated in frauds, but knew positively of the injustice that took place, then he may regard the victims as creditors of his former employer and return to them that of which they were deprived in the manner above described, with the reasonable presumption that the employer had no intention of restitution.

W. Stentrup, S.J.

Three men agreed to drive out to a certain farm on which no one was living to pluck some of the fine fruit they had seen there. Upon their arrival at the farm they find that the fruit has already been plucked and stored away in the vacant house, and the house locked. A is anxious to get at the fruit and so he proceeds to remove one of the window-panes to enable him to get in. B helps him, but C’s conscience becomes uneasy, and so he protests and tries to dissuade the other two, but they persist in removing the fruit. When they have it and are about to start for home, B, too, becomes uneasy and turns his share over to A. C had demurred and had taken no part in the transaction. But now they are getting ready to return. A and B proceed to load the fruit into the wagon. If C would refuse to haul it in, A would most likely back down and leave it; at least as far as C knows, A could not get away with the fruit. But C is a good-hearted fellow, and out of human respect allows the fruit to be loaded onto his wagon, and helps cover and conceal it on the way in.

What about restitution?

Answer.—This is a case of co-operating in a theft. These three men agree to steal the fruit. They agree to act jointly in injuring their neighbor. In order to determine whether they are bound to make restitution, we must consider whether their action is (a) unjust; (b) the real and efficacious cause of the damage done to their neighbor; (c) sinful; or, as the theologians say, theologically culpable. These three conditions must be verified before anyone can be held responsible in conscience for an injury done to another. The damaging action must be truly, efficaciously, and formally unjust. When these three men agreed to jointly steal the fruit they became equally responsible for the injury they agreed to do their neighbor, because they agreed to become the real, efficacious and sinful cause of an unjust action, causing injury to their neighbor. The three are equally guilty, because they conspire mutually to do the injury, and each one renders himself liable for the whole damage that the three of them do, provided the other two refuse to repair their share. He inflicts the entire harm who concurs with others in inflicting the harm BY A COMMON CONSPIRACY. Had these three men, therefore, proceeded without more ado, to steal the fruit, each one would be bound to make restitution of a third part of the fruit, provided all three of them were willing to make restitution; but each one is liable in conscience for the whole damage, in case the other two do not make restitution, because there existed a mutual conspiracy. But before they actually steal the fruit, C’s conscience becomes uneasy, and so he protests and tries to dissuade the other two, but they persist in removing the fruit.

By protesting against the theft, and by endeavoring to dissuade the other two men from committing it, C effectually dissociates himself from A and B and ceases to be a co-operator in the theft that follows. He actually and effectively withdraws before any injury is done to the owner of the fruit. Whatever influence his original agreement to steal the fruit may have had on A and B he effectively neutralizes it by protesting against the theft before it takes place, and by endeavoring to dissuade A and B from committing it. If C had retired after this he would not be responsible for any part of the theft that A and B thereupon committed, because he was not a party to it, and could not be regarded as a causa vera, efficax et theologice culpabilis damni injusti. In this case A and B alone would have been the only persons responsible for the restitution, each one for half, in case both made restitution, and each one for the whole damage in case the other refused or failed to restore his share.

But now that the fruit is stolen and all three are getting ready to start for home, “B, too, becomes uneasy and turns his share over to A.” This does not alter the case of B. B has actually stolen the fruit together with A. He is a unjust, real, effective, and theologically culpable cause of the harm. Therefore, he must make restitution. And because there existed a conspiracy between A and B, both become responsible conditionally for the full amount of the damage; that is, on condition that the other party fail to make restitution for his share of the theft. “He who together with others is an equal cause (whether moral or physical) of the entire harm is bound conditionally to make restitution for the whole: for the whole indeed, because he inflicted the entire harm; conditionally, however, because he did not inflict it alone but together with others.” “He inflicts the entire harm who, by a common conspiracy with others, concurs in inflicting the harm, as when several conspire to despoil a house, because each influences the whole harm at least morally, provided the conspiracy is real and effective” (Noldin ii, 489).

But, unfortunately for C, after A and B have stolen the fruit, he becomes again a co-operator formalis et injustus. “A and B proceed to load the fruit into the wagon. If C would refuse to haul it in, A would most likely back down and leave it; at least as far as C knows, A could not get away with the fruit. But C is a goodhearted fellow and out of human respect allows the fruit to be loaded on to his wagon and helps cover and conceal it on the way in.” By so doing C becomes again a party to the theft and as his co-operation this time seem to be necessary to execute the theft, he becomes responsible again in solidum condicionate for the full amount of the theft; that is, on condition that A and B refuse to make restitution for their share,

“He inflicts the entire harm whose cooperation, whether moral or physical, is necessary for inflicting the harm, so that if he did not concur the harm would not be done; as if two men despoil a traveler whom one alone could not have overpowered, or if someone casts a vote necessary for an unjust sentence which the others would never have passed if he were absent or opposed. For although his cooperation is not sufficient to inflict the entire harm, nevertheless the refusal of his cooperation could have prevented the entire harm. If someone helps a thief carry away a chest which neither could carry alone, each is bound to repair the entire harm, because each is a cause of the whole effect, insofar as without his assistance no effect would have occurred” (Noldin ii, 489; Ballerini-Palmieri iii, 376).

A, B and C, therefore, are bound to make restitution for the fruit they stole, each one absolutely for his own share; that is, for one-third, and conditionally in solidum, that is, each one is liable for the whole amount, in case the other two fail to restore their share. A and B are bound, because they conspired to steal the fruit, and by their conspiracy each becomes the author of the whole damage, not, of course, in a physical, but in a moral sense. C becomes responsible conditionally for the whole amount, because, although he withdrew effectively from the conspiracy before any injury was inflicted, still the co-operation, that he lends to haul the fruit home, being necessary or required in order to accomplish the theft, and without which assistance the fruit would not have been removed from the premises, makes C also a moral cause of the whole damage, and, therefore, responsible for the whole restitution in case A and B do not restore their share.

St. Alphonsus says, regarding the practical application of the above-mentioned principles, that it is rarely advisable to oblige the ignorant and uneducated to make restitution in solidum, even though they be bound to it by strict justice, because the ignorant and uneducated do not understand how they should be held responsible for what their partners stole. In fact, says the holy doctor, it may be presumed that the injured party will be satisfied if each person restores the part he himself stole, since otherwise it is greatly to be feared that not even that much restitution will be made. (St. Alphonsus, n. 579).

Case.—Paul, a student, makes it a practice to escape the paying of car-fares whenever he can, and even uses various tricks to evade the attention of conductors.

He claims that he may do this with a good conscience. First, he says, it is not the passenger’s business to look out for the pecuniary advantage of the company; this is the conductor’s affair, who is hired and paid to collect fares, and it is the conductor’s business to see that every passenger pays. Moreover, Paul is of the opinion that the company suffers no real injury from occasionally carrying a “deadhead” passenger, because no additional expense is incurred by the company; hence he is not cheating the company.

Questions:

1. Is Paul’s action lawful?

2. Is he obliged to make restitution and how may this be best accomplished?

Solution:

1. Paul is wrong in this practice. The reasons he adduces in support of it are false and without validity. It is of course the conductor’s duty to look out for the company’s interests, and for this purpose to keep count of the passengers as far as it is possible in respect to their large number and frequent change. But this duty of the employee does not in the least excuse the passenger from his obligation. It is an essential principle of commutative justice that in the case of a tacit agreement, which manifestly exists here, a certain performance of the one party (carrying the passenger to a certain distance by the trolley-car) conditions a reciprocal performance on the other party (payment of fare). Since Paul benefits himself by using the opportunity of travel, the company has eo ipso a claim upon his fare. Paul’s assertion, that the company is entitled to the fare only if the conductor makes positive demand for it, and that otherwise he is permitted to ride free, is absolutely unfounded. On the contrary, the fact that the companies despite heavy traffic place only one conductor in a car indicates that for getting their fares they trust to an extent in the honor of the public. Moreover, the matter of common decency should be sufficient inducement to pay one’s way, and to avoid the appearance of trying to cheat the conductor.

The second excuse advanced by Paul is no more valid than the first. Paul claims that he has not injured the company, because on his account there was no additional expenditure for coal or electricity. But was not the company deprived of rightful income? What would be the result if other passengers would act on the same principle as Paul?

2. From the above it is plain that Paul is obliged to make restitution, and this not merely if he was aware of the injustice of his actions, but even if he was under the impression that his action was permissible and not sinful. It can not be objected that according to the teaching of moralists one is liable to restitution only when he has been guilty before God (theologice culpabilis). Here it is not a question of injury that only harms the neighbor and does not benefit the perpetrator (cf. Noldin, n. 419): Paul has by his acts so to speak “become richer” (ditior factus est; cf. Noldin, n. 449, Ll. c.) or, more exactly, he is still in possession of the fares to which the railroad company has every legal right. Therefore he must be dealt with as a man in bona fide possession of the property of others. There is not the slightest reason, unless actually outlawed on account of time, why the original obligation of paying the fare has ceased to exist; it exists at present and presses for fulfilment.

But how may Paul carry out this obligation without attracting attention to his unlawful action? The easiest way would be to purchase a corresponding number of tickets and to destroy them (burning them, for instance). In this way complete restitution would certainly be made.

180. The violation of the right of ownership, if committed secretly, is called theft; it is called robbery, if the act is done openly and with physical force. Such violations disturb the balance of equality which justice demands for all the members of the community. The balance cannot be properly restored except by the restitution of the property unjustly acquired. What was stolen continues to belong to the one from whom it was taken, and must be given back to him. Res clamat ad dominum, "property calls for its owner," is an important axiom of jurisprudence. Even if the owner cannot be found, it is not fair that the thief should retain what he has stolen: fraus sua nemini patrocinari debet, "no one should reap any benefit from his fraud." He must part with his ill-gotten goods, disposing of them as he may presume the owner would direct, if he could be consulted; for instance, by giving them or their value to the poor.

181. If damage has been done willfully to the property of another, reparation of the damage must be made before equality can be restored. This duty rests, in the first place, upon the chief perpetrator of the damage; and, secondarily, upon those who have voluntarily aided him, physically or morally, to inflict the injury. Such aid or co-operation may be given in various ways, viz.: by taking part in the material action; by command, advice, consent; by sheltering or concealing; by sharing in ill-gotten gains; and even by not warning, not preventing, or not making the guilty known when one is, in justice, bound to do so.

The virtue of Justice forbids us to injure our neighbor, and this obligation is of its nature grave, as all theologians admit. Still, if the matter be trivial an offense against justice is no more than a venial sin, as all agree. The well-known lines: —

It is a sin

To steal a pin,

Much more to steal

A greater thing may be as faulty from the strictly theological stand- - point as they are from the poetic; but for all that they express the theological truth that the matter determines whether a sin against justice is grievous or venial.

But when does the matter become sufficient to constitute a mortal sin? Theologians have always considered this a difficult question to answer. And yet it is a question of great practical importance for the confessor, not only that he may know when he must require restitution to be made under pain of refusing absolution, but also for measuring the guilt of violations by religious of their vow of poverty; for this question is settled on the same principles. Nearly all theologians who treat of justice discuss this question; and of late there has been a tendency in certain quarters greatly to increase the sum which others commonly assign as necessary and sufficient for a mortal sin of theft. Unless I am much mistaken, they have increased it unduly, and for reasons which have no validity ; so I propose briefly to examine the question again, and in doing so I will make use of the labors of economists. For although the question belongs to theology, still, as we shall see, its solution partly depends on certain data which belong to economics, and on these it is only right that economists should be heard.

Since about the time of Lugo († 1660) it has been a common opinion among theologians that it is a grave sin of theft to rob a working man of a sum which is sufficient to support him and his family for a day. The reason for this doctrine is obvious and satisfactory. For that quantity will be sufficient for a mortal sin, whose theft causes a notable injury to the owner, an injury which ordinary men of prudence and sense consider serious, and which is sufficient to upset them considerably. This is the test which is applied in other matters where there is question of the grave breach of a moral law which admits of parvity of matter. When theologians settle what omission of the Office by a priest, or of Mass on a Sunday by the faithful, or what quantity of servile work on a holy-day of obligation is mortally sinful, they ask themselves what quantity of the matter prescribed or forbidden, as the case may be, is notable and considerable, having regard to the subject matter, the end of the precept in question, and the intention of the lawgiver. In the same way, when we wish to know what sum is sufficient for a grave sin of theft, we consider how important it is for maintaining peace among men that property should be secure; what quantity of money or commodities is looked upon as considerable with a view to the use that can be made of them; and what quantity will, with reason, cause the owner serious concern and chagrin if he is unjustly deprived of it. Now, to a workman, or indeed to any one who has to earn his living, the loss of what will support him and his family for a day is a serious matter; it practically means that he has worked a whole day for nothing, and such a loss causes most men, with reason, to be seriously put out. So that we may take it as fairly established doctrine that the theft of such a sum will keep the owner and his family for a day is a grave sin.

This rule, however, will only serve in those cases where theft has been committed against one who earns his living, or at any rate, who is not very rich. It cannot be applied to wealthy companies, or governments, or to millionaires, who would hardly feel the loss of a day’s support in however grand a style they live. And so in such cases we must have recourse to other considerations in order to find what quantity will constitute a grave sin of injustice when stolen. Here we consider, not so much the loss caused to the owner of the property, as the wrong done to public order and to the security of property. Public and private interests require that property should be safe; public as well as private interests are seriously jeopardized when notable injuries to property are of frequent occurrence. All this is but saying in other words that the public weal requires that theft of a considerable sum must be forbidden in all cases, as a grave violation of justice, by the natural law. A prohibition, under pain of venial sin, not to steal a considerable sum of money, would not be sufficient to safeguard the rights of property. In other words, theft of what is commonly at a certain time and place considered a notable sum of money, will be sufficient to constitute a mortal sin of theft, even when the owner of the property stolen is not sensibly the worse off.

We have now arrived at a principle for measuring the quantity which will be grave matter in theft, independently of the harm done to the owner who is wronged. But there remains the great difficulty of determining the quantity which public and private interests require should not be stolen under pain of committing grievous sin. The value of money is constantly changing, and differs considerably in different places; the quantity of money, too, in a country varies greatly with the growth or decrease of national wealth, and so, a sum which was considerable at one time would cease to be so at another. This truth is illustrated very well by the change in the opinions of theologians from age to age on this point. Navarrus, in the sixteenth century, taught that a sum equivalent to about twopence-halfpenny of our money was sufficient for a mortal sin of theft. This opinion, however, was commonly rejected as too severe. Sanchez says that the more common and the truer opinion fixed the sum at one shilling and eightpence. Lugo, a generation later, called attention to the change in the value of money which had been caused by the large influx of the precious metals from America. He asserted, that where formerly fifty gold crowns sufficed for support, three times that sum did not suffice in his day. And so, following the example of other recent authors, as he says, he put the sum required for grave theft, in the case of very rich lords and kings, at five shillings. St. Alphonsus thought five shillings sufficient in the case of rich lords, but for kings he put the sum of ten shillings. Modern theologians agree in still further increasing the amount. Haine and Marc increase it to between twenty and twenty-five francs; D’Annibale and Bucceroni to between twenty and thirty francs; Kenrick and Sabetti to five dollars; Lehmkuhl to between twenty and thirty shillings; Berardi to between thirty and forty francs; Génicot and Waffelaert to forty francs. Lehmkuhl thinks that for England and America, on account of the less value of money in those countries, thirty or forty shillings would be required for a grave sin. Father Ojetti¹ goes further than any one else that I have seen, and says that a sum under four pounds would not be grave matter.

¹ Synopsis rerum moralium, s.v. “Furtum.”

All these theologians, as was to be expected, attach great weight to traditional teaching on the point, but on account of the continual depreciation of money, they think the amount required for grave theft continually increases. Génicot, to take one example, says: —

“Nor does this last computation [forty francs] seem to exceed the measure for our region, if account is taken of the great change that has occurred in the value of money since the time when many authors whom St. Alphonsus cites required two or three gold pieces [fifteen francs].”²

² Vol. I., n. 497.

The very great depreciation in the value of money, then, is the reason why he selects a sum eight times as great as that assigned by Lugo and others in the seventeenth century, and three times as much as the most liberal of those who are quoted by St. Alphonsus. This reason is not theological, it rests on a question of fact: has money, in reality, depreciated so much in value during the last two or three centuries? This is a question belonging to economics, a difficult question, as all admit, but one on which great labor has been spent, and with regard to which fairly certain conclusions have been reached, though no pretense can be made to mathematical accuracy.

Professor Bastable, one of our greatest authorities on monetary questions, gives in the Encyclopædia Britannica³ a general history of the changes which have taken place within historical times in the value of money. Concerning the period with which we are dealing, he writes: —

³ S.v. “Money.”

The annual addition to the store of money has been estimated as £2,100,000 for the period from 1545 to 1600. At this date the Brazilian supply began. The course of distribution of these fresh masses of the precious metals is an interesting point, which has been studied by Mr. Cliffe Leslie. The flow of the new supplies was first towards Spain and Portugal, and from thence they passed to the larger commercial centers of the other European countries, the effect being that prices were raised in and about the chief towns, while the value of money in the country districts remained unaltered. The additions to the supply of both gold and silver during the two centuries 1600-1800 continued to be very considerable; but, if Adam Smith’s view be correct, the full effect on prices was produced by 1640, and the increased amount of money was from that time counterbalanced by the wider extension of trade. At the commencement of this century [nineteenth] the annual production of gold has been estimated as being from £2,500,000 to £3,000,000. The year 1809 seems to mark an epoch in the production of these metals, since the outbreak of the revolts of the various Spanish dependencies in South America tended to check the usual supply from those countries, and a marked increase in the value of money was the consequence. During the period 1809-1849 the value of gold and silver rose to about two and a half times their former level, notwithstanding fresh discoveries in Asiatic Russia. The annual yield in 1849 was estimated at £8,- 000,000. The next important date for our present purpose is the year 1848, when the Californian mines were opened, while in 1851 the Australian discoveries took place. By these events an enormous mass of gold was added to the world’s supply. The most careful estimates fix the addition during the years 1851-1871 at £500,000,000, or an amount nearly equal to the former stock in existence. The problems raised by this phenomenon have received the most careful study by several distinguished economists, to whose writings those desiring more extensive information may refer. The main features of interest may be briefly summed up... (2) The contemporaneous development of the Continental railway systems, and the partial adoption of free trade, with the consequent facilities for freer circulation of commodities, led to the course of distribution being different from that of the sixteenth century. The more backward districts were the principal gainers, and a more

general equalization of prices, combined with a slight elevation in the value, was the outcome. .. . (4) The change in the value of money, which may for the period of 1849- 1869 be fixed at twenty per cent., enabled a general increase of wages to be carried out, thus improving the condition of the classes living on manual labor. It may be added that the difficulty of tracing the effects of this great addition to the money stock is a most striking proof of the complexity of modern economic development.

This general sketch is fully borne out by the results obtained by other workers in the same field. The following table was drawn up by the Vicomte d’Avenel, and is borrowed from Palgrave’s Dictionary of Political Economy, iii. p. 193: —

TABLE OF THE COMPARATIVE PURCHASING POWER OF EQUAL WEIGHTS OF THE PRECIOUS METALS AT DIFFERENT Periods IN France :—

Period. PERIOD. 1451-1500 about 6 1651-1675 about 2 1501-1525 ”» 5 1676-1700 » 214% 1526-1550 ” 4 1701-1725 7” 2% 1551-1575 ”» 3 1726-1750 ”» 3 1576-1600 7 216 1751-1775 ”» 2% 1601-1625 » 3 1776-1790 ”» 2 1626-1650 ” 2% 1890 ” 1

To show the changes in the value of money during the last century, we can avail ourselves of the Index numbers calculated for this purpose by able economists, such as Jevons and Sauerbeck. They give the prices of a large number of the chief commodities in gold for each year. I subjoin a table composed of the Jevons’ Index numbers for the years 1782-1839, and of Mr. Sauerbeck’s to 1905. These Index numbers show us whether gold increased or decreased in value, and what the increase or decrease was approximately, for each year.

PERIOD. Jevons’ Ind. No. | Period. Sauerbeck Ind. No. 1782-84 .. 97 | 1840-44 (Jevons, 77).. 92 1785-89 -- 87 | 1845-49 .- 85 1790-94 -. 93 | 1850-54 -. 85 1795-99 .. 120 | 1855-59 -- 98 1800-04 -. 126 | 1860-64 -, 101 1805-09 .. 138 | 1865-69 -. 100 1810-14 -. 125 | 1870-74 -. 104 1815-19 .. 111 | 1875-79 -. 91 1820-24 .. 92 | 1880-84 -- 83 1825-29 .- 88 | 1885-89 .- 70 1830-34 .- 79 1890-94 -. 69 1835-39 ..- 85 | 1895-96 -. 62

1896-1905 .. 68

If it were necessary, the results that we have obtained might be corroborated from other sources, but they will, perhaps, suffice for our purpose.

We find then that from the end of the fifteenth century to the middle of the seventeenth gold decreased in value as 6:2; the Vicomte d’Avenel’s figures fully bear out the correctness of Lugo’s estimate quoted above; from that time till the end of the eighteenth century, the value of gold remained fairly constant ; it sank during the revolutionary wars with France; after Waterloo it rose until about 1850, when it began to sink again till about 1870, since which time it has been rising gradually. The Vicomte d’Avenel calculated that the purchasing power of equal weights of the precious metals in France in 1790 and in 1890 was as 2:1, in other words, the net result of the fluctuations in the value of the precious metals during the nineteenth century was that their value decreased by about one-half.

These conclusions agree with what might be expected on general principles. For the value of the precious metals, as of other things, depends on supply and demand. If the supply is increased, other things remaining the same, the value will fall, as was the case with gold when the vast stores from America had been distributed through the commercial centers of Europe in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. During the next century and a half trade developed, population increased, and the greater number of business transactions demanded a larger supply of money. The demand was equal to the supply, and in spite of the constant influx of gold, its value remained much the same for a century and a half. The revolt of the South American colonies from Spain tended to check supplies from that quarter, and gold rose in value till the discovery of the mines in California and Australia. The quantities drawn from thence caused gold to depreciate till about 1870, when the growing expansion of trade, the adoption by Germany and other countries of a gold standard of currency, together with other causes, brought about an appreciation of the precious metal.

The evidence, then, from Political Economy shows that gold has, indeed, depreciated in value since the time of Lugo, but that the amount of the depreciation is not nearly so great as some modern theologians suppose. If we say that the value of gold in Lugo’s time was twice as much as it is now, we shall probably not be far wrong. So that if we take the opinion of Lugo and other great theologians of his time, as an accurate estimate of the quantity required for a grave sin of theft, we shall arrive at the sum required to-day on account of the depreciation in the value of money, by multiplying Lugo’s five shillings by two. If we adopt the more liberal estimate of Laymann and others, we must double this amount, and say that the theft of more than twenty shillings is always a grave sin. However, besides the depreciation of money, other circumstances have to be considered, as we shall presently see.

Father Lehmkuhl⁴ thinks that in England and in the United States, where, he says, the value of money. is less than in other countries, a sum of from thirty to forty shillings is required; whereas in other countries twenty to thirty shillings would be sufficient for the absolute sum necessary for a mortal sin of theft.

⁴ Vol. I., 931 note.

It is, of course, possible that money may have a greater value on the continent of Europe than in England and the United States. But this, again, is not a theological question, it is a question of fact, though a very complex one, and one very difficult to solve satisfactorily. Just as the value of commodities is measured by money, so the value of money is measured by what it will exchange for. If one pound will purchase more commodities of the same quality in Germany than in England, then the value of money is greater in Germany than it is in England. And if this be the case, a mortal sin of theft will be committed by stealing a less sum of money in Germany than in England.

Of course it is perfectly true that a pound will purchase more of some commodities in Germany than in Great Britain. It will purchase more wine in the Rhineland, otherwise Rhenish wine would not be imported to England. On the other hand, it will not purchase more cotton goods, or else we should not export those articles to Germany. But the value of money depends on its general purchasing power, not on its power of purchasing more or less of one or two commodities. The general purchasing power of money is proximately determined by the law of supply and demand. If the supply of money increases relatively to the supply of other commodities for sale, its value decreases; if the supply decreases its value augments. Moreover, whenever an object has a higher value the greater demand attracts supplies until a common level is reached. Money obeys this law like any other commodity, and the vast improvement in means of communication which the last hundred years have witnessed, the facility and cheapness of carriage, the intimate commercial relations which now exist between all the countries of the civilized world, tend to equalize values, if we neglect tariffs and the cost of transit. So that, although we should allow still for some difference in the value of money in the different countries of the civilized world, it is probable that the difference is not great. Professor Bastable says:⁵ “ At present it is quite natural to assume that the materials of money are distributed by means of international trade, and tend to keep at an equal level all the world over,—an assumption which is in general well grounded, though an important exception exists with regard to the East.” Professor Marshall, one of our greatest English economists, is of opinion that money is now of greater value in England than in France. He writes: — 6

⁵ Encycl. Brit., s.v. “ Money.”

Free trade, improvements in transport, the opening of new countries, and other causes have made the general purchasing power of money in terms of commodities rise in England relatively to the Continent. Early in this century [nineteenth] twenty-five francs would buy more, and especially more of the things needed by the working classes, in France than £1 would in England. But now the advantage is the other way: and this causes the recent growth of the wealth of France to appear to be greater relatively to that of England than it really is.

Many facts seem to corroborate Professor Marshall’s opinion. There is undoubtedly less gold in England now than there was twenty-five years ago, 7 and it is estimated that the circulation of gold, silver, and uncovered notes per head of the population is almost as much in Germany and Spain, is considerably more in Belgium and Holland, and more than twice as much in France as it is in England.⁸

⁸ Ibid., p. 605.

Statistics published in 1903 by the Board of Trade in the Blue Book on British and Foreign Trade and Industry [Cd. 1761] tend to prove the same conclusion. By their means we can make a rough estimate of the relative cost of the chief necessities of life in England, in America, and on the Continent. Since 1877 the price of food, which represents one-half of the total expenditure of the working classes, has de creased by about thirty per cent. in Great Britain; very much more than it has decreased in France and Germany. Between 1880 and 1897, the cost of workmen’s food in Paris fell fourteen points, compared with thirteen in Germany, and forty-two in the United Kingdom.⁹ Of the chief articles of food, bread and flour are cheaper in London than in Paris or Berlin; home-produced butcher’s meat is slightly dearer, but the balance is redressed by the cheaper price of foreign and colonial meat. Butter and eggs are slightly dearer in London, but sugar and rice are cheaper. Clothing is cheaper, on the whole, in England than on the Continent or in America; house rent in the large towns is somewhat dearer.

⁹ Loc. cit., p. 226.

6 Principles of Economics, i., p. 817.

1 Dictionary of Political Economy, ii., p. 617.

It would seem, then, that there is no reason for saying that money has less value in England than on the Continent, or that, on this account, a greater sum is required in England for a mortal sin of theft. The contrary is probably more correct.

Not all countries, however, are equally rich; England and America are the richest nations in the world, and it is conceivable that in comparison with the wealth of the population, what is a notable sum in one country is not so in another. I take it that this would be true if the wealth of England and America were more or less equally divided among the population. This is not by any means the case. Wealth, in great measure at any rate, seems to accumulate in comparatively few hands, and the great mass of the people remains little the better off for the greater wealth in the country. The urban population of England is about seventy-seven per cent of the whole, and the recent investigations of Mr. Charles Booth and Mr. Rowntree have shown that some thirty per cent. of these live in a state of poverty, without a sufficiency of the bare necessaries of life. It seems to me that in these circumstances the common estimate of the value of money in England is not likely to be less, but rather more than in other European countries.

It is, indeed, true that wages are higher in England and in America than in France or Germany. According to the rough estimate contained in the Blue Book from which I have already quoted, workmen’s wages in the United States are one-and-a-half times higher than in England; in Germany they are two-thirds, and in France three-fourths of those which prevail in the United Kingdom. We may remark, however, in passing, that this does not prove that the cost of labor of the same amount and quality is greater in the States and in England than abroad; it may be, as many competent judges affirm, that English and American labor is more efficient, and so as cheap or cheaper than labor is on the Continent. So that even though the income of the working-classes is greater in England than it is abroad, this will not cause them to put a less value on money if it costs them correspondingly greater effort. Still the higher wages and cheaper food and clothing enable the working classes in England to spend more and live in greater style, than on the Continent, and this may somewhat lower the common estimate of the value of money. But, even if we allow something for this, it seems to me that Father Lehmkuhl’s estimate of the difference is much too large, amounting, as it does, to fifty per cent.

The general level of wages, not only in England and America, but on the Continent also, is very much higher now than it was sixty or seventy years ago. In 1883, Sir Robert Giffen calculated that in England at that time wages were much more than one hundred per cent. higher than they had been fifty years before.¹⁰ Engel estimated that workmen’s incomes had nearly doubled in Belgium between the years 1853 and 1891. 11 This general rise in wages will have some influence on the estimate to be formed of the quantity required for a grave sin of theft. For the working classes form the great bulk of the population, and their estimate of the value of money will greatly influence the general estimate. It seems clear that a workman who gets thirty shillings a week will put less value on ten shillings than if his weekly wage were only twenty shillings. We must, then, allow not only for the depreciation of money, but also for the higher wages, the higher standard of comfort, and in consequence, the relatively less value attached to money by the working-classes throughout the civilized world, independently of its purchasing power.

¹⁰ Dictionary of Political Economy, ii., p. 617.

All things considered, I see no reason for increasing the quantity which the greater number of modern theologians assign as the absolute sum required for a mortal sin of theft. That quantity is about twenty shillings, and if we attach much importance, as we should do, to the opinions of such classical moralists of the past as Lugo about such a question, the sum will be rather below than above twenty shillings.

11 Ibid., iii., p. 679.

With twenty shillings I can purchase a week’s work of an average workman, who will be able to support himself and his family on it. Such a sum is a notable quantity of money; it is a very respectable subscription even for a rich man to a charity, or any other object that attracts public support. Subscriptions to learned societies are, commonly enough, one pound or one guinea a year. If such a sum could be stolen without grave sin, its amount would prove too great a temptation for the virtue of large numbers of people, who wish to save their souls, but make little of venial sins; who shrink from crime, but, to put the matter in homely language, do not profess to be better than their neighbors. For all these reasons, then, it seems to me that to assign twenty shillings as the absolute sum required for a grave sin of theft, is as near the truth as we can get in so intricate a question.