Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 1. On Necessity Excusing the Carrying Away of Another's Thing
- Things to be noted beforehand. 1. One necessity is extreme or quasi-extreme, or gravest; another grave; and another common (recall the things said in n. 480, 3).
The right to life is prior to the right to property.
The rich person from charity alone is held in ordinary cases to provide for his neighbor: therefore he must give, not hide the things that the neighbor needs. - But from justice the rich person is held not to impede the poor person by violent means from using his right; if he has impeded him, he is liable to restitution.
Here it must be asked: when does the poor person use his right legitimately?
- Principles. I. It is not licit to steal another's things in grave necessity, nor a fortiori in common necessity. The reason is that then the owners are reasonably unwilling; and otherwise an easy entrance would lie open to plunderings. It is confirmed from the thirty-sixth proposition condemned by Innocent XI. Except with Viva (Theses damn., prop. 36, n. 10), if from the adjuncts, for example from the piety of a wealthy owner, his consent is prudently presumed.
- II. Anyone constituted in extreme necessity can steal another's thing, as much as suffices for freeing himself from such necessity. Thus commonly with St. Thomas (2. 2, q. 66, a. 7). - The reason is that the primary end for which God created things is the conservation of human life; hence the right of property must yield to the right to life (cf. n. 216). - The case is excepted in which the owner himself, by the taking away of his thing, would be reduced to equal necessity. For then the rule has force: "In an equal cause, the condition of the possessor is better"; and therefore the owner would be unwilling by right (III, 520, q. 3).
Hence it is inferred: 1. One constituted in extreme necessity is not held to seek the thing from the owner, if that thing in species is absolutely necessary to him; for then he has the right of vindicating it for himself.
- If the thing that someone needs in such necessity is of great value, nevertheless, according to the truer opinion, he can vindicate it for himself; because he has the right of taking whatever is actually necessary for the conservation of his life. - Yet the rich person is not held to give that precious thing from justice, which does not impose the burden of providing for a neighbor; nor from charity, which does not oblige with so great a loss, as was said in n. 488, 2. - But from piety he would be held to give to a father or son; and from justice he is held not to impede positively the poor person from the use of his right (St. Alphonsus, l.c.).
We said: as much as suffices, etc. For thus the order of justice requires, which indeed uses its own right, but does not go beyond it.
Hence: a) If only the use of the thing suffices, for example of a horse for fleeing, when the necessity ceases there remains the obligation of restoring. - b) If the one in extreme need has elsewhere in reality or in probable hope something from which he can pay, he cannot take another's thing except with the burden of restitution: because necessity then does not require the thing to be received gratis when it can sufficiently be relieved by a thing received by loan or commodatum. - c) But if the one in extreme need has nothing elsewhere in reality or in hope, after he has consumed another's thing he is not held to restitution, even if he has come to a better condition. - The same must probably be said if the thing was stolen; because, if it had existed with the owner, the needy person could have taken and consumed it without obligation of restoring (III, 520, q. 4 and 5).
- III. The same things are valid for him who is in gravest or quasi-extreme necessity. For this necessity is equated with extreme necessity. In such necessity someone can provide for himself from another's goods through ordinary means, but not through exquisite and extraordinary means. Thus St. Alphonsus (III, 520) and others commonly.
But such gravest necessity is judged to exist when someone is in probable danger of undergoing death, for example from assassins, unless he hand over such a sum of money; or of losing some principal member, say an eye; or of falling into perpetual captivity, or into perpetual illness, or of incurring infamy. For it is not necessary that evils of this kind actually be inflicted; it suffices that they threaten proximately and morally certainly, indeed that a certainly probable danger of them threaten.
It is asked: Whether it is licit to steal another's thing in order to come to the aid of the extreme necessity of one's neighbor?
Resp. affirmatively: the reason is that then you bear the role of one showing indulgence and you show that you love your neighbor as yourself (St. Thomas, l.c., ad 3). Indeed piety and, grave inconvenience being excluded, charity itself can sometimes obligate you to this. - "But if you could have bestowed your own thing, and you gave another's, it seems that you are held to restitution; because you could not determine another's thing when your own was at hand." Thus St. Alphonsus, II, n. 33. Cf. the things said in n. 489, q. 2.