Chapter — Prümmer, Manuale Theologiae Moralis
Chapter II. On The Unjust Taking Away Of Another's Thing
77. Preliminary Note. The unjust taking away of a thing is either simple or qualified. In the first sense it is the same as theft. In the other sense there is added a certain quality changing the species. Qualities of this kind are two: that of a sacred thing and that of force employed in the unjust taking away. Therefore there are three species of unjust taking away, namely simple theft, real sacrilege, and rapine. It will be better to discuss sacrilege below, when local and personal sacrilege also will be treated. - Ancient authors, besides the qualified thefts just enumerated, assigned from Roman law certain others, namely 1. peculate, by which someone steals something from public goods or converts it to his own private uses; 2. plagium, by which someone abducts a man, whether free or slave, into servitude; 3. cattle-lifting, by which someone steals cattle in pastures. - All these indeed have only historical value; in confessional practice judgment must be made about them in the same way as about simple theft. Nevertheless some things will be said specially below, n. 84, concerning peculate or concerning thefts in public things.
Rapine is the unjust taking away of another's thing while the owner is present and unwilling, upon whom grave violence or fear is inflicted. Therefore rapine includes a twofold injustice: one real, the other personal; for another's thing is unjustly taken away, which constitutes real injustice; besides, by fear or violence a most grave injury is inflicted upon the person of the present owner, which constitutes personal injustice. Whence it is clear that rapine is a much graver sin than simple theft. Consequently it is also punished by civil tribunals much more gravely than theft. But rapine is not only a graver sin than theft, but is also specifically distinguished from theft, because it includes an injustice distinct in species.7 But with respect to the restitution of goods carried off by rapine, the same things are valid which will be said below, n. 80 sqq., concerning the restitution of goods taken away by theft.
For the sake of clarity, all things that must be said in this chapter we divide into three articles: 1. on the nature and gravity of theft in general; 2. on certain thefts in particular; 3. on causes excusing the taking away of another's thing.
7 Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 66, a. 4 and 9.