Duties to Parents and Superiors (Fourth Commandment)

293. On obligations in general. Parents, and in their defect ascendants, are bound from piety to show children love, bodily education, and spiritual education. And the obligation of love indeed never ceases, but the obligation of education ceases when the end itself ceases.

a. The right of educating offspring belongs in the first place to parents; wherefore they offend against nature itself who vindicate the right of educating to civil authority.¹

b. The obligation of education arises from the law of nature and is of its kind grave.

c. In defect of parents, ascendants, namely grandfather and grandmother, are bound to educate children; and indeed the paternal grandfather, because he succeeds to the father, before the maternal. But now civil law is accustomed to supply the defect of parents by constituting a tutor or curator. This obligation also extends to illegitimate and spurious children (n. 292).

¹ Cf. Th. Meyer, Institutiones iuris natur., II, n. 108 ss.

294. Obligation of love. The obligation of love comprises three things: they ought to will good to children, do good to them, and turn away evil from them, whether bodily or spiritual.

a. Therefore parents sin against piety, and also gravely according to the measure of the matter, if they pursue children with hatred, seriously call down evils upon them, favor one of the children before the others without just cause, subordinate some children, for example those of a prior marriage, to others, inflict evils upon them or do not turn evils away from them when they can.

b. If they manifest the hidden defects of their children to outsiders, if they treat them too harshly, so that, for example, they inflict a grave evil upon them by mutilation, they offend not only against piety, but also against justice.

295. Obligation of bodily education. Bodily education likewise requires three things: that they procure for children life, sustenance, and state.

Since the primary end of marriage, which is the procreation of offspring, cannot be obtained unless to generation there is added the preservation and suitable education of the offspring received, those about to marry, with the obligation of rendering the conjugal debt, also contract the obligation of preserving and educating the offspring to be received.

a. Therefore parents are bound, from the very conception of the offspring up to the time when it can sufficiently provide for itself, to supply to it those things which are necessary for preserving life and health, and likewise to turn away all things which harm life or health. And so the care of the mother concerning the life of the offspring begins immediately from conception; therefore she ought to guard against both the danger of abortion and any detriment whatever of the fetus.¹

The mother ought to take care that the offspring be born sound in mind and body. Therefore let her abstain from food and drink, especially alcoholic, which harms the body and irritates the nerves. She ought to beware, as far as can be done, of more vehement excitations and movements of the heart, of illicit desires, and especially of all those things which injure chastity, such as wicked readings and obscene spectacles. For since every movement of the soul, every passion, in general all internal thoughts and appetitions exercise an influence upon the fetus, the whole internal life should be peaceful, chaste, religious, and pious, so that the offspring may acquire hereditary dispositions rather toward virtue and good morals than toward vices.²

b. Parents are bound to supply to children sustenance, that is, food, clothing, habitation, and education, up to that time when they themselves can provide the things necessary for themselves according to the measure of their state, indeed even through the whole time of life if they are found in extreme or grave necessity. Nor are they excused from the office of supporting children on account of their perversity.

alpha. The father is not immune from the obligation of supporting a son, with support necessary for life, if the latter has dissipated the portion previously given to him. In equal manner, if the son has contracted debts for procuring sustenance for himself, the father is bound to pay them, because he is bound to support the son; but debts contracted from another title he is not bound to pay.

beta. Therefore parents sin gravely who without just cause expose offspring, whether in a hospital or on the threshold of a parish house, etc., not only because they fail in their office, but also because they harm the offspring, since they bring it into suspicion of spurious origin. And if they expose the offspring in a deserted place, so that for this reason it undergoes danger to life, they sin not only against piety, but also against justice. Yet if they had a just cause for exposing offspring, such as the danger of losing life or reputation, or the impossibility of supporting the offspring, this would excuse them at least from grave sin.

gamma. But if a rich father exposes offspring in a foundling hospital (Findelhaus) erected by pious generosity for supporting exposed infants, according to a probable opinion he is not bound to restore the expenses for supporting the offspring. For these hospitals were erected to protect the life of little ones who are accustomed to be killed by the poor lest they have to support them, and by the rich lest they be defamed. From these things some infer that the rich ought to pay the expenses for supporting offspring, because, to avoid infamy, it is not necessary that they be excused from paying expenses. But others probably release them from this burden, because the reputation of the parents and the safety of the little ones would not be sufficiently provided for if the rich had to pay the expenses of support.³ But where exposed infants are supported by care of the civil community, whether in private homes or in a hospital, from taxes or from goods destined for the poor, rich parents are bound to compensate the expenses.⁴

c. Parents are bound to procure for children a state suitable to their condition, so that afterward they can live honorably according to their state. Therefore alpha. they ought to take care that they learn either a trade or letters; beta. they ought to employ at least some moderate diligence so that they may leave to children an inheritance suitable to their state.⁵ Wherefore parents can sin gravely not only if they squander their goods so that they leave the children needy, but also if they employ no care to acquire goods from which children may be supported according to their state and receive an inheritance.

Parents are indeed bound to furnish a suitable dowry to children who embrace an honorable state; yet if they justly dissent from their marriage, they are bound to furnish only necessary support if they need it.

¹ Cf. Capellmann, Medicina pastoralis^6 (Aquisgrani: Barth, 1893), p. 155 ss.

² Cf. Ernst, Elternpflicht, chapter 2 (Kevelaer: Butzon-Bercker).

³ St. Alphonsus, n. 656.

⁴ Cf. Marres, De iustitia^2 (Ruraemundae: Romen, 1889), l. 2, n. 310 ss.

⁵ Cf. 2 Cor. 12:14.

296. Whether mothers are bound to nourish children with their own milk. A mother of herself is bound to nourish children with her own milk; yet this obligation can scarcely be called grave. Wherefore a mother does not seem to sin gravely, even if without just cause she hands over an infant to a nurse to be nourished, provided the little one is suitably and sufficiently nourished. Physiologists judge of this obligation somewhat more severely than theologians. For maternal milk, so they say, is for the infant the most natural food; indeed it is the nourishment uniquely suited to it. Wherefore a mother assuming a nurse, and especially nourishing offspring either wholly or in part with cow's milk, fails in the office imposed upon her by nature itself; moreover she exposes her own health to various dangers. There is added the reason of the common good: for from the custom, widely prevailing, of employing nurses without just cause, it follows that nurses neglect their own offspring, that they fornicate lest they lose the office of nurse, etc.¹ But from these things it indeed follows that mothers are earnestly to be exhorted to nourish their offspring themselves, without however needing to be obligated to this under grave obligation.

Three causes are customarily enumerated on account of which mothers can without sin hand children over to others to be nourished: alpha. necessity, as if the mother is too weak, sick, if milk is lacking, etc.; beta. notable utility, as if the mother cannot nurse the child without abandoning labor by which she is accustomed to procure sustenance for herself; gamma. custom flourishing among noble families. But custom against the law of nature can generate good faith, but it cannot remove the law itself; wherefore not even for a noble woman without legitimate cause is it licit to hand over offspring to another's nurse. But in this case they are bound under grave obligation to employ a nurse who in no way harms the health of the infant; for experience establishes that by certain diseases of the nursing woman the infant also can easily be infected. Capellmann and Antonelli rightly affirm that the moral qualities of the nurse effectively influence the infant, although others deny this.²

¹ Capellmann, Medicina pastoralis^6, n. 47 s.

² Cf. Antonelli, Medicina pastor.^2, I, 489 ss.; Olfers, Pastoralmedicin^2 (Freiburg: Herder, 1893), p. 32 ff.

297. Obligation of spiritual education.¹ Spiritual education is chiefly instruction and right governance in those things which are necessary for attaining salvation, and therefore it comprises four things: instruction, example, correction, and vigilance.

a. Parents: alpha. ought to instruct children, either by themselves or through others, in all things which are necessary for salvation, whether by necessity of means or of precept, and in the exercises of Christian life which are common to all the faithful. beta. They ought to take care that children be imbued with good morals, observe the precepts of God and of the Church, frequent the sacraments, and abstain from sins.

After considering the social and economic circumstances which now occur almost everywhere, parents are bound to send children to school, not only so that they may be suitably instructed in the Christian religion, but also in letters. Although elementary instruction is not called absolutely necessary for procuring for oneself the supports of life, nevertheless those who lack the instruction which others enjoy are pressed by many difficulties and inconveniences; but parents are bound to preserve their children from inconveniences of this sort, since they easily can. There is added that those whose mind is suitably developed and cultivated can much more easily drive away the dangers which today everywhere threaten both faith and morals.

b. They ought to furnish children a good example; wherefore they sin gravely against piety if in a grave matter they are for them an occasion of sinning, for example, by blaspheming before them, by speaking foul things against good morals, impious things against faith.

c. They are bound seriously indeed, but prudently and discreetly, to correct the vices of children. Sacred Scripture inculcates this obligation rather often,² so that parents can sin gravely if they notably neglect to correct the defects and sins of children.

Parents sin, sometimes even gravely, if without legitimate cause they beat children from hatred alone, likewise if they exceed just limits by punishing more gravely than the children have deserved.

d. Vigilance, by which parents are bound to guard children, demands that they remove all things which can be harmful to children. Therefore let them not permit them to associate with evil companions, read bad books, frequent bad workshops or schools or theaters, unless necessity compels them.

Parents must also watch lest children harm others: and indeed those who do not yet have the use of reason they must watch continually and from justice; but those who have sufficient discretion they must watch from piety and to this extent, insofar as they prohibit them from inflicting evils, as far as they morally can.

¹ Pedagogical institutes treat professedly of the end, object, and means of education.

² Prov. 13:24; 23:13.

298. Declarations. 1. Non-Catholic schools are of diverse kinds: a. positively non-Catholic, in which heresy or impiety is openly taught; b. neutral, which in instruction and education wholly prescind from positive religion. These are also called mixed schools, because they admit pupils belonging to any sect whatever.

2. Pupils of schools of this sort are exposed to proximate danger of perversion both as to faith and as to morals. This danger chiefly flows from a threefold cause: from teachers, from books, and from fellow pupils. Nor do neutral schools lack this danger; for by the very fact that pupils are neither instructed in the faith nor educated to live in a Christian manner, indifferentism is fostered and the way is prepared for atheism. Moreover, it can scarcely happen that instruction wholly prescind from religion; but what is said about religion in schools of this sort is usually contrary to the Catholic religion.

3. What is said here about non-Catholic schools is valid not only of elementary and middle schools but also of higher schools: for in all, even the highest, which are not truly Catholic, grave dangers in faith and morals threaten the pupils.

¹ Instruction of the Holy Office, 24 Nov. 1875, to the bishops of North America. Cf. I. Aertnys, Fasciculus theol. moral.^4 (Tornaci: Castermann, 1888), tract. 1, n. 38 ss.; Genicot, I, n. 352.

299. Assertions. 1. Never, not even for avoiding the gravest damage, is it licit for parents to send children to non-Catholic schools in which the proximate danger of perversion can in no way be removed; nor is it ever licit for the children themselves to frequent schools of this sort, even if parents force them to this, because it is never licit to expose oneself to a proximate danger of sinning which cannot be removed.

Schools of this sort are those in which those things are taught or done which cannot be heard or performed without grave spiritual detriment, as if openly evil doctrines are proposed, if pupils are forced to recite heretical prayers, to be present at false rites, if fellow pupils are so evil that scarcely anyone can be preserved from contagion.

2. Although of itself it is always illicit to send children to non-Catholic schools, nevertheless from a just cause it is licit to send them to those schools in which the proximate danger of perversion can be made remote. The reason for the first is that parents do not satisfy their obligation if they procure for children an education which is only not openly opposed to the true religion, unless it is also truly Christian and Catholic. The reason for the second is that from a just cause it is licit to expose oneself to a remote danger of perversion.

a. A sufficient cause on account of which a non-Catholic school can be approached is present if no Catholic school is had, or if the Catholic school which is available does not suffice for the condition of the children, while the parents lack the resources by which they can send the children into another region to a Catholic school. Moreover, the excusing cause must be greater in proportion as the danger of perversion is greater. But judgment both concerning the quality of the school and concerning the sufficiency of the cause belongs to the ordinary.

b. The means by which the proximate danger must be removed are these: alpha. to instruct and educate the children suitably outside school in those things which are necessary for believing and living in a Christian manner; beta. to teach and confirm them suitably in those things which are usually chiefly attacked in schools of this sort; gamma. to watch diligently lest children suffer damage in faith and morals either from bad books or from evil companions.

c. The Holy See itself declared that it could now be tolerated, what had previously been prohibited, that Catholic youths approach the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, because a Catholic university was lacking in England; and at the same time it determined what cautions had to be employed for removing the dangers arising from it.¹

Note. From these things the following are now inferred for practice:

a. Parents cannot be absolved: alpha. if they send children to non-Catholic schools because they approve their principles and prefer them to Catholic schools; beta. if they commit children to be instructed in positively non-Catholic schools; gamma. if they hand over children to a non-Catholic school and do not take care that the danger of perversion be removed.

b. To parents who without sufficient cause send children to a non-Catholic school, but take care that the dangers of perversion be removed by a good education of the children, absolution cannot be denied, unless by reason of scandal or cooperation in promoting bad schools they sin gravely; because they do not expose them to proximate danger of perversion, and they are not bound under grave obligation to avoid a remote danger.

c. That priests teach Christian doctrine in mixed schools and Catholic men teach other disciplines in the same schools, the Holy See not only permits, but greatly commends. Yet at the same time it wills that the people be warned that this is done so that the evils which flow from schools of this sort may be turned away as far as can be done, and that parents are not for this reason excused from sending their children to merely Catholic schools, in which their faith and morals are in no way endangered.²

¹ Holy Office, 26 Mar. 1895. S. C. de Prop. Fide, 17 Apr. 1895, to the Archbishop of Westminster.

² Holy Office, 26 Mar. 1866, to the bishops of Switzerland.

The Fourth Commandment is: “ Honour thy father and thy mother.”¹ By this Commandment not only are children bound to be dutiful in their conduct towards their parents, but these latter are also implicitly bidden to perform all the obligations which nature imposes on them towards their offspring, inasmuch as rights imply corresponding obligations. The mutual obligations of parent and child may be extended to all who hold an analogous position towards each other, and so under this heading theologians commonly treat of the mutual obligations of other relations, and of superiors and subjects, both ecclesiastical and civil.

¹ Summa, 2-2, q. 101, a. 3.

CHILDREN owe their existence to their parents, and for many years, until they come to maturity, they stand in need of their constant care and direction. It is but right, therefore, that children should love, reverence, and obey the authors of their being and their natural guardians. This is due to parents from their children on account of the special relationship in which they stand towards them, and so, as St Thomas teaches,” there must be a special virtue which regulates the mutual obligations of parent and child. This virtue is called piety in Catholic theology, and it regulates not only the mutual offices of parents and children towards each other, but our duty to other near relatives, and to our country and fellow-countrymen. It is a virtue similar to charity, but it binds more strictly, so that while charity prescribes a general love for all mankind, piety obliges us to a special love for those who are near to us, and for the country in which we were born.¹

If, then, hatred or want of love for our fellow-men is of itself a grave sin, as we saw above, it will be still easier to commit a grave sin by want of proper affection for our parents. To show dislike of them or contempt for them, or to show that we are ashamed of them, will be a grave sin if our unfilial conduct is likely to cause them serious grief. In the same way, serious want of reverence and respect shown in word or action is grievously sinful. To strike a parent, or even to threaten to do so, will usually be mortally sinful.

By the duty of obedience children are bound to obey their parents in all that belongs to their bringing up and to domestic discipline. Sins of disobedience will be grievous if the matter is sufficiently important and the command is given with the serious intention of imposing a strict obligation.

Children are only bound to support their parents when they cannot support themselves, for whatever property a child may have or may acquire belongs exclusively to him. Among the working classes it is usual for elder brothers or sisters who have begun to work to throw their earnings into the common stock for the support of the family until they leave home and get an establishment of their own. This is quite as it should be, for the money which they earn is scarcely sufficient to pay for their own keep; or if it does more, there are little brothers and sisters or aged parents who are dependent on them, and whom they are bound to help to support.

¹ St Thomas, Summa, 2-2, q. 101, a. I.

The other obligations of children towards their parents are permanent and last as long as life, but that of obedience ceases with their emancipation, In England children are emancipated from the control of their parents when they become twenty-one years of age, when they marry, or when they enter into religion; for as soon as they have attained the age of puberty they are independent of their parents in what concerns the salvation of their souls and the choice of a state of life.

A minor may also enlist as a soldier without his parents’ consent according to the English law.

Moreover, when a child has attained years of discretion, which he is considered to do at sixteen, it would seem that he may lawfully depart from home and provide for himself, if it be for his advantage. This, of course, supposes that the necessities of his parents or of his brothers and sisters do not require that he should remain at home. If a youth has acted in this way, and it appears to be for his benefit, English courts will not compel him to return home, and it was the common teaching of the classical moralists that in acting thus a youth would do nothing wrong.¹

¹ Laymann, lib. 3, tract. 4, c. 8, n. 13.

Nature herself teaches parents their duties towards the offspring that they have brought into the world, and which stands in need of their loving care for many years before it arrives at maturity, so as to be able to lead an independent life.

Parents, then, are bound first and foremost to love their children with that special affection which belongs to the virtue of piety. They will commit grievous sin if they are indifferent to their children’s welfare, if they deliberately curse them, if they show great and foolish preference for one child over others to the serious discontent of the latter.

They are bound to support their children until these can support themselves. Even before the child’s birth, the mother must take care not to risk its life or natural development. After birth she is bound at least under venial sin to nourish it with her own milk, unless some good reason excuse her. Then there is the obligation of providing sufficiently for the child’s maintenance, according to its position in life, by a prudent administration of the family property, or by earning money and saving what is necessary for the purpose. Grave sin is committed by a father who will not work, or who squanders his wages in drink or gambling, so that wife and children are deprived of proper support. Parents are bound to instruct their children in all that is required to enable them to lead a good Christian life; they must warn them of dangers into which their inexperience would lead them, and correct them when they do wrong. Above all, they must be careful to give them good example by leading a good Catholic life themselves, and by never being a source of scandal to their children in word or deed. They must watch to see with what companions their children associate, what they read, and what places they frequent.

The Elementary Education Act, 1876, declared it to be the duty of the parent of every child between the ages of five and fourteen years to cause it to receive efficient elementary instruction in reading, writing, and arithmetic; and penalties were imposed on parents who neglected this duty. As such an education can in most cases only be given in a school, it becomes a practical moral question of great importance as to what sort of school Catholic parents should select. The education of their children belongs primarily by the law of nature to the parents, and if they entrust a portion of their task to others they are bound to select such as can and will educate them according to Catholic principles. The Church, too, has received a divine commission to teach, and those who by baptism have become subject to her authority are obliged to be guided by her directions in this all-important matter. The Church condemns all non-Catholic schools, whether they be heretical and schismatical or secularist, and she declares that as a general rule no Catholic parent can send his young children to such schools for educational purposes without exposing their faith and morals to serious risk, and therefore committing a grave sin. A Catholic child, if educated away from home, should be placed in a Catholic school, under Catholic masters or mistresses. Sad experience in many different countries has shown how necessary this is for the preservation of the Catholic faith. If, however, there is no suitable Catholic school to which children can be sent, they may be sent to a non-Catholic school provided that the proximate danger can be made remote by using the proper means, and provided that the parents see to the religious instruction of their children. In many countries, as in England, the Bishops have reserved to themselves the decision as to whether in any particular case these conditions are fulfilled. A priest, therefore, should not take it upon himself to deny the sacraments to parents who send their children to a non-Catholic school; the case should be sent to the Bishop (cf. Can. 1113, 1374).

What has just been said applies specially to primary and secondary schools, for the question about non-Catholic universities is somewhat different. The Church would indeed wish that all who desire it might be able to obtain a higher education in a Catholic university. As this, however, is impossible in England, the Holy See has permitted Catholic parents to send their sons to Oxford or Cambridge on account of the grave necessity, and because when a young man has already received a sound secondary education among Catholic surroundings, if there is any character in him, he can be trusted to hold his own, Suitable safeguards, however, are prescribed for the young men who avail themselves of this permission, among which is the obligation of attending Catholic lectures which are provided by the Bishops.

In order that parents may fulfil their obligations towards their children, the law of nature itself confers on them the requisite authority and the right to look after their children until these can provide for themselves. It would, then, be against natural justice if children were removed from their parents’ control or if there were any interference with the parental authority as long as it is rightly exercised.1 Although parental authority is derived from the law of nature, yet its precise extent and its limits are not defined by natural law; this is left to positive law, ecclesiastical and civil.

Parental authority extends to the person and to the property of a child. i. (a2) The right to the custody of the person of a child belongs to the father during his life, and after his death to the mother. Until emancipation at the age of twenty-one or until marriage a father can enforce his right by writ of habeas corpus.

An action also lies for loss of services against anyone who entices a minor away from the custody of his parents. Moreover, abduction of a girl under sixteen or under eighteen for immoral purposes is rigorously punished by English criminal law.

However, if a child who has reached years of discretion chooses to depart from home, our courts will not compel him to return, if the departure seems to be for his benefit.

(6) A parent or one who is in loco parentis may moderately chastise a minor who has been guilty of fault.

(c) The consent of the parent is required for the lawfulness of a minor’s marriage. ii. The parent as such has no rights over the property of his child according to English law. If, however, no other guardian has been lawfully appointed, the father will be regarded as the guardian of his child, and he will be compelled to administer its property for its benefit, and he can be compelled to render an account of his administration. Gifts which have been freely made by children to their parents are considered valid by our law, but there is a presumption against their being free gifts, unless this is proved. 1 St Thomas, Summa, 2-2, q. 10, a. 12.

The duties of parents extend to illegitimate as well as to legitimate children. The duty of caring for an illegitimate child falls primarily on the mother, who, before a year has elapsed from its birth, may obtain from the magistrates a maintenance order against the reputed father, providing for the child’s support and education at his expense.

A husband is bound by our law to support the children of his wife by a former husband as well as his own.

What has been said concerning the mutual obligations of parent and child applies proportionately to those of other near relations. These are also bound to love each other, not only out of charity, but out of piety, and they are under a grave obligation of rendering each other assistance not only in extreme but also in grave necessity. English law only enforces on relatives the obligation of maintaining a poor relation who is unable to support himself when he would otherwise be chargeable to the parish where he happens to be. Those who are so compellable are the wife and husband, the father and grandfather, the mother and grandmother or the children of the pauper. The law of charity and piety obliges more frequently and extends further.

Guardians are sometimes appointed according to law to take care of the person and property of minors.

Parents are legally the guardians by nature and nurture of the persons of their children until these reach the age of twenty-one, as we saw above.

Of the many kinds of guardians recognized by English law the following are still of practical importance: Statutory guardians, guardians appointed by the high court and guardians appointed for special purposes.

(a) Statutory guardians. By a statute of Charles II a father may appoint by deed or by will a guardian or guardians to have the custody of his infant child, and to manage its property until it reach the age of twenty-one. The Guardianship of Infants Act, 1886, made the mother on the death of the father the guardian of her infant children, either alone if no guardian was appointed by him, or jointly with the guardian or guardians appointed by the father. The mother can also by deed or will appoint one or more guardians to act after her death and that of the father. She may also appoint a guardian to act provisionally after her death jointly with the father.

(b) Guardians appointed by the High Court. An infant may be made a ward of court by settling a sum of money on it and bringing a suit for its administration. 183 This may be done even though the father be still alive, or a testamentary guardian has been appointed. Where the court is satisfied that it would be for the good of the ward, it may remove a guardian from his office and appoint another in his place, even though the infant be not a ward of court.

(c) Guardians for special purposes are sometimes appointed to consent to an infant’s marriage, or for some other object under different statutes.

A guardian has a right to the custody of the person of his ward, and in general he exercises the rights, and is under the obligations of a father towards his ward. He administers the ward’s property, and must render an account of his administration.

No one may marry a ward of court or remove it out of the jurisdiction without the court’s permission.

The wishes of the father, as a general rule, according to English law, must be followed with regard to the religion in which a ward is educated by his guardian.

BESIDES the obligations which are treated of under Marriage, and the rights and obligations arising out of property belonging to married people, which are discussed under the Seventh Commandment, there are certain obligations arising from marriage inasmuch as it places the husband in a position of authority and the wife in one of subjection. A word must here be said concerning their mutual obligations in this respect.

The wife becomes by marriage subject to her husband, and owes him love, reverence, and obedience, as to a superior. ““ Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord,” says St Paul. ‘‘ Because the husband is the head of the wife: as Christ is the head of the Church. ... Therefore as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let wives be to their husbands in all things.”¹ However, a wife is not the slave or servant of her husband, but rather his companion, and so, though subject and bound to obey in all that relates to family life and conduct, yet she should be treated with love, consideration, and deference, and consulted in what concerns the family affairs.

¹ Eph. v 22-24.

The wife will commit grave sin if she shows great contempt for her husband, habitually neglects his commands, and arrogates his authority to herself without just cause.

The husband is bound to support his wife and family according to English law, who therefore have a claim in justice upon him as well as in piety. The husband sins grievously by treating his wife with habitual harshness and neglect, and by not providing for her necessities and those of her children. In this latter case the wife would not be guilty of sin if she took from her husband without his knowledge what was necessary for the decent support of the family.

SERVANT is here understood in a wide sense so as to comprise both domestic servants and workmen who work for a master. The relation in modern times arises out of a contract freely entered into by the parties, and it is less intimate than that which in ancient times subsisted between the lord and the slave or serf. In spite of this, however, the nexus of cash payment is not the only bond between master and servant. By the very fact that one enters into the service of another, the latter becomes his superior, assumes the duty of caring for him, and in fitting proportion he acquires a claim to those marks of honour and reverence which are due to all who exercise authority over us.¹

¹ St Thomas, Summa, 2-2, q. 102, a. 1.

Servants, then, owe to their masters reverence, fidelity, and obedience.

(a) They are bound to show their masters due honour and respect, and grave sin may be committed by displaying open contempt for them, ridiculing them, and making known their secret defects. ‘‘ Whosoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honour.’”¹

(b) They must faithfully discharge the duties imposed on them by the nature of their charge. If they waste the time which belongs to their master, wilfully neglect their duties, damage or destroy the property of their master by not taking ordinary care of it, they sin against justice and are bound to restitution. If special charge of what belongs to the master is committed to a servant, he will be obliged to guard it against damage or loss caused by others, and he will sin against justice and be bound to make restitution if he fail to do so. Where no such special charge has been laid on a servant, he will only be bound in charity, not in justice, to protect the property of his master.

(c) A workman who does not live in his master’s house will be bound to obey his master’s commands in all that relates to the work that he undertook to do.

A domestic servant is a member of the master’s household, and the obligation of obedience extends to what concerns domestic discipline, as well as to the special work which was expressly undertaken by the contract. ‘“‘ Servants,” says St Paul, “‘ be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling in the simplicity of your heart, as to Christ: not serving to the eye, as it were pleasing men, but as the servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart, with a good will serving, as to the Lord, and not to men.”² Still one who contracted to be a cook would not be bound to obey if ordered to do housemaid’s work; neither explicitly nor implicitly was such an obligation undertaken when the contract was entered into.

These duties of a servant toward his master are touched upon by Leo XIII in his encyclical letter on the condition of the working classes, May 15, 1891. “‘ Thus religion teaches the labouring man and the artisan to carry out honestly and fairly all equitable agreements freely entered into; never to injure the property, nor to outrage the person, of an employer; never to resort to violence in defending their own cause, nor to engage in riot and disorder; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises, and excite foolish hopes which usually end in useless regrets, followed by insolvency.”

¹ 1 Tim. vi 1.

² Eph. vi 5-7.

The duties are not all on one side and the rights on the other in the relation of master and servant. Each has his rights and each his duties, and their good and the good of the community largely depends on both sides faithfully and loyally fulfilling their mutual obligations.

(a) A master must treat his servant not as a mere instrument of production, but as a fellow-Christian: “‘ Religion teaches the wealthy owner and the employer that their work-people are not to be accounted their bondsmen; that in every man they must respect his dignity and worth as a man and as a Christian; that labour is not a thing to be ashamed of if we lend ear to right reason and to Christian philosophy, but is an honourable calling, enabling a man to sustain his life in a way upright and creditable; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical power.

(b) “ Again, therefore, the Church teaches that, as religion and things spiritual and mental are among the working man’s main concerns, the employer is bound to see that the worker has time for his religious duties; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions, and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family or to squander his earnings.”¹ The general obligation of fraternal correction will more frequently impose a duty on the master of admonishing and correcting a domestic servant than an ordinary workman of his.

(c) “‘ Furthermore, the employer must never tax his workpeople beyond their strength or employ them in work unsuited to their age or sex.”² According to English common law, the contract between employer and employed involves on the part of the former the duty of taking reasonable care to provide appliances and to maintain them in a proper condition, and so to carry on his operations as not to subject those employed by him to unnecessary risk. This common law liability has been further increased and defined by the Employers’ Liability Acts and Workmen’s Compensation Acts, which, however, will as a rule only affect the conscience after the sentence of a competent authority, except in so far as there was grave culpable negligence on the part of the employer.

(d) The employer’s “ great and principal duty is to give everyone a fair wage. Doubtless before deciding whether wages are adequate, many things have to be considered; but wealthy owners and all masters of labour should be mindful of this, that to exercise pressure upon the indigent and the destitute for the sake of gain, and to gather one’s profit out of the need of another, are condemned by all laws, human and divine. To defraud anyone of wages that are his due is a crime which cries to the avenging anger of heaven. Behold, the hire of the labourers . . . which by fraud hath been kept back by you, crieth aloud; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth.³ “ Lastly, the rich must religiously refrain from cutting down the workmen’s earnings, whether by force, by fraud, or by usurious dealing; and with all the greater reason because the labouring man is, as a rule, weak and unprotected, and because his slender means should in proportion to their scantiness be accounted sacred. Were these precepts carefully obeyed and followed out, would they not be sufficient of themselves to keep under all strife and all its causes?”⁴ Sums must not be deducted from a servant’s wages on account of temporary illness, though by English law a master is not bound to provide medical aid or medicines for a sick servant, though he is for an apprentice. If he sends for medical assistance for a servant whilst under his roof, he is liable. In the same encyclical of Leo XIII a general rule is laid down for deciding what a fair wage is: ‘‘ Let it, then, be taken for granted that workman and employer should, as a rule, make free agreements, and in particular should agree freely as to the wages; nevertheless, there underlies a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man—namely, that the remuneration must be sufficient to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the workman accept harder conditions, because an employer or contractor will afford him no better, he is made the victim of force and injustice.”

The workman, then, has a right to a living wage, and the employer who grows rich by sweating his work-people commits a sin against justice and is bound to make restitution of his ill-gotten wealth. If, however, the employer gives as good wages as he can afford, or as good as the labour is worth, he will be excused from any sin against justice; occasionally in bad times he may be bound out of charity to give employment without profit to himself or even at a personal loss.

¹ Leo XIII, l.c.

² ibid.

³ Jas. v 4; Can. 1524.

⁴ Leo XIII, l.c.

It is sometimes the duty of the State to interpose its authority in order to settle labour questions. As Leo XIII says: ‘‘ If by a strike, or other combination of workmen, there should be imminent danger of disturbance to the public peace; or if circumstances were such that among the labouring population the ties of family life were relaxed; if religion were found to suffer through the operatives not having time and opportunity afforded them to practise its duties; if in workshops and factories there were dangers to morals through the mixing of the sexes or from other harmful occasions of evil; or if employers laid burdens upon their workmen which were unjust, or degraded them with conditions repugnant to their dignity as human beings; finally, if health were endangered by excessive labour or by work unsuited to sex or age—in such cases there can be no question but that, within certain limits, it would be right to invoke the aid and authority of the law.” A little further on Pope Leo again refers to strikes: “* When work-people have recourse to a strike, it is frequently because the hours of labour are too long, or the work too hard, or because they consider their wages insufficient. The grave inconvenience of this not uncommon occurrence should be obviated by public remedial measures, for such paralyzing of labour not only affects the masters and their work-people alike, but is extremely injurious to trade and to the general interests of the public; moreover, on such occasions, violence and disorder are generally not far distant, and thus it frequently happens that the public peace is imperilled. The laws should forestall and prevent such troubles from arising; they should lend their influence and authority to the removal in good time of the causes which lead to conflicts between employers and employed.”¹

It is unlawful for workmen to strike when by so doing they violate a just contract which they have freely entered into, or when they cannot hope to gain anything substantial, so that there is no adequate compensation for the sufferings, losses, and risks which generally accompany a strike. It is wrong to use violence and threats to compel other workmen to strike against their will, or to prevent them accepting work if they desire to do so.

If, however, other means of obtaining redress or of securing their rights have failed, it is not wrong for workmen to strike in order to obtain a diminution of excessive hours of toil, or a just wage, or other just, reasonable, and adequate advantage.

¹ Leo XIII, l.c.

The contract of hiring may be terminated by mutual consent of the parties concerned, or for just cause by one of the parties, provided that the laws and customs which regulate the matter be duly observed. Generally speaking, a month’s notice, or a month’s wages, is required by English law to determine a general hiring of a domestic servant. If, however, the servant is incompetent to do what he undertook, is habitually disobedient, or is guilty of immorality, or unlawfully absents himself from his work, he may be dismissed without notice.

SCHOOLMASTERS and schoolmistresses are put in the place of the parents to educate children in letters and good conduct. They therefore to a certain extent share the obligations and the rights of parents. Furthermore, they are bound in justice by contract to fulfil the special duties which are annexed to their office of training the children committed to their charge.

Pupils are bound to love, reverence, and obey their masters and mistresses in all things that pertain to their education in letters and morals. However, in estimating the gravity of sins of disobedience toward masters and mistresses, we must consider not only whether the matter be grave and there be a serious intention of imposing an obligation, as in other cases of disobedience, but also whether the authority of the master or mistress enables them to give a precept which binds under pain of grave sin. Such ample authority is usually not committed to inferior masters and mistresses.

ALL those to whom the care of souls is committed in the Church of God are bound by divine precept and by the very nature of their office to fulfil the duties of their charge If they fail in their duty, they sin not only against charity and obedience, but also against justice; for everyone who voluntarily undertakes an office implicitly thereby undertakes to discharge the duties annexed to it. In general, therefore, ecclesiastical superiors are bound to love, watch over, and instruct by word and by example those committed to their charge. The special obligations of each one depend on the office which he holds, and are treated of elsewhere.

Subjects also owe to their ecclesiastical superiors love, reverence, obedience in all that belongs to their office, and temporal support. This is obvious from what has already been said, and it is inculcated in several places of Holy Writ.”

It has been the constant teaching of the Catholic Church that all public and legitimate authority is of divine right, in the sense that God is the Author of man’s nature by which he is a social animal, formed to live in society, which necessarily implies a distinction of rulers and ruled. The rulers may, indeed, be designated in various ways, their power may be more or less absolute; this power may be in the hands of one or of many, but it is derived from God, the Author of man’s nature and of human society. This is the teaching of St. Paul: “‘ Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. And they that resist, purchase to themselves damnation.”¹ As Leo XIII says in his encyclical letter, Diuturnum, June 29, 1881, this doctrine is taught in many passages of Holy Writ, and has been constantly inculcated by the Catholic Church. ² Rom. xiii 1-2.

In English-speaking countries the people have a large share in the election of their rulers, and such an important duty should be faithfully and religiously fulfilled. There may easily be a moral obligation to vote at elections in order to prevent the election of one who would do grave public harm if elected, or in order to secure the election of one whose election would be a great public benefit. If the only choice lies between candidates who are equally good or equally bad, there will be no moral obligation to vote.

Those who hold any civil office are bound to perform its duties faithfully, not only out of charity, but out of justice.

¹ Trent, sess. 23, c. 1, de Ref.

² x Tim. v 17; Heb. xiii 17.

For Catholics it is a matter of religious obligation to love, reverence, and obey those who wield civil power. As Leo XIII teaches: ‘‘ We are bound to love dearly the country whence we have received the means of enjoyment this mortal life affords, but we have a much more urgent obligation to love with ardent love the Church to which we owe the life of the soul, a life that will endure for ever. Moreover, if we would judge aright, the supernatural love for the Church and the natural love of our own country proceed from the same eternal principle, since God himself is their Author and originating Cause. ... Law is of its very essence a mandate of right reason, proclaimed by a properly constituted authority, for the common good. But true and legitimate authority is void of sanction, unless it proceed from God, the supreme Ruler and Lord of all. The Almighty alone can commit power to a man over his fellow-men; nor may that be accounted as right reason which is in disaccord with truth and with divine reason; nor that held to be true good which is repugnant to the supreme and unchangeable good, or that wrests aside and draws away the wills of men from the charity of God. Hallowed, therefore, in the minds of Christians is the very idea of public authority, in which they recognize some likeness and symbol, as it were, of the divine Majesty, even when it is exercised by one unworthy. A just and due reverence to the laws abides in them, not from force and threats, but from a consciousness of duty; for God hath not given us the spirit of fear.”’+ 1 Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, January 10, 1890.

VII. The effect of irritation is that the vow is entirely extinguished, so that in no case does the obligation afterward revive (can. 1312, § 1).

Corollary. The following can irritate vows:

1. A father can irritate vows emitted by prepubescent children, provided that when they become pubescent they have not confirmed them while aware of the infirmity of the prior vow. If, unaware of the infirmity, they confirm them, strictly speaking they only renew the vow as it was; but it was infirm or irritatable. The aforesaid power also belongs to him who, either by law (as a tutor), or by the father's disposition, is substituted in his place. The reason is that, because of the weakness of prepubescents, power over their will, that is, dominative power, must be judged to belong to the father and to the others enumerated. But dominative power, by can. 1312, § 1, has annexed to it the power of irritating vows (St. Alphonsus, III, 229, 238; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 9).

It is disputed whether a father can irritate vows emitted by pubescent minors. Now the matter seems wholly doubtful, because the father's dominative power over pubescent minors is not proved. Nor is can. 89, which declares: "A minor person remains subject to the power of parents or guardians in the exercise of his rights, except in those things in which the law holds minors exempt from power"; nor is the cited canon, I say, judged to settle the question or theoretical controversy whether or not the father enjoys dominative power over pubescent minors.

Corollary. In doubt whether a vow was emitted before or after puberty, the power of irritating is doubtful, because it is doubtful whether the vow was emitted at a time when it was certainly subject to irritation.

2. The mother seems able to do the same as the father, provided he does not contradict, or with dependence on the father. The reason is that dominative power seems to belong to the mother as much as to the father, because she is the principle of the child no less than the father. Once dominative power is admitted, the power of irritating vows also must be admitted (St. Thomas, opusc. 17, cap. 13, vers. Decimo; St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, n. 36).

3. The husband seems to have the power of irritating the vows of the wife, because he seems to enjoy dominative power over her; for such power of itself is very expedient for the good of conjugal society, that is, for fostering dependence and intense love, for restraining the wife's impulses of mind, and for favoring the peace of the family. But dominative power carries with it the power of irritating vows (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 324).¹

4. Superiors of religious, both exempt and non-exempt, both solemnly and simply professed, and likewise Superioresses, can directly irritate vows emitted by subjects during the time in which they were subject to themselves or to other Superiors, for example to a predecessor (can. 501, § 1). The power does not extend: 1. to substantial religious vows, for since these are constitutive of subjection, they are emitted independently of this subjection, and therefore cannot be called infirm or irritatable; 2. to vows annexed to the substantial vows, because since they are emitted together with the substantial vows, they likewise are judged to have been made independently of subjection. They also except the vow of passing to a stricter Religion² (St. Alphonsus, III, 233; IV, 53, 54).

What has been said about Superiors of religious should also be applied: 1. to the Pope with respect to professed male and female religious (cf. can. 499, § 1); 2. to Chapters of religious according to the norm of the constitutions and common law (cf. can. 501, § 1); 3. to the Bishop, if it is a question of a religion of diocesan right.

A Superior cannot irritate the vows of novices unless, according to the things said under I, he truly supplies the place of a parent, and it is a question of a vow which a parent could irritate (St. Alphonsus, IV, 55). Nor does the faculty of irritating the vows of novices or other faithful belong to the Supreme Pontiff, because he lacks dominative power over them.

Question. Whether the Church supplies probable power of irritating vows.

Response. We judge that it must be denied. For the power of irritating vows supposes dominative power; if this is present, the Church certainly completes it; if it is not present, it cannot be completed.

Corollary. Those who enjoy the power of irritating vows can also in advance render subjects incapable of vowing, either in some matter or universally, so that vows from that time are null from the beginning (St. Alphonsus, III, 228).

¹ Cf. Num. 30:7-13; Eph. 5:24.

² Cap. 18, de Reg.

V. The effect of suspension is relaxation for a time of the obligation of the vow; namely, when the right of the one suspending ceases, it revives, unless in the meantime it has ceased from another cause (can. 1312, § 2).

Corollary. The following can suspend vows - besides those who can irritate them:

1. A father or the one acting in his place in administering the goods of children can suspend the real vows of pubescent children as long as they lack the right of administering their own goods; likewise their personal vows, insofar as they prejudice domestic governance. The same power belongs to the mother as to personal vows; likewise as to real vows, if she herself is tutor or curatrix (St. Alphonsus, III, 229, 230).

2. A husband can suspend the vows of the wife insofar as they prejudice the use of marriage, the education of offspring, or domestic governance; likewise the wife can suspend the vows of the husband which prejudice her rights (St. Alphonsus, III, 234, 235).

Corollary. If spouses by mutual consent have emitted a vow of chastity, and in such a way that each has ceded his or her own right, the husband can directly irritate the vow of the wife; but the wife, once freed from the vow, can indirectly irritate the vow of the husband (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 239).

4. The Pope can suspend the vows of all the faithful, and the Bishop the vows of diocesan subjects, insofar as they are adverse to the ecclesiastical governance belonging to him.

5. Religious Superiors and Superioresses can suspend the vows of novices which prejudice probation and religious discipline (St. Alphonsus, IV, 55).

Note. Vows emitted before religious profession are suspended for as long as the one vowing remains in religion (can. 1315).

V. Cessation. From can. 1319, a promissory oath, or the obligation induced by an oath of this kind, ceases:

1. If it is remitted by him for whose advantage the oath had been emitted (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89, a. 9, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 193). And that remission quite probably is made validly and licitly even when the oath was emitted principally in honor of God. "The reason is that, although the promise was made to God, it was nevertheless always made dependently on the will of the man to whom it was sworn, namely: if he does not remit the execution" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. If the thing sworn is changed substantially; or, when the circumstances have changed, becomes either evil or altogether indifferent; or finally impedes a greater good. The former is drawn from the fact that the intention of the one swearing is not judged to have extended itself to matter substantially or notably changed, as was said concerning the intention of the one vowing (n. 653). The other things follow from this: that the thing sworn, if it becomes evil, or indifferent, or an impediment to a greater good, ceases to be matter apt for an oath (n. 688). Notice, however, that honorable matter promised and accepted in favor of a third party, even if perhaps less perfect in itself, nevertheless here and now remains more perfect, indeed is commanded, on account of the right acquired by the third party (n. 688).

3. If the final cause or the condition under which perhaps the oath was given is lacking. See what was said about a vow, n. 655.

4. By irritation, dispensation, or commutation, according to the norm of can. 1320. Moreover, from the cited canon:

a) The same persons who can irritate vows can irritate promissory oaths, and for the same reason (n. 662). They can irritate them - equally as vows - even if the irritation tends to the prejudice of others, even though these refuse to remit the obligation.

b) Likewise the same persons who can dispense or commute vows can dispense or commute promissory oaths, and for the same reason (n. 671); but if the dispensation of the oath tends to the prejudice of others, the Apostolic See alone can dispense or commute the oath on account of the necessity or utility of the Church (St. Alphonsus, III, 189, 192).

III. Excusing causes from the precept are enumerated: one's own or another's necessity, charity, piety, and custom.

1. One's own or another's necessity, that is, grave spiritual, bodily, or temporal harm to be averted from oneself or from a third party. Especially excused are:

a) The poor, who otherwise cannot provide for themselves and their own as to food or clothing. Likewise female servants, who otherwise lack time for mending or washing clothes (St. Alphonsus, III, 297). Although, if someone is known as poor, scandal ought to be absent, it is nevertheless better, as far as can be done, to work secretly.

b) Subjects who are compelled by a master to work; yet if servants must often work on Sunday, let them seek another service (St. Alphonsus, III, 296).

c) Bakers and butchers, who otherwise cannot satisfy those asking (St. Alphonsus, III, 298, 299). Nevertheless they are not excused, unless perhaps on account of competition, if the law forbids it, for example, to bakers.

d) Tailors and other workmen, if the matter is urgent, for example for impending weddings or funerals. Yet let them take care that, without a special cause, by taking on more work, or by refusing a sufficient number of workmen, they do not place themselves in such necessity (St. Alphonsus, III, 303).

e) Pharmacists providing necessities to the sick, unless they have agreed among themselves - as is done rather often today - that only one or another should sell on feast days.

f) Farmers, if from a storm or a similar cause grave harm is imminent (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 6, n. 21).

g) Barbers are excused partly on account of necessity, partly on account of custom (St. Alphonsus, III, 290).

h) Blacksmiths who shoe "the horses of travelers, or of those who (on the following day) will set out on a journey at very early morning or go out into the field to work.... Likewise the plowshares of those who otherwise would not be able to work on the following day can be repaired. So also roads, bridges, etc., can be repaired" (St. Alphonsus, III, 300).

i) Whoever cannot interrupt works once begun without grave harm, as those who labor in foundries, and sometimes also in butter-making establishments (St. Alphonsus, III, 300).

j) Those who prepare things which are necessary for a public festivity, for example on account of the arrival or birthday of a Prince, and which cannot conveniently be prepared beforehand. "The reason is that such signs of joy are morally necessary for the commonwealth" (St. Alphonsus, III, 304).

k) Those who would miss an occasion of gain extraordinary in view of their condition, as was explained in n. 704.

l) Avoiding idleness does not excuse by reason of itself; yet by reason of avoiding sin it excuses those who, morally speaking, will not abstain from sin unless they work, for example prisoners who cannot occupy themselves with works lawful in themselves (St. Alphonsus, III, 302). - But to those who complain of idleness, it can be permitted that they perform lighter works for the benefit of a poor person or of a needy church. If these things cannot be done less conveniently, by epikeia it can be permitted (at least if otherwise there is danger that they will run about) that for some hours they be occupied with other labors, though lighter ones. Likewise light domestic labor is lawfully conceded to a workman who otherwise would be exposed to the danger of making himself drunk, etc.

2. Charity permits someone to serve the sick, bury the dead, and generally to do for another what that other could lawfully do for himself.

Question. To what extent is it lawful to work for the poor?

Resp. 1. It is certainly lawful to work to assist either a determined poor person placed in grave necessity, or a community placed in such necessity (St. Alphonsus, III, 293).

Resp. 2. It is certainly unlawful in common necessity to work or make things so that the gain received from the labor or the things may be granted to the poor.

Resp. 3. It is disputed whether in common necessity it is lawful to make things, for example clothes to be distributed to the poor. With St. Alphonsus and others, against some, it seems it must be denied; for, if that opinion were admitted, it would already be lawful for all and always to work; which seems to oppose the sense of the Church (St. Alphonsus, III, 293).

3. Piety permits servile works as follows:

a) Works which are proximately ordered to divine worship are permitted. Such are: ringing bells, playing organs, blowing them, etc. (St. Alphonsus, III, 291).

b) Works which are ordered to divine worship only remotely or by accident are prohibited unless necessity requires them. Such are, for example, "to cultivate the fields of the church, to carry stones and timber for its building, to whitewash the walls of the temple" (St. Alphonsus, III, 293). Nevertheless, with sufficient probability it is lawful "to labor at making necessary ornaments for a needy church" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

c) Works which are ordered to divine worship neither so proximately nor so remotely are prohibited at most under light sin, indeed according to St. Alphonsus with sufficient probability not at all. Such are: "to sweep the church, to bake hosts, to adorn the altar and church with tapestries, to erect platforms necessary for a festivity or sepulcher, and similar things." Yet "knowingly to prepare platforms on a feast day for viewing a procession is, of itself, a grave sin; but if they were not made the previous day, they are lawfully made on the feast day" (III, 292).

4. What custom permits has been sufficiently indicated above (n. 705).

5. Finally, in doubt whether a sufficient excusing cause is present, a dispensation is required, about which see n. 183; note, however, that a sufficient cause is undoubtedly present if grave danger of notable harm is imminent.

(St. Thomas, II-II, qq. 101-105; St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, bk. III, nn. 333-362; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 7.)

The fourth precept of the Decalogue explicitly speaks only of the honor which children owe to parents; implicitly, however, it comprehends both the duties of parents toward children, and the duties of other blood-relatives, spouses, and other superiors and inferiors toward one another. Therefore we shall speak first of the duties of children toward parents, then of the duties both of other blood-relatives and of spouses, finally of the duties of domestic masters and servants; fifth, of the duties of non-domestic masters and servants; sixth, of the duties of teachers and pupils; seventh, of the duties of civil rulers and subjects.

I. Principles. 1. Children must render love, reverence, and obedience to their parents. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture¹ and from what has been said about the virtue of piety and observance (nn. 395 and 398). In addition, the obligations of love and reverence persist; but the obligation of obedience ceases when children become of age or become their own masters by marriage or emancipation; nevertheless those remaining in the paternal home remain subject to parents as regards domestic order.

2. The duties of love, reverence, and obedience, since they regard morally different modes of exercising piety, differ specifically; hence one who transgresses them commits a specifically different sin according as he injures love, reverence, or obedience.

3. The duties set forth are grave from their kind, so that children who notably injure them sin gravely. The reason is that, in the supposed case, they are gravely opposed to the good of parents and therefore to charity (St. Alphonsus, III, 333; n. 282).

¹ Cf. Ecclus. 3:9 ff.; Prov. 19:26; 23:24, 30; Eph. 6:1.

II. Applications. 1. Due love requires that children pursue their parents with the affection of love, will good things for them, and furnish signs of love.

Against this obligation children sin gravely: 1. if they hate their parents, wish grave evil to them, or rejoice over their grave evil; 2. if - even though perhaps internal hatred is absent - nevertheless they behave as if they hated them, for example by habitually looking at them with a grim eye or addressing them harshly; 3. if they do not help parents in grave temporal or spiritual necessity; if they do not visit them in their illness; if they do not take care that the sacraments be administered to them when they are dying; if they do not fulfill their testament, etc. (St. Alphonsus, III, 333).

2. Due reverence requires filial fear, that they think honorably of them, acknowledging them as superiors, and that they prove the aforesaid sentiments by words and deeds.

Against this obligation children sin gravely: 1. if they despise their parents or are unwilling to acknowledge them; nevertheless merely external simulation without internal contempt, on account of some cause, at least excuses from mortal sin; 2. if they strike them, even only lightly, or raise a hand or instrument for striking them. Nevertheless those are excused from grave, and sometimes even from light, sin who restrain by words or deeds parents who are dull, insane, delirious from old age or drunkenness (St. Alphonsus, III, 334). For the rest, the gravity of irreverence depends not a little on the condition of the family and the customs of the place, so that the same words can constitute light or grave irreverence according as they are uttered against parents of lower or higher condition.

3. Due obedience extends: 1. to the education of children both temporal and spiritual, which nevertheless have force only for minors and those not yet joined in marriage, minority being computed in civil matter according to civil law, in matter of morals and religion according to canon law (cf. can. 88, § 1); 2. to domestic order. But in order that in the case there truly be sin, a true command is required; one who acts against a will or against merely directive arrangements does not sin of himself, although by accident, if the honorable end of the act is lacking, he can easily sin. Moreover, as to grave matter, note that several transgressions, according to the mind of the one commanding, with the matter considered, often coalesce in an altogether prudent judgment (St. Alphonsus, III, 335). With these things attended to:

Against this obligation children sin gravely who, against a formal injunction of the parents, 1. omit a precept of religion or even abstain from the sacraments for a long time; 2. frequent bad company, taverns, dances, theaters; 3. do not cease wandering in the evening; 4. continue an untimely courtship; 5. refuse to perform work of grave importance, etc. (St. Alphonsus, cited place). As to neglect of studies, note that a son can sin gravely even if the parents have not imposed a strict command, namely on account of the harm to be inflicted on the parents. Moreover, for this reason the son of rich parents will not so easily sin gravely, but the son of parents of moderate fortune will more easily sin gravely.

For the rest, in this whole matter of obedience it must be well considered: 1. whether there is only a warning or directive arrangement, or a true mandate; 2. whether or not children sufficiently attended to the objectively grave malice, so that they are subjectively gravely culpable.

Question 1. Are children bound to obey parents in the choice of a state of life, whether matrimonial, celibate, clerical, or religious?

Resp. Children are not bound to obey either as to the state of life in general, or as to marriage with a determined person, or as to entrance into a determined religious institute. For, "according to those things which pertain to the nature of the body, man is not bound to obey man, but only God, because all men are equal by nature; for example in those things which pertain to the sustenance of the body and the generation of offspring; whence neither are servants bound to obey masters, nor children parents, concerning contracting marriage, or preserving virginity, or anything of this kind" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 104, a. 5); these things are also to be applied to the state of life of the supernatural order (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 189, a. 6). It is added that in the aforesaid states there is a certain perpetual servitude, to which man cannot compel man (St. Thomas, Supplement, q. 47, a. 6). Hence parents sin gravely who compel children, even indirectly, to choose a state of life (St. Alphonsus, III, 335; cf. can. 2352). Yet by accident it can happen that children must either enter marriage, or for a time at least abstain from marriage, from the clerical state, or from the religious state, namely if otherwise the parents would be exposed to grave necessity (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 189, a. 6; St. Alphonsus, III, 335; IV, 66).

Question 2. Are children bound to seek the counsel and consent of parents in the choice of a state?

Resp. 1. As to the conjugal state, especially as to the person with whom marriage is to be entered, filial reverence seems to require that parents be consulted in so grave a matter, and that their assent be sought. Yet since children are not bound to follow the counsel to be given by parents, the obligation itself of consulting and seeking assent seems of itself only light. Indeed there is none if the parents are foreseen to be irrationally unwilling, or another just cause of acting otherwise is present (St. Alphonsus, VI, 849, 877). By accident the obligation can be grave, for example if the parents will be gravely offended or affected with grave sadness from counsel not being sought.

Note. To what extent children, with civil law considered, need the consent of parents or of a guardian for entering marriage, see in domestic law.

Resp. 2. As to the religious or clerical state, there is no obligation of seeking the counsel or consent of parents; indeed often it is not even expedient to consult them, both because in this matter they lack experience, and because "as the flesh lusts against the spirit, as is said in Gal. 5, so also carnal friends frequently oppose spiritual progress" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 189, a. 10, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, IV, 68). Yet if a son "can easily and safely obtain their consent, it is fitting that he not depart without the blessing of his parents" (St. Alphonsus, cited place, III, 335); but if they dissent, he should wait a little, if there is hope that afterward they will consent. Besides, note well that minors, with the civil law of many regions considered, can be brought back by force by their parents; hence let them not easily depart without their consent.

Corollary I. Although children are not subject to parents as to the choice of a state of life, nevertheless let them not easily contract marriage without the parents' knowledge or with them reasonably unwilling. Hence can. 1034 rightly establishes: the parish priest is gravely to exhort minor children of families not to enter marriages without the knowledge of their parents or with them reasonably unwilling; but if they refuse, he is not to assist at their marriage unless the local Ordinary has first been consulted.

Corollary II. What has been said about the state of life can almost be applied to the choice of a profession - for example of acquiring a science or art - since this too regards the whole life. Yet here by accident there will more easily be an obligation of satisfying the wishes of the parents.

I. Principle. Parents owe their children love, both internal and proved by acts. The acts chiefly include bodily and spiritual education.

II. Applications. 1. Due love requires that they pursue their children with a good affection and wish good things for them.

Against this obligation they sin gravely: 1. who hate their children, wish grave evil to them, or from the heart curse them or rejoice over their grave evil; 2. who do not help them in necessity or do not avert some other grave bodily or spiritual evil from them; 3. who without cause often treat them truly harshly, strike them; 4. who undeservedly favor one much more than the others and thus are the cause why the others are gravely saddened.

2. Due bodily education requires provision for life, sustenance, and state. "Parents," as can. 1113 says, "are held by a most grave obligation, according to their powers, to care for the education of their offspring, both religious and moral, and physical and civil, and also to provide for their temporal good."¹

a) Provision for life requires that parents care for the offspring from conception itself, and avoid those things which could harm it.

Against this obligation they sin gravely: 1. the mother who, while pregnant, dances immoderately, labors immoderately, lifts heavier burdens, consumes harmful things. Besides, let her beware of too tight clothing, of more vehement anger, melancholy, drinking spirituous liquors, and other things which can bring harm to the offspring or induce danger of abortion; indeed in the case there is also sin against justice, because the offspring has a right to life and to it whole. 2. The father who long vexes his pregnant wife, afflicts her with grave sorrow, or strikes her. 3. Parents who leave little children alone at home with danger that harm may come to them through fire, water, animals, instruments, or excessive crying. Likewise those who keep tender infants with them in bed with danger of suffocation;² the gravity of this danger depends on the age of the infant, the width of the bed, and on whether the mother is accustomed to be quiet in sleep. Commonly, however, especially in the first year of life, the mother should not keep the little infant with herself (St. Alphonsus, VI, 160).

Question. Is the mother bound herself to nurse the offspring?³

Resp. 1. In the affirmative; which is clear both from the authority of the holy Fathers,⁴ and from the fact that the Author of nature granted milk to the mother for that end, as is evident; wherefore note that the milk of the mother herself profits the offspring more than another's. But the obligation is only light, because no grave disorder appears. Hence a just cause excuses, for example weakness of the mother or a new pregnancy (St. Alphonsus, III, 336).⁵

Resp. 2. If the mother herself abstains from nursing the offspring, she is bound to entrust it to a wet-nurse, because artificial nutrition cannot fully compensate for human milk. Indeed she is held to this under grave obligation if the infant is somewhat weak, namely on account of the danger otherwise to be feared for the offspring. From seeking a wet-nurse a very grave or just cause excuses, according as the obligation is grave or light.

Resp. 3. If the mother abstains both from nursing the offspring and from seeking a wet-nurse, artificial nutrition remains. Moreover, if recourse is had to it, the mother is held under grave obligation to apply due precautions; for the death of innumerable newborns is to be attributed to the neglect of these precautions, for example to a defect of milk, uncleanness of vessels, etc.

Resp. 4. If the mother uses a wet-nurse, there is a grave obligation of taking on a wet-nurse healthy in body, because the infant is easily infected by diseases of the wet-nurse - especially syphilitic diseases. It is disputed whether there is also a grave obligation of substituting for herself a wet-nurse of honorable morals. Some affirm it, because they judge that the qualities of the wet-nurse flow into the infant. This, however, is denied today, because food, for example the flesh which we use, in no way directly flows into morals. Yet a grave obligation can be present from the fact that a wet-nurse ruined in morals can harm the infant in another way.

Corollary. Practically one must work so that the mother herself nurse her own offspring; both because of itself she is bound to this, and because the use of a wet-nurse is to be disapproved for the reasons set forth, and artificial nutrition is easily done without due precautions; which is so true that innumerable infants die chiefly on account of precautions neglected.

b) Provision for sustenance requires that parents furnish to children a dwelling, food, clothing, and all those things which are necessary for maintenance suitable to their condition, and this until the children can provide for themselves; finally, that according to circumstances they leave a suitable inheritance to the children (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 101, a. 2, ad 2).

Against this obligation they sin gravely: 1. who expose offspring in a public place; who hand it over to a foundling hospital, unless very grave poverty or infamy to be avoided excuses them (St. Alphonsus, III, 336). Let them see, however, whether the foundling hospital to which it is handed over provides due education, even religious education; 2. who deny food or other necessities to needy children; 3. who squander goods and thus cast the children down into a lower state⁶ (St. Alphonsus, III, cited place).

c) Provision for state imposes on parents the obligation of seeing to it that afterward the children can live according to their condition; this obligation is of charity, not however of justice.

Therefore they sin: 1. who do not send children even to elementary school; indeed they commit of themselves a grave sin, since on the one hand this can be done easily today, and on the other hand neglect of elementary instruction creates grave inconvenience for children, and those who do not frequent schools easily find themselves in the occasion of sinning; 2. who do not see to it that children acquire a science, art, or craft suitable to their state and capacity; I say suitable: hence higher instruction is not to be imposed on those who are less apt in talent for acquiring it.

3. Due spiritual education comprises teaching and exhortation, example, vigilance and correction, and these so furnished that at the same time formation of character is kept before the eyes.

a) Teaching and exhortation; namely, parents are to instruct their children, by themselves and through others, in Christian doctrine, and therefore are to command them to frequent catechism (can. 1335) and sermons and ask them about what they have heard; they are to imbue them with hatred of sin, especially mortal sin, with love of virtue, of God, and of the Blessed Virgin Mary, and send them to Catholic schools (can. 1372 ff.); they are to take care that they recite prayers morning and evening, receive the sacraments of Penance and Eucharist in due time (cf. can. 854, § 4), fulfill the precepts of the Church, frequent the sacraments, be present at sacred offices, and enroll in pious associations (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 7, n. 5).

Parents sin gravely who care nothing or little for Catholic instruction.⁷

About schools we shall speak more fully in Scholion I; about coeducation in Scholion II; about instruction concerning dishonorable actions and sexual life something is more suitably said in the treatise on the Sixth Precept.⁸

b) Example, according to the saying: words move, examples draw.⁹

Against this obligation they transgress gravely: 1. who blaspheme in the presence of children, speak shameful things, provoke a spouse with injuries and curses, indulge in marital liberties; 2. who are given to a notorious vice, such as drunkenness or lust; 3. who ridicule Religion or priests, or do not observe the precepts of the Church (St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 7, n. 5).

c) Vigilance and correction. Let them see from the first age what the inclinations of the children are, namely so that good inclinations may be promoted, but bad ones restrained. Let them amend those who offend, now by correcting them but without anger or curses, now by chastising them, chiefly by privative punishments. - Let them turn them away from dangers and occasions. Therefore let them beware lest sons and daughters sleep in the same bed, or even in the same room as parents; lest boys together with girls guard animals or play; lest they be perverted by bad companions or readings; lest they court untimely, or with a non-Catholic, or alone; lest they hand them over to dangerous service; nor let them permit girls to be taught, for example, music, by a teacher outside all presence of others (St. Alphonsus, III, 339; Homo Apostolicus, tr. 7, n. 5; Praxis confessarii, n. 211).

d) Formation of character; about which we spoke in n. 50.

Corollary. Education "which, content with the mere powers of nature, rejects or neglects those things which divinely contribute to the right formation of Christian life, is false and full of error; and every way and method of educating youth which takes no or scarcely any account of the stain transmitted from our first parents to all posterity and of divine grace, and which therefore rests wholly on the powers of nature alone, wanders entirely from the truth."¹⁰ "Here nearly belong the doctrines which place almost the whole foundation of education in this, that children should be free to form themselves by their own talent and wholly by their own judgment, or with the counsels of elders rejected and every law and both human and divine help set aside. Yet this does not prevent adolescents, the more they advance in age and knowledge of things, from having to bring their own effort and industry also more and more to their education; nor does it prevent force and harshness from having to be removed from the education of children, while just correction, however, is not excluded."¹¹

¹ Cf. encyclical letter of Pius XI, Divini illius magistri, "On the Christian Education of Youth," December 31, 1929 (A.A.S. 1930, p. 49 ff.).

² Roman Ritual, title 2, chapter 2, n. 32.

³ Cf. Muckermann, Der biologische Wert der muetterlichen Stillpflicht; Capellmann-Bergmann, Pastoral-Medizin, 8th ed., p. 96; N. K. Stemmen 1904, p. 239; Meuleman, Het levensrecht van de geboren vrucht; De Katholiek, vol. 148, p. 62 and p. 181.

⁴ Cf. Benedict XIV, De Synodo dioecesana, bk. 11, c. 7, n. 9.

⁵ The contrary custom of matrons is to be prudently opposed: both because it is observed on vain grounds, namely so that they may withdraw themselves from the burden and be able to frequent pleasures; because desire for wet-nurses who are well-fed multiplies fornications; and because wet-nurses more easily neglect their own offspring.

⁶ Cf. 2 Cor. 12:14.

⁷ Cf. the cited encyclical letter.

⁸ Cf. the cited encyclical letter; our little work De virtute castitatis, p. 111 ff.

⁹ Sirach 7:25.

¹⁰ Cited encyclical.

¹¹ Cited encyclical.

I. Among non-Catholic schools:

1. Some are so harmful that the danger to faith or morals cannot, morally speaking, become remote, for example if children would continually hear bad doctrine or would be compelled to be present at prohibited rites, or if the students were so perverse that scarcely anyone could keep himself unharmed.¹

2. Others are less, but nevertheless positively, harmful, either on account of doctrines to be handed on or on account of association with bad companions, which threatens in them.

3. Others are only negatively harmful, namely neutral schools, or such as merely exclude religion.

II. It is clear that the schools under 1 and 2 are to be condemned; but even neutral schools are to be disapproved. This is clear first from ecclesiastical documents. Thus Pius IX condemned proposition 48: "This method of educating youth can be approved by Catholic men, which is separated from the Catholic Faith and from the power of the Church, and which regards only, or at least primarily, the knowledge of merely natural things and the ends of earthly social life."² And Pius XI declares that "through schools which they call neutral, the whole foundation of Christian education is thrown down and overturned, since religion is wholly removed from them; these schools, moreover, will in no way be neutral except in appearance, since in reality they are or will be fully hostile to religion."³ And can. 1373: in every elementary school, religious instruction is to be handed on to children according to their age (§ 1). Youth which attends middle or higher schools is to be cultivated by a fuller doctrine of religion, and Ordinaries of places are to see to it that this be done through priests outstanding in zeal and doctrine (§ 2). Next, that neutral schools are to be rejected is clear from the fact that - as the cited documents already declare - in practice they will cease to be truly neutral, because they are separated from the authority of the Church, whereby it easily happens that the teachers to be put in charge and the books to be used harm the children; all the more because scientific instruction, for example of history, can scarcely be handed on without its being plain which religion the teacher supports.⁴

III. As to attendance at non-Catholic schools, can. 1374 establishes: Catholic children are not to attend non-Catholic, neutral, mixed schools, namely those which are open also to non-Catholics. But it belongs to the local Ordinary alone to decide, according to the norm of the instructions of the Apostolic See, in what circumstances of things and with what precautions applied, so that the danger of perversion may be avoided, it can be tolerated that those schools be attended. With these things noted, I say:

1. It is never lawful to send children to schools about which we spoke under I, 1.

2. It is also of itself gravely unlawful to send children to a less, but nevertheless positively, harmful school. By accident, or on account of a grave cause, this is lawful, provided remedies are applied by which the danger becomes remote. As to children who attend universities (especially non-Catholic ones), let parents take the greatest care that before the children are sent to them, they be cultivated by solid education and knowledge of religion; that they enroll in a Catholic society of students; that they be able to approach a learned and upright man who by his counsel may remove dangers and doubts; that they choose a religious friend, which association may draw them back from illicit companionships.

3. To send children to a neutral school, as it is called, that is, to a school only negatively harmful or such as merely excludes religion:

a) It is a grave sin: a) if it is done from a gravely bad motive, for example because one approves neutrality or spurns the authority of the Church; b) if it is done with grave scandal; this can be present if in that place there is a Catholic school equally suitable.

b) Otherwise it is of itself a light sin, provided religious instruction is cared for in another way. But parents are excused if no Catholic school is at hand, or if the one available is little suited for instructing adolescents suitably according to their condition; if otherwise grave harm threatens the parents, for example from the side of magistrates.⁵

4. What has just been said is almost also valid concerning schools about which Pius XI speaks thus: nor can that school be tolerated (especially if it is the "only" one and all children are bound to attend it), in which, although the precepts of sacred doctrine are handed on separately to Catholics, nevertheless the teachers are not Catholic who instruct Catholic and non-Catholic children together in letters and arts.⁶

Finally, it must be seen whether the local Ordinary has prescribed anything concerning the aforesaid matters.

Corollary I. Unworthy of absolution are parents who "neglect to impart necessary Christian education and instruction to their children, or who permit them to attend such schools in which ruin of souls cannot be avoided; or finally who, although there is a Catholic school in the same place, suitable and aptly equipped and prepared, or although they have the ability to educate their offspring in a Catholic manner in another region, nevertheless entrust them to public (neutral) schools without sufficient cause and without the necessary precautions, by which the danger of perversion may be removed from being proximate."⁷

Corollary II. It is lawful for someone, on account of a grave cause, to assume the office of teacher in neutral schools, provided he is not compelled to use bad books. Likewise it is permitted to hold the office of inspector: 1. if a grave cause is present and the schools to be inspected are not positively harmful; 2. if the schools are indeed positively harmful but there is hope that they will be rendered notably less harmful. Yet it must be considered to what extent public scandal perhaps prohibits the aforesaid things.

¹ Instruction of the Holy Office, November 24, 1875 (Collectanea de Propaganda Fide, n. 1449).

² Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1748.

³ Encyclical Divini illius magistri, December 31, 1929; cf. Pius IX, letter Quum non sine, July 14, 1864; Leo XIII, allocution Summi Pontificatus, August 20, 1880; encyclical letter Nobilissima, February 8, 1884; encyclical letter Quod multum, August 22, 1886; letter Officio sanctissimo, December 22, 1887; encyclical letter Caritatis, March 19, 1894, etc.

⁴ Instruction of the Sacred Congregation de Propaganda Fide, November 24, 1875 (Collectanea, n. 1449).

⁵ Cf. encyclical of Pius XI, Divini illius magistri.

⁶ Cited encyclical.

⁷ Instruction of the Holy Office, November 24, 1875 (Collectanea, n. 1449).

Coeducation is to be rejected; this is clear first from the fact that Pius XI, in his encyclical On the Christian Education of Youth, rejects it. "Equally fallacious," says the Supreme Pontiff, "and hostile to Christian training must that method of instructing adolescents be held which is commonly called coeducation." Next, education of this kind, on account of human nature inclined to illicit things and vitiated by the stain of our first parents, is not without danger. It is added that each sex precisely on account of the difference of body and soul must mutually complete itself and coalesce into one thing; hence that very difference must be held and fostered in education and instruction by apt distinction and separation, suitable to ages and conditions. And this must be observed "not only in all schools, through the anxious years of adolescence, on which the plan of almost the whole future life altogether depends, but also in gymnastic games and exercises, in which special care must be taken for the Christian modesty of girls, since it is most unbecoming for them to display themselves and to put themselves before the eyes of all."¹

¹ Cited encyclical.

I. Duties of other blood-relatives. According to the things set forth in the treatise on virtues (n. 394), the obligation of piety, which is primarily between parents and children, also exists: 1. between blood-relatives ascending and descending, for example between grandfather and grandson; 2. between nearer collateral blood-relatives, for example between brothers; 3. between guardians and wards, between sponsors and spiritual children. For since guardians and sponsors are equated with parents, competent authority is judged to have imposed on them duties from the motive of piety. The aforesaid persons, moreover, owe to one another love, and, according to the circumstances of persons, reverence and obedience. For the rest, note can. 1372, § 2: not only parents, according to the norm of can. 1113, but also all who hold their place, have the right and the most grave duty of caring for the Christian education of children.

Toward more remote collateral blood-relatives, duties of common charity rather than of piety ought to be exercised.

II. Duties of spouses. 1. Spouses owe one another love, affective and effective,¹ conjugal fidelity,² and living together.³

2. The husband is bound: 1. diligently to administer family affairs; 2. rightly to govern the wife and the whole family. Yet let the husband be mindful of the condition of the wife, who is a companion, not a handmaid. Hence let him treat her honorably; if there is need, let him correct her, but it scarcely happens that it is lawful to strike her (St. Alphonsus, III, 351).

3. The wife is bound: 1. to reverence her husband;⁴ 2. to obey her husband;⁵ 3. together with the husband to govern the family; 4. to perform domestic duties. As to obedience, however, note that of herself she is not held to those things which the husband would irrationally impose, for example if he required from a woman of more honorable condition that she sweep the house, unless poverty excused it (St. Alphonsus, III, 351, 352, question 2). Besides, disobedience as such is not easily gravely evil, because she ought to obey as a companion, not as a handmaid.

Spouses sin gravely by provoking one another with hatreds, grave curses, or quarrels.

The husband sins gravely: 1. "if he hinders [his wife] concerning the precepts of God or of the Church... but if he hinders her, even without cause, concerning those good things which are only of counsel, as confession, communion, etc., he commonly sins only venially; 2. if he beats her gravely; yet sometimes he can moderately chastise by words, or even from a grave cause by moderate blows, with account taken of condition and state;... 3. if he neglects the governance of the house and the family property; 4. if he does not cohabit with his wife or is absent for a long time without just cause; 5. if, when he can, he does not procure food, unless however the wife has departed from the company of the husband by her own fault, or unless she has committed adultery" (St. Alphonsus, III, 356).

The wife sins gravely: 1. "if she provokes her husband by quarrels or otherwise by words to grave anger or blasphemy;... 2. if, despising her husband, she claims authority for herself; 3.... if she inserts herself into the administration of the house without just cause; such as if, for example, the husband, being prodigal, squanders the goods of the family" (St. Alphonsus, III, 351).

¹ Cf. Eph. 5:25, 28, 29; Titus 2:4.

² Cf. our little work De virtute castitatis, n. 34.

³ Cf. cited work, n. 103.

⁴ Eph. 5:33.

⁵ Eph. 5:22, 23.

I. Moderns distinguish a threefold emancipation of women: physiological, economic, and social: physiological, insofar as women wish, by their own free will, to be freed or to be free from the burdens of a wife, whether conjugal or maternal; economic, by which women wish, even without the husband knowing and with him objecting, to be freely able to have, conduct, and administer their own affairs for themselves, with children, husband, and the whole family set aside; social, insofar as they remove domestic cares, whether of children or of the family, from the wife, so that, with these neglected, she may be able to indulge her own talent and be devoted to affairs and offices, even public ones.¹

II. The threefold emancipation set forth is altogether to be rejected. And indeed the physiological is manifestly a wicked deed, because it entirely neglects the rights and burdens intrinsically joined to marriage. The economic is opposed to the subjection owed to the husband. As to the social, however, we note these things.

1. Social emancipation is not true emancipation of woman, that is, it by no means procures for woman that liberty which is owed to the office of a Christian woman and wife; rather, it is a denial of the feminine character, a corruption of maternal dignity, and a perversion of the whole family. It is said:

a) A corruption of the feminine character; for that equality of rights which is so greatly exaggerated and claimed must indeed be acknowledged in those things which are proper to the human person and dignity, and which follow the nuptial compact and are inherent in marriage; in these indeed each spouse enjoys altogether the same right and is held by the same debt; but in other matters, the natural character of the female sex itself, both lesser aptitude for public affairs and offices, and the natural disposition suggest a certain inequality.

b) A corruption of maternal dignity; since through the said emancipation woman descends from that royal seat to which she was raised within the domestic walls through the Gospel, and in a short time will be reduced to the old servitude (if not in appearance, yet in very truth), and it will come about that, as among the pagans, she will be a mere instrument of man.

c) A perversion of the whole family, because through that emancipation the husband is deprived of a wife, the offspring of a mother, the house and the whole family of an ever-watchful guardian.²

2. "Yet if anywhere the social and economic conditions of the married woman, on account of changed modes and usages of human intercourse, must in some way be changed, it belongs to public authority to adapt the civil rights of the wife to the necessities and needs of this time, with account indeed taken of those things which the diverse natural character of the female sex, honorable morals, and the common good of the family require, provided also that the essential order of domestic society remain unharmed, which has been founded by an authority and wisdom higher than human, that is, divine, and cannot be changed either by public laws or by private good pleasure" (cited encyclical).

¹ Encyclical of Pius XI Casti connubii, December 31, 1930.

² Cf. cited encyclical.

Preliminary Note. The discussion concerns workers who have been received into the family, and therefore pertain to the masterly society.

I. Duties of masters. Masters are bound regarding domestic servants:

1. To treat them kindly, by not imposing excessive labor on them, by furnishing suitable food to them, and by addressing them humanely¹ (St. Alphonsus, III, 342).

2. Not to dismiss them before the appointed time, unless a legitimate cause is present, and to pay them a just wage; these things are explained at length in the treatise on the Seventh Precept of the Decalogue.

3. To provide for their spiritual good. This is clear both from Sacred Scripture,² and from the fact that "they are their head, and act in the place of parents; and therefore they are bound in some way to the same things to which parents are bound" (St. Alphonsus, III, 342). It is added that from the encyclical Rerum novarum and from can. 1524 masters must "take care that the same [that is, workers] have a suitable span of time free for piety";³ which you may apply with greater right to masters of domestic servants. Add can. 1335: not only parents and others who hold the place of parents, but also masters and sponsors are bound by the obligation of taking care that all subject or commended to them be instructed by catechetical instruction.

Corollary. "Masters sin gravely: 1. if without just cause they hinder servants from hearing Mass on feasts, or if on feasts they impose servile works;... 2. if they permit an occasion of sinning when they can prevent it; or if they do not correct those gravely offending" (St. Alphonsus, III, 342); 3. if they do not dismiss the incorrigible, unless they would suffer grave detriment from their dismissal.

As to forestalling occasions of sin, Aertnys-Damen rightly notes: "Regularly they should not permit a male servant and female servant of their house to court each other, but they ought to procure that those courting desist from courtship, or dismiss one or the other as soon as possible. Let them provide, as far as can be done, that servants not sleep together in the same bed. Let them also see to it that male servants and female servants are properly separated as to sleeping quarters; otherwise an occasion of sins will easily arise."⁴

¹ Cf. Ecclus. 33:31.

² 1 Tim. 5:8.

³ Namely because they preside over the society which is called masterly (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 2; II-II, q. 72, a. 2, ad 2). From this encyclical masters must "effect that the worker have a suitable span of time free for piety."

⁴ Aertnys-Damen, I, 556.

II. Duties of servants. Domestic servants owe their masters reverence, obedience, and faithful service.

1. They owe them reverence and obedience, as is clear from Sacred Scripture;¹ likewise from the fact that masters, as governors of the masterly society, are true superiors (St. Alphonsus, III, 343). Faithful service is owed by force of contract, and therefore from justice.

2. The duties of reverence and obedience, since they regard morally different modes of observance, differ specifically; that the duty of faithful service differs specifically from the aforesaid duties is clear.

3. Obedience, as regards minors, extends also to morals; those of age are subject as regards domestic governance. Faithful service requires that they fulfill the work to which they are held, with law, contract, and custom considered, labor diligently, and not depart illegitimately before the appointed time (St. Alphonsus, III, cited place).

¹ 1 Tim. 6:1; Eph. 6:5; 1 Pet. 2:18.

Preliminary Note I. The discussion concerns workers who have not been received into the family, and therefore do not pertain to the masterly society; such as those who labor in factories or workshops.

Preliminary Note II. It is disputed whether between employers and non-domestic servants there exists a relation properly so called of superiority and inferiority, or only that relation which every contract brings with it between contracting parties.¹ Now the reasons which are alleged for the existence of superiority properly so called, that is, authority, seem less firm.

Objection 1. Everything cannot be determined by contract; therefore it remains that authority be admitted, which orders what has not been determined.

Resp. Everything can be sufficiently determined by contract, at least implicitly; but if something obscure remains, recourse should be had to friendly composition, or the matter should be settled by a judge.

Objection 2. Between the employer and the workers there exists a true society, since they are bound to pursue a good common to themselves; but a common good to be pursued argues a society. But where there is a society, there is also authority.

Resp. The employer and servants are bound to pursue a good common to themselves, as all men are bound to that with respect to neighbor; indeed masters and servants are bound to that in a special way because they are joined to one another in a special way: granted. They are bound to pursue a good common to themselves insofar as they constitute a society, or insofar as they must pursue one moral end: this is not proved, or rather seems to be denied, because it is lawful for each one to rest in his own good, with common charity nevertheless preserved.

¹ Cf. Oskar Renz in Xenia Thomistica, vol. I, p. 474 ff.; Peques, Commentaire litteral sur la Somme Theologique, t. XII, on II-II, q. 104, a. 1; Vermeersch, De Iustitia, n. 455; Ned. Kath. Stemmen, 1927, p. 85.

I. Duties of employers. Employers are bound:

1. To treat workers kindly, for example by addressing them kindly and not imposing "more work than their strength can bear, nor that kind which is at variance with their age and sex."¹

2. To grant them a suitable wage, and not dismiss them illegitimately; concerning these things, in the treatise on the Seventh Precept of the Decalogue.

3. The things said in n. 719 about the spiritual care of domestic servants are not to be urged equally as regards workers. Yet certainly employers are bound, insofar as it can morally be done:

a) To take care that those who are of childhood age, and mothers of families, are not employed in factories or workshops.

"It is wrong to abuse childhood age and the weakness of woman. Let mothers of families chiefly at home, or in those things which are adjacent to the home, devote their labor by applying themselves to domestic cares. But it is a very bad abuse and to be removed by every effort, that mothers of families, on account of the smallness of the father's wage, are compelled to exercise gainful work outside the domestic walls, with their peculiar cares and duties, and especially the instruction of infants, neglected. Therefore one must strive with every effort that fathers of families receive a wage sufficiently ample, which may suitably provide for common domestic necessities."²

b) To take care that in factories or workshops everything be done honorably; hence, for example, let neither sex labor promiscuously, and let those who continue to be a scandal to others be dismissed.³

"The soul shudders if the very grave dangers are weighed, to which in modern workshops the morals of workers (especially younger ones) and the modesty of girls and other women are exposed."⁴

c) To leave them the faculty of fulfilling ecclesiastical precepts.⁵ Besides, other precepts also of common charity - for example of correcting - can be urged more as regards workers, since they are joined to the master by a special bond.

d) To acknowledge the right of workers to establish associations for protecting their rights and promoting their good.⁶

¹ Encyclical of Leo XIII Rerum novarum, May 15, 1891.

² Encyclical of Pius XI Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931.

³ Encyclical of Leo XIII Rerum novarum.

⁴ Encyclical Quadragesimo anno.

⁵ Encyclical Rerum novarum; likewise Quadragesimo anno.

⁶ Encyclical of Leo XIII Longinqua oceani, January 6, 1895; Sacred Consistorial Congregation to the Bishop of Lille, June 5, 1929; likewise encyclical Quadragesimo anno.

II. Duties of workers. Workers owe employers:

1. Reverence, and indeed from the virtue of observance. Moreover, they owe them a certain reverence because employers are more eminent in many things; wherefore note these words of St. Thomas: "In anyone there is found something from which someone can regard him as superior, according to that saying in Phil. 2: 'In humility, considering one another as superiors'; and according to this all also ought to anticipate one another in honor" (II-II, q. 103, a. 2, ad 3). But the reverence due is from the virtue of observance, according to these words of the same Doctor: "Reverence which is shown to some persons on account of any excellence whatever pertains to the same virtue [that is, to observance]" (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 102, a. 1, ad 2; n. 397).

2. Faithful service; which is owed by force of the contract entered into, and therefore from commutative justice; for the rest, as to faithful service, what has been said about domestic servants has force (n. 720).

I. Duties of teachers. 1. Teachers, when and so long as they enjoy true authority over pupils, authority, I say, received from parents or from those taking their place, with due conditions observed, are held to the same duties by which parents are held toward children; for they truly take their place (St. Alphonsus, III, 362). These things are especially to be applied to teachers of institutions, and to instructors of the lower disciplines.

2. Teachers are bound diligently to care for the instruction of pupils; and they can violate this obligation even by negligence. Likewise they are bound, even if they do not fully take the place of parents, according to the circumstances, to provide for moral education; for example, while the pupils are subject to them, by watching over their morals, protecting good morals, correcting delinquents, and so forth. Yet these things have greater force for instructors of lower and middle-level discipline than for teachers of the higher sciences.

3. As regards the latter teachers, I note especially:

a) Teachers of the higher sciences sin if they teach the false as true; and indeed gravely, whenever from the doctrine handed on damage for faith or morals follows.

b) They are bound to obey if legitimate authority, whether a Rule or a competent Superior, imposes on them some system or weighty doctrine of some Doctor to be taught, that is, to be set forth together with the arguments which support it; they are bound to obey, I say, even if they themselves adhere to another system or doctrine. For it is lawful for them to obey, because the doctrine imposed, as we are supposing, can safely be taught. Now if it is lawful, there is an obligation of obeying; yet they should not propose the doctrine as their own if they do not admit it. But if a higher Authority has imposed another doctrine to be taught, let obedience be given to this. Hence obedience must be given to the Code when it establishes: let professors in every way treat the studies of rational philosophy and theology, and the instruction of students in these disciplines, according to the method, doctrine, and principles of the Angelic Doctor, and let them hold these sacredly (can. 1366, § 2; can. 589, § 1).

c) Likewise they are bound to obey if legitimate authority for a time forbids teaching or disseminating a doctrine which is apt to disturb peace or promote abuses. I said for a time, because we are supposing that it concerns a doctrine which, in itself, can safely be taught; on that supposition, one should abstain from a definitive prohibition. As regards our assertion, however, observe: the act of teaching is an act of beneficence or charity, which is lawful for anyone, unless per accidens he is impeded from the use of this natural liberty, whether: 1. because of reservation of the matter, as faith has been entrusted to the sole authority of the Church; or 2. because of injuring the right of a third party to reputation or to secrecy; or 3. because of the legitimate prohibition of a Superior, of a Superior, I say, who must attend to dangers which can threaten the community.

II. Duties of pupils. Pupils owe teachers, from the virtue of observance, reverence and obedience. They owe them reverence and obedience insofar, namely, and because, they are subject to them (n. 397 sq.). Moreover, that these duties are owed from the virtue of observance follows from the notion of that virtue handed down above (n. 397).

As regards pupils who, considering the circumstances, are not truly subject to teachers, these words of St. Thomas have force: "There is a moral debt, which is owed from a certain honesty; and in this way we owe worship and honor to those who are constituted in dignity, even if we are not subject to them" (II-II, q. 102, a. 2, ad 2). For pupils also with respect to teachers, more than the reverse, these words of the same holy Doctor cited above have force: "In anyone there is found something from which someone can regard him as superior, according to that saying in Phil. 2: In humility, considering one another as superiors; and according to this all also ought to anticipate one another in honor" (II-II, q. 103, a. 2, ad 3).

I. Rulers are bound to promote the public good and therefore especially: 1. to entrust public offices to worthy persons; 2. to provide for the rights and security of citizens; 3. to promote public prosperity by just laws and statutes; 4. to preserve the rights of the Church and to be of assistance to her.¹

¹ Leo XIII, encyclical Immortale Dei, November 1, 1885; Council of Trent, sess. 25, chap. 20, De reformatione.

II. Subjects owe civil superiors reverence,¹ and subjection in those things which are justly established for promoting the common good.²

Corollary I. Rebellion is illicit, both because it is opposed to the right which a ruler enjoys, and because very great evils are everywhere joined to rebellion. Hence Pius IX in the Syllabus condemned proposition 63: "It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate rulers, indeed even to rebel."³ And Gregory XVI says: "Both divine and human rights cry out against those who, by most shameful machinations of treason and sedition, strive to fall away from fidelity toward rulers and to hurl them down from authority."⁴

Question 1. Whether it is lawful to eject a usurper.

Resp. It is lawful to eject a usurper in the name of legitimate authority, so long as he has not yet become a legitimate ruler. Now he can become a legitimate ruler either by the just abdication of the legitimate ruler, or by the tacit or express consent of the people to transfer the rights of power to the usurper after the death of the legitimate ruler and of his heirs, or by the public welfare of the commonwealth, if this makes the permanence of the usurper necessary. It is disputed whether long possession of a realm confers a right to authority. It seems it must be denied, especially in the first usurper, and while good faith is lacking and the legitimate ruler still protests, unless that very long possession brings about the necessity that the government of the usurper remain for the public good.⁵ On that supposition, to depose such a ruler already becomes illicit.

Question 2. Whether it is lawful to depose a ruler who is indeed legitimate, but a tyrant.

Resp. 1. It is not lawful to depose a legitimate ruler who is actually abusing power, since an actual injury does not confer the right of dissolving the constituted state.

Resp. 2. If the discussion is about habitual and excessive tyranny, one must distinguish thus:

If the right of electing a ruler belongs to the people, it seems it must per se be affirmed, both because election from the mind of the people seems to be interpreted in this way, and because of the reason to be adduced in the following hypothesis. I said per se, because of the inconveniences often joined to such a manner of acting, about which there will be discussion immediately.

If the principality is hereditary, several more recent authors deny it; but older authors and many more recent ones affirm it, at least per se, because the right of the people to be well governed prevails over the individual good of the ruler that he govern. I said at least per se, because in practice it is difficult to prevent a greater ruin from following from deposition and so forth.

"Tyrannical government," says St. Thomas, "is not just, because it is not ordered to the common good, but to the private good of the ruler, as is clear from the Philosopher in III Politics (chap. 5) and in VIII Ethics (chap. 10); and therefore the disturbance of this government does not have the character of sedition, unless perhaps when the rule of the tyrant is so inordinately disturbed that the subject multitude suffers greater detriment from the consequent disturbance than from the rule of the tyrant" (II-II, q. 42, a. 2, ad 3). And Leo XIII says: "Yet if sometimes it happens that public power is exercised by rulers rashly and beyond measure, the doctrine of the Catholic Church does not allow rising against them on one's own initiative, lest the tranquility of order be disturbed more and more, and lest society receive greater detriment from this. When the matter has come to this, that no other hope of safety shines forth, she teaches that a remedy must be obtained by the merits of Christian patience and by insistent prayers to God."⁶ These words can be understood in such a way that the Supreme Pontiff practically fears that greater evils will arise from rebellion.

Corollary II. Although rebellion is everywhere illicit, nevertheless it is lawful for a nationality, by parliamentary means, as they are called, to tend toward its own commonwealth. It is said by parliamentary means, so that unjust means are excluded, whether with respect to the former commonwealth or with respect to another nationality existing in the same commonwealth. The doctrine stated is drawn from this, that it is lawful, with the rights of others preserved, to tend toward that which is the more suitable means for obtaining human good. But its own commonwealth is per se a more suitable means for a nationality to obtain human good, because citizens of the same morals, culture, and psychological dispositions cooperate more easily toward the common good.

Corollary III. Per se there is no obligation of obeying a usurper who has not yet become a legitimate ruler. The reason is that in reality he lacks authority. Per accidens there can be an obligation, namely lest scandal arise or order be disturbed (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 104, a. 6, ad 3).

Corollary IV. Nor per se is there an obligation of obeying the unjust precepts of a legitimate Ruler. Per accidens there can be an obligation, as was just said about a usurper.

"A man is bound to obey secular rulers," says St. Thomas in the cited place, "insofar as the order of justice requires; and therefore if they do not have a just rule but a usurped one, or if they command unjustly, subjects are not bound to obey them, except perhaps per accidens, on account of avoiding scandal or danger." From these things you may deduce what must be thought about resistance to unjust laws, whether passive or active. Passive resistance, which consists in this, that the law is merely not observed, is per se lawful; per accidens, or because of a greater evil to be avoided, there can be an obligation of fulfilling the law. Yet it is always illicit to observe the law if that which it commands is intrinsically evil. Active resistance, by which someone positively resists observing the law, likewise can per accidens be illicit, and at least as being generally useless is everywhere to be dissuaded.

¹ 1 Pet. 2:17.

² Rom. 13:1, 2, 7.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1763.

⁴ Encyclical Mirari vos, August 15, 1832.

⁵ Aertnys-Damen, I, n. 563.

⁶ Encyclical Quod Apostolici muneris, December 28, 1878.

I. Electors are bound to use the right of electing as follows:

1. The obligation of electing is grave: 1. if there is hope through one's own election of bringing it about that there will be present a number of good deputies sufficient for establishing good laws or at least for warding off harmful ones; in other words, at least in practice, that there will be present a number of good deputies greater than, or at least as great as, the number of wicked deputies; 2. if there is hope through one's own election of warding off a deputy who by his influence will notably harm the common good; 3. if it is of great importance that it be signified how many electors favor right principles, for example if from the number of votes the boldness of adversaries will be diminished.

2. Outside the aforesaid cases the obligation of electing is everywhere light, either because there is hope of increasing the number of good deputies, or because at least it is of interest that it be signified how many men oppose wicked principles. A just cause excuses from a light obligation. I said everywhere; for:

3. If neither of the enumerated causes is present, there is no obligation of using one's right, unless perhaps from a law which obliges at most under light sin, and which is satisfied by a blank ballot dropped into the urn. If the election is only between two wicked candidates, and the worse will certainly be warded off without the cooperation of Catholics, per se one should abstain from the election.

Corollary I. He who elects an unworthy deputy:

a) Sins gravely: 1. if he is led by a wicked end, for example because he approves wicked principles; 2. if it is to be feared that by electing an unworthy one he brings it about that the number of good deputies sufficient for establishing good laws, or at least for warding off wicked laws, will be lacking; 3. if it is to be feared that by electing he is the cause why a deputy is elected who by his influence will notably harm the common good.

b) Does not sin if he acts thus so that a greater evil may be forestalled, for example so that a worse candidate may be warded off.

c) Outside the aforesaid cases, he sins at least lightly.

Corollary II. He who abstains from an election is not bound to restitution of the damages that followed, because he is not bound by commutative justice to use the right of electing. There is a dispute about one who has voted illicitly; but the obligation of making restitution is denied with sufficient probability, because electors are rather the occasion than the cause of the damage, nor is it sufficiently proved that there belongs to the community a strict right that an unworthy candidate not be elected.

II. Deputies are bound to promote the common good, especially by establishing good laws and warding off harmful ones. Moreover, they sin gravely: 1. whenever they vote for a law intrinsically evil; 2. when, either by abstaining or by voting, they are the cause why a gravely harmful law, even though not intrinsically evil, is established, unless this is done so that a more harmful law may be warded off.

Corollary I. Deputies who, either by abstaining from voting or by giving a vote, have been the cause why a harmful law was established, are bound to restitution, because by reason of their office, to which remuneration is joined, and therefore from commutative justice, they must, if they can, promote the common good and ward off evil.

Corollary II. The things said about electors and deputies have greatest force concerning electors of legislative assemblies and concerning deputies to the aforesaid assemblies; nevertheless they can also be applied to electors of administrative assemblies, for example of a province or municipality, and to deputies to the said assemblies.

I. Public authority, just as it can kill a criminal, so a fortiori can mutilate, imprison, and beat him. But it is another question whether public authority lawfully imposes certain mutilations, namely vasectomy, oophorectomy, and so forth, as a punishment. Now, speaking theoretically, a punishment of this kind, although it can be defended from the fact that it deprives criminals of a great good, that is, of the faculty of procreating, seems less congruent with the common sense of morality. I said theoretically, because in practice it will impose the said punishment for this end, that the procreation of offspring to be procured by the criminal may be impeded. But that is illicit, because it is not lawful even for public authority directly to impede the good of the species (n. 740).

II. Superiors lacking supreme power, for example parents and those taking their place, cannot mutilate or strictly imprison their delinquent subjects; nevertheless they can beat them moderately. It is said:

1. They cannot mutilate them, because "man himself and all his parts" belong to society (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1); but it belongs only to the supreme governor of society to subtract from the community what pertains to the community (n. 741).

2. They cannot strictly imprison them, because not only man and all his parts belong to the community, but also his activity; hence again it belongs only to the supreme governor of society to impede the activity of man by strict imprisonment (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 3). Nevertheless inferior Superiors can keep their subjects at home for just causes.

3. They can beat them moderately. For they enjoy the power of coercing subjects insofar as by acting thus they do not inflict injury on the community. But beating a subject inflicts no injury on the community, because it removes neither life, nor the integrity of members, nor activity (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 2). Yet it is not lawful for a man to beat his wife, unless a most grave necessity urges, since the wife is not his servant but his companion (St. Alphonsus, VI, 972).

III. Equals, for example brothers and sisters, even if older by birth, cannot even beat delinquents, unless by consent of a superior. The reason is that by beating some harm is inflicted on the body of him who is beaten; moreover, it is not lawful to inflict harm on someone except by way of punishment, on account of justice. But no one can punish someone unless he is subject to his power. Therefore an equal cannot beat an equal (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 2).

The goods of spouses are distinguished into common and proper, according as they belong to both or to either one. It depends on the law what kind the goods of spouses are: whether common, or proper, or partly common and partly proper. In many kingdoms legal community is in force; in other words, the goods of spouses are common unless before marriage something else is agreed. Now:

I. As regards common goods, ownership of them belongs to both; the right of administration is in the husband's hands; the right of the fruits falls to both. It is said:

1. Ownership of them belongs to both; this is the same as asserting co-ownership, as it is called.

A twofold co-ownership of spouses can be distinguished: one by which spouses are not distinct subjects of right but one owner; according to many, though undeservedly as it seems, co-ownership of this kind is constituted by Dutch law. The other co-ownership is that by which the spouses are two distinct subjects of rights. And this co-ownership is again twofold, Roman and Germanic. Moreover, the chief difference between them consists in this, that the Romans divided common goods mentally, and then considered the undivided part of the thing as a separated whole, which any co-owner could alienate or burden. But the Germans did not divide common goods mentally, but continued to consider them as one whole, and therefore left to all co-owners the right of disposing of the common goods.

2. The right of administration is in the husband's hands; the right of the fruits falls to both.

Corollary I. Spouses who seize common goods for themselves alone or squander them sin against commutative justice if, with the law considered, the co-ownership is Roman or Germanic. The reason is that they violate the strict right of the other spouse. The contrary is to be said with sufficient probability if the co-ownership is of the former kind explained above, because deservedly it is doubted whether the alterity required for commutative justice is present if one person, although one is not the same as two, with another becomes one subject of rights or one owner. In a word: the matter depends on whether the two are to be regarded as a moral person or not; if the former, the required alterity is certainly had. For the rest, not only the husband, but also the wife, can subtract those things which otherwise will be squandered by the husband. This is clear if Roman or Germanic co-ownership is had, because squandering is opposed to strict justice, as we have said; and the wife can certainly forestall that injustice. If co-ownership is of the former kind explained above, the squandering to be feared is a sufficient reason for withdrawing common goods from the husband's disposition and acquiring for herself the administration of those goods (St. Alphonsus, III, 541).

Corollary II. If the husband refuses necessities or grants them with great difficulty, the wife can, even if Roman or Germanic co-ownership is had, from the common goods:

1. Give out what is necessary for suitable support of herself and the offspring, for decent adornment and suitable recreation, for alms to be given according to condition; likewise for guarding herself in the future and procuring a suitable state for the offspring, or for averting grave spiritual or temporal damage from the family. The reason is that the intimate conjunction between wife and husband, between children and parents, brings it about that common goods, if the proper good or the good of the offspring demands it, can be treated as proper goods (St. Alphonsus, III, 540, 541).

2. Spend those things by which she may consult the necessary support of her parents or of offspring received from another marriage; for what is lawful for her in order to her own advantage also seems lawful in order to the good of those who are in some way one with her; all the more because in the case the husband is also bound from piety to consult the parents and offspring of his wife (St. Alphonsus, III, 542).

II. As regards proper goods, each spouse has direct and useful ownership of them, that is, of proper goods; but to whom administration belongs is to be drawn from the law.

Corollary I. Those about to marry sin against justice, and in themselves are bound to restitution, by deceiving the other party, for example by exaggerating goods, lessening debts, and thus bringing it about that a nuptial agreement is omitted by which community of goods would be excluded wholly or in part.

Corollary II. A wife can freely dispose of those things which she has gathered by extraordinary labor or parsimony, or has saved from what was granted for food or pleasure (St. Alphonsus, III, 541).

Corollary III. If the husband refuses, or grants with great difficulty, the things which are necessary for suitable support of the wife or offspring, for decent adornment and suitable recreation, for alms to be given according to condition, for guarding the wife in the future and procuring a suitable state for the offspring, or for averting grave damage from the family, if, I say, the husband refuses these things or grants them with great difficulty, the wife, in defect of proper and common goods, can also use the husband's proper goods, because the intimate conjunction between wife and husband, between children and parents, brings it about that the proper goods of one are in some way also those of the other, so that things owed to the other spouse or to the children, if they are denied, can be seized (St. Alphonsus, III, 540-541).

In general, however, the confessor should not easily indulge the complaints of wives, lest the reins be loosened too much.

V. Obligations of the locator, or hired person. 1. The hired person is bound faithfully to render his work according to the agreement.

2. With attention paid to natural law, the hired person cannot leave the hirer before the fixed time except for a grave cause. But if he does so, he ought to compensate the damages perhaps following for the hirer from the illegitimate departure. If, however, in the case the hirer finds another worker, the hired person can diminish the compensation proportionately, or even omit it, if no damage follows for the hirer. For the rest, the hired person retains a right to the wage proportionate to the time during which he rendered service, with some part nevertheless deducted as a just penalty (St. Alphonsus, III, 845). But what has force with attention paid to civil law, see in the code of one's country.

Question. What is to be said about the concerted interruption of labor, or about what are called strikes?¹

Response 1. Strikes are unjust: 1. if they are done for this end, that a wage greater than the just wage may be obtained;² 2. if the contract of letting was validly entered into, and the time of the lease has not yet elapsed, and a reason for not observing the contract is lacking. Therefore, with the end of obtaining a wage greater than the just wage excluded, they are not unjust: 1. if the contract of letting was invalid, for example because of a wage agreed upon that was less than just; 2. if the time of the lease has elapsed; 3. if there is a reason for not observing the contract, for example because the master himself does not observe the conditions.

Response 2. Strikes, though just, can nevertheless be illicit, with attention paid to graver damages that may perhaps arise, for example greater inconveniences that will befall families, disturbance of public order, etc. Hence they also are illicit if there is hope of obtaining the end by way of settlement.

Note. They are guilty of injustice who keep others back from work by an unjust means. Unjust means are threats, force, and fraud.

¹ Cf. Vermeersch, Quaestiones de Iustitia, n. 470-477; Aengenent, o.c., n. 140 sq.

² If workers conspire for the highest wage, they seem to act illicitly (n. 903).

I. Notion. Labor here is understood as the use of powers which by its nature is not ordered to delight, as games or sport, as it is called, are. It is distinguished as spiritual and bodily.

II. The right of laboring. It is clear that to each person belongs the right of using his powers, insofar as by that use the right of another is not harmed. But it is asked to what extent one who otherwise cannot provide for himself and his own has a broad right that an occasion of laboring be procured for him. Now those who can conveniently furnish it are bound to furnish an occasion of laboring to those who lack another means of support. Likewise the State, insofar as there is need, should provide for this cause.

What is to be said about the rationalization of labor, as it is called?

Response 1. The rationalization of labor consists in this, that with the least possible powers the greatest number and best effects are produced and brought to buyers. The consequence will be that more workers become superfluous and are dismissed.

Response 2. This way of acting is not illicit, because no one is bound to neglect his own advantage in order to procure advantage for another. Make exception if the State, insofar as it is necessary for the common good and can practically be done, restricts liberty.

III. Obligation of laboring. Each person is bound to labor: 1° if otherwise he cannot provide for himself and his own; 2° if idleness would be a proximate and free occasion of sins. Labor is also necessary for the common good; but if the intended end, with attention paid to the common character of men, will be obtained certainly enough - as has place in the case - a necessity of this kind does not oblige individual persons (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 187, a. 3).

Objection. The Apostle warns: "If anyone will not work, neither let him eat."¹

Response. The Apostle can best be understood of those who, with labor neglected, cannot provide for themselves and their own.²

¹ 2 Thess. 3:10.

² Encyclical Quadragesimo anno, May 15, 1931 (A.A.S. 1931, p. 197).

The Duties of Superiors and Subjects: Duties of Superiors.—Superiors both in domestic and civil society need especially prudence and justice in order to fulfill well their special duties of ruling successfully and lawfully (Jerem., xxiii. 5).

(a) Prudence.—If every individual must use wise deliberation, decision and direction to guide himself aright, much more does a ruler, whether of the home or of the State, need these qualities; and hence it is the prudent servant who is placed over his master’s household (Matt., xxiv. 45), whereas the imprudent ruler brings confusion upon his community (Is., iii. 4 sqq). Parents, guardians, executives, lawmakers and magistrates are, therefore, bound to fit themselves by competent knowledge of their duties. At the minimum, they must know what constitutes the welfare of their circle or community, and how it should be promoted. For this, in positions of subordinate importance, common sense with good will often suffices, but from those who are heads of large organizations much more is expected. A chief who has to direct a great multitude must have unusual ability and unusual knowledge or unusual quickness to learn from study and conference what measures will safeguard the interests of his body and promote the happiness and prosperity of its members (see 1640 sqq.).

(b) Justice.—In their rule superiors must be lovers of the common good; they must decree, judge and govern according to natural justice and the law; in distributions of burdens and favors they must be guided by fairness to all, avoiding partiality, bribery, peculation and every form of political corruption; in discipline they must conscientiously enforce the right; in personal life they must be a model to their subjects, showing themselves moral, religious, truthful, dignified but approachable and patient (not arrogant, stubborn, sensitive, ill-humored or revengeful), given to work and duty rather than to pleasure and display.

What is the fourth precept of the Decalogue? - The fourth precept of the Decalogue is: Honor your father and your mother. Ex. 20:12. This precept primarily and directly regards the obligations of children toward parents, because "they are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 3. But secondarily and implicitly it regards both the obligations of parents toward children, and also the mutual obligations of other blood-relatives, and of other inferiors and superiors. Roman Catechism, p. 3, c. 6, nn. 2, 8. Therefore this precept concerns acts per se of the virtues of piety, observance, dulia, obedience, legal justice, and gratitude.

Piety is a certain special virtue, to which it pertains to exhibit worship toward parents and one's fatherland, from whom and in which we are born, because they are "a connatural principle producing in being and governing." For piety regards this "principle, insofar as it spends duty and worship upon parents and fatherland, and upon those things which are ordered to these." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 101, a. 3. Besides this, piety also exhibits worship toward other blood-relatives, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; and likewise toward benefactors of the fatherland, because in them we behold the favor and help of the fatherland. S. Th. l. c., a. 1. "Through the fact that we are born from parents, both blood-relatives and fatherland pertain to us." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 122, a. 5. Hence piety is also between spouses and with respect to children, "because between spouses there is worship and duty toward each other, as coadjutors for the preservation of the blood-relationship of both, which each spouse has from his own parents; for by the propagation of children the blood of each parent is preserved. And we say the same about children, namely because they are regarded by the virtue of piety as preservers of the blood-relationship received from parents." Cajetan, on 2. 2, q. 101, a. 1.

Worship is an act by which someone professes his own subjection to another in testimony of the latter's excellence. Hence the worship owed to parents imports reverence, obedience, and duty. Obedience imports compliance. Duty imports obedience and assistance.

Observance is a virtue "through which worship and honor is exhibited to persons constituted in dignity." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1. Honor imports a certain testimony concerning someone's excellence, either by words or by deeds, such as inclinations, or also by exterior things, for example, the offering of gifts. It is distinguished from praise, because praise consists in words alone. It is distinguished from glory, which is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness shines out in the knowledge of many, and this the name of glory imports, which is clear knowledge with praise. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103, a. 1.

Observance also pertains reductively to this fourth precept; since, just as parents are for us a principle producing in being and governing, so persons constituted in dignity not only have a certain excellence in themselves, but also a certain power of governing with respect to some things, whence the nature of principle also belongs to them, as a Prince of a city is in civil matters, a leader of an army in military matters, a teacher in disciplines. Hence it is that all such persons are also called fathers because of the likeness of care. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 63, a. 3; q. 102, aa. 1, 2; Quodl. 10, a. 12; Roman Catechism, n. 8.

Dulia is "a certain species of observance, because through observance we honor any persons whatever who excel in dignity; but through dulia, properly taken, servants venerate their masters. For dulia in Greek is called servitude." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103, a. 3. They venerate, by furnishing due service to masters. A certain species of observance. For observance has diverse species according to the diverse nature of excellence. And thus in one way a servant reveres a master, a soldier a commander, a disciple a teacher. S. Th. l. c., a. 4; q. 104, a. 2 ad 4.

Obedience properly is "a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept" of a superior. "But if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for omission of the same from any intention whatever, then obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 2. The former is usually called formal obedience; the latter, material obedience. "Obedience proceeds from reverence, which exhibits worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered in itself, insofar as it regards the nature of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for Prelates it is contained in some way under observance; insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 3 ad 1. But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Cf. 835.

Gratitude or thankfulness is a virtue which recompenses benefactors for some particular and private benefit received, by the action of thanks, and by spending something gratuitously. Ingratitude is opposed to gratitude, which according to the diversity of circumstances is sometimes a lethal, sometimes a venial sin. It is not grave unless the ingratitude was great. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 107.

Therefore gratitude is a certain virtue which comes after piety and observance, as deficient from them, since "not whatever we owe to a father or to a person excelling in dignity do we owe to some benefactor from whom we have received some particular benefit." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 106, aa. 1, 3, 6; q. 107. But honor and reverence are owed to a benefactor because he has the nature of a principle, and per accidens relief or support, if he is in need.

What about legitimate and illegitimate, natural and adoptive children? - Some children are legitimate and natural, others natural, others legitimate. Legitimate and natural children are those who are born from a man and his wife. Those are presumed by law legitimate and natural who are born from a mother joined in lawful marriage, unless it is juridically certain that their origin is from another than the husband of the mother. For he is held as father whom marriage points out. The mother indeed is certain; but the father is presumed. And this presumption also has force in the forum of conscience. C. B. 1591, 1717, 1720; C. L. 101 seqq.; C. He. 252.

The fetus is usually brought forth in the ninth month from the time it was conceived, sometimes at the beginning of the seventh, sometimes at the full tenth, namely not before 180 days, nor after 300 days. C. I. 161 seqq.; C. G. 315; C. H. 108; C. A. 138, 163; C. B. 1592, 1717; C. L. 101; C. He. 252, 254.

Hence, of him who is born either after the seventh month from the marriage entered, or before the tenth month from the marriage dissolved, he is the father whom marriage points out, unless something else is most evident. C. L. 103; C. He. 254, 255. Nor indeed does it at all stand in the way that the mother was adulterous, C. I. 165; C. G. 313; C. H. 109; C. A. 158, or that she herself has declared the son adulterine, C. A. 158, unless she brings forward such indications as would suffice in the external forum, Lugo, de Iust., d. 12, n. 26, although she be most worthy of faith, and sworn, and assert this while dying; for no one deserves belief when alleging his own baseness. C. Inter 8, § ult., de Donat.; L. 654, 924.

A fetus brought forth before the seventh month from the marriage entered is held legitimate only if the husband either married the woman knowingly and willingly while she was pregnant, or, since he was present, did not altogether repudiate the child born. C. I. 161; C. G. 314; C. H. 110; C. L. 102. A fetus brought forth later after the tenth month from the dissolution of marriage is held as illegitimate, unless the health and morals of the mother and the circumstances of things suggest otherwise. C. I. 169; C. G. 315; C. H. 111; C. L. 102 seqq.

Natural or illegitimate children are those who are born outside marriage. These by canon law are irregular; by civil law they are distinguished from legitimate children chiefly as to succession to paternal inheritance. C. A. 155, 165; C. H. 114, 127, 134, 139. These natural children, if they were born from a man and woman between whom marriage could not have been entered, whether by natural law or by divine and canon law, by the same canon law are called spurious, or born from condemned intercourse. C. 3, 10, Qui fil. sint legit. And they are adulterine, sacrilegious, incestuous, and nefarious, if they were born from ascendants and descendants. But by civil law all are called illegitimate, and if they are adulterine or incestuous, they cannot be recognized. C. I. 180; C. G. 335; C. He. 304.

Other illegitimate children can be acknowledged and legitimated. C. I. 179, 195; C. G. 331, 334. They are acknowledged by the confession of parents, in civil law, authentic, C. I. 181; C. G. 334; C. H. 131; C. He. 503; in canon law, simple and bare, C. 10, de Probat.; and after they have been acknowledged they follow the condition of the one acknowledging, whether of the mother, or of the father, or of both. C. I. 185. But those acknowledged are legitimated by subsequent marriage by the law itself, C. I. 194; C. G. 331; C. H. 120, 121; C. He. 258 seqq.; C. A. 161; C. B. 1719; and they can also be acknowledged after the marriage has already been contracted. C. I. 197; C. H. 121; C. L. 119. Cf. C. G. 331.

By Canon Law, C. 1, 6, Qui filii sint legitimi, and C. H. 119, by marriage only children are legitimated from parents who freely could contract marriage between themselves. But whether those legitimated by dispensation of the Supreme Pontiff, as to canonical effects, are also legitimated as to civil effects, some affirm, others deny.

But from the time when they have been legitimated, they are held as if they had been born from lawful marriage. C. 6, Qui fil. sint leg.; C. I. 194; C. G. 333; C. H. 122; C. A. 161; C. He. 263. Cf. Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 13, c. 24, n. 16. But one merely acknowledged is understood as the child only of him who acknowledged him. C. I. 182; C. G. 336; C. H. 129, 134. From C. B. 1589, 1705, a natural child and father are not reputed blood-relatives; and on the contrary, in his relations with the mother and the mother's blood-relatives he has the juridical condition of a legitimate child. But the same code admits investigation of the natural father and obligations, arts. 1708, 1717. Almost the same is had from C. He. 302 seqq., which also admits investigation of the natural father and obligations. C. H. 135 and C. L. 130 admit investigation of the father in a limited way, and the same codes admit investigation of the mother in the following articles. C. I. 189, 190, 193 admits investigation of maternity. But investigation of paternity is limited to the case of abduction and seduction. C. G. 340, 341, 342 likewise admits investigation of maternity, but investigation of paternity is restricted to the case of abduction. But by each Code and by C. L. 132, investigation of paternity and maternity is forbidden to adulterine and incestuous children whose recognition is prohibited; and by C. H. 141 investigation of paternity is prohibited to children in whom the legal condition of natural children does not concur. In doubt whether someone was born from legitimate marriage, he is to be presumed legitimate. C. I. 120; L. l. 3, n. 951.

Legitimate children are natural children legitimated, and adoptive children. C. I. 737. Adoption is an act by which one is taken into the place of a child who is not such by nature. From more recent laws, the adopted person is held as the legitimate and natural child only of him who adopted him, and he acquires the right of succession to him. C. I. 202, 204, 210, 737; C. G. 343, 344, 350; C. B. 1741, 1757; C. L. 124, 129; C. He. 268. But he is not withdrawn from the power of his natural father, nor does he pass into the power and family of the adopting father. C. I. 210, 212; C. G. 348, 349. But it is otherwise from C. A. 183; C. H. 177; C. B. 1765. This adoption is perpetual and is not dissolved even by mutual consent. C. I. 217. And so also the French Jurists. It is otherwise from C. A. 185; C. B. 1768; C. He. 269.

Legitimate and natural children, as to receiving donations and as to the right of succession, are held such from the time when they were truly conceived, provided they are afterwards born viable. C. I. 724; C. G. 725; C. A. 138. He is born viable who is born after the 180th day from conception, C. I. 160, 162; C. G. 312, 314; C. A. 138, and is perfectly born. In doubt, one who was brought forth alive is presumed to have been born viable. C. I. 724. Abortive children, if they do not survive, are held as born dead.

Natural children only, whether legitimated or acknowledged, acquire the right of succession from the marriage entered by the parents, or from that later time when they have been acknowledged. C. I. 197; C. H. 124. Merely legitimate children acquire the right of succession from the time when they were adopted, as if they had then first been conceived. C. I. 210, 217; C. B. 1754, 1757. From C. H. 177, an adopted person acquires no right of succession except from a testament, or from a previous agreement. From C. B. 1767, the right of succession can be excluded in the contract of adoption. To spurious, incestuous, and adulterine children the laws concede only support, namely when their filiation is duly established. C. L. 134, 135, 136; C. G. 762; C. I. 193, 752; C. H. 139, 140, 141.

What about infants; about those below puberty and pubescents; about minors and majors; about wards? - Those less than seven years old are called infants, as if not speaking, unable to speak. Unless they have already attained the use of reason, although they are not held by human laws, nevertheless they are held by the natural law.

From the seventh year to the fourteenth year, if male; to the twelfth, if female, they are called below puberty; but beyond the aforesaid age they are called pubescent, namely from the proximate power of generation attained at that age. Those below puberty, if they cease to be under the power of the father, by the death of the father or by the emancipation of the children, are called wards. L. 239, de Verb. sign. Having become pubescent, sons are called minors up to the twenty-fifth year of age from Roman Law. L. 1, de Minoribus. By more recent Law, every other distinction having been removed, he or she who has not yet completed the twenty-first year of age is called a minor; after such an age has been completed, he or she is called a major. C. I. 323, 240; C. G. 388, 488; C. B. 2; C. L. 97, 311. From C. H. 320, majority is established when the twenty-third year has been completed; C. A. 21, 174, at the twenty-fourth year; C. He. 14, when the twentieth year has been completed and by marriage.

A cleric is major in benefice matters and other spiritual causes when he has completed the fourteenth year of age. C. Si annum 3, de Iudic., in 6. At a minor age a son, unless he has been emancipated, is constituted under paternal power. C. I. 220; C. B. 1626. But a major regularly manages his own affairs. He can freely dispose of his person and goods. C. L. 311. He is called a son of the family who is still subject to paternal power.

What is the proper obligation of children? - Since children have existence from parents, therefore, besides love, they owe piety to them. For as the love of parents is for doing good, so the love of children is for honoring parents. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 31, a. 3 ad 3; q. 26, a. 9 ad 1, ad 3. But although love does not import honor, honor includes love, since him whom we honor from the soul we also love. Therefore when by the sin of children charity alone toward parents is injured, the only malice contained in it is that alone which is against filial piety. But if that sin has another malice against another virtue, then this new species is added to the former.

Piety per se demands two things, reverence and obedience, but per accidens help to be furnished if they need it. Hence it is that sin against piety can injure both love and reverence and obedience toward parents. For example, if a son conceives internal hatred against parents, or externally by words or in another way saddens them, he sins against love; if he curses parents, he sins against love and against reverence; if he contemns parents and the precept of parents, he sins against reverence and obedience. Another species can also be added to the species against piety, for example, if a son defames or strikes his father, he sins against piety and against justice. C. He. 273, 275.

Even at a greater age children owe love, honor, and reverence to parents, because they are always children, and the others always parents. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 26, aa. 9, 10; q. 101, a. 7; L. 333; C. I. 220; C. G. 371; C. H. 154; C. A. 144, 154. Reverence can be injured by words, gestures, and deeds, namely gravely, even in those things which as to others are light, provided they are not altogether light. Therefore children sin gravely: by words, by commonly addressing parents harshly, or even by showing them no sign of benevolence; by calling them with contumelious words in their presence; or by cursing them from the soul. By gestures, by looking at them with grim eyes, by laughing at them in their presence, by mocking them. By deeds, by deliberately raising hands against them as a sign of striking them, by accusing them of crimes, unless the matter concerns crimes pernicious to the commonwealth, such as heresy, treason, etc. L. 333, 334.

Likewise obedience is gravely injured by not obeying parents in those things which regard domestic governance and economy, or pertain to good morals, if however parents command seriously and in a grave matter; excepting the choice of state, of entering marriage, of entering religion, unless however parents contradict children in this matter from a just cause. Likewise a grave sin is committed by not recognizing them as parents, unless this is done from a just cause and only externally by hiding that one is their child. But they by no means sin by fulfilling duties of religion against the prohibition of parents. For as to all those things which pertain to salvation, "they are immediately subject to God, by whom they are instructed through the natural or written law." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 104, a. 5 ad 2; L. 334, 335; S. Th., Quodl. 2, a. 9; 2. 2, q. 104, aa. 2, 5; C. A. 148; C. L. 142.

Children owe help to needy parents, and consequently must support them; and it is grave even to enter religion by abandoning them in need. Likewise it is grave under this heading not to take care that the sacraments be conferred upon them when sick; that the dead be handed over to burial; that some sacrifice be offered for their soul. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 101, a. 2, a. 4 ad 4; q. 102, a. 2; q. 123, a. 5 ad 3; L. 333, 335; C. I. 139; C. G. 205; C. A. 154; C. B. 1617; C. He. 271, 272.

Do children also owe their own goods to parents? - R. Negatively. Children owe piety to parents, not labors. Therefore if a son furnishes labors in the paternal house, for example, as a craftsman or shoemaker, what he gains from them is his own, after deducting the support which he receives from the father, since he is now able to be sustained by his own work and labor, and no longer needs paternal sustenance. But if he asks nothing, he seems to remit these things to the father from grateful mind and piety. The same must be said about goods acquired by the son by donation, testament, etc.; the son indeed makes them his own, but he is bound to refund the expenses of education to the father. C. A. 150, 154; C. B. 685, 1618. Nor is he bound to pay the father's debts from his own goods. These things are clear by natural law, and it is confirmed by positive law, which, determining the natural obligation, assigns to parents the usufruct of the goods of children. As to positive Law, dominion, or ownership of goods, usufruct, and administration must be distinguished. Likewise the various goods and various Laws must be distinguished: Common or Roman Law, and various More Recent Laws, which are in force in various regions.

Since the right of parents as to the goods of children constitutes part of those rights from which paternal power is had, we shall speak of it more particularly soon, while explaining paternal power. L. 488; C. B. 1627; C. He. 271, 272, 284, 293, 295.

What is paternal power? - Paternal power is the complex of rights of parents over children, and it arises from a twofold cause: 1. because children have had life from them; 2. because parents must educate them fittingly. C. A. 147; C. L. 137. It is from Natural and Positive Law at the same time, positive law defining and determining natural right. For the rights of parents over children flow from natural and civil law. By Natural Law, piety is owed to parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, namely to father and mother, and it belongs to them equally and perpetually as to love and honor, but not however as to obedience after the son has become major, or has been emancipated. C. I. 220. Besides this, power belongs to parents as to those things which pertain to the spiritual salvation of children. And this also belongs equally to each, indeed also to grandfather and grandmother. But if they disagree among themselves, he prevails who consults the salvation of the child. And, when the father has died, if the mother as tutor and the paternal grandmother disagree, the latter will be stronger. Benedict XIV, Ep. Probe te, §§ 20, 21, 23; Ep. Postremo mense, §§ 16, 17; C. Ex litteris 2, de Conv. infid. - The natural power of parents in those things which pertain to the salvation of the soul ends when infancy has passed; in those things which pertain to the choice of state it ends at puberty, C. Cum virum 12, de Regul.; C. A. 148; in those things which pertain to domestic care and discipline it ends by emancipation. But in those things which regard the sustenance of the body and generation of offspring, children are their own masters. And as to entering marriage, they commonly are bound only to seek the counsel of parents. L. 335.

But emancipation is naturally had when the son of the family has already grown sufficiently by age, so that he himself can now be father of a family, and by himself duly consider and oblige himself concerning those things which pertain to his own person and to his exterior goods. C. 11, 12, de Regul.; S. Th. 4 D. 27, q. 2, a. 2; D. 38, q. 1, a. 1, q. ult., sol. 3; 2. 2, q. 104, a. 5; S., q. 43, a. 2; q. 58, a. 5; St. Basil the Great, Epist. 276, Migne, vol. 32, col. 1011.

By Common Law paternal power belongs only to the father of the family, and it was per se perpetual. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 9, §§ 2, 3; t. 12; lib. 1, tit. 6, ff., §§ 3-5, de Patr. pot.; l. 8, t. 46, C.; C. 2, de Convers. infid. But from the More Recent Laws it belongs also to the mother of the family. C. I. 220; C. G. 372; C. B. 1634, 1684, 1685; C. L. 138; C. He. 274. But the mother does not use it as long as the father uses it, to whom it principally belongs. C. I. 46, 220, 230, 331; C. G. 141, 373, 507; C. A. 144, 147; C. H. 154; C. B. 1634; C. L. 139, 155. Moreover it belongs over legitimate and natural children, over natural children acknowledged, over natural children acknowledged and legitimated, and at least in some way also over adoptive children. C. I. 66, 184, 194, 210, 211, 220; C. H. 154; C. A. 183; C. B. 1306, 1757, 1765; C. L. 166. Cf. here n. 663.

Paternal power is exercised by the father, and when he has died or is absent, by the mother with equal right. C. I. 46, 220, 231; C. H. 154; C. G. 141, 390; C. A. 144, 147; C. B. 1627, 1684; C. He. 274. Yet a father dying has the right to prescribe to the surviving mother the manner he wishes to be observed in the education of the children and the administration of goods. C. I. 235, 1059. Cf. C. G. 391; C. B. 1852 seqq. If the mother enters second nuptials, it will be in the power of the family Council or pupilary Judge to permit or remove guardianship from her. C. I. 237; C. G. 395; C. A. 255. When parents are lacking, and a tutor has not been named, guardianship by law belongs to the paternal grandfather; and, he being lacking, to the maternal grandfather. C. I. 244; C. B. 1776.

Moreover paternal power is exercised partly over the persons, partly over the things of children. C. B. 1627.

Paternal Power is exercised, 1. over persons by the faculty which the father has of retaining the son at home, C. He. 273, unless the son wishes voluntarily to give his name to military service. C. I. 221; C. G. 374; by the faculty which the father has of moderately correcting and punishing a disorderly son, C. He. 275; also of barring him from his own house, and even having recourse, where there is need, to the tribunal, and of placing him in another house of education or correction. C. I. 222; C. H. 155, 156; C. G. 375 seqq.; C. A. 145; C. B. 1631, 1632; C. L. 143; L. 3, de Patr. pot., C. Moreover the son is prohibited without the consent of parents from giving himself into adoption, C. I. 208; C. G. 346; C. A. 181; C. B. 1747, and from entering marriage. C. I. 63; C. G. 148; C. A. 49, 153; C. H. 1305; C. L. 1058, 1061; C. He. 98. But when the mother dissents, the consent of the father suffices. C. I.; C. G., ll. cc.; C. He. 274. Finally the right of appointing a tutor belongs to the last surviving parent. C. I. 242; C. G. 397; C. B. 1777; C. He. 274.

Excepting marriage, which before puberty is null from canon law, as to other acts and contracts sons of a family who are minors are only naturally obligated; and if in due time they do not seek restitution in full, they can also be civilly obligated, and those who contract with them are naturally and civilly obligated. Therefore, if they have entered betrothals, if they have emitted a vow, they are bound by the betrothals and by the vow. If they have donated anything, they transfer dominion to the recipient; and if they themselves receive something as a gift, they licitly acquire and retain dominion. C. I., de Desp. impub.; C. I. 1304; C. G. 1314; C. H. 160, 161; C. A. 244, 246; C. B. 106; C. L. 98, 99; Inst. 1, l. 3, t. 19, § 6; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8; 4 D. 27, q. 2, a. 2; L. l. 3, n. 918; Lugo, de Iust., d. 22, nn. 228, 295, 300.

But although a minor validly contracts, from the More Recent Laws he does not contract firmly if various prescriptions of those laws are not observed, and then restitution in full is conceded to them, which also holds in the forum of conscience, since a law of this sort is definitive of right and just; since it is for protecting good morals, for the peace and good of families, and for the common good. C. G. 2012; C. I. 317, 319, 1899.

From C. I. a minor is restored because he is a minor, and an action of nullity is admitted: 1. If a non-emancipated minor performed an act by himself without the intervention of the father or his legitimate representative. 2. If an emancipated minor performed by himself an act for which the law requires the assistance of a curator. 3. When the formalities constituted for certain acts by special dispositions of law are not observed. But an action of nullity is not admitted: 1. If the minor by evil art and deceit concealed his condition as a minor. 2. If the matter concerns an obligation arising from delict or quasi-delict. 3. If it is proved that what was paid was turned to the convenience and utility of the minor. C. I. 1300, 1303, 1305, 1306, 1307, 1899.

From C. G. a minor is restored because he was harmed, and an action of nullity is admitted if the prescriptions of the law in contracts of minors were not observed. Rescission is not admitted: 1. If the harm happened from a chance event. 2. If a minor exercises commerce or some art, as to contracts entered by reason of his commerce or art. 3. If the matter concerns an obligation flowing from delict or quasi-delict. 4. If it is proved that what was paid went to their convenience and utility. C. G. 1304, 1305, 1306, 1308, 1310, 1312, 2012; L. l. 3, nn. 514, 918. Cf. Troplong, della Vendita, cap. 2, art. 1594, num. 166 seqq.

From C. H., the formalities of law not having been observed, the contract of a minor becomes liable to rescission. But he is not bound to restitution except insofar as he became richer by the thing received. C. H. 317, 420, 1163, 1304, 1764, 1765. From C. A., in general a minor indeed cannot be validly obligated without the consent of the father and the other prescriptions of the law. Yet he can freely dispose of things acquired by his own industry, and of others given to him for his own use after puberty has been attained. C. A. 151, 152, 244, 246, 248. From C. B., a minor needs the consent of his representative for any declaration of will whatever, unless this procures a juridical advantage for him, or unless the matter concerns things left to his free disposition. Without the aforesaid consent of the representative, the act can be rescinded. C. B. 108 seqq. From C. L. 297 seqq., the acts of a minor are null if they are made without due authority. But they themselves cannot use this nullity as to obligations upon things of their own art or profession, or if they use deceit so that they may be held as majors.

The power of the father is exercised, 2. over the things of children. From common Law the son was at first a thing of the father of the family; whatever he acquired belonged to the father. Afterwards peculium was recognized. Peculium is any good whatever proper to the son, separated from paternal goods. It is fourfold: 1. Castrense, acquired by military service or on the occasion of military service; and this whole thing, in perfect dominion, belongs to the son. Yet one below puberty does not have its administration.

2. Quasi-castrense, acquired by the profession of sciences or liberal arts, or by some civil office, for example, of judge, advocate, physician, teacher, from an ecclesiastical office or benefice; and the perfect dominion of this also belongs to the son. Yet administration belongs to the father if he himself is below puberty.

3. Adventitious, which comes to the son from elsewhere than from paternal goods, and not by regard for the father, for example, what comes to the same son from the mother, from the maternal line, or by regard for the mother, or what is acquired by his own industry and labor, by the liberality of others, by chance and fortune. The dominion of ownership belongs to the son; the usufruct and administration of this peculium belongs to the father as long as he lives. Therefore by Roman Law the father has the usufruct of all these goods of the son; and this usufruct ends only by the death of the father, otherwise than is had by More Recent Law.

4. Profectitious, which either is acquired from paternal goods, or has been donated to the son by regard for the father. And this whole thing belongs to the father, in ownership, usufruct, and administration. Inst. 1, l. 2, t. 9, §§ 1, 2; l. 3, t. 29; Lugo, d. 5, n. 23 seqq. The father can dispose of adventitious goods if they are consumable, with the burden however of restitution. If the son trades outside the father's house from goods other than paternal goods, the gain is adventitious. If he labors in the paternal house and is fed by the father, or trades from the father's goods, it is profectitious. "If a son trades with the money of the father, either received as a loan or secretly stolen, at his own risk, so that he seriously determines to preserve the father unharmed in any event whatever, it is certain from the common opinion of all cited by Laymann, l. 3, tr. 4, c. 8, n. 12, that the whole gain pertains to the ownership of the son as adventitious peculium. Why is this? Because although he obtains the whole gain by the money of the father, he obtains it in such a way that the whole gain is derived not from the money of the father, sterile of its own nature, but from the industry of the son, which renders the money fruitful." Ithur., Cas. 3, n. 6; L. 488.

The father of the family and the son of the family are held as one person. Since therefore no one can contract with himself, if they contract, the pact is civilly void. Civilly, for naturally they are mutually obligated and obligate. Inst. 1, l. 3, t. 19, § 6. A son of the family, not even with the father consenting, can make a testament concerning adventitious or profectitious peculium; but he can, even against the father's will, concerning castrense or quasi-castrense peculium. Inst. 1, l. 2, t. 12.

From More Recent Laws, minors are held by law incapable of protecting themselves and their own goods. Hence as to each, he with whom paternal power is represents them. C. B. 1630; C. L. 98, 100; C. He. 279.

The administration of all goods of minor children is in the hands of the father or mother, or tutor, who must supply the incapacity or lack of skill of the children until they become majors or obtain emancipation. Exceptions must be made, from C. B. 1638; C. L. 147; C. He. 294; C. I. 224, of goods given to the son with exclusion from this administration of the father. Cf. C. L. 146, 147. Majors are altogether free in managing their own affairs, unless in some case the law specially forbids this to them, and therefore they have full administration of their own goods; but emancipated persons have it only limited. C. I. 323, 310 seqq.; C. G. 488, 476 seqq.; C. A. 149, 187, 251. Cf. C. L. 305 seqq., 311.

Hence he who exercises paternal power manages the affairs of the son. C. I. 224, 242; C. G. 389; C. A. 149, 152. He, not the son, acts in judgment, enters upon inheritances coming to the son after an inventory has been made, accepts donations, C. I. 226, 1059; C. A. 205, 222 seqq., 243, and administers his goods, C. I. 224; C. G. 389; C. H. 159; C. A. 149. But goods, whether immovable or movable, excepting those which cannot be preserved by being preserved or become worse, he cannot alienate, bind by mortgage or pledge, nor likewise receive a loan in the name of the son, nor exercise other acts which exceed acts of simple administration, except from a cause of necessity or evident utility and by decree of the civil tribunal. C. I. 224, 225; C. H. 164; C. G. 389; C. B. 1640 seqq.; C. L. 150; C. He. 290, 299, 300.

The father, or mother exercising paternal power, has the usufruct of those things which come to the son by succession, donation, or another lucrative title. C. I. 228, 229, 231; C. G. 384, 386; C. H. 160; C. B. 1640, 1685; C. He. 294, unless the goods were left to the son by testament, or given by donation, on this condition, that the usufruct not pertain to the parents, C. I. 229; C. G. 387; C. B. 1651; or were left to the son by testament, or given by donation for undertaking some course of life, art, or profession, C. I. 229; or for his education and instruction, C. H. 162; or unless, against the will of the parents, the son accepted the donation or legacy, or entered upon the inheritance, C. I. 229. Likewise excluded from that usufruct are those things which the son acquired for himself by labor, profession, or separate industry, C. I. 229; C. G. 387; C. B. 1650, 1651, and the goods of the succession of a son as to which parents have been declared unworthy. C. I. 728; C. G. 730.

To this usufruct there inheres the obligation of feeding, sustaining, educating, and instructing the children. C. I. 230; C. G. 385; C. B. 1602, 1603, 1606, 1656; C. L. 148; C. He. 293. Neither father nor mother has the usufruct of the goods of natural children. They can only administer their goods, but with the burden of rendering an account also concerning the fruits. Gousset on a. 384, C. G.; C. I. 184. Cf. C. L. 166, 167.

From C. A. 149, 150, 151, 154, all goods, administration excepted, simply pertain to the son; yet the father can deduct the expenses of education from the revenues. From C. H. 161, goods acquired by children from the goods of the same parents simply pertain to the parents. From the same C. H. 160, the usufruct even of those goods which the son acquired by his own labor and industry pertains to the parent exercising paternal power. From C. L. 145, 146, 147, the usufruct of goods which a son of the family acquires by his labor, his industry, his means, or by any other gratuitous title whatever, pertains to the parents, unless they were given with exclusion of this usufruct, or the children acquire by arms, letters, liberal arts, or acquire by their own labor and industry, but live from themselves with the father's permission.

Usufruct of this sort ends by the emancipation of the son, or by death, or when minority or legitimate age has been completed; by the widowed father or mother passing to other nuptials; if the father abuses paternal power, either by not caring for the obligations imposed or by administering goods badly, with a sentence of the tribunal added; and likewise it ceases with respect to the spouse by whose fault divorce has legally been pronounced. C. I. 156, 228, 232, 233; C. G. 384, 386; C. H. 167, 172; C. B. 1666, 1673, 1679, 1680; C. He. 297 seqq. From C. B. 1661, 1662, usufruct also has an end by the marriage of the son, and by renunciation of the father. From C. G. 384, 386, usufruct is conceded to the father, and after he has died to the mother remaining unmarried, up to the eighteenth year of the children, or their emancipation. Cf. C. L. 149; C. He. 274, 292.

But when the son has become a major, those things which have been done by the parents, if they were done according to law, remain ratified; but otherwise they can be made void by him. And if meanwhile a conflict arises as to goods between father and son under paternal power, the latter will be able to have recourse to the tribunal. C. I. 224, 227, 1304; C. G. 1314; C. H. 165; C. A. 271; C. B. 1667, 1668; C. L. 153; L. 488, 543, 544; Gousset 682; C. He. 283, 284, 297 seqq.

Paternal power is dissolved by the death of the father or son, C. H. 167; C. L. 170; C. He. 274; by adoption of the son, C. H. 167; C. B. 1757, 1765; C. A. 183; by emancipation of the son, C. I. 220, 311; C. G. 372, 476-479; C. L. 170; C. H. 167; C. A. 172, 252. But a son is emancipated by the law itself through marriage, C. I. 310; C. G. 476; C. L. 304; C. He. 14, otherwise from C. A. 175. Emancipation is a legitimate act by which a father dismisses his minor son from his power, so that he is made his own master. Emancipation cannot be made before the completed eighteenth year, C. I. 311; C. He. 15. It is dissolved besides by majority of age, C. I. 220;

C. G. 372; C. A. 172; C. L. 170. Cf. here 664. From C. B. 386, which does not admit emancipation, declaration of majority can be had in the eighteenth year of age. It is likewise dissolved if the father abuses paternal power, with a sentence for the crime added. C. I. Poen. 392; C. H. 171; C. B. 1666, 1680; C. A. 177, 178. Paternal power ought to consist in piety, not in atrocity. If the mother survives, she does not simply lose it, although she passes to other nuptials. Yet in this case, from C. I. 237, she can be removed from the administration of the son's goods. From C. B. 1697, a mother passing to other nuptials loses paternal power in part. Cf. C. L. 155 seqq.; C. He. 286. When parents are interdicted, insane, or mad, their paternal power remains suspended. C. I. 220, 229 seqq.; C. A. 179; C. B. 1676 seqq.

When paternal power has been dissolved, the son of the family becomes his own master. But whether he is his own master or is still subject to paternal power, the father of the family can usefully contract with him, and from the eighteenth year of age he can make a testament. C. I. 763, 1107; C. A. 271, 596; at the sixteenth year, but in a limited way, from C. G. 903, 904. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 12.

Can a son of the family retain gains which come to him from his own labor, but not from separate industry, in the paternal house? - Several and grave theologians deny. The reason is that then the son of the family laboring is judged to act not in his own name, but as a member of the family, and thus every gain ought to fall to the good of the family. Besides, positive Law does not favor him, but altogether stands against him.

Several also and grave theologians affirm. The reason is that a son is not of worse condition than a servant; therefore at least the wage which would be owed to a servant or to an extraneous person laboring ought to fall to the son. That would certainly be owed to the son if by his condition he is not bound to labor, and he supplies for an extraneous person, or if he spends extraordinary and altogether undue labor in the paternal house. C. L. 144. Nor indeed in these two cases does positive Law seem to stand against him, since they are extraordinary, and, by legitimate epikeia, are not comprehended by positive Law, which regards cases commonly occurring. But then the expenses which the father made in feeding, sustaining, educating him, etc., must always be deducted. For he was not bound to make these for a son able and willing to earn. C. He. 272; Inst. 1, l. 2, tit. 9; L. l. 3, nn. 488, 3; 544, 910; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4; Ithur., Cas. 3; Gousset 683, 684, 991.

Does a son have perfect dominion over movable goods given to him by parents or relatives? - R. Affirmatively, if they are consumable by first use, because they are given to him absolutely for use, unless perhaps some restriction has been added, as would be money for buying books, for paying a pension, etc. "If they are not consumable by first use, as books, clothes, etc., the son generally has only useful dominion, because parents almost do not intend to confer anything else upon him." Thus Gury, 546. But rather it seems that it must be said that, by this very fact that children can by continued use for their own utility consume and destroy these things, they have dominion over these things also directly, although perhaps restricted and not altogether absolute, insofar as, from the mind of the giver, the whole thing is to be turned only to their utility, as, for example, is seen in books, clothes, etc.

Is a son judged to renounce the usufruct to which he has a right, if, with him seeing and silent, the father receives this usufruct? - R. Negatively, at least speaking generally. The reason is that silence would be equivalent to renunciation only insofar as the son could easily protest. Now reverential fear for the most part stands in the way of his being able to do this easily. From C. I. 234, if, after usufruct has ceased, the parents still continue to receive it, with the son staying with them, and without the condition of rendering an account having been established, the parents or their heirs are bound only to the fruits existing from the day on which they are demanded.

What is the proper obligation of parents? - Parents are the principle of the existence of children; and children are something of the father. Therefore, besides love, parents owe providence to children, whether legitimate or illegitimate; namely, they must provide for children as to the body, as to the soul, and as to state. L. 336; S. Th. 1. 2, q. 100, a. 5 ad 4; 2. 2, q. 26, a. 9.

They owe providence as to the body; and therefore parents sin gravely if they expose children not yet brought into the light to the danger of abortion, or if they expose those already born in public places of mercy, unless they do this from a grave cause. Besides this, they must feed them, unless however they can feed themselves from another source and are not in need, whether they are legitimate or illegitimate, or spurious. C. Cum haberet 5, de Eo qui dux.; C. I. 752; C. G. 762; C. H. 139; C. A. 166; C. B. 1602, 1627, 1705, 1708. And if the matter concerns food necessary for life, they are bound to feed the son, although he has squandered the portion of goods given to him by the parents, because he is always a son. But father and mother together are bound to this from C. I.

138; C. G. 203; or the father first, as from Common Law, L. 9 C., de Patr. potest., from Canon Law, C. 2, de Convers. infid., C. A. 141, 143, 167; C. H. 155; C. B. 1627, 1634, 1709, 1739; C. L. 140. The adopting person also must feed the adoptive child, C. B. 1766, in case of necessity from C. I. 211.

But a mother is bound to nurse her offspring with her own milk. For the natural law itself demands this. Yet this obligation per se does not press under grave obligation, since otherwise grave disorder is not had. Necessity excuses from light fault, if, for example, the mother is weak; notable utility, if, for example, the mother would have to abandon another occupation by which she procures sustenance for herself and her family; custom, prevailing among noble families. But then the mother is bound under grave sin to seek a good nurse. L. 336, 949, 951; C. A. 218; C. B. 1635.

They owe providence as to the soul; therefore under grave obligation parents must teach children those things which are necessary for eternal salvation, imbue them with good morals by words and examples, keep them away from proximate occasions of sinning, correct them with due moderation, lest having been provoked to anger they become worse, and coerce them when delinquent, even imploring the office of the judge if it is necessary. C. I. 222; C. G. 377; C. H. 155, 156; C. A. 145; C. B. 1631; C. L. 143. For this reason parents sin gravely who allow children freely to associate with bad companions, to read bad books and newspapers, to frequent bad workshops and schools, unless a most grave cause excusing them is present, and the dangers of these workshops and schools are removed. Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Sapientiae christianae, 10 Jan. 1890, § Locus admonet; L. 339; C. He. 277.

The newly introduced so-called education of purity cannot be approved, which consists in this, that those things which regard venereal matters are manifested to children. For by this manifestation the danger is not averted, but is begotten and increased, since from knowledge of those hidden matters the very natural bad inclination to experience them evidently grows. S. C. Ind., 18 Jan. 1908, to the Bishop of Barcelona.

They owe providence as to state; whence parents must instruct children in some art or in letters, according to the custom of the region and condition of the family. They must take care that children who wish to enter marriage enter an honorable marriage; and if the chastity of daughters is therefore placed in danger, they must at least from charity give them a dowry. Indeed there is no lack of those who hold absolutely that a father is obligated to give a dowry to a daughter, which C. H. 1340, 1341 and C. A. 1220, 1222, 1231 prescribe, whether she contracts a worthy marriage or enters religion, and likewise that he is obligated to give patrimony to a son who wishes to receive the priesthood. L. l. 6, n. 819. The reason is that just as a father must procure for children an honorable and fitting placement, so he is bound to furnish them the means necessary for obtaining it. Yet from C. I. 147 and from C. G. 204, no action belongs to children against parents unwilling to subtract anything from their patrimony so that sons or daughters can enter marriage, or by another similar title. Cf. C. B. 1610, 1620, 1621.

If parents squander their goods and therefore leave children needy, they certainly are not free from grave sin. Nor can they be excused from sin if they do not apply at least moderate diligence to acquire goods by which the children may be fed and have an inheritance according to their state. But most especially they are bound to leave freedom to offspring as to the choice of state; and they sin gravely by compelling the unwilling to marriage or religion, or by turning them away from such a state. L. 336, 337, 339, 740; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 101, a. 2; Ferraris, v. dos, a. 2, nn. 1-5; Sanchez, de Matr., d. 26, n. 7; C. I. 138, 230; C. G. 203, 385; C. A. 139, 148; C. H. 155; C. He. 275, 276; E. M.

Can parents sometimes disinherit children? - R. Affirmatively; yet on account of a just and grave cause of a crime against the parents themselves, which merits such a penalty. This is clear first by natural law. For it is altogether equitable that parents be able to punish children who are gravely injurious to them by such a penalty, and to contain them in their own duty by fear of the same penalty. It is clear besides by positive law. For Roman Law recognizes this power in parents and determines several cases in which parents can disinherit children. And by reason of the same crime, children can disinherit parents, and brothers disinherit brothers. Novella 115, cap. 3, 4; Novella 22, cap. 47. The same is had from Spanish Law 848 seqq.; from Lusitanian Law 1875 seqq.; and from Austrian Law 768 seqq.

From Swiss Law 477, by a disposition by reason of death, one can be deprived of a legitimate inheritance when he has committed a grave offense against the one disposing or against a person intimately joined to him; when he has gravely contracted against his obligations of family toward the one disposing or toward a person pertaining to the same family. From German Law 1938, 2333 seqq., 2339 seqq., someone can by testament exclude a blood-relative or spouse from succession without instituting an heir. Besides this, various causes of unworthiness for succession are assigned, which causes, after succession has devolved, anyone who has an interest in the exclusion of the unworthy person can oppose. And on account of certain graver crimes, especially crimes against piety, almost the same as those which constitute unworthiness from C. I. and from C. G., someone can by testament take away from his necessary heir the portion reserved to him by law. When some descendant has been prodigal, or gravely burdened by debt, the testator can reduce the portion reserved by law for that descendant, by attributing it to other legitimate heirs as fideicommissary substitutes. He can also commit the administration to a testamentary executor, and then the descendant has a right to the whole annual revenues.

From Italian Law 725, 1081, and from French Law 727, 955, 1046, 1047, disinheritance properly so called is indeed not had, but incapacity and unworthiness of succeeding are generally established by reason of crime, and revocability of a donation itself made by reason of ingratitude, on account of certain determined offenses; namely if 1. they plotted against the life of the testator; 2. if they were guilty toward him of another crime, cruelty, or grave injuries; 3. if they denied him support; 4. if they calumniously accused him of a grave crime from Italian Law, or of a capital crime from French Law; and 5. from Italian Law, if they compelled him to make or change a testament, or impeded him from making or revoking it. L. 340, 948, 949; Ferraris, v. Exhaeredatio.

Are parents bound in the forum of conscience to leave the legitimate portion to children according to the laws? - Parents, more truly and according to the common doctrine, must by civil law leave the legitimate portion after death to their children, whether male or female, natural and legitimate, indeed also natural children acknowledged and legitimated by law, and also legitimate or adoptive children, unless a grave cause is present. For the law is just, and indeed obliging in conscience. Parents by natural law owe providence to children as to the body and as to state. Therefore the positive law determining the legitimate portion in reality interprets and defines the natural law. But it does not exclude certain rarer cases of necessity, in which the good itself of the children and family may suggest that one must act otherwise; which is also confirmed by the practice of the God-fearing. L. 215, 740, 947, 950; H. A. 237; La Croix, p. 3, l. 2, n. 1173; Gousset 794.

But there is no doubt that parents can, with attention to civil laws, make manual gifts, especially remuneratory ones, to children; for if these are not prohibited for friends, neither are they prohibited for relatives or for pious causes. Besides this, they can also effect gifts of greater moment to the same persons, if they are made from mere revenues; because they are full and free masters of these, nor, by the civil laws themselves, are they bound to increase the patrimony by revenues. Finally, if a just and proportionate grave cause is present, they can also, if the legitimate portion of the children is not injured, effect a donation from those things also which constitute the patrimony. The reason is that the law determining the legitimate portion gives this faculty to parents, that they may dispose freely of the remaining goods for others. Therefore if a father can leave these things to other extraneous persons, he can also donate them to the children themselves, if a reasonable cause of acting thus is present and the legitimate portion is not injured.

But that must be noted which Lugo has, d. 23, n. 147, namely "parents, if they have donated undutifully, that is, to the prejudice of the legitimate portion of children, their donations can be revoked by the children. Nevertheless the donation is not invalid, but can be voided." And this holds also in Italian and French Law; for in both these Laws it is not said that it is void, but that it will be void, namely to be voided by reduction. C. I. 821, 1091; C. G. 920; C. He. 522; C. A. 775; C. H. 654; C. L. 1492, 1789; L. 740, 950.

How many kinds of rights and obligations are there between spouses? - Marriage is the union of man and woman, containing an undivided sharing of life. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 9, § 1; C. B. 1353; C. A. 44. Hence from marriage there flows a threefold kind of rights and obligations: as to persons, as to goods, as to the body. The rights and obligations of each spouse as to the body will have to be discussed in the treatise on Marriage. Therefore here we shall speak only of the others. C. A. 89.

Obligations as to persons: some are mutual, others of only one or the other. The mutual ones are mutual love, mutual help as to the body, as to the soul, as to the conjugal debt, and common habitation, common table and bed. To the husband belongs marital power over the wife, and the principal paternal power over the children. But he is bound to feed the wife according to her proper condition. To the wife as mother belongs the education of the offspring, although dependently upon the husband, and to have care of the family estate, likewise dependently upon the husband. C. He. 163; C. H. 62.

What are the rights and obligations of spouses as to persons? - The head of the wife is the husband, and therefore the wife is under the power of the husband in those things which pertain to marriage, that is, which pertain to the undivided sharing of life. Eph. 5:22 seqq.; C. A. 91. Therefore the wife, without the consent of the husband, cannot be obligated by vow, S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3; L. l. 3, n. 234; regularly she cannot be obligated by contract; she cannot make a pilgrimage without the consent of the husband, and regularly must follow the domicile of the husband. C. I. 131, 134, 135; C. G. 214, 217, 220, 221, 222; C. H. 58, 61; C. A. 91, 92; C. B. 1354; C. He. 160, 170; C. L. 1193, even if the husband changes domicile without cause, provided the wife can follow him without grave detriment either of soul or of body, and, from C. H. 58 and C. L. 1186, not into a foreign nation. By the same C. L. 1189, a wife can publish a writing without the consent of the husband. C. Pervenit 1, de Coni. lepr.; Sanch., de Matr., l. 1, d. 41, nn. 2, 4; L. 351, l. 6, n. 977; S. Th. S., q. 64, a. 6 ad 1; Quodl. 4, a. 11. Cf. v. 2, n. 1052.

Without the consent of the husband, and except for cases excepted by law, the wife cannot act in judgment. C. I. 134; C. H. 60; C. L. 1192. From C. He. 168, whatever the regime of goods has been, a wife can stand in judgment. But in cases with third parties, as to goods brought in, she is represented by the husband.

The wife indeed must furnish reverence, obedience, and compliance to the husband in those things which regard the governance of the house and good morals; but she is his companion, not his maidservant. Therefore if she is rich or noble she is not compelled to furnish to the husband things which are not of her dignity, for example, to cook foods, sweep the house, etc. Yet if she does not obey the husband in a grave matter, she sins gravely, and a certain moderate coercion is permitted to the husband. 1 Pet. 3:5 seqq.; L. 351, 352, 356; l. 6, n. 972; Sanch., de Matr., l. 6, d. 6, n. 14; C. I. 131; C. G. 313; C. H. 57; C. B. 1354, 1356, 1357; C. L. 1185, 1189; Leo XIII, Enc. Arcanum, 10 Feb. 1886.

The husband in turn must love and protect the wife, Eph. 5:25; C. I. 132; C. H. 57; C. G. 213; C. L. 185; feed her, and dwell with her; and therefore it is not licit for him to be absent from her for a long time unless from a grave cause. Gen. 2:24; C. I, de Coni. lepr.; C. I. 130, 132; C. G. 212, 214; nor even to undertake a long pilgrimage with the woman unwilling. C. 8, de Voto. Yet the husband is not usually bound to take the wife with him at great inconvenience and expense, when it happens that he must travel around because of business. C. 9, § In tanta, de Voto. But the husband sins gravely if he affects the wife with contumelious or defamatory words; if he impedes her concerning the precepts of God or of the Church without just cause; if he gravely beats the wife; if he neglects the governance of the house and the family estate. Col. 3:18, 19; L. 356; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 5, n. 17; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 26, a. 11.

In those things which pertain to mutual help of life, man and wife are of equal right, since marriage is entered for the sake of mutual help. Hence they mutually owe each other love, fidelity, assistance, and support. Eph. 5:25; Matt. 19:5; 1 Cor. 7:3 seqq.; C. I. 130; C. G. 212; C. H. 56; C. A. 90; C. L. 1184; and if anything adverse happens to one, the other must be a participant. Therefore a woman must follow a husband migrating elsewhere for the sake of health or as a punishment, and a man must follow a woman. L. 353, l. 6, nn. 957, 977. And one must furnish support to the other in need, even if driven into exile by his or her own fault, or shut in prison, indeed even when separated from the other, provided it is not by his or her own fault, if he or she has resources; and the husband must feed the wife even if he married her without dowry, or the dowry perished by chance. C. I. 132, 133, 142; C. G. 214; C. B. 1360, 1361; C. He. 159, 160, 161; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 4, n. 20; d. 5, nn. 8, 14.

It is lawful for neither, with the other unwilling, to enter religion, C. un., Extr., de Voto; and he who passes to religion with the spouse unwilling can be recalled. C. 3, 12, de Conv. coni. Nor is it lawful for a man, with the wife unwilling, to receive orders, indeed not even tonsure, C. 4, de Temp. ord., in 6, except if he has justly and by law separated from her as to habitation. L. l. 1, n. 969. Cf. 1 Tim. 2:8-15; 5:9-14; Eph. 5:22-33.

Note: Children and a wife can receive support from one burdened by debts who is not solvent, since he is bound to feed them from strict piety, and also from legal justice; nor is he less bound to feed them than to pay other debts. Indeed they can do this even if the father of the family contracts other debts, provided however they do not have sustenance from elsewhere. Nor indeed after the death of the father is the son bound to pay those debts of the father, if the father left no goods to the son, for that obligation was altogether personal to the father. "Yet the wife cannot use for the sustenance of the family money given by the husband for paying debts, except in the case in which the family would be gravely in need; for then the husband is bound to help this first, and therefore the wife then uses her own right. Thus Laymann, who adds that the wages of workers for the necessary uses of the debtor are to be preferred even to hypothecary creditors." L. 695, 354.

What are the rights and obligations of spouses concerning goods? - If Natural Law is considered, marital society does not prevent both husband and wife from retaining ownership, usufruct, and administration even of goods which they had before marriage, and which they acquire during marriage. Yet they must concur for expenses necessarily to be sustained on account of common burdens. Moreover, it is fitting that the husband either have the whole administration of goods, or certainly assist the wife as much as is necessary for supplying her weakness.

But if positive Law is considered, the husband's power in this matter is broader. Hence by positive Law various goods of the wife are distinguished. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 57, a. 4.

Some goods of the wife are dotal, whose fruits the husband enjoys for sustaining the burdens of marriage; others are paraphernal, namely beyond the dowry, which the wife has beyond the dowry, and which she specially reserves to herself; others are common, which by pacts of the spouses or by determination of law are brought into a certain society. Before entering marriage, spouses can determine under what conditions their goods are to be subjected, with certain statutes of the law observed. If they have omitted to do this, the law will supply.

From Roman Law: The wife has direct dominion of her dowry, but the husband has usufruct and administration. When the husband has died, she is preferred to all personal creditors of the husband, and even during life she can juridically seek the dowry again if she fears lest the husband become unable to restore it. If the dowry consists in money, or in other things consumable by use, or in appraised things handed over, full dominion of the dowry is indeed attributed to the husband, but with the obligation of restoring the value, dominion being transferred for the wife into all goods of the husband according to the rate or quota of her dowry. The wife has full dominion and administration of paraphernal goods, so that concerning these the husband, with her unwilling, can dispose of nothing. Hence as to these she in no way depends upon the husband.

The ownership and utility of common goods pertain to each spouse; but administration of the same pertains to the husband alone. But this community of goods can admit various conditions or restrictions, and therefore attention must be given to the various dispositions of places. Gury 549; Elbel 69; L. 489; Troplong, della Prescrizione, c. 3, n. 483 seqq.

From More Recent Law: In the first place we can distinguish goods of the wife, goods of the husband, and common goods. As to goods of the wife, these likewise are either dotal or extradotal, or paraphernal. Dowry is goods brought to the husband for sustaining the burdens of marriage. But any goods whatever of the wife not constituted as dowry are held as paraphernal. C. I. 1388, 1425; C. G. 1540, 1575; C. A. 1218.

That there be dowry it is necessary: 1. that it was expressly constituted by this name, C. I. 1388; C. H. 1336. Therefore those things which are donated to the woman by contract of marriage are not dotal, unless something else has expressly been provided. But it is otherwise from C. G. 1541. Moreover, dowry can comprehend all goods, even future goods. C. I. 1389; C. G. 1542; C. A. 1218, 1227; C. H. 1336, 1337. 2. That an instrument be drawn up by a notary, and, if the dowry is constituted by the spouses themselves, before marriage. C. I. 1382, 1391; C. G. 1394. For after marriage dowry can neither be constituted nor increased by them. C. I. 1341; C. H. 1338; and from C. G. 1543, not by others either. Cf. C. A. 1225; C. H. 1344. 3. That nuptials have been entered from Civil Law. L. 3, de Iure dot.; C. I. 93; C. G. 165; C. A. 44; C. H. 42.

He who constitutes a dowry must furnish it from his own goods, even if the woman does not lack her own goods. C. I. 1392, 1393, 1394, 1395; C. G. 1544, 1545, 1546; C. A. 1224. Cf. C. H. 1340, 1341; and he furnishes security against eviction. C. I. 1396; C. G. 1547. But the husband is not bound to surety for the dowry unless he is obligated to it by agreement made, or is driven to it by sentence of the judge, if the dowry is exposed to danger, and the dowry was constituted by him who, if it were lacking, would be compelled to furnish support to the dowered woman. C. I. 1400; C. G. 1550, 1563; C. A. 1245. Cf. C. H. 1345, 1349, 1358.

Of those things which are given by reason of dowry, some pass into the full dominion of the husband, others do not, and constitute a permanent dowry. Things which are consumed by use pass into the full dominion of the husband, C. A. 1227; things, whether movable or immovable, which are given to him in payment, C. I. 1403; C. G. 1553; movable things, if they were given appraised, C. I. 1401; C. G. 1551; not likewise immovable things, unless this was openly expressed. C. I. 1402; C. G. 1551; C. A. 1228. From C. H. 1346, if nothing is determined in the marriage contract, the wife preserves dominion of all her dotal goods. Cf. C. B. 1227, 1228.

Of those goods which constitute a permanent dowry, natural and direct dominion remains with the wife; civil and useful dominion passes to the husband. C. A. 1227, 1228, 1230. Therefore, by force of the natural and direct dominion of the wife, the increase or damage of the dowry will belong to the wife. By force of the civil and useful dominion of the husband, the husband has administration and usufruct of dotal goods; whence he administers dotal goods as his own, acts in judgment for them, C. I. 1339; C. G. 1549; C. H. 1357, 1360, and all things which are contained under the name of fruits are his from the marriage entered, C. I. 1399; C. G. 1549; C. A. 1227; and if counted money was promised, interest by the law itself is owed to him, although delay for payment had been stipulated. C. I. 1397; C. G. 1548. But the husband must furnish that diligence in administering dotal things which he furnishes in his own things, and he must fulfill all obligations of a usufructuary, C. I. 1408; C. G. 1562. But he is bound to use the fruits for feeding the family, for this is why the fruits are assigned to him, namely for bearing matrimonial burdens.

A woman can obtain separation of dotal goods by the office of the judge if the dowry is in danger, or the affairs of the husband are turning to evil, or she has been judicially separated from him. C. I. 1418; C. G. 1563. When this has been obtained, she herself, in place of the husband, administers the dotal goods, C. I. 1424; C. G. 1449; C. H. 225, 1365; but together with the husband she must provide for domestic necessities and for the instruction of the children. C. I. 1423; C. G. 1448. Cf. C. A. 1241, 1263. It can be established in the marriage contract: 1. that the wife receive each year a part of the fruits for small expenses, C. I. 1399; C. G. 1549; 2. that the surviving spouse receive some gain beyond the dowry, with the legitimate portion of the children preserved. C. I. 1398; L. l. 3, n. 539.

Dotal goods regularly, while marriage remains, cannot be alienated, and an alienation made can be revoked even by the husband himself who consented to the alienation. C. I. 1407; C. G. 1560. Dotal goods, namely all from C. I. 1405, but only immovables from C. G. 1554. Regularly; for they can be alienated from a grave cause of necessity or utility, by decree of the tribunal and consent of each spouse, C. I. 1405; C. G. 1558; C. H. 1358 seqq.; or if alienation was permitted in the marriage contract itself. C. I. 1404; C. G. 1557. They cannot be alienated for any cause whatever from C. I. 1405, which distinguishes nothing, except the cause of placing some child from C. G. 1556. Alienation, moreover, also comprehends exchanges, servitudes, and mortgages. C. I. 1404, 1405; cf. C. G. 1554, 1559. While marriage remains; therefore also after separation from C. I. 1405; cf. C. G. 1449. But if, while marriage remains, a woman has legitimately contracted debt, or any obligation whatever, after the marriage has been dissolved even dotal goods are bound to creditors from C. I. 1407; but otherwise from C. G. 1558, 1560. Cf. C. A. 1260.

When the marriage has been dissolved, the dowry ceases and must be restored. The dowry must be restored to the wife, or to her heirs. C. A. 1229; C. H. 1365. Things whose civil and useful dominion only was in the hands of the husband must be restored immediately in their own species, as they then are. C. I. 1409, 1411, 1412; C. G. 1564, 1566, 1567; C. H. 1367; and if by the fault of the husband they have become worse, the loss is charged to him. C. I. 1408; C. G. 1562; C. H. 1360, 1375. But of things of which the husband had full dominion, only the price must be restored within a year. C. I. 1401, 1410; C. G. 1551, 1565; C. H. 1347, 1366, 1370. From these the woman can retain for herself linens and those things necessary for her ordinary use, with their actual price deducted, if, after an appraisal of the same had been made, they were first given. C. I. 1411; C. G. 1566. Cf. C. H. 1384.

Besides this, the fruits of the last year of marriage are to be restored, according to the proportion of time. The year is computed from the anniversary day of the marriage celebrated. But the widow can according to her judgment either demand these fruits, or support for the whole year of mourning. Besides, during this year housing and mourning clothes are owed to her. C. I. 1415, 1416; C. G. 1570, 1571; only mourning clothes, C. H. 1879. Cf. C. A. 1242, 1243. Finally, when the marriage has been dissolved, gains also or dotal increases are owed to the surviving spouse from the goods of the deceased, if a pact concerning them was present in the marriage contract. C. I. 1398.

Paraphernal or extradotal goods are those which the wife reserves to herself outside the dowry. C. H. 1381. These are the wife's by full right, and therefore she administers them and enjoys their usufruct. C. I. 1427; C. G. 1576; C. H. 1382. Yet she cannot alienate immovables, nor stand in judgment for them without the express consent of the husband, or, with the husband resisting, without sentence of the tribunal. C. I. 134, 136; C. G. 215, 217, 1576, 1538; C. H. 1387; cf. C. A. 91. The same must be said from C. G. 1536, if the wife is altogether separated in goods. But if the husband administers them from the express or tacit mandate of the wife and receives the fruits, he must restore only the fruits which then exist when the woman asks, or dies; but he must restore all the fruits which he received if the condition was added to the mandate that he render accounts of the fruits, or if the woman opposed herself at least by an extrajudicial act. C. I. 1427 seqq.; C. G. 1576 seqq. But from C. H. 1384, 1389 seqq., if paraphernal goods are handed over by the wife to the husband to be administered, they are then equated with dotal goods, whose dominion remains in the hands of the wife. From C. A. 1238, 1239, unless the wife opposes herself, by presumption of law the administration of the wife's free patrimony is judged to have been entrusted to the husband as legitimate procurator. But he is responsible only for the substance of the thing, or for the capital; he is not bound to give an account of the fruits received, unless this was expressly agreed.

To paraphernal goods belong, and they are the wife's, those goods which, during marriage, she acquires from her own goods, or from singular industry, or from her own extraordinary labor, especially if she exercises commerce in her own name, or also by subtracting something from what has been conceded to her for food, clothing, recreation, etc.; and also those things which were given to her with the express condition that they not fall to the husband. C. A. 1237; L. l. 3, n. 541.

As to the goods of the husband. The wife has no dominion over the goods of the husband. But since the wife is the companion of the husband, and the husband must feed the wife according to her condition, the wife can by her own right take for herself those things which are necessary to her for this reason. Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 16, n. 72; Lessius, de Iust. et Iur., l. 2, c. 12, n. 85. And if by received custom of the region it is accepted that the wife spend something from the goods of the husband, she can also do this. Lugo, l. c. Therefore the wife can take not only those things which are necessary for the body, but also those things which pertain to relieving the mind and to the decency of her state. Lugo, l. c., nn. 68, 70. Nor indeed can she do this for herself only, but also for the children received from that marriage, for the utility of the family, or for removing some harm to it, and this even against the will of the husband. Therefore she can withdraw things from a prodigal husband in order to reserve them for the family in the future, or from an avaricious husband for making moderate alms. Lugo, l. c., n. 65; Lessius, l. c., n. 85. From the very nature of conjugal society the wife has administration of domestic things, the pantry, furniture, etc. C. He. 163; Lugo, l. c., n. 65; Lessius, l. c., n. 85. From C. I. 1432, if the wife administered the goods of the husband, she is subject to the same law to which he himself is subject in the administration of the wife's paraphernal goods.

But when the husband is absent or insane, the wife administers his goods, and she can spend them, according to the strength of the patrimony, for the sustenance and preservation of the dignity of the family, although perhaps the husband, if he were present or in control of himself, would not have spent them. From C. H. 1442, 1444, the wife administering all the goods of the marriage has the same faculties and obligations as when the husband administers them. Yet she cannot alienate or burden immovables. Lugo, l. c., nn. 16, 70; Lessius, nn. 12, 86; L. 541.

As to common goods. From C. I. 1433, 1435, 1436, 1438, 1439, 1441, in the marriage contract itself, although a dowry has been constituted, the spouses can enter together into a universal society, not indeed of goods, but of fruits coming from the goods themselves, whether movable or immovable, whether present or future. Yet this society cannot comprehend debts and credits existing before marriage, nor those which are later deferred by title of succession or donation while the communion itself lasts. The effect of this communion is to render common and divisible those things which are acquired by the spouses together or separately during the communion, whether by common industry, or by thrift made upon the fruits or incomes of the spouses, the debts of the communion itself always being deducted. Goods placed in common are administered by the husband, who cannot alienate them or subject them to mortgage except by onerous title, and if he leases them, he must observe the laws established for leasing which is done by a usufructuary. But the society ceases by the death of either spouse, by the declared absence of one, by definitive separation of persons, and by judicial separation of goods.

From C. H., when a contract concerning goods is lacking, by which they can also establish separation of goods between themselves, the marriage is judged to have been entered under the regime of legal society of gains, 1315, 1432. But if this society is excluded, without the rules by which the goods are governed being expressed, then the dotal regime is observed, and nevertheless the husband receives all the fruits of the society of gains just as if it existed, 1364.

Now by society of gains husband and wife make their own, by half, when the marriage has been dissolved, the gains and benefits indistinctly obtained by either spouse during marriage, 1392. By the law itself the proper goods of each spouse and the common gains are determined, 1396 seqq., 1401 seqq., and also the burdens and obligations of this society, 1408 seqq. The husband administers the society according to the established laws, 1412 seqq.; he can make moderate donations for the sake of piety and beneficence, but cannot reserve usufruct for himself, 1415.

The society is dissolved by dissolution of marriage, by the absence of either spouse, by separation of persons or goods, 1417, 1433. When the society has been dissolved, after an inventory has been made, and dotal and paraphernal goods have been restored, and the other burdens of the society have been satisfied, what remains is divided equally between husband and wife, or their respective heirs, 1418 seqq. Cf. ibid. 1435, 1436.

From C. G. 1393, even if spouses do not establish that certain goods will be common, nevertheless if any other pact is lacking, legal Community has place by force of law. For the pacts which can be entered by spouses before marriage constitute three classes, or a threefold regime, namely the dotal regime, concerning which we have already spoken, the regime of community, and the regime excluding community. Moreover, Community is either legal or conventional, according as it is constituted by law or by a special pact of the contracting parties. 1391, 1400 seqq., 1497 seqq., 1540 seqq. Legal Community coalesces: 1. from all movable goods which the spouses possessed on the very day of the marriage entered, or which afterwards come to them by title of succession or donation; 2. from all fruits and any revenues whatever of immovable goods possessed by the spouses before marriage, or coming to them during marriage; 3. from all immovable goods which were acquired from common goods during the time of marriage. Conventional Community consists in other pacts of the spouses, by which legal statutes can be restricted or relaxed. When these are lacking, the community is governed by the disposition of the law alone.

Under the regime of community the husband alone has administration of common goods. Indeed he can sell them, exchange them, and hand them over into mortgage, even without the consent of the wife. Yet he cannot donate immovables by gratuitous title, nor movables by universal title, or as to their universality or quota, that is, a half, third, or fourth part. He can dispose of some movable thing by gratuitous title, provided he does not reserve usufruct for himself. But when the community has been dissolved, goods and burdens are divided into two parts, unless the wife or her heirs prefer to renounce the goods, and thus to exempt themselves from the burdens. Debts are to be paid by each spouse, or by their heirs. The husband also has administration of the proper or personal goods of the wife. 1400, 1401, 1409, 1422, 1428, 1441, 1453, 1467 seqq., 1497 seqq.

A regime excluding community can be constituted by the spouses in two ways, namely: 1. by declaring that they enter marriage without community; 2. by establishing that each will be altogether separate as to goods. In the former case the man receives all revenues of the wife's goods and alone administers all things. But if they are consumed by use, he is bound to return their value. But in the latter case the woman has administration and usufruct of all her own goods. Each spouse concurs for the burdens of marriage by special pact; but if no agreement exists, the wife must concur up to a third part of her revenues. Therefore in this third regime, as also in the second, some dowry must be contributed by the wife, by which she may in part aid the burdens of marriage; but a dowry of this sort can be alienated by the husband. 1530 seqq., 1536 seqq. Cf. here 868, 1237.

From C. A. 1233, 1234. For communion of goods between spouses a special contract is required. But it is understood only for the case of death, and gives to the spouse a right to the half part of the goods constituted in communion which remain after the death of the other spouse. Cf. art. 1262, 1266.

From C. B. the regime of goods is twofold, legal and conventional. Legal matrimonial regime of goods. By the marriage contract the goods of the wife, even those which she herself acquires during marriage, are administered by the husband, who has their usufruct, but must sustain the expenses of marriage. The goods reserved to the wife are excepted, whether by law, namely clothes, precious gems, and instruments of labor, and goods acquired by labor or the personal exercise of a gainful profession; or by contract, namely those which were declared such by the marriage contract; by succession, legacy, or donation made with that reservation. The wife has administration and usufruct of these reserved goods. When administration and usufruct of the husband have ceased, the husband is bound to restore the goods to the wife and also to render an account of administration. But the wife can demand this cessation if her goods are placed in danger. C. B. 1363 seqq.

Conventional regime of matrimonial goods. Spouses can establish an agreement concerning goods both before marriage and after marriage has been contracted, and they can dissolve or modify the regime of goods. If by the marriage contract the administration and usufruct of the husband is excluded, or if the community of goods is dissolved, then separation of goods is had. But community can be either universal of goods, or particular, or particular of acquisitions, or particular of movables and acquisitions. The husband administers the community and sustains the burdens of marriage from the goods of the community. When the community has been dissolved, the debts having first been paid, those things which remain are divided into two equal parts between the two spouses, or the descendants of either and the widowed spouse. C. B. 1432 seqq.

Besides these things, which are constituted by various laws, all those pacts must be observed both by the husband and by the wife which in the marriage contract either were tacitly entered, according to the proper laws of the region, or expressly constituted by private will, provided however that these agreed pacts do not oppose good morals or the laws. C. I. 1378; C. A. 1217; C. G. 1387; C. H. 1315.

From C. L. It is licit for spouses before marriage to make a contract concerning goods, within the limits of the law, 1096. Agreements of this sort will not be valid unless they have been made by public writing, 1097. If no agreement is made, the marriage is judged to have been contracted according to the custom of the kingdom, 1098. A woman can reserve to herself the right of receiving part of the fruits of her goods, provided it does not exceed a third part, 1104. An agreement can be made of marriage according to the custom of the kingdom, of community of acquisitions, of separation of goods, of the dotal regime, 1099 seqq. Agreement according to the custom of the kingdom imports community of all present and future goods not excepted by law, 1108 seqq. Dominion and possession of these goods is with each spouse; administration is in the hands of the husband, 1117 seqq. When the Community has ended, its goods are divided between the spouses and their heirs, due equality being observed. But satisfaction must be made first to the woman, then to the man, 1123, 1124. Agreement of community of acquisitions does not comprehend goods which are had at the time of marriage, or which afterwards are had by succession or another gratuitous title, 1130 seqq. Agreement of separation of goods does not exclude from community goods acquired without express declaration, 1125. Each spouse preserves dominion of his or her own goods, and their free disposition, with however that restriction for the woman which is made by law, 1127, 1128. Under the dotal regime the husband can alienate movable goods, but is bound concerning their value, 1148. Immovable goods are inalienable except for cases permitted by law, 1149 seqq., nor can they be prescribed during marriage, 1152. When the marriage has been dissolved, dotal goods must be restored to the woman and her heirs, 1156 seqq.

C. He. has the regime of union of goods, communion of goods, and separation of goods. Unless otherwise disposed, spouses are subject to the regime of union, 178. By union of goods all goods which the spouses possess at the moment of the celebration of marriage, or acquire during marriage, are joined into one sole conjugal substance, 194. The part of this conjugal substance brought by the wife remains her property. The husband is owner of the goods which he himself brought, and of any conjugal substance which was not brought by the wife. The wife's revenues and natural fruits of goods brought by her are the property of the husband from the moment when they are owed or separated, 195. The husband administers the conjugal substance, uses and enjoys it as a usufructuary, 200, 201. When the wife has died, the goods brought by her pass to her heirs. When the husband has died, the wife recovers the goods brought by her. If, after separation has been made, an increase is had, two thirds of this pertain to the wife and her descendants, the third part to the husband and his heirs. If on the contrary diminution is had, it is to be sustained by the husband and his heirs unless it is proved to have been caused by the wife. And, if on account of debts made by the husband the wife would obtain less than half of the goods brought by her, her credit for completing this half part is privileged. The cession of this privilege in favor of individual creditors is null, 211 seqq.

By communion of goods all goods and revenues of husband and wife are joined into one undivided substance, which pertains to each. The husband administers it. By the death of either spouse, half part of the common substance pertains to the surviving spouse, the other half part to the heirs of the deceased. Increase is divided into two equal parts between the spouses or their heirs. Diminution must be sustained by the husband or by his heirs, unless it is proved to have been caused by the wife. 215, 216, 225, 240.

Separation of goods regards the whole substance of each spouse. Each preserves ownership, administration, and usufruct of his or her own substance. But the wife is bound to contribute, in an equitable portion, to the burdens of marriage, even with reserved goods. 192, 241, 242, 246. Goods are reserved either by matrimonial contract, or by the liberality of third parties, or by law. Reserved by law are those things which personally and exclusively pertain to either spouse; goods of the wife which serve her for the exercise of her profession or art; and the gain which the wife receives by laboring in her own name. Reserved goods of the wife are not comprehended in the union of goods. 190, 191, 194.

What can a wife do as to entering various contracts? - The wife cannot, without the consent and authority of the husband, donate, alienate, or subject to mortgage her immovable things, contract a loan, cede or demand capitals, stand surety, make a settlement, or act in judgment concerning these acts. C. I. 134; cf. C. G. 215, 217; C. A. 91. Nor can she undertake to manage another's affairs without authorization of the husband. C. I. 1743; cf. C. G. 1990. But a woman needs no consent or authority of the husband or of another when the husband is a minor, interdicted, absent, or expiating a penalty longer than a year, or absent, or when she is juridically separated by the fault of the husband, or when she exercises commerce. C. I. 135; C. G. 220. From C. He. 161, 163, the wife is the one who directs domestic economy and represents it. And from art. 167, the wife has the faculty of exercising a certain profession or art with the express or tacit consent of the husband.

He who contracts with a wife, without the consent and authority of the husband, when this is needed, is obligated to the wife both civilly and naturally; and the wife is likewise obligated to him. But restitution in full is given to the wife and her heirs, and also to the husband while marriage remains, and to those having cause, unless it is proved that what was paid to the wife went to her convenience and utility. C. I. 134, 137, 1157, 1300; C. G. 217, 225, 1304, 1312. From C. H. 1304, the wife is not bound to restore a thing received by contract, when it has been rescinded, unless she became richer by it. Cf. also art. 1163. From C. B. 1365-1371, 1395-1400, 1405-1407, the wife can freely dispose of goods reserved to her; but as to goods subject to the administration and usufruct of the husband, she needs the approval of the husband.

Can a wife sometimes stand surety for the husband? - R. Affirmatively, namely so that she may provide for domestic necessities. But otherwise negatively. Thus commonly. The reason is that the former is sometimes required by the good itself of the family, but the latter is excluded by this same good. Hence it follows that a wife is bound to pay debts legitimately contracted by the husband in the name of the wife, with her knowing and consenting, for the good and convenience of the family itself. L. 454. From C. I. 1405; C. G. 1558, the authority of the judge is required, or from C. He. 177, the consent of tutelary authority.

What is the law if a man and woman contracted an invalid marriage? - If each was aware of the nullity, there is indeed no marriage, and no right from positive law can be claimed from it, whether as to the dowry of the wife, or as to the legitimacy and hereditary succession of the children. C. 10, Qui fil. sint legit.; C. I. 116; C. G. 202; C. A. 160. Yet the son can, during his life, demand support from the father just as if he were legitimate. C. B. 1703. If each was unaware of the nullity, the marriage is just as if it were truly valid, whence rights flow from it as from a true marriage. C. 2, 8, 14, Qui fil., etc.; C. I. 116; C. G. 201; C. A. 160; C. B. 1699; L. l. 7, n. 425.

If one was aware and the other unaware of the nullity, civil rights are established for the spouse alone who contracted in good faith; but the children are legitimate as to each. C. 14, Qui fil.; C. ult., § Si quis 1, de Cland. desp.; C. I. 116; C. G. 202; C. A. 160; cf. arts. 1265, 1266; C. B. 1701, 1702; Schmalz., l. 4, t. 17, nn. 13, 18, 57; Lugo, d. 24, n. 8; L. l. 7, nn. 425, 432. Cf. here 223.

680bis. Can a woman be emancipated from the man, and obtain equality with him? - Emancipation of this sort of woman from the man in the family and in society, whether civil or religious, as also absolute equality in the same order of family and society, is against every law, natural and positive, divine, canonical, and civil, as is clear of itself. Yet from this it does not follow that the condition of the woman is vile, or that she is altogether to be depressed. The nobility of the woman appears from her first production, from her destination by universal nature for propagating the human race together with the man. Whence she is the man's companion. Gen. 2:18 seqq. Yet in this domestic society, the woman is under the power of the man. But this subjection of the woman is in no way servile, but economic. 1 Pet. 3; S. Th. 1 p., q. 92, a. 1; q. 94, a. 4. But if the discourse is about civil society, man by nature itself is destined for exercising rule and for undertaking the greater offices. Woman can exercise arts and lesser offices for which she has aptitude, and which, if she is a mother of a family, do not impede the duties of a mother of a family.

Ulpian, L. 2, de Diversis Regulis Iuris antiqui, lib. 50, tit. 17. Finally, in the Church of Jesus Christ, man and woman are of equal condition in order to faith, to grace, and to obtaining eternal glory. Gal. 3:28. But, since woman is altogether excluded from Order, the sacrament, as to the ecclesiastical hierarchy she is in an inferior condition with respect to man. Yet nothing prevents a woman also from exercising in the Church certain works of religion and charity for promoting the salvation of souls and the glory of God. 1 Cor. 14:34; Rom. 16:1 seqq. Therefore the emancipation of woman from man, or absolute equality between man and woman, cannot be admitted. Yet a woman can well be admitted to undertaking easier and secondary offices which seem more proper to woman, and for which she herself also has greater aptitude, outside domestic society. Consequently women can also be admitted to a certain broader education and instruction beyond domestic matters. But in that exercise of offices, and in this greater education, due precautions must be observed, lest public honesty suffer detriment, and the religion and good morals of women be exposed to danger of perversion.

What are the obligations of other relatives? - As to other relatives, ascendants and descendants, the obligations are generally the same, with due proportion, as those of parents with respect to children, and vice versa. For all these, by reason of generation, of some from others, are mutually bound by a strict bond of piety, especially if, when parents are lacking, ascendants take up the care of grandchildren. But theologians commonly teach that they ought to take up this care, in defect of parents and tutors, as long as they are minors, and as much as they conveniently can. Other things being equal, the paternal grandfather is bound to take up that care before the maternal grandfather, as the doctors commonly teach.

As to brothers and sisters, these ought to pursue one another with mutual love, not only by common affection, as other men, but by particular affection on account of the close bond of blood. They also ought to help each other mutually as to the necessities of life, not only in extreme necessity, but also in grave necessity. L. 340.

The remaining blood-relatives and collaterals are likewise bound mutually to furnish love and help in necessity, according to the order of the degrees of consanguinity. The reason is that conjunction of blood and descent from the same stock and principle of life induces this special obligation of piety. Hence, in defect of parents, or quasi-parents, and ascendants, collateral blood-relatives also succeed to the obligation of furnishing support to one in need in ordinary necessity and beggary, if they can, or unless others are present who wish liberally to relieve a similar necessity. Struggl 20. "It must be said that someone from what is proper to him must satisfy parents more, or those from whom he has received greater benefits." S. Th. 2. 2, q. 62, a. 5 ad 4.

Since conjunction with other blood-relatives is not so great as with parents and children, in order that piety be gravely injured against them, a certain greater harm inflicted upon them is required, though less against brothers and sisters than as to others less closely joined. But against more remote relatives a special grave malice against piety is absent.

What about support to be furnished, as to various blood-relatives and in-laws? - By the right of piety some ought to exhibit or feed others if they are in necessity. But to furnish support, in the first place a spouse is obligated; second, descendants; third, ascendants; fourth, son-in-law and daughter-in-law; fifth, father-in-law and mother-in-law; finally, brothers and sisters, which obligation indeed is reciprocal. C. I. 132, 138-142; C. G. 203, 205, 207, 212; C. L. 172; C. H. 143 seqq.; C. B. 1601 seqq.; C. He. 228 seqq. Ascendants are bound in the order of proximity. C. I. 138; C. H. 144; C. L. 173. But descendants are bound in that order by which they would be called to the legitimate succession of the person in need. C. I. 142; C. H. 144. Support is owed to brothers and sisters if they are in very grave necessity. C. I. 141; C. H. 143; and C. L. 174, in defect of parents and other ascendants; from C. He. 329, when they are sufficiently rich. In those places in which civil law does not obligate brothers and sisters to furnish support to brothers and sisters, nevertheless natural charity and piety press gravely if brothers or sisters have been constituted in grave necessity.

But as to other more remote blood-relatives, besides brothers, if they are in grave necessity, the obligation is still present, although light, "since toward them also there is some obligation of piety, although not so strict." L. 339, l. 3, n. 946; Lugo, de Iust. et Iur., d. 24, n. 176. Yet the obligation of piety is present more strictly toward other blood-relatives of the direct line. Mother-in-law and daughter-in-law lose support if they pass to other nuptials, or if the spouse from whom the affinity arose has died leaving no descendants. C. I. 140; C. G. 206.

Parents cannot deny support to children because, against their will, they contracted nuptials with unworthy persons. L. l. 3, nn. 337, 949. "Sanchez, etc., say that a father is bound to furnish support not only to the son, but also to his wife, although he married her without dowry and against the will of the father himself. Besides, Azor, etc., hold that a father must feed the son even if the son has viciously consumed the portion already previously handed over to him." L. 336, 337. "But it is certain that parents are bound to furnish support to children, even spurious children, and even those born from condemned intercourse, if they cannot be sustained from elsewhere." L. 951.

Nor indeed generally is it licit to deny support because he who asks it came to poverty by his own fault, except to brothers and sisters from C. I. 141; and from C. B. 1611 only strict sustenance is owed. From the same C. B. 1963, 1969, if, an inheritance having devolved, an heir to be born must be awaited, the mother who cannot provide for her own sustenance can demand support fitting to her social condition from the inheritance itself up to the birth. Likewise the heir is bound to furnish support to the members of the family of the deceased for a month from the inheritance devolved.

But how much must be furnished is to be estimated from the necessity of the one asking and from the resources of the one giving. C. I. 143; C. G. 208; C. H. 146; C. L. 178, 179. Support comprehends food, clothing, habitation, and other things necessary for life, and, according to circumstances, instruction fitting for the person. C. I. 846; C. H. 142; C. B. 1610; C. L. 171. But an option is given either of receiving the needy person at home, or of furnishing him a pension, unless the judge has established otherwise. C. I. 145; C. G. 210; C. H. 149. But because this obligation of furnishing support is from charity and piety, not from justice, he who does not furnish it is not bound to restitution, nor is he obligated toward the heirs of the deceased who had the right to it. C. I. 144, 146; C. G. 209; C. H. 148, 150, 151. Cf. C. A. 171; C. L. 176; L. 339, 356, 946, 949, 951.

The obligation of furnishing support can vary according as the conditions of him who furnishes it, or who needs it, have varied. C. I. 144; C. G. 209. It ceases altogether when he who needed support has died, although it was owed to him from sentence of the judge, C. I. 146, or from donation or legacy, because these things are personal. Therefore if by legacy it was owed for ten years, if the one to whom support was left dies before that, the right of support does not pass to his heirs.

What about repairing harms? - The question is generally raised: Is a superior bound to repair harm inflicted by his subjects?

R. Affirmatively in the external forum, according to the various laws in force in various regions. Generally this obligation of repairing harm on account of the deed of another is either from negligence in custody and vigilance to be used, or from the choice of persons whom we deputize to do something. Cf. C. I. 1153; C. G. 1384; C. H. 1903, in which express mention is made: 1. Of the father, and, when he has died, from C. G., or is lacking from C. I., of the mother in relation to minor children dwelling with them; and in C. I. and in C. H. of tutors in relation to those whose administrators they are, likewise dwelling with them. 2. Of the master and of the one commanding in relation to servants and mandatary persons in the exercise of functions to which they themselves destined them. 3. Of the teacher and craftsman in relation to students during the time in which they are under their vigilance. But nothing is established about the husband in relation to the wife.

Moreover, an obligation of this sort, whether in parents or in tutors, whether in masters and those commanding, whether in teachers and craftsmen, ceases, from each Law, Italian and French, whenever they prove that they could not have impeded the deed concerning which otherwise they would have to respond; or, from C. H., that they used due diligence. C. G. 1424. From C. B. 828 seqq., children before the completed seventh year by no means answer for harm inflicted. After the seventh year and before the eighteenth year, they answer for it if necessary discretion was not lacking. But those who ought to watch over them must repair the harm if they omitted to use due diligence. The same is established about one commanding another some business, if this other inflicts harm on another in the execution of that business, unless the one commanding used ordinary diligence. From C. He. 333, the head of the family, or of domestic communion, answers for harm inflicted by a member of it who is a minor, interdicted, or of infirm mind, unless he demonstrates that ordinary diligence required by the circumstances was used.

R. Negatively, speaking generally, in the internal forum. The reason is that the quality of superior brings only the burden of governing subjects rightly, but by no means the obligation from a debt of justice of impeding harms of his own subjects, and much less of others who are not subjects, unless he ought to impede them either from a special contract or from a special office. Hence a private schoolmaster who does not correct students stealing or detracting from others, although he ought to imbue them with good morals and receives payment for this, nevertheless is by no means bound to restitution to those from whom the students steal or whom they detract, since nothing was done with them.

Speaking generally; for they who preside over others are bound concerning harm if they do not prohibit it in that thing or office in which they ought to be over them, for example, if the apprentice of a pharmacist gave poison instead of medicine, provided they do not lack grave fault. The same altogether holds if from your animal, or from your thing, with your fault harm happened to another, if, for example, your dog, untied, bit one entering, or your house, collapsed from age, killed several. Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 7; l. 4, tt. 5, 8; Dig. 1. 47, t. 5; C. A. 1308, 1309, 1314-1316; C. L. 2394 seqq.; Gousset 963 seqq.

What are tutor and curator; and to whom are they given? - To those who cannot protect themselves and their own, if they are not under paternal power, a tutor or curator is given. C. A. 187; C. B. 1773. Tutor and curator differ from each other: 1. because a tutor is given principally to the person, secondarily to things. But a curator is given either only to things, or principally to things, and only secondarily to the person, at least regularly speaking. C. A. 188, 209; C. B. 1793, 1794, 1909.

2. They differ because a tutor cannot be given for a certain thing and cause. But a curator can be given for certain things and determined causes. And thus C. I. 980; C. B. 1961, a curator is assigned to an unclaimed inheritance; C. A. 274, 690; C. L. 157; C. B. 1912, a curator is given to the inheritance of future offspring to be born, and to an inheritance when legacies burden it whole and the heir refuses to administer it. C. B. 1911; C. L. 55 seqq., a curator is given to the goods of one absent. C. B. 1913, 1914, a curator is given to the goods of an unknown owner, and to goods coming from public collections when their administrators are lacking.

3. He who is under tutelage can do absolutely nothing. He who is under care, if he is an emancipated minor, can with the assistance of the curator demand principal sums and pursue judgments, C. I. 318; C. G. 482; if he is a major declared incapable, or deaf-mute or blind from birth, he can do all things with the assistance of the curator. C. I. 339, 340; C. G. 513; C. A. 269, 270.

4. They differ from Common Law, because a tutor is regularly given to a ward or one below puberty, and to him who is compared to one below puberty. But a curator is given to a minor or pubescent up to the twenty-fifth year of age. Inst. 1, l. 1, tt. 13, 23; Ferraris, v. Tutela, 10 seqq. From More Recent Law, a tutor is given to a non-emancipated minor and to one interdicted from the administration of goods. But a curator is given to a son soon to be born; to a minor called to an inheritance; to an emancipated minor; to a major declared incapable because of infirmity of mind or prodigality; to an absent person; to a deaf-mute, or one blind from birth. C. I. 236, 241, 245, 247, 277, 314, 315, 329, 339, 340; C. G. 389, 393, 405, 450, 482, 505, 509, 513; C. B. 1773, 1893, 1901, 1909-1914; C. L. 55, 65, 317, 337, 349, 356. From C. H. 199, 200 no distinction is had between tutor and curator as to name; but as to the thing it is preserved. For a tutor is given both to the person and goods, and only to goods. Subject to tutelage are non-emancipated minors, the insane, deaf-mutes, prodigals, and the interdicted. Almost the same is had in C. A. 187, 188, 269, 270, 275.

But in any tutelage a protutor must also be chosen, whose role it is to supply the place of the tutor and protect the minor if the minor's good is opposed to the good of the tutor. C. I. 265; C. G. 420; C. H. 201, 234; C. L. 205. Cf. C. A. 211, 215; C. B. 1791, 1799; L. 917; C. L. 187 seqq.

Who designates a tutor; who can be tutors? - R. To the first: The following can give a tutor: The parent who dies last, either by testament or by public instrument, C. I. 242; cf. C. A. 196, 197; C. H. 206; the family Council, if the parent did not designate and those whom the law designates are lacking, C. I. 245; cf. C. A. 198, 199; C. H. 204, 211, 212, 231; the council of tutelage and the judge in certain cases, C. I. 248, 261, 262; C. A. 189, 190, 199, 204. The family Council is constituted for legitimate children; the Council of tutelage for acknowledged illegitimate children. C. I. 249, 261; C. B. 1774 seqq., 1852 seqq., 1858 seqq.; C. L. 203.

R. To the second: Since the tutelage of minors is a public office, filled with many cares, not all can assume it, nor can all reject it or ought they to; but only persons capable by law and designated by law. C. I. 268 seqq.; C. G. 427 seqq.; C. H. 202, 203, 237 seqq., 244 seqq.; C. A. 191 seqq., 201; C. L. 186 seqq. Tutelage and care by law belongs to the spouse, father, mother, paternal grandfather, maternal grandfather, C. I. 315, 330; C. G. 402 seqq.; C. B. 1776, and, these being lacking, to the nearer blood-relatives. C. A. 198. Cf. C. L. 200, 201, 227 seqq.; Inst. 1, l. 1, tt. 14-20, 25, 26; C. B. 1776 seqq.; C. L. 200.

What are the duties of tutor and curator? - A tutor has care of the person of the minor and of his education, especially religious education, and represents him in civil acts, and merely administers his goods. C. I. 277, 296, 318; C. G. 450, 457, 481; C. H. 261 seqq.; C. A. 188, 205, 216, 243; C. B. 1793, 1801 seqq.; C. L. 243 seqq., 258 seqq. Hence he cannot exceed the limits of administration. C. I. 296 seqq., 301; C. G. 456 seqq., 482; C. A. 233, 484; C. H. 269, 275; C. B. 1804, 1831. A curator furnishes assistance and authority to him who is under his care. C. I. 318, 339, 432. Therefore the power of tutor and curator is confined within certain limits, and in any matter whatever of graver moment is dependent upon the family Council and even upon the homologation, or confirmation, of the tribunal. C. I. 296, 297, 301; C. G. 457, 467; C. H. 269 seqq., 293 seqq.; C. A. 216, 233; C. B. 1803 seqq.; C. L. 74 seqq., 263 seqq.

Therefore both tutor and curator are bound to use great fidelity in their own office, as a good father of a family, and if he gravely fails in fulfilling it, he sins gravely, even against justice, by force of a quasi-contract, and they are bound to compensation of harms. C. I. 277, 302; C. G. 450, 469; C. A. 202, 204, 228, 264, 265; C. B. 1805, 1833, 1848; C. L. 220 seqq.; L. 341, 917, 918.

A tutor, unless he is the paternal or maternal grandfather, must give surety, from which however the family council can dispense him. C. I. 292. Cf. C. B. 1844; C. H. 252 seqq. From C. A. 237, a tutor is not obligated to surety. Besides this, from the beginning of tutelage he must make a statement and inventory of the goods of the minor. C. I. 281; C. G. 451; C. A. 222, 223, 224; C. H. 264; C. B. 1802.

Each year, while tutelage lasts, unless he is the paternal or maternal grandfather, he must render an account of his administration to the family Council, C. I. 303; or to the substituted tutor, C. G. 470; or to the pupilary judge, C. A. 238, 239. Cf. C. H. 279 seqq.; C. B. 1837 seqq.; C. L. 249 seqq.

When tutelage has been completed, he is likewise bound to render an account of his administration, C. I. 302; C. G. 469; C. H. 281; C. B. 1890, and he is bound concerning less diligent administration, unless he is freed by legitimate prescription. C. I. 309; C. G. 475; C. H. 287; C. B. 1833; Inst. 1, l. 1, t. 21. Acts of the family council and tutor need the homologation of the tribunal when the matter concerns alienation of the goods of the minor, receiving money by loan, and other graver matters. Homologation is ratification, confirmation.

Note: The tutor or protutor cannot buy or hire the goods of the minor, nor can he accept the cession of the rights of the minor. No agreement can be made between tutor and minor, nor can any testamentary disposition useful to them be made before the account of tutelage has been rendered and approved. Yet he has the right to compensation for expenses made by reason of tutelage, and to fitting remuneration for his office. C. I. 300, 307, 769, 1457; C. G. 156, 450, 472, 907; C. H. 269, 270, 275, 276, 285, 753; C. A. 266, 271; C. B. 1795, 1796, 1805, 1834-1836; C. L. 73, 243 seqq.; L. 917.

You will resolve: A tutor or curator cannot make donations or gratuitous remissions from the goods of the ward; he is constituted not for destroying, but for protecting. Except a remuneratory donation; for thus he can, for example, add something by liberal donation to a stipend owed for liberal service. Lugo, d. 23, s. 10; L. 341; C. H. 275; C. B. 1804.

What are the obligations of a minor? - A tutor is in the place of a father. Hence the duties of a minor toward him are similar to those which would be owed to the father himself. But the obligation of a minor toward a curator is lesser; yet as to administration of goods he must both be subject to him and bear a grateful mind. Yet a minor is not bound, whether toward curator or toward tutor, as strictly to love, reverence, and obedience as toward parents. For his dependence upon them is far less than upon parents. C. I. 280; C. H. 263; C. A. 217.

What is the value of the acts of tutor and curator? - Those things which are done according to the laws, whether by tutor or by curator, are valid and firm, and therefore by no means liable to rescission, although they were not useful, but harmful, to him who was under tutelage or care. C. I. 335, 1300, 1304; C. G. 1314. On the contrary, those things which were not done according to the laws, although usefully managed, can be revoked through restitution in full. Through restitution; for meanwhile they are valid. C. I. 1107; C. G. 502, 1125, 1304; C. H. 1291; C. B. 1829 seqq.

How do tutelage and care end? - They end on the part of the tutor or curator by his legitimate excuse, removal, death, or by the affairs committed to him now completed. On the part of him whose tutor or curator he is, by his majority of age, or when the cause of interdiction or inhabilitation has ceased, or by his death. C. H. 278; C. A. 249, 251, 253, 283; C. B. 1882 seqq.; C. I. 388, 342; C. G. 512, 514.

What is the distinction between slaves and servants? - Servants are distinguished from slaves. Slaves are those who, by the law of nations and civil law against natural liberty, are subject to another master, so that they can be possessed, alienated, and sold after the manner of patrimony. Schmalz., l. 4, t. 9, n. 1 seqq. "The appellation of slaves flowed from this, that our commanders are accustomed to sell captives, and by this to preserve them and not kill them." L. 239, de Verb. sign. But servants are not slaves, but free persons who freely enter contracts of service, by hiring their works for a certain or uncertain time in the service of a master and his family. Hence servants are of the family, and therefore are also called familiars or domestics. Servants are under the governance of the master, and masters have rights and obligations toward servants. Although by servants and those of the family is not properly understood one who furnishes the duties of service only for one or another hour of the day, nevertheless those are sufficiently understood as familiars who have a stable seat for the whole day in the house of the master and serve him, but sleep at night in their own house. S. Th. 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1.

Therefore servants are also distinguished from workers. For these hire their works to some master for a certain time and labor, but are not received into his house and family, nor are they properly subject to his governance. From the contract of works there arises an obligation of commutative justice, for the servant to furnish his works to the master, and for the master to pay the agreed wage. But from the fact that he is taken into part of the master's family, the master has the right and office also of ruling and governing the servant for the common good of the family; but the obligation of observance and obedience falls upon the servant in those things which pertain to domestic order. And thus S. Th. 2. 2, q. 65, a. 2, not from some pact or from commutative justice, but from the order of society, although imperfect, recognizes in the master, besides dominion of ownership over the works of the servant, dominion of jurisdiction or power extending itself over the person even to moderate correction of him.

What are the obligations of masters? - Masters are bound toward their servants: 1. To treat them kindly, that is, by addressing and commanding them decently and humanely, by furnishing good and sufficient food, by not burdening them with too many works, by not exposing them to harmful and dangerous works without due precautions, and by conveniently caring for the sick. And generally they are bound to fulfill the offices of charity toward their own servants more than toward others, because servants labor for them, and as it were live for them, and are of the family. This is clear from natural law, and from Sacred Scripture. Ecclus. 33:31: If you have a faithful servant, let him be to you as your soul; treat him as a brother. Eph. 6:9: And you, masters, do the same things to them (servants), forbearing threats; knowing that both their Lord and yours is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with him. C. He. 331, 332.

2. To govern them conveniently, having due regard for the goods of religion and salvation, to instruct and correct them conveniently; for the master is head of the servant, just as of the whole family; but it belongs to the head to direct, where there is need. It seems also clear from the words of Paul, 1 Tim. 5:8: But if anyone does not have care for his own, and especially for those of his household, he has denied the faith, and is worse than an unbeliever. But the servant is reckoned among domestics. C. He. 332; Elbel n. 950.

3. To pay a just price; for the matter concerns an obligation of justice and natural equity; and defrauding such a wage is numbered among the sins crying to heaven. 1 Tim. 5:18; 1 Kings 30:13; L. 342; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1.

You will resolve: Masters can sin, and indeed even gravely: If they do not concede time to servants for learning the rudiments of the Christian faith, or do not send them to catechism and sermon; if they do not take care that at the due time they assist at Mass, confess, and communicate. If they hire or retain in the house servants addicted to illicit sects, irreligious, impious, blaspheming, speaking base things; if they do not warn and correct those sinning gravely, or do not dismiss those unwilling to promise amendment, unless perhaps they especially need their works and cannot find others. If they do not watch, as far as lies in them, that servants abstain from sins; if they permit an occasion of sinning to them; if they lead or entice them into sin by bad example or solicitations.

If they do not pay the promised or just stipend, or delay it too much; if they do not care for sick servants, and immediately expel them, or dismiss them before the fixed time without just cause. Catholic Epistle of Blessed James 5:4; C. B. 618; C. He. 331, 332; L. 342. For understanding the gravity of sin as to the aforesaid omitted warning, correction, and vigilance, and the scandal that followed, it is often necessary to open the condition of the master. For as to extraneous persons grave fault is often absent. Almost the same are the obligations of other masters toward workers who labor in their factories.

What are the obligations of servants? - Servants are bound to furnish to masters: 1. Reverence; for thus the Apostle, 1 Tim. 6:1: Let servants judge their masters worthy of all honor. From this, those can sin even gravely who mock masters, spurn them, or manifest their hidden defects. 2. Obedience and compliance in all those things to which they have obligated themselves by force of contract and by force of positive laws, C. A. 1172; C. B. 616, 617, and in those things which regard good morals. For by force of service there arises a relation of superiority and subjection between master and servant. Therefore, if the right of governance belongs to the master, the obligation of obeying corresponds to the servant. Thus Eph. 6:5: Servants, obey your carnal masters with fear and trembling in the simplicity of your heart, as Christ. And 1 Pet. 2:18: Servants, be subject in all fear to masters, not only to the good and modest, but also to the difficult. Hence they sin more or less, by reason of matter, who, when something is prescribed to them, grumble, answer insolently, waste time uselessly, neglect to perform the prescribed labor, or labor for themselves with damage to the master; and in one word, all those who do not furnish the service which ordinarily is usually required and furnished by such persons. 3. Fidelity; according to the words of Paul to Titus 2:9: Servants are to be subject to their masters... not defrauding, but showing good faith in all things. Hence they sin, and often gravely against justice, who do not have care for things entrusted to them, who by their fault allow them to become worse, who steal expensive foodstuffs, or those not usually given to them, whether for eating, or for giving or selling to outsiders, who manifest secrets of the family, especially if harm follows from this. Leo XIII, Enc. Quod Apostolici, 28 Dec. 1878; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 103; L. 343.

For understanding the gravity of the sin, by reason of irreverence, disobedience against observance and dulia, and infidelity against justice, the condition of service must be manifested in confession. Otherwise the grave malice which is had is either not declared, or is not sufficiently expressed in its lowest species. Almost the same are the obligations of workers toward their own patrons.

Note: "Wages are owed to servants sick for a brief time, for example, for a few days, because the time of the year for which they are hired is to be taken morally, or no attention is to be given to a defect for a brief time; for a small time with respect to the whole year is to be reputed as nothing. But otherwise, if the servant is sick for several months, because wages are by no means owed for an office not furnished. L. 346. Nor is the master bound to expenses to be made for care, or for remedies and the work of a physician. All agree on this if the expenses are notable; indeed St. Liguori, n. 864, after Lugo, admits this, at least as probable, if the expenses are light. But no wages are owed to workers, even those sick for a brief time, because they are hired by the day... therefore they must be paid only for individual days, indeed for half a day, if they fail for half a day." Gury, Cas. 972; C. B. 616, 617.

A master cannot dismiss a servant before the established time without grave cause. The reason is that a contract of hiring is truly onerous, obligating each party according to the measure of the matter. Therefore, just as a servant cannot desert the master without grave cause if the latter, by defect of the servant, would have to undergo grave harm, so likewise neither can a master without grave cause cast off a servant hired for a year. A master dismissing a servant before the time without sufficient cause is bound to repair the harm arising from this. But if a servant departs before the established time, per se he has a right to salary almost according to the proportion of time served, though somewhat less; but if the master suffers grave detriment from the departure of the servant, he can retain a proportionate part of the stipend. L. 342, 345; C. H. 1584; C. B. 620 seqq.

Servants can rightly receive salary from a master burdened by debts if they have furnished service in good faith. For it is the just wage of labor, and the master gives his own thing. "But whether they are bound to depart if they notice that the master is rendered unable to satisfy debts from such service? Navarrus, etc., affirm. Yet Molina denies, and not improbably, says Laymann. For they do not sin against justice if, asked by the master, they serve and receive wages; nor against charity, if others will not be lacking for serving." L. l. 3, n. 694, and this especially if the master needs the servant.

Are servants bound to restitution when they culpably do not impede harms which are inflicted upon the master? - Either servants are hired to guard and defend the family estate, and to watch and impede lest any harm be inflicted upon it, as administrators, guards, etc., who are usually called by this name rather than by the name of servants; or they are hired for mere labor and furnishing their work in necessary things of the family, who are commonly called servants properly. In the first case they are bound to restitution and compensation of harms. For they are bound to impede the harm of masters from office and contract, and therefore from strict commutative justice.

In the other case, some say that even servants are bound to compensation of harms, whether they are inflicted by outsiders or by other servants. Their reason is that by force of the service itself, the master commits his things into custody to each servant. Others more commonly and more probably say that they are bound if theft and harm is committed by outsiders; but that they are not bound if it is committed by other servants or domestics. The reason is that by the very fact that they are admitted into the family, they are indeed judged to undertake the obligation of defending it against outsiders, but by no means also against other familiars. Finally, others say that servants are not bound to restitution or compensation of harm. For although they are obligated from charity to impede that harm, nevertheless they are not obligated from justice. For they are indeed hired to furnish labor and their work in necessary things of the family, but by no means also to guard and defend the goods of the family. Special servants and ministers are placed over custody and vigilance above domestic things or the family, and specifically over care and custody of the pantry; and to these the keys for guarding things are handed over. Therefore then servants are bound to restitution or compensation of harm, when that care and custody of the family estate has been committed to them by special duty, either explicitly or implicitly, for example, when a key is given to them for taking something from some place, because for then the custody of that place is entrusted to them. Given this variety of opinions, the confessor ought prudently to abstain from urging the obligation of restitution. Lugo, d. 19, nn. 105, 106; L. l. 3, nn. 344, 573.

Can servants, judging that the salary is below the work furnished by them, use hidden compensation? - R. Affirmatively, if masters do not pay the stipend established by agreement, or diminish it. For then they openly injure commutative justice. Ithur., Cas. 1, n. 2.

R. Negatively, at least speaking generally, outside the aforesaid case. This is proved: 1. from prop. 37 condemned by Innocent XI. 2. For although they have agreed about a lower price, nevertheless the contract, as being just in conscience, must be stood by. At least speaking generally, because several except: 1. If the servant is compelled by force or fear to consent to an unequal price. 2. If, compelled by necessity, he consented to it, provided however that the master would not already have justly found other servants at the same low price, or did not receive this one asking from mercy. Indeed, if a servant serves with no wage established, from mere charity of the master, so that he may be fed by him, he can claim none, "just as happens with boys whom nobles or Bishops are asked to admit into their family; for then it suffices if the masters give them food, clothing, and habitation, since such is the custom." L. 348. 3. If he is unwillingly burdened with undue works. 4. If he increases the works from the will of the master, whether express or tacit; for the worker is worthy of his wage; but otherwise if he himself altogether spontaneously increases the works, because then he is judged to remit the works in order to conciliate to himself the favor of the master. L. 522, 523; E. M. 1473.

Note: What has been said of servants is to be said likewise of other workers, and of merchants. What the just compensation is can also be left to the judgment of the servant, if he is prudent and of a timid conscience. But in practice the matter often is not without danger of illusion. The practical danger must also be guarded against, lest, if he is discovered to have taken the master's money secretly, he be denounced as a thief and condemned to prison. L. 524.

What are the obligations of teachers and pupils? Between teachers and pupils there are, in a certain way, the same obligations as between parents and children. The reason is that parents, whose right and obligation properly concerns the education and instruction of children, substitute teachers for themselves, who therefore hold their place in this matter toward the children. Therefore masters and preceptors owe to pupils love, good example, right education, correction, and true doctrine. Hence they are bound to perfect themselves in the science which they teach, in order to instruct others duly; to promote the progress of pupils in letters, as much as lies in them; to turn them away as much as they can from others who are defiled by depraved morals, whom they ought in no way to admit into their schools. They can also sin gravely when they neglect the instruction of pupils, or punish them unjustly or indiscreetly; but especially if they seduce them, by driving them toward sins; if they do not teach good morals; if deliberately they teach false things as true, or things harmful to salvation; if they retain pupils imbued with bad morals, who are pernicious to others, etc.

They can sin gravely, however, both by reason of office and by reason of the stipend which they receive. If the teacher has assumed from quasi-contract a special care for the education of his pupils, by contrary sins, for example of scandal, not only charity but also justice is violated. Hence the condition of teacher is to be explained in those sins. Pupils are bound to show teachers love, reverence, and obedience, because of their superiority and care, while they are instructed by them in good morals and arts. The reason is clear: for this is what the reciprocal obligation of pupils to teachers imports; teachers would plainly be obligated in vain to instruct them, or to imbue them with good morals, unless pupils likewise were obligated to follow the admonitions and precepts of the teachers. Pupils sin, however, gravely or lightly according to the gravity or lightness of the matter itself, and its various circumstances, if they do not obey teachers in things pertaining to studies and good morals; if they do not show honor and reverence to teachers; namely if, far from studying diligently, they waste time in idleness, play, or other follies against the will of their teachers; if they detract from teachers, or ridicule them, jeer at them, afflict them with curses, calumnies, annoyances, etc. C. 1. ult. de Magistr. etc.; Clem. 2. e. t.; L. 361; S. Th. Quodl. 3, a. 9; E. M. The condition of pupil is to be explained in grave sins against due reverence and obedience. Otherwise the grave malice against observance is not declared.

700bis. Schools: By her native right the Church has true authority over schools, whether private or public, in order to her own end. And the Church has in fact always applied care lest schools, even lower schools, be lacking, and for the sake of the poor, as may be seen in the Decrees, title de Magistris, and lest anything be demanded for the license to teach. Parents sending their children to heretical, schismatic, neutral schools generally sin gravely. They can be excused from the gravest necessity, scandal being removed, and the proximate danger of all perversion against faith and morals being removed, and suitable means being used for the right, Christian, and Catholic education of the children. E. M.

Studies: The teaching of Sacred Scripture is to be imparted in each Seminary, according to the prescription made on this matter by Pius X, Litt. Quoniam in re biblica, 27 Mar. 1906.

In the plan of studies, moreover, those things are to be observed which are contained in the Encyclical Letter of Pius X, Pascendi dominici gregis, section I, "Primo igitur," and following, and are repeated in the Motu Proprio Sacrorum Antistitum.

Therefore scholastic Philosophy is to be handed on, especially that which was handed on by Saint Thomas, concerning which whatever was sanctioned by Leo XIII remains in force. Scholastic Theology also is to be handed on. But account is also to be taken of positive theology, and indeed more than before, yet with due moderation. The science of philosophical matters cannot decline from divine and ecclesiastical authority. Profane disciplines also are to be cultivated, especially those of natural things, yet with no harm to sacred studies. As to the directors and teachers to be chosen for Seminaries or Catholic Universities and religious houses of studies, whoever, in any way, shall have been imbued with modernism are to be barred both from the office of governing and from the office of teaching. All books, periodicals, and any reviews which have the savor of modernism are to be permitted neither to adolescents in Seminaries nor to hearers in Universities. Besides this it is prescribed that individual teachers, before beginning lectures at the start of the year, show to their Ordinary the text which each has proposed to himself in teaching, or the questions or theses to be treated; then that during the year itself the method of each one's teaching be examined; and if it should appear to depart from sound doctrine, this will be the reason why the teacher is immediately to be removed. Finally, besides the profession of faith, they are to give an oath to their Ordinary, according to the established formula, and with their name subscribed.

The same thing must be furnished each year to their moderators by teachers or lecturers in religious orders before they begin lectures; namely they are bound also to show to them the text of lectures, and the questions or theses to be treated, and at the beginning of the year to give the oath. For the effect of sacred ordination, years of studies cannot be said to be completed by the feast of Pentecost or of the Most Holy Trinity; rather it is required that the scholastic course of nine months be completed, with the final examination successfully passed. E. M. Ordering of studies: In the Seminaries of Italy the ordering of discipline, and of schools and studies, is to be observed which is contained in the Circular Letter of the S. C. Consist., 16 Jul. 1912, A. A. S. vol. 4, p. 491 seqq. The S. C. Consist., Circular Letters 16 Jul. 1912 and 17 Oct. 1913 to the Ordinaries of Italy, recommends that in the Seminaries of Italy scholastic texts more apt and of safer doctrine be used, with others excluded, which can be dangerous for the formation of clerics. Hence in particular in the aforesaid letters are excluded: Il primo passo alla filosofia of Aloysius Ambrosi, the manual works of ecclesiastical history by F. S. Funk and F. S. Kraus, the manual work of Patrology by Rauschen, works of consultation and erudition, Delehaye's Leggende agiografiche, and similar things. E. M.

Academic Degrees: Regulars can have the habitual faculty from the S. C. to obtain academic degrees from the Biblical Commission. Degrees regularly are necessary for various dignities and ecclesiastical offices, for the Episcopate, for the Archdiaconate, for the penitentiary, theological, and scholastic Canonry, for the office of capitular vicar, Advocate before the Roman Congregations. Assistants in Rome must be distinguished by the laurea of doctor in sacred theology and in canon law. C. Sapienti Consilio, Ord. serv. in R. C., Normae pecul. c. 6, n. 5. E. M. Doctorate: Let no one hereafter be given the laurea of Theology and Canon Law who has not previously completed the established curriculum in scholastic philosophy. But if he should be given it, let him be given it in vain. The precept that no one is to be given the laurea of Theology unless he first has obtained the laurea in philosophical disciplines, or at least has furnished certain testimony concerning the completed curriculum in Scholastic Philosophy, is strictly to be observed. If anyone is enrolled in the same year in the Faculty of Theology and of Canon Law at the same time, even if in different Institutes, let him be deprived of every right to receive degrees. But if he is given some degree, let him be given it in vain. No one can be admitted to the school of the canonical text unless he proves by written document that he has studied for a year in some Institute in the Institutions of Canon Law. Those to be promoted to the doctorate are bound to make the profession of faith, according to the formula prescribed by Pius IV, with the addition prescribed by Pius IX. Academic degrees obtained in Rome or elsewhere at Catholic Universities or Pontifical Institutes are to be judged altogether valid in other places, without new confirmation, or new taxes to be exacted. The laurea of Doctor in Theology or in Canon Law, which is granted through the S. Congregation of Studies, without any examination made, but because of excellent merits, has all the rights and privileges of any other doctoral laurea. The manner of testing the doctrine of candidates for academic degrees in Sacred Scripture is found in Acta Apostolicae Sedis, vol. 3, p. 47 seqq., p. 296 seqq. Teachers, at the beginning of the year in Seminaries, and teachers or lecturers in religious orders, after the profession of faith has been made, are likewise bound to emit the oath, according to the formula prescribed by Pius X, M. P. Sacrorum antistitum. Before anyone is admitted by the superiors of some school, lyceum, or university to academic degrees, it must be evident by document that he was not enrolled in another institute. E. M.

What are the obligations of inferiors as regards ecclesiastical Superiors? Subjects are bound to show to their spiritual Superiors love, honor, and obedience in those things which pertain to their jurisdiction and care; likewise necessary support. Proof: 1. This is clear from many places of Sacred Scripture, 1 Tim. 5:17, 18; Heb. 13:17, etc. 2. As to love, reverence, and obedience, because they are superiors, having true jurisdiction; as to support, because the laborer is worthy of his wage. As to those who serve the common utility, that is, Princes, soldiers, and others of this sort, the stipends of livelihood are owed by the people; so also to those who minister to worship for the salvation of the whole people, the people owe stipends of sustenance. Trid. s. 25, C. 17 de R.; Leo XIII, Enc. Sapientiae christianae, 10 Jan. 1880; S. Th. Quodl. 6, a. 10; Quodl. 10, a. 12; E. M.

1. Aloisius, a young man of noble family and honest morals, desires to enter some strict religious Order, so that more securely he may render his own salvation secure. His father resists the religious vocation of Sempronius [i.e., Aloisius], because, after secretly squandering a great quantity of the goods of the family, he places hope in Aloisius that, by his talent and industry, he may restore the domestic wealth. Aloisius has also a brother already joined in marriage, who, in a short time, on account of his vicious life, consumed his share of the family goods, so that from now on, for himself and his family, there remains scarcely what is necessary for an honorable sustenance. Nevertheless Aloisius, his father being unwilling, enters Religion; and when he has professed, in order to attend more perfectly to Christian perfection and to theological studies, he breaks off all communication with his family, not even sending or receiving letters. Nevertheless he daily prays much and fervently to God for his family, especially for his father and for his brother, whom he knows to be declining from the path of virtue; and, while these are converted to God with a sincere heart, although they afterward fell into graver temporal necessity, and each of them dies most holily, he receives supreme consolation from the news, brought to him by the Superiors themselves, and gladly celebrates many Masses for them.

Q. What are the obligations of children toward parents? What as to the case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 665, 666. To the second. Aloisius used his right when he entered Religion. For each one is free in the choice of state, as already often said. Moreover, Aloisius is worthy of praise, since for rendering his salvation more secure, he wished to enter Religion and take up the evangelical counsels. Again, he is worthy of praise, since he wished to enter a Religion of stricter observance, in which he could more easily and surely render his salvation secure.

But Aloisius is not held to obey his father and remain in the world, so that, by his own talent and industry, he may restore the domestic wealth squandered by the fault of the father. First, indeed, the whole thing is uncertain. Then, the opulence and honor of the family are of an order far inferior to his own spiritual and eternal salvation, to which, because of this, he most greatly provides by embracing the evangelical counsels. Besides, the good of the family is not necessary to the sustenance of life. "If parents cannot be sustained without the service of children, then children are not permitted, with the parents having been deserted, to enter Religion. But if they can be sustained in some way without the service of the children, not honorably, then because of this the children are not held to leave aside the works of perfection. For it is one thing to provide that someone may in some way live; and another, that he may live honorably. But he who is in the world is held to provide his parents that they may live honorably, if he can; but he who has already entered Religion is reputed dead to the world. And therefore, according to the mode pertaining to him, he is not held to provide that his parents live honorably, but only that they live in some way." St. Thomas, Quodlibet 10, a. 10.

Much less is Aloisius held to abstain from entering Religion so that he may increase the wealth of his brother's family, or so that he may sustain him honorably, since he has been reduced to grave want by his own vices and fault.

Aloisius, after entering Religion and then professing, conducts himself praiseworthily, when he gives himself more perfectly to Christian perfection and to theological studies. For "the religious state can be considered in three ways: first, insofar as it is an exercise tending to the perfection of charity; secondly, insofar as it quiets the human mind from exterior cares, according to 1 Cor. 7:32: I will that you be without solicitude; thirdly, insofar as it is a certain holocaust, by which someone offers himself and his goods totally to God. And according to this, Religion pertains to perfection not only of charity, but also of religion." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 186, a. 1. "Properly, therefore, religious are called those who totally bind and, as it were, hand themselves over to divine service, offering, as it were, a holocaust to God." Ibid. a. 1. But the state of Religion "was principally instituted for acquiring perfection by certain exercises, through which the impediments of perfect charity are taken away." Ibid., a. 2.

Finally, that Aloisius wishes no communication thereafter with his family, even by letters, is also, speaking of itself, a thing worthy of praise; for we read this of several saints, among whom St. Ignatius Loyola, who only once, if I remember well, wrote to his brother from the time of his conversion. And speaking of itself, this difficulty of communication seems also to have been present for Aloisius.

But parents, after the entrance of Aloisius into Religion and after his profession, fell into rather grave need. Aloisius indeed cannot be obligated on account of this to leave Religion, as is clear from the words of St. Thomas just cited. But he does not seem able entirely to neglect the grave need of his parents. "He who has already professed in Religion is regarded as though dead to the world. Hence he must not, on the occasion of sustaining his parents, leave the cloister in which he is buried with Christ, and implicate himself again in secular business. Nevertheless, with obedience to the prelate and the state of Religion being preserved, he is held to apply a pious effort, so far as he can, as to how his parents may be helped." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 101, a. 4, ad 4. "When someone sees his parents to be in necessity and he does not have the care of them, before he enters Religion he is held to minister to them and must not leave them if they cannot be sustained without him. But if after he has entered Religion and made profession, his parents have been reduced to poverty, he ought, so far as possible, with obedience to his prelate preserved, to strive, either through himself, if this belongs to him, or through another, as he can, that assistance be given to his parents." Quodlibet 3, a. 16.

Finally, Aloisius is also to be praised, since he daily prays much and fervently for his family, especially for his father and his brother, whom he knew to be declining from the path of virtue. He receives supreme consolation worthily, because of the news of their conversion and of their most holy death. Finally, he praiseworthily celebrates many Masses for them. For the care of children for parents, especially in grave spiritual necessity of parents, certainly pertains to that love which they owe them. Hence St. Alphonsus, l. 4, n. 333, says: "Children sin gravely if they neglect prayers and sacrifices for their parents." And again: "Children sin gravely, if they do not take care that their parents, in the article of death, receive penance and the other sacraments."

2. Alphonsus, being twenty-one years old, by the counsel of his confessor hears Mass daily in a nearby church, and each week frequents a Congregation of the Blessed Virgin Mary, where he also confesses and communicates. Moreover, he earnestly applies himself to the study of canon and civil law, and indeed, by natural inclination, he desires the profession of an advocate. His father, otherwise Catholic, displeased at these things, forbids his son to continue in this course; for he fears lest these spiritual exercises harm his health. Therefore he wants him to abstain from daily Mass and to hear Mass only on Sundays and feast days; and to approach the sacred table at most once a month, since because of Eucharistic Communion he must often be fasting up to the tenth hour. He wishes besides that his son embrace the medical profession; for he himself is a notable physician and has many clients. Therefore Alphonsus refers the thing to his confessor, who responds that he must be patient and obey his father, because a son is bound to obey his father in all things.

Q. Can Alphonsus continue his pious exercises and embrace the profession of advocate? What as to the response of the confessor?

R. To the first, affirmatively. For these things, in the case, do not pertain to the right governance of the house and to the education of the son, but to the spiritual exercises of Alphonsus, the direction of which belongs to the confessor, not to the father. Besides, in the case, the father's fear concerning the son's health is excessive and unfounded. And finally, the choice of profession belongs to the son himself, according to each one's talents and inclination. The father can indeed direct his son by counsel and help him, but not command him in this matter, if the son wishes to embrace a fitting profession. For the rest, Alphonsus must take care that he does not fail in reverence toward his father, and not resist openly, but sweetly persuade him to allow himself to be directed by the confessor.

To the second. The confessor erred in responding that a son must obey his parents in all things. For obedience is owed to a superior or to a prelate according to the mode and order of the superiority or prelacy. Hence, just as secular subjects are not held to obey ecclesiastical superiors, nor vice versa, except perhaps in those things in which the one power depends on the other; so subjects are held to obey their own prelates only in those things concerning which they have been appointed over them. But just as man is created by God, and is subject to God's governance, so also the son is naturally generated by the father; and, in the beginning, indeed, according to body and soul, and then, in the course of time, according to the soul by discipline and education. And therefore the father, in the first place, has right over his children as to domestic intercourse. "The carnal father is partaking particularly of the nature of principle, which is universally found in God. But the father is the principle both of generation and education and discipline, and of all things which pertain to the perfection of human life." St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 102, a. 1. Hence the carnal father has the right over his children in domestic intercourse, as also the king in the kingdom, etc. And consequently sons and servants are held to obey the father of the family in those things which pertain to the governance of the house. But secondly, he has right as to the moral discipline and education of his son; wherefore the Apostle says, Heb. 12:9: We had the fathers of our flesh as instructors, and we reverenced them. For the father is held to educate and instruct children. In these therefore the son is held to obey the carnal father, and not in others. Cf. St. Thomas, Quodlibet 2, a. 9; 2. 2, q. 104, a. 5.

3. Virginia, an exceedingly modest and laborious girl, works diligently in her father's shop. But her brothers spend much money in games and drinking parties; her parents, moreover, imprudent and lacking counsel, spend at present everything which they receive, having no care for the future. Virginia therefore, seeing the future needs of her parents and brothers, and wishing to provide both for herself and for her brothers and her parents in case of sickness, of death, or of another rather grave necessity, secretly takes money aside, and by her own industry already has several thousand lire. But afterward, becoming anxious, she refers the whole matter to the confessor.

Q. What dominion do children in the family have over goods? What is to be answered to Virginia?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 666 seqq. To the second. Insofar as Virginia takes money aside, not for herself, but for the whole family, and especially for the needs of her parents, she is safe in conscience, and indeed worthy of praise. The reason is that, since she retains nothing for herself, but spends the whole for the utility of the family and especially of her parents, she injures no one and procures good for all. And indeed, if a wife does not sin by taking something for food, clothing, and other necessities of the family, which husbands often do not care for, and would be sought from them in vain; if a wife, seeing her husband dissipate the goods of the family to the detriment of the family, can hide them and reserve them for the good of the family, as the doctrine of theologians holds, why will not the same thing be possible for a daughter of the family, the mother being dead, for example, or if the mother herself also associated herself with the husband in dissipating all the goods of the family? Cf. G. 824. 2°, Comp. 554.

But insofar as Virginia sets aside money also for herself, so that she may provide for herself for the future time, her parents being dead, she does not seem to be disturbed, although the matter presents greater difficulty. For if a wife, who brought a very small dowry, can secretly and gradually subtract money from a rich and avaricious husband in order to support a very poor and miserable mother, although she knows that the husband would bear this most unwillingly if he knew it; if a wife can do the same in order decently to clothe a son whom she has from a prior marriage, to whom the husband, besides necessary food, scarcely wishes to concede anything else; if finally the same is also permitted to a wife in order to provide for herself for the future, lest she lack the things necessary for preserving the decency of her state, as the opinion of theologians also holds, the same certainly seems able to be conceded to a daughter of the family. Cf. Gury, Cas., v. 1, n. 560, 561. And the reason is at hand: for therefore such an indulgence must be granted to such a miserable wife, if she helps her needy mother or a son born from a first marriage, because the husband cannot reasonably be unwilling in that matter. But therefore the same must be granted to her, if she also provides for herself for the future, seeing that her husband is much older, infirm, and knowing certainly that he will give nothing to her, because a husband must provide for a wife in these circumstances. Now each of these reasons, which militates for the wife, seems also to hold for a daughter of the family constituted in the same straits. Let Virginia therefore take care lest she be led by blind passion; but if the matter is certainly established, she does not seem to be held to restitution, provided that she does not exceed what is reasonably necessary for herself. And especially unhappy Virginia merits indulgence, if, while she sets aside for herself only what is necessary, she uses labor altogether not owed. For something is owed to her extraordinary industry itself; and the industrial fruit is owed to him who uses the industry.

Fr. Gury holds the contrary opinion, Cas. Consc., v. 1, n. 503, who consequently, while in the place cited above he judges that a wife constituted in a similar case must be indulged, nevertheless thinks that a daughter of the family cannot of herself be excused from mortal sin. But the reason which Fr. Gury brings is, "because she committed theft in grave matter against parents reasonably unwilling." But this is precisely what can be denied in our case: namely, that the parents are reasonably unwilling. For if, in a similar case, the husband is not reasonably unwilling toward the wife, why would the parents be reasonably unwilling toward the daughter? - But Fr. Gury objects to himself, l. c., n. 504: "According to several very grave authors, children of the family in a similar case merit at least the wage owed to a servant." He himself responds: "that doctrine is full of dangers and not easily to be tolerated in practice." But that same doctrine the same Fr. Gury, in Comp., v. 1, n. 547, affirms "appears sufficiently probable," and for that very reason just brought forward, "because a son is not of worse condition than a servant." He indeed carefully notes at once in the same Comp., l. c., "that in practice one must not depart from the negative opinion." But, as Fr. Ballerini well observes, "since otherwise he admits that the opposite is probable, he is not to be understood as if an obligation ought, or even could, be imposed on anyone; for a confessor is not a legislator, nor does he have the power of imposing or enjoining a certain obligation when this is uncertain; and it is certainly uncertain when it is probable that it does not exist. Therefore this author only intimates this: that that practice should be prudently advised; prudently, I say, lest, while he fears hallucinations in the penitent, he himself hallucinate more gravely, and thus deprive the penitent of a utility not unjust."

The question therefore is one of prudence, not of liceity. Nor indeed does it avail to object against the argument brought from that case of the wife, that parity is not present; since the goods which she subtracts, as common to herself and her husband, are not only the husband's, but also her own. For Fr. Gury, l. c., openly holds the contrary; for he says that such a wife must be indulged, "if the husband were much older, infirm, and if it were established that he would give nothing to his needy wife, because a husband must provide for a wife in these circumstances." Therefore those goods which the wife subtracts are the husband's goods, not her own. And this is confirmed; for immediately proceeding, Fr. Gury adds these words: "A fortiori a wife would not be condemned who, while her husband was dissipating the substance of the family, would withdraw money and preserve it for the children, or even for herself, if she had goods in common with her husband." Therefore in no way was it a question of common goods.

Finally, since the same Fr. Gury in the two immediately preceding cases, 449, 502, is so easy with a son of the family, it does not appear why he is so difficult in the following case for a daughter of the family. For in the first of those cases, the question is about a son who, after the death of his father, remains with two sisters in the paternal house and alone carries on the father's trade with notable profit; and Fr. Gury says: "Leopoldus, who contributed not only an equal part of the money, but also himself alone the whole labor and industry, ought to obtain the greater part of the profit mentioned. For although the civil law does not except a case of this sort, nevertheless some place seems to be given to epikeia, at least in proportion to the extraordinary and undue labor, according to the judgment of an upright and skilled man. But if he has a certain and evident right to some compensation, strictly speaking, he could make it secretly, if in another way he cannot recover that to which he has a right." Let Leopoldus be removed, let Virginia be put in his place, and certainly the same conclusion remains. But in the other case the question is about a son of the family who trades with his father's money and receives profit from it, and Fr. Gury says: "Nor is Marius held to restore the profit which he acquired by private trade, because it is to be attributed to his extraordinary industry; but the industrial fruit is owed to him who applied the industry." Let it be said not Marius, but Virginia, and here also the same conclusion remains. For that Virginia exercises that extraordinary industry not, as Marius, outside the paternal house, the father unaware, but in the paternal house with the parents present, this certainly does not change the nature and dominion of the fruit of this industry. For a thing always and everywhere fructifies for its owner. But the difficulty would be still less for Virginia if, as can be sufficiently gathered from the case itself, she is no longer a minor, but of age; and there would be no difficulty at all if she were separated in goods from her father and from the family; if she labored not in the name of the father, or in the name of the family, nor by the aid of common money, but in her own name and with her own money, from Virginia's saved frugality, for example, which sufficiently appears in Virginia from the case. For the fruit of frugality from those things which are altogether owed to her in the family, as to a brother, is entirely her own.

1. Melania, a widow, has two sons; one she loves greatly, but the other she can scarcely bear to see, for she herself did not nurse him. Although this one is of a good disposition and of no common talent, the mother experiences toward him a natural antipathy, which, as she says, she cannot overcome. Hence it is that she constantly reproves him with words and afflicts him with insults and even beatings. But the other son, whom she had nursed, although he is of a depraved disposition and of rather mediocre talent, she heaps with every blandishment. She continually bestows hand-gifts upon him, gives him precious objects, notable sums of money, and also a certain small villa, bought by her, which she pretends was given to him by an uncle. Indeed, in her testament she assigns to this one the whole remaining disposable part.

Q. 1. What are the obligations of parents toward children? 2. Has Melania sinned in the case?

R. To the first. Cf. I. M. 671 seqq. To the second. 1. It cannot be doubtful that Melania, by that manner of acting, sins, and sins gravely against piety. For in the correction and chastisement of her son she gravely exceeds moderation, and in these things she is led by no honorable motive of good toward the son, but by a natural and disordered passion; and this perhaps she cannot overcome insofar as she cannot extinguish it in herself; but she certainly can overcome it insofar as she does not act according to it, but according to right reason. So pertinacious a manner of acting on Melania's part can at length inflict grave harm on her son. "You fathers," says the Apostle, "do not provoke your sons to anger." Eph. 6:4. Immoderate chastisement harms children much. It renders them morose, dull, pusillanimous, and sometimes affected with despair. In place of the love owed to parents, it is accustomed to produce contempt and hatred. Reuter, Neoconfessar., p. 2, 6, 4, q. 3, n. 9; Gur., Comp. 375.

2. In those gifts which Melania lavishly bestows in every way upon her other son, she also sins gravely against charity; for she is led by aversion of mind against her other son, to whom, by such excessive gifts, she causes evil. But from this acceptance of persons, with the lapse of time, grave dissension and discord can also arise between the two brothers. Does she also sin gravely against legal and commutative justice? It seems it must be denied.

For through various acts between the living and through the testament she gives and bequeaths to her favorite son only the disposable part. Wherefore, if the legitime of the other son remains untouched, Melania seems to be exempt from grave sin against justice. But it would be otherwise if she harmed this legitimate part, and then the other son, after he had already received it, would be held to restitution, but not before the sentence of a judge. "But it must be noted," says St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 740, "that the donee is held to restore nothing to the children before the sentence of a judge." I. M. 673; G. 822-824.

2. Titius first contracted an ecclesiastical marriage only with Bertha, from whom he begot children. Then, having left his family, he entered civil nuptials with Caia, from whom he begot other children. Being near death, he made a testament, and in it, with not even a word having been made about Bertha and her children, he assigned the whole inheritance to Caia and her children. To what are these heirs held in conscience?

3. Caius, with children received from a merely ecclesiastical marriage, dies intestate; and thus the inheritance civilly devolves to his collaterals. What of these in conscience?

4. Seia, when she could not, after an ecclesiastical marriage contracted with Titius, induce him to complete the civil act, steals something from his goods, so that she may compensate herself for the legal part which, at his death, she will not be able to obtain. Can she justly conduct herself thus in conscience?

Q. What must be responded to the various cases?

R. As regards the civil law, these things must be noted in advance:

1. Civil laws, definitive of right and translative of dominion of property, oblige in conscience. Of this sort, moreover, are the laws which define the legitime of necessary heirs and the legitimate succession of legitimate heirs.

2. Laws are to be interpreted in a fitting way, if this is possible, and are not to be drawn to an iniquitous and unjust disposition, if this is not necessary. Now the law of civil marriage, if it is understood of a true marriage to be entered, where the Council of Trent has been promulgated, is iniquitous and unjust, and then must not be attended to. For no legitimate right can flow from a law which is contrary to natural and divine right, and which is not from the use of legitimate authority but from its abuse. But this interpretation is not necessary. For it can be understood only of a certain exterior form, so that there may be certainty concerning true marriage in order to its civil effects, which depend only on true marriage, from the very fact that they are the civil effects of marriage; and by no means on that legal form, which is only for the proof of true marriage. Besides this common and extrinsic reason, there is also a proper and intrinsic reason for this interpretation. For first, that law concerning civil marriage has its foundation in the power which the civil authority has of ruling the civil effects of marriage. Therefore, if an effect supposes its cause, that law cannot be understood except of true marriage, that is, of the mere civil declaration or proof of true marriage. Moreover, the law itself distinguishes between marriage, concubinage, and adultery; and, what is more, between valid and null marriage. Therefore again it must be understood only of true marriage, that is, of the proof and declaration of true marriage. - Moreover, some civil laws have been approved by the Church and oblige, others have been reprobated by the Church and do not oblige, others have neither been approved nor reprobated, which in particular are to be examined in order to define the force and nature of the obligation. Now the law of civil marriage, if again it is understood of true marriage to be entered, has been reprobated several times by the Church. But if it is understood only of the legal form and civil proof of marriage, thus that law has never been reprobated; indeed, it has been positively approved. Nor indeed is that law approved in another sense, except insofar as the civil authority can dispose concerning the civil effects of marriage, namely true marriage. Cf. the letter of Leo XIII, Il Divisamento, 8 Feb. 1893, to the Cardinal Bishop of Verona and to the Episcopate of Venice, concerning the schema of the law on the precedence of civil formalities with respect to religious marriage.

3. It is worthwhile to report certain words of the praised letter, which bear most upon the matter: "It is not inappropriate to declare once more that the civil power may indeed dispose of the civil effects OF MARRIAGE, but let it leave to the Church what regards marriage in itself; LET IT ADMIT THE FACT OF TRUE AND LEGITIMATE MARRIAGE, as it was instituted by Jesus Christ and practiced by the Church, AND FROM THERE TAKE ITS MOVES to grant or deny the effects which follow from it in civil society." Lower down the Supreme Pontiff reprobates the civil law in this same matter, which indeed could not bring it about that a marriage legitimately contracted be null, "because it is a matter of natural and divine right, against which there is no power in the world that can prevail; but it would put into operation all means to make it be considered as null, to impede its duties, AND TO FRUSTRATE THE EFFECTS WHICH LEGITIMATELY FOLLOW FROM IT." And afterward the Supreme Pontiff asserts that civil effects of this sort pertain solely to the civil State, and that sufficient provision had been made by the State regarding them, even beyond measure, through civil marriage, without the precedence also of the same marriage being imposed.

4. The same observation must be made as regards the civil law constituting the legitime, in testamentary disposition, and legitimate succession, in legitimate disposition, in favor of the spouse and legitimate children. Cf. C. I. 721. This law is pious and just, and it must be understood piously and justly only of a true spouse and of children born from true marriage, who truly and uniquely are, and are called, legitimate. But impiously and unjustly it would be understood of an adulterous concubine and adulterine children, whom the law itself punishes and excludes from any succession. Nor indeed would the same law be fittingly and honestly understood of a merely fornicating concubine and fornicating children; nor would that law be understood coherently in this way, since the law itself distinguishes between merely natural children, born outside marriage, and legitimate children, born from marriage. Moreover, the law here disposes in reality concerning the civil effects of marriage. Therefore it presupposes true marriage, and accordingly treats of truly legitimate children and a true spouse. Cf. tit. Qui filii sint legitimi.

As regards the natural law: 1. No right belongs to collaterals and ascendants from natural law and from strict justice; but only from civil law, founded on charity and piety. Wherefore, with the assistance of civil law and legitimate succession failing, and with testamentary disposition also failing for them, ascendants and collaterals cannot exclude from testamentary succession the spouse and children, whether only civil marriage was present, or whether only ecclesiastical marriage was present. For these legitimately succeed in either case, as at least voluntary heirs, if testamentary disposition was present for them. But if testamentary disposition failed and only civil marriage was present, they also legitimately succeed, as voluntarily called to the inheritance by the testator himself, who, entering civil marriage and dying intestate, is now considered to bestow rights upon the wife and children from the civil marriage, according to the very laws to which he remits himself. If again testamentary disposition failed, and also civil marriage, but only canonical marriage was present, then from natural law ascendants and collaterals have no right to succession, nor do they have any right to succession from civil law, since a truly legitimate spouse is present, and truly legitimate children are present; to whom, in the case, the civil law itself gives assistance.

2. The spouse and children, as many think, have no strict right from natural law and from justice to succession, but only from civil law, founded on equity and piety. Others, on the contrary, hold that the spouse and children have a right to succession from the natural law itself. But those who opine thus in reality fall back into the prior opinion. For they must finally necessarily agree in this: that a right of this sort is not a right in the thing, but to the thing; it is in no way a right from strict justice, but one arisen only from piety and founded in piety, to which natural equity consequently accedes. But this right certainly is neither to the whole inheritance nor to this principal part of the inheritance, but only to some goods, namely to food and due provision, if they need these things. Wherefore, with the assistance of civil law failing, they could claim nothing else, even from natural right. But the civil law admits the spouse and children to legitimate succession, and establishes the legitime for children, but not always for the spouse. Nevertheless the Italian Code also assigns a legitime to the spouse.

Hence to the first case it is answered: Bertha and her children have a right to the whole inheritance, by force of legitimate succession, according to the civil law. For the testament in favor of Caia the adulteress and the adulterine children, with the legitimate wife and legitimate children having been passed over, is of no force with respect to the adulterine children, declared incapable by the law itself, and to whom only food is owed, C. I. 767. But with respect to Caia the adulteress, no more can be owed to her by force of the testamentary disposition than if she were the legitimate spouse of Titius; this cannot exceed, in the case, the portion of one of the children, within the limits, nevertheless, of the disposable part, C. I. 770; CC. 10, 13, Qui fil. sint legit.

To the second. The collaterals of Caius have no right to the inheritance of Caius, neither by force of testamentary disposition, which did not take place, nor by force of legitimate disposition, since, when legitimate children, or legitimate children and a legitimate spouse, are present, as in the case, collaterals are excluded.

To the third. Seia, in the case, from what has been said does not seem to be disturbed. - D'Annib., 3rd ed., p. 2, n. 342, notes 22, 23; Gennari, Consult. etc., cons. 24, 27; Scav., l. 4, n. 560, cas. 6.

5. Aristides, married and having legitimate children, committed adultery with Vincentia, from whom he had a son and a daughter. The matter is hidden and remains so; for Vincentia died before the adulterine children arrived at the use of reason. But Aristides provided for the sustenance and right education of his children, as of orphans altogether foreign to himself, placing the son in a certain college of religious, and the daughter in a house of nuns. Hence the son, now having become older, is initiated into sacred orders, and Aristides establishes a patrimony for him; but the daughter contracts nuptials, and he establishes a fitting dowry for her. But Aristides makes a testament and leaves the disposable part to each, son and daughter, while pretending a work of charity toward abandoned orphans, whom he also commends to his testamentary executor.

"Honor thy father and thy mother." Exod. 20. 12.

This precept primarily and directly regards the obligations of children toward parents; but secondarily and implicitly it looks to the obligations of parents toward children, and also to the mutual obligations of other Superiors and inferiors.

The obligations which regard other Superiors or inferiors, with due proportion observed, are generally the same as the obligations of parents and children. Hence we shall say only a few things: 1. concerning the obligations of masters and servants; 2. of teachers and disciples; 3. of citizens toward temporal authority.

But concerning the offices of Parish Priests and other ecclesiastical Superiors in the Treatise on particular states, where the clerical state will be treated.

Honor thy father and thy mother.

Exod. xx, 12.

1. "The precepts of the Decalogue are ordered to the love of God and of neighbor. But among neighbors we are most bound to parents. And therefore immediately after the precepts ordering us to God there is placed the precept ordering us to parents, who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle. And thus there is a certain affinity of this precept to the precepts of the first table." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5.

2. This precept primarily and directly regards the obligations of children toward parents, but secondarily and implicitly looks to the obligations of parents toward children, and also to the mutual obligations of other blood-relations, and of other Superiors and inferiors. "The use of this Precept extends most widely, for besides those who begot us, there are many others whom we ought to reverence in the place of parents, under the title of power, or dignity, or usefulness, or of some eminent duty and office." Roman Catechism, P. 3, C. 5, nn. 2, 8. "Something is owed first to parents rather than to country and blood-relations, because through the fact that we were born of parents, both blood-relations and country pertain to us. And therefore, since the precepts of the Decalogue are precepts of law, through them man is ordered more to parents than to country or to other blood-relations. Nevertheless, in this precept, which concerns the honoring of parents, there is understood to be commanded whatever pertains to rendering what is due to any person whatever, just as the secondary is included in the principal." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5, ad 2.

3. This fourth precept, as regards acts per se, belongs to the virtue of piety, observance, dulia, obedience, and besides, gratitude.

4. Piety is taken 1. in a broader sense for religion, and thus to be pious is the same as to be religious; and the pious are called worshipers of God, but the impious idolaters and sinners. "God is the principle of being and governance in a far more excellent way than father or country. And therefore religion, which offers worship to God, is a virtue other than piety, which offers worship to parents and country. But the things which belong to creatures are transferred to God through a certain superexcellence and causality... Hence by excellence piety is named the worship of God; just as God is excellently called Our Father." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 3, ad 2. - It is taken 2. likewise in a broader sense for mercy or a benign affection toward those needing our help. "As Augustine says: ... according to common usage the name of piety is also frequently used in works of Mercy. I think this has happened for this reason, because God principally commands these things to be done, which He testifies please Him before sacrifices; from this custom it has happened that even God Himself is called pious." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 1, ad 2. - Piety is taken 3. properly; and it is a special virtue, to which it belongs to offer worship to parents and country. "It must be said that some virtue is special from the fact that it regards some object according to some special reason. But since it pertains to the notion of justice that it render to another what is due, wherever there is found a special reason of debt to some person, there is a special virtue there. Now something is owed to someone specially because he is the connatural principle producing into being and governing. But piety regards this principle, insofar as it spends duty and worship upon parents and country, and upon those who are ordered to these." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3.

5. As in every virtue pertaining to justice, which is a virtue toward another, so also in piety a threefold object is distinguished, namely the object to whom, the object which, or material object, and the objective formal reason.

6. The object to whom of piety is 1. parents, because after God they are the chief authors of our origin and of our education; 2. country, because country also is in some way the principle of our origin and education; 3. other blood-relations, not because they are the principle of our origin, but because in them, by communion of blood, parents are in some way represented; 4. the well-wishers of the country, because in them we behold the favor and assistance of the country. Therefore, just as on account of parents piety pays worship to blood-relations, so on account of country it pays worship to the well-wishers and allies of the country. "It must be said that man becomes debtor to others in diverse ways according to their diverse excellence and the diverse benefits received from them. But in each respect God obtains the highest place, who both is most excellent and is for us the first principle of being and governing. But secondarily the principles of our being and governance are parents and country, from whom and in which we were born and nourished. And therefore after God man is most debtor to parents and country. Hence just as it pertains to religion to offer worship to God, so in the secondary degree it pertains to piety to offer worship to parents and country. But in the worship of parents there is included the worship of all blood-relations; because blood-relations also are so called from the fact that they proceeded from the same parents... But in the worship of country there is understood the worship of all fellow citizens and all friends of the country. And therefore to these piety principally extends itself... The communications of blood-relations and fellow citizens are referred more to the principles of our being than other communications, and therefore the name of piety extends more to these." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 1.

7. Therefore piety is also between spouses and with respect to children, "since between spouses there is worship and duty toward each other, as cohelpers for the conservation of the blood-relationship of each, which each spouse has from his own parents: for by the propagation of children the blood of each parent is conserved. And we say the same about children, because they are regarded by the virtue of piety as conservers of the blood-relationship received from the parents." Cajetan on 2.2, q. 101, a. 1.

8. The object which, or material object, of piety is worship, service, and duty; worship indeed and service per se, duty per accidens. "Something is owed to parents and fellow citizens in two ways: in one way per se, in another way per accidens. Per se there is owed to them that which befits a father insofar as he is a father, who, since he is superior, existing as a kind of principle of the son, is owed reverence and service by the son. But per accidens something is owed to a father which it befits him to receive according to something that happens to him; for instance, if he is sick, that he be visited and that attention be given to his cure; if he is poor, that he be sustained, and so with other things of this kind; all of which are contained under the debt of service. And therefore Tully says... piety exhibits both duty and worship, so that duty is referred to service, but worship to reverence or honor; because, as Augustine says... we are said to cultivate men whom we honor with either remembrance or presence." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 2.

9. Therefore the worship due to parents consists in reverence and honor to be shown to them; service, in this, that the son "obey their command, and while living repay their benefits according to his manner," St. Thomas, l. c., q. 102, a. 2; duty, in supplying to them any necessary assistance of life, if they need it. As duty is contained in service, so duty and service are comprehended in worship. For "in worship not only honor is understood, but also whatever other things pertain to fitting acts by which man is ordered to another." St. Thomas, l. c., ad 1. Likewise "in the honoring of parents there is understood every assistance which ought to be shown to parents, as the Lord interprets in Matthew 15. And this is because assistance is given to a father from debt as to one greater." St. Thomas, l. c., q. 101, a. 2, ad 1. "To parents as such there is owed the honor of reverence. But sustenance and other things of this kind are owed to them by reason of some accident, for instance insofar as they are needy, or servants, or something of this kind, as was said above, q. 101, a. 2. And because what is per se is prior to that which is per accidens, therefore among the first precepts of the law also, which are the precepts of the Decalogue, the honoring of parents is specially prescribed, in which, as in a certain principal thing, sustenance is understood to be commanded, and whatever else is owed to parents." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5, ad 3. "With this honor," says the Roman Catechism, P. 3, c. 5, n. 7, "all these things are conjoined: love, observance, obedience, and worship. But wisely in the Law the word of honor was placed, not of love or fear, although parents are greatly to be loved and feared. For he who loves does not always observe and venerate; he who fears does not always love; but whom someone honors from the soul, he also loves and reveres."

10. The objective formal reason of piety is the special honesty which is in that worship; arising proximately from the reason of debt of that worship, remotely from the reason of the principle of our origin, which is in our parents. For piety offers worship and service to parents because this is due to them; but this is due to them because they are the principle of our origin. Therefore piety is wholly distinguished from charity toward neighbor. For charity indeed wills good and does good to parents, but on account of God, namely insofar as they are ordered to God. But piety wills good to them and does good to them according as they are the principle of being for us. "Just as religion is a certain protestation of faith, hope, and charity, by which man is primordially ordered to God; so also piety is a certain protestation of the charity which someone has toward parents and country." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101, a. 3, ad 1. Likewise piety is wholly distinguished from legal justice, which indeed "regards the good of the country, but according as it is the common good" to be obtained through observance of the laws: "Piety extends itself to the country according as it is a certain principle of being for us." St. Thomas, l. c., ad 3.

11. Observance is a virtue "through which worship and honor are shown to persons constituted in dignity." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 1. Hence the object to whom, the object which, and the objective formal reason of observance are clear.

12. The object to whom of observance is all persons constituted in dignity, namely superiors who actually govern us, and all others endowed with some excellence, since they are fit to govern us. "It is necessary that virtues be distinguished in an ordered descent in the same way as the excellence of the persons to whom something is to be rendered. But just as the carnal father particularly participates in the account of principle, which is universally found in God, so also a person who in some respect exercises providence over us particularly participates in the account of father; because the father is the principle both of generation and education and discipline and all things which pertain to the perfection of human life; but a person constituted in dignity is as a principle of governance with respect to certain matters: as the prince of the city in civil matters, the leader of an army in military matters, a teacher in disciplines, and there is the like in other matters. And thence it is that all such persons are called fathers because of the likeness of care; just as in 4 Kings 5 the servants of Naaman said to him: Father, and if the Prophet had told thee some great thing, etc. And therefore, just as under religion, through which worship is given to God, there is found piety, through which parents are worshiped, so under piety there is found observance, through which worship and honor are shown to persons constituted in dignity." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 1. And hence it is clear that persons constituted in dignity, as has already been said, are properly here those who not only have excellence, but also power of governing: kings, masters, teachers, the Supreme Pontiff, Bishops, and all others who have fitness to govern us by reason of their excellence. And thus the same Angelic Doctor, l. c., ad 2, says: "It must be said that someone, from the fact that he is constituted in some dignity, not only has a certain excellence of status, but also a certain power of governing subjects, whence the account of principle belongs to him, insofar as he is governor of others. But from the fact that someone has perfection of knowledge or virtue, he does not obtain the account of principle as regards others, but only a certain excellence in himself. And therefore a certain special virtue is determined to showing honor and worship to those who are constituted in dignity. But because through knowledge and virtue, and all other things of this kind, someone is rendered fit for the state of dignity, the reverence which is shown to some persons because of any excellence whatsoever pertains to the same virtue." But because of the various dignity there is various observance: civil, religious; natural, supernatural, which, offered to the saints, is called dulia.

13. The object which, or material object, of observance is honor, and worship or service; the former is owed by reason of the excellence of the person constituted in dignity, the latter by reason of power over subjects. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 2, "that to those who are constituted in dignity it belongs to govern subjects. But to govern is to move some persons to a due end, as a sailor governs a ship by leading it to port. Now everything moving has a certain excellence and power above that which is moved. Hence it is necessary that in him who is constituted in dignity there be considered first the excellence of status with a certain power over subjects, and second the office itself of governance. Therefore by reason of excellence honor is owed to him, which is a certain recognition of someone's excellence. But by reason of the office of governance worship is owed to him, which consists in a certain service, namely while someone obeys their command and repays in turn their benefits according to his manner... To the excellence of those who are constituted in dignity there is owed honor by reason of the higher grade, but fear by reason of the power which they have for coercing; but to the office of their governance there is owed obedience, by which subjects are moved to the command of those presiding, and tributes, which are certain stipends of their labor."

14. Honor certainly imports a certain testification concerning someone's excellence, either by words or by deeds, as by inclinations, or even by exterior things, for instance by the offering of gifts. It is distinguished from praise, because praise consists in words alone. It is distinguished from glory, which is the effect of honor and praise, because from the fact that we testify concerning someone's goodness, his goodness becomes clear in the knowledge of many; and this the name of glory imports, which is clear knowledge with praise. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 103, a. 1.

15. The objective formal reason of observance is that special honesty which shines forth in worship and honor shown to persons constituted in dignity, which arises proximately from the reason of debt of that worship, remotely from that dignity. Now there is a twofold debt. "One indeed is legal, to the rendering of which man is compelled by law, and thus man owes honor and worship to those who are constituted in dignity and have prelation over him. But the other is a moral debt, which is owed from a certain honesty; and in this way we owe worship and honor to those who are constituted in dignity, even if we are not subject to them." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 2, ad 2. Now persons constituted in dignity can be considered in two ways: according to their personal dignity, and according as they are ordered to the common good. Worship shown to them insofar as it is ordered to the common good pertains not to observance, but to piety. But worship shown to them which pertains specially to their personal usefulness and glory properly pertains to observance, according as it is distinguished from piety. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 102, a. 3. But since piety shows worship and honor, as observance also shows worship and honor, piety, although properly distinguished from observance, can by a certain excellence be called observance; just as, although piety properly so called is distinguished from religion, religion by a certain supereminence is called piety. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 1, ad 1.

16. As regards dulia, "dulia can be taken in two ways. In one way commonly, according as it shows reverence to any man whatsoever by reason of any excellence whatsoever. And thus it contains under itself piety and observance, and any virtue of this kind which shows reverence to man. And according to this it will have parts diverse in species. In another way it can be taken strictly, insofar as, according to it, a servant shows reverence to a master: for dulia is called servitude... And according to this it is not divided into diverse species, but is one species of observance... because by one account a servant reveres a master, a soldier a commander, a disciple a teacher, and so concerning other things of this kind." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 103, a. 4. Dulia "is a certain species of observance; because through observance we honor any persons whatsoever excelling in dignity; but through dulia properly taken servants venerate their masters. For dulia in Greek is called servitude." St. Thomas, l. c., a. 3. And hence it is clear that observance is not a special virtue in the most specific species, but a special virtue in a subalternate species. And the Angelic Doctor insinuates this by saying, q. 102, a. 1, that it pertains to observance to cultivate and honor prince, commander, teacher, master, etc., whom he asserts, q. 103, a. 4, to be cultivated and honored by a diverse account.

17. Obedience, although it is comprehended under religion, piety, and observance, nevertheless properly is a special virtue. "For since inferiors must show many things to their superiors, among the rest this is one special thing, that they are bound to obey their precepts. Hence obedience is a special virtue; and its special object is a tacit or express precept. For the will of the superior, in whatever way it becomes known, is a certain tacit precept. And obedience seems so much the more prompt, as it anticipates the expressed precept by obeying, once the will of the superior has been understood." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2. Indeed the will of the superior is the rule of the subject. But this subject can be subject to a superior, even if the superior does not expressly command; and therefore then he still renders true obedience. - And q. 104, a. 3, ad 1, the same Holy Doctor says: "It must be said that obedience proceeds from reverence, which shows worship and honor to superiors. And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues, although considered according to itself, insofar as it regards the account of precept, it is one special virtue. Therefore insofar as it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is in some way contained under observance; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion, and it pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion." But insofar as it proceeds from procuring the common good, it is contained under legal justice, and pertains to it. Indeed, "if obedience is taken broadly for the execution of anything whatever which can fall under precept, and disobedience for the omission of the same from whatever intention, thus obedience will be a general virtue and disobedience a general sin." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2.

18. Finally, as regards gratitude, "it must be said that according to the diverse causes from which something is owed, it is necessary that the account of rendering what is due be diversified; yet so that always in the greater that which is lesser is contained. But in God first and principally is found the cause of debt, because He Himself is the first principle of all our goods. But secondarily in a father, because he is the proximate principle of our generation and discipline. Thirdly, in a person who excels in dignity, from whom common benefits proceed. Fourthly, in some benefactor, from whom we have received certain particular and private benefits, for which we are particularly obligated to him. Therefore, because not whatever we owe to God, or to a father, or to a person excelling in dignity, do we owe to some benefactor from whom we have received some particular benefit, thence it is that after religion, by which we pay due worship to God; and piety, by which we worship persons excelling in dignity; there is grace, or gratitude, which recompenses favor to benefactors; and it is distinguished from the foregoing virtues, as each of the later is distinguished from the prior, as it were falling short of it." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 106, a. 1. Therefore to a benefactor there is owed also per se honor and reverence, because he has the account of principle, and per accidens assistance or sustenance, if he is in need. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 107, a. 3. But grace or gratitude recompenses a benefit by thanksgiving and by bestowing something gratuitously. St. Thomas, l. c., a. 6. To it is opposed ingratitude, which, according to the diversity of circumstances, is sometimes a lethal, sometimes a venial sin. It is not grave unless the ingratitude has been great. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 107.

19. Some children are legitimate and natural, others natural, others legitimate. - Legitimate and natural children are those who are born from a man and his wife. - Those are presumed in law to be legitimate and natural who are born from a mother joined in a just marriage, unless it is juridically certain that their origin is from someone other than the mother's husband. For he is held to be the father whom the nuptials demonstrate. The mother indeed is certain; but the father is presumed. And this presumption also has force in the forum of conscience. C. B. (Cod. Germ.) 1591, 1717, 1720.

20. The fetus is usually brought forth in the ninth month from the time when it was conceived, sometimes at the beginning of the seventh, sometimes at the completion of the tenth, namely not before 180 days, nor after 300 days, C. I. (Cod. Ital.) 161 seqq.; C. G. (Cod. Gall.) 315; C. H. (Cod. Hisp.) 108; C. A. (Cod. Austr.) 138, 163; C. B. 1592, 1717; C. L. (Cod. Lusit.) 101. - Hence of him who is born either after the seventh month from the marriage entered, or before the tenth month from the marriage dissolved, that one is the father whom the nuptials demonstrate, unless something else is most evident; C. L. 103. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that the mother was adulterous, C. I. 165; C. G. 313; C. H. 109; C. A. 158, or that she herself professed the son to be adulterine, C. A. 158, unless she brings forward such indications as would be sufficient in the external forum, Lugo de Iust. d. 12, n. 26, although she be most worthy of faith, and under oath, and dying, asserts it; for no one merits belief when alleging his own turpitude, C. Inter 8, sect. ult. de Donat.; L. 654, 924. - A fetus brought forth before the seventh month from the marriage entered is held legitimate only if the husband either knowingly and willingly married the pregnant woman, or, when he was present, did not wholly repudiate the born child, C. I. 161; C. G. 314; C. H. 110; C. L. 102. A fetus brought forth later, after the tenth month from the dissolution of the marriage, is held as illegitimate, unless the health and morals of the mother and the circumstances of things persuade otherwise, C. I. 169; C. G. 315; C. H. 111; C. L. 102 seqq.

21. Natural or illegitimate children are those who are born outside marriage. These by canon law are irregular; by civil law they are distinguished from legitimate chiefly as regards succession to the paternal inheritance. C. A. 155, 165; C. H. 114, 127, 134, 139. - Natural children, if they are born from a man and woman between whom marriage could not have been entered, whether by natural law or by divine and canon law, by the same canon law are called spurious, or born from a condemned intercourse, C. 3, 10 Qui fil. sint legit.; and they are adulterine, sacrilegious, incestuous, and nefarious; these latter are those who are born from ascendants and descendants. But by civil law all are called illegitimate and cannot be recognized, in various cases nevertheless determined by the various laws, C. I. 180; C. H. 119; C. G. 335; C. B. 1732; C. L. 122, 134. But in other cases not excepted by the laws they can be acknowledged and legitimated. C. I. 179, 195; C. G. 331, 334; C. L. 119. - They are acknowledged by the confession of the parents, by civil law authentic, C. I. 181; C. G. 334; C. H. 131; C. B. 1718; by canon law simple and bare, C. 10 de Probat.; and after they have been acknowledged, they follow the condition of the one acknowledging, whether mother, or father, or both, C. I. 185. - But those acknowledged are legitimated by subsequent marriage, by the law itself, C. 1, 6 Qui fil. sint leg.; C. I. 194; C. G. 331; C. H. 120, 121; C. A. 161; C. B. 1719; C. L. 119; and they can also be acknowledged after the marriage has already been contracted, C. I. 197; C. H. 121. Cf. C. G. 331. - But from the time they have been legitimated they are held just as if they had been brought forth from a just marriage, C. 6 Qui fil. sint leg.; C. I. 194; C. G. 333; C. H. 122; C. A. 161; C. L. 121. Cf. Benedict XIV, de Syn. l. 13, c. 24, n. 16. But one merely acknowledged is understood to be the child only of him who acknowledged him. C. I. 182; C. G. 336; C. H. 129, 134. - From C. B. 1589, 1705, it is established altogether against natural law that a natural son and father are not reputed blood-relations! and, on the contrary, in his relations with his mother he has the juridical condition of a legitimate son! - In doubt whether someone was born from a legitimate marriage, he must be presumed legitimate. C. I. 120. - L. l. 3, n. 951.

22. Legitimate children are legitimated natural children, and adopted children, C. I. 737. Adoption is an act by which someone who is not such by nature is admitted into the place of a child. From more recent laws, the adopted person is held just as the legitimate and natural son only of him who adopted him, and he acquires the right of succession to him, C. I. 202, 204, 210, 737; C. G. 343, 344, 350; C. B. 1741, 1757; C. L. 124, 129. But he is not exempted from the power of his natural father, nor does he pass into the power and family of the adopting father; C. I. 210, 212; C. G. 348, 349. It is otherwise from C. A. 183; C. H. 177; C. B. 1765. This adoption is perpetual and is not dissolved even by mutual consent, C. I. 217. And so also the French Jurisconsults. It is otherwise from C. A. 185; C. B. 1768.

23. Legitimate and natural children, as regards receiving donations and as regards the right of succession, are held such from the time when they were really conceived, provided that afterwards they are born viable, C. I. 724; C. G. 725; C. A. 138. One is born viable who is born after the 180th day from conception, C. I. 160, 162; C. G. 312, 314; C. A. 138, and has been perfectly born. In doubt, one who was brought forth alive is presumed to have been born viable, C. I. 724. Abortive children, if they do not survive, are held as born dead. - Merely natural children, whether legitimated or acknowledged, acquire the right of succession from the marriage of the parents entered, or from that time at which they afterwards were acknowledged, C. I. 197; C. H. 124. - Merely legitimate children acquire the right of succession from that time at which they were adopted, as if then first they had been conceived. C. I. 210, 217; C. B. 1754, 1757. From C. H. 177, an adopted person acquires no right of succession except from a testament or from a prior agreement. From C. B. 1767, the right of succession can be excluded in the contract of adoption. - Therefore a donation can be made to one scarcely conceived, and, when a pregnant widow has been left, the inheritance in the meantime pertains to the son to be born. But, when he is born dead, it devolves to the nearer cognates of the father.

24. Those younger than seven are called infants, as if non-speaking, unable to speak. If they have already attained the use of reason, although they are not held by human laws, nevertheless they are held by natural law. - From the seventh year to the fourteenth, if male; to the twelfth, if female, they are called impubes; but beyond the aforesaid age they are called pubes, namely from the proximate power of generation attained at that age. - Impubes, if they cease to be under the power of the father, by the father's death or by the emancipation of the children, are called pupilli, L. 239 de Verb. sign.; having become pubes, they are called minors up to the twenty-fifth year of age by Roman Law, L. 1 de Minoribus. - By more recent Law, every other distinction having been removed, whoever, male or female, has not yet completed the twenty-first year of age is called a minor; with such age completed, he is called of age, C. I. 323, 240; C. G. 388, 488; C. B. 2; C. L. 97, 311. From C. H. 320, majority is established when the twenty-third year has been completed; C. A. 21, 174, the twenty-fourth year. - A cleric is of age in beneficial and other spiritual causes when he has completed the fourteenth year of age. C. Si annum 3 de Iudic. in 6. - At a minor age the son, unless he is emancipated, is constituted under paternal power. C. I. 220; C. B. 1626. But one of age regularly manages his own affairs. From C. L. 311, he can freely dispose of his person and goods.

25. Since children have existence from parents, therefore, besides love, they owe them piety. For as the love of parents is for doing good, so the love of children is for honoring parents, St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 31, a. 3, ad 3; q. 26, a. 9, ad 1, ad 3. But although love does not import honor, honor includes love, since whom we honor from the soul we also love. Therefore when by a sin of children only charity toward parents is injured, the only malice contained in it is that alone which is against filial piety. But if that sin has another malice against another virtue, then this new species is superadded to the former. - Piety per se requires two things, reverence and service, but per accidens help to be furnished, if they are in need. Hence it is that a sin against piety can injure both love and reverence and service toward parents; as, for example, if a son conceives internal hatred against parents, or externally by words or another action saddens them, he sins against love; if he curses his parents he sins against love and against reverence; if he contemns parents and the precept of parents, he sins against reverence and obedience. Another species can also accede to the species against piety, for example, if a son defames or strikes his father, he sins against piety and against justice. - Even at a greater age children owe parents love, honor, and reverence, because they are always children, those always parents. - St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 26, a. 9, 10; q. 101, a. 7; L. 333; C. I. 220; C. G. 371; C. H. 154; C. A. 144, 154.

26. From Sacred Scripture, in several places under grave penalties, love, honor, and obedience toward parents are prescribed. Eccli. 3:8, 9, 18; 7:29, 30; Prov. 19:26; Deut. 27:16; Exod. 21:15; Eph. 6:1; Col. 3:20. - And this precept is also clear by reason; because parents have a threefold respect to children, namely by reason of cause, by reason of preeminence, and by reason of governance. Consequently children ought to love them as authors of their existence, honor them as Superiors, and obey them as rulers delegated by God. But this precept is grave per se. - "For among neighbors we are most bound to parents." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 122, a. 5. The reason is that, as the same St. Thomas teaches, 2.2, q. 102, a. 3, the persons of parents are more substantially joined to us than any other persons constituted in dignity. For generation and governance, of which parents are the principle, pertain more to substance than exterior governance, of which other persons constituted in dignity are the principle. Besides, "the showing of honor or worship must be proportioned not only to the person to whom it is shown, considered according to himself, but also according as he is compared to those showing it. Therefore although the virtuous considered according to themselves are more worthy of honor than the persons of parents; nevertheless children are more obligated, because of benefits received from the parents themselves and natural conjunction, to show worship and honor to parents than to virtuous strangers." St. Thomas, l. c.

27. Therefore although love, honor, and obedience, as they are shown to other men, pertain precisely to the virtue of charity, observance, and obedience, nevertheless as they are shown to parents they pertain to the virtue of piety, according as it is a certain special virtue which furnishes worship and duty to parents as the chief authors of life after God, and to other blood-relations, in whom, because of communion of blood, parents are in some way represented. But only those sins bear before themselves a special malice against piety which immediately injure their person, or intrinsic personal goods, such as hatred, detraction, striking; not theft. Nevertheless, since a father with respect to a son, and the same is true of a son with respect to a father, retains his own right as regards life, reputation, honor, a son sinning against his father in these things sins at once against piety and justice. But secretly taking away the goods of the father, against the father's will, a son sins per se only against commutative justice, and per se is bound to restitution.

28. For piety, which is between children and their parents, does not exclude strict justice between them. Those duties which are had between children and parents, as also between husband and wife, between brothers and sisters, and between other blood-relations, if they regard only these conditions of these persons, contain a certain deficient just, and pertain only to piety, as, for example, the education of children does. But those duties which regard the same persons among themselves insofar as they are men contain a just strictly such, and look to commutative justice. Therefore theft committed by a son against a father is theft injuring commutative justice, as any other theft. Likewise if a son kills his father, he sins against justice, as any other homicide, but besides there is also added a graver malice against piety. Similarly, if a spouse does not keep conjugal fidelity, he sins against justice, as any other person violating faith given in a bilateral and onerous contract; but besides there is added a graver malice against piety. The reason is that those duties which pertain to piety recede from the perfect distinction and otherness of persons which is properly required by commutative justice.

29. To the point St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 57, a. 4: "Right, or the just, is said by commensuration to another. But another can be said in two ways: in one way, that which is simply another, as that which is altogether distinct, as appears in two men, one of whom is not under the other, but both are under one prince of the city, and between such persons there is the simply just. In another way something is called another not simply, but as existing as something of him; and in this way in human affairs a son is something of the father, because he is in some way part of him, and a servant is something of the master, because he is his instrument. And therefore there is not a comparison of father to son as to one simply other; and on account of this there is not there the simply just, but a certain just, namely paternal; and by the same reason neither between master and servant, but there is between them dominative just. But a wife, although she is something of the husband, because she is compared to him as to his own body, nevertheless is more distinguished from the husband than a son from a father, or a servant from a master; for she is assumed into a certain social life of marriage; and therefore between husband and wife there is more of the account of the just than between father and son, or master and servant: because, since husband and wife have an immediate relation to domestic life, therefore between them there is not even the simply political just, but rather the economic just." But, as the same Angelic Doctor has ibid. ad 2: "A son, insofar as he is a son, is something of the father; and similarly a servant, insofar as he is a servant, is something of the master; nevertheless each, insofar as he is considered as a certain man, is something subsisting according to himself, distinct from others. And therefore, insofar as each is a man, justice is toward them in some way; and on account of this also some laws are given concerning those things which are of father to son, or of master to servant."

Hence it is clear that children under paternal power can well have dominion of things. But this dominion regards things given to them by any translative title of dominion, or acquired by their own industry. For as regards paternal goods, no strict right to paternal goods belongs to children while the father is living. Hence, if children under paternal power steal anything from these goods, they are bound to restitution per se. Per se, namely unless there is question of a thing of lesser moment, and it is prudently presumed that the father remits that obligation.

30. Now as regards love, one does not sin against it if parents are saddened by the manner of acting of children, when a just and grave cause urges that something be done, and it is clear that the offense of the parents arises from their mere moroseness.

But children, whether they are legitimate, that is, born in legitimate marriage from husband and wife, or illegitimate, that is, born outside legitimate marriage; likewise whether they are natural, generated from father and mother, or adopted, not from generation but from adoption, all owe parents love, honor, and obedience. But all owe love both by internal affection and by exterior work, also by furnishing them assistance if they are found in necessity, whether corporal or spiritual. For as love is contained under honor, so also the assistance of necessities is contained under the same honor. St. Thomas, Quodl. 3, a. 16.

31. As regards reverence, every irreverence and contempt toward parents, other things being equal, is graver than toward other neighbors, even relatives, even those constituted in dignity, because of the greater conjunction with them, which obtains the first grade after God, because of their greater dignity. But although, if children have injured the honor of parents, they ought to repair the injured honor to them by asking pardon from them, even before others in whose sight they sinned, nevertheless it can certainly be presumed, at least for the most part, where children refused to do this, that parents remit this obligation to the children, lest the children again incur offense of God and undergo eternal danger to the soul. Cf. St. Alphonsus n. 334.

32. Reverence can be injured by words, gestures, and deeds, namely gravely, even in those things which as regards others are light, provided that they are not altogether light. Therefore children sin gravely: by Words, by everywhere addressing parents harshly; or even by showing them no sign of benevolence; by calling them, when present, by contumelious words; or by cursing them from the soul; by Gestures, by looking at them with fierce eyes, by mocking and deriding them when present; by Deeds, by lifting hands against them with deliberation, as a sign of striking them, by accusing them of crimes, unless there is question of crimes pernicious to the republic, such as heresy, treason, etc. - L. 333, 334.

33. Service likewise is gravely injured by not obeying parents in those things which look to domestic governance and economy, or pertain to good morals, if nevertheless parents command seriously and in a grave matter; except the election of a state, the entering of marriage, the entering of religion, unless nevertheless parents for a just cause contradict children in this matter. Likewise a grave sin is committed by not acknowledging them as parents, unless this is done from a just cause and only by outwardly concealing that one is their son. But they by no means sin by fulfilling the duties of religion against the prohibition of parents. For as regards all those things which pertain to salvation, they "are immediately subject to God, by whom they are instructed through the natural or written law." St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 5, ad 2. - L. 334, 335; St. Thomas, Quodl. 2, a. 9, 2.2, q. 104, a. 2, 5; C. A. 148; C. L. 142.

34. The obedience to be furnished by children to parents is not unlimited, but has its own boundaries by which it is circumscribed. - The reason is that obedience is to be furnished according to the power of the Superior; namely, in those things to which the right of prelation extends. But paternal power does not exceed the rule and governance of the family, and the right education of the children. Aptly St. Thomas, Quodl. 2, q. 5, a. 9: "It must be said that, since obedience is owed to a prelate, the debt of obedience extends to those things to which the right of prelation extends. But a carnal father has the right of prelation over a son, first indeed as regards domestic conversation. For the father of a family is in the house as the king is in the kingdom; hence, just as subjects of the king are bound to obey the king in those things which pertain to the governance of the kingdom, so also children and others are bound to obey the father of the family in those things which pertain to the dispensation of the house. Secondly as regards discipline of morals, whence the Apostle says at Heb. 12:9: We had fathers of our flesh as instructors and we obeyed them. For the father owes the son not only education, but also discipline, as the Philosopher says. Therefore in these things the son is bound to obey the carnal father, and not in others."

35. And this doctrine is general: any subject whatever ought not obey his superior in all things, but only in those which pertain to his own subjection and to the superior's prelation. Man owes obedience in all things to God alone, because he is subject to God as regards all things; to any other human superior he is subject only according to a certain limited and determinate account. To the point St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 104, a. 5: "In those things which pertain to the disposition of human acts and things, a subject is bound to obey his superior according to the account of superiority; as a soldier obeys the commander of the army in those things which pertain to war, a servant his master in those things which pertain to carrying out servile works, a son his father in those things which pertain to discipline of life and domestic care, and so concerning others... Man is subject to God simply as regards all things, both interior and exterior, and therefore he is bound to obey Him in all things. But subjects are not subject to their superiors as regards all things, but as regards some things determinately, and as regards those things they are intermediaries between God and subjects. But as regards other things they are immediately subject to God, by whom they are instructed through the natural or written law."

36. Ought a son, concerning the election of a state, to consult parents and obey them? - R. 1. If there is question of the conjugal state, theologians more commonly teach that a son per se is bound to consult parents. The reason is that this is required by the service to be furnished by children to parents, that in a matter so grave, and in which they have greater experience, they should hear their counsel. But this obligation per se is light. For first, a grave obligation is not clear, since it is much disputed among the Doctors. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 849. Besides, this obligation cannot be grave, since children are not bound also to follow the counsel of parents, but are free. And they can sufficiently, either by themselves or through other prudent men, know what things occur in such an affair, lest they err in it. - But if there is question of the religious state, it is certain that per se they are not bound, nor is it expedient, commonly speaking, that children await the counsel of parents; because parents in this matter have no knowledge and experience, indeed often in this affair they are not friends, but enemies. St. Thomas, Opusc. 17, Against Those Withdrawing Men from Entrance into Religion, c. 9.

“The domestic society or entire family borrows the whole reason of its existence from civil law alone; and therefore all the rights of parents over their children, but especially the right of providing for their instruction and education, emanate and depend upon civil authority alone.” Proposition condemned by Pius IX in the Encyclical Quanta cura.

“45. The entire government of public schools in which the youth of any Christian commonwealth is instructed—with episcopal seminaries alone excepted in some manner—can and ought to be attributed to the civil authority, and indeed so attributed that no right of interfering in the discipline of the schools, in the government of studies, in the conferring of degrees, or in the selection or approval of teachers is acknowledged in any other authority whatsoever. — 46. Indeed, even in seminaries of clerics the method of studies to be employed is subjected to the civil authority. — 47. The best ordering of civil society requires that popular schools, which are open to all boys of every class of the people, and public institutions generally, which are destined for imparting letters and the more rigorous disciplines and for providing for the education of youth, be exempted from every authority, governing power, and interference of the Church, and be subjected to the full judgment of the civil and political authority, according to the pleasure of rulers and according to the exact measure of the common opinions of the age. — 48. That manner of instructing youth which is separated from the Catholic faith and from the power of the Church, and which regards only, or at least primarily, the knowledge of natural things and the ends of earthly social life, can be approved by Catholic men.” Propositions condemned by Pius IX in the Syllabus; A. S. S., vol. 21, p. 691.

“The clergy, as being enemies of true and useful knowledge and of the progress of civilization, are to be removed from every care and office of instructing and educating youth.” Proposition condemned by Pius IX in the Encyclical Quanta cura.

“29. Universities, studies, colleges, graduations, and masterships in them were introduced by vain paganism; they profit the Church as much as the devil.” Proposition of John Wycliffe condemned at the Council of Constance.

“…Moreover, the very manner of instructing youth proper and peculiar to schools of this kind—non-Catholic schools—had first to come under deliberation. This appeared to the Sacred Congregation to be full of danger even of itself and exceedingly adverse to the Catholic cause. For pupils of such schools, since their proper manner excludes every doctrine of religion, will neither learn the rudiments of the faith nor be instructed in the precepts of the Church, and thus they will lack the knowledge most necessary to man, without which one does not live as a Christian…. In the aforesaid schools … teachers from every sect without distinction are employed, so that they are free to infuse errors and seeds of vice into tender minds. A certain corruption also threatens from this additional fact: that in the same schools, or at least in many of them, young people of both sexes are brought together in the same room to hear lessons, and males are ordered to sit upon the same bench beside females. All these things bring it about that youth is wretchedly exposed to harm concerning the faith and that morals are endangered. — But unless this danger of perversion is rendered remote from proximity, such schools cannot be attended with a safe conscience. The natural and divine law itself proclaims this…. And these things, as founded upon natural and divine law, state a certain general principle, possess universal force, and pertain to all those regions where this most pernicious manner of instructing youth has unhappily been introduced….

“Nevertheless, the Sacred Congregation is not ignorant that the circumstances of affairs are sometimes such that Catholic parents can in conscience commit their children to public schools. But they cannot do this unless they have a sufficient cause for acting thus; and whether such a sufficient cause is present or absent in some particular case will have to be left to the conscience and judgment of the Bishops. According to the things reported, it will then generally be present when either no Catholic school is available or the one available is poorly suited to instructing young people in a manner fitting and congruent with their condition. But then, so that public schools can be approached in conscience, the danger of perversion, which by their proper nature is always more or less connected with them, must by opportune remedies and precautions be rendered remote from proximity. Therefore it must first be seen whether, in the school concerning the attendance of which there is question, the danger of perversion is of such a kind that it plainly cannot be rendered remote, as often as certain things opposed to Catholic doctrine or good morals are either taught or done there, things which can neither be heard nor performed without harm to the soul. Indeed, as is evident of itself, such a danger is to be avoided at the cost of any temporal harm whatsoever, even of life.

“Moreover, in order that youth can in conscience be committed to public schools, it must duly and diligently receive the necessary Christian instruction and education, at least outside school time. Therefore, let pastors and missionaries … diligently devote themselves to catecheses…. Let the parents themselves, or those who are in their place, keep solicitous watch over their children…. From Catholic moral doctrine it is manifest that however many parents neglect to impart this necessary Christian instruction and education to their children; or allow them to attend such schools in which ruin to souls cannot be avoided; or, finally, although a suitable Catholic school, properly instructed and prepared, is present in the same place, or although they have the faculty of educating their children as Catholics in another region, nevertheless commit them to public schools without sufficient cause and without the necessary precautions by which the danger of perversion is rendered remote from proximity—such persons, if they have been contumacious, cannot be absolved in the sacrament of Penance.” Instruction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, On Public Schools, to the Most Reverend Bishops in the United States of North America, 30 June 1875; C. 481.

“By letters given on 3 Feb. 1865 to the Most Reverend Fathers and Lords, the sacred Prelates of England, the Sacred Council commonly called the Propagation of the Faith signified that it had most willingly confirmed the opinion unanimously proposed by the praised Bishops at the recent London meeting: that colleges were not to be erected in connection with the English Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and that Catholic parents were opportunely to be persuaded not to send their sons to those Universities, because, namely, the same Sacred Council had seen that the opinion of the Bishops was wholly consonant with the principles handed down by it according to the mind of the Supreme Pontiff whenever it had been consulted concerning the dangers of mixed schools…. “But since not all passed the same judgment concerning the avoidance of non-Catholic Universities, and there were even some who judged that it could be tolerated that Catholic youth attend the aforesaid Institutions, whether on account of the temporal emoluments acquired in them or because, in their opinion, no certain law appears by which access to them is absolutely prohibited, I judge it worthwhile that Your Amplitude clearly explain in a pastoral letter the doctrine concerning the avoidance of proximate occasions of sinning gravely, to which no one can expose himself without mortal sin unless a grave and proportionate necessity urges, and unless such precautions are employed by which the proximate danger of sinning is rendered remote. Now, in the matter concerning which there is question, in which, according to the declaration of the Supreme Pontiff, there inheres an intrinsic and most grave danger not only for uprightness of morals but especially for the faith, which is altogether necessary for salvation, who does not see that there can scarcely, or not even scarcely, be circumstances in which non-Catholic Universities can be attended without sin? The lightness of mind and instability of young people, the errors which are drawn in as if with the air in the said Institutions without the antidote of more solid doctrine, and the very great force which human respect and the mockeries of companions exercise upon the young introduce so present and so proximate a danger of falling for young people that generally no sufficient reason can be conceived on account of which they may be committed to non-Catholic Universities….” Instruction of the Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 6 Aug. 1867; C. 478.

“1. Is it lawful for parents to commit their children to schools of this kind—mixed schools—to be instructed? — Resp. Generally speaking, it is not lawful; but in particular cases it is to be left to the judgment and conscience of the Ordinary. It will, however, be his duty to take diligent care that opportune remedies be employed not only by himself and by the pastors, but also by each parent, by which the danger of perversion may be removed from the pupils; and at the same time to press upon the magistrates and governors that violence not be inflicted upon the conscience of Catholics by employing books hostile to the Catholic religion; and finally, constantly and insistently to admonish and exhort all, and especially those who have the ability, to send their children into other regions where they may be educated as Catholics.

“2. Is it lawful for a priest to teach the doctrines of the Christian faith in the aforesaid schools or to discharge the office of chaplain? — Resp. In the affirmative, and according to the intention. The intention is that care is to be taken that, insofar as possible, priests or upright laymen of proven religion be placed over as many schools as possible, not only for teaching the Christian faith but also the other disciplines. But in order that every fear of scandal may cease, the people are to be admonished that this is done so that the evils which flow from schools of this kind may, insofar as possible, be averted; and that it therefore ought to be an excuse for no one not to send his children to purely Catholic schools, in which their faith and morals are in no manner endangered.

“3. Even if those mixed schools can in some manner be tolerated, is it lawful for the Catholics of the Jura to renounce their right, resting upon public treaties, by force of which it is unlawful for anyone who does not profess the Catholic religion to discharge the office of teaching in their public schools?” Resp. In the negative, whether there is question of an express cession or even of a tacit cession arising from silence and culpable toleration. Therefore, although care must be taken lest anything be done imprudently by which the ferocity of adversaries is aroused to inflict graver evils, nevertheless nothing is to be relaxed of diligence and constancy, so that the legitimate means which are in the power of Catholics may be employed for recovering the aforesaid right, together with the sanctity of the treaty and the immunity of the Catholic religion.” Instruction of the Holy Office to the Bishops of Switzerland, 26 March 1866; A. S. S., vol. 25, p. 132 ff.; vol. 33, p. 222 ff.; C. 477.

“By a most recent decree the Catholic catechism is expelled from the schools of the Municipality. The decree, worthy of reproach, removes an obstacle from raging heresy and unbelief…. But while, in the name of religion, we raise our voice to defend its sacred rights, we also wish it to become known to everyone how much a senseless design of this kind is opposed to the good of society…. For it is not lawful to renew Solomon’s judgment upon a child, and irrationally and inhumanly to divide him in half with respect to his intelligence and his will: because, while the former is cultivated, the latter must be directed toward acquiring virtuous habits and pursuing the last end…. And the matter shines with such splendor that it was held to be true, even at the price of contradiction, by those very persons who desire that religious instruction be cast out of the schools; for they do not direct their efforts to the intellect alone, but also to the will, endeavoring that the ethics which they call civil and natural be taught in the schools, and taking care that youth be directed toward the acquisition of civil and social virtues. But a moral philosophy of this kind is not only unable to lead man to the higher end established by the divine goodness in the beatific vision of God, but also proves unequal to this: that the soul of the child be instructed in true virtue and be able to remain constant upon the right path…. And rightly have we used the word expel: since the method devised of offering religious instruction only to those children whose parents have expressly requested it is altogether a mockery. For it is not easy to comprehend how the authors of this impious design failed to consider with what evil feeling a child would be affected who perceived that he was receiving religious instruction in a manner altogether different from others…. But if, driven either by depravity of mind, or ignorance, or sloth, there are parents—as is not difficult—who do not request for their children the benefit of religious instruction, a great part of the young would be deprived of the most salutary teachings, with the greatest danger not only to the souls of those innocent children, but also to civil society itself…. When benefits even of less importance were expected, elementary instruction was rendered obligatory by law, compelling parents by fines to send their children to school; who now will dare to take religious instruction away from Catholic youth, when it presents itself as the more prudent protection for leading life uprightly? Is it not cruel to demand that children of this kind grow up without any knowledge of religion…?” Letter of Leo XIII to the Most Eminent Cardinal Vicar, Tot inter, 26 June 1878.

“The Church, guardian and vindicator of the integrity of the faith, which, by the authority committed to her by God her Founder, ought to call all nations to Christian wisdom and likewise carefully to see by what precepts and institutions the youth placed under her power is cultivated, has always openly condemned schools which are called mixed or neutral, repeatedly admonishing fathers of families to turn their attention, in a matter of such importance, to taking precautions.” Encyclical Letter of Leo XIII, Nobilissima Galliarum, to the Bishops of France, 8 February 1884.

Cf. no. 367.

“10. No one without revelation would reasonably assert of himself or of another that he was the head of a particular Church, nor is the Roman Pontiff the head of the particular Roman Church. — 11. It is not necessary to believe that this man, whoever is the Roman Pontiff, is the head of any particular holy Church, unless God has predestined him.” Propositions of John Hus condemned by the Council of Constance.

“15. No one is a civil lord, no one is a Prelate, no one is a Bishop, while he is in mortal sin.” Proposition of John Wycliffe and John Hus condemned by the Council of Constance.

“63. It is lawful to refuse obedience to legitimate Princes, and even to rebel.” Proposition condemned by Pius IX in the Syllabus. Cf. no. 870.

“1. Is it lawful for a priest to open a vein or to practice certain other things of the medical art? — 2. What is to be called the best manner of providing for the support of ministers here in these new regions? — 3. What obligation rests upon the laity to pay this due? — 4. Is it lawful to deny spiritual ministry to those persons, or to persons belonging to their family—for example, the Sacrament of Baptism to infants—if they refuse to submit to this due? — Resp. To 1. In the negative, unless a dispensation has been obtained and in a case of true necessity. — To 2. Provision is to be made from the revenues of the churches and the voluntary offerings of the faithful. — To 3. The faithful are bound in conscience to the sufficient support of the Ministers of the Church. — To 4. The question of denying sacred things, and Baptism itself, to those who refuse to submit to the due of offerings is unworthy of an ecclesiastical man and deserving of censure.” Sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, 13 May 1816.

“…But if we descend from abstractions to the consideration of facts, care must diligently be taken lest the principles established thus far be denied. These indeed remain immovable; nevertheless, when facts arise, they bear the character of something contingent and variable in use, which is determined by those very facts, whence the application made of those principles follows. Or, in other words: although each form of civil government is good in itself and can be adapted to the supreme government of peoples, nevertheless in reality among every people civil power is found only in its one unique form; each people certainly possesses its own proper form. This form arose from a complex of historical or national circumstances, which nevertheless always pertain to men; these circumstances in each nation gave origin to its laws, which were to be transmitted to posterity and held as a foundation; and through these circumstances this or that particular form of civil government is found to be defined, namely, this foundation for transmitting every supreme power to posterity.

“We deem it useless to admonish here that individual citizens are bound to submit to governments thus constituted, and that nothing is to be attempted in order to overthrow them or to change their form. Hence it came about that the Church, which alone upon earth guards as a deposit, most of all, the true and sublime notion of civil power, because she teaches that all power is derived from God, has continually condemned rebellious men who refuse obedience to legitimate authority. And this even at the very time when Kings and Princes were abusing the power entrusted to them, thereby depriving themselves of the strongest of all safeguards granted them for sustaining their authority, and of the most efficacious of all aids for obtaining from peoples observance of the laws of government…. Nevertheless, it must here be diligently noted that, whatever may be the form of civil government in any nation, it is by no means to be regarded as so definitive that it ought to remain immutable forever, even if perhaps this was the intention and will of those who determined it at the beginning. The Church of Jesus Christ alone has been able to preserve until now the form of her government…. But as regards merely human societies, it is a fact confirmed by six hundred historical documents that time, that remarkable transformer of earthly things, repeatedly effects most grave changes in their civil institutions. Sometimes indeed it changes the form of government only to some extent; but at other times it advances so far that, after the former forms have been abolished, it substitutes new and altogether different ones; indeed, sometimes it even changes the very manner of transmitting supreme power to successors.

“But how do these changes of which we speak happen to the commonwealth? They sometimes follow violent crises of a nation, all too frequently bloody; in the heat of these the preceding governments vanish; then behold anarchy, which now holds sway there; immediately the public order of the state is overturned from its lowest foundations. Then a certain social necessity is imposed upon the nation; it is compelled to provide for itself without delay.

“Why, I ask, will it not have the right, or rather the duty, to withdraw itself from such a state of affairs, which disturbs it so gravely, and to restore public peace to its former tranquility of order? Now this social necessity proves the constitution and existence of a new government to be just, whatever form at length it assumes; because, in the hypothesis in which we are situated, these new governments are meanwhile necessarily required for restoring public order, since no public order can subsist without some civil government.

“Hence it follows that the whole novelty of the matter, in events of this kind, is confined to the political form of civil government to be established, or to the changed manner of transmitting that government to successors, but in no way touches the government itself considered in itself. This indeed continues immovable and worthy of observance; for, if it is inspected more intimately in its very nature, it is established and imposed for the sake of providing for the common good, which is the supreme reason from which human society takes its origin. In other words: in every hypothesis civil power, considered as such, is from God, and always and everywhere from God alone. For there is no power, writes the Apostle, but from God (Rom. 13:1).

“Therefore, when new governments which represent this immutable power have in fact been constituted, citizens are not only not forbidden voluntarily to submit to them; they are, rather, altogether commanded to do so because of the necessity of the common good, for the sake of which those governments arose and continue to exist. This is especially so since the rebellion of peoples can sharpen hatred among citizens, excite civil wars, and cast the nation itself down into the chaos of anarchy. But this great duty of observance and submission will continue so long as the necessity of the common good shall demand it; for this public good is the first and last law before God and in human society.” Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Inter gravissimas, 16 February 1892, to the Bishops of France; A. S. S., vol. 24, p. 534 ff.

“An unbelieving king lays snares for the Christians subject to him, or wishes here and now to destroy them and to abolish the Christian name in his kingdom. While he is contemplating and preparing these things, other wicked men, by conspiring against him and defeating him, attempt to cast him out of his kingdom. It is asked: — 1. Whether the Christians are bound positively to defend him, namely, the tyrant who wishes here and now to slaughter them; or whether they can rather conduct themselves negatively, neither fighting against him nor assisting him. — 2. Insofar as the response to the first part is affirmative: after he has been cast out of his kingdom, whether the Christians are bound to recall him to his kingdom, if they can; or whether they can rather admit and defend his successor, even, in the given case, against the former king, especially if the successor tolerates or favors religion. — Resp. To 1. As the matter is stated, in the negative to the first part; in the affirmative to the second part. — To 2. Provided for in 1.” Holy Office, 27 January 1892.

On the schools of heretics. - "... Fathers and mothers become guilty of a most enormous sin all the more who, truly cruel toward the souls of their children, send them to the schools of Protestants; and even worse, if they compel them to go. The matter is evident: parents of this kind are to be reproved and detested in their crime, and their amendment is to be sought by all possible means; and at times they are to be kept far from the Sacraments, as being incapable and unworthy, until they have recalled their children from schools of this kind. - The children also, the matter considered in itself, certainly become guilty of grave fault by going to such schools. But in the case of true coercion, the confessor, having weighed the circumstances of the person and of the fact, should act toward them according to the rules proposed by approved authors for cases of this kind." Instr. of the Cardinal Vicar for the Parish Priests of Rome, 12 July 1878.

"Moreover, what had to fall under deliberation first of all was the very manner of instructing youth, proper and peculiar to schools of this kind, non-Catholic schools. This seemed to the Sacred Congregation, even of itself, full of danger and very adverse to the Catholic cause. For the students of such schools, since their own plan excludes every doctrine of religion, will learn neither the rudiments of faith nor be instructed in the precepts of the Church, and therefore will lack knowledge most necessary for man, without which one does not live as a Christian... In the aforesaid schools... teachers are used indiscriminately from every sect, so that it is free to pour errors and seeds of vices into tender minds. A certain corruption also threatens further from this, that in the same schools, or at least in many of them, adolescents of both sexes are gathered into the same room for hearing lessons, and males are ordered to sit on the same bench next to females. All these things bring it about that youth is miserably exposed to harm concerning faith, and morals are placed in danger. - But unless this danger of perversion is made remote from nearby, such schools cannot be frequented with a safe conscience. The natural and divine law itself cries this out... And these things indeed, as founded on natural and divine right, state a certain general principle and have universal force, and pertain to all those regions where this most pernicious method of instructing youth has unhappily been introduced... - Moreover, the Sacred Congregation is not ignorant that the circumstances of things are sometimes such that Catholic parents can, in conscience, entrust their offspring to public schools. But they will not be able to do this unless they have sufficient cause for so acting; and whether such a sufficient cause is or is not present in some particular case will have to be left to the conscience and judgment of Bishops. According to the things reported, it will then generally be present when either no Catholic school is at hand, or the one which is at hand is little suited for instructing adolescents suitably and congruently to their condition. But in order that public schools can be approached in conscience, the danger of perversion, which is more or less always connected with their own plan, must be made remote from nearby by opportune remedies and precautions. Therefore it must first of all be seen whether, in the school about whose attendance there is question, the danger of perversion is of such a kind that it plainly cannot be made remote, as often as there are either taught or done there certain things contrary to Catholic doctrine or good morals, which cannot be heard or done without loss to the soul. Truly such a danger, as is evident of itself, must be wholly avoided with any temporal harm whatever, even of life. - Moreover, in order that youth can in conscience be entrusted to public schools, they must duly and diligently receive the necessary Christian instruction and education, at least outside school time. Wherefore let parish priests and missionaries... diligently apply themselves to catecheses... But let the parents themselves, or those who are in their place, carefully watch over their children... It is manifest from Catholic moral doctrine that those parents who neglect to impart this necessary Christian instruction and education to their children; or who allow them to frequent such schools in which ruin of souls cannot be avoided; or finally who, although a suitable Catholic school is present in the same place and aptly instructed and prepared, or although they have the faculty of educating their offspring as Catholics in another region, nevertheless entrust them to public schools without sufficient cause and without the necessary precautions by which the danger of perversion is made remote from nearby, cannot, if they are contumacious, be absolved in the Sacrament of Penance." Instr. S. C. de P. F. on public schools to the Most Reverend Bishops in the United States of North America, 30 June 1875, approved by the Supreme Pontiff 24 Nov. of the same year.

On non-Catholic Universities. - "By letters given on 3 Feb. 1865 to the Right Reverend Fathers and Lords, the sacred Prelates of England, the Sacred Council called Propaganda signified that it had most willingly confirmed the opinion unanimously proposed by the praised Bishops in the recent London meeting, concerning colleges not to be erected near the English Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and concerning Catholic parents to be opportunely persuaded not to send their sons to those Universities; namely, because the same Sacred Council had seen the judgment of the Bishops to be especially consonant with the principles handed down by itself according to the mind of the Supreme Pontiff, as often as it had been consulted concerning the dangers of mixed schools... But since not all have carried the same judgment concerning non-Catholic Universities to be avoided, and since there were even some who judged that it could be tolerated that Catholic youth frequent the aforesaid institutes, either because of the temporal advantages which are obtained in them, or because in their opinion no certain law appears by which access to them is absolutely prohibited, I think it worthwhile that Your Excellency explain clearly in the Pastoral Letter the doctrine concerning proximate occasions of sinning gravely which are to be avoided, to which no one can expose himself without lethal sin, unless grave and proportionate necessity urges, and unless such precautions are employed by which the proximate danger of sinning is removed. Now truly in the matter of which there is question, to which, from the declaration of the Supreme Pontiff, there belongs an intrinsic and most grave danger, not only for honesty of morals, but especially for faith, which is altogether necessary for salvation, who does not see that there scarcely can, or indeed scarcely even can, be given those circumstances in which non-Catholic Universities may be frequented without sin? The lightness of mind and instability of adolescents, the errors which are drunk in, as it were with the air, in the said Institutes without the antidote of sounder doctrine, the very great force which human respect and mockeries of companions exercise upon youths, bring upon adolescents so present and so proximate a danger of falling that generally no sufficient reason can be conceived on account of which adolescents may be entrusted to non-Catholic Universities..." Instr. S. C. de P. F. 6 Aug. 1867.

On mixed schools of heretics. - "1. Whether it is lawful for parents to entrust their children to be instructed in schools of this kind, mixed schools? - Resp. Generally speaking, it is not lawful, but in particular cases this must be left to the judgment and conscience of the Ordinary; nevertheless it will be his office to take diligent care that not only by himself and by parish priests, but also by individual parents, opportune remedies be applied by which the danger of perversion is removed from the students, and at the same time to strive with magistrates and presidents that violence not be done to the conscience of Catholics by using books which are hostile to the Catholic religion; and finally assiduously and earnestly to admonish and exhort all, and especially those who have the means, that they send their children to other regions where they may be educated as Catholics."

2. "Whether it is lawful for a priest in the aforesaid schools to hand down the teachings of the Christian faith, or to discharge the office of Chaplain? - Resp. In the affirmative and according to the mind; the mind is that care is to be taken that priests, or upright laymen of well-known religion, be placed in charge, as far as can be done, not only of handing down the Christian faith, but also of schools of other disciplines. But so that every fear of scandal may cease, the people are to be admonished that this is done so that the evils which flow from schools of this kind may be averted as far as can be done; and that this therefore ought to serve no one as an excuse not to send his children to merely Catholic schools, in which their faith and morals are in no way endangered."

3. "Even if those mixed schools can somehow be tolerated, is it lawful for the Catholics of the Jura to send notice that they renounce their right founded on public agreements, by force of which it is unlawful for anyone to take up the office of teaching in their public schools who does not profess the Catholic religion?" - "Resp. In the negative, whether there is question of an express cession, or even of a tacit cession from silence and culpable tolerance. Therefore, although care must be taken that nothing be done imprudently by which the ferocity of adversaries is stirred up to inflicting graver evils, nevertheless nothing is to be remitted of industry and constancy, so that legitimate means which are in the power of Catholics may be employed to recover the aforesaid right together with the sanctity of the compact and the indemnity of the Catholic Religion." Instr. S. I. C. to the Bishops of Switzerland, 17 Jan. 1866.

On Catholic schools without religious instruction. - "By a very recent decree the catechism is cast out of the municipal Catholic schools; a decree worthy of censure, it removes the barrier against rampant heresy and unbelief... But while, in the name of Religion, we lift up our voices to defend its sacred rights, we also will that it become known to anyone how much a mad plan of this kind is opposed to the good of society... For it is not lawful to renew upon the child the judgment of Solomon and irrationally and inhumanely to divide the same in the middle as regards his intelligence and will; because while the first is cultivated, the second must be directed to acquiring virtuous habits and pursuing the ultimate end... And the matter shines with such splendor that it would be held as true, even at the price of contradiction, by those same persons who desire that the document of Religion be cast out of schools; while they direct their efforts not only to the intellect, but to the will also, striving that ethics, which they call civil and natural, be taught in schools, and taking care that youth be directed to the acquisition of civil and social virtues. But moral philosophy of this kind not only is unable to lead man to the higher end, constituted by the Divine Goodness in the beatific vision of God, but also becomes unequal to this, that the mind of the child be instructed toward true virtue and be able to remain constant on the right path. And rightly have we used the word cast out: because the method devised of offering religious instruction only to those children whose parents expressly request it becomes altogether a mockery. For it is not easy to grasp how the authors of an impious plan did not weigh with what bad feeling a child would be affected who would see himself undertaking religious instruction by a manner wholly different from others... But if there should be parents, as is not difficult, driven either by depravity of mind or by ignorance and sluggishness, who would not ask the benefit of religious instruction for their children, a great part of the young would lack most salutary teachings, with the greatest risk not only to the innocent souls of those children, but also to civil Society itself.

When benefits of lesser moment also were expected, elementary instruction was made obligatory by law, with parents being driven by fines to send their children to schools. Who now will dare to snatch away from Catholic youth religious instruction, which presents itself as a wiser protection for living life uprightly? Is it not cruel to require that children of this kind grow up without any notion of religion...?" Letter of Leo XIII to the Most Eminent Cardinal Vicar, Tot inter, 26 June 1878.

"The Church, guardian and vindicator of the integrity of faith, which, by the authority handed to it by God its founder, must call all nations to Christian wisdom, and likewise carefully see by what precepts and institutions youth, which is within its power, is cultivated, has always openly condemned schools which are called mixed or neutral, having admonished fathers of families again and again that, in a matter of such importance, they should turn their mind to caution." Encyclical Letter of Leo XIII, Nobilissima Galliarum, to the Bishops of France, 8 Feb. 1884.

On mixed schools of Catholics. - "... It can be tolerated that Schismatic girls be admitted into a college which sisters direct, provided that they show a good disposition, that they be instructed according to the things set forth, and yet that they not be obligated to assist at the Sacrifice of the Mass and other ecclesiastical functions, but that this be left to their judgment; with it forbidden indeed that they ever have disputations with Catholic girls about matters pertaining to religion, or go to a Schismatic temple to receive sacraments from Schismatic ministers. But if in some case this can in no way be prevented, let the sisters behave passively. And likewise with it forbidden that the girls be visited by friends and relatives, except parents and tutors, without the license of the Ordinary. Concerning all these things, the parents or tutors of the same girls are to be clearly and explicitly instructed and to consent to them before the girls themselves are admitted to the College. And let this be written to the Right Reverend Archbishop, the Ordinary, with the warning that he take care of the execution of all these things and of the spiritual good of the girls, as far as can be done, even after departure from the college; and let the sisters be instructed that if any girl asks to be converted to the Catholic faith, the matter is to be referred to the Archbishop himself, who will prudently provide according to the circumstances of the case, and should carefully take care that from the admission of Schismatic girls there be no danger, not even the least, of perversion or indifferentism for the Catholic girls. Feria VI, place IV, 1 June 1866." From this decision it can be concluded what is the mind of the S. C. S. O., and what precautions were prescribed by it in this matter. Nevertheless the decree reported cannot be held as a general rule to be applied to any other mixed boarding school, because of the diverse circumstances of each particular case. Instr. S. C. de P. F. 25 April 1880, n. 66. Cf. Collectan. Constit., etc., for the use of Apostolic Workers, Paris, 1868.

763. Principle: Regularly spouses are held to dwell in the same house, and to use the same table and the same bed. It is certain.

(A) For this is deduced from Scripture,¹ as understood by the Fathers: "A man shall leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh"; for the word shall cleave signifies an intimate and constant union, and from the context it is gathered that this is closer than that which exists between parents and children; but the words "and they shall be two in one flesh" rather clearly designate communion of bed.

¹ Gen., II, 24.

(B) The same is clear from the very ends of marriage: for this is required by (a) the conjugal debt, which cannot easily be rendered without regular cohabitation of the spouses; (b) the good education of offspring, which demands the cooperation of each spouse; for for good education there is desired both the tender love and provident care of the mother, and the severe authority and consummate prudence of the father; (c) the fellowship of common life: for they ought mutually to help and console each other; for the man is stronger and more prudent than the woman, who therefore needs the counsels and direction of the man; conversely, the woman is more suited to domestic matters, and therefore the man needs her work;² but they cannot furnish this unless they live together.

² St. Thomas, Comment. in Ethic., lib. VIII, c. 12.

764. The principle is explained: (a) Since man and woman are one flesh, they must not be separated for a longer time without grave cause. But since the man is the head of the woman, regularly the wife is held to follow the husband wherever he goes, even if he is sent into exile or goes away into a distant region, unless there is a grave excusing reason. But on the other side, a man departing for a long time is held to bring his wife with him, unless a grave reason stands in the way. But if the man is going to depart for a short time, he is not held to take his wife with him.

It was said regularly, because the wife is not held to follow the husband if this cannot be done without grave spiritual or temporal harm, for example if she would be exposed to proximate danger of sin, death, or grave detriment. Hence there does not fall upon her the obligation of following a man wandering everywhere, unless before the nuptials she had known his wandering life.

(b) Regularly also the spouses ought to share the same table, so that they may be able to enjoy the consolation of mutual conversation. The man is held to support his wife, unless it has been otherwise agreed, even if she does not have a dowry; but the wife is to attend to domestic matters, according to her condition.

(c) Generally also communion of bed ought to be present: but if the spouses, on account of a reasonable cause, have a distinct room and bed, free access to the other's room should be open to each.

765. Corollary. That spouses may cohabit peacefully and happily, they must cultivate certain virtues, especially chaste love, constant fidelity, mutual assistance; besides, the man must furnish protection to the wife, and the woman obedience to the man.

Leo XIII excellently declares this thus, in the Encyclical Arcanum: "Namely, they themselves must always be so disposed in soul that they understand that each owes to the other the greatest love, constant fidelity, and careful and assiduous protection. The man is the prince of the family and the head of the woman; yet she, because she is flesh of his flesh and bone of his bones, is to be subject and obedient to the man, not in the manner of a slave, but of a companion; so that, namely, neither honor nor dignity be absent from the obedience furnished. But in him who presides, and in her who obeys, since each bears the image, the one of Christ, the other of the Church, let divine charity be perpetually the moderator of duty."

(a) They must cultivate chaste love: "Men, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered Himself up for her... So also men ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself."¹

¹ Ephes., V, 25, 28.

Hence that love must be chaste: for if it is lustful, it will soon become adulterous; pleasure is naturally inconstant and is carried toward various objects, so that those who serve lust, after some time, foster other loves; - patient, by cheerfully bearing mutual infirmities and forgiving each other mutually; otherwise discord arises: the man, abusing his power, treats the wife badly not as a companion, but as a slave; the wife despises the husband and refuses to be subject to him; - full of devotion, insofar as each seeks not exclusively his or her own things, but the man those things which please the wife, and the wife those things which please the man; likewise insofar as each is prepared to sacrifice himself or herself for the other, just as Christ delivered Himself for the Church.

766. (b) They are held to preserve mutual fidelity for each other, not only by avoiding adultery, but also whatever can lead to so great a crime and deservedly excite the jealousy of the other spouse: "The woman has not power over her own body, but the man; and likewise the man has not power over his own body, but the woman."¹ In reality nothing destroys domestic happiness more effectively than the very suspicion of conjugal infidelity.

¹ I Cor., VII, 4.

Moreover, the spouse who, without legitimate cause, nourishes sinister suspicions as to the fidelity of the other party sins gravely: for this is against charity and justice, and often becomes the cause of quarrels and of other evils. Hence let the confessor seriously warn him or her to lay aside so unjust a suspicion, as though it were a suggestion of the devil himself.

767. (c) They must furnish mutual assistance to each other; for God created the woman so that she might be a help to the man: "It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a help like himself."² And surely the woman herself needs the help of the man.

² Gen., II, 18.

St. Thomas explains this thus:³ "For it is immediately apparent that the human works which are necessary for life are distinct between male and female; so that certain things are fitting to the man, I mean those things which are to be done outside, and certain things to the wife, such as spinning and other things which are to be done at home. Thus therefore they suffice for each other, while each reduces his or her proper works to the common." Therefore let them divide among themselves the works of domestic life; and in all things let them strive to please not so much themselves as the other party.

³ Comment. in lib. Ethic., lib. VIII, c. 12, p. 608, t. XXV, ed. Vives.

768. (d) The man is held to furnish protection to the wife, and the wife obedience to the man.⁴ This flows from these words of St. Paul:⁵ "Let women be subject to their husbands, as to the Lord, because the man is the head of the woman, as Christ is the head of the Church: He is the savior of His body."

⁴ The Gallican civil Code thus sets forth these various duties: "The spouses owe each other fidelity, help, assistance" (a. 212). "The husband owes protection to his wife, the wife obedience to her husband" (a. 213). Cf. Baudry-Lacantinerie, nn. 714-718.

⁵ Ephes., V, 22-23. - It is lawful to advocate the rights and higher education of women, provided nevertheless that those words of St. Paul be kept in a pious mind.

Indeed spouses form a certain society, of which the man is the head or president: therefore there falls upon him the obligation of a president, namely of protecting the whole body; therefore he will furnish himself as a strenuous protector not only in dangers of the body, but also in dangers of the soul, not only in temporal matters, but also in spiritual matters. But the wife must obey the man in all things which are legitimately prescribed by him, "not in the manner of a slave, but of a companion, so that neither honor nor dignity be absent from the obedience furnished." The husband indeed cannot prohibit the wife from fulfilling the precepts of God and of the Church, for example from being present at Mass, approaching the tribunal of Penance and the sacred table; but she herself must satisfy religious works in such a way that at the same time she fulfills the duties of her state. - If these things are rightly attended to, Christian spouses will live piously and happily.¹

¹ On the duties of married life see St. Francis de Sales, Introd. à la vie dévote, 3rd Part, ch. 38-39; A. de Margerie, De la Famille, Paris, 1869, vol. I, pp. 1-53, 151-225; Devas, Studies of family life, London, 1886, part II; P. Janet, La Famille, Paris, 1894, pp. 23-106; Landriot, La Femme forte, 1868; La Femme pieuse, 1874; Baudrillart, La Famille et l'Education; Meignan, Instructions et conseils aux familles; Turgeon, Le Féminisme français, Paris, 1902, vol. II, pp. 80-113.

1099. 1. This precept agrees with the first three: for if we do not venerate and honor parents, whom we ought to love next after God, since they are almost always before our eyes, what honor, what worship shall we give to God, the supreme and best parent, who falls under no sight?³

³ 1 John 4:20.

(A) Besides those who begot us, there are many whom we ought to honor in the place of parents, either by reason of power, or dignity, or utility, or some excellent function and office. Thus there are to be honored: (a) prelates of the Church and priests, who have begotten us in Christ Jesus through the Gospel,⁴ and as it were travail again with their little children until Christ be formed in us;⁵ (b) magistrates who govern the republic; (c) guardians and teachers, to whose care, fidelity, probity, and wisdom we are entrusted; (d) the aged and those worn out by age.

⁴ 1 Cor. 4:14.

⁵ Gal. 4:19.

(B) But especially are father and mother to be honored by us, who are certain images, as it were, of the immortal God, from whom life has been given to us, whom God used in order to impart to us an immortal soul, by whom we were led to the sacraments, instructed in religion and in human and civil culture, and educated to integrity of morals and holiness.

2. The honor of parents includes: (a) love, since they are so disposed toward us that they flee no labor, no striving, no dangers for our sake; (b) prayer, that they may be most commended to God and to the saints; (c) obedience, by which we conform our manner of acting to their judgment and will; (d) imitation, since we seem to attribute very much to those to whom we wish to be as similar as possible; (e) help as to the necessities of body and soul, especially in sickness, taking care lest they omit anything that pertains either to confession of sins or to the other sacraments; (f) care for burial and funeral rites, and also suffrages for hastening the repose of the soul.

In this same manner Bishops and Pastors are to be honored, assisted, and heard; Princes are to be observed and helped by prayers. The same is true of others who rightly and deservedly are called fathers, such as magistrates and the aged: for they are worthy to receive honor and benefit from our charity, obedience, and help.

3. Parents also have their own proper duties and functions: (a) that they imbue their children with most holy disciplines and morals; (b) that by their examples they inculcate equity, continence, modesty, and religion; (c) moreover that they especially avoid three things: 1) lest they speak or determine anything too harsh against their children, so that they do not become fainthearted;⁶ 2) lest by dissolute indulgence they corrupt their children; 3) lest in the education and instruction of their children they enter into preposterous counsels, being occupied in this one thought and care, that they may leave a rich and ample patrimony, while not solicitous about eternal salvation.

⁶ Col. 3:21.

Concerning these things it has been said in the Treatise on the Various Obligations of States, n. 969-1002 (30-63).

942. According to St. Thomas,¹ parents "are the particular principle of our being, just as God is the universal principle"; for just as God creates men, so parents procreate their children; just as He preserves creatures in being, and directs them to their end and governs them by his providence, so parents protect their offspring by assiduous cares, and by counsels, examples, and also by wise providence rule them and direct them to the end. From this it follows that the right and office of educating their own children is incumbent upon parents, and besides that children are held to render the due honor to parents.

¹ St. Thom., 2. 2., q. 122, art. 5.

943. State of the question. Socialists, adhering to the footsteps of J. J. Rousseau,² contend that children belong to the Republic rather than to parents, and therefore that the office of feeding and educating them is incumbent upon the State: for parents, they say, often imbued with many prejudices, inculcate the same in their offspring, and thus dissensions arise among citizens, because not all have received the same discipline; wherefore, for placing national unity in safety, it is necessary that children be snatched away from parents, so that each and all may be instructed in the same way in public schools; then there will be no distinction between rich and poor, noble and ignoble, Catholics and non-Catholics; all, imbued with the same principles, will defend liberty of thinking, social equality, and perfect solidarity; no preeminence will be acknowledged except that which is owed to each one's talent and merit.³ - Anarchists, who altogether reject the authority of the State, nevertheless do not wish children, procreated from a free union, to be educated by parents, but by those who love them more, and adopt them as children, and freely consent to furnish them food and education.¹ - Not a few of those who defend the rights of women beyond what is fair (feministes) are more or less imbued with the same errors; for since they contend that women have, by equal right with men, the faculty of managing public affairs, they wish them to be immune from domestic cares and the education of children, so that they may give themselves to civil offices.²

¹ Taparelli, Essai de Droit naturel, n. 1555-1575; Meyer, Instit. juris naturalis, t. II, n. 107-111; 660-678; A. Jansen, De facultate docendi, 1885; Castelein, Droit naturel, Paris, 1903, p. 625-640; R. Lavollee, L'Etat, le Pere et l'Enfant, Paris, Plon, 1904.

² For he holds that the family is indeed older than any other society, but that children do not remain joined to parents except as long as they need them for protecting their life: "The oldest of all societies, and the only natural one, is that of the family: and even so, children remain bound to the father only as long as they need him in order to preserve themselves; as soon as this need ceases, the natural bond is dissolved." (Contrat social, l. I, ch. 5.) But afterward (ch. 6-8) he declares that, by force of the social pact, all authority is in the Prince's possession.

³ Thus G. Renard, Le Regime socialiste, Paris, 1898, p. 89-100, where among other things he writes: "The child, a moral person in potency, or, to speak still better, in the way of development, must no longer, as formerly, be considered the property of his parents. The power of the father or of the mother is justified, like every authority exercised over human beings, only on condition of being a creator of liberty, and not of oppression... If the parents remain absolute masters of his education, I fear over his mind a pressure all the more powerful because the pupil is naturally predisposed to undergo the affectionate suggestion of those who are nearest to him. Beware then hereditary prejudices, which are the very negation of scientific progress... Teaching being gratuitous and the maintenance of children being put at the charge of the community, one will no longer see, as in our mercantile society, this unreasonable anomaly: public instruction reserved to those who can pay for it... education will address itself equally to all intelligences which will be capable of profiting from it."

¹ Thus J. Grave, La Societe future, ch. 23, where he says: "The child is not a property, a product, which can belong more to those who have procreated him, as some wish, than to society, as the others contend." Whose therefore will children be? "To those who love the child most... Instead of being a charge for those who will adopt him, the child will no longer be anything but a pretty little creature to love and caress." - This system C. Turgeon sets forth and refutes, Le Feminisme francais, Paris, 1902, t. II, p. 405-420.

² In Turgeon, op. cit., t. II, 417-420.

944. Thesis: The right and office of educating their own offspring belongs primarily to parents, and only secondarily to the State, namely when parents are lacking. - For if it is certainly and publicly established that certain parents do not furnish the education necessary to their children, and there are no others who act in place of the parents, it pertains to the State, insofar as it is the provider of the public good, to provide for this education.³

³ We do not here treat of the rights of the Church, whose office it is to hand on moral and religious education to all those who have arisen from Catholic parents, or who through baptism have entered the Church, as was declared in Tr. on the Church. As to human sciences, spiritual authority has the right of teaching them, by at least the same right as private citizens or private associations. - Cf. F. Cavagnis, Instit. juris publici, l. IV, n. 1-145.

(A) It is proved by reason. For the right and office of educating offspring naturally belongs to those who have begotten the same: "It is a most holy law of nature that the father of a family should protect, with sustenance and every cultivation, those whom he himself has procreated."⁴ For children, as long as they have not attained the use of reason, are altogether unable to protect their own life; likewise, when reason now first dawns, they can obtain the truth in the intellectual, moral, and religious order only with the greatest difficulty by their own powers, without any external aid, and therefore they need some authority which directs them in the right path of truth. Now nature itself manifestly shows that the work of education is primarily to be performed by the parents themselves.

⁴ Leo XIII, Encyclical Rerum Novarum.

"For the son," says St. Thomas,¹ "naturally is something of the father; and at first indeed he is not distinguished from the parents according to the body, as long as he is contained in the mother's womb; but afterward, after he comes forth from the womb, before he has the use of free will, he is contained under the care of the parents, as under a certain spiritual womb." In reality nature gave breasts to the mother, but not to the State, for nursing children; to each parent, but not to the City or to strange nurses, it gave a maternal or paternal heart for pursuing their own offspring with tender and at the same time generous love; to parents, but not to strangers, at least from things commonly occurring, it gave an inclination that they gladly hand over not only their own things, but even themselves and their own life, for the welfare of their offspring. Wherefore long and universal experience establishes that children educated at home, fed with maternal milk, and carefully guarded by the vigilant care of parents, much more easily escape the dangers of diseases and death, and progress much more than those who are nourished by strangers.²

¹ St. Thom., 2. 2., q. 10, art. 12.

² For many of those who are handed over to strange nurses die: "Already in 1889, at the congress of hygiene and demography, Dr. Fleury attested that at Lyon the mortality of nurslings rose to 49 percent." (C. Raff, Natalite, Paris, 1901, p. 364.)

945. The same must be said concerning intellectual and moral education; no one, as the mother, can look into the mind of her offspring, no one can detect and correct their depraved inclinations, or direct the powers of the will to good: for led by maternal instinct, she naturally performs all these things, and besides by native inclination the child is inclined to follow the sweet direction of the mother. Afterward, when the boy is now growing up, he needs a virile education, for furnishing which no one is more suitable than the father: for, because of the special and generous love with which he pursues his children, he tempers with gentleness the authority necessary for restraining the depraved habits to which they incline, and helps them by opportune counsels to avoid dangerous occasions;³ by words and examples he draws them to the practice of virtues; indeed he himself is induced to lead a more honorable and more perfect life, led by this reason, that unless he gives a good example, he will scarcely be able to exhort his boys to honesty. - Hence experience establishes that children educated at home, other things being equal, generally progress much more in studies and in the practice of virtues than those who are instructed by strangers.¹

³ To the point it is read in the Expose des motifs du Code civil, where the matter concerns paternal authority: "The child is born weak, besieged by needs and diseases; nature gives him his father and mother to defend and protect him. When the time of puberty arrives, the passions awaken at the same time as intelligence and imagination... It is then that the child needs a counsel, a friend, who may defend his nascent reason against the seductions of every kind which surround him."

¹ On the office of each parent in education, cf. Turgeon, II, 341-362.

946. Socialists indeed object that children have rights which parents are not permitted to oppress. - It is certainly wonderful that these men complain of the tyranny of parents, while they themselves wish tyrannically to inculcate their opinions in the young; do they not thus contradict themselves? - We by no means deny the rights of children, since Christ himself and the Church have diligently vindicated these against the unspeakable errors of the pagans, as was proved elsewhere, on True Religion, n. 155; but since the child himself cannot protect these rights, it pertains to parents, rather than to strangers or to the State, to preserve them whole and intact; for those who begot and nourished children are joined more intimately with them, and are more apt to instruct them than any others. For the family is historically and logically prior to the State, nor is it consonant with right reason that civil power at its own judgment penetrate even to the interiors of homes, and disturb domestic peace; paternal power ought neither to be extinguished nor absorbed by the republic, but rather confirmed by it.² And certainly, if prejudices are in parents, is it not to be feared that the State, imbued with worse prejudices, may wish to inculcate them in the young, and thus oppress the liberty of children equally and of parents by intolerable tyranny? - And, since besides the opinions and theories of the State are diverse according to the diverse ministers who manage public affairs, will children also be held to change their ideas at the will of various officials? Where, I ask, is liberty? - Nor should it be said that the young are to be educated in such a way that they are instructed neither by the State nor by parents in religious or ethical disciplines, until, mature in age and reason, they are able freely to choose among various religions or diverse systems of ethics; - for this is nothing other than to promote indifferentism in matters altogether necessary for the right ordering of life, and to deprive the young of the means by which they need to restrain depraved inclinations.¹

² Leo XIII declared this excellently, Encyclical Rerum Novarum: "Therefore to wish that civil power at its own judgment penetrate even to the interiors of homes is a great and pernicious error... Paternal power is of such a kind that it can neither be extinguished, nor absorbed by the republic, because it has the same and common principle with the life itself of men. Children are something of the father, and as it were a certain amplification of the paternal person; and if we wish to speak properly, they do not of themselves, but through the domestic community in which they were generated, enter and participate in civil society." Cf. Brunetiere, Le Droit de l'Enfant, in the periodical Reforme sociale, Feb. 1, 1903, p. 202-221.

¹ G. Bonjean, Enfants revoltes et parents coupables, Paris, 1895; A. Fouillee, Les Jeunes Criminels, l'Ecole et la presse, in the periodical Revue des Deux Mondes, Jan. 15, 1897, p. 417-449; H. Joly, L'Enfance coupable, Paris, 1904, among others, have described into what excesses the young frequently fall who are educated without religion and moral discipline.

947. They insist, saying that by paternal education those dissensions are preserved and strengthened which draw one region and city, as it were, into two or more factions, and invincibly stand in the way of national unity. - I turn the argument back: are there not factions and dissensions in the State itself, and indeed among the socialists themselves? Do not anarchists, collectivists, and moderate socialists try to draw the minds of the young to their systems? - Therefore this difficulty rests on a false concept of unity: for it is impossible, especially in our days, where unbridled liberty of thinking, speaking, and writing flourishes, that all citizens of one City think and will the same thing concerning religious, philosophical, or political matters. Therefore those who vindicate national unity in this sense, that they wish all citizens to have the same principles concerning all these matters, not only promote intolerable tyranny, but dream of a thing altogether impossible. No unity can flourish among rational and free citizens other than that which arises from mutual tolerance and fraternal charity;² for all citizens ought to tend toward the common good of the fatherland, and devise nothing which turns to its detriment; but concerning the better reason for pursuing this end, discussion ought to be free, according to that saying: in necessary things unity, in doubtful things liberty, in all things charity. This is clearly evident by the example of nations which are eminent among cultivated nations, such as Great Britain and America: there certainly flourishes a singular love of fatherland, precisely because the greatest liberty flourishes for parents in educating children; and certainly the fatherland is loved the more, the more securely and efficaciously the liberty of domestic life is protected.

² Cf. Ch. Dupuy, in the speech held to the Senate Nov. 5, 1903, in Questions actuelles, t. 71, p. 168-192; E. Faguet, Le Liberalisme, Paris, 1903, p. 128-169, where he lucidly shows how much they contradict themselves who, under the pretext of unity, strive to extinguish liberty of teaching.

948. (B) The same is established by history. For Nations which assigned the office of educating boys to the Republic alone soon fell into despotic tyranny; thus the Spartans, ignorant of human dignity, who had committed the education of children to the State, instituted not men nor free citizens, but soldiers. Thus also the leaders of the French Revolution, Danton and Robespierre, who assigned to the fatherland alone the right of educating children, oppressed their fellow citizens with bronze tyranny and cruel persecution. Hence those who favor Caesarism, as Napoleon I, State Socialists, in one word, all haters and oppressors of liberty, vindicate for themselves the exclusive right or monopoly of teaching.¹ - On the contrary, however, the Christian religion, which liberated peoples from tyranny, has always asserted and defended the rights of parents to educating their own offspring; likewise everywhere and at every time it has favored those institutes and Universities which, independently from the State, hand on various disciplines. Wherefore even in our days truly cultivated nations, which pursue not only the shadow and name of liberty, but the thing itself, such as Belgium, Switzerland, Great Britain, and the Federated States of America, gladly acknowledge and protect the rights of parents to instructing their own offspring in various disciplines, and at the same time confer the greatest liberty on independent schools and Universities.¹ Unless therefore we wish to say farewell to the liberty of private persons and families, we ought unceasingly to vindicate, by all legitimate means, especially by rightly ordered associations of fathers of families, the rights of parents as to the education of offspring.

¹ This indeed is admitted by a man otherwise most hostile to the doctrines of the Church, Clemenceau, in the speech held to the Senators Nov. 17, 1903: "The State, I know it: it has a long history, all of murder and blood. All the crimes which have been accomplished in the world, massacres, wars, breaches of sworn faith, pyres, torments, tortures, everything has been justified by the interest of the State, by reason of State... I understand well: you dream of the ideal State. Thus Plato, thus Aristotle, thus Thomas More, thus other dreamers. You dream of the ideal State. This State, in books, you make it as beautiful as it can please you; but here we are weak men, changing, grappling with reality... If you could succeed, you would put into the hands of universal suffrage, into the hands of the changing majorities which succeed one another in Assemblies, the most formidable instrument of reaction which has yet been seen in the world, for the responsibility would be ungraspable, scattered in the anonymous crowd." (In Questions actuelles, t. 71, Dec. 12, 1903, pp. 197, 198, 199; ibidem p. 177-183, read what Lamarzelle spoke excellently concerning liberty of teaching.)

¹ Thus J. Stuart Mill (Principles of Political Economy, New York, 1882, t. II, p. 576-577) writes that no right belongs to the State of teaching exclusively, or even of conferring special privileges on those who frequent the State's schools; and that it is intolerable tyranny to wish to subject all schools to its rule: "to possess such a control, and actually exert it, is to be despotic." - R. Lavollee sketches the history of this question and the laws of diverse Nations, op. cit., p. 3-202.

949. Corollary. A twofold office belongs to civil authority concerning the instruction of children, namely to take care that independent schools not favor the corruption of morals, and to found schools necessary for the right instruction of citizens.

(A) The reason for the former is that it pertains to the State to promote the public good, and therefore to prohibit those things which manifestly stand in the way of this good. Now, if there were any school which notoriously corrupted the minds of the young by doctrines evidently contrary to natural right, or weakened good morals, civil authority would deservedly restrain those abuses, since the right and office is incumbent upon it of warding off dangers which can overturn the foundations of the republic. - Yet we said notoriously, because public authority ought not to be too solicitous about hidden things, lest perhaps, while it tries to restrain abuses, it take away all liberty altogether.

(B) The same reason of the public good often urges civil authority to institute schools and colleges. For although it pertains primarily to parents to educate their own offspring, nevertheless many can fulfill this office neither through themselves nor through private teachers; wherefore it pertains to the City to remedy this insufficiency by the foundation of public schools, to which parents can send their offspring: for the right instruction of the young greatly profits the public good.

But the Republic cannot institute a monopoly of education, namely by commanding that parents send their children to public schools, with the faculty excluded of educating them privately through teachers well seen by themselves: for this would be a usurpation of domestic right and an open violation of liberty of conscience.

Indeed that system, now flourishing among not a few nations, by force of which public schools alone are sustained from the common treasury, harms the equality and liberty of citizens; for then the school tax is paid by all, although many receive no advantage from it.¹ Much fairer is the system prevailing in Great Britain and other regions, by force of which public and private schools are equally sustained, provided that they attain a certain degree of progress: for thus the liberty of families remains intact, burdens are equally distributed, and noble emulation prevails among the diverse schools.

¹ Faguet sets this forth thus, op. cit., p. 134: "It is as if from Paris to Bordeaux there were two railways, one by Chartres, the other by Orleans, operated by two different companies, and I had the right to go to Bordeaux by Orleans, but on condition of paying my place to the Company of Orleans and also to the Company of Chartres."

950. Since parents act in God's place with respect to their offspring, they are held to pursue them with a special love, and to impart to them bodily and spiritual education, and also by a certain providence to direct them to the end.

² St. Chrysostom, De liberorum educatione, in Migne, P. G., t. LXIII, col. 763-772; Sayrus, Clavis regia sacerdotum, lib. VII, cap. 7; Mayol, Summa doctrinae moralis circa decem Decalogi praecepta, in Migne, Curs. Theol., t. XIV, p. 503-532; Jaugey, De virtutibus cardinalibus, Paris, 1876, p. 464-475; Berardi, Praxis, Tract. VII, n. 1-32; Rosset, De sacram. Matrimonii, t. V, n. 3520-3572; A. de Margerie, De la Famille, Paris, 1869, t. I, p. 226 sq.; P. Janet, La Famille, 15th ed., Paris, 1894, p. 107-236; A. de Gasparin, La Famille, Paris, 1866, t. I, p. 143-297; M. d'Hulst, Lent of 1894, 4th Conference.

1. On The Love Of Parents Toward Children.

951. Love of this sort is called piety, because it bears before itself something sacred and religious; it helps to set forth its foundation and endowments.

(A) The motives on account of which parents ought to love their offspring are natural and supernatural.

(a) Natural indeed; for if anyone loves the work of his hands, if even beasts themselves by a certain natural instinct love and protect their young,³ even with danger to their own life.

³ St. Augustine lucidly sets forth this argument, Sermon 349 (alias, de Tempore 52), in Migne, P. L., XXXIX, 1530: "Beasts also love their children: asps love their children, tigresses love their children, lions love their children. For there is no beast which does not gently murmur to its children. For when it terrifies men, it cherishes its little ones. A lion roars in the woods, so that no one may pass: he enters the cave, where he has his children, he lays aside every rage of ferocity. Outside he places it, when he himself does not enter. Therefore he who does not love his children is worse even than a lion."

how much more ought parents to pursue with tender and devoted affection the offspring whom they have begotten from their own substance, and who are as it were a certain amplification of the paternal person? - This appears even more manifestly if one considers that the children whom they procreated are endowed with reason and free will, bear in themselves the image of God and at the same time of the parents, enjoy immortality, are destined to God as to their ultimate end, and that they are citizens of the earthly fatherland, whose good and honor they can promote, if they have been rightly educated; for who, attending to these things, would not sincerely and devotedly love the sweet offspring who can procure the glory of God, the exaltation of the fatherland, and the happiness of the family?

952. (b) To these are added supernatural motives; for these are citizens not only of the earthly, but also of the heavenly fatherland: they are destined to the supernatural end, namely the clear vision of God and perfect possession; wherefore they are given the divine life, and all the graces necessary for increasing it; redeemed by Christ, and cleansed by his precious blood, they bear the image of Christ impressed in their hearts, and ought to imitate his virtues. Now parents are as it were God's cooperators in the sanctification of children, as they were in procreation; and therefore they ought to love their offspring with a special and supernatural love, so that by paternal solicitude they may form in them the spirit and virtues of Christ, and supernaturally beget those whom they have carnally begotten, according to that saying of the Apostle:¹ "My little children, of whom I am in labor again, until Christ be formed in you."

¹ Galat., IV, 19.

953. (B) The endowments of this love. The love of parents toward children ought to be:

(a) True and internal, insofar as they sincerely will their good, not only as to the body, but also and chiefly as to the soul, not only for the present, but also for the future. - Wherefore they sin gravely of themselves who deliberately pursue them unjustly with hatred, or seriously and from the soul curse them or imprecate evils upon them, or provoke them to anger with names gravely injurious; to the point St. Paul says: "And you, fathers, do not provoke your children to anger, but educate them in the discipline and correction of the Lord."¹ - Yet parents are often excused from grave sin who, moved by anger, act thus without perfect deliberation. Nor do they commit any sin, but act rightly, who, on account of a just cause, severely rebuke children, and moderately chastise them.

¹ Ephes., VI, 4.

(b) Rightly ordered, that is, resting on and ruled by a rational and also supernatural motive, so that it is neither excessive, nor irrationally favors one rather than another. - Hence they should not love children with a quasi-idolatrous love, by indulging everything to them, on account of sluggishness or cruel benignity, by by no means correcting their vices, etc. Likewise they should love all offspring equally, insofar as it can be done; and if there is some distinction, let them take care that it not be made without a reasonable cause; not rarely incautious parents are deceived by external qualities or flattering caresses, and they pursue with a more tender affection those who are worthy of less love; and from this arise not a few envies, quarrels, contentions, and other things of this sort, as is clear from the history of Joseph.²

² "But his brothers, seeing that he was loved by his father more than all the sons, hated him, nor could they speak anything peaceably to him." (Gen. XXXVII, 4.) - Hence St. Ambrose writes (de Joseph, in Migne, P. L., XIV, 643): "To love children is sweet, and to love more intensely is very sweet; but frequently paternal love itself, unless it holds moderation, harms children; if either by excessive indulgence it weakens the beloved, or by the preference of one turns the rest away from the affection of brotherhood... Let equal grace join children whom equal nature has joined."

(c) Generous and operative, insofar as parents not only will well to children, but do good, by averting from them every evil, whether corporal or spiritual, insofar as it can be done, and by furnishing that which can conduce to their good and salvation; this indeed is especially performed through the best education.

2. On The Education Of Children.³

³ Dupanloup, De l'Education, 7th ed., Paris, 1866, t. II, l. 2, p. 138; Guibert, L'Educateur apotre, Paris, 1894, p. 66-84.

954. Education is the progressive and harmonious evolution of faculties, by which children are gradually and orderly transformed into perfect men. For children have received from God various faculties, which, although generically the same in all, are nevertheless imbued with special inclinations, whether good or bad; now good education is placed in this, that it eradicates evil inclinations, restrains untamed passions and directs them to good, but strengthens, cultivates, and orders good qualities to human and at the same time Christian perfection. - This evolution, however, can only be slow and progressive, because it is impeded by many obstacles, and besides man naturally can obtain perfection only gradually. It ought to be harmonious, or rightly ordered, insofar as all faculties, whether bodily, spiritual, or religious, must be cultivated in such a way that the whole man is formed, that is, a sound mind in a sound body; if therefore one kind of faculties is evolved before the others, this nevertheless ought to be done proportionately, so that bodily exercise does not harm the progress of the mind, nor excessive intellectual cultivation stand in the way of bodily health. - We shall speak of education both bodily and spiritual, and also of the schools to which parents ought to send their children.

955. (A) On bodily education. This already begins in the maternal womb, and does not come to an end except at mature age.

(a) As soon as it is established that a child has been conceived, everything which, under grave obligation, could harm the life of the little child ought to be avoided. Wherefore the mother ought to abstain from those dances, violent movements and actions, and other things of this sort which induce more violent concussions of the body;¹ and also from immoderate excitements, anxieties, or from excesses in drink; for all these things can induce abortion. Men and others who inhumanely treat, exasperate, or strike a pregnant woman also sin, since from this the life of the fetus is endangered.

¹ To the point Capellmann, Medicina pastoralis, 1896, p. 156, n. 1: "It is also to be most carefully guarded that they (pregnant women) not be carried in a carriage through badly paved streets or rough roads. The very trips on the railway, by continual concussions, not rarely furnish the occasion of abortion, wherefore longer journeys on the railway are not to be undertaken without necessity. To this also pertains the use of machines for sewing (machines a coudre, sewing machines) which are moved by the feet."

(b) After the birth of the offspring, parents are held diligently to watch so that whatever would induce danger of death be warded away from it. Wherefore the Ritual admonishes parents not to have a little child with them in bed, because of the danger of suffocation.

956. (c) The mother ought to nourish children with her own milk, as often as this can be done;² for many inconveniences arise from the contrary practice as to the mother herself, who is exposed to a longer-lasting fever, - as to the children, for whose nourishing maternal milk is more apt,¹ - and as to the nurses themselves, who are generally compelled to abandon their husbands and their own offspring, with danger of incontinence and neglect of the offices of domestic life. Yet mothers are excused from this office who, because of lack of milk, infirmity, or another reasonable cause, prudently cannot nurse their own offspring.

² Concerning the gravity of this obligation, scarcely anything certain can be established; of itself it is held as light by most theologians; but when many evils, and very grave ones, are foreseen to arise from the use of a strange nurse, of itself a grave sin is committed if this is done without legitimate cause. On this Capellmann wrote excellently, op. cit., p. 47-53; cf. R. Bazin, Donnatienne; Brieux, Les Remplacantes.

¹ Hence, with experience as witness, among infants who are nourished by art, mortality is far greater than among those who are fed with maternal milk.

But when little children are handed over to nurses, care should be taken that these be healthy in mind and body, and provide for the health and also the morals of the child: for maternal solicitude is no less necessary in this case than where the mothers themselves feed their children.

(d) Parents are held under grave obligation of itself to furnish to offspring food and other things necessary for honestly sustaining life, according to their condition, until these can feed themselves; for it pertains to them to protect the life of those whom they have procreated, and this obligation from its nature is grave.

Therefore parents sin who, without grave necessity, expose offspring in public ways, with danger of death, or at the door of an orphanage, so that they may free themselves from the burden of feeding it, when besides they can easily provide for its education. Yet, if the matter concerns illegitimate offspring, prudence can demand that it be commended to an orphanage; in which case, however, honor and equity demand that the rich repay the expenses for nourishing the offspring. But whether justice requires this is disputed among theologians; certain ones probably deny it, because hospitals of this sort have been instituted not only for assisting the poor, but also the rich who otherwise would incur the mark of infamy;² whence if any parents have not paid these expenses, they are to be earnestly exhorted, but not compelled to restitution.

² St. Alphons., lib. III, on the Decalogue, n. 656; Ball. P., n. 824.

957. (e) Finally, in a general way parents ought to take care that children, by bodily exercise and labor proportioned to age, orderly evolve and increase their physical powers; for since the body is the instrument of the soul, and the health of the body favors not a little the evolution of intellectual life, it is very expedient that legitimate means be used for multiplying physical powers.³ This is also true of girls: for if they are educated delicately and are weaker in body, they easily suffer in their nerves and by an irritable character exasperate others.⁴

³ Demolins described how, in Great Britain, attention is given to the physical education of boys, A quoi tient la superiorite des Anglo-Saxons? Paris, s. d., p. 52-86; every excess indeed in this matter must be avoided, but in France parents and teachers often do not care enough about bodily education.

⁴ To the point Bentzon, Causeries de Morale, p. 236: "It is a duty to be well. Without doubt each of us inherits a more or less robust temperament; but, such as it is, we ought by wise hygiene to maintain it in the best possible equilibrium. And why? Because the soul is bound to the body; how many nervous people, by losing all command over their will, become insupportable to themselves and to others! How many young girls are sullen, capricious, disagreeable, because they overwork, digest badly, lead a life too over-excited, abuse dance and worldly pleasures..."

958. (B) On spiritual education. The care of parents is not confined to the health of the body, but ought especially to be occupied in rightly instructing the souls of children. For this it is necessary that they cautiously and diligently look into their inclinations and psychological dispositions: for not all ought to be instructed in the same way and by the same method, but each according to his own powers and the special character with which he is endowed.¹ Yet we shall hand on certain more general things: namely education ought to be virile, practical, and Christian.

¹ Courtade and d'Hulst, De l'action individuelle dans l'education chretienne, Paris, 1870; E. Picard, Comment traiter l'enfant a l'ecole, in Science sociale, t. XXXVI, August 1903, p. 97-129.

959. (a) First, education ought to be virile, insofar as it ought to tend to forming men gradually. For there are parents and teachers who think that nothing else is to be desired in the young except perfect docility of soul and blind obedience of will, by which they immediately and without complaint embrace the opinions expressed by superiors and obey their commands. Men endowed with reason and liberty are not formed thus. But by words and examples, persuasion and gentle suggestion, and also paternal correction, let the young be taught how they may cultivate their faculties, and gradually may be able by themselves to think, will, and act, not indeed independently from God and the rule of morals, but independently from vain human fear and from prejudices by no means consonant with reason.

Wherefore, as soon as the exercise of reason dawns, let it be set forth to them why and how they ought to flee evil and do good; let them be deterred especially from vices common to their age, such as lies, small thefts, contentions, and quarrels; let them be induced to perfect sincerity and honesty, justice and charity, modesty and chastity.² But let them be taught to perform all these things not only from fear or custom, but from the inward persuasion of the soul, by which they understand that they are held to this both from the will of God and from the dictate of conscience. Likewise let them increase the powers of the will by assiduous efforts,¹ so that they may more easily overcome the untamed passions which arise within, and the allurements of the world which from without entice them to vices.

² Fonssagrives excellently sets forth how the young are to be strengthened in chastity, Conseils aux parents et aux maitres sur l'education de la purete, 2nd ed., 1902. - For preserving chastity, it must diligently be cared for that boys and girls not sleep together in the same room, and especially in the same bed, at least after the seventh year.

¹ J. Payot, L'Education de la volonte, 18th ed., Paris, 1894; Ribot, Les maladies de la volonte, Paris, 18th ed.; A. Martin, L'Education du caractere, Paris, 1889.

960. (b) Education ought also to be practical, that is, truly preparing boys or girls for that kind of life for which they are destined, according to the character and condition of each. Many parents today, especially in France, think only of teaching letters, and send their offspring to colleges and universities, so that they may be able to lead a quiet life in the exercise of the liberal arts or in managing public affairs; from this it happens that many exercise no office, because there are many more candidates than offices to be distributed. Now the liberal arts must be cultivated by some, but not by all; otherwise industry, commerce, agriculture, and other arts necessary for life would soon grow languid and perish. Moreover many are found less suitable for the liberal arts, while on the contrary they would wish to give themselves to agriculture, industry, or commerce, if they were rightly instructed in these. Therefore let parents and teachers diligently look into the character and inclinations of their children or pupils, and not exercise any longer in literature those who intend to devote themselves to industry. Therefore it is greatly to be desired that schools which they call professional be multiplied among Catholics, in which all those who wish to embrace an industrial office, independent from the State, may be rightly formed.²

² Demolins, op. cit., p. 87-112; the same author, in another work (L'Education nouvelle, Paris, s. d.), describes how the young can be practically prepared for industrial life.

961. (c) Education should especially be Christian, by which namely adolescents are formed who embrace religion and adhere to it, not only when they are placed under the guardianship of parents or teachers, but also when they now act by their own movement and lead life far from the family. For this it is required that they believe from an inward and reasonable persuasion of the soul, and not be ashamed to manifest faith by works; for today, since the Catholic faith is attacked everywhere, it is necessary that Catholic youth be ready to fight manfully for the faith, as soldiers of Christ.

Wherefore parents are held under grave obligation, either through themselves or through others, to hand on to their children Catholic doctrine concerning all those things which are necessary to be known for attaining salvation and living as Christians; to form the same to the practice of those virtues without which they cannot be saved. For since children of this sort are destined to a supernatural end, those who procreated them by that very fact took upon themselves the burden, insofar as it can be done, of furnishing them the means necessary for obtaining this end. - The Roman Catechism inculcates this obligation in these words:¹ "The proper offices and duties of parents are that they imbue their children with most holy disciplines and morals, and give them the best precepts of living, so that, instructed and prepared for religion, they may venerate God holily and inviolate."

¹ Catech. Rom., On the fourth precept of the Decalogue, n. 13.

The same is handed down in the Code, c. 1113.

962. 1. Hence parents ought to take care that children be baptized as soon as possible (On Baptism, n. 48), and receive the grace of regeneration, by which they are made children of God, citizens of the Church and of the kingdom of heaven; - that from the tenderest years they learn the principal mysteries of faith, invoke the name of God,² love Christ the mediator, and pursue his Mother with a pious affection; - that they become accustomed to morning and evening prayers, the sacrifice of the Mass and divine offices, and also catechisms; - that they avoid depraved companions and dangerous readings, and especially that they not be corrupted by impious or dishonest servants.

² Let mothers take care that children, first attaining the years of discretion, turn themselves to God; to the point St. Thomas, 1. 2., q. 89, a. 6, ad 3: "For the first thing that occurs to a man having discretion is that he think concerning himself, to whom he should order other things as to an end. For the end is prior in intention. And therefore this is the time for which he is obliged by the affirmative precept of God, by which the Lord says: Be converted to me, and I will be converted to you (Zach., 1, 3)."

2. But they themselves ought to furnish a good example to their offspring, by speaking cautiously before them, especially about things pertaining to religion or chastity, lest at an inopportune time they learn what they ought still to be ignorant of; - likewise by acting cautiously, lest perhaps they furnish scandal to little ones:³ for these easily desire to imitate all things which they see; - by showing them examples of all virtues: for since the first age, like soft wax, receives impressions more distinctly and elegantly, it is certainly of great importance that only specimens of virtue be shown before boys, especially by those who enjoy the greatest authority among them.

³ Hence even the pagan poet Juvenal writes (Satire 14): "The greatest reverence is owed to the boy; if you prepare anything shameful, do not despise the years of the boy: but let your infant son stand in your way when you are about to sin."

3. Parents are also held to correct delinquent children, yet moderately, prudently, and benignly, so that it clearly appears that this is done for the sake of amendment, but not of indignation and anger. - For parents act in God's place in the rule of the house, and ought to imitate him who disposes all things sweetly and strongly, and chastises men only wisely, for instructing them and deterring them from vice. Therefore let them speak or determine nothing too bitter against children; but, as the Roman Catechism admonishes,¹ "if any fault has been committed, since chastisement and rebuke are necessary, let them not loosely remit anything to children through indulgence: for often children are depraved by the excessive softness and facility of parents; wherefore let the example of Heli, the high priest, deter them from relaxed indulgence, who, since he had been too indulgent toward his children, was afflicted with the greatest punishment."

¹ Catech. Rom., loc. cit., n. 14.

963. (C) On Catholic schools. Finally parents, when they cannot provide at home for the perfect education of children, are held to send them to Catholic schools; for from the Code, c. 1374, "Catholic children should not frequent non-Catholic, neutral, mixed schools, namely those which are open also to non-Catholics"; lest they be exposed to the danger of losing faith or morals.²

² Dupanloup discusses excellently the endowments of teachers and the manner of educating the young, De l'Education, and Lettres sur l'Education des Filles, Paris, 1879; cf. Guibert, op. cit.

To set forth the matter more fully, it must be known that non-Catholic schools are of two kinds: neutral, which in the education of boys prescind from any positive religion, but teach nothing heretical or impious; positively evil, in which atheism, heresy, or indifferentism is more or less defended.

(a) Now it is not permitted to parents to send children to positively evil schools, in which the proximate danger of perversion cannot be removed: for here the matter concerns the eternal salvation of souls, which must be preferred to all goods; nor is it permitted to expose oneself to the proximate danger of sinning, as is established from the things said where treating the proximate occasion, On Penance, n. 458-469. Hence, if such public schools exist, let fathers of families not omit to denounce them, as contrary to the common good, and let them use all legitimate means to abolish them thoroughly. - But if, with attention to all the circumstances, the danger can certainly morally be removed, let these things from the Code, c. 1374, be attended to before the eyes: "But it belongs to the Ordinary alone to decree, according to the norm of the instructions of the Apostolic See, in what circumstances of things and with what cautions employed, so that the danger of perversion may be avoided, it can be tolerated that those schools be attended." This also applies to neutral schools.

964. Schools which are called neutral are also very dangerous; for by the very fact that they exclude every religion, they prepare the way for religious indifferentism, especially as regards boys of tender age; at least in their estimation the dignity and authority of religion is much diminished if it seems relegated within domestic walls; besides, in these schools purity of morals is not rarely exposed to great dangers; finally it can scarcely happen that religion is altogether prescinded from, especially in historical and moral matters, and often, under the pretext of neutrality, Catholic dogmas are attacked or mocked.¹

¹ Leo XIII vividly described these dangers, Encyclical Nobilissima Gallorum gens, Feb. 8, 1884; cf. Instruction of the S. C. de Prop. Fide, Nov. 24, 1875, to the Bishops of the Federated States of America, in Collectanea, n. 481; Third Council of Baltimore, n. 194-213; Letter of the S. C. de Prop. Fide, in Acta S. Sedis, t. XXVIII, p. 381. - In France, the Bishops set forth how dangerous State schools are, in the letter of Sept. 14, 1909; cf. Goyau, L'ecole d'aujourd'hui, Paris, 1899; J. Bricout, Ce qu'on enseigne aux enfants dans nos ecoles publiques, Paris, 1910. In certain schools the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the very foundations of morality are denied or called into doubt!

Wherefore Catholic schools are to be erected wherever this can be done, all the more because, where such have been instituted, public schools are compelled to reverence the Catholic religion more, lest perhaps parents send their offspring from these to Catholic schools.

But where there are no Catholic schools suitable for conveniently educating the young, parents are permitted to commit their offspring to public schools, provided that cautions are employed by which the danger of perversion is made remote from proximate.²

² Thus the Holy See already declared that it can be tolerated that Catholic young persons frequent the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, and at the same time defined what cautions are necessary for removing the dangers thence arising (Holy Office, March 26, 1895).

But the cautions to be employed so that the danger of perversion may be warded off are these: to hand on Christian instruction and education outside school rightly and diligently, especially concerning those truths which are usually attacked in schools; to watch solicitously lest children suffer some detriment in faith or morals from lessons heard, from depraved books, or from association with depraved companions.¹

¹ Thus the Holy Office, in Collectanea, n. 481. - Hence the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore, n. 199, established that "all Catholic parents are held to send their offspring to parochial schools, unless either at home or in other Catholic schools they sufficiently and evidently consult the Christian education of their children, or, on account of a sufficient cause, approved by the Bishop, and with opportune cautions and remedies, it is permitted to them to send them to other schools."

3. On The Providence Of Parents Toward Children.

965. When parents have given work to the education of children, it remains that, by a certain paternal providence, they help them toward choosing a state and rightly ordering life.

(A) First of all they are held to help them so that they may be able to embrace a state suitable to their condition and character; for it is not fitting that even the rich and noble remain idle, but an obligation is incumbent upon each person of devoting himself to some labor, so that he can bring some utility to himself, to the family, and to society. They will furnish this indeed:

(a) By taking care that boys and girls (for these also ought to do something useful) learn art or letters, - and acquire those endowments of body and soul by which, even if they were deprived of an inheritance, they would be able to obtain for themselves an honorable support.

(b) By furnishing to the same counsel concerning choosing a state of life, according to their condition: for parents, who have greater experience, can help incautious young persons much in this matter; nevertheless they cannot bring force upon their children, who have the right of choosing a decent state for themselves, after they have sought the counsel of parents.

966. (c) By bringing help to them, so that they may be able to attain the state which they have chosen; therefore, if parents are richer, it is altogether fitting that they moderately endow their children, so that these may more easily be able to devote themselves to some industry or art and support themselves and their family, when they have married. But whether this is owed from justice, by natural right alone, is not so certainly established, provided that otherwise the children are able to provide for themselves. - Whatever may be the case, in many regions the custom has prevailed that daughters be endowed, so that they may more easily marry according to their condition; and, where custom flourishes, parents who without reasonable cause would not wish to furnish this would sin against charity - gravely or lightly according to the circumstances - because by their fault a daughter would often remain unmarried or would enter only an unequal marriage.

It is likewise fitting that parents lay up treasure for children, and leave to them a part of the inheritance, so that the honor and security of families may be more safely provided for; but, natural right alone being inspected, that is not prescribed from justice;¹ wherefore, in certain nations, civil law leaves full liberty to fathers, as we declared above, on the Virtue of Justice, n. 716. But where civil law has defined something concerning this matter, what is to be done in conscience we handed down in the same place, n. 725.

¹ To prove that this is an office of justice, many allege the words of the Apostle: "For children ought not to lay up treasure for parents, but parents for children" (II Cor., XII, 14); but, the context having been inspected, it is clear that St. Paul there in no way treats of an office of justice incumbent upon parents, but only refers to those things which are fitting, and which in his time were commonly done.

967. (B) After children have chosen a state of life and have married, paternal care is indeed diminished, but not altogether extinguished; for children, even after marriage has been celebrated, are closer to parents than strangers; wherefore the order of charity demands that, if they are placed in bodily or spiritual necessity, parents assist them more than strangers.

(a) If therefore children by fortuitous chance, from physical infirmity or misfortune, indeed from their own fault, have been made needy, and do not have the necessities for the support of themselves and of their children, and neither wives nor their own children can furnish them food, paternal charity demands that parents, insofar as they can, provide for the necessities of children: for if they are held to aid the poor, a fortiori those who are joined to them by the closer bond of consanguinity. - Yet they ought by no means to supply them with wealth and luxury, but only those things which are required for honorable support.

968. (b) Thus likewise if children need spiritual correction or opportune counsel, the right and office of furnishing spiritual alms by paternal affection is incumbent upon parents rather than upon strangers, because of the closer conjunction which they retain with them.

In one word, the special bonds of charity by which parents are bound to children are indeed relaxed at mature age, but are not entirely dissolved. Yet in these matters very great attention must be paid to the morals and customs which have prevailed in such or such a region, indeed even in the same region among various kinds of families; for the bonds by which parents and children are joined are closer or looser among diverse Nations, and also at various times or among diverse families: in this matter, custom is the best interpreter of laws.

969. Since parents act in God's place with regard to children, they have the right to be loved and honored by them, first on account of God, whom they represent; hence the honor rendered to parents is attributed to God rather than to men. Wherefore to them, as to God, yet in a lesser degree, love, reverence, and obedience are owed: love indeed, because they participate in God's infinite goodness in a finite way; reverence, because divine excellence specially shines forth in them; obedience, since they are made participants of divine authority; concerning these we must speak separately.²

¹ Mayol, op. cit., p. 478-504; Jaugey, p. 448-464; Ball. P., Tr. VI, n. 815-822; A. de Margerie, t. II, p. 138-171; P. Janet, op. cit., p. 143-236; M. d'Hulst, op. cit., 5th Conf.

² And thus we shall set forth the fourth precept of the Decalogue: "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thou mayest be long-lived upon the land which the Lord thy God will give thee" (Exod., xx, 12). For, as the Catech. Rom., l. c., n. 4, rightly observes, to honor is to think honorably concerning someone, and to consider all his things of very great worth. The other things are joined to this honor, namely love and obedience; for he who loves does not always venerate; he who fears does not always love; but he who honors someone from the soul loves and reveres him.

1. On The Love Owed To Parents.

970. Principle: Children are held to love parents not only from the common law of charity, but from the special precept of piety.

It is proved. For besides motives common to all, there are certain special ones on account of which parents ought to be loved; for by procreating children, they bestowed life upon them, and with it all the goods which flow from it;³ by nourishing and protecting them they preserved that same life, often subtracting very many things from themselves so that they might provide for them; by education they cultivated and increased their faculties; in one word, whatever children have, after God, they owe to progenitors, and on that account they are held to exhibit special love and gratitude to them. In reality if God must be loved because he is good in himself and benign to us, ought not parents likewise to be loved, who, participants in divine goodness, have imitated his benignity toward their offspring?

³ "In thy whole heart honor thy father, and do not forget the groans of thy mother: remember that unless through them thou wouldst not have been born; and repay them as they also did to thee" (Eccli., VII, 29-30).

Wherefore in the Sacred Scriptures God promises all the best things to those who honor and love parents: "Honor thy father and thy mother, that thou mayest be long-lived upon the earth";¹ this longevity indeed was highly valued among the Jews. And again: "He who honors his father will rejoice in children, and in the day of his prayer he will be heard... In work and speech, and in all patience honor thy father, that a blessing may come upon thee from him, and his blessing may remain in the end."² Nor otherwise St. Paul: "Honor thy father and thy mother, which is the first commandment with a promise, that it may be well with thee, and thou mayest be long-lived upon the earth."³

¹ Exod., XX, 13.

² Eccli., III, 7, 9-10.

³ Ephes., VI, 2-3; see other texts in the work La Famille suivant l'Ecriture Sainte, Paris, 1881, p. 233-268.

971. It is declared. This love indeed ought to be internal and external at the same time, and consists in two things: to will well and to do good.

(A) To will well, that is, to pursue them with a pious, tender, and devoted affection, so that one is ready in soul to suffer and do all things for them. - Wherefore children gravely sin against piety who deliberately and seriously wish death upon their parents, or grave damage of soul or body, or rejoice concerning notable damage inflicted on them; likewise those who truly despise them, mock them, affect them with insults and words gravely injurious, or, without a just cause, gravely and deliberately sadden them. - It must be noted that hatred toward parents is more easily a grave sin than toward strangers.

972. (B) To do good, or to show parents signs of benevolence: (a) by a friendly and cheerful face, sweet speech, prompt service, and all those means by which tender and devoted love is manifested. Wherefore those who scarcely show a sign of friendship, but speak harshly or act imperiously, sin more or less, and often gravely.

(b) By assisting them in bodily or spiritual necessity. Thus, when parents labor under infirmity or old age, or suffer from adverse cases, children ought to visit and console them and bring help to them; if they are placed in poverty, not only extreme but grave, they are held to furnish the same food and other necessities of life.

So great is this obligation that, when parents are placed in extreme or grave necessity, a son cannot enter religion, even if he has emitted a vow of entering religion, but ought to remain in the world so that he may assist them, provided that there is no other who can or wishes to furnish this; for the natural law concerning the care of parents precedes an obligation undertaken by one's own will.¹ - But when he has already been professed in religion, he can and is held to go out from the convent for a time, even with the Prelate unwilling, if the parents are in extreme and evident necessity, which cannot otherwise be assisted, on account of the same reason;² but if the religion itself provides necessary things for needy parents (which is altogether fitting as often as this can be done), the religious ought to remain within the cloister. - But if the necessity is only grave, it is disputed; according to the more probable opinion, he is held, with obedience to his Prelate preserved, to use means by which his parents may be assisted.

¹ St. Thom., 2. 2., q. 101, a. 4. - Thus also civil law in most regions; so in France: "Children owe support to their father and mother or other ascendants who are in need... Support is granted only in proportion to the need of the one who claims it, and to the fortune of the one who owes it... If the person who ought to furnish support shows that he cannot pay the support pension, the tribunal can, with knowledge of the cause, order that he receive in his dwelling, feed, and maintain the one to whom he owes support" (Cod. civ., art. 205, 208, 210).

² St. Thom., l. c., ad 4, seems to teach the contrary; but there he does not speak of extreme necessity; for elsewhere he writes (Quodlibet 3, q. 6, art. 11): "He ought, as far as he can, with the obedience of the order preserved, to strive that by himself or by another his parents be assisted, if they shall have been placed in necessity." Besides, the Superior would not reasonably be unwilling who denied permission of going out from religion to him who otherwise would not be able to succor the extreme necessity of parents. Thus St. Alphonsus, n. 67; Jaugey, op. cit., n. 551; Ball. P., n. 148.

973. Likewise they are to be assisted in spiritual necessities, namely by taking care that they obtain all spiritual helps which they need, but especially that to those lying in extremity there be administered the sacraments and other helps useful for dying well. Likewise they ought not to impede them from restoring another's goods before death, or repairing damage inflicted on neighbors, or making a testament for donating something to pious works. - After their death, according to their faculties, let them take care that they receive decent obsequies and that the sacrifice of the Mass be offered for them several times: for piety extends even to the dead.

2. On The Reverence Owed To Parents.

974. (A) Principle: Children are held to show to parents special signs of reverence and honor, according to the custom of the fatherland and of their condition. - It is said special, because greater reverence, other things being equal, is owed to parents than to strangers.

This is certainly openly established from all the places of Scripture related above, in which the matter directly concerns the honor owed to parents. - This is also proved by reason: for honor is owed to those to whom excellence belongs, and indeed the greater the higher their dignity; but parents participate in the excellence of God in a particular way, insofar as they were cooperators of God in the procreation and education of children; they are therefore visible and living images of the invisible God, and their excellence is as it were a certain emanation and participation of divine excellence; therefore to these, insofar as they act in God's place, children ought to show special honor and reverence.

e) To stop work without regard to the stipulations of a written or oral contract constitutes a breach of contract and entails the duty of restitution. Whether such a breach of contract should be subject to criminal proceedings, is a question which in our time is political rather than judicial.

A man does not as a rule break a contract without justifying his action, at least before his own conscience. That a workingman has the right to withdraw from a wage contract one-sidedly for good reasons, such as the non-compliance of the employer with the stipulations agreed upon, or an essential change in the relation between labor and wage, cannot be denied. Though strikes are mostly based on false and short-sighted calculations, not every such act of combined self-help is per se immoral, but each case must be decided on its own merits, with due regard to the interests of the weaker party when there is room for doubt.

A strike, as our readers know, is the quitting of work by a body of laborers for the purpose of forcing their employer or employers to comply with some demand or condition, as for increase or against reduction of wages. As carried on at the present time, strikes are usually accompanied by active interference with the business of the employers, by the use of the boycott, intimidation of new employees (scabs), etc.¹⁵

¹⁵ W. McDonald, "The Ethical Aspect of Boycotting," Irish Theol. Quarterly, Vol. I (1906), No. 3; P. Marshall, Ibid., Vol. I, No. 4; T. Slater, S.J., Ibid., Vol. II (1907), No. 6.

Theoretically, a strike need not necessarily be condemned as illicit, though on account of the numerous evils by which it is usually accompanied it can scarcely ever be advisable in praxi. It is for this reason that Leo XIII so strongly insisted on the duty of the State to strive for the abolition of strikes.

"When work-people have recourse to a strike," he says, "it is frequently because the hours of labor are too long, or the work is too hard, or because they consider their wages insufficient. The grave inconvenience of this not uncommon occurrence should be obviated by public remedial measures; for such paralyzing of labor not only affects the masters and their work-people alike, but is extremely injurious to trade and to the general interests of the public; moreover, on such occasions violence and disorder are generally not far distant, and thus it frequently happens that the public peace is imperilled. The laws should forestall and prevent such troubles from arising; they should lend their influence and authority to the removal in good time of the causes which lead to conflicts between employers and employed."¹⁶

¹⁶ Rerum novarum (The Pope and the People, p. 203).

Strikes, therefore, especially in their more threatening forms, should be prevented as much as possible for the sake of the common weal.

This is not tantamount to saying that they are never justified under any conditions. If the public authorities will not or cannot assure just treatment to the workingmen, and the latter abstain from violence, they must not be condemned for laying down work. The evils that often accompany strikes are not essential to the latter, and a strike quite often is a true act of legitimate self-defense. In such a case, the strike is justifiable, unless higher considerations demand a renunciation of just rights.

When the conditions of labor are not in accord with justice, workingmen may, without awaiting the expiration of their contract, threaten to quit work, and if the employer refuses to comply with their demands, lay down their tools. But if the employer is not guilty of injustice, the workers are obliged to live up to the terms of their contract until it expires. They may ask for more favorable conditions, but are not allowed to use force to obtain them.

With due regard to the contractual term, or after its expiration, says Fr. Lehmkuhl, the workingmen may, individually or by common action, go much farther. They have the right to value their labor more highly, and even if they went to imprudent and unfair limits in so doing, one would not be allowed to accuse them of injustice in the strict sense. The value of labor need not be measured by the current exchange value of its product, but the laborer is within his rights if he holds that the exchange value of the product might just as well be measured by the increased value of labor. We do not hesitate to allow the working people a larger scope in this respect for the increase of wages, than we would allow the employers for lowering the same. This lies in the nature of a free contract. The contracting parties may go to the limit of a just wage, the laboringmen in their demands, the employers in their offers. The upper limit, in the very nature of things, is naturally more indefinite than the lower, though in individual instances the determination of the lower limit, too, is not easy. What may be generally regarded as an unjustly low wage may be shorn of its injustice by circumstances. For this reason it will, as a rule, be difficult to permit laboringmen to quit work at once without regard to their contract because of unfair conditions.

In discussing just and unjust conditions of labor we have employed the amount of the wage as an example; not as if it were the only thing that can be enforced through strikes, but because it is the first and most important. The others are either subordinate to, or intimately connected with, wages; in fact, for the most part they are merely another form of wage regulation. Working hours, night work, limitation of child and female labor, all these questions are closely related to the wage problem; so too, the protection of good morals and compliance with religious duties on the part of the workingmen.¹⁷

¹⁷ Lehmkuhl, Arbeitsvertrag und Streik, 4th ed., pp. 59 sq.

1. Definition.—Man is not a lone individual, but a social being.¹ That is evident not only from the innate attraction he feels for his fellowmen, but likewise, and in a particular manner, from his physical and intellectual dependence upon others. In the words of Jesus, the son of Sirach, “all flesh consorts with the like of itself, and every man shall associate himself to his like.”²

¹ ζῷον πολιτικόν, animal rationale et sociale.—Cfr. St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 1a, qu. 96, art. 4; 2a 2ae, qu. 109, art. 3, ad 1; qu. 114, art. 2, ad 1; qu. 129, art. 6, ad 1; 3a, qu. 65, art. 1. The term animal rationale et sociale in Scholastic parlance means a rational and social being, not animal. Animal is brutum. Animal in Latin is a generic term comprising homo and brutum.

² “Every man shall associate with one like himself.”—Ecclus. XIII, 20.

“Man’s natural instinct,” says Pope Leo XIII in his famous encyclical on the Christian Constitution of States, “moves him to live in civil society, for he cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the necessary requirements of life, nor procure the means of developing his mental and moral faculties. Hence it is divinely ordained that he should lead his life—be it family, social or civil—with his fellowmen, amongst whom alone his several wants can be adequately supplied.”³

³ Encyclical “Immortale Dei,” Nov. 1, 1885: “It is implanted in man by nature that he should live in civil society: for if he lives in solitude, he cannot obtain the necessary sustenance and preparation for life, nor likewise the perfection of mind and soul; therefore it has been divinely ordained that he should be born for union and human association, both domestic and civil, which alone can furnish the perfect sufficiency of life.” (The Pope and the People, p. 73.)

Another proof that men are destined to consort with their like is the gift of language, by which they can communicate to one another their thoughts, desires, and aspirations. Finally mutual love also has its part in the constitution of society.

The principal requirements of a society are: (a) multiplicity of individuals, (b) a common end, and (c) a stable union for the attainment of that end. A single individual can not constitute a society. It is only when several persons come together and unite their aims for the attainment of a common object that a society is established. Since rational beings alone are capable of forming such a union, which involves rights and duties on the part of each member, the term society is inapplicable to irrational brutes, no matter how many analogies may be found among them reminding us of human society, as in a colony of bees or ants.⁴

⁴ V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 4th ed., p. 377; M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 385 sqq.

An essential requirement flowing from the very nature of society is authority, i. e., the right of certain members to compel others to do or to omit certain things in relation to the common purpose. In view of its object, authority can be but one, and must always remain the same, so that it becomes extinguished only when the society itself ceases to exist or undergoes an essential change. Being a moral person with well-defined objects and scope, every society is the bearer of rights and duties, towards other societies as well as towards its own members. Hence a society may be more comprehensively defined as the permanent union of a number of free beings who, under the direction of an authority, strive by common effort to achieve a common purpose.

2. Division.—Societies are distinguished from one another in purpose, origin, and extent.

a) In regard to its purpose a society may be perfect or imperfect, according as its object is to procure for its members all the things they need for their welfare, and it possesses all the means necessary for this purpose within itself, or according as it aims only at the one or other necessity, and consequently requires to be supplemented in its efforts by other societies. The State (civitas sive communitas civilis) is a perfect society because it possesses all the means required for the attainment of its objects and is self-sufficient within the natural order. The Church, too, is a perfect society, because it is equipped by its Divine Founder with all the means necessary to attain its end. The family (familia domestica), on the other hand, consisting of father, mother, and children, is an imperfect society, for the reason that, though it aims at providing its members with all they need, it cannot fully attain this purpose without the aid of other social organisms of a wider scope, namely, State and Church.⁵

⁵ St. Thomas, Comment. in Polit., I, l. 1: “Since every association of all men is ordered to something necessary for life, that community will be perfect which is ordered to this: that man have sufficiently whatever is necessary for life; but such a community is the State.”—Cfr. V. Cathrein, S. J., Phil. Mor., n. 433: “For a twofold reason a society can be called perfect: 1. because it is ordered to the perfect sufficiency of human life and is sufficient unto itself for this end, and in this sense it is the same as a society complete intrinsically and extrinsically; 2. because it possesses in and of itself (actually or virtually) the means necessary for attaining its end, and does not depend, at least directly, upon other societies: in this sense both the State and the Church are perfect societies; all the others are imperfect.”—Cfr. M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 388 sq.

b) In respect to its origin a society is either natural (necessary) or free, according as its peculiar character is based upon the very nature of man or depends upon free choice, exercised within the limits of justice and order.

c) In regard to extent, a society is either general or particular, according as it includes all men or only one race, community, or body of men. The only general society in this sense is that which comprises the whole race, human society, i. e., all men, in as far as all have the same final end, namely, to glorify God and work out their eternal salvation, and in so far as they are all subject to one supreme Legislator and bound together by mutual rights and duties. This general society—“society” par excellence—is divided into a large number of particular societies, of which the basic groups are the family and the State.⁶

⁶ Is. XLVIII, 11; Prov. XVI, 4; Gal. VI, 2; Jas. IV, 12.—Conc. Vatic., Sess. III, c. 1.—St. Augustine, De Bono Coniugali, c. 1: “Since every man is a part of the human race, and human nature is something social and has the great and natural good of the power of friendship, for this reason God willed to create all men from one, so that in their society they might be held together not only by likeness of kind but also by the bond of kinship. Therefore the first natural bond of human society is husband and wife. God did not create even these as separate individuals and join them as strangers, but created the one from the other, signifying also the power of union in the side from which she was taken and formed (Gen. II, 21–22). For those are joined at their sides who walk together and together look to where they walk. There follows the connection of society in children, who are the one honorable fruit, not of the union of male and female, but of intercourse. For in each sex there could have been, even without such commingling, a certain friendly and genuine union, the one ruling, the other obeying.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 373).

The respective relations to State and Church give rise to the further distinction between public and private so- cieties. Public societies are those which are acknowledged as juridical persons by the authority, either of State or Church, and enjoy definite public rights. All others are private.

Readings.—Theo. Meyer, S. J., Inst. Iuris Naturalis, Vol. I, n. 347 sqq.—V. Cathrein, S. J., Moralphilosophie, Vol. II, 5th ed., pp. 388 sqq.—M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. II, pp. 385 sqq.—J. E. Ross, C. S. P., Christian Ethics, pp. 190 sqq.—C. Antoine, S. J., Cours d’Economie Sociale, Intr. and Ch. I of Part I.—T. Slater, S. J., Questions of Moral Theology, pp. 191 sqq.

Husband and wife together constitute a society, i. e., a stable union of persons, entered into for a common purpose, i. e., a complete enduring personal partnership for the continuance of the race.

From this definition may be deduced the mutual duties of husband and wife. These duties are partly natural, partly intellectual, moral, and religious. They are based upon the threefold character of Matrimony as a natural union, a moral society, and a sacramental association for the salvation of its members, and designed to enable man to accomplish the threefold purpose of marriage, namely, the propagation of the human race, mutual assistance, and mutual sanctification.¹

¹ Gen. I, 27 sq.; II, 18; Matth. XIX, 4–6; 1 Cor. VII, 2–5; 1 Tim. II, 15; 1 Pet. III, 7.

Though the sedatio concupiscentiae and the propagation of the species are true purposes of Matrimony, yet its highest or principal object is the undivided community of life led by husband and wife.² Hence we may distinguish matrimonial duties of the natural or lower, and of the spiritual or higher order.³

² 1 Cor. VII, 2.—St. Augustine, De Bono Coniug., c. 5: “Marriage exists for this, that concupiscence, reduced to a legitimate bond, should not drift about misshapen and unrestrained, having from itself an unbridled weakness of flesh, but from marriage an indissoluble fellowship of fidelity; from itself a tendency to immoderate intercourse, from marriage a manner of chaste procreation. For although it is shameful to wish to use a husband lustfully, it is nevertheless honorable to be unwilling to unite except with a husband and to bear children only by a husband.”—Ibid., c. 3: “The good of marriage, which the Lord also confirmed in the Gospel, not only because He forbade dismissing a wife except for the cause of fornication (Mt. XIX, 9), but also because He came when invited to a wedding (John II, 2), why it is good is rightly asked. It does not seem to me to be only the natural fellowship in the different sex. Otherwise marriage would no longer be called such in old age, especially if they had either lost children or had begotten none. But now, in a good marriage, even one advanced in years, although the ardor of age between male and female has withered, the order of charity between husband and wife nevertheless flourishes, because the better they are, the earlier, by mutual consent, they have begun to abstain from the union of their flesh, not that it would thereafter be a necessity not to be able to do what they wished, but that it would be to their praise first not to have wished what they could.” (Migne, P. L., XL, 377, 375).

³ Gen. II, 24; Matth. XIX, 5; 1 Cor. VII, 4; Eph. V, 25–29; Tit. II, 4.

The qualities required of the married are thus described by the famous pulpit jester Abraham a Santa Clara: “Married people must have good teeth, for they are obliged to chew and swallow many disagreeable things. They must have good fingers, for it is often necessary that they peer through them. They must have good feet, for the shoe will often pinch them. They must have a good stomach, for they have to digest many troubles. They must be very devout, for they have to carry the cross every day in the year.”

I. The principal duties of the married in the natural order are cohabitation and the debitum coniugale.

1. The duty of living together (communio mensae sive cohabitatio) is imposed by the common life to which both parties are vowed.⁴ By the law of nature the husband is the head of the family and determines its place and manner of living. If for some good reason he decides to change his domicile, the wife is bound to follow him, unless she is physically or morally unable to do so. If he is temporarily forced to live apart from his wife, he should obtain her consent, without which he should not act except in case of necessity, and even then only provided the separation does not bring in its wake the periculum incontinentiae. For a short absence the husband does not need the consent of his wife, but it would undoubtedly be an injustice to her if he remained away even for a brief while without informing her of the reason.⁵

⁴ Matth. XIX, 5; 1 Cor. VII, 5.—Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theologia Mor., l. VI, n. 977.—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., Vol. I, n. 388.

⁵ St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 939: “It is certain that spouses are bound by an obligation of justice to cohabit in the same house, at the same table and bed. Hence it is inferred that neither spouse can depart elsewhere for a long time against the will of the other unless just causes are present, namely for the public good, to support or protect the family, or to avoid harm from enemies. But Bossius, with Toletus and Sayrus, said that if the husband had to remain elsewhere for a long time, he would be bound, if he conveniently can, to bring his wife there so that she may cohabit with him. . . . The husband can undertake a brief pilgrimage for the sake of devotion even against his wife’s will; the wife, however, cannot do this without the husband’s consent, since she is subject to his will and it does not become the state of women to travel. From mutual consent, however, spouses can rightly separate from each other, provided the danger of incontinence and harm to the education of the offspring are absent, from the words of the Apostle (1 Cor. VII, 5): ‘Defraud not one another, except perhaps by consent for a time, that you may devote yourselves to prayer, and return together again, lest Satan tempt you because of your incontinence.’”—Cfr. Reuter-Lehmkuhl, Neoconfessarius, P. II, c. 4, n. p. 151.

If the matrimonial contract stipulates that the husband shall not change his domicile without the wife’s consent, or if he becomes a vagabond after marriage, and the wife was unaware of this propensity before she married him, she is not bound to accompany him. The fact that the wife’s dowry has not yet been paid, does not justify the husband in refusing to cohabit with her, for the duty of cohabitation flows from the marriage contract. Arbitrary separation, secret escape, or malicious abandonment of one party by the other, is a grievous injustice.

If married people live apart, it is usually an indication that their spiritual union is not very close. The wife’s place is in her husband’s house, and she inflicts an injury upon him if she goes away to live with her parents or other relatives.

If a man wishes to emigrate to a foreign country, he should not do so against the wishes of his wife. Even though she can give no other reason for opposing the plan than a strong love of home, this sentiment should be respected. The man who without important reasons disregards such a noble sentiment in his wife, cannot expect her to become more closely attached to him if he disregards her wishes. Only when the motives inspiring the husband are very weighty, can the wife be expected to acquiesce, even at the sacrifice of her natural sentiments.⁶

⁶ Linsenmann, Moraltheologie, p. 629.

Neither party may leave the other except on account of notorious adultery or if further cohabitation has become impossible without serious danger to faith, morals, or honor. In that event the facts should be reported to the ecclesiastical authorities and permission obtained for a separatio a mensa et toro.

If one party has committed adultery, and the fact is established beyond doubt, the innocent partner is justified in denying to the guilty the debitum coniugale and other signs of matrimonial affection, and if he or she intends to apply for an ecclesiastical decree of separation, the debitum must be denied, because otherwise the right to a separation would be forfeited.

Even when there are good reasons for demanding a separation the innocent party should consider well whether it would not be better, for the sake of the temporal and eternal welfare of himself or herself and of the children, to condone the crime and continue to cohabit with the guilty partner rather than get a separation.

For a husband or wife to live apart from the other without sufficient canonical reasons is a mortal sin and renders the party per se unworthy of absolution. Under present conditions, however, the Church is no longer able to prevent such unauthorized separations and therefore tolerates them. Hence if married persons living apart are convinced that they are right, if their separation does not give scandal, and if admonitions and warnings are likely to prove ineffective, they may be left unmolested.⁷

⁷ J. E. Pruner, Kath. Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 3rd ed., p. 335; cfr. Lehmkuhl, Theol. Mor., Vol. II, n. 934 sqq.

2. The communio tori or ius et debitum coniugale also flows from the nature of Matrimony.

a) Matrimonial cohabitation in the narrower sense of the term is not sinful, but on the contrary, the right to demand, and the duty to render it, are clearly taught by St. Paul, when he says: “Let the husband render to his wife her due, and likewise the wife to her husband. The wife hath not control of her own body [in this matter], but the husband; the husband likewise hath not control of his own body, but the wife. Deprive not one another [of your due], unless it be by consent for a time, that you may devote yourself to prayer and [then] be together again, lest Satan use your lack of self-control to tempt you.”⁸

⁸ 1 Cor. VII, 3 sq.—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 938: “Although spouses are bound by no law to the use of marriage, they are nevertheless bound of themselves in justice to render the debt to each other if one asks it of the other expressly or tacitly (modesty, of course, standing in the way). The reason for the former is that they are not bound to use their right. The reason for the latter follows from the nature of a mutual contract. Neither is bound, speaking of itself, to request the debt, although accidentally one may sometimes be bound either by charity, e. g., to notice the danger of incontinence threatening the spouse, or by legal justice, because the public welfare would be endangered unless offspring were born.”—Gury, Comp. Theol. Mor., II, n. 687: “The conjugal debt is called that common action of the spouses which is necessary for generation and which is ordained by the supreme Provider of all things for propagating human society. This action consists in carnal union, by which man and woman become as it were one body and one flesh. An act of this kind is called a debt by the Apostle; for it is what spouses owe to each other.”—Ibid., n. 688: “The conjugal act is of itself altogether honorable and licit between true spouses, provided it is exercised for a due end; for it is the sole means established and ordained by the Creator of nature Himself for the legitimate propagation of the human race. The ends which render such an act honorable are: 1. The generation of offspring, which is numbered among the principal ends of marriage; 2. The satisfaction of the obligation arising from the right of one’s spouse; 3. The avoidance of incontinence both in oneself and in one’s spouse; 4. The desire of fostering or obtaining honorable friendship, of making manifest the conjugal affection, or of promoting it.”—Ibid., n. 696: “There is no obligation of itself to request the conjugal debt. The reason is that neither spouse is bound to use his right and each can remit it. Accidentally, however, there can be an obligation to request it from charity or another virtue, especially in the husband, e. g., if he judges that his spouse is in danger of incontinence because of modesty in asking, or if the request is necessary for the sake of fostering or restoring conjugal friendship, etc.”—Wilhelm, Das Eheleben, 98 sqq.

It follows that the married have the right, within the limits set by God, to demand the debitum coniugale of each other, and to this right corresponds the strict duty of rendering the debitum, unless there are good reasons justifying a refusal. Hence both parties have equal rights and duties in regard to matrimonial cohabitation and, generally speaking, are bound under pain of mortal sin to render each other the debitum. This obligation is especially grave if either party is exposed to the danger of incontinence.

As a rule the debitum coniugale or the redditio debiti may not be denied sub gravi if the other party expressly demands it, or the demand may be reasonably presumed. Unwarranted denial of this right is apt to disturb the peace and may easily become a source of marital infidelity.⁹

⁹ 1 Cor. VII, 7.—St. Thomas, Summa Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 63, art. 2: “Requesting the debt happens in two ways: in one way expressly, as when they request it from one another in words; in another way interpretatively, when, namely, the husband perceives through certain signs that the wife would wish the debt to be rendered to her, but is silent because of modesty; and thus, even though she does not expressly request the debt in words, nevertheless the husband is bound to render it when certain signs of rendering the debt appear in the wife.”—Ibid., art. 9, ad 1: “This has been divinely ordained because of the slipperiness of the flesh, that the debt always be rendered to one requesting it, lest any occasion of sin be given.”—St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 940: “He sins mortally who denies the debt to a spouse seriously and urgently requesting it, because it is a grave matter and is owed in justice. Understand this unless the one requesting can be turned aside by entreaties or another honorable reason and the request is not immoderate (for if it is denied once in words to one frequently requesting it, apart from danger of incontinence, it seems to be only venial because of lightness of matter; and sometimes, if one requests too immoderately and unjustly too often, none), nor is there another just cause for denying. M. Perez judges it a just cause, apart from danger of incontinence for either, if more children would be born than they can support.”

The duty of rendering the debitum ceases if the party demanding it is not in the full possession of his or her senses (e. g., insane or totally drunk), if he or she suffers from an infectious disease or has forfeited the ius petendi debitum coniugale by adultery.¹⁰

¹⁰ St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. VI, n. 948, 950–953; Gury, II, n. 696: “The obligation of rendering the debt ceases when the right of demanding it ceases; but the right is extinguished especially in the following cases, namely: 1. If one of the spouses has committed adultery, because fidelity is no longer owed to one who breaks fidelity; 2. If the one requesting lacks the use of reason, because his request is not a human act; 3. If the one rendering can reasonably fear damage or grave danger to health, because spouses are not judged to have bound themselves to render the debt with so great an inconvenience; 4. If the one requesting has lost the right to request because of incest committed with the other’s blood relatives or for some other reason.”

b) The conjugal act (usus matrimonii) is licit only if prompted by reasonable and proper motives, such as the desire for children (generatio prolis), mutual affection (caritas mutua), or the wish to avoid sin (evitatio peccati), and provided it takes place within the limits prescribed by the moral law, or, as theologians are wont to put it, “salva personae incolumitate et salvâ debitâ honestate.” Though in its nature licit, nay laudable and where the conditions for supernatural merit are present, even meritorious, the actus coniugalis may become illicit and sinful per ac- cidens, i. e., through the circumstances accompanying it.¹¹

¹¹ St. Augustine, De Genesi ad Lit., l. IX, c. 7, n. 12: “That which marriages possess as a good, and by which marriages are good, can never be a sin. This, however, is threefold: fidelity, offspring, sacrament. In fidelity, care is taken that there be no intercourse with another woman or man outside the marriage bond; in offspring, that it be lovingly received, kindly nourished, religiously educated; in the sacrament, moreover, that the marriage not be dissolved and that the man or woman who is dismissed not be joined to another even for the sake of offspring. This is, as it were, the rule of marriages, by which either the fecundity of nature is adorned or the depravity of incontinence is governed.” (Migne, P. L., XXXIV, 397.)—Idem, De Bono Coniug., c. 6, n. 6: “Conjugal intercourse for the sake of generation has no fault; that for satisfying concupiscence, however, but nevertheless with one’s spouse, has venial fault because of fidelity to the marriage bed; adultery, however, or fornication, has mortal fault. And for this reason continence from all intercourse is indeed better than even marital intercourse itself, which is performed for the sake of begetting.”—Ibid., c. 7, n. 6: “But because that continence is of greater merit, while rendering the conjugal debt is no crime, demanding it beyond the necessity of generation is a venial fault, and fornicating or committing adultery is a punishable crime, conjugal charity ought to take care lest, while seeking for itself that from which it may be more greatly honored, it make for the spouse that from which the spouse may be condemned.” (P. L., 377 sq.)—Peter Lombard, Sent., l. IV, dist. 31, c. 5.—St. Thomas, S. Theol., 3a, Suppl., qu. 49, art. 5: “Just as the goods of marriage, in so far as they are in a habit, make marriage honorable and holy, so also, in so far as they are in actual intention, they make the act of marriage honorable with respect to those two goods of marriage which concern the act itself. Hence, when spouses come together for the sake of procreating offspring, or in order to render to each other the debt that pertains to fidelity, they are totally excused from sin.”—J. Nider († 1438), Praeceptorium Div. Legis, pr. 6, c. 4: “Intercourse in marriage is therefore a meritorious act and an act of the virtue which is called conjugal chastity, when it takes place solely for the sake of procreating offspring and educating it religiously for the increase of divine worship. And if the other due circumstances are then present, it is an act of the virtue which is called religion.”—Cfr. Denifle, Luther und Luthertum, Vol. I, 2nd ed., pp. 238 sqq.

Reason of order. After religion, by which the supereminent excellence of God, our Creator and Governor, is worshiped, those virtues obtain primacy which worship analogous excellences of men. A Parent approaches most nearly to God. Hence the virtue which is primarily toward him, or piety, must first be discussed.

Utility. A distinct understanding of the genuine ratio of piety must be acquired by us concerning the reason why not only parents and fatherland, but also wife, children, and we ourselves are the object of piety; besides, the mutual offices of parents and children, with their application to present times, must be well known, so that they can be inculcated firmly and efficaciously.

Order of treatment. After general notions have been set forth, we shall speak in order of piety toward parents, toward children, between spouses, toward the remaining blood-relatives; of quasi-piety between tutor and wards, of piety toward the fatherland, of man's piety toward himself (where suicide is treated).

What it is, and toward whom. 1. Now piety is a special virtue by which we cultivate the proper excellence of those from whom we draw origin.

2. a) There is an eminent title of piety in God, since, even in the natural order, He is a principle of being for us more absolutely and by an action more voluntary than any others; and in the supernatural order, by a deifying adoption, He willed us truly to be His children.

b) Then parents, by generation itself, and the fatherland, by the protection and guardianship by which it has guarded parents and ourselves, are truly for us a principle of being. Therefore the formal title of piety is primarily in them.

c) But because of unity with those parents themselves, we can and must venerate parents in a spouse, in children, in blood-relatives, in ourselves. Because "God Himself made us and not we ourselves" (Ps. 99, 3), we must venerate in ourselves not only the blood of parents, but also, indeed more, the image of God. And the spontaneous reverence by which we honor blood-relatives, and which, especially among nearer relatives, is a safeguard of chastity, itself testifies that the formal ratio of piety is participated by a spouse, by children, by blood-relatives, by ourselves. Nor in a dissimilar manner, because of the fatherland, is it participated by citizens; because of God, by the remaining men: in all men God has placed something divine; yet so that the title of piety is stronger in the saints, because they are more divine, and in the poor, because they turn the special solicitude of God toward themselves and bear the image of the suffering Christ, so that they are most of all the object of divine piety. Cf. Quaestiones de religione, etc., n. 178 ff.

Piety is a special virtue by which we cultivate the proper excellence of those from whom we draw origin. The formal title of piety is primarily in God, then in parents and fatherland; because of conjunction with parents, a title is participated by spouse, by children, by blood-relatives, by ourselves, just as, because of conjunction with the fatherland, by citizens; and, because of God, by the remaining men: which last title is stronger in the saints and in the poor.

Utility. Although there is not leisure to explain according to its merit the argument of the present tractate, which touches in no slight way upon the social question itself, nevertheless already a summary proposition of the relations by which, in the private and public order, superiors and inferiors are bound by mutual benevolence from their very offices, is very opportunely opposed today to haters and contemners of all authority, and to those disturbers of society who meditate and strive either to confound the orders of citizens or to separate them by deadly hatred.

Notion of the virtue. Observance is the virtue which honors the excellence of another. It was introduced on account of good governance. For every excellence denotes some aptitude for leading or governing others in some matter. The offices of this virtue are absorbed by piety, when there is question of honoring parents; by religion, when there is question of honoring God.

According to the diverse order of governance, the virtue varies specifically; whence political observance is distinguished from religious observance. But in the same order, the honesty and necessity of the virtue differ in degree but not in species. Wherefore the offices of observance toward a pastor and toward a bishop are of the same species. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 923.

Marriage was instituted first of all for the due propagation of the human race.

Because propagation of any sort would satisfy neither the dignity of the parents, nor the education of the children, nor the interests of society.

Because it might be the work solely of animal passion, whereas man’s dignity requires in all his free actions intervention and even control by his superior or spiritual part.

Because it might leave paternity uncertain, it might be the fruit of transient unions, and it would then afford for the education of the children neither the security nor the continuity nor the unity which are needed.

Because the citizen is no better than the man of whom he is made; and a promiscuous propagation of mankind, by compromising the right formation of men, would expose society to the risk of being in want of that which it needs most, virtuous citizens who are devoted to their country.

by requiring in advance of the corporal union a First, sincere affection uniting the souls; secondly, by providing for education by means of the stability of the union; finally, by creating through the fusion of two persons a common principle of vigilance, tenderness and care, by which the children benefit from the qualities of both sexes harmoniously combined. “Man and woman together constitute the principle which is destined to transmit and develop human life.”¹

¹ Dermine, work cited, p. 44.

Such a death is an accidental misfortune. Sad though it be, it does not entirely destroy the unity in duality which was realized in the marriage. The surviving spouse is guided in his life and in his task of education by the remembrance of the lessons and counsels of the departed one, and by all that the deceased has left him. He knows the counsels and wishes of the deceased partner, and tries to conform to them; and thus the education of a legitimate child is never the work of one parent alone.

The Creator of the human race Himself [says the Encyclical] who in His goodness wished to use men as His

helpers in the propagation of life, taught this when, instituting marriage in Paradise, He said to our first parents, and through them to all future spouses, “Increase and multiply, and fill the earth,” as St. Augustine¹ admirably deduces from the words of the holy Apostle St. Paul to Timothy when he says, “The Apostle himself is therefore a witness that marriage is for the sake of generation: ‘I wish,’ he says, ‘young girls to marry.’ And, as if someone said to him, ‘Why?’ he immediately adds, ‘to beget children, to be mothers of families.’”² We prove it from the fact that the faculty of reproduction brings together intimately persons of different sexes; also because apart from this power of reproduction the institution of marriage would be inconceivable; because the right use of that power is a safeguard of the other blessings of marriage; and because the right propagation of mankind closely concerns the good of society as a whole.

¹ De bono conjugali, c. 24, n. 32; PL, 40, 394.

² Pp. 24-25.

Yes, a great blessing. In the first place what an honor it is for man to be associated with the creative work of God, to bring forth a king of visible creation, to prepare one of the elect for Heaven, to furnish to the Church a son, in whom, once he will have been regenerated by baptism, Jesus Christ will dwell! What happiness to survive, as it were, one’s self in the persons of dear ones who love you, and thus obtain even on earth a kind of perpetual memory! Besides, the child cements the union of the parents; in the little quarrels which are almost inevitable he is the conciliating element; because he requires good example he is an educative factor, and makes the work of mutual upbuilding easier for the parents. The sacrifices he demands are compensated for by satisfactions of a higher order; the cares he requires make him the more beloved. The human mind is unable to imagine or to taste this dignity, or to appreciate that feeling of pride in being the father or the mother of a child of men and a child of God. Even then they will not appreciate it when they see the look in the eyes of their child in whom shines the immortal soul; or when afterward they reflect that that soul is the breath of God, that the Son of God died for that child, that enriched as he is with the gift of sanctifying grace, he is more like a God than a man, that he is destined to live forever *De bono conjugali chapter 24. number 32, Latin Patrology. 40, 394. *Pp. 24-25.

and when, thereupon they exclaim: “This is my child! He owes his existence to me! Without me he would not be there, and would never come to be!”¹ If a true Christian mother weighs well these things, she will indeed understand with a sense of deep consolation that of her the words of Our Saviour were spoken: “A woman . . . when she hath brought forth the child remembereth no more the anguish, for joy that a man is born into the world”; and proving herself superior to all the pains and cares and solicitudes of her maternal office with a more just and holy joy than that of the Roman matron, the mother of the Gracchi,² she will rejoice in the Lord, crowned as it were with the glory of her offspring. Both husband and wife, however, receiving these children with joy and gratitude from the hand of God, will regard them as a talent committed to their charge by God, not only to be employed for their own advantage or for that of an earthly commonwealth, but to be restored to God with interest on the day of reckoning.³ “Such,” says St. Augustine whom the Encyclical cites, “is the law of marriage, which sets off the glory of fecundity while it puts a brake to the shameful disorder of incontinence.”⁴

¹ Schilgen, work cited, p. 11.

² The Encyclical here recalls an event of Roman history. Whilst other matrons were displaying their jewels to their hearts’ content, the mother of the Gracchi presented her two sons, saying: “These are my jewels.”

³ P. 26.

⁴ De Gen. ad. lit., Book IX, chapter 7, number 12; Latin Patrology, 34, 397.

Not at all; it is completed only by the right education of the child. In giving them this little being who is entirely incapable of providing for himself, nature, in a general way, designates the parents as those who must provide for him: physically, by the mother’s milk and the means of subsistence; morally, by the education of the mind and heart which begins immediately and lasts continuously, thanks to the constant influence which the common life exerts on those who share it. The parents have an inviolable right to fulfil this mission of education with which nature has entrusted them, and in view of which they have been instilled with a love which nothing can replace.

Since this twofold duty entrusted to the parents for the good of their children is of such high dignity and of such great importance, every use of the faculty given by God for the procreation of new life is the right and the privilege of the marriage state alone, by the law of God and of nature, and must be confined absolutely within the sacred limits of that state.¹ Certainly, outside of marriage, education is deprived of the double guaranty which a lawful union provides: the guaranty of its duration by the perpetual bond which attaches the parents to each other; the guaranty of prudence by the intimacy which gives to education the resource of a common principle rich with the complementary qualities of both sexes.

¹ P. 27.

The great positive duty is that of mutual love inspired by charity. The marriage bond sets up between the spouses an intimacy which no other surpasses or even equals; the marriage would never have been entered upon without the mutual affection which was necessary for the parties to give themselves to each other. Conjugal love has in Christian marriage a sort of noble primacy. For matrimonial faith demands that husband and wife be joined in an especially holy and pure love, not as adulterers love each other, but as Christ loved the Church. This precept the Apostle laid down when he said: “Husbands, love your wives as Christ also loved the Church,” which of a truth He embraced with a boundless love, not for the sake of His own advantage, but seeking only the good of His spouse.¹

¹ P. 28.

Charity is a love which is forgetful of self: “Charity seeketh not her own” (I Cor. xiii, 5). It is a love which is not content with words: “Let us not love in word, nor in tongue, but in deed and in truth” (I John iii, 18). It is a love which has its source in God, ends in Him, and tends to lead to Him those that He loves. Charity should, therefore, manifest itself by mutual benevolence, readiness to help in every necessity or difficulty; also by activity of mutual upbuilding, and reciprocal

influence for good according to the qualities allotted to each party, an office which is called in Christian tradition the work of edification according to the Gospel.

It excludes any abasement of one of the spouses, any degrading subjection or servitude; but, far from excluding all subordination, it rather requires it for the sake of order and harmony; only it must see to it that this subordination is suave and gentle.

Because if nature had not established a hierarchical order domestic society would begin with anarchy, and authority which did not rest on a natural title would make submission more painful and less welcome. Nature herself designates the husband as the superior by giving him strength of body and a fatherhood which does not interfere with his duties in the maintenance and government of the family. Besides having a natural ability which is usually greater, the man has by nature a taste for government and leadership; whereas the woman, physically less robust, naturally leans upon him, and is besides normally impeded by the inconvenient consequences of motherhood. By supernatural revelation, the Apostle derives this hierarchy from the mysterious origin of woman: “For the man is not of the woman, but the woman of the man” (I Cor. xi, 8).

Not at all. It is limited to the exterior acts of family life which may be reasonably demanded. The wife keeps the independence of a human person; she remains free in her personal conduct, in her practises of piety, in her goings and comings, with due consideration for the conjugal pact and the order of the house and family; she preserves the right to demand of the husband whatever her quality as wife and mother entitles her to, for she, too, has charge of the education of the children. Finally, as the husband and wife were equal in giving themselves each to the other, so they remain equal in regard to the right which flows from

this mutual self-surrender. Besides, the subordination of the wife admits of a certain variation according to circumstances of time, place, and persons. Incapacity on the part of the husband confers upon the wife by a natural devolution the right to replace him in the government of the house. State laws, and the ante-nuptial agreement, if any, may modify the property rights of the wife. There will, therefore, be,even as a regular thing, cases of independence and cases of equality; besides there are exceptional cases.

It may be somewhat diminished or intensified; but, since it is founded in the natural order it can never be entirely abolished nor go beyond certain limits. It is intended to last as long as the family itself.

The Encyclical reminds us that if the husband is the head of the family, the wife is the heart.¹ As the former has the primacy of government, the latter may and should claim for herself the primacy of love. As Leo XIII observes (Encyclical “Arcanum”): “Divine charity should never cease to be the norm of their respective rights.”

¹ See the beautiful reflections of Dermine, work cited, pp. 41-43 on these reciprocal parts of the husband and wife.

Marriage may also be defined as a “total community of life.”

Certainly not, since it began and sprang from that mutual giving of self, and at the same time is its crown and glory.

First, because the spouses can in their union make this their chief purpose. Secondly, because the community of life between the spouses—our second definition of marriage—is providentially directed by God to this last end, which, being the supreme end of man, occupies the first place in the Divine Will.

Absolutely not, because such relations are intrinsically vicious, wrong, and the circumstances mentioned, being merely accidental and extrinsic, cannot alter this. Besides, such a moral disorder could never conduce to perfection nor even serve the purposes of true love, for true love is partly founded on mutual respect, which moral disorder must necessarily weaken. This truth is confirmed by the experience of anthropologists and public officials. Improper relations break up homes.

A training which curbs selfishness and cowardice in the presence of temptations; training to generosity and self-command.

Those who are determined to help each other in everything; to save their souls and to work for their mutual perfection; to be real fathers and mothers to their children,

and to provide for them at home that happiness which money cannot buy and which is a reminder of Heaven.

Precisely those who have prepared in this way for marriage.

Future spouses must pass through, as it were, an apprenticeship for conjugal life by practising generosity and cultivating moral fibre. Educators must correct the disordered tendencies of children from their early years, and develop their good inclinations; imbue their minds with the doctrines that come from God, and prepare their hearts to receive the help of Divine grace.

It insists in the first place—and with what good reason!—on the importance of that choice. How many have to rue during their whole lives the rashness and frivolity of an ill-considered match! Hence it demands mature deliberation, in which neither God nor religion are left out: in which the aspirants to marriage reflect on themselves, their character, education, propensities, and qualities; and consider, also, the other party and his or her fitness under these same respects, the children whom they must be ready to receive willingly from God's bounty, and finally society and their place in it. It demands a prayer that this choice may be enlightened, pure and high in its motives. It demands that the wise counsel of parents on the subject be not neglected; they have experience on their side; and besides this deference to them draws down the blessing of God.

256. - 1. The obligation of cohabiting follows upon the obligation of rendering the conjugal debt. Moreover, cohabitation is consonant with the nature of marriage, since, from the very definition of law, marriage is "the union of a man and a woman, containing an undivided manner of life" (Institutes, book 1, title 9, De patria potestate, § 1).

The new Code of Canon Law sanctions the same in these words canon 1128: "Spouses must preserve the communion of conjugal life, unless a just cause excuses them."

Therefore, when the other is unwilling, one spouse cannot be absent for a longer time without necessity. Except the case of adultery, as was stated in no. 249.

2. Nevertheless, this obligation is to be understood in a human manner. Wherefore, with a burden plainly extraordinary and unforeseen, the wife will not be bound to follow her husband into a distant region; and a more excellent good, or certainly one more due and more necessary, can excuse spouses from cohabitation. It must be left to the judgment of prudent persons to determine when, in proportion to the gravity of the cause, a husband or wife is judged to be absent longer than the obligation of cohabitation permits. But if it is necessary for the husband to be absent for a long time, he must take his wife with him, if he conveniently can. Cf. St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 939.

3. When the other spouse is unwilling, to be absent without a sufficient cause will be mortal:

1. Whenever it includes a mortal denial of the debt;

2. If it is not for a short time: this will have to be weighed both in itself and from the harm or sadness of the other.

4. Just causes can be: honorable recreation, care for health; the necessity either of avoiding one's own harm, of supporting the family, or of administering the family property; the demand of the public good.

Thus, for the sake of religion, they permit a man a brief pilgrimage, while the wife, since the man is her head, has need of the husband's permission.

5. But neither, "when the other consents, is it therefore at once lawful, without another just cause, to depart for a fixed time, unless provision is made against the probable danger of incontinence in either party, no harm comes to the family, and scandal is absent" (Palmieri, vol. 6, treatise 10, no. 388).

In this matter, it will be necessary that the richer assist the poorer or more humble who, seeking richer wages outside their homeland, can easily be exposed there to many sins against religion and morals. Cf. the institutions in Belgium for assisting those who, each year, are accustomed to go to France for several months for the sake of work; and what Kolping devised to protect those who learn a trade even in a foreign region (apprentices).

Formerly writers permitted that, in order to obtain payment of the promised dowry, the man refuse cohabitation for some time, if this seemed to be an efficacious means. And they dispensed the man from providing support to a wife whose promised dowry had not yet been paid. Cf. St. Alphonsus, book 6, no. 939; Palmieri, vol. 6, treatise 10, nos. 390, 391. These things now have little practical use.

6. It is also to be desired, and care is to be taken insofar as possible, that spouses use not only a common roof but also a common bedroom. For the separation of bedrooms, besides providing an easy occasion for sins and suspicions, is shown to be not slightly harmful to mutual love and, as experience testifies, is a frequent cause of unhappy marriages and divorces. Cf. nos. 208, 3, and 215, 1, and Forel himself.

Honor thy father and thy mother.

(Exod., 20, 12).

686. The three prior precepts order man to God. Among the other precepts, which regard neighbor, the first, that is, the fourth precept, has itself specially and directly toward those who on earth hold the place of God. Such are before all parents, and then extensively, by reason of similitude as regards power and office, all those who in some way possess authority. But parents preside under a twofold respect: namely insofar as they are the principle of life, and insofar as they are strong with eminent authority: to them therefore piety is owed, and observance; the latter, however, eminent and complete, insofar as it also includes obedience.

Indirectly from this precept are prescribed the duties both of parents toward children and among themselves, and of other Superiors toward subjects (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 122, a. 5). For there is not given a right without an office, nor an office without a right.

Therefore let there be four heads of inquiry: 1. concerning piety, observance, and obedience in general; 2. concerning the mutual obligations of children and parents; 3. concerning the duties of spouses; 4. concerning the mutual duties of inferiors and Superiors.

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101-105; St. Alphonsus, III, 333 seq.; ed. G., I, p. 600; H. Ap., tr. VII; Catech. Rom., de 4 Praec.; Aertnys, I, n. 147; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 922-952; Noldin, II, n. 278; Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 363; Genicot-Salsmans, I, n. 345; and others, as Gopfert, Schindler, in the respective places; Vermeersch, Quaest. de Virt. Relig. et Piet., q. 2, c. 1, n. 178.

687. I. Piety, in the BROAD sense, is taken for an affection of devotion, or even for mercy and kindness, especially toward those needing help.

But in the STRICT sense, piety is defined: The virtue by which due worship is rendered to parents, country, and those joined by blood. - To PARENTS are reduced blood relatives, especially ascendants, grandfather, great-grandfather, etc.; likewise spiritual parents, namely those who, after God, are the authors of spiritual life for us. But to COUNTRY are referred fellow citizens and friends of the country, because of their conjunction with it.

Brothers or sisters are not directly referred to parents, because they are not the principle of being. Nevertheless the virtue of piety redounds to them, because blood is common to the whole family. Besides, brothers are often the principle of education. Whence Lugo concludes (de Poen., disp. 16, n. 299 and 307): Sins against remote blood relatives are not sins against piety; but such are sins against brothers or sisters, at least if a most grave evil is brought upon them.

II. The MATERIAL object of piety is WORSHIP, as it is defined n. 531. Piety recognizes in another the excellence of principle, and subjects itself from love, full of reverence and manifested by obedience. Its FORMAL object is the special honesty which shines forth in such worship, from this namely, that parents and country are, after God, the principle of our being and of our education, and therefore are, after God, especially to be worshiped (Billuart, de cet. Virt. Just. annexis, Diss. 1, a. 1).

688. • From what has been said you will gather: 1. PIETY is a special virtue, different both from charity toward neighbor, which wishes well and does good to men insofar as they are ordered to God; and from legal justice, which indeed regards the good of the country, but insofar as it is the common good to be procured through the observance of laws; and therefore must also be exercised by those who have departed from the country.

2. The debt of piety, especially toward parents, is so great that it can never be satisfied to equality: understand, in the same order of things and through ordinary services; for, through supernatural services, or even extraordinary ones, the benefit received from parents and country can well be compensated, indeed surpassed, as if a son should convert his parents to the true faith, or expose his life for their liberation. Nevertheless, extraordinary services of this kind by no means free the son from the natural obligation by which he is bound to parents, because the son always perseveres in being a son (Lessius, de Just. et Jure, l. 2, c. 46, n. 4).

3. As religion is eminently piety, so piety is eminently observance; and therefore, by a stronger title, it prescribes the same duties as observance, and especially obedience (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 101, a. 1, ad 1).

689. • I. OBSERVANCE is defined: the virtue by which worship is exhibited to persons constituted in dignity or excellence.

II. Observance is twofold: 1. civil, which offers worship to persons increased with civil dignity, for example kings, magistrates, masters, teachers; - 2. religious, which offers worship to those adorned with supernatural excellence.

This is subdivided into simple and sacred, according as it regards either wayfarers, as the Pope, Bishops, priests, etc., or comprehensors, as the Blessed who triumph in the heavens (cf. n. 531).

III. The MATERIAL object of observance is worship. Here it bespeaks excellence of personal dignity in another and proportionate submission on our part. But the FORMAL object of observance is the special aspect of honesty, from the fact that those who are constituted in this dignity have divine authority, and are, or can be, after God, the principle of our governance.

There are two offices or parts of observance: 1. To exhibit due honor to Superiors, by reason of the more sublime grade in which they are placed. By strict debt, honor is owed only to Superiors; but by moral debt, from a certain honesty, it is owed to all those who are constituted in dignity, even if we are not subject to their authority (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 102, a. 2, ad 2). - 2. To furnish obedience, that is, to submit oneself to the command of Superiors, and faithfully to grant to them the service which is owed to them by reason of the office of governance.

Concerning obedience, since it obtains the principal parts in the ordering of inferiors to Superiors, more things must be added.

690. Definition. Obedience is a virtue inclining one to comply with the will of a Superior, that is, of him who participates in the supreme dominion of the divine Governor over a rational creature.

Division. 1. By reason of the order of superiority, there is given civil, ecclesiastical, domestic, or finally monastic obedience. - 2. By reason of the nature of superiority, there is given material or general obedience, and formal or special obedience.

a) Material or general obedience inclines one to observe whatever precept, from whatever honest motive; and thus it is a complex of all the virtues.

For every virtue inclines one to observe a precept in its own matter; and since these can be posited from the special motive of obedience, hence every honest act is called material obedience. Conversely, any violation whatever of law or virtue is disobedience broadly, taken generally. Therefore general disobedience is not a special sin.

b) Formal obedience, if taken strictly, as here, is a virtue inclining one to observe precepts because they are precepts, on account of the special honesty which subjection toward God commanding brings and includes.

But if it is taken a little more broadly, it is a virtue inclining one to comply with the will of a Superior, whether that will is preceptive or of mere good pleasure, because this is honest: for since the will of a superior is a certain rule of the subject, obedience will be the more perfect, according to St. Thomas (2.2, q. 104, a. 2), if it anticipates the precept, after the example of Christ, for whom the will and complacency of the Father was the highest precept, as Albertus Magnus says, c. 3, de Virtutibus.

From these things conclude: 1. Whatever may be the source of authority, obedience or disobedience on the part of subjects will be of the same species (St. Thom., l. c., ad 4).

For it always tends toward divine authority, whether as existing in God, or as participated by man.

2. Disobedience, taken strictly, will formally be present as a special sin only when a true precept issued by a Superior is transgressed, as Lessius says (l. c., n. 22). In this case a special sin against the fourth precept would be committed. Thus clearly Genicot, I, n. 348, 4. Cf. what was said n. 325.

3. If contempt of the Superior, as Superior, accedes, there will always be present a mortal sin, whatever disobedience you have committed. Cf. n. 179.

691. Principles. I. Formal obedience is a special virtue, among the moral virtues most excellent after religion. 1. It is a special virtue, because it has a special aspect of honesty, namely to fulfill the precept of the Superior, tacit or express, precisely because it is the precept of the Superior, that is, of one holding the place of God governing. - 2. Among the moral virtues, for its object is not God, but the thing willed by the Superior. - 3. Most excellent, because it contemns the greatest good, namely one's own will (Lessius, l. c., n. 36). Whence St. Gregory (Moral., l. 35, c. 42, n. 28): "Obedience is rightly preferred to victims: because through victims another's flesh is slain, but through obedience one's own will is slain." Cf. St. Thom., l. c., a. 2 and 3.

It must be noted with Reuter (Theol. mor., P. II, n. 230): "That the precept of obedience may be satisfied, it is not necessary to operate from its special motive, but it is enough that the commanded work be posited, even from the motive of another virtue." See what was said n. 212.

692. II. A subject is held to obey a Superior in all things in which he is subject to him, and in which a Superior of higher grade does not stand opposed. This is established from the necessity of preserving order, and from Sacred Scripture (Hebr., 22): Obey your prelates, etc.; and (Acts Ap., 5, 29): It is necessary to obey God rather than men. God alone must be obeyed in all things simply; but man determinately according to the nature of superiority.

693. Note. a) If there is doubt concerning the legitimacy of the Superior, or concerning the imposition of the precept, the subject is not held of himself to obey, as was said n. 55. b) But if there is doubt whether the thing commanded is licit, whether it exceeds the power of the Superior, the obligation of obedience possesses (cf. n. 52 and 223). See St. Alph., I, 100, Quaer. 3; IV, 47.

Consult, besides the cited authors, Berardi, Theol. mor. (1905), I, n. 621; Koch, 166; special works and opuscula, for example Guilmont, La culture de l'ame dans l'enfance; Meschler, Principes d'educ. cathol.; Toublan, Directeur des Meres chretiennes, La Jeune Fille chret.; Diessel, Ratschlage; Berthier, La jeune Fille, la Mere, le jeune Homme, l'Homme; Becker, Christl. Erziehung, etc.

By reason of the threefold respect which parents have toward children, children are held to exhibit to parents duties of a threefold genus, which are declared in the following principles.

One and the same piety imposes filial love, reverence, and obedience. Nevertheless he who offends against these three commits a sin diverse in species. Thus, for example, he who in the presence of his parents, from hatred, curses them, has two sins diverse in species, one against love, the other against due reverence.

694. Principles. I. By reason of origin, children are held to exhibit love to parents, even from piety. This is established from natural right, by which gratitude is especially commanded, on account of the greatest benefit of existence and education received from parents. Moreover gratitude necessarily wishes good to parents, which is the same as to love. That love toward parents must be both internal, by which children from the soul wish them well and desire goods for them, and external, by which, according to their powers, they avert evils from them, attest their benevolence to them, and kindly come to their aid when they are constituted in necessity.

Piety through itself urges more strictly; because it imposes obligation not from a common title, but from a special and personal title; and thus a fault which is light if it is committed toward strangers can be grave if directed against parents, because perhaps it will be the occasion of greater sorrow.

Hence: 1. Children sin gravely, both against charity and against the love of piety, who, deliberately and in notable matter, are borne toward parents with ill will, indignation, hatred; - who exhibit signs of hatred toward them, treat them harshly; who look at them with grim eyes, and address them so bitterly as if they hated them; who provoke them to grave indignation, and gravely sadden them; - who wish evil to them, for example death, so that thus they may more quickly obtain possession of their inheritance; who in a notable matter speak evil of them, or calumniate them; who by evil arts impede them from making a testament, or, having already entered into their inheritance, do not execute their last will.

2. Similarly they sin gravely, at least against the love of piety, who do not furnish food to them when reduced to want; - who do not visit them when worn out by disease, old age, or sorrow, and leave them without consolation; - who do not succor them when they are in spiritual necessity, for example by not taking care that, when dangerously sick, they receive the sacraments of the dying; - who dissemble, as if they did not know them; - who, when they have already departed this life, neglect that the funeral rites and suffrages of the Church be paid, in a manner congruous to their condition (III, 333; Instr. catech., P. I, c. 4, n. 1).

Note. In most regions, civil laws agreeing with natural right drive children to this, that they supply FOOD to father and mother, and to other ascendants who are in necessity, that is, food, clothing, and habitation. And indeed this obligation binds children in solidum. In a similar way, son-in-law and daughter-in-law are held to feed father-in-law and mother-in-law. Nevertheless the obligation ceases when the mother-in-law enters a new marriage; likewise it ceases when there die both the spouse who had induced the affinity and the children of this spouse, procreated from the marriage which had been the cause of the affinity.¹

As regards children who would wish to enter Religion, see n. 2137.

695. II. By reason of the personal dignity of parents, children are held to exhibit to them reverence and honor: reverence, so that they acknowledge their dignity, and thence conceive, as they say, reverential fear; honor, so that externally by words, signs, and deeds they profess their preeminence. This is established from Sacred Scripture saying (Deuter., 27, 16): Cursed is he who does not honor his father and mother; and elsewhere (Eccli., 3, 9): In deed and speech, and all patience, honor thy father. Reason supports it: for where there is a special dignity of a person, there special observance is owed.

Hence, children sin gravely, of themselves, against reverence:

1. By an internal act, if they contemn parents in the heart.

2. By word, if in the presence of parents they cast curses or insults against them, calling them, for example, mad, drunk, beasts, thieves, poisoners, wicked. But if they call them "old, ignorant, stupid, etc.," they are not absolutely to be condemned of mortal sin, unless they gravely sadden them thereby. Likewise, "if a son should mock a parent, or utter evil prayers against him, without a depraved mind and secretly, I would not know," says St. Alphonsus, "how to condemn him of mortal sin" (H. Ap., VII, 2).

3. By sign, if they contemn them by laughter, derision, gesture. Likewise, if when advanced to dignities or made rich, from pride they either despise or neglect them, or refuse to know them, or even, which not rarely happens, blush because of them. Nevertheless a son is excused from mortal sin who, on account of a just cause and without internal contempt, pretends that he does not know them, or refuses to have them at his house, for example because they are marked by an infamous crime, or because he himself would suffer grave harm therefrom; provided he furnishes necessary things to them. And the reason is that in such a case the parents themselves are not judged to be gravely or reasonably unwilling (III, 334).

4. By deed, if deliberately and with sufficient advertence they strike them, even lightly; indeed if they only raise a hand, or seize an instrument for striking. Likewise, if in court they accuse them of a crime, though true; for nature itself shrinks from this. - Except the case of heresy, treason, or conspiracy against the prince, if there is no other mode of correcting: for the common good must be preferred to private good (cf. n. 2308). It is also licit for children in court to seek goods owed to them by strict right, which parents unjustly deny to restore.

696. III. By reason of authority, children are held to furnish obedience to parents in all licit things, and in things pertaining to their care, as long as they remain under their power. For children, being born in domestic society, are by this very fact members of the same society, for directing which toward the common good paternal power presides. Sacred Scripture agrees, saying (Ephes., 6, 1): Children, obey your parents in the Lord: for this is just.

We have said 1. In all licit things; for as parents cannot command the things which are forbidden by God, so neither can children obey them when they command forbidden things, according to what was said n. 692.

2. In things pertaining to the care of parents, namely to the governance of the house, to good morals, to the salvation of the soul. For in these things parents have not only the right, but also the office of commanding.

Otherwise, if it is a question of choosing a state of life, of preserving virginity, and similar things, in which pubescent children are of their own judgment, as will be said in its own place (n. 1951, 1; n. 2137, 2). Meanwhile it should be noted that children are held to seek the counsel of parents if there is question of entering marriage; nevertheless there is not given to them a necessity under grave obligation of following the counsels given. If it is a question of a priestly or religious vocation, the whole business must be brought to its end before God, with the confessor and competent authority helping. But what must be done if parents compel one to enter marriage, see n. 700.

3. As long as they remain under their power; for the power of the father is not perpetual, as perpetual is his right to the love and reverence of offspring. This power ceases when the office of education of the offspring or of domestic governance ceases, for example when children begin to have a hearth separate from the father (cf. n. 698).

697. • From what has been said you will gather: Children sin gravely against obedience, namely by a special sin, and therefore one to be declared in confession, if they refuse to obey parents seriously commanding: 1. In a grave and just matter which regards good morals, for example if children frequent taverns, theaters, and other dangerous places, if they play harmful games; if daughters go out of the house at night, if with suitors, or even with other youths, witnesses being removed, they converse (III, 335; H. Ap., VII, 3).

2. In a grave and just matter which regards the salvation of the soul, for example if against the formal precept of parents they neglect to satisfy the duties which religion imposes; if they neglect to assist at Mass and other pious functions; if for a notable time they abstain from the reception of the sacraments, etc.

3. In a grave and just matter which regards the governance of the house, for example if they refuse to furnish work formally imposed, of great moment certainly; if, because of sloth, they neglect to devote themselves to the study of letters, or to learn an art which befits their condition; if without grave cause they flee from the paternal house. But otherwise, if flight happens on account of a grave cause, for example because in the paternal house there is for them a proximate occasion of sinning which they would not find elsewhere, or because they are treated too harshly, and there is no hope that a change of things will soon follow. - In practice, nevertheless, not rarely the disobedience of children, even in a grave matter, is excused from mortal sin, both because of levity of mind and inadvertence, and more often because of defect of a rigorous precept (cf. n. 325, q. 2 and n. 692).

Note. a) What matter is to be judged grave must be defined by prudent judgment: generally it will be that by whose omission parents, domestic order, or the temporal or spiritual good of children would suffer grave detriment. In these also observe that one act of rebellion less easily constitutes a mortal sin.

b) Let the confessor take care that, in questioning children concerning their threefold obligation toward parents, he not proceed inconsiderately. For often, only incidentally and obscurely, they accuse themselves concerning their manner of acting, although it is very bad; and hence it happens that easily, and without fruit of amendment, they obtain the benefit of absolution. Therefore, their character and their education having been known, they must be asked whether they have gravely harmed father or mother by words, what they did, and with what plan; for there must be attended to the effect of exasperation, sadness, etc., caused in the parent without just motive, and at least confusedly foreseen by the child.

698. • PATERNAL POWER is the right which by force of laws belongs to the father, and subordinately to the mother, over their offspring and over the goods of the offspring. 1. As regards the persons of children, the law everywhere in force imposes on parents the obligation of furnishing food and education according to the condition of fortune and status. It confers the right of custody, whether in the paternal home or in a house of education, and the right of moderate correction. - 2. As regards goods, there will be discussion in the treatise on justice (n. 858). This power indeed arises from the very right of nature; but it belongs to civil law to determine how far this power extends itself, as regards public effects, and when and how it is extinguished. - When parents are lacking, paternal power is conferred on a guardian, beside whom stands a family council under the vigilance of a judge.

Children are distinguished as legitimate or illegitimate. Illegitimate children, that is, those born outside legitimate marriage, are either spurious, that is, incestuous, adulterine, sacrilegious, that is, procreated from parents between whom, at the time when they were conceived and born, by reason of consanguinity, or bond, or solemn vow, marriage could not be contracted; or natural, that is, born from parents who at the time of conception were indeed not joined in marriage, but capable of contracting it.

Natural children can be recognized, in which case they enjoy the rights determined by law; or they can even be legitimated by subsequent marriage, and then they are equated with legitimate children, and the Church herself admits legitimation of this kind (cf. Ferraris, v. Son). Let each person see under what conditions the law grants such legitimation (French Code, 331; German, 1732; Austrian, 160-162). Spurious offspring ordinarily cannot be legitimated before civil law. But the supreme power in the Church can grant such legitimation. See n. 1962.

In FRANCE (art. 371-515) paternal power, which belongs to the father, and, he being dead, absent, or interdicted, to the mother, lasts until the majority or emancipation of the child. Moreover, a son, likewise a daughter, obtains majority as soon as he has completed the 21st year. Emancipation happens by the law itself through marriage; it can also be granted by the father, or, the father being lacking, by the mother after the 15th year has been completed; or, both parents having died, by the family council, but after the 18th year has been completed. The emancipated person has the right of directing his own person and administering all his goods, a curator nevertheless assisting. But as regards marriage, a son before the 25th year completed, and a daughter before the 21st year completed, cannot contract it without the consent of parents; if the parents disagree among themselves, the consent of the father suffices.

In SPAIN, paternal power ceases: 1. by privation: a) if a widowed mother enters a second marriage, unless the husband, by testament, established the contrary as regards those not emancipated; but the mother, if she again becomes a widow, recovers it; b) if father or mother by sentence of a judge are declared incapable because of crime or divorce; but the lost power is restored when the effect of the sentence ceases; c) or if the child, the parents consenting, is adopted by another (Spanish Code, 168-177);

2. by emancipation; and this is a) absolute, by majority, which son and daughter obtain after the 23rd year has been completed. Nevertheless a daughter, even if of majority age, cannot desert the paternal house before the 25th year has been completed, unless for contracting marriage, or father or mother have entered second marriages; - b) relative, alpha) by the marriage of a minor, within the limits of the law (315), beta) by concession of the father, or, he being lacking, of the mother, but not before the 18th year has been completed, gamma) by concession of the family council to orphans of father and mother, but not before the 18th year has been completed, and with the judge of first instance approving. Emancipated persons can direct their own person and administer their goods. But as regards marriage they do not obtain independence in every way. Minors cannot contract without the consent of father or guardian; the father being lacking, without the consent of the mother, in whose default grandfather and family council successively furnish permission. Likewise those of majority age cannot marry without counsel sought from father or mother; but if these disagree, they can contract after three months.

Both request and consent must be established from an authentic document of a notary or judge. A marriage contracted without the counsel or consent of the father is valid; but the goods of the contracting parties will remain separate, nor can the spouses make donations to one another or receive them mutually, nor can a minor administer goods, and he has a right only to food. Spanish Code, 45, 47, 50. Widowers and widows, even minors, do not need the aforesaid license or counsel (ibid.).

In ITALY, the laws are nearly the same as in France. Yet a son can never be emancipated before the completed 18th year (art. 220 seq. and 311).

In AUSTRIA, sons and daughters are ordinarily of majority age and of their own right after the completed 24th year, but extraordinarily even before then, if the father, with the judge approving, expressly emancipates the children, or when the 20th year has been completed permits separate industry (a. 172 seqq.). Indeed, at the insistence of the father, paternal power can, from just causes, be prolonged beyond the 24th year. Besides, a minor daughter delivered in marriage, if the husband dies, returns under paternal power (art. 172-178).

In ENGLAND, the mother has the right of custody over children not yet seven years old; then the father, until they have completed the 21st year: at which age sons and daughters become of majority age and of their own right (Crolly, de Just., n. 466, 469).

In GERMANY, sons and daughters are of majority age after the completed 21st year. When the 18th year has been completed they can be emancipated by sentence of the guardianship tribunal, provided the minor himself and his parents, unless care of the children has been taken away from them, furnish consent. It is not licit for a minor, whether son or daughter, even after emancipation, to enter marriage without the consent either of the father, if he is legitimate, or of the mother, if he is illegitimate, or of the adopter, if he has been adopted (Civil Code, § 2 seq., § 1305 seq.). - As regards religious education, especially of those who arise from a mixed marriage, the whole matter is committed to the law of the particular States. Holy Mother Church is deservedly saddened by these things, because in many respects her rights are harmed. Let these be consulted: Dr. Geiger, Die religiose Erziehung der Kinder; Karl Schmidt, Konfession der Kinder; Lehmkuhl, Das burgerliche Gesetzbuch, where there are many very useful things.

Preliminary note. Just as children are held to honor their parents, so likewise parents are bound to this, that they bear diligent care for children. For the right of procreating and governing offspring was granted to them for this reason, that they may bring the offspring received to its end.

The following things also have force in relation to illegitimate offspring. For although their progenitors do not possess paternal power, nevertheless both are obliged, from natural right, to have care for those to whom they gave life. Many civil laws order the matter otherwise, so that the obligation of feeding the offspring regards the mother alone (cf. French Law, 340); but one cannot stand by this ordinance, not even after the sentence of a judge. See below n. 958. Better is the German Code, § 1705-1718.

In all these things there lies hidden a question of the greatest moment: Whether children possess rights against parents?

Resp. with St. Thomas: Insofar as each is a man, there is justice in some way toward them; but insofar as each belongs to the other, according to this the perfect notion of justice or right is lacking (2.2, q. 57, a. 2, ad 2). - Thus therefore children, as they are men, have a strict right to life, integrity of members, reputation, and honor. This assertion is confirmed by civil law. But children, as they are children, that is, something of the father, have a right to education and food, but of themselves only from charity, for they are destitute of help. But if parents are lacking, relatives or the community are held to supply. See what was said n. 398.

699. Principles. I. Parents, from a special precept, are held to love their children with internal and external love, and this rightly ordered. Nature itself promulgates this obligation, as is established from brute animals themselves, which love and nourish their offspring.

Hence, parents sin not only against charity, but specially against PIETY, more or less according to the gravity of the matter, who have hatred toward their own children, who utter evil prayers against them, who treat them too harshly, who do not succor them when constituted in necessity, who from defect of ordered love indulge them too much, etc., etc.

700. II. Parents are held to procure corporal education for children. He who gives being must also give the things consequent upon being; namely to have care of life, sustenance, and status (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 4, n. 12).

1. In relation to care of LIFE, parents are held, from the very conception of the offspring up to the time when the offspring is truly able to suffice for itself, to confer diligent care toward its preservation, and according to their powers to avert all things which could harm it.

Hence, of themselves they sin gravely: a) Women who bring the existence of the fetus into risk, for example by carrying burdens that are too heavy, sustaining labors that are too toilsome, indulging too much in anger, sadness, lust, and other passions. Cf. Capellmann, Med. past. b) Husbands who treat pregnant wives inhumanely, gravely strike them, exhaust them with excessive labors. c) Spouses who keep little infants with them in the same small bed, with danger of suffocation (cf. Rit. Rom., de Bapt. parv., 32); as also those who use no precautions lest some evil befall their little children through water, fire, animals, iron instruments, etc.

2. In relation to care of SUSTENANCE, parents are held to supply to children whatever things, according to their condition, are necessary for food, clothing, and habitation. They are obliged even if the children have dissipated their part; and therefore parents are held to pay debts which the children contracted for sustenance, but not for other things (H. Ap., VII, 4). See German Code, 1705; Spanish, 155.

Hence: a) The mother is held, under venial obligation, to nourish the infant with her own milk, unless perhaps she has a just excuse, for example that she is weak, noble, or very rich; but then she is held, under grave obligation, to provide for herself a faithful nurse, that is, one healthy and well-mannered.¹ b) Parents sin mortally by exposing offspring in a hospital or public places without just cause, such as can be very great want, or illegitimacy of offspring from a hidden crime;² likewise by casting children out of the house, or not furnishing necessary things, until they can suffice for themselves by their own industry.

3. In relation to care of STATUS, parents are held to procure for children such a condition of life that afterward they can live in a manner which befits their birth; for children ought not to store up treasure for parents, but parents for children (2 Cor., 12, 14). See St. Alph., III, n. 336; H. Ap., tr. VII.

Hence they sin: a) If they do not use at least moderate diligence to acquire goods by which children may be fed and may obtain an inheritance according to their status. b) If by squandering goods they render themselves unable to educate and endow them honorably according to their condition. c) If they do not take care that they go to school, provided the required cautions are present, that they learn an art, or embrace some genus of life by which they may be honorably sustained.³ d) If they unjustly disinherit them, or harm them in the legitimate portion; if they refuse to establish a patrimony for a son wishing to be promoted to sacred Orders; if they deny dowry or the legitimate part of inheritance to a daughter who, after the years of majority, celebrated marriage against their will. Nevertheless to this daughter, if before the years of majority she married an unworthy man, dowry is not owed, according to the more probable opinion; but food is owed to one in need. In a similar way, if a son, against the father's will, took a wife, the father is held to feed him in need and his wife. e) Finally parents sin gravely if they drive unwilling children to embrace a state, whether conjugal, religious, or especially priestly, or earnestly turn them away from such a state. They can be excused, at least for a brief time, by reason of ignorance or inadvertence, which can easily be admitted because of their excessive love (IV, n. 77).

701. III. Parents are held to procure spiritual education for children. Man, created to the image and likeness of God, has been elevated to a supernatural end. Therefore he must be directed to this end by parents. Whence St. Charles Borromeo (Hom. 31, to the people of Canobbio, 1583): "To educate," he says, "is to lead children to Christ."

But spiritual education requires four things for itself, namely instruction, vigilance, correction, and good example (Inst. cat., P. I, c. 4, n. 15-20).

1. It requires INSTRUCTION, according to that admonition of Scripture (Eccli., 7, 25): Hast thou children? instruct them ... from their childhood.

By force of this precept parents must take care: a) that either through themselves or through others fit for it, they instruct children in faith, in good morals, in the observance of the commandments of God and of the Church, and in all things necessary for salvation (cf. n. 718);⁴ - b) that they instill into them the highest esteem and love of holy prayer, and render this very familiar to them; - c) that they imbue them with an affection of true devotion toward the Virgin Mother of God; for, as St. Alphonsus testifies, devotion toward the divine Mother is morally necessary for salvation.

2. It requires VIGILANCE. For more precious things are entrusted to parents than to a depositary with whom an earthly thing has been deposited.

Hence, parents sin gravely if they do not remove children from the dangerous amusements of the world, depraved companions, games, conversations, readings, etc.; if, for the sake of learning an art or serving, they place them far from themselves in such families where their faith or modesty is endangered; if they do not keep them away from conversations with persons of the different sex; if they permit boys and girls to sleep in the same small bed, etc.

3. It requires CORRECTION; and indeed serious correction, for Scripture says: He who spares the rod hates his son (Prov., 13, 24); discreet correction, for Scripture adds (Coloss., 3, 21): Fathers, do not provoke your children to indignation, lest they become of little spirit. Therefore first let them admonish, afterward threaten, finally chastise, without imprecation and harmful words.

4. It requires EXAMPLE. For words move, examples draw, especially children.

Therefore let parents conduct themselves cautiously in all things, and, especially in those things which pertain to the worship of God, furnish themselves as an example of good works. Parents sin most gravely when in the presence of children they blaspheme, mock religion, utter or do shameful things, detract from neighbor, or drive them to sin in any way whatsoever (H. Ap., VII, 5).

702. On the obligations of blood relatives and guardians.

1. Blood relatives are held, from piety, to mutual love, assistance, and reverence; more, however, or less, according as they approach parents more or less (cf. n. 484). - Whence he who affects a grandfather, great-grandfather, paternal uncle, paternal aunt, brother, sister, and probably collaterals in the second degree, with hatred or injury, or does not assist them in necessity, must, if otherwise the fault is grave, declare the circumstance of kinship in confession. Otherwise, if the degree is more remote (III, 340).⁵ Cf. what we said n. 687, I.

2. Guardians are held, by force of quasi-contract: a) to bear care of the ward, protect his person, correct him, and educate him in a Christian manner; - b) duly to administer the same person's temporal goods: and this according to the prescriptions of law, so that, the guardianship having ended, an account of all acts may be rendered before the family council, or the guardianship council for illegitimates, according to the rules of justice (see the treatise on Justice, n. 1039 seqq.).

Note. Piety alone can oblige to the same things, namely if someone is a proximate blood relative of the ward, and no other fit guardian or assistant guardian is found. Yet advert that it is not a light thing for Catholics to undertake the guardianship of non-Catholic wards, lest namely they seem to favor heresy by educating them in it; or, by not educating them, to violate the faith furnished to the testator and the court (III, 918; Kon., n. 434).

Noldin, II, n. 281; Rosler, C.SS.R., Die Frauenfrage; Vermeersch, Quaest. de Just., n. 512; Godts, C.SS.R., Le feminisme condamne; Cathrein, Frauenfrage; Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, where there are many things (cf. Gen. Index, v. Frauenemanzipation, etc.); Ami du Cl., 1903, p. 36, 745; Schindler, Moraltheol., II, 747.

703. Principles. I. Spouses mutually owe to themselves society, love, and faith. Thus namely from the nature of marriage, and from positive law, both divine and human⁶ (cf. treatise on Matrimony, c. VII).

1. Society; for they are held to live together, as to table and bed, unless a legitimate cause excuses, as is established from the words of the Lord: A man shall leave father and mother, and shall cling to his wife, and the two shall be in one flesh (Matth., 19, 5). But the choice of domicile pertains to the husband (cf. n. 2120 seq.).

2. Special love, namely conjugal love; for since they are one flesh, they ought also to be, through a more intimate love, one heart. Thus Ephes., 5, 15: Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church; and (Tit., 2, 4) it is commanded to wives that they love their husbands.

Whence a spouse sins against charity and conjugal love if he or she has hatred for the other, or wishes a grave evil; if by injurious words or signs he or she saddens the other, etc. Likewise, because they are held, from love, to furnish food mutually to one another, either husband or wife sins gravely if, either by harshness, idleness, or sumptuousness, he or she deprives the other part of those things which are necessary to life or condition (III, 356).

3. Faith, that is, conjugal fidelity, according to that (1 Cor., 7, 4): The woman does not have power over her own body, but the man. And similarly also the man does not have power over his own body, but the woman, namely in order to generation.

Hence: a) They are held to render to each other the conjugal debt, when it is sought seriously, and there is not a legitimate cause of denying. b) Every venereal act, whether internal or external, with or concerning an alien person, in married persons has the malice of adultery (cf. n. 781).

704. • II. Certain duties are proper to each spouse. This follows from the proper condition of each. For although there is some equality between spouses, nevertheless the ends of marriage and the native character itself of the spouses require that the man be the head of the woman (1 Cor., 11, 3), and that the woman be subject to the man.

1. The HUSBAND must care for his wife's soul, by directing her rightly, watching over her morals, and correcting her where there is need; - body, namely by retaining his wife with him, and feeding her according to his status; - goods, by diligently conducting the family affair.

Hence, the husband sins, and at times gravely: a) If he affects his wife with blows or insults, without just cause. "Nevertheless he can sometimes chastise her moderately by words, or even from a grave cause by moderate blows, having regard to condition" (III, l. c.; H. Ap., VII, 12). See n. 732. b) If he impedes her from fulfilling the precepts of God or of the Church. But if he impedes her, without cause, concerning those things which are of counsel, such as confession, communion, etc., he sins only venially, unless it is established that she perceives great utility from the sacraments. c) If he denies or neglects to procure food for her. Yet he could justly deny these things if the wife had committed adultery, or had departed from him without cause. d) If he treats her in a tyrannical manner, like a vile slave. e) If he neglects the governance of the family, etc.

2. The WIFE is held to exhibit reverence and obedience to the husband in all licit things: Women, be subject to your husbands, as is fitting, in the Lord (Coloss., 3, 18).

Whence she sins gravely if by quarrels or harsh words she provokes the husband to grave anger, or blasphemy; if, the husband being spurned, she claims authority for herself; if without sufficient indication she judges badly concerning his continence; if she spends something notable from common goods, against his will and the custom of women of her condition; if she arrogates to herself the administration of the house without just cause; if she is unwilling to follow the man changing domicile, provided she can follow without danger of life and salvation, and he, after the nuptials, has not become wandering. It also belongs to the wife to devote work to the offspring to be educated, and in domestic business to bear care of the family, applying effort to cleanliness, not to luxury or talkativeness. If nevertheless she is of conspicuous condition, she can fulfill the lower offices through male servants or maids, provided she watches over them and takes care that the domestic affair is well conducted. Consult St. Alphonsus, III, n. 351-356; H. Ap., tr. VII, n. 12-13. See the rest in the treatise on Charity (n. 484 seqq.) and in the treatise on Justice (n. 863 seqq.).

The doctrine just set forth does not please many moderns, especially those who are opposed to positive religion. They demand equality in every way between man and woman, and they say that it is a crime that woman must be subject to man. This modern theory can be considered under a threefold respect: for it touches the domestic order, the economic or social order, and finally the political order.

1. As regards the domestic order. Whatever those say who vindicate complete emancipation, this can in no way be conceded; for nature has so prepared and ordered the whole matter that the man preside, be the head of the family, the mind which directs all things, the will which by labor and endeavor conquers all things. But let the woman become and remain the heart of the family, and let her work by loving, praying, and bearing, and always lead morals to better things. Head and heart, the mind directing and the heart loving, fortitude and loveliness, the strength of the body and the tender constitution of the members, must be one; yet so that what by nature has been made weaker subjects itself to the stronger.

2. As regards the economic and political order, nothing prevents women also from being admitted almost equally as men to many businesses and to many arts, provided, and let this be well noted, that all things are proportioned to their powers, and never harm the office which they must pursue as wives and mothers. Therefore a moderate and tempered emancipation is not to be rejected a priori; but let there be rejected whatever could destroy the family as it was founded by the Creator: in the middle you will go most safely. Cf. the authors cited at the beginning of this chapter.

Encyclical Rerum novarum (ed. Herder), p. 28; authors cited at the beginning; Biederlack, Die soz. Fr., p. 154; Willems, III, p. 415 seqq.; Cathrein, Moralphil., II, p. 436 seqq.; Burg, Vie sociale des nat. mod., p. 437; Koch, Moraltheol., 2160, 167; Schindler, Moraltheol., II, 714, 761 seqq.; Forster, Schule u. Character.

The duties which are proper either to inferiors or to Superiors, some arise from justice, from the contract of hiring work, and are positive; others from observance which is to be given to personal dignity, and are rather completive and negative, insofar as it is licit to attempt nothing against this superiority. Concerning the former there will be treatment below (n. 1153); concerning the latter there was discussion when we were speaking of the virtue of observance (cf. n. 689). It remains that we here add a few things: 1. concerning the mutual obligations of servants and masters; 2. concerning the obligations of disciples and teachers toward each other.

As regards the duties of parish priests and of those who bear a public office, see n. 2250, 2265, 2282 seqq.

By the generic name of servants there is designated by authors a threefold genus of men, of whom some are obliged more strictly than others; and thus someone is also called master in a threefold way. a) There are slaves, who depend on the master perpetually and for all works. b) There are domestics, who freely hire their works for a time to a richer person, and are as though enrolled into the family. c) There are artisans and workers, who freely hire their works for a certain time, but are not admitted among the household.

568. Order of matters to be treated. After discussion of the noblest potential part of the virtue of justice, namely, the virtue of religion and the vices opposed to it, it remains (following the footsteps of the Angelic Doctor) to treat the remaining potential parts of justice, namely, piety, observance, obedience, gratitude, vindication, truth, affability, liberality, and epikeia. Sufficient has already been said above, n. 165ff., concerning truth or truthfulness, when there was discussion of lying. Therefore the other virtues remain to be explained, concerning which treatment will be given in two parts, namely: 1. on piety, observance, and obedience; 2. on gratitude, vindication, affability, liberality, and epikeia. The reason for this subdivision is that the first three virtues include nearly those things which are established in the fourth precept of the Decalogue, and thus, after the explanation of the first three precepts of the Decalogue made in the preceding tract, the explanation of the fourth precept fittingly follows.

It is expedient to treat separately these virtues (piety, observance, and obedience) in general and the same virtues insofar as they must be observed by children, parents, subjects, superiors, etc. For thus an occasion is also furnished for discussing the duties of certain states, since there is no special tract on the states of men in this Manual.

575. Definition. Obedience is a moral virtue which renders the will of a man prompt to fulfill the will of another, namely, of one commanding. Thus St. Thomas.⁹⁷⁴

Obedience seems to be the same as to hearken, or to be one who listens to a word, and consequently by force of the word denotes a certain inclination of the will toward the words of another, especially of a superior.

Distinction. A twofold obedience must be distinguished: one material, the other formal. Material obedience is nothing other than the execution of any commanded virtuous act; for example, if someone elicits an act of faith without intending thereby to fulfill any command. This material obedience is a circumstance of any commanded virtuous act, and consequently is not a special virtue, just as material disobedience is not a special sin but is found in every sinful act,⁹⁷⁵ since this is a transgression of the eternal law. Formal obedience is the execution of a work insofar as it is commanded by a superior. Therefore the proper motive of this obedience is the command of the superior.

Theologians dispute whether formal obedience demands a true command of the superior (although tacit and interpretive), or whether a manifestation of will short of a command suffices. For example, Peter knows the will of his father, who desires that some work be performed by him. Does Peter exercise an act of true obedience if he fulfills this work without his father having commanded it? Cajetan,⁹⁷⁶ Lehmkuhl,⁹⁷⁷ and others stand for the affirmative opinion; Lessius⁹⁷⁸ and Billuart⁹⁷⁹ for the negative. This controversy is of little importance. For that act, whether it is said to be elicited by the virtue of obedience strictly so called or not, is certainly virtuous and pertains to the spirit, so to speak, of the virtue of obedience. Certainly if Peter does not fulfill his father's will, known indeed but not joined with a manifest command, he does not commit a sin of disobedience; but the Angelic Doctor rightly says:⁹⁸⁰ "The will of a superior, in whatever manner it becomes known, is a certain tacit command, and obedience appears the more prompt, the more it anticipates the express command by obeying, once the will of the superior has been understood."

Hence ascetical authors are also accustomed to distinguish three grades of obedience: 1. to fulfill the commanded work at the determined time and in the determined manner; 2. not only to fulfill the external work, but also interiorly to submit one's own will entirely, and thus to will the same and not to will the same as the superior commanding; 3. to comply with the will of the superior, in whatever manner it is known, not only by execution of the work and submission of the will, but also by submission of judgment in simplicity of heart. This is that blind obedience which is undeservedly reproached by some. For all right obedience must be most clear-sighted and therefore keenly discern whether the thing commanded is pleasing to God and lawful in itself, since God must always be obeyed more than man.

But the most perfect obedience is blind in this sense: that it does not judge concerning the natural reason, motive, or value of the thing commanded, but leaves all these things to the prudent discretion of the superior. In this sense St. Gregory the Great says:⁹⁸¹ "For true obedience neither examines the intention of prelates nor discriminates among commands.... For whoever has learned to obey perfectly does not know how to judge." We must render this perfect submission of judgment to God and the Church, especially when she employs her infallible magisterium; and therefore the so-called respectful silence does not suffice.⁹⁸²

⁹⁷⁴ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 104, a. 2 ad 3. B. Raus, C.Ss.R., has discussed De sacrae oboedientiae virtute et voto very learnedly, Lyon, 1923.

⁹⁷⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 104, a. 2 ad 1.

⁹⁷⁶ Comm. in 2, 2, q. 104, a. 2.

⁹⁷⁷ Theol. mor. I, n. 924.

⁹⁷⁸ De iust. l. 2, c. 46, n. 22.

⁹⁷⁹ De relig. diss. 2, a. 1.

⁹⁸⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 104, a. 2.

⁹⁸¹ In 1 Reg. l. 2, c. 4, n. 11 (Migne, Patr. lat. 79, 131).

⁹⁸² Cf. Clement XI, Bull Vineam Domini, 1713.

576. The object of obedience is a command of a superior, whether explicit, tacit, or interpretive.⁹⁸³ But since this object has a special aspect of good, obedience is also a special virtue, the exercise of which can indeed be commanded by diverse other virtues. For obedience proceeds from reverence, which offers homage and honor to a superior; therefore, if it proceeds from the reverence due to God, it pertains to religion and especially to devotion; if it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is contained in a certain manner under observance.⁹⁸⁴

⁹⁸³ S. theol., l.c.

⁹⁸⁴ Ib., a. 3 ad 1.

577. Excellence of obedience. That obedience is a very excellent virtue is evident both from Sacred Scripture, from the praises of the holy Fathers, and from reason. In Sacred Scripture it is said: "Obedience is better than victims."⁹⁸⁵ Explaining these words, St. Gregory the Great says:⁹⁸⁶ "Obedience is rightly preferred to victims, because through victims the flesh of another is slain, but through obedience one's own will is slain." St. Thomas says:⁹⁸⁷ "Man can give nothing greater to God than that, for His sake, he subject his own will to the will of another."

Because of this excellence of its own, obedience is also accustomed to command the other virtues, causing, for example, now a fast, now an act of religion, now an act of love, etc. If obedience is compared objectively with the other virtues, then it is certainly inferior not only to the theological virtues, but also to the virtue of religion, whose object approaches much more closely to God. But if obedience is considered on the part of that which it despises in order to adhere to God, then it excels the other moral virtues. For while the other virtues despise material or bodily goods for the love of God, for example, riches and carnal pleasures, obedience binds and sacrifices one's own will in the service of God, which certainly excels material and bodily goods.⁹⁸⁸

⁹⁸⁵ 1 Kings 15:22.

⁹⁸⁶ Moral. l. ult., c. 14 (Migne, Patr. lat. 76, 765).

⁹⁸⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 186, a. 5 ad 5.

⁹⁸⁸ Ib., q. 104, a. 3.

578. Extent of obedience. Since obedience is limited by the authority of the superior, its extent is as great as the authority of the superior. Now the authority of God is unlimited and infinite, and His will is most holy. Hence God must be obeyed in all things, and a case in which it is lawful to resist a certainly known command of God is impossible.⁹⁸⁹

But the authority of a human superior is limited by not only divine but also human law. Hence a subject cannot obey a superior commanding something which is contrary to natural or positive divine law. For such obedience would be indiscreet, since God must be obeyed more than men.⁹⁹⁰ If a human superior indeed exceeds his competence but commands nothing unlawful, the subject can, but is not bound, to obey. But if a doubt arises concerning the liceity of an act commanded by a superior, then this doubt is to be examined according to one's ability. But if the doubt persists, the subject is bound to obey, because the presumption stands for the superior, who is not considered to have commanded something unlawful unless this is certainly established. Authors do not agree whether a human superior can command merely internal acts. This controversy was discussed above, I, n. 183, in the tract on laws. Whether parents can command their children concerning the choice of some state will be discussed in the following chapter.

⁹⁸⁹ Ib., a. 4.

⁹⁹⁰ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 104, a. 5.

579. Opposed vices. To obedience is opposed: 1. by excess, servility or indiscreet obedience, which complies even in unlawful things; 2. by defect, disobedience, which is either material, and then is not a special sin because it is found in the violation of every virtue; or formal, which arises from formal contempt either of the command or of the one commanding. Someone transgresses a command from formal contempt when his will refuses to be subjected to an ordinance and transgresses it precisely from this motive. For if someone transgresses a command because of anger, concupiscence, or another disordered passion, he sins neither from contempt nor from formal disobedience.

Formal contempt of a (particular) command is called imperfect, but contempt of the one commanding is called perfect formal contempt and is a sin much graver than formal contempt of a command.⁹⁹¹ Indeed, it is a mortal sin in its whole genus because it is a grave injury to despise a superior and precisely from this contempt to transgress his command, although it concerns matter light in itself.⁹⁹² The same holds if someone does not despise a particular command but already refuses in whole, that is, in all commands, to be subject to the superior. Formal contempt of a particular command indeed constitutes formal disobedience and therefore is a mortal sin from its genus, but admits slightness of matter.

For all formal disobedience is opposed to the charity both of God and of one's neighbor, since the charity of God demands that we comply with His commandments. Hence Christ said: "He that hath my commandments and keepeth them; he it is that loveth me."⁹⁹³ But in the divine precepts is contained the requirement that human superiors also be obeyed. And "therefore also disobedience, whereby someone is disobedient to the commands of superiors, is a mortal sin, as contrary to divine love, according to that saying: He that resisteth the power resisteth the ordinance of God.⁹⁹⁴ It is opposed moreover to the love of one's neighbor, insofar as it withdraws from a superior who is one's neighbor the obedience which is due to him."⁹⁹⁵

Disobedience admits slightness of matter and consequently can be a venial sin. In general it can be said: A sin of disobedience is the graver, the higher the one commanding and the graver the command violated.

⁹⁹¹ Ib., q. 105, a. 2.

⁹⁹² Cf. Billuart, De relig. diss. 2, De oboed., a. 4.

⁹⁹³ John 14:21.

⁹⁹⁴ Rom. 13:2.

⁹⁹⁵ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 105, a. 1.

In this chapter there will be treated the obligations of children, parents, spouses, masters, servants, teachers, pupils, rulers, and subjects.

S. Th. II-II, q. 101, a. 1 and 3.

816. Piety (filial piety; filial love and homage) is the virtue by which service and worship are given to parents and country. It is a virtue because it renders a debt. It is a special virtue because it has a special object: for just as we owe worship to God because He is for us the first principle of being and governing, so also to parents and country because they are the secondary principle of our being, education, and governance. But where there is a special account of debt, there is a special part of justice and a virtue. It is one virtue because it has one object: the secondary principle of our being, which belongs to parents and country, to whom piety first and principally extends;¹ it indeed honors blood-relatives, but insofar as the blood of the parents exists in them and therefore they represent them; also fellow-citizens and all friends of the country, because in them we behold the favor and helps of the country and therefore they represent it to us; it honors a spouse and children, insofar as they preserve the blood-relationship received from the parents; indeed even ourselves, insofar as we venerate in ourselves the image and blood of our parents, but piety reaches all these only secondarily.

¹ Although piety is owed more principally to parents than to country, because from the fact that we are born from parents, the country pertains to us (q. 122, a. 5, ad 2); nevertheless in the latter there is per se a title to piety, which demands our dependence, and not only on account of the sole relation to parents.

817. Object of piety. - The material object which it intends to exhibit is worship and service toward parents and country, namely, acts by which we render due honor to them and attest their excellence and our subjection.

The primary material object which principally, per se, and by reason of itself it intends to exhibit by service is the due equality between the honor exhibited and the right of parents to it, by which equality the honor is proportioned to the right which parents have to it.

The formal object by which, or proximate motive on account of which we exhibit worship to them, is the special honesty of the said equality.

818. Corollaries. - 1. The debt which piety attends to is a strict or legal debt, because parents have a true right that honor be exhibited to them. And nevertheless piety is not a species of justice properly so called: 1) because justice is toward another and is founded upon the personal distinction of one from another, while piety is founded upon the special conjunction of father and children: father and son as such are in some way one; 2) because piety does not render the whole debt, a) parents are for us the principle of being and have conferred on us the very faculty of honoring them, which we are not able to render back to them; b) besides, by ordinary services and in the same order of things, namely, of generation, education, and providence, we cannot render the debt to equality. But virtue regards that which is per se, and therefore piety falls short of strict justice and is only a potential part of it.

2. Legal justice is distinguished from piety. For piety regards the country according as it is the principle of our being; legal justice, according as it is the common good. Whence the preeminence above all human virtues which St. Thomas attributes to legal justice is not to be attributed to piety toward country.

3. God in a more excellent mode than parents is the principle of our being: for He is the primary and total principle, and is the cause of every created paternity, because no one can be a parent except through the force received from Him. Whence the virtue of piety does not order us to Him as Creator, but the virtue of religion, which is not formal but eminent piety. Besides, because God through grace has adopted us as sons, toward Him there is also formal piety: for from the virtue of piety there must be distinguished the gift of the Holy Spirit by which we venerate God as Father and other men as His sons (I Tim. IV, 8; q. 121, a. 1, ad 2).

4. Cajetan notes on a. 1: "The name of piety seems to have been extended to works of mercy (and to God) (on account of the likeness of the works). Namely, because works of mercy are similar to the works which from piety we exhibit to those joined by blood and to citizens and friends of the country, therefore works of mercy seem to have been called works of piety, and those who are occupied with them called pious. And hence it seems to have become usage that God is called pious, that divine piety does these and those things; since God most greatly exercises works of mercy. But, so far as the proposed matter is concerned, the offices of piety differ from the offices of mercy in this, that piety gives what it gives under the account of debt, while mercy does so under the account of gratuitous relief."

S. Th. II-II, q. 104 and 105.

839. Obedience (obedience) is twofold: one general, by which from any honorable intention whatever we furnish acts prescribed from any virtue whatever; the other special, formal, or strictly so called, which is a virtue inclining the will to fulfilling the precept of a superior from the motive of satisfying the precept, because it is good to obey a superior commanding. This is a virtue, because it renders a debt. It is a special virtue because it has a special object: the precept of a superior formally as precept; from which it follows that to do only the desire or will of a superior when not commanded does not pertain to obedience strictly so called (a. 2, ad 1 and 3). It is one virtue because it has one object: for it regards the authority of anyone commanding, not insofar as it belongs to such or such a person, but precisely insofar as it is sufficient for commanding (ad 4).

840. Object of obedience. - The material object of obedience which it intends to exhibit is the commanded acts; the primary or principal material object is the due equality between the acts executing the precept and the right of the superior to them, by which equality our acts are proportioned to the right of the one commanding to them. The formal object or proximate motive on account of which is the special honesty of this equality.

841. Perfection of obedience. - Obedience is less perfect than the theological virtues; if it is considered on the part of the object, it is not greatest among the moral virtues, for religion, for example, approaches more nearly to God; but if it is considered on the part of that which it contemns in order to adhere to God, thus it is greatest, because it contemns a greater good, namely, one's own will, than other moral virtues, which contemn lesser goods, whether of the soul, or of the body, or external goods (a. 3).

842. To whom obedience is to be given. - Obedience is to be given:

1. to God, in all things, because He is Lord of all and as to all things (a. 4; cf. Exod. XXIV, 7);

2. to human superiors, not indeed in those things which pertain only to the motion of the will, but in those things which are voluntarily to be done outwardly through bodies; not indeed as to those things which regard the nature of the human body (that is, the body's sustenance and generation), because in this way all are equal, but as to the disposition of human acts and things, according to the account of superiority (Rom. XIII, 2, 7; Tit. III, 1; I Pet. II, 13; Heb. XIII, 17).

An exception is made: a) if someone commands contrary to the command of a greater superior (Acts V, 29); b) if he commands something to which his power does not extend (a. 5). In doubt whether a superior can command this or that, one must stand by the command, because he cannot be deprived of his right of commanding which he possesses, on account of the doubt of subjects (n. 91, C).

Obedience from its genus obliges under grave obligation because it is altogether necessary for the good of society, for example, of the Church, State, community, family, etc. (q. 105, a. 1).

843. Remarks. - 1. Nothing prevents one and the same act from regarding several virtues, just as a soldier by defending the camp of the king fulfills a work of fortitude and of justice; in this mode the acts of all virtues pertain to obedience insofar as they are commanded, yet not all acts of the virtues, because not all are in precept. But if a work is altogether indifferent and pertains to no virtue, it will belong to obedience alone: thus if it is commanded precisely for proving obedience (q. 104, a. 2, ad 1).

2. Although obedience considered according to itself is of one account and one species, nevertheless it can proceed from causes diverse in species (q. 104, a. 2, ad 4). "And as to this it is contained under diverse virtues... Insofar as it proceeds from reverence for prelates, it is contained in a certain way under observance; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for parents, under piety; but insofar as it proceeds from reverence for God, under religion and pertains to devotion, which is the principal act of religion" (a. 3, ad 1).

3. Since obedience is a moral virtue, it is in the mean, not indeed according to quantity: for the more obedient someone is, the more he is praised; but according to other circumstances, it can exceed, insofar as someone obeys either one whom he ought not, or in things in which he ought not (a. 2, ad 2).

4. A work is rendered virtuous and laudable and meritorious chiefly according as it proceeds from a free will; and therefore, although to obey is a debt, if someone obeys with prompt will (as if there were no precept), his merit is not on this account diminished, especially before God, who sees not only external works, but also the internal will (ibid., ad 3).

5. For satisfying the precept of obedience, ordinarily it is not necessary that the enjoined work be done from the motive of obedience, but it is enough that the commanded work be placed from an honorable end; but if it is done for this reason, that it has been commanded, it will be an act of the special virtue of obedience.

844. Inobedience is taken either materially and broadly, for the transgression of every precept from any intention whatever, and thus it is not a special sin but a general circumstance of every sin; or formally and strictly, for transgression of a precept from contempt, whether of the precept, or of the one commanding as such, or of the authority itself (q. 104, a. 2, ad 1, and q. 105, a. 1, ad 1). This is a special sin, simply mortal from its genus: to refuse to be subject to a superior or to law directly conflicts with the ordination of God (a. 1); sometimes venial from indeliberation, or from imperfection of contempt, if someone refuses to be subject to a human superior in some light matter only, while being prepared to obey in others.

Yet it is not the gravest, for it is graver to contemn the one commanding than the precept, and thus blasphemy is a greater sin than inobedience toward God, and homicide of a superior is greater than inobedience toward him (a. 2).

Moreover inobedience is so much the graver 1) the more excellent is the one commanding whose commands someone transgresses; 2) the more gravely something is commanded (a. 2).

845. Remark. - If the thing commanded is contemned because it is esteemed little, or if someone does not obey from indignation against a superior, or if he contemns the superior insofar as he is a private person, for instance because he is unlearned, imprudent, austere, there is not formal contempt of authority; nevertheless such sins frequently induce dispositively to contempt.

419. • Children are bound toward parents by a most special obligation. But three offices must be exhibited to parents by children by title of piety, namely love, reverence, and obedience. For parents have a threefold respect to children, namely by reason of cause, by reason of preeminence, and by reason of governance. Consequently children ought to love them as the authors of their existence, reverence them as Superiors, and obey them as rectors delegated by God.

Children ought to love parents with love both internal, pursuing them with a pious and benevolent affection of heart, and external: 1) warding off from them every evil and notable injury; 2) exhibiting to them signs of external benevolence; and 3) aiding them according to their capacity when they are constituted in necessity.

420. You will resolve. - 1° Children sin gravely against the virtue of piety if interiorly they hold parents in hatred; exteriorly exhibit signs of hatred to them; treat them harshly, or look upon them with fierce eyes, just as if they had hatred.

2° A fortiori, if they wish evil to them, and death itself, that they may live more freely, or be able to possess their inheritance, or that they may be liberated from the care and custody of them; if they gravely detract from them before others; if by force, deceit, or other unjust means they impede them from making a testament, etc.

3° Likewise, if they provoke them to anger, and bring grave sadness on them without a just and grave cause, especially if they sadden them even to tears.

4° If they do not furnish food and other necessaries to parents gravely in need, compelling them to begging or to exercising an art unbecoming to their state; if they do not visit them when sick, afflicted, or worn by old age, or do not sympathize with them and refuse to bring help to them; but especially if they do not aid them in spiritual necessities, namely that Sacraments be administered to them in the article of death, etc. Finally, if, when they have departed this life, they do not take care that the obsequies and ceremonies of the Church be performed in a manner congruent with their condition, or do not pray for them.

421. • Children ought to exhibit to parents reverence both internal, so that they recognize them as Superiors and therefore also have reverential fear toward them; and external, which is placed in words and deeds.

422. You will resolve. - 1° Children sin gravely if they strike parents, even lightly, but injuriously. - Likewise if they show the will of striking, for example by raising the hand against them, or seizing a stick or another instrument for striking. Likewise if in any manner they threaten them with menaces of this sort, etc.

2° Likewise if from the soul or in their presence they curse them; or if they cast insults against them, and afflict them with injuries or contumelious words by which they know they will be gravely offended; if they gravely mock them with laughter, sneers, gesticulations, reproaches, derisions, fierce aspect, etc., provided nevertheless that these things are done from contempt, not from levity or simple rusticity.

3° Speaking of itself, they sin gravely if they reprehend them very proudly and bitterly, exasperate them by contradictions, or address them with harsh words, or without cause afflict them with grave sorrow; and a fortiori if through these things they provoke them even to grave anger; if they studiously refuse them the signs of reverence according to the custom of the fatherland or of their condition, for example if they do not rise when they come, or do not uncover the head, or do not greet them, provided nevertheless that from these things the parents judge themselves gravely offended.

4° Likewise if they despise poor, wretched, badly clothed parents, or blush for them, or refuse to acknowledge them, or regard them as unknown and strangers. Except, however, if, with contempt and pride excluded, they pretend for a just cause that they do not acknowledge them, for example to avoid some inconvenience which the son would incur if his parents were known, etc.

Quaer. Do children sin gravely when striking or treating badly and irreverently parents who are dull, insane, delirious from old age, drunk, etc.?

Resp. Affirmatively, if they act from malice or contempt. - Negatively, if rebuke or some somewhat severer treatment is necessary for restraining parents lacking reason.

423. • Children ought to furnish obedience to parents in all things: 1) licit and honorable; 2) pertaining to their care; while 3) they live under their power.

424. You will resolve. - 1° Children sin more or less if in a matter looking to morals, the salvation of the soul, and the governance of the house they are unwilling to hear their parents, although want of consideration or defect of age excuses them in part. - Hence they sin:

a) If, notwithstanding the serious prohibition of parents, they frequent wicked companionships, games of chance or other games of this kind, or dangerous places, as taverns, dances, theaters, or other similar places; daughters especially sin who, against the will of parents or even without their knowledge, converse with suitors, or go out from the house by night, or speak alone with lovers.

b) If, with the command of parents neglected, they notably omit the Sacraments or other offices of religion; if they are unwilling to give attention to letters or arts congruent with their state, and thus consume time and render useless the expenses made for them.

c) If they refuse to execute those things which look much to the good governance and peace of the family, or if they wish to administer all things according to their own judgment, with the authority of the parents spurned, especially if they respond arrogantly and proudly: I will not do it; conduct your own business. - I do not want anything to be prescribed to me. - You bring weariness and disgust upon me, etc.

2° Yet not rarely in practice the disobedience of children can be excused from grave sin because of levity of mind, inadvertence, or because of a certain human negligence, and very often because of smallness of matter. Indeed they must often be judged immune from every fault because of defect of a rigorous precept on the part of the parents. For in order that a sin, especially a grave one, be committed against obedience, it is required that parents seem strictly to prescribe, not merely to advise, solicit, or signify their mind. But a true precept being enjoined is discerned from the serious or severe manner in which the matter is prescribed, and from other adjuncts, for example from the necessity and magnitude of the thing prescribed, from a penalty appended, etc.

3° But in depraved things children neither ought to obey nor can they. This is plain from natural law.

425. Questions. - Quaer. 1° Are children bound to obey parents in the choice of state?

Resp. Negatively, of itself, because: 1° God calling must be obeyed more than men contradicting; 2° in those things which pertain to the nature of the body, man is not bound to obey man, but God alone, because all men are equal by nature: "Hence... children are not bound to obey parents concerning contracting matrimony, or preserving virginity, or some other thing of this kind." St. Thomas.¹ Therefore parents sin gravely who compel unwilling children, either directly or even indirectly, to choose a state, whether religious, clerical, or conjugal; or on the contrary, if without a just cause they impede them, altogether unwilling, from choosing some state of life.

I said, of itself; for otherwise it must be said if parents, because of grave and reasonable causes, contradict children, for example if, constituted in grave necessity, they need the aid of the son, nor can he assist them here in another way except by remaining with them. - St. Alphonsus.²

Quaer. 2° Can children embrace the religious state without the knowledge of parents?

Resp. Affirmatively, of itself. Indeed sometimes the son will act more advisedly if, feeling himself divinely called to the religious or clerical state, and noticing that entrance will be unjustly closed against him by parents, he conceals the matter from them and executes the divine will. Yet this is not to be advised to children younger in age as often as the matter does not press so greatly, or it is not sufficiently established concerning the divine vocation.³

426. • Quaer. 3° Can children enter matrimony without consulting parents?

Resp. Negatively, generally speaking, as to liceity. See what is to be said in the Treatise on Matrimony, n. 1548. q. 8°-q. 10°.

Quaer. 4° What do our civil laws generally establish concerning the obligations of children toward parents?

Resp. I. Concerning the love to be exhibited to them by aiding them when they are constituted in necessity, neither the Common Law nor the Statutes of most States compel adult offspring to this, however rich.¹

II. Our laws prescribe love, reverence, and obedience in this sense, that they attribute to parents (that is, to the father, and, with him lacking, dead or legally impeded, to the mother, and, with both either dead or legally impeded, to the tutor) the right to everything which coheres with the sustenance and education of offspring, minor nevertheless. Hence among other things: a) the obligation of offspring to seek the consent of parents² for licitly entering matrimony; b) the right of domestic correction;³ c) the right of placing offspring with strangers so that they may learn some art or trade, which right nevertheless is variously limited in various States;⁴ d) the right that they can reclaim offspring from whatever place, for example from a monastery which the offspring had entered.

Parents owe children: 1° love; 2° education.

The reason for this obligation is founded in the very bowels of nature and in the title of generation. For nature teaches each, indeed even brute animals themselves, which love their offspring and seek for them the things necessary for preserving life.

427. • Parents ought to pursue children with love: 1) internal; 2) efficacious; and 3) ordered, so that they not only put away every hatred and malevolence of soul, but love them in heart and, as much as in them lies, care for their good and provide for them in every matter. For just as anyone ought to love himself, so parents are bound sincerely to love children as something of themselves, flesh from their flesh, so that after God they have nothing dearer to themselves.

Hence parents sin more or less against the special virtue of piety:

1° Who are inflamed with a depraved affection and unjust hatred against children, and disdain them by their aspect, or seriously imprecate grave evils against them, and do not assist them when there is need.

2° Who call them by gravely contumelious names. For thus they furnish to them occasion for anger, and make them peevish and contumacious.

3° Who manifest their hidden faults to outsiders without a just cause. Yet parents can reveal these to one another, because they share in the power of punishing, and it is often expedient that they be known to each, for preventing the perversion of children, etc.

4° Who love them with disordered affection, so that they concede or permit all things to them lest they sadden them; or who, using unseasonable kindness, act more remissly toward them, and whether because of sluggishness or because of cruel benignity neglect to draw them back from vices by serious precepts or other efficacious means.

5° Who favor one more than the others without a just reason, and look upon the rest indifferently, or even have them as adulterine; for this love of one before the rest is the font and occasion of quarrels, fights, divisions, and infinite evils in families.

The education of children, both bodily and spiritual, must be procured by parents.

428. • Bodily education demands from parents a threefold providence, namely by reason of: 1° life; 2° food; 3° state.

a) By reason of life. Parents are bound to carry on diligent care of offspring from conception itself, to turn aside all things which can be harmful to them, and to watch that they be exposed to no danger of life.

Hence of themselves they sin gravely: 1° women who do not take care lest the fetus in the womb be destroyed by disordered wantonness, dances, too heavy burdens, running or a long journey, too much anger, or rather vehement grief; 2° men who treat pregnant wives harshly, afflict them with grave blows, or impose enormous labors on them; 3° spouses who do not take care lest little children be suffocated, by placing them, still very tender, that is, in general before they have completed the first year of age, with themselves in bed without any barrier, or do not take care lest some evil in any way happen to them from water, fire, beasts, iron instruments, etc....

b) By reason of food. Parents are bound to procure for children whatever things are necessary for food, habitation, and clothing congruent with their state and condition.

Hence parents sin: 1° who do not assist children suffering necessity, until they are able to provide for themselves by labor or industry; 2° who cast children out of the house while they cannot yet provide for themselves, or who compel them to beg or to exercise a vile art alien to their condition.

Quaer. Must a mother nourish little children with her own milk?

Resp. Affirmatively, with the common opinion, because natural right seems to postulate this. Nevertheless this obligation does not press under grave sin, because otherwise a grave disorder does not appear. But necessity, notable utility, or custom in force among primary families, etc., excuses from every fault; ... but then under grave sin the mother ought to substitute for herself a nurse good as to morals and health. St. Alphonsus¹ - Collet, etc., and others commonly against others more lax or more strict.

429. • c) By reason of state. Parents are bound to procure for children a state in which they can sometime live honorably according to their condition. - Hence they sin:

1° Who do not employ at least moderate diligence so that they may acquire goods from which they may suitably sustain their children and provide for their future state.

2° Who do not teach, nor take care that their children be taught, an art congruent with their state, or another kind of living decently.

3° A fortiori, those who by laziness, negligence, drinking, feasting, games, and imprudent business dissipate the family property.

4° Who without a legitimate cause obstinately deny a dowry suitable for the daughter for entering matrimony or entrance into Religion.¹

Quaer. What do our laws generally establish concerning the obligation of parents as to the bodily education of offspring?

Resp. 1° "The common law furnishes no means of enforcing the parent to maintain, protect, or educate his child."² But in many States, during the minority of the child, "... the parent is absolutely bound to provide reasonably for his maintenance and education; and he may be sued for necessaries furnished, and schooling given to a child under just and reasonable circumstances...."

"In consequence of the obligation of the father to provide for the maintenance, and ... the education of his infant children, he is entitled... to the value of their labor and services."³

Resp. 2° Concerning the obligation of parents as to the sustenance and education of illegitimate offspring, Kent⁴ has these words: "The mother or reputed father" (by which the judge ordinarily considers him whom the sworn mother affirms) "is generally in this country chargeable by law with the maintenance of the bastard child." Cf. L. IV. 951.

430. • Parents are especially bound to procure spiritual education for children. The reason is that man, besides material or bodily being, which he has in common with the other animals, is endowed by God with a rational and most noble soul, created to the image of the Divinity itself; and he was made that he may tend to God as his supernatural last end. Therefore by parents he ought especially to be instructed and directed to this end; for matrimony has been raised to the dignity of a Sacrament for this reason, that offspring born may be reborn in Christ and prepared for eternal life. - But for this education there is required: 1° doctrine; 2° correction; 3° example.

a) Doctrine. Parents are bound, by themselves or through fit instructors, to educate children in good morals, in observance of the commandments of God, in faith, and in all things necessary to salvation, because they ought to educate them in the way by which they may arrive at God.

Therefore parents must carefully take care: 1° that children be regenerated by the grace of Baptism as soon as possible (see n. 1259. q. 5°); 2° that from tenderest childhood they teach them the principal heads of Christian doctrine (n. 257 sq.), and incline their hearts to God; 3° that from the first years they accustom them to morning and evening prayers, to the Offices of the Church and Catechisms, and also turn them away from the fallacious allurements, pomps, and pleasures of the world; 4° that they set over them teachers conspicuous in doctrine and especially in gravity of morals; 5° that they watch day and night lest they be corrupted by depraved companions, conversations, or readings.

431. • b) Correction. Parents are bound to correct delinquent children. Hence: He that spareth the rod hateth his son.¹

But correction, that it may be useful, ought to be moderate and prudent. For immoderate chastisement is known to harm more than to profit, since it renders children peevish, stupid, faint-hearted, and sometimes affected by despair; indeed, instead of the love owed to parents, it is wont to produce contempt or even deadly hatred.

c) Example. Parents owe good example to children, because 1° examples more efficaciously than words somehow draw to following, especially if they are furnished by Superiors; 2° because, if parents themselves are known to be imbued with evil morals, their words will move children little to pursuing good morals.

432. You will resolve. - 1° Parents sin gravely who, spending every care only on temporal things, so forget spiritual things that they do not even know the things necessary for attaining salvation, much less instruct their children or take care that they be instructed.

2° Parents sin gravely who, to spare expenses, utterly neglect the spiritual education of their children.

3° Of themselves parents sin gravely who by excessive indulgence notably neglect to correct children when otherwise it would be necessary; but no less do they sin who punish children with more grave penalties, for example if they mutilate them, or inflict on them a grave wound or blows or beatings so grave that their life or health suffers notable detriment.

4° Parents perpetrate a threefold sin in species when they utter filthy words and obscene conversations while children are hearing, vomit forth curses and imprecations, and belch out oaths and blasphemies. This is plain from those things which I taught n. 293, under "We have said: Scandal has at least a twofold malice."

5° Parents sin gravely who permit children near the use of reason, either with themselves or with others of a different sex - whether children or adults - in the same bed, or older ones with themselves in the same room. But if the matter can in no way be otherwise, parents should abstain from the use of marriage during the time when children lie with them in the same bed or room.

433. Questions. - Quaer. 1° What about parents who hand over offspring to a foundling home, especially in these regions?

Resp. It is certain that those sin gravely:

1° Who place newly born offspring near the house of someone; for they expose both the temporal and spiritual life of the offspring to grave danger.

2° Who hand over offspring to a public foundling home in those places where a Catholic one exists; for without cause they expose the soul of the offspring to grave danger.

3° Who, in whatever manner finally they expose the offspring, do not first duly baptize them, or neglect means by which their baptism may be rendered indubitable.

4° Who expose them in whatever manner without a cause sufficiently excusing.

Quaer. 2° What in places where no Catholic foundling home exists, and where therefore offspring, after leaving the public foundling home, is to be handed over to sectarians or infidels, as is customary?

Resp. A mother can be moved by a threefold cause to expose offspring: a) infamy alone; b) poverty alone; c) each at the same time. If the girl has means, in the first case, she is bound to hand the offspring over to a nurse or take care that it be handed over, as often as this can be done without danger of her reputation, which, as is supposed, is still intact. - But one who is pressed by necessity of consulting her reputation is bound to take care lest the offspring be imperiled in life or salvation. But to take care for salvation will be most difficult for her, since the curators of the foundling home hand infants over for education to whomever they wish, as was said above.

The second cause, or poverty alone, will be of various force for excusing. Yet where it is extreme, or so grave that the mother cannot sustain the offspring, Kenrick¹ does not dare to condemn her if, that she may consult its life, from the instinct of nature she hands the offspring over to the foundling home to be nourished, cherishing hope that some occasion may afterward be born to her to instruct it with Christian documents.

The third cause will excuse if she commits the offspring to the foundling home with this intention, that at least she may consult herself, being prepared to consult the salvation of the offspring by that means which she can.

434. • Quaer. 3° What are the obligations of other blood relatives, ascendants and descendants, especially tutors?

Resp. They are generally the same, with due proportion, as those of parents with respect to children, and vice versa; for all these, by reason of the generation of some from others, are bound mutually by the strict bond of piety, especially if, parents lacking, ascendants take up the care of grandchildren. - Thus all.

Yet note with Kenrick² that the care of non-Catholics is not easily to be assumed by anyone as tutor or curator, since on one side he cannot favor heresy by educating them in it, and on the other side, by not educating them in it, he would seem to violate the faith given to the testator or the court. (z) p. 479.

The dispositions of our civil laws concerning the constitution of a tutor and his rights and offices, see, if you like, apud Kent,³ or apud Walker,⁴ or apud Smith.⁵

Quaer. 4° What are the mutual obligations of brothers and sisters?

Resp. 1° They ought to pursue one another with mutual love, not only with common affection, as other men, but with a peculiar love because of the close bond of blood.

Resp. 2° They ought also mutually to aid one another as to the necessaries of life, not only in extreme, but also in grave necessity. - Thus all. - See St. Alph.¹

441. • I. Spouses are bound:

1° To mutual love. For since they are one flesh, they ought also to be one heart. Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church. - Let them (wives) love their husbands.²

2° To conjugal society and cohabitation. This is plain from the nature and ends of matrimony, and from the words of Christ: A man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh.³

3° To furnishing mutually to one another food, and whatever pertains to the honorable sustenance of their condition: For (now) they are not two, but one flesh.⁴ But no one ever hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it.⁵

4° To rendering the conjugal debt mutually to one another, concerning which matter in the Treatise on Matrimony.

442. • II. The husband is bound in particular:

1° To conduct the family property studiously.

2° To take care that the wife fulfill the duties of a Christian profession, and execute the precepts of the law both divine and ecclesiastical. For the man is the head of the woman and the rector of the whole family; and therefore to him belongs the right governance both of the wife and of the other members of the family.

3° To correct a delinquent wife where this is necessary for her amendment and for preventing scandal. But correction ought to proceed from charity, or love of justice, or zeal for procuring the right governance of the family, and in manner to be such that it is plain the wife is the partner of the man, not a servant. Care must also be taken lest peace and love perish between them.

443. • III. The wife for her part is bound:

1° To reverence her husband, because he is her Superior, as is established from what was said, and from the words: Thou shalt be under the power of the husband, and he shall rule over thee.¹

2° To furnish obedience to him; because obedience is owed to a Superior in those things which pertain to governance; and the Apostle says to the Colossians:² Women, be subject to your husbands, as it behooveth in the Lord.

3° To carry care of the house in the family property, and therefore to undertake the offices of the family, as to prepare food, sweep the house, wash linens, repair torn garments, and furnish other things of this kind. Yet in families sufficiently wealthy the wife can fulfill the lower offices through male servants or maidservants, provided she watches over them and takes care that the domestic matter be well conducted.

444. You will resolve. - 1° A husband can sin gravely if he pursues his wife with insults, for example by calling her an adulteress, etc.; - if without a just cause he impedes her from fulfilling divine or ecclesiastical precepts, or from devotions very useful, for example from discreet frequency of the Sacraments; - if he treats her in a tyrannical manner like a vile slave; - if he does not cohabit with her; - if he neglects the governance of the family, etc.³

2° A wife likewise can sin gravely if she is accustomed to ridicule and mock her husband; - if by harsh words, contumacious disobedience, or excessive peevishness she provokes him to anger and blasphemies, etc.

3° Ordinarily the man ought to begin the correction of the wife by gentler words, and, if these do not profit, to proceed to graver correction. Sometimes he ought to conceal the faults of the wife when he can do this without sin, and not be excessive in correcting; but sometimes to defer correction for a time, lest the correction seem to proceed from the heat of anger and lack fruit, while the wife is less disposed to receive it.

4° Let the confessor not immediately believe a spouse complaining against a spouse, especially if a wife rails against the husband; because women are generally prone to lying or certainly exaggerating. Wherefore it is better, the matter being passed over, to commend to them prayer, patience, meekness, and greater solicitude for furnishing services to the man.

5° Let the wife be silent while the husband is angry or drunk; if admonition seems likely to profit, let her admonish while the husband is well disposed; if a reply must be made to an angry man, let her reply gently: for a soft answer breaketh anger, and a hard word stirreth up fury. If these things obtain nothing, let her take care that the husband be admonished by the Pastor or another prudent man.

445. • Quaer. What are the principal dispositions of our civil laws concerning the obligations of spouses?

Resp. 1° "The husband may ... be bound to keep the peace as against his wife, and for any unreasonable and improper confinement by him, she may be entitled to relief upon habeas corpus. But as the husband is the guardian of the wife, and bound to protect and maintain her, the law has given him a reasonable superiority and control over her person, and he may even put gentle restraints upon her liberty, if her conduct be such as to require it, unless he renounces that control by articles of separation, or it be taken from him by a qualified divorce."¹

2° "If he" (the husband) "shifts his domicile, the wife is bound to follow him wherever he chooses to go."²

3° The husband is bound to provide his wife with necessaries suitable to her situation and his condition in life; and if she contracts debts due for them during cohabitation, he is obliged to pay those debts; but for anything beyond necessaries, namely "elegancies or luxuries,"³ he is not chargeable....

"If the husband abandons his wife, or they separate by consent, without any provision for her maintenance, or if he sends her away, he is liable for her necessaries, and he sends credit with her to that extent." The same says "if she receives such treatment as affords a reasonable cause for her to depart from his house, and refuse to cohabit with him."

"But if the wife elopes, though it be not with an adulterer, he is not chargeable even for necessaries."¹

The obligations which regard other Superiors or inferiors are generally the same, proportion observed, as the obligations of parents and children. Hence we shall say only a few things: 1° concerning the obligations of masters and servants; 2° of teachers and students; 3° of citizens toward temporal authority.

But concerning the offices of Pastors and other ecclesiastical Superiors there will be treatment in the Treatise on Particular States, where there is treatment of the clerical state.

446. • Masters are bound toward their servants: 1° to treat them kindly; 2° to instruct and correct them; 3° to pay them a just price.

I. To treat kindly, that is, by addressing them and prescribing to them decently and humanely; by furnishing good and sufficient food; by not burdening them with excessive works; by suitably caring for the sick. This is established from natural law and from Sacred Scripture: If thou have a faithful servant, let him be to thee as thy own soul; treat him as a brother.² And you, masters, do the same things to them (servants), forbearing threatenings, knowing that the Lord both of them and of you is in heaven, and there is no respect of persons with Him.¹

II. To instruct and correct: for the master is the head of the servant, as of the whole family; but it belongs to the head to direct where there is need. It seems also to be established from the words of Paul:² But if any man have not care of his own, and especially of those of his house, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel. But servants are reckoned among domestics. - Elbel,³ and others commonly.

III. To pay a just price: for there is question of an obligation of justice and natural equity; hence fraud of such wage is numbered among sins crying to heaven.

447. You will resolve. - Masters can sin, and indeed even gravely:

1° If they do not concede time to servants for learning the rudiments of the Christian Faith, or do not send them to catechism and sermon; - if they do not take care that at the time of the precept they confess and communicate.

2° If they hire or retain in the house servants who are irreligious, impious, blaspheming, speaking filthy things; - if they do not admonish and correct those sinning gravely; - or do not dismiss those unwilling to promise amendment, unless perhaps they have very great need of their work and cannot find others.

3° If they do not take care, as much as in them lies, that servants abstain from sins; - if they permit to them an occasion of sinning; - if by depraved example or solicitations they induce or allure them into sin.

4° If they do not pay the promised or just stipend, or delay too much; - if they do not care for a sick servant, immediately expel him, or dismiss him without a just cause before the fixed time. - But if a servant hired for a year is sick for some months, suppose for a quarter of a year, according to the truer opinion a salary is not owed to him for service not furnished; nor probably is the master obligated to the expenses of sickness, provided charity does not demand aid because of grave necessity. Except, for each case, if and insofar as custom bears otherwise, especially in brief sickness.⁴ Yet in these matters let equity prevail over strict right! - Similarly neither is the servant bound in such a case to supply his services. - To a servant departing before the fixed time by his own fault, according to the more common opinion, half the stipend owed for the time in which he served, or a little less, is owed, unless grave damage comes to the master from this, or mutual agreement or custom establishes otherwise.¹

448. • Servants are bound to furnish to masters:

1° Reverence; for thus the Apostle:² Let servants count their masters worthy of all honor. From this they can sin even gravely who ridicule masters, spurn them, or manifest their hidden defects.

2° Service and obedience in all those things to which they have obligated themselves by force of the contract, and in those things which look to good morals. Thus to the Ephesians:⁴ Servants, be obedient to them that are your lords according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in the simplicity of your heart, as to Christ. - And St. Peter:⁵ Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle, but also to the froward.

Hence by reason of matter they sin more or less who, when something is prescribed to them, murmur, answer insolently, are accustomed to be unteachable, neglect to carry out the prescribed labor, or fail in the office imposed on them; and in one word, all who do not furnish the service such as is ordinarily able to be exacted and furnished from such persons.

3° Fidelity; according to the words of Paul:⁶ Servants to be subject to their masters, ... not defrauding, but in all things showing good fidelity.

Hence they sin, and often gravely against justice, who do not take care of the things entrusted to themselves; who from their own fault permit them to become worse; who steal precious victuals, or those not customarily given to them, either to eat, or to give or sell to outsiders.

449. • Quaer. What do our laws generally establish concerning the obligations of masters and servants?

Resp. 1° The "relation of master and servant rests altogether upon contract," express or implied.¹ If this contract is lacking, nothing is owed by civil law to a servant.²

2° "If the servant hired for a definite term leaves the service before the end of it, without reasonable cause, or is dismissed for such misconduct as justifies it, he loses his right to wages for the period he has served. A servant so hired may be dismissed by the master before the expiration of the term, either for immoral conduct, wilful disobedience, or habitual neglect."³

3° The power of the master of giving "moderate corporal correction to his servant ... may safely be confined to apprentices and menial servants while under age, for then the master is to be considered as standing in loco parentis."⁴

4° "The master is not bound to provide even a menial servant with medical attendance and medicines during sickness."⁵

Concerning servants whom they call "apprentices," see, if you like, Kent.⁶

450. • I. Teachers and instructors owe to students: 1° love; 2° example; 3° correction; 4° doctrine. The reason is both because they in some way stand in the place of parents, and because they are instituted for educating students in sound doctrine of morals and letters.

Therefore they ought: 1° to perfect themselves in the knowledge which they teach, for duly educating others; 2° to promote the progress of students in letters, as much as in them lies; to turn them away, as much as they can, from others who are disgraced by depraved morals, and whom they ought in no way to admit into their schools.

Hence instructors can offend even gravely when they neglect the instruction of students, or punish them unjustly or indiscreetly; but especially if they seduce them, by impelling them for example to carnal sins; if they do not teach good morals; if deliberately they teach false things as true, or things harmful to salvation; if they admit or retain students imbued with evil morals who are pernicious to others, etc. Cf. n. 437. case VI, 440. 1°.

451. • II. Students are bound to exhibit to teachers:

1° Love and reverence, because of their superiority and care.

2° Obedience, while they are being educated by them in good morals and arts. The reason is plain: for the reciprocal obligation of students toward teachers imports this, since teachers would be obligated altogether in vain to educate them or imbue them with good morals unless students were likewise obligated to follow the admonitions and precepts of teachers.

Hence students sin if, instead of studying diligently, they waste time in idleness, play, or other foolishness contrary to the will of their teachers; but much more gravely if they detract from teachers, ridicule them, mock them, afflict them with curses, calumnies, annoyances, etc.

Concerning these obligations we note these dispositions of our civil law. "The power allowed by law to the parent over the person of the child may be delegated to a tutor or instructor, the better to accomplish the purpose of education. A schoolmaster, who stands in that character loco parentis, may in proper cases inflict moderate and reasonable chastisement, even for acts done out of school, if prejudicial to its order and good discipline."¹

452. • A. On Magistrates. Principles. I. They ought to know the things which pertain to their office, for example laws.

II. They are bound to seek and guard the common safety of all.

453. You will resolve. They sin:

1° Who, altogether ignorant of laws and not powerful in judgment, procure or assume some office for themselves, with danger of inflicting harm on those concerning whose controversies they are going to pronounce sentence, or whose business they are going to handle.¹

2° Who foster quarrels or lawsuits for their own gain.²

3° Who pronounce an unjust sentence, yielding to popular prejudices, or courting popular favor, or seeking the utilities of private persons, with damage to the innocent.³

4° Who permit the rights of conscience to be violated, the children of the poor being taken away by masters from ancestral Religion against the laws.⁴

5° Who promote or take care that men not suitable be promoted to offices because they are men of their own party;⁵ or indeed suitable men, but with the promoted, by wages agreed upon to the prejudice of the public treasury; and likewise those who take care or permit themselves to be promoted by this same pact.

6° Who either permit the public treasury to be pillaged, by entrusting public money to fraudulent men,⁶ or pillage it themselves, while, for example, they expose public money to dangerous businesses from which they hope profit for themselves, or on occasion of contracts which they enter with private persons in the name of the republic they bargain or procure something unjustly for themselves.

7° Higher magistrates, namely Presidents and Governors, if, uniquely seeking their repeated election, in distribution of offices and in laws either to be approved or vetoed they especially consider whether they are going to procure more votes for themselves, and to that end neglect the advantages of most citizens.⁷

8° Who do not take care that laws be committed to execution, and do not guard public tranquillity and order.⁸

I. The special obligations of spouses are usually numbered as three:

1. Mutual love and assistance: namely an intimate and special love, and one conformable to the order of charity, so that it inspires in the wife reverence toward her husband and obedience in good morals and in the governing of the house, because the man is the head of the woman; but the husband should be a protection to his wife and should show benevolence to her, because she is not his servant or maid, but a suitable companion. Hence in daily life they ought patiently to bear each other's defects; nevertheless at times the wife can charitably admonish and exhort the husband, while the husband can correct, reprove, and chastise the wife, that she may fulfill her duties, even authoritatively, but moderately, and ordinarily only lightly.

2. Cohabitation, because they have entered marriage unto an undivided sharing of life; hence regularly they ought to dwell together unless a grave reason excuses; and the wife is bound to follow the husband if it can be done without grave harm, but not if the husband wishes to wander about, unless this was his condition before the marriage, because then the wife is presumed to have consented in this.

3. Chaste fidelity as to the conjugal due, so that at the same time every approach to adultery may be closed off, and also imprudent familiarity with another person, and likewise every vice against nature may be avoided; concerning this we have spoken sufficiently in the little work Questions concerning Chastity and Lust, q. 8.

II. Spouses sin gravely:

A. Generally: 1. those who hate one another, or provoke one another with insults or quarrels;

2. those who indulge unjust jealousy;

3. those who deliver their heart to an outside person of the other sex and withdraw it from their spouse, even if they leave the body to the spouse for conjugal acts;

4. those who are accustomed to deny to one another due assistance, especially if in grave necessity;

5. those who habitually do not cohabit without a sufficient reason;

6. those who deny the conjugal due without a grave reason, all the more if they break matrimonial fidelity.

B. In particular, the husband sins:

1. if he denies his wife food and support, or, when he can, does not provide it, unless she has departed by her own fault;

2. if he treats his wife very harshly and roughly, or compels her to labors which are altogether unbecoming to her condition;

3. if he afflicts his wife with insulting or defamatory words;

4. if without grave cause he impedes her as to the practice of religion;

5. if he beats her gravely;

6. if he greatly afflicts her by his drunken revels and other disordered passions;

7. if he is very negligent in the governing of the family estate.

C. But the wife sins:

1. if she provokes her husband by quarrels or words to grave anger or blasphemy;

2. if, despising her husband, she herself wishes to govern and is notably disobedient, unless the husband commands altogether unreasonably;

3. if she gravely neglects the household, indulging sloth or amusements; or, being given to luxury, she exasperates her husband;

4. if she habitually thrusts herself into the administration of the house, not in the manner of one helping but of one ruling; unless there is a just cause, such as if the husband as a spendthrift dissipates the goods of the family or is unfit for management; but let her not easily think this latter thing.

What can be lawful for spouses as to their goods of fortune, and how they can be guilty of injustice, is declared in the treatise on Justice.¹

¹ Cf. Summa Theologiae Moralis, II, nn. 181-182.

III. Spouses are to be questioned:

1. Each one, whether he or she lives well with the consort, so that they are of one mind; whether they employ every solicitude and care for the Christian education of the offspring; whether they permit themselves nothing which is opposed to the ends of marriage.

2. The husband, whether he keeps faith with his wife, and supplies the family the sustenance due to it.

3. The wife, whether she obeys the husband in honest and lawful things; whether she has not provoked the husband to anger or blasphemy; whether she has not defrauded him of the conjugal due.

As far as possible, such questioning should be done in more modest words, especially to a wife; for example, whether she has not been disobedient to her husband as regards marriage, whether perhaps she has some doubt which troubles her concerning marriage, and so on. This questioning can generally be omitted with persons who are truly pious, unless nevertheless there is some special reason for doubting.

IV. Special tribulations occur for spouses, which arise from three sources: from vices, from the evil morals of children, and from adverse fortune.²

² Cf. Aertnijs, Th. P., n. 144-147; Reuter, Neo-conf., n. 130-135.

As to the first: a) If one spouse complains against the other, the confessor should not at once believe that the complaining one is free from fault, nor condemn the other while the cause is unknown, nor in the presence of the wife cast blame upon the husband, even if he is certainly guilty; because women by their nature, being forward, easily object faults to their husbands, especially if these have been condemned by the judgment of the confessor. Therefore it is better, while passing over the matter, to commend prayer, patience, meekness, and greater solicitude in showing services to the husband.

b) If the wife complains of the severity and anger of the husband, the confessor should persuade her to pray for the husband, to be diligent in rendering services to him, and to add extraordinary things to ordinary ones, for example by preparing foods pleasing to him and saying that she does this so that it may be well with him; that she be exactly obedient; that she be silent while the husband is angry or drunk. Let her try to lead the drunken man to bed with gentle words so that he may sleep; and on the following day, if an admonition seems likely to profit, let her lovingly admonish the husband while he is well disposed. If an angry man must be answered, let her answer gently, for "a soft answer breaketh wrath, a harsh word stirreth up fury" (Prov. XV, 1). If nothing is of avail, there is need of patience, by which she may obtain consolation from God and merit.

c) On the other hand, if the wife attempts to dominate the husband, the husband should be advised to dissuade the wife gently, but by no means to show himself timid, otherwise the woman would become more insolent; if gentle words do not profit, let him resist graver things and do contrary to what the wife wills, yet let him sometimes consent; let him discharge his own office well, lest he provide the wife any occasion of complaint.

As to the second: If a parent complains that the children are disobedient, fierce, and given to idleness, the confessor should exhort him to examine whether perhaps this has happened by his own fault from neglected education, for example because in childhood he indulged them too much, did not restrain them from wicked companionships, or, on the contrary, treated them too harshly and addressed them with curses and disgraceful words; then it is not strange that the children have become stubborn and disobedient. Let him remember his own youth, whether he himself did not err.

The correction of children should have paternal kindness mixed with rigor. Moreover, while the offspring is being punished by one parent, if it is not done beyond measure, let the other beware lest he openly oppose it, or afterward flatter the offspring as though it had suffered innocently; this removes the fruit of correction and makes children refractory. If one parent seems to need admonition from the other, let this be done secretly from the children.

As to the third: If they complain of a defect of means for sustenance, the confessor should console them and stir them to patience and conformity with the divine will; let him say that the salvation of the soul is to be preferred to all things; let him exhort them to educate their children in the fear of God; let him stir them to confidence in God, who said: "Seek first the kingdom of God, and the rest shall be added unto you." In the service of God there is true happiness; and mediocrity is sufficient for man, since riches are for many an occasion of perversity and damnation.

V. Spouses are to be admonished according to opportunity concerning their obligations; and indeed:

1. That not all things are lawful for married persons, but that the sanctity of marriage can be defiled.

2. That in this matter a threefold rule holds: those things are lawful which of themselves are ordered to the primary end of marriage; things contrary to this are gravely evil, such as adultery, pollution, sodomy, onanism; but useless things are only lightly evil if they are done without great danger of pollution.

Honor thy father and thy mother. - Exod. xx, 12.

This precept primarily and directly imposes upon children certain obligations toward parents; but secondarily and indirectly it regards parents. It also regards, although implicitly, the mutual obligations of other superiors and inferiors.

Since parents have a threefold relation toward children, namely by reason of cause, by reason of preeminence, and by reason of governance, there are three duties which children ought to render to parents by title of piety, namely love, reverence, and obedience. Wherefore they ought to love them as authors of their existence, reverence them as superiors, and obey them as rectors delegated by God. - Therefore:

I Say 1st. Children ought to love parents with love both internal, cherishing them with a pious and benevolent affection of heart, and external, repelling every evil and injury from them, as well as exhibiting to them signs of external benevolence, and assisting them according to ability when they are constituted in necessity. This is clear from the law of nature itself; for however grave the defects which our progenitors have may be, and whatever may be the manner in which they have conducted themselves toward us, nevertheless we always owe them life and preservation, which surely is the greatest of all benefits. Hence Ecclus. vii, 29 and 30: "Honor thy father, and forget not the groanings of thy mother: remember that unless through them, thou wouldst not have been born: and repay them, as they also thee."

I Say 2nd. Children ought to exhibit reverence to parents, both internal and external; they ought, namely, to acknowledge them and to treat them both in words and deeds as superiors, for they are such, designated by nature itself. - Hence Ecclus. iii, 9: "In work and speech and all patience honor thy father." - And ibid., 8: "He who fears the Lord honors parents, and as masters he will serve those who begot him." - Deut. xxvii, 16: "Cursed is he who does not honor his father and mother; and all the people shall say: Amen."

I Say 3rd. Children ought to render obedience to parents in all licit and honorable things pertaining to their education, while they are under their power. This is clear from natural law and from Scripture, for example, Ephes. vi, 1: "Children, obey your parents in the Lord; for this is just." - Coloss. iii, 20: "Children, obey parents in all things; for this is pleasing to the Lord." - I said 1st, in all licit and honorable things, because in things evidently depraved children neither ought to obey, nor can they. - I said 2nd, pertaining to their education, for in those things which pertain to the choice of their own state, children are independent, and parents would sin gravely if directly or indirectly they compelled them to choose the religious state rather than the conjugal state or vice versa. - I said 3rd, while they are under their power, for if children, for example, marry and establish a new family or wish to embrace the religious state, although they always owe love and reverence to parents, the duty of obedience properly ceases.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. Children sin gravely if they strike parents or attempt to strike them even lightly, but injuriously. This crime, even in ancient times, was seen as so atrocious that formerly among the Hebrews any who had committed it were punished by death; for it is said, Exod. xxi, 15: "He who shall strike his father or mother shall be put to death."

2nd. They sin gravely if they curse parents, as is clear from the words of Exod. xxi, 18: "He who shall curse his father or mother shall die the death"; or if they throw insults upon them, and affect them with injuries or contumelious words by which they know that they are to be gravely offended; if they gravely mock them by laughter, jeerings, gesticulations, reproaches, derisions, a stern look, etc., provided nevertheless that these things are done from contempt, but not from levity or simple rusticity.

3rd. They sin gravely if they despise parents who are poor, miserable, badly clothed, or are ashamed of them, or refuse to acknowledge them, or regard them as unknown and foreign. Yet except if, with contempt and pride excluded, they pretend for a just cause that they do not know them, for example, to avoid some inconvenience which the child would incur if his parents were known, etc.

It must be noted here that in practice the disobedience of children can not rarely be excused from grave sin on account of levity of mind, inadvertence, or some human negligence, and very often on account of smallness of matter. Indeed often they ought to be judged immune from every fault on account of defect of a rigorous precept. For that a sin, especially grave, be committed against obedience, it is required that the parents seem strictly to command, but not only to counsel, solicit, or signify their mind. But that a true precept is being enjoined is discerned from the serious or severe manner in which the thing is commanded, and from other circumstances, for example, from the necessity and magnitude of the thing commanded, and the penalty added, etc.

Parents are held by a most grave obligation of taking care, according to their strength, of the education of their offspring, both religious and moral, and physical and civil, and also of providing for their temporal good (Can. 1113).

I Say 1st. Parents ought to cherish their children with true, efficacious, and ordered love. The reason of this obligation is founded in the very bowels of nature and in the title of generation. For just as, by the impulse of nature, each one ought to love himself, so parents are held to love children as something of themselves, or flesh from their flesh. - I said 1st, with true love, namely both with internal affection of heart and with external love, by procuring their good as much as is in them. - I said 2nd, efficacious, insofar as parents ought not, on account of sluggishness or cruel kindness, to act too remissly with children, neglecting to draw them back from vices by more severe precepts and other suitable remedies. - I said 3rd, ordered, namely insofar as the spiritual good of children ought to be preferred to their temporal good, and among the diverse kinds of temporal goods, that which is better and more necessary for them. - Hence:

1st. Parents can sin gravely if they are inflamed with a depraved affection against children, and look upon them disdainfully; 2nd, if they address them with gravely contumelious names; 3rd, if they grant or permit all things to them, lest they sadden them; 4th, if they favor one before the others very much without a just reason, and look upon the rest indifferently, or even hold them as if adulterine.

I Say 2nd. Parents ought to procure for children a suitable bodily education, namely not only to do nothing positively against their life from the moment of conception, but also to provide all those means which are necessary for sustaining life, and for preserving and perfecting strength, and to prepare a future state for them according to their proper condition. This is clear from the law of nature, according to which we see even brute animals, after they have begotten offspring, labor greatly for preserving life for them and for seeking food. Hence:

1st. Parents can sin gravely if they cast children out of the house without sufficient reason, while they cannot yet sufficiently provide for themselves; 2nd, if they do not apply at least moderate diligence to acquire goods from which they may suitably sustain children and provide for their future state; 3rd, if they do not teach children an art suitable to their state or some other manner of living decently, nor take care that they be taught.

I Say 3rd. Parents are principally held to procure spiritual education for children. The reason is that man, besides material or bodily being, which he has in common with the other animals, is endowed by God with a rational and most noble soul, created according to the image of the Divinity itself; and he was created that he might tend to God as his supernatural last end. Therefore he ought especially to be instructed and directed by parents to this end; for marriage was raised to the dignity of a sacrament so that the offspring born may be reborn in Christ, and prepared for eternal life. - Hence:

1st. Parents sin gravely or can sin gravely if, when opportunity is given, they do not take care that children be regenerated as soon as possible by the grace of Baptism; 2nd, if they do not teach them or strive that they be taught the principal heads of Christian doctrine, and do not form their morals from tenderest childhood according to the norm of the divine law; 3rd, if they do not correct them when delinquent, even with the rod being applied, yet prudently, moderately, and opportunely; 4th, if finally they furnish depraved examples to them or utter filthy words or blasphemies in their presence.

Question 1. Ought a mother nourish her little children with her own milk?

Response. Affirmatively, with the common opinion, because natural law seems to demand this. Yet this obligation does not urge under grave obligation, because in this matter grave disorder does not appear. But necessity, notable utility, or custom prevailing among noble families, etc., excuses from every fault; but then under grave obligation the mother ought to substitute for herself a nurse good as to morals and health. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 336. - Benedict XIV, de Synod. dioec., lib. 11, chap. 7, nn. 9, 10 and 11. - Kenrick, tract. 8, n. 85.

Question 2. Do parents sin gravely who, with no cause or only a futile cause, bring newly born offspring to foundling homes or expose them at the houses of private persons?

Response. Affirmatively, and indeed both against the piety which they owe to children and against justice, by imposing a grave burden upon foundling homes or private persons without reason. But if they redeem with competent money the cares expended for the good of the offspring, they sin only against piety, because only a maternal instinct can suitably satisfy the natural needs of offspring, especially in the tenderest age. But when a just cause is present, there is no sin; indeed then parents, even if they are rich, probably are not held to monetary compensation if they entrust the offspring to public foundling homes. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 336; and tract. 5, n. 656. - Kenrick, tract. 8, nn. 84 and following.

Question 3. What must be said concerning those parents who, compelled by want or to avoid infamy, place offspring at Protestant foundling homes?

Response. If they do this only because of danger of infamy to be avoided, certainly they are not excused from grave sin; because, by using money, they could by many other means provide both for their own reputation and at the same time for the eternal salvation of the offspring. But if they are oppressed by the greatest want, and a fortiori if to want there is added the danger of infamy, the distinguished Kenrick does not dare to condemn those who thus expose their own children, yet with this mind and hope: that, Baptism now having been conferred, in the future they strive to obtain their eternal salvation in the best way they can. - Cf. Kenrick, n. 84.

Question 4. Is it licit for parents to send children to positively evil schools, when a most grave cause is present?

Response. Not at all, negatively, because parents acting thus expose the offspring to evident and proximate danger to eternal salvation, which can never be licit, notwithstanding even a most grave temporal evil, and therefore absolution must be absolutely denied to these parents unless they repent. But I call positively evil schools those in which heresy, impiety, or corruption of morals is taught.

Question 5. What must be said concerning public schools as they generally exist among us, in which namely religious education is set aside?

Response. Speaking of themselves, and with the principles of both positive and natural law considered, schools of this kind are evil: namely the system itself according to whose norm they have been instituted is evil and full of dangers.

It is clear 1st from proposition 48 of the Syllabus, which sounds thus: "That method of instructing youth can be approved by Catholic men which is separated from Catholic faith and from the power of the Church, and which looks only, or at least primarily, to the knowledge of merely natural things and the ends of earthly social life."

It is clear 2nd from Conc. Plen. Balt. II, n. 426, where it is read thus: "Long experience has indeed proved sufficiently and more than sufficiently how grave are the evils and how intrinsic also the dangers which commonly come upon Catholic youth in these regions from attendance at public schools. For by virtue of the system obtaining among them, it can in no way happen that Catholic youths are not at the same time brought into great danger of faith and morals. Nor indeed do the advances which that fatal stain of Indifferentism, as they call it, has thus far had to the greatest degree in this region, and has day by day, seem to be traced back to any other cause; also that corruption of morals, by which not without tears we see even the tenderest age among us everywhere infected and ruined. For the daily intercourse of those who practice either a false religion or none, also the reading and meditation of authors who attack, gnaw at, and sprinkle with black salt our most holy religion and institutions, indeed the Saints themselves, gradually weaken in the souls of Catholic children the force and virtue of true religion. Then the fellow-students with whom they associate are commonly of such morals and examples, with such wicked license of speaking and acting, that by this association and familiar intercourse, for our adolescents, although excellently instructed at home, every modesty and piety is quickly consumed and perishes, as wax when fire has been applied."

The things which are prescribed in the new Code concerning schools accord:

Let Catholic children not attend non-Catholic schools, neutral schools, mixed schools, which namely are open also to non-Catholics. But it belongs to the Ordinary of the place alone to decide, according to the norm of the instructions of the Apostolic See, in what circumstances and with what cautions applied, so that the danger of perversion may be avoided, it can be tolerated that those schools be frequented (Can. 1374).

§ 2. Not only parents according to the norm of can. 1113, but also all who hold their place, have the right and most grave duty of taking care of the Christian education of children (Can. 1372). - Cf. Can. 2319, § 1, nn. 2, 4, § 2, where penalties are established against parents educating offspring outside the Church.

Question 6. With these things notwithstanding, can Catholic parents ever send their offspring to our public schools?

Response. Affirmatively, provided the conditions under which the Baltimore Fathers permit this are verified. The reason is that, after all, the malice of those schools consists both in the system itself of the separation of religious education, and in the danger concerning morals and faith; but parents who, compelled by grave necessity, send their own offspring to them do not approve the system but rather undergo it, and by applying cautions they either altogether remove the dangers or in great part lessen them. Therefore. ... This same thing is clear from Conc. Plen. Balt. III, which, in n. 198, made its own the very words of the Instruction which the Congregation de Propaganda Fide sent to our Bishops on November 24, 1875, concerning this matter. Therefore the Baltimore Fathers speak thus: "It can sometimes happen - as also the Instruction just cited intimates - 'that Catholic parents can in conscience entrust their offspring to public schools. But they cannot do this unless they have a sufficient cause for acting thus, and whether such a sufficient cause is present or not in some particular case, that will have to be left to the conscience and judgment of the Ordinaries; and then it will generally be present when either no Catholic school is available or the one which is supplied is little suited for educating adolescents suitably and congruently to their condition. But then, that public schools can be attended in conscience, the danger of perversion, always more or less connected with their proper nature, ought to be made remote instead of proximate by opportune remedies and cautions.'"

Question 7. Can a confessor ever deny absolution to parents who send their offspring to public schools?

Response. A twofold case can be present; for Catholic parents either do this from a just cause approved by the Ordinary of the place, or otherwise. If the first, absolution would be denied unjustly. Wherefore in the cited place the Fathers of Conc. Plen. Balt. III add: "Therefore when, on account of a sufficient cause and one approved by the Ordinary, parents wish to send children to public schools, provided the proximate dangers are removed by necessary cautions, we strictly command that no one, whether Bishop or presbyter, as the Pontiff through the Sacred Congregation expressly forbids, dare to repel parents of this kind from the sacraments as if unworthy, either by intended threats or by the act itself. This must be understood much more concerning the children themselves. Wherefore pastors of souls, while they warn the faithful committed to them concerning the dangers of these schools, should take the greatest care lest, led by immoderate zeal, they seem by words or deeds to violate the most wise counsels and precepts of the Holy See."

But if the other case is verified, then it will belong to a prudent confessor to judge from the circumstances whether the malice which Catholic parents contract is grave, by reason of disobedience, scandal, and the dangers to which they expose their own offspring, and thence to gather whether absolution must certainly be denied to them. - Cf. Amer. Eccl. Review, vol. 12, pp. 339 and following.

We give here one document from which the unshaken principles of Catholics can be derived. Thus Leo XIII in his Constitution Nobilissima Gallorum Gens:

"First indeed, as regards domestic Society, it is of the greatest importance that the offspring received from Christian marriage be instructed early in the precepts of religion, and that those arts by which the age of childhood is accustomed to be formed to humanity be joined with religious instruction. To separate the one from the other is the same in reality as to will that childish souls be moved to neither part in duties toward God: which discipline is deceitful, and, especially in the earliest years of children, most pernicious, because in truth it fortifies the way of atheism and blocks up the way of religion. Altogether good parents must take care that each of their children, as soon as they have begun to understand, perceive the precepts of religion, and that nothing occur in the schools which offends the integrity of faith or morals. And that this diligence be applied in instructing offspring has been established by divine and natural law, nor can parents by any cause be freed from that law."

Question 8. What does the Code prescribe concerning schools?

Response. § 1. All the faithful are to be instructed from childhood in such a way that not only is nothing handed on to them which is opposed to the Catholic religion and honesty of morals, but religious and moral instruction occupies the principal place (Can. 1372).

Hence in any elementary school religious instruction is to be handed on to children according to their age. Indeed, let youth frequenting middle or higher schools be cultivated by doctrine of religion, and let Ordinaries of places take care that this be done through priests outstanding in zeal and doctrine. - Cf. Can. 1373.

But the Church has the right of founding these schools, elementary, middle, and higher; to its authority and inspection the religious instruction of youth in all schools is subject. Therefore to Ordinaries of places there belongs the right and duty of watching lest anything against faith or good morals be handed on or done in any schools of their territory. Cf. Can. 1373, 1374, 1375, 1376.

But these domestic duties, namely care of the family, reverence owed to the husband, education of infants, are sacrosanct; and whatever calls wives away from these is forbidden to them. Besides, whatever introduces discord between them and their husbands, or effects that they desert the hearths and domestic walls, that they neglect infants, that they aspire to divorce, that they foster free loves, that they cast off the modesty and shamefastness adorning Christian women, is forbidden. Therefore every feminism which endeavors to emancipate a married woman from her matrimonial obligations, and to liberate the unmarried and the married from the natural and divine law, is to be avoided, since it is repugnant to the nature of civil society, of the family, and of religion. But with conjugal duties saved, if they are married, and other duties if they are not, it is licit for women, according to the measure of their condition, to have a part in social action, and to devote themselves to those sodalities whose end is that, under the care of the Ordinaries, especially in their own order, the praise of Christian morals may revive entire, that the stain of divorces may be averted from Christian marriage, that the instruction of children may be duly provided for, that there may be restrained the pest of human intercourse, the shameful license of spectacles, the obscenity of books and newspapers, the futile softness of conversations and assemblies, the shameless luxury in adornment and cultivation of the body, that laws may be issued protecting working youth by limits placed as to age, hours and manner of labor, workshops, wage, and other aids, by which both body and soul, especially of girls and women workers, may be preserved from every harm. Therefore socialistic, atheistic, irreligious feminism is to be fought with all strength. But let that pest not be confused with the social action of Catholic women working under the Ordinaries of places. Nouvelles Orientations de la morale, pp. 27 and following. - Epist. Pius X, Quae de istius, November 22, 1904.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. But let parents principally take care that children are protected from all occasions, whether of companions, books, newspapers, or theaters, by which either faith or chastity is brought into danger. Around chastity, in our times, great caution must be applied. Therefore let parents take care, 1st, that from earliest childhood modesty of the offspring truly grows, for it is the bulwark of chastity: once it has been lost, virtue is easily lost; 2nd, that boys or girls never be permitted to attend schools in which sexual education is part of the program or schedule of studies; such public instruction in this slippery matter is an occasion of monstrous crimes; may nothing more dangerous happen to youth than this; the same should be said concerning books which set forth sexual life for boys and girls to know deliberately; such books do not fortify the hearts of children with a holy fortification, but open the way to the malignant enemy of souls; 3rd, since knowledge does not give security, let them take care that conscience be well instructed and the soul strengthened by frequenting the sacraments; 4th, when age and bodily development demand instruction, then let the mother alone, or father, or faithful instructor, or confessor hand it on to the child alone, holily, reverently, and only according to necessity; let him not give the whole doctrine, but a gradual doctrine accommodated to age and conditions of time; 5th, let the parent dedicate himself wholly to preserving modesty; let the offspring be accustomed to rational care of soul and body, to victory over self, to strengthening of the will; let religious instruction be handed on in order from the first years, and let the life of the child be illuminated and enlightened by the light of faith; 6th, let the offspring approach daily, if only it can be done, to holy communion, which is a special and necessary remedy against luxury. See the golden Encyclical Letters of the Bishops of Germany, August 20, 1913.

2nd. Parents are held to watch with peculiar care lest children associate themselves with certain sodalities dedicated to the instruction of children in a certain natural morality, unless ecclesiastical authority itself has approved them or at least, the dangers having been removed, has permitted association in them. For if such a society in its norms publicly inculcates that all religions are to be held by the members in the same rank, that equal respect is to be furnished to all, that truth is in all, that there are various ways leading to the one end of blessedness, and that there is one head of all, it is wicked and cruel to permit children to enroll themselves in these assemblies. Such a society opens the way to indifferentism, lessens the powers favoring faith, increases those hostile to it, separates things not to be separated, religious and moral education, claims for itself a magisterium in a certain natural morality, which does not belong to it. Besides, that instruction is not normal, either as to method or as to matter. They are children, not soldiers; they are to be watched over, not watchers. Today the world campaigns for children. It belongs to Catholic parents to protect them from the world, to educate them in Catholic schools, to cherish them day and night and not to permit that they go alone through roads or woods, and that they guard others, being themselves guards needing guardianship. See the things just cited from Leo XIII and Pius X.

3rd. Parents are gravely obliged to guard offspring from the modern danger of cinematographic representations; indiscriminately to be present at these is certainly not licit for boys and girls of tenderer age; easily such attendance harms their eyes and nerves, lessens modesty day by day and thus can weaken chastity, indeed also here and there, on account of the matter treated, leads faith into danger. Therefore great caution is to be applied in permitting these entertainments to offspring.

4th. Not only parents or those holding the place of parents, but also masters and sponsors are obliged to take care that subjects and those commended to them are instructed in catechesis. - Cf. Can. 1335.

I. Spouses are held: 1st, To mutual love. For since they are one flesh, they ought also to be one heart. Thus Ephes. v, 25: "Husbands, love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church"; Tit. ii, 4: "(Wives) let them love their husbands." 2nd. To conjugal society and cohabitation. This is clear from the nature and ends of marriage and from the words of Christ, Matth. xix, 5: "A man shall leave father and mother and shall cleave to his wife and they shall be two in one flesh." 3rd. To furnishing mutually to each other food and whatever pertains to the decency of their condition: from the words of Christ, l. c. Matth.: "For now they are not two but one flesh." - Cf. Ephes. v, 29. 4th. To rendering to each other the conjugal debt when it is seriously asked and there is no legitimate cause for denying it, because they have obliged themselves to this. - Cf. I Cor. vii, 4.

II. The husband is held in particular: 1st. To conduct the family estate diligently, and either rightly to administer or to take care that both common goods and the wife's goods are not dissipated; 2nd. To take care that the wife fulfills the duties of Christian profession, and executes the precepts of both divine and ecclesiastical law. For the man is the head of the woman and the ruler of the whole family; and therefore the right governance of both wife and whole family duly pertains to him. 3rd. To correct a delinquent wife, where this work is necessary for her amendment and for preventing scandal. But correction ought to proceed from charity or love of justice or zeal for procuring the right governance of the family, and to be much lighter than the fault deserves, because the wife is the companion of the man, not a slave. Care must also be taken lest peace and love perish between them.

III. The wife, for her part, is held: 1st. To reverence the husband, because he is her superior, as is clear from what has been said. 2nd. To render obedience to him, because obedience is owed to a superior in those things which pertain to governance; the Apostle to the Colossians iii, 18, says: Women, be subject to husbands, as is fitting, in the Lord. 3rd. To bear the care of the house in the family affair, and therefore to go about the offices of the family.

Speaking of Christian marriage, Leo XIII in the Encyclical Letter Arcanum thus explains its dignity and the duties of spouses:

"By the nuptial society something higher and nobler has been proposed than had been before: for it was commanded to look not only to propagating the human race, but to generating offspring for the Church, citizens of the saints and domestics of God (Eph. ii, 19), namely, that a people might be procreated and educated for the worship and religion of the true God and of Christ our Savior (Catech. Rom. chap. VIII). In the second place, their own duties have been defined for each of the spouses, their own rights entirely described. Namely, it is necessary that they always be so affected in soul that they understand that the one owes the other the greatest love, constant faith, and attentive and assiduous protection. The man is the prince of the family, and the head of the woman, who nevertheless, because she is flesh from his flesh and bone from his bones, is to be subject and obedient to the man in the manner not of a handmaid, but of a companion; namely so that neither honorableness nor dignity may be absent from the obedience furnished. But in him who presides, and in her who obeys, since each represents an image, the one of Christ, the other of the Church, let divine charity be the perpetual moderator of duty. For the husband is the head of the woman, as Christ is the head of the Church. ... But as the Church is subject to Christ, so also let women be subject to their husbands in all things; Eph. v, 23, 24. But as regards children, they ought to be under and obey parents, and to show honor to them on account of conscience; and conversely, in protecting children and especially in forming them to virtue, all the cares and thoughts of parents must be vigilant: 'Fathers, educate them (children) in the discipline and correction of the Lord'; from which it is understood that the duties of spouses are neither few nor light; yet for good spouses, on account of the virtue which is received from the sacrament, these become not only tolerable, but also pleasant." § "Nor to them."

I. Masters are held toward their servants:

1st. To treat them kindly, that is, by addressing and commanding them decently and humanely, by furnishing good and sufficient food, by not burdening them with excessive works, by suitably caring for the sick. This is clear from natural law and from Sacred Scripture, Ecclus. xxxiii, 31: "If thou hast a faithful servant, let him be to thee as thy soul; treat him as a brother." - Ephes. vi, 9: "And you, masters, do the same things to them (servants), forbearing threats: knowing that both their Lord and yours is in heaven, and there is no acceptance of persons with him."

2nd. To instruct and correct: the master is the head of the servant, as of the whole family; but it pertains to the head to direct where there is need. I Tim. v, 8: "But if anyone has no care of his own and especially of those of his household, he has denied the faith, and is worse than an infidel." But servants are reckoned among domestics.

3rd. To pay a just wage, for it is a question of an obligation of justice and natural equity, whence the defrauding of such a wage is counted among sins crying to heaven.

II. Servants are held to render to masters:

1st. Reverence. I Tim. vi, 1: "Let servants account their masters worthy of all honor." From this they can sin even gravely who deride masters, spurn them, or manifest their hidden defects.

2nd. Service and obedience in all those things to which they have obliged themselves by virtue of contract, and in those things which regard good morals; thus Ephes. vi, 5: "Servants, obey carnal masters with fear and trembling in simplicity of your heart, as Christ"; and I Pet. ii, 18.

Hence by reason of the matter those sin more or less who, when something is commanded to them, murmur, respond insolently, waste time uselessly, neglect to perform the commanded labor, or labor for themselves with damage to the master; and in one word all those who do not render the service which ordinarily is accustomed to be exacted and furnished from such persons.

3rd. Fidelity, according to the words of Paul to Titus ii, 9: "Let servants be subject to their masters, not defrauding, but in all things showing good faith." Hence those sin, and often gravely against justice, who do not have care of things entrusted to them, who by their fault permit them to become worse.

Pius X, in the Motu Proprio of December 18, 1903, hands down the fundamental norms of Christian popular action, among which some clearly place before the eyes the duties of workers and of the wealthy.

1st. "The duties of justice, as regards the proletarian and worker, are these: that what has been freely and equitably agreed upon as to work, he render entirely and faithfully; that he harm the property in no way, that he not violate the person of the masters; in protecting his own interests, that he abstain from force and never stir up sedition." 2nd. "As regards capitalists and employers, the duties of justice are these: to furnish a just wage to workers; that they harm their just savings in nothing, neither by force nor by fraud nor by usurious arts (manifest or disguised usury); to grant them liberty for fulfilling their religious duties; not to expose them to corrupting seduction and dangers of scandal nor draw them away from the spirit of family and pursuit of thrift; not to impose more work than their strength can bear nor that kind which is at variance with age and sex." 3rd. "The duty of charity of the rich and fortunate is that they assist the poor and needy according to the Gospel precept, which precept indeed obliges so gravely that on the day of judgment an account of its observance will have to be rendered most severely." 4th. "Therefore let the poor not have their poverty as a reproach, nor disdain to accept the charity of the rich. Let them always place before their eyes Jesus the Redeemer, who, although he could have been born amid riches, made himself poor so that he might ennoble their poverty and render it rich with incomparable merits for heaven." 5th. "For resolving the worker question, capitalists and workers themselves can do much by institutes ordered to extending opportune remedies to the needy and to effecting that one order approach nearer to and be united with the other. Such are mutual aid societies, manifold private insurances, patronages for protecting children, but above all corporations of workers."

But if these principles ought to be dear to all, much more to those who are the example of the flock, as is clear from the Code:

All, and especially clerics, religious, and administrators of ecclesiastical goods, in the hiring of labor must assign to workers an honorable and just wage; take care that these same have leisure for piety for a suitable space of time; in no pact lead them away from domestic care and the pursuit of thrift, nor impose more work upon them than their strength can bear, nor that kind which is at variance with age and sex (Can. 1524).

From natural law and positive divine law we are held by the title of piety to render reverence and obedience to our civil superiors. For they bear the place of God himself in the temporal order toward us. Thus indeed the Apostle to the Romans xiii, 1 and following: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers. For there is no power except from God, and those which are, have been ordained by God. Therefore he who resists the power, resists the ordinance of God. But those who resist acquire damnation for themselves. For he (the Prince) is the minister of God, an avenger unto wrath to him who does evil. Therefore be subject of necessity, not only on account of wrath, but also on account of conscience."

For this reason the Catechism of the Council of Trent compares and joins this obligation with that by which we are bound toward paternal and ecclesiastical authority. For in part III, on the fourth commandment, § 15, after it has taught that parents and ecclesiastical superiors are to be honored, it adds: "Likewise concerning Kings, Princes, Magistrates, and the rest to whose power we are subject. For if we attribute any honor to them, it is referred to God; for an excellent degree of dignity has the veneration of men, because it is like divine power: in which also we venerate the providence of God, who attributed to them the administration of public office, and uses them as ministers of his power." - I Pet. ii, 15. - St. Justin, Apol. I, 17. - St. Augustine, on Ps. 124, n. 7; de Civitate Dei, lib. V, 10, 11, 14, 15.

"But now a society can neither exist nor be understood in which someone does not moderate the wills of individuals, so that one thing may be made, as it were, out of many, and impel them rightly and in order toward the common good; therefore God willed that in civil society there should be those who would command the multitude. And that also has great force, that those by whose authority the republic is administered ought to be able to compel citizens to obey in such a way that it is plainly a sin for them not to obey. But no man has in himself or from himself that by which he can constrain the free will of others with bonds of this kind of command. That power belongs only to God, creator and legislator of all things: those who exercise it must necessarily exercise it as communicated to them by God. ... From which it will be necessary for citizens to be subject and obedient to princes as to God, not so much from fear of punishments as from reverence for majesty, nor for the sake of flattery, but from conscience of duty." - Leo XIII, Diuturnum illud.

Hence the response is also clear to the question: Can there ever be for citizens a cause for not obeying? "That one cause exists for men not to obey, if something is demanded by them which openly conflicts with natural or divine right: for in all things in which the law of nature or the will of God is violated, it is equally wicked to command and to do. Therefore if it should happen to someone that he is compelled to choose one of the two, namely either to neglect the commands of God or those of princes, Jesus Christ must be obeyed, who commands rendering the things that are Caesar's to Caesar, and the things that are God's to God." - Nor are citizens therefore to be accused of having cast off authority: "for if the will of princes fights with the will of God and his laws, they exceed the measure of their power, and pervert justice, nor then can their authority have force, since, where justice is not present, it is null." Diuturnum illud.

Legislation is the work of men who are clothed with power and who in fact govern the state. Whence it follows in practice that the character of laws depends on the character of these men more than on the virtue of that power. Laws, namely, will be either good or evil according as the legislators themselves are imbued with good or evil principles, and allow themselves to be led by prudence or passion. Therefore one must resist by any legal and honorable means the abuse of legislation: laws hostile to God and religion are in no way to be approved; indeed they are to be disapproved by all prudent men.

Generally citizens enjoying the right of suffrage are held to use that right duly. The reason is that each one according to his strength is held to impede evils and to promote good things. The Sacred Penitentiary, December 1, 1866, responded that nothing stands in the way of Bishops and Ordinaries, on the occasion of elections, whenever they shall have been required for this, recalling to the mind of the people that each one of the faithful according to his strength is held to impede evils and to promote good things. "Is it not the duty of each Catholic to use the political arms which are in his hand for defending [the Church], for containing political systems within their own dominion and compelling them, after they have rendered to the Church what is owed to her, for the rest to leave her quiet?" - Pius X, Encycl. Letter Notre Charge Apostolique - cf. Scavini. The precept of electing upright deputies, whether municipal or political, presses upon all electors in every legitimate government and, other circumstances being excluded, not only do those sin who give suffrage to bad men, but also those who by not taking part are the cause that bad men are elected by others: each one is held to avert evil from the republic, if there is hope.

But how great evils and how great good things come to the state when laws are made by enemies of the Church, or by her friends, history testifies. Besides, the present condition of things, to be lamented in many regions, is derived from the fact that Catholics remained idle in political action. Now this obligation of using one's right in many cases can be grave, namely if on one side the danger of grave harm is imminent and on the other side suffrage seems likely to be efficacious. It must be noted that political leaders greatly fear votes; and they desire that these be given for themselves. And although it is not of itself a grave sin not to vote, if the bad party undoubtedly has the greater number, certainly one must not therefore abstain from voting: for the action and voting of good men gradually takes away the security of bad men, and instills anxiety in them; and thus they will not always perpetrate the same graver evils by making iniquitous laws. Yet if it is certain that the evil to come from the influence of this candidate is grave, and it is doubtful whether even my action and voting can decide the matter, it seems that in such a case it must be said that I sin gravely by omitting suffrage. Namely individual good men in this hypothesis are held to bring help and procure the election of good men. "An obligation," says Palmieri, "is present: but unless it affects individuals, in reality there will be none." - Op. Th. Mor., tract. IX, n. 640, v. 4, ed. III.

Therefore, whenever citizens give their votes in public assemblies: "favor is to be given to men of proved virtue, who will merit well of the Christian name." - Leo XIII, Sapientiae Christianae.

But if someone gives votes to an unworthy man about to act against the Church or good morals, precisely for this end, that an iniquitous law may be made, he sins gravely. In general, when my cooperation directly and certainly has influence upon such evils so that without it these things would not occur, my cooperation is formal. Yet this case will be rare, but must not be called impossible.

But if an election is to be made between a notable enemy of the Church and another who is at least less unworthy, suffrage must be given to this one, since he is going to do less evil, and so by your action you avoid the greater evil; indeed you can also act publicly to obtain his election.

It must especially be taken care that the leaders themselves of the district, of the city, as they are called, are ruled by true principles. For these exercise the greatest influence and not rarely by their work decide the election. Therefore just as these can much more easily sin gravely than ordinary electors, so also they can more easily promote the good.

The law concerning not buying or selling votes seems to be penal, for there is no proportion between penalty and fault. This notwithstanding, he who sells his vote not rarely incurs a sufficiently great danger of infamy, which renders him and his own people wretched. Voluntarily to undergo such a danger appears to us to be a grave fault. But if one political party simply and obstinately buys votes, certainly those introducing this abuse sin gravely; nor is it remarkable if the other party, as if compelled, does the same, otherwise one and the same worse party will always occupy the highest magistracies. It matters much that the electorate be pure, and all things are to be done for obtaining this end; nevertheless it is wicked to say that justice is gravely violated by the fact that here and there an elector holds his vote for sale. Therefore he would not be compelled to restore the price.

The first opinion is that infidels can be compelled to embrace the faith when sufficiently propounded. So Maior, 2. dist. 4., and indeed Genesius Sepúlveda, as in the Cardinal de Lugo disp. 19. sect. 2. §. 2.

The second opinion asserts this of infidels who are subjects in temporal things of a Prince coercing them to the faith; yet they assert this speaking of Divine law; for by Human law this coercion is prohibited. This Scotus teaches, 4. dist. 4. quaest. 7. at the end, and some of his School; Lorca asserts it probable, 3. disp. 36.

Others limit it to indirect coercion; but they deny it of direct. So Gabriel, dicta dist. 4. quaest. 2.; Angelus, as in Suarez disp. 18. sect. 3.

The common and true opinion altogether denies that infidels, whether they are subjects or not subjects, can be compelled to embrace the faith. So St. Thomas, quaest. 10. art. 8. and 12., where Cajetan and the other Thomists, Paludanus, Durandus, Antonius, Richardus, Sotus, Abul., Sylvester, Castro, Victoria and others, whom Suarez cites and follows above; Bannes, Aragon, Turrianus, Valencia, Azorias and others, whom Hurtado cites, disp. 75. sect. 2.; Coninck, disp. 18. dub. 14. num. 125.; Castro Palao, Tom. 1. tract. 4. disp. 2. p. 6.; Lugo, disp 19. sect. 2. §. 2.; Tannerus, disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 1., who reviews others. Add Bass., verb. Fides, 2. num. 8. And it is the opinion of St. Bonaventure, in 4. dist. 4. p. 1. art. 2. quaest. 1. arg. 4. opp., which he admits also in other places, adduced quaest. 3.

I assert with this opinion that infidels, whether subjects or not subjects, cannot be compelled to embrace the faith.

St. Gregory the Great commands this, lib. 11. epist. 15., cited in cap. Qui sincera, dist. 45., and the Fourth Council of Toledo, cap. 56. relatum eadem dist. cit. de Iudaeis. And Innocent III decrees the same in cap. Maiores, de Baptismo, where the Pontiff gives the reason: because it is against the Christian religion, which is the reason of St. Bonaventure: because the Evangelical Law is free; and it does not judge those that are outward, as the Apostle teaches, prima Corinth. 5., as St. Bonaventure notes, in 4. dist. 39. art. 2. quaest. 1.; and therefore the Saintly Doctor observes, ad 10. Lucae, the Mission of Christ: Ecce ego mitto vos, sicut Agnos inter Lupos — Behold I send you as sheep among wolves, where he says that the arms with which He wills the world to be brought to the faith are meekness, and not arms after the ancient manner; and he notes that Paul himself was thus converted, of whom it had been said, Genesi. 49. Beniamin Lupus rapax — Benjamin a ravening wolf, who, having been thrown from his horse by Christ the Monarch, yet convicted by arguments and lights, came of his own accord to the faith. Hence the adversaries bring forward this example in vain, as Lugo notes, num. 85. In this sense he expounds also that word of Lucae 14. Compelle eos intrare — Compel them to come in; that is, not by arms, but by heavenly motives; not by temporal punishments, but at most by the terror of eternal punishments, as St. Bonaventure expounds on this place: Arma enim militiae Christianae non sunt carnalia — For the arms of Christian warfare are not carnal, as is said 2. Cor. 10. St. Ambrose notes this, lib. 7. in Lucam. And he observes that the Apostles are forbidden to take up rods, which are signs of power, as the Saintly Doctor describes ad Psal. 22.; and in the commentary, cap. 22. Lucae, St. Bonaventure observes with St. Ambrose lib. 10. in Lucam, that it is commanded that for the time of the Passion alone the Apostles take up two swords for mere defense, and the Gloss adds: Donec sopita persecutorum insania, tempus euangelizandi redeat — Until the madness of the persecutors having been lulled, the time of evangelizing return. But if this coercive force did not remain in the Church, it does not appear how it could remain in Princes in regard to infidels: for to judge of the things of faith belongs to the Church.

But the Saintly Doctor proves this admirably ad 9. Lucae, on that remarkable event, when Christ was going to Samaria, and because the Samaritans were unwilling to receive Him for preaching, James and John wished to punish them with fire from heaven; but Christ rebuked them. Nescitis cuius spiritus estis. Filius hominis non venit animas hominum perdere, sed salvare — You know not of what spirit you are. The Son of man came not to destroy the souls of men, but to save; which place I weighed in the preceding question with St. Bonaventure. If some had weighed this, they would not have raged with such slaughter and savagery against the wretched infidels in distant lands, under the pretext of winning them to the Christian religion; on this see the Archbishop of Valencia in the history of America,^{1 1} Editor's note: the print reads 'vide Archiepiscopum Valentiz in historia Americz'; terminal 'z' is the OCR's garbling of the 'æ' ligature; rendered as 'Valentiæ in historiâ Americæ'.

It is proved by the Saintly Doctor ad 9. Lucae with reasons, because the nations ought to be moved to the faith voluntarily, in the spirit of rectitude; otherwise contentions and scandals arise, so that the nations say: Haeccine hic Christus eorum praecepit, qui se Salvatorem mundi praedicandum mandavit? — Did this Christ of theirs command, who bade himself be preached as the Savior of the world? Tanner also uses these, num. 4.

You will object, that Sisebutus King of Spain once compelled the Jews to Baptism, and he is praised by the Fourth Council of Toledo, cap. 56.; but King Ferdinand expelled the Jews from the kingdom.

It is answered, that the zeal of Sisebutus is praised, not the deed. Ferdinand indeed expelled the Jews by right, not wishing them to dwell in his kingdoms, lest they harm his subjects. So would that the bloodsuckers be driven out on every side.

You will object second, that St. Gregory Magn. lib. 3. epist. 26., cited in cap. Iam vero, 23. quaest. 6., seems to wish infidels to be compelled by exactions.

It is answered, that they are compelled indirectly and by right, by not remitting to them the tributes due, unless they be converted.

You will object third, the Laws enacted against Pagans and their rites, ut Lex prima, Lex Ne quis. Lex Nemo ea. Lex Nemo venerandi, C. de Paganis, which laws are praised by the Councils and Fathers, as in Suarez sect. 4.

It is answered, that those laws prohibit the sacrilegious cults of Demons and other things against the natural law, to which Princes have right by nature.

You will object fourth. Those baptized unwillingly are compelled to obey the Church, as is clear from the Fourth Council of Toledo, cap. 56., cited in cap. de Iudaeis, dist 45.

Lugo answers, num. 91., from St. Bonaventure, in 4. dist. 3. p. 1. art. 2. quaest. 1., that not all who are baptized unwillingly are so esteemed; but those who, driven by fear, so that they may avoid inconveniences, approach baptism; and these are said to be unwilling only in a certain respect.

The first opinion is affirmative. So Maior, and Sepúlveda, as in Suarez disput. 18. sect. 4. They are cited by Coninck disput. 18. num. 184.; St. Antoninus 3. p. tit. 22. cap. 1. §. 6. et 8., but there he speaks according to the mind of Augustinus Anconitanus. Sylvester is also adduced, under the word Papa, quaestione 7., who speaks in the same way. Panormitanus is also cited, cap. Quod super his, de voto; and after Panormitanus, Hostiensis, and Innocent on cap. Quod super his, extra de voto.

The common opinion of Theologians grants this of subject infidels only. So Caietan. Victoria, Soto, Valentia, Aragon, and others, whom Suarez disp. 18. sect. 4. cites and follows; Turtianus disp. 52. dub. 2.; Coninck disp. 18. dub. 12. num. 187.; Hurtad. disp. 75. §. 23.; Lugo disp. 19. sect. 2.; Bassaeus v. Fides 2. 8., who cite others. Others hold the same with Tanneto disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2., who also say it is lawful if they are burdensome and a scandal to Christians. The Saintly Doctor, de Eccl. Hierarch. p. 2. cap. 3. proves it from the deed of Iudae Machabaei lib. 1. cap. 3.

It is proved by Suarez from the example of God, who, when He wished to destroy or punish the nations dwelling in the land of promise, nevertheless willed them not to be warred down by the Israelites for the crime of Idolatry, but for the denial of peaceful passage through their lands; and it is gathered from 20. Numer., and St. August. signifies this, cited in cap. 3. d. 23. quaest. 2.

But Coninck num. 193. says this deed was done by a special concession of God, the supreme Lord.

Lugo num. 97. adds that the mere denial of passage did not bring those evils upon the Chanaanites, nor sufficiently justify all the wars of the Jews. Hence when they crossed the Jordan, they killed them, yet not on account of the denied passage. Moreover even little ones were killed, who were ignorant of that barbarity. You will find the better course with St. Bonaventure, ad 12. Sap., for the universal cause of the just war of the Israelites: because certainly those Pagans, corrupted, were unwilling to cease from works against the law of nature; and thus he speaks: O quam bonus, et suavis est Domine spiritus tuus in omnibus! Ideoque eos, qui exerrant, partibus corripis: et de quibus peccant, admones, et alloqueris: ut relicta malitia, credant in te Domine. Illos enim antiquos inhabitatores terrae sanctae tuae, quos exhorruisti, quoniam odibilia opera tibi faciebant per medicamina, et sacrificia iniusta; et filiorum suorum necatores sine misericordia, et comestores viscerum hominum, et devoratores sanguinis a medio Sacramento tuo, et auctores parentes animarum inauxiliatarum perdere voluisti per manus parentum nostrorum, ut dignam perciperent peregrinationem puerorum Dei, quae sibi omnium charior est terra — O how good and sweet is thy spirit, O Lord, in all things! And therefore thou correctest those that err by little and little: and admonishest and speakest to them of the things wherein they sin: that leaving wickedness they may believe in thee, O Lord. For those ancient inhabitants of thy holy land, whom thou didst abhor, because they did odious works to thee by potions and unjust sacrifices; and murderers of their own children without mercy, and eaters of the bowels of men, and devourers of blood from the midst of thy Sacrament, and authors and parents of souls without help, thou didst will to destroy by the hands of our parents, that they might receive a pilgrimage worthy of the children of God, the land most dear to them of all.

These are the causes, as the Saintly Doctor says there, for which He willed those peoples not to dwell with the faithful people, nor to make a covenant with them; nay rather to be expelled and killed, because incorrigible they accomplished enormous works against nature, to the ruin, scandal, and damnation of the faithful. But the little ones were killed in punishment of the scandals of the adults.

Pope NICOLAUS, answering the questions of the Bulgarians, speaking of Idolaters as such, says: De his, qui idolis immolant, nihil aliud dicere possumus, nisi quod ratione potius, quam vi, convincendi sunt — Of those who sacrifice to idols we can say nothing else, but that they are to be convinced rather by reason than by force.

And Paul III, as in Lugo n. 102. et Coninch. 160., declared that the Indians, as infidels, are the true lords of their goods, nor can they be despoiled of them;

But Bannes quaest. 10. art. 10. dub. 2.; Suarez, above, num. 8.; Coninck num. 188.; Lugo n. 116. note that the Prince must first enact a law, prohibiting; and afterwards punish the delinquents.

Lugo adds that they ought to be punished in the mildest way possible; nevertheless, the same says, the more atrocious crimes related above are to be punished most severely. It is a wonder, however, that in the Laws of Solon and Romulus no penalty for parricides is prescribed. Certainly I think with Tullius, oratione pro Rossio Amerino, and Plutarch in vita Romuli, that the cause was that they did not believe so great a crime would ever happen. But when the case should occur, the parricide ought to be chastised with the most atrocious death, as was Francis Ravaillac of Angoulême, who stabbed Henry IV, the Great, the legitimate King of the Gauls, as Lugo Hispanus observes. For this Monarch was great, not inferior to Alexander or Caesar, as his deeds show in Matthaeus and Davila. He had been made most sincerely Catholic, but he wished first to acquire the Kingdom by the sword, lest anyone should ever induce in his mind the hope of capturing the kingdom by the flood of the Sacraments of the reconciled Church; nor indeed had he relapsed by his own judgment, because as an adolescent, with the terror of death struck into him by Charles IX, he had received the Catholic faith. Truly, however, if he had abjured before a Judge, he was not excused, as P. Cyprianus fol. 748. P. Bonagratia v. Absolutio says, even though this doctrine was declared by the Most Eminent only in the year 1068.^{1 1} Editor's note: the print reads 'declarata solum an. 1068'; the year is chronologically impossible here (the volume was printed in 1655 and the authors discussed are 16th–17th century), and the djvu OCR layer could not be aligned to verify the figures; the true reading (perhaps 1568 or 1668 of the Congregation's decree) cannot be established, so the print's '1068' is kept.

The certain rule is that these rites are not to be permitted by Christians to subject infidels without a most grave cause.

The most grave causes, however, are twofold: to avoid greater evils, or lest a greater good be impeded. So the Theologians commonly with St. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 10. art. 11. et St. Bonau. locis allegandis. So Tanner. disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2.; Card. Lugo disp. 19. sect. 2. §. 4.; Bassaeus v. Fides, 2. num. 9.

I assert first, that for the causes adduced, subject infidels can be tolerated by Christian Princes.

It is proved from the Saintly Doctor, opusc. de sex alis Seraphim, cap. 7., from that word of Matth. 13., where the Father of the family, expostulated with about eradicating the Zizanias, answered: Non: ne forte eradicetis et triticum. Sinite utraque crescere, etc. — No: lest perhaps you root up the wheat also. Suffer both to grow, etc. For this is the general rule, observed at that time by Pontiffs and Kings, lest seditions and confusions boil up in the Church. For thus God also tolerates certain evils for these causes, as Tanner. notes after St. Bonau. in 1. dist. 47. quaest. 3., where he infers our conclusion, certainly for this reason, because our goods ought to have their exemplars in God.

I assert second, that for this cause also the Jews are tolerated, both because as it were shadows they confirm the truth of our faith, and they exhibit the sacred Books to us for convincing the Pagans. So it is had in can. Qui sincera, dist. 45. et St. August. l 8. de ciuit. cap. 46. The legitimate Books of the old testament are indeed to be received from them, but the truly Talmudic, Cabalistic, and similar ones, vomiting forth insults against Christ, are to be given to the flames, as was long ago decreed by Gregory IX, Innocent IV, Julius III, Paul IV, and recently by Clement VIII.

I assert third, that outside these cases subject infidels are not to be tolerated. So it is defined in the Fourth Council of Carthage, can. 15. Elibertino; cap. 44. et Clem. un. de Iudaeis, et Saracenis, et leg. Nemo, C. de Paganis.

It is proved from Suarez disp. 18 sect. 4.; Tannero disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2.; Lugo disp. 19 sect. 2. §. 4.; by the argument of St. Bonau ad Psal. 118. cap. 2. vers. 11., expounding that word of Matthaei 20: Principes gentium dominantur eorum — The princes of the nations lord it over them; because they are bound to remove their subjects from the perdition of souls, from scandals, and to promote them to good. For this reason Constantine burned the Temples of the Pagans and forbade the sacrifices; and he is praised by the Saints, Ambr. epist. 30. August. epist. 48. 50. et 104., and Nicephorus lib. 8. cap. 33. et de Iouiniano lib. 10. cap. 39. et Theodosio lib. 12. c. 25. relates it; thus Josias, Ezechias, Iosaphat are praised, who took away the high places, 3. et 4. Reg., and others are blamed who did not take them away, as St. August. epist. 50. notes.

Here they ask: whether a Prince can grant a safe-conduct to infidels without a faculty of the Pontiff.

Hurtadus answers, disp. 79. sect. 5., that it can be granted to unbaptized infidels; not to heretics, who are subjects of the Church.

Therefore, notwithstanding any safe-conduct of the Kings, the Church can punish heretics, as the Council of Constance defines, sess. 19.; yet if she herself has given the safe-conduct, she is bound to keep it: as the Master Joannes Marq., the Augustinian, teaches, lib. 2. de gubernatore Christiano. cap. 24., who on pagina 301. says that faith is to be kept with them, especially when confirmed by oath.

This is a most weighty question, and necessary in our times.

I assert first: it is not lawful for a Christian Prince to make compacts on this matter without most grave causes. The Catholics agree with D. Bonav. in the places to be cited. So D. Thom. quaest. 10. art. 11. Molanus lib 1. de fide haereticis servanda, cap. 20. Lenaeus de unica religione servanda. Becanus lib. de fide haereticis servanda, cap. 10. Iacobus Simanc. lib. Cathol. Instit. cap. 46. Conradus Brunus de haeret. lib. 3. cap. 15. Petrus Ribadeniera lib. 1. de Inst. Principis, cap. 17. and others cited by Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 3. num. 66.

It is proved first by D. Bonav. on 12. Wisdom, in these words: Those ancient inhabitants of thy holy land, whom thou didst abhor, because they did hateful works to thee by charms, and unjust sacrifices, etc. thou didst will to destroy from the midst of thy Sacrament by the hands of our forefathers.

It is proved secondly by S. Doct. there from Deuter. 7. You shall not make a covenant with them, nor show mercy to them; nor shall you join with them in marriage. You shall not give your daughter to his son, nor take his daughter for your son: for she will lead your son astray, lest he follow me, so that he may serve strange gods rather: and the wrath of the Lord will be kindled, and he will quickly destroy you. The same is commanded Exodus 34. Hence Solomon is reproved for transgressing, 3. Reg. 11. and Josaphat, otherwise pious, 2. Paral. 19. and 20. for that he had imprudently made a covenant with the infidel Kings of Israël.

Titius, a Catholic father of a family, sent his children to a Catholic elementary school, but when, as he thought, they were unjustly and cruelly beaten by the schoolmistress, and the greater part of the boys who attended the school were from the lowest class, he afterward transferred them to a school provided by public authority. In it, indeed, no religious education was given besides the reading of the Bible; but on Sundays Titius sent the boys to the Catholic church, where they were instructed in Christian doctrine. Paul, the parish priest of Titius, tries in vain to bring him to a better course, and remains doubtful whether he ought to deny him the sacraments, or what should be done in the case. Hence it is asked:

1. What right belongs respectively to the Church and to parents concerning the education of children?

2. Is there an obligation, and what kind, for parents to send their children to a Catholic school if one exists in the place?

3. When is a penitent to be judged incapable of receiving absolution?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What rights have the Church and parents, respectively, over the education of children ?

The Church has received the right and the duty from

God to teach, train, and educate especially, all those who belong to her by Baptism. This right of the Church directly extends to religion, faith, and morals, but as these can not, in practice, be separated from education in other branches, and no attempt should be made to separate them, therefore the Church claims authority over all the education of her children. The parents by natural law have the right and the duty to bring up and educate their children, and in fulfilling this duty, as all others, Catholic parents should follow the guidance of the Church. If parents commit part of their office to others, they are bound to select those who can and will give a Catholic education to their children.

2. What sort of obligation are parents under of sending their children to a Catholic school, if there is one in the place?

The bishops of the Province of Westminster declared, in a circular read Sept. 17, 1905: “We desire to call the earnest attention of all Catholics to the grave departure from Catholic teaching and tradition, and to the very serious dangers to Catholic faith and spirit, which are involved in the placing of Catholic children, of whatever class in life, in non-Catholic schools. Owing to the usually proximate nature of these dangers, it is under ordinary circumstances a grievous sin on the part of parents to expose their children to such risks, and this has been expressly declared in the instructions of the Holy See, and of the bishops of this province. There is not infrequently also a grave sin of scandal. . . . The social advantages to be gained at certain schools manifestly do not constitute such a necessity. No individual priest or confessor is entitled to decide where necessity of this nature exists, but the matter is one to be referred to the Ordinary of the diocese for his counsel and judgment.”

3. When is a penitent to be judged unfit to receive absolution ?

A penitent is unfit to receive absolution for his sins if he is not sorry for them, if he has not made, at least, a formally integral confession, and if he is not prepared to fulfil all his duties which impose on him a grave obligation.

4. The case. Titius, a Catholic parent, transferred his children from the Catholic elementary school to the provided school, because, as he thought, they had been unjustly and cruelly beaten by the mistress, and because the greater portion of the children were from the lowest classes. No religious instruction besides Bible reading was given in the provided school. Titius sent his children to the Catholic Church on Sundays where they were taught their catechism. Paul, the parish priest of Titius, having tried in vain to get him to send the children to the Catholic school again, is now in doubt as to whether he should refuse him the sacraments, or what he should do.

Such questions, as to whether and how far Titius was justified in his action or not, have been reserved to the bishops in the Province of Westminster. Paul, therefore, should not take upon himself to refuse the sacraments to Titius, but he should refer the case to the bishop. Objectively it will seldom be advisable to proceed to extremes with people like Titius, unless their example is likely to be imitated by many others if some drastic remedy is not found.

Caius, a young Catholic twenty years of age at the University of Oxford, wishes, as a volunteer soldier, to wage war for his country in South Africa. His parents oppose him, however, because they do not wish to undergo the danger of losing their first-born son, since he is of the best character and likely to bring greater glory to their honored name. Since he cannot obtain their consent, but nevertheless burns with zeal to serve his country, he approaches Julius, his confessor, and asks whether he can enlist without mortal sin. Hence it is asked:

1. What are the obligations of children toward their parents?

2. What are the rights of parents over their children?

3. When do the obligations of children toward their parents cease?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What are the obligations of children toward their parents?

Children are bound to love, honor, and obey their parents, and support them when they are in need.

2. What are the rights of parents over their children?

As parents have the duty of bringing up and educating their children they have the right, which corresponds to that duty, to keep their children with them, and to receive their obedience, honor, and love. They may correct a child when he requires it. A parent, as such, has no rights over a child’s property, but if no guardian of the property has been lawfully appointed, the father will be considered its guardian, and he will be obliged to administer it for the benefit of his child.

3. When do the obligations of children toward their parents cease?

The obligations of children to love and honor their parents never cease. The obligation to live under their direction and control terminates with minority. In general, minority terminates when the child is twenty-one, but before that age a child who has reached the age of discretion may enter into religion, marry, and enlist in the army.

4. The case. Caius, a young Catholic at Oxford, twenty years of age, wanted to enlist in the army and serve in the South African war. He was the eldest son in a family of position, and the parents would not give their consent. He asked Julius, his confessor, whether he would sin grievously if he enlisted without his parents’ consent.

In such cases, the confessor will, as a rule, act prudently by taking the side of the parents, and trying to induce the son to do as they desire. Still, if Caius insists on a theological answer to his question, Julius should tell him that he will not sin if he enlists against his parents’ wish. They do not stand in need of his assistance, and English law allows him to enlist without the consent of his parents: * Although parental authority continues until the child is twenty-one, yet public policy requires that a minor should be at liberty to contract an engagement with the State; and the parental authority is suspended, though not destroyed, by enlistment in the army.”¹ Thus positive law determines and defines the indefinite and vague law of nature concerning the time of emancipation from parental control.

1 Encyclopedia of Laws, vol. v, p. 28.

Robert, a young man seventeen years of age, seeks the counsel of Titius, his confessor, concerning his obligations. For recently, as he says, he left his father’s house because of frequent quarrels between his drunken father and the rest of the family; but now his father commands him to return, and Robert is in no way prepared to obey unless he is bound under grave sin. For he says that, if he returned, his father would squander in indulging his vice the greater part of the money which Robert acquires by his labor, and that, furthermore, it would be necessary for him to endure quarrels and other inconveniences between his father and himself or another member of the family, which indeed he affirms he would bear most unwillingly and only under compulsion. Titius knows Robert to be well-behaved and prepared to do everything that the Catholic religion requires in the case. Hence it is asked:

1. How long do children remain under the authority of their parents?

2. The ownership of what goods belongs to children of a family?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. How long do children remain under the authority of their parents?

The natural law requires that children should, in general, remain under the authority of their parents until they are able to take care of themselves. The age at which they are able to do this is not determined by the natural law, but is left to be determined by positive law, ecclesiastical and civil. A child is sui juris for the purpose of receiving baptism at seven years of age by himself, for the purpose of taking vows, or marrying at the age of puberty. By English law, children in general become sui juris at twenty-one, but when they have attained years of discretion (regularly fourteen for males, sixteen for females), and separation from their parents appears to be for their advantage, English law will not compel them to remain with their parents.

2. Of what property have children the ownership?

Children, by English law, are capable of owning property just like adults who have attained their majority, but they are limited in the administration of it. The administration is regularly in the hands of a guardian, appointed for the purpose, but a minor can make contracts for necessaries, and necessaries are understood in a wide sense to comprehend whatever is suitable to the minor’s position in life.

3. The case. Robert, a youth of seventeen, asked the advice of Titius, his confessor. He left home because of the frequent broils between his drunken father and members of the family, and he is determined not to return unless he is bound under pain of mortal sin to do so. He knows that if he does return, his father will take the largest part of his wages, and spend it in drink, and that he will have to put up with the constant family broils, and this he is not prepared to do. Titius knows that Robert is steady and will do what a good Catholic is bound to do. The confessor, as a rule in such cases, will try his best to keep youths at home till they marry or attain their majority. Still he can not tell Robert that he is bound to return home under pain of committing mortal sin. He is steady, we must presume that he is in respectable lodgings, he can support himself, and he is not bound to give his wages to his father, to be spent in drink. Under such circumstances Titius should give Robert some good advice about keeping steady and attending to his religious duties, but he should also tell him frankly that he is not bound to return home in the circumstances.

Martha accuses herself in confession of stealing her husband’s money, and, when the confessor asks about the circumstances, she answered that her husband earns by his labor the sum of twenty shillings every week, but gives her only ten to pay the expenses of the family, which scarcely suffice, if indeed they suffice at all, for that, while he dissipates the other ten in drinking with bad companions; furthermore, that she has been accustomed secretly to take three or four shillings from her husband’s clothes, and that on this account her conscience is tormented all the more because she possesses nearly one hundred pounds sterling of her own money, which, however, she says she wishes to preserve for providing dowries for her daughters. Hence it is asked:

1. By our law does a husband acquire any right in the goods of his wife?

2. Is support owed by a husband to his wife and children from strict justice?

3. What is to be said of the case?

Caia, a Catholic and the wife of Titius, a Protestant official in a certain colony, comes to her native country to supervise the education of their daughters in a convent of nuns and, led by this purpose, lives near the convent. After some months Titius asks, indeed orders, her to return to him; Caia, however, always excuses herself on the ground that she herself must care for the daughters who are to be educated, and at length Titius publicly takes a concubine for himself. Having heard this, Caia, anxious about the past and the future, asks a confessor whether she is bound to return to her husband. Hence it is asked:

1. What are the obligations of spouses with regard to cohabitation?

2. Is it lawful to institute a partial divorce by public or private authority?

3. Are husband and wife equal in rights with regard to a partial divorce?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What are the obligations of married people with regard to cohabitation?

From the nature of the marriage contract and to secure the ends of marriage those who are married are bound to live together, unless by mutual consent they agree to live apart for a time and there is no danger of scandal or incontinence. This obligation is one of justice and is grave in serious matter.¹

1 Génicot, vol. ii, n. 552 ff.

The second question was answered above, p. 266.

3. Are husband and wife equal in the matter of rights about separation?

In general, husband and wife are equal in the matter of conjugal rights, though the husband as head of the family has authority over her and is her superior. The causes then, such as adultery, on account of which one consort is allowed to separate from the other, favor husband and wife equally. Because the husband has the duty of providing for the family, lawful causes of absence from his wife will more frequently exist in his case than in hers, and because of this and of her inferior position the wife will be called upon in general to follow her husband, and not vice versa.

4. The case. Titius was a colonial official, and his wife Caia went to the mother country to see to the education of her daughters. She put her daughters in a convent and took up her residence in the neighborhood. Her husband sent for her but she refused to go, under the pretext that she had to look after the education of her daughters. She became uneasy in conscience when she heard that her husband was living with another woman.

Caia’s uneasiness was justified. Her husband bade her come out to him and she had no good reason for refusing. The education of her daughters would probably proceed better without her presence than with it. Objectively she committed a grave sin in not obeying her husband and exposing him to the danger of incontinence.

She is bound to do what she can to repair her fault and bring back her husband from his sinful course of life. But now on the supposition that Caia knows for certain that her husband has committed adultery she has the right to separate from him. Although her disobedience was the occasion of his sin, yet we must not presume that she acted as she did with the view of making him commit adultery, and on that supposition she did not lose her right to separate from her husband on account of his adultery.¹

1 Gasparri, De Matrim., vol. ii, n. 1113.

Caius relates to his confessor that he is anxious about his manner of acting with his own wife. For she, he says, is very weak; indeed, a certain experienced physician declared that she would give birth again only with proximate danger of death. Caius himself, on the contrary, is robust and has scarcely any hope of restraining himself. Indeed, he often indulged in immodest touching with his wife in bed, from which he not rarely suffered pollution; sometimes he began intercourse but did not complete it because of fear that a child might be generated. He wishes to confess all these things insofar as they are sinful, and humbly asks advice concerning the future. Hence it is asked:

1. What are the marital obligations of spouses, and what is permitted to them?

2. Is the hope of generating a child equal at whatever time intercourse is had?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. What are the obligations of marriage for spouses, and what are permitted to them?

A spouse is bound under grave sin to render the conjugal debt to the other spouse who reasonably asks it, and consequently spouses are regularly bound to live together. Moreover, signs of conjugal love are to be shown mutually by the spouses. What is permitted to them is contained in the following rule: 'What is useful for the performance of the conjugal act is permitted; what is' contrary to the generation of offspring or tends to hinder that is gravely illicit; what is not contrary to the generation of offspring, although it is beyond that, at least is not gravely illicit.

2. Is there an equal hope of generating offspring at whatever time intercourse is had?

The matter is uncertain. Some thought that the period between two days before menstruation and fourteen days afterwards was more suitable for generating offspring more certainly, and consequently that, if spouses do not wish offspring to follow from intercourse, they can avoid this period and have intercourse outside it. Nothing prevents them from acting in this way, but whether they will attain the intended end is very doubtful.²

2 Génicot, vol. ii, n. 551.

3. To the case. To employ immodest touches in such a way that a proximate danger of emission is induced is forbidden under grave sin even to spouses. To employ touches not so immodest, short of the proximate danger of emission, although emission sometimes follows, to which, however, consent is not given and which is not intended, is not considered forbidden to spouses under grave sin, nor even under venial sin, provided there is a just cause, such as fostering conjugal love. According to these rules judgment is to be made concerning the immodest touches employed by Caius. By beginning intercourse but not completing it because of fear of generating offspring, Caius sinned onanistically and gravely, unless it is established to him by experience that he can act in this way without proximate danger of emission.³

3 Ibid., 551.

For the future, let Caius exercise the marital offices in an honorable and due manner, entrusting himself and his wife to God with great confidence.

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 362.

1. Thomas Hobbes, than whom never was greater genius for riding an idea, right or wrong, to the full length that it will go, was born in 1588: and notwithstanding his twelve pipes of tobacco daily, his vigorous constitution endured to his ninety-second year. The first half of his life fell in with the age of the greatest predominance of Calvinism. In religion he was scarcely a Calvinist, indeed he laboured under a suspicion of atheism: but his philosophy is accurately cast in the mould of the grim theology of Geneva. We may call it the philosophy of Calvinism. It has for its central tenet, that human nature either was from the first, or is become, bad, "desperately wicked," depraved, corrupt, and utterly abominable, so that whatever is natural to man, in so far forth as it is natural, is simply evil. The remedy for our evil nature Hobbes finds in no imputed merits of a Redeemer, no irresistible victorious grace, but in the masterful coercion of a despotic civil power. But, lest any one should suspect that there was at least this good in man, a propensity to civil society and obedience to the rulers of cities, Hobbes insists that man is by nature wholly averse to society with his kind: that the type of the race is an Ishmael, "a wild man, his hand against all men, and all men's hands against him:" in fact that the state of nature is a state of war all round. He writes (Leviathan, c. xiii.): "Men have no pleasure, but on the contrary a great deal of grief, in keeping company where there is no power able to overawe them all. For every man looketh that his companion should value him at the same rate he sets on himself; and upon all signs of contempt or undervaluing naturally endeavours, as far as he dares (which among them that have no common power to keep them quiet, is far enough to make them destroy each other), to extort a greater value from his contemners by damage, and from others by the example…. Hereby it is manifest, that during the time that men live without a power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war, and such a war as is of every man against every man…. In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth: no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea: no commodious building: no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force: no knowledge of the face of the earth: no account of time: no arts, no letters, no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short…. To this war of every man against every man this also is consequent, that nothing can be unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where there is no common power there is no law: where no law, no injustice…. It is consequent also to the same condition, that there be no propriety, no dominion, no mine and thine distinct, but only that to be every man's that he can get, and for so long as he can keep it."

2. Such is what Hobbes is pleased to call "the natural condition of mankind," a condition which man would have every natural reason for getting out of with all speed, were he ever so unhappy as to fall into it. It is true that, apart from civil government, violence would reign on earth. But it is not true that to live apart from civil government is the natural condition of mankind. It is not true that the only motive which draws men into civil society is the fear of violence, as though there were no such facts and exigencies of human nature as sympathy, friendship, intellectual curiosity, art, religion. It is not true that the one reason for the existence of the civil power consists in this, that without the restraining hand of the magistrate men would bite and devour one another. Lastly, it is not true that all rights, notably rights of property, are the creation of the State. A man is a man first and a citizen afterwards. As a man, he has certain rights actual and potential (c. v., s. i., p. 244): these the State exists, not to create, for they are prior to it in the order of nature, but to determine them, where indeterminate, to sanction and to safeguard them.

Natural rights go before legal rights, and are presupposed to them, as the law of nature before that law which is civil and positive. It is an "idol of the tribe" of lawyers to ignore all law but that upon which their own professional action takes its stand.

3. "In considering man as he must have come from the hands of nature," writes Jean Jacques Rousseau, "I behold an animal less strong than some, less active than others, but upon the whole in organism having the advantage of them all. I behold him appeasing his hunger under an oak, slaking his thirst in the first brook, finding a bed at the foot of the same tree that furnished his repast, and there you have all his cravings satisfied." (Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité.) This noble savage—quite a contrast to Hobbes's ruffian primeval, "nasty, brutish," and short-lived—observes and imitates the industry, and gradually raises himself to the instinct, of the beasts among whom he lives. His constitution is robust, and almost inaccessible to malady. He attains to old age, free from gout and rheumatism. He surpasses the fiercest wild beasts in address as much as they surpass him in strength, and so arrives to dwell among them without fear. Yet withal he is distinguished from brutes by freewill and perfectibility, qualities which gradually draw him out of his primeval condition of tranquil innocence, lead him through a long course of splendours and errors, of vices and virtues, and end by making him a tyrant at once over nature and over himself.

4. Rousseau's life, 1715-1778, was a continual protest against the formalism, affectation, pedantry and despotism of the age of the Bourbons. His ideal of man was the unconventional, unconstrained, solitary, but harmless and easy-going savage. Hobbes was the growth of a sterner and more serious age. The only reality to him in heaven and on earth was force: his one idea in philosophy was coercion. Human nature to him was an embodiment of brute violence ever in need of violent restraint. Rousseau, an optimist, saw nothing but good in man's original nature: to the pessimist mind of Hobbes all was evil there. Neither of them saw any natural adaptation to social life in the human constitution. To live in society was, in both their views, an artificial arrangement, an arbitrary convention. But Hobbes found in the intolerable evils of a state of nature an excellent reason why men should quit it for the unnatural condition of citizens. Rousseau found no reason except, as he says, quelque funeste hasard. The problem for Hobbes stood thus: how men, entering society, might be "cribbed, cabined, and confined" to the utmost in order to keep down their native badness. Rousseau's concern was, how one might so become a citizen as yet to retain to the full the delightful liberty of a tropical savage. Hobbes's solution is the Leviathan, Rousseau's the Social Contract. The prize, we think, rests with the Englishman: but the reader shall judge.

5. And first of the Social Contract. Rousseau proposes "to find a form of association which shall defend and protect with all the strength of the community the person and the goods of each associate, and whereby each one, uniting himself to all, may nevertheless obey none but himself and remain as free as before." (Contrat Social, i. 6.) This proposal is hopeless, it is a contradiction in terms. No man can contract and remain as free as before, but he binds himself either under a wider obligation to do or abstain, where he was not bound before, or under a stronger obligation where he was bound already. Nevertheless Rousseau finds a means of accomplishing the impossible and the self-contradictory. "Each of us puts into a common stock his person and all his power under the supreme direction of the general will; and we receive in our turn the offering of the rest, each member as an inseparable part of the whole. Instantly, instead of the private person of each contracting party, this act of association produces a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly has voices, which body receives by this same act its unity, its common Ego, its life and its will." (ib.) This awful signing away of all your rights, so that your very personality is merged in that of the community—a self-renunciation going far beyond that of profession in any religious order—ought certainly, as Rousseau says, to be "the most voluntary act in the world;" and he adds the characteristic reason: "every man being born free and master of himself, none can, under any pretence whatsoever, subject him without his own consent." (Contrat Social, iv. 2.) Then you ask: When have I made this large contract by the most voluntary act in the world? Rousseau replies: "When the State is instituted, consent is in residing." (ib.) But, you reply, my residence is anything but the most voluntary act in the world: it would be awkward for me to emigrate; and if I did emigrate, it would only be to some other State: I cannot possibly camp out and be independent in the woods, nor appease my hunger under an oak. To this plea Rousseau quite gives in, remarking that "family, goods, the want of an asylum, necessity, violence, may keep an inhabitant in the country in spite of himself; and in that case his mere sojourn no longer supposes his consent to the contract." (ib.) Then none of us have made the contract, for we have never had the option of living anywhere except in some State.

6. Hobbes, after laying down the necessity of men combining for protection against mutual injustice, observes that a mere promise or agreement not to injure any one will not suffice: "for the agreement of men is by covenant only, which is artificial; and therefore no wonder if there be something else required besides covenant to make their agreement constant and lasting, which is a common power to keep them in awe and to direct their actions to the common benefit." He continues: "The only way to erect such a common power … is to confer all their power and strength upon one man or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills by plurality of voices unto one will: which is as much as to say, to appoint one man or assembly of men to bear their person; and every one to own, and to acknowledge himself to be the author of, whatsoever he that so beareth their person shall act or cause to be acted in those things which concern the common peace and safety; and therein to submit their wills every one to his will, and their judgments to his judgment. This is more than consent or concord,—it is a real unity of them all in one and the same person, made by covenant of every man with every man, in such manner as if every man should say to every man: I authorise, and give up my right of governing myself to this man or to this assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him, and authorise all his actions in like manner. This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a commonwealth, in Latin civitas. This is the generation of that great Leviathan, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god, to whom we owe under the immortal God our peace and defence." (Leviathan, c. xvii.) This idea of all the rights and personalities of the individuals who contract to live socially being fused and welded together into the one resultant personality and power of the State, has evidently been borrowed by Rousseau from Hobbes. We shall deal with the idea presently. Meanwhile several points claim our notice.

7. The hideous piece of cynicism whereby Rousseau (Contrat Social, iv. 2), after promising you that, if you join his commonwealth, you shall obey none but yourself, then goes on to tell you that you obey yourself in obeying the will of the majority, even when it puts you in irons or leads you to death—because as a citizen you have once for all renounced your own will, and can only wish what the majority wishes,—has its root in the position of Hobbes, that "every subject is author of every act the sovereign doth." (Leviathan, c. xxi.)

8. A real and important difference between the Leviathan and the Social Contract, is that Hobbes (c. xix.) allows various distributions of sovereign power, but prefers monarchy: Rousseau (l. ii., c. i.) will have it that sovereignty is vested inalienably in the people: of which doctrine more to follow.

9. Men are by nature equal, say Rousseau and Hobbes and many more respectable authors. Yes, in their specific nature, that is, they are all equally men. Similarly you have it that all triangles are equal, if that is a proposition of any value. But men as individuals are not all equal. One is stronger in body, another more able in mind: one predisposed to virtue, another to vice: one born in affluence and honour, another in squalor. Not men in the abstract, but living men, start at different points of vantage, and the distance between them widens as they run the race of life. We may lay it down as an axiom, in diametric opposition to Rousseau, that inequalities are natural, equalities artificial.

10. Man is born free: so opens the first chapter of the Contrat Social. If free of all duties, then void of all rights (c. v., s. i., nn. 5, 7, pp. 246, 247): let him then be promptly knocked on the head as a sacrifice to Malthas; and with the misformed children born in Plato's Republic, "they will bury him in a secret and unseen spot, as is befitting."

11. Hobbes and Rousseau go upon this maxim, which has overrun the modern world, that no man can be bound to obedience to another without his own consent. The maxim would be an excellent one, were men framed like the categories of Aristotle—substance, quantity, quality, relation, and the rest—each peering out of his own pigeon-hole, an independent, self-sufficient entity. But men are dependent, naturally dependent whether they will or no, every human being on certain definite others,—the child on the parent, the citizen on the State whose protection he enjoys, and all alike on God. These natural dependences carry with them natural uncovenanted obediences,—to parents, filial duty—to country, loyalty—to God, piety: all which are embraced in the Latin term pietas. (See St. Thomas, 2a 2æ, q. 101, art. 1, in corp.) The fatal maxim before us is the annihilation of pietas. In lieu of loyal submission we get a contract, a transaction of reasoned commercial selfishness between equal and equal. This perverse substitution has called forth Leo XIII.'s remark on the men of our time, "Nothing comes so amiss to them as subjection and obedience," Nihil tam moleste ferunt quam subesse et parere. (Encyclical on Christian Marriage.)

12. The common extravagance of the Leviathan and the Social Contract is the suppression of the individual, with his rights and his very personality, which is all blended in the State. (See Rousseau's words above quoted, n. 5, and those of Hobbes, n. 6.) The reservations in favour of the individual made by Hobbes, Leviathan, c. xxi., and by Rousseau, Contrat Social, l. ii., c. iv., are either trifles or self-contradictions. But it is not in man's power by any contract thus to change his nature, so as to become from autocentric heterocentric (c. ii., s. i., n. 2, p. 203; c. v., s. i., n. 1, p. 244), from a person a thing, from a man a chattel, void of rights and consequently of duties, and bound to serve this Collective Monster, this Aggregated Idol, with the absolute devotedness that is due to God alone. The worship of the new Moloch goes well with the dark misanthropism of Hobbes: but in Rousseau, the believer in the perfect goodness of unrestrained humanity, it is about the most glaring of his many inconsistencies. It is of course eagerly taken up by the Socialists, as carrying all their conclusions. It is the political aspect of Socialism.

Reading.—Burke, Warren Hastings, Fourth Day, the passage beginning, "He have arbitrary power!"

1. The Greeks had a name [Greek: eranos], which meant a feast where the viands were supplied by each guest contributing in kind. If, in a party of four, one man brought a ham, another a rabbit, a third a dish of truffles, and a fourth a salmon, no one would expect that, when the cover was raised, there should appear a pigeon-pie. That would not be in the nature of an [Greek: eranos]. Now not only Hobbes and Rousseau, but Locke and a great multitude of modern Englishmen with him, hold that the power of the State is an aggregate, the algebraic sum of the powers whereof the component members would have stood possessed, had they lived in what is called, by a misleading phrase, "the state of nature," that is, the condition of men not subject to civil authority. These powers,—either, as Hobbes and Rousseau virtually say, all of them, or, as Locke and the common opinion has it, only some of them, —men are supposed to resign as they enter into the State. If therefore there appears in the City, Nation, State, or Commonwealth, a certain new and peculiar power, which belongs to no individual in the "state of nature," or, as I prefer to call it, the extra-civil state, then what we may designate as the Aggregation Theory breaks down, and another origin must be sought of civil principality. But there is such a power in the State, new and peculiar, and not found in any of the component individuals: it is the power and authority to punish on civil grounds. It is the right of the rods and axes, that were borne before the Roman magistrate. It is, in its most crucial form, the right to punish with death.

2. We are not here concerned with proving the existence of this right. It is generally admitted: we assume it accordingly, and shall prove it later on. Nor are we concerned with domestic punishment, inflicted by the head of a family within his own household, for the good of that household, stopping short of any irreparable harm to the sufferer. (St. Thos., 2a 2æ, q. 65, art. 2, ad. 2.) Leaving this aside, we say, and have proved already, that one private individual has no right to punish another, neither medicinally for the amendment of the delinquent, nor by way of deterrent for the good of the community, nor in the way of retribution for his own satisfaction. He has the right of self-defence, but not of punishment: the two things are quite different. He may also exact restitution, where restitution is due: but that again is not punishing. If he is in the extra-civil state, he may use force, where prudence allows it, to recover what he has lost. This right of private war really is surrendered by the individual, when the State is established: but war and punishment are two totally different ideas. Subjects are punished: war is levied on independent powers. (Ethics, c. ix., s. iii., nn. 4-6, pp. 171-174; Natural Law, c. ii., s. ii., n. 6, p. 212.)

3. Opposite is the opinion of Locke, who writes:

"The execution of the law of nature is in that state [of nature] put into every man's hands, whereby every one has a right to punish the transgressors of that law to such a degree as may hinder its violation: for the law of nature would, as all other laws that concern men in this world, be in vain, if there were nobody that in the state of nature had a power to execute that law." We observe that the punishment of offenders against the law of nature, as such, belongs to the Legislator, who is God alone. Certainly it is well, nay necessary, that there should be human law to bear out the law of nature: but human law is the creation of human society in its perfection, which is the State. Man is punished by man for breaking the laws of man, not—except remotely—for breaking the laws of God. Nor would it be any inconvenience, if the law of nature were in vain in a state wherein nature never intended men to live, wherein no multitude of men ever for any notable time have lived, a state which is neither actual fact nor ideal perfection, but a mere property of the philosophic stage, a broken article, an outworn speculation. Such is "the state of nature," as identified with the extra-civil state by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau.

1. The State is deemed by Aristotle (Politics, III., ix., 14): "the union of septs and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life." The first and most elementary community is the family, [Greek: oikia]. A knot of families associating together, claiming blood-relationship and descent, real or fictitious, from a common ancestor, whose name they bear, constitute a [Greek: genos], called in Ireland a sept, in Scotland a clan, nameless in England. When the sept come to cluster their habitations, or encampments, in one or more spots, and to admit strangers in blood to dwell among them, these hamlets, or camps, gradually reach the magnitude of a village. When a number of these villages, belonging to different septs, come to be contiguous to one another, this mere juxtaposition does not make of them a State. Nor does interchange of commodities, nor intermarriage, nor an offensive and defensive alliance: these are the mutual relations of a confederacy, [Greek: xymmaxia], but all these and more are needed for a State, [Greek: polis]. To be a State, it is requisite that these septs and villages should agree to regulate the conduct of their individual members by a common standard of social virtue, sufficient for their well-being as one community. This common standard is fixed by common consent, or by the decision of some power competent to act for all and to punish delinquents. The name of this common standard is law. (Ethics, c. vii., n. 1, p. 126.) The community thus formed leads a life complete and self-sufficient, not being a member of another, but a body by itself,—not part of any ulterior community, but complete in the fulness of social good and social authority.

2. Among the ancient Greeks and Italians, and to some extent also in mediæval Italy and Germany, the city or municipality, with the small country district attached, was the State. With us the nation is the State; and accordingly we say my country where the Greek said my city. Bearing this difference in mind, as also the fact that the sept is not known amongst us except to antiquarians, and likewise that the village with us coincides with the parish, and that there are town as well as country parishes,—upon these modern data we may amend Aristotle's definition thus: The State is the union of parishes and municipalities in a perfect and self-sufficient community.

3. The City State is well illustrated in the following narrative of Thucydides (ii., 15):

"In the time of Cecrops and the early kings as far as Theseus, Attica was always divided among several independent cities, with their own town-halls and magistrates; and when there was no alarm of an enemy, the inhabitants did not resort for common deliberation to the King, but severally managed their own affairs and took their own counsel, and some of them even went to war. But when Theseus came to the throne, he abolished the council-chambers and magistracies of the other cities, and centralised all the people in what is now the city [of Athens], where he appointed their one council-chamber and town-hall; and while they continued to occupy their own properties as before, he forced them to recognise this as their one city and State." Attica before Theseus was a confederacy, [Greek: xymmaxia], not a State, [Greek: polis].

4. A citizen is defined: "one who has access to a share in deliberative and judicial functions." (Ar., Pol. III., i., 12.) It is not necessary that he actually should share these functions, but the way to them should lie open to him: he should be a person qualified to share in them. There are various degrees of citizenship. Under a parliamentary government, we distinguish the member of parliament, the elector, and him who will be an elector as soon as he gets a house of his own; and again, the judge, and him who is liable to serve on juries. In an absolute monarchy there are no citizens, only subjects.

5. "The distribution of power in the State, and especially of the sovereign power, is called the polity" ([Greek: politeia], Ar., Pol., III., vi., 1),—a word immortalised by the judicious Hooker, and happily recovered recently to the English language. The polity then is the distribution of the sovereignty. The person, singular or collective, in whose hands the full sovereignty rests, is called the ruler. Be it observed that what we call the ruler is never one man, except in absolute monarchy. By the theory of the British Constitution, the ruler is King, Lords, and Commons, together.

6. Nature requires that men generally live in society, domestic and civil, so that the individual be of the family, and families form associations, which again conspire to form one perfect community, which is the State. The requirement of nature may be gathered from the universal practice of mankind. "If it (the word savage) means people without a settled form of government, without laws and without a religion, then, go where you like, you will not find such a race." (Max Müller, in Nineteenth Century, Jan. 1885, p. 114.) The same may be gathered from a consideration of what the State is, and of the ends which it serves. The State, as we have seen (n. 2), is a union of septs and villages, or of parishes and municipalities. The individual is born and nurtured in the family, and ordinarily becomes in time the parent of a new family. Families must combine to form septs by blood, or villages (or parishes) by locality. Municipalities we may leave aside, for a municipality is a potential State. But we must consider the sept, village, or parish, which is the community intermediate between family and State. Among the cogent reasons which require families to enter into this association, we may mention friendship, intermarriage, the interchange of services and commodities, the cultivation of the arts, the preservation of traditions and inventions.

7. But it is further necessary that these septs, villages, or parishes, should band together and combine to form a higher community, self-sufficient and perfect,—for the determining of rights which Natural Law leaves undetermined,—for the punishing of disturbers of the peace, if need be, even with death,—for defence against a common enemy,—for a union of counsels and resources to the execution of magnificent works. This self-sufficient and perfect community, which is not part of any higher community, is the State.

8. We may observe that the whole reason for the being of the State is not mutual need, nor the repression of violence. Main reasons these are, no doubt, but not the whole main reason. Even if men had no need of one another for the supply of their animal wants, they would still desire to converse for the satisfaction of their intellectual curiosity and their social affections. And even if we had all remained as void of guile, and as full of light and love, as our first parents were at their creation, we should still have needed the erection of States. In a State there are not only criminal but civil courts, where it is not wicked men alone who come to be litigants. From sundry passages of Scripture it would appear that even angels may disagree as to what is best and proper: angelic men certainly may and do. It is a mistake to look upon civil government, with its apparatus of laws and judgments, simply as a necessary evil, and remedy of the perverseness of mankind. On the contrary, were all men virtuous, States would still be formed, towering in magnificence above the States known to history, as the cedars of Lebanon above the scanty growths of a fell-side in our north country.

9. There can be no State without a power to guide and govern it. It has indeed become the fashion to repeat, as the latest discovery in politics, that what a State needs is not government but administration. This saying comes of a theory, to be examined presently, that sovereign power abides permanently with the people at large, and that the sole function of princes, cabinets, and parliaments, is to provide means of giving effect to the popular will. This however is not quite a repudiation of government, but a peculiar view as to the seat and centre of government. Those who hold it, vigorously maintain the right of the Many to govern, control, and command the Few. The need of some governing authority in a State can be denied by none but an Anarchist, a gentleman who lives two doors beyond Rousseau on the side of unreason.

10. Every State is autonomous, self-governing, independent. Either the whole people taken collectively must rule the same whole taken distributively, or a part must rule the rest. The ruler is either the whole commonwealth, or more frequently a part of the commonwealth. An autocrat is part of the State which he governs. Sovereignty whole and entire is intrinsic to the State. A community that is to any extent governed from without, like British India or London, is not a State, but part of a State, for it is not a perfect community.

11. We have it therefore that man is a social animal. Naturally he is a member of a family. Nature requires that families should coalesce into higher communities, which again naturally converge and culminate in the State. Nature further requires that in every State there should be an authority to govern. But authority to govern and duty to obey are correlatives. Nature therefore requires submission to the governing authority in the State. In other words, Nature abhors anarchy as being the destruction of civil society, and as cutting the ground from under the feet of civilised man. The genuine state of nature, that state and condition, which nature allows and approves as proper for the evolution of the human faculties, is the state of man in civil society. That is lost where there is no judge in the land.

12. There are men full of a sentimental deference to authority and professions of obedience, who yet will not obey any of the authorities that actually are over them. These are disobedient men. He is an anarchist in practice, who meditates treason and rebellion against the "powers that be" actually over him in the State wherein he lives. To obey no actual power is to obey no power, as to wear no actual clothes is to go naked. To keep up the comparison,—as a man may change his clothes upon occasion, and thus go through a brief interval of unclothedness without injury to health or violation of decency, notwithstanding the requirement of nature to wear clothes: so it may be or it may not be consonant with the exigency of our nature at times to subvert by insurrection the existing government in order to the substitution of a new authority; that does not concern us here. We are stating the general rule under ordinary circumstances. The submission to civil authority, which nature requires of us, must be paid in the coin of obedience to the actual established "powers that be."

13. Any one who understands how morality comes from God (Ethics, c. vi., s. ii. nn. 6-9, 13, pp. 119-125), can have no difficulty in seeing how civil power is of God also. The one point covers the other. We need no mention of God to show that disobedience, lying, and the seven deadly sins, are bad things for human nature, things to be avoided even if they were not forbidden. All the things that God forbids are against the good of man. Their being evil is distinguishable from their being prohibited, and antecedent to it. Now as drunkenness and unchastity are evil for man, so too is anarchy. The one remedy for anarchy is civil government. Even if there were no God, it would be still imperatively necessary, as we have seen, for mankind to erect political institutions, and to abide by the laws and ordinances of constitutional power. But there would be no formal obligation of submission to these laws and ordinances; and resistance to this power would be no more than philosophic sin. (Ethics, c. vi., s. ii., n. 6, p. 119.) What makes anarchy truly sinful and wrong is the prohibition of it contained in the Eternal Law, that law whereby God commands every creature, and particularly every man, to act in accordance with his own proper being and nature taken as a whole, and to avoid what is repugnant to the same. (Ethics, c. vi., s. ii., n. 9, p. 120.)

Therefore, as man is naturally social, and anarchy is the dissolution of society, God forbids anarchy, and enjoins obedience to the civil power, under pain of sin and damnation. "They that resist, purchase to themselves damnation" (Rom. xiii. 2): where the theological student, having the Greek text before him, will observe that the same phrase is used as in 1 Cor. xi. 29 of the unworthy communicant, as though it were the like sin to rend our Lord's mystical Body by civil discord as to profane His natural Body by sacrilege. But to enjoin obedience and to bestow authority are the obverse and reverse of one and the same act. God therefore gives the civil ruler power and authority to command. This is the meaning of St. Paul's teaching that there is no power but from God, and that the powers that be are ordained of God. (Rom. xiii. 1.)

14. The argument is summed up in these seven consequent propositions:

(a) Civil society is necessary to human nature. (b) Civil power is necessary to civil society. (c) Civil power is naught without civil obedience. (d) Civil obedience is necessary to human nature. (e) God commands whatever is necessary to human nature. (f) God commands obedience to the civil power. (g) God commissions the civil power to rule.

15. If any one asks how the State and the civil power is of God any otherwise than the railway company with its power, or even the fever with its virulence, a moment's reflection will reveal the answer in the facts, that railway communication, however convenient, is not an essential feature of human life, as the State is: while diseases are not requirements in order to good, but incidental defects and evils of nature, permitted by God. Why God leaves man to cope with such evils, is not the question here.

Readings.—Ar., Pol., I., ii.; III., i.; III., ix.: nn. 5-15.

1. One polity alone is against the natural law; that is every polity which proves itself unworkable and inefficient: for the rest, various States exhibit various polities workable and lawful, partly from the circumstances, partly from the choice, of the citizens: but the sum total of civil power is a constant quantity, the same for all States. We proceed to establish the clauses of this statement in succession.

2. If a watch be necessary to a railway guard, and he is bound to have one accordingly, it is also necessary, and he is bound to procure it, that the watch shall go and keep time. A watch that will not keep time is an unlawful article for him to depend upon, being tantamount to no watch, whereas he is bound to have a watch. Otherwise, be his watch large or small, gold, silver, or pinchbeck, all this is indifferent, so long as it be a reliable timekeeper. In like manner, we must have a State, we must have a government, and we must have a government that can govern. Monarchy, aristocracy, parliaments, wide or narrow franchise, centralisation, decentralisation, any one of these and countless other forms—apart from the means whereby it is set up—is a lawful government, where it is a workable one; unlawful, and forbidden by God and nature, where it cannot work. A form of government that from its own intrinsic defects could nowhere work, would be everywhere and always unlawful.

3. You cannot argue from the accomplished fact the lawfulness of the means whereby it was accomplished. Nor do we say that every form of government, which succeeds in governing, was originally set up in justice; nor again that the success of its rule is necessarily due to the use of just means. The Committee of Public Safety in Paris in 1794 did manage to govern, but it was erected in blood, and it governed by an unscrupulous disregard of everybody's rights. All that we say is, that no distribution of civil power as a distribution, or no polity as a polity (s. iii., n. 5, p. 312), is unlawful, if by it the government can be carried on. And the reason is plain. For all that nature requires is that there should be an efficient civil authority, not that this man should have it, or that one man or other should have it all, or that a certain class in council assembled should engross it, or that all the inhabitants of the country should participate in it. Any one of these arrangements that will work, satisfies the exigency of nature for civil rule, and is therefore in itself a lawful polity.

4. Working, and therefore, as explained, lawful polities are as multitudinous as the species of animals. Besides those that actually are, there is a variety without end, as of animals, so of polities, that might be and are not. We can classify only the main types. We ground our classification upon Ar., Pol., III., vii., modernising it so as to take in forms of representative government, whereof Aristotle had no conception.

(1) Monarchy, or the rule of the Single Person, in whose hands the whole power of the State is concentrated, e.g., Constantine the Great.

(2) Aristocracy, or the rule of the Few, which will be either direct or representative, according as either they themselves by their own votes at first hand, or representatives whom they elect, make the laws.

(3) Democracy, or the rule of the Many, that is, of the whole community. Democracy, again, is either direct (commonly called pure) or representative. The most famous approach in history to pure democracy is the government of Athens, B.C. 438-338.

(4) Limited Monarchy.

(a) Monarchy with Aristocracy, the government of England from 1688 to 1830.

(b) Monarchy with Democracy.

5. All civil government is for the governed, that is, for the community at large. The perversion of a polity is the losing sight of this principle, and the conducting of the polity in the interest of the governing body alone. By such perversion monarchy passes into tyranny, aristocracy into oligarchy, and democracy into ochlocracy or mob-rule. It might appear strange that, where the power rests with the whole people collectively, government should ever be carried on otherwise than in the interest of the entire community, did we not remember that the majority, with whom the power rests in a democracy, may employ it to trample on and crush the minority. Thus the Many may worry and harass the Few, the mean and poor the wealthy and noble: though commonly perhaps the worrying has been the other way about. Anyhow it is important to observe that there is no polity which of itself, and apart from the spirit in which it is worked, is an adequate safeguard and rock of defence against oppression.

6. The wide range of polities that history presents is not drawn out by the caprice of nations. The very fact of a certain nation choosing a certain polity, where they are free to choose, is an indication of the bent of the national character, and character is not a caprice. No North American population are ever likely to elect an absolute monarch to govern them. That polity which thrives on the shores of the Caspian, can strike no root on the banks of the Potomac. The choice of a polity is limited by the character of the electors and by the circumstances in which the election is made. Not every generation in a nation is free to choose its polity: but the choice and institution of the fathers binds the children. Up to a certain point ancestral settlements must be respected, or instability ensues, and anarchy is not far off. Thus the spirit of freedom should always act as Burke says, "as if in the presence of canonized forefathers."

7. The smallest State in the world is the little republic of Andorra in the Pyrenees. Though it be a paradox to say it, there is as much political power in Andorra as in Russia,—one and the same measure of it in every State. In every State there is power for civil good to the full height of the emergencies that may arise. The same emergencies may arise everywhere, and everywhere there is full power to see that the commonwealth take no harm by them. What a great empire can do for this purpose, e.g., proclaim martial law, search houses, lay an embargo on the means of transport, impress soldiers, the same can the tiniest commonwealth do in the like need. And the ordinary functions of government are the same in both.

8. This seems at variance with the theory of some constitutions, according to which there are certain so-called fundamental laws, which the legislature cannot call in question, nor deal with in any way, but must take them in all its deliberations for positions established and uncontrovertible. The British Constitution recognizes no fundamental laws. There is no reform that may not legally be broached in Parliament and enacted there. Parliament is said to be "omnipotent," "able to do everything, except to make a man a woman." But in many legislatures it is not so. At Athens of old there were certain measures which no one could introduce for discussion in the Sovereign Assembly without rendering himself liable to a prosecution [Greek: graphae paranomon]. And there have been many monarchs termed absolute, who yet were bound by their coronation-oath, or by some other agreement with their people, to preserve inviolate certain institutions and to maintain certain laws. It may be contended that such a government as we have in England, which is theoretically competent to pass any law within the limits of the natural law, has a greater range of power than a government whose operation is limited by a barrier of fundamental positive law. But this contention vanishes when we observe that there must remain in the State, which has fundamental laws, a power somewhere to reverse them. They can be reversed at least by the consent of the whole people. Thus at Athens the [Greek: graphae paranomon] could be suspended by a vote of the Assembly. A people can release their monarch from his coronation-oath in such portions of it as are not binding absolutely by divine law. Where fundamental law obtains, a portion of the civil power becomes latent, and only a diminished remainder is left free in the hands of the person or persons who are there said to rule. Such person or persons are not the adequate ruler of the State, as they have not the full power, but the people, with whom rests the latent authority to cancel certain laws, are to that extent partakers in the sovereignty. Where there is agreement of the whole people, great and small, no part of the power remains latent, but all is set free. With us, it may be observed, the omnipotence of parliament has become a mere lawyer's theory. On every great issue, other than that on which the sitting parliament has been elected, it is the practice of ministers to "go to the country" by a new General Election. Thus only a certain measure of available authority is free at the disposal of parliament: the rest remaining latent in the general body of the electorate. Such is our constitution in practice.

9. If in any State the whole power were free in the hands of one man, there we might look to see made good the dictum of the judicious Hooker (Ecclesiastical Polity, bk. i., s. x., n. 5): "To live by one man's will became the cause of all men's misery." In a monarchy untrammelled by senate or popular assembly, it were well that some of the sovereign power should remain latent, and that His Majesty should rule in accordance with certain laws, not within his royal pleasure to revoke.

10. The State and the power of the State, apart from the polity, is of God. (s. iii., n. 14, p. 318.) The State under this or that polity and this or that ruler, is also of God. But, apart from the polity, the State is of God antecedently to any determination of any human will: because, willy nilly, man must live in civil society and God commands him so to do. But the State under this polity and this ruler is of God consequently to some determination of human volition. In this consequent sense we write Victoria Dei gratia.

A young man, whom we will call Robert, accuses himself in Confession of having borne a great dislike and even hatred toward his father for many years. His father, he says, was a drunkard, and filled their home with shame and sorrow. He abused the mother and the children, cursed them, drove them from the house by his violence, and even threatened their lives. When Robert was seventeen years of age he left home, against the will of his father, and came to New York to make his way in the world by learning a trade. His father wanted him to remain at home and to go to work for a daily wage, which the father hoped to be able to spend for drink. After Robert had been in New York for a number of years the father died, having wasted in drink everything he possessed, and leaving a good many drink bills unsettled in different taverns. Robert, who in the meantime had prospered greatly and had considerable money in the bank, buried his father as cheaply as possible; in fact, so cheaply that it caused considerable unfavorable talk among the townspeople. Nor did Robert ever afterward have even one Mass said for the repose of his father's soul, or ever offer a penny toward the payment of his father's debts. What judgment is the confessor to form of Robert's conduct?

Solution.—It is necessary to separate the different counts in Robert's accusation in order to form a clear estimate of the sinfulness or lawfulness of Robert's conduct. There are four separate counts in the accusation, namely:

(1) Robert accuses himself of harboring hatred toward his father; (2) of having left home against the will of his father; (3) of having shown disrespect toward his father in the matter of the funeral arrangements, and ingratitude in not having Masses said for his soul; (4) and, finally, of injustice toward others in not settling his father's debts.

Let us take up each one of these four counts of Robert's accusation, and see whether and in how far Robert may have sinned.

1. Robert accuses himself of cherishing a great dislike and even hatred toward his father. Is this odium inimicitiae, or is it odium abominationis? Odium inimicitiae is sinful; odium abominationis need not necessarily be sinful. Odium inimicitiae is the hatred we conceive for some one personally, not merely for the evil that is in him or the wrong that he does, but for himself personally, inclusive of the good there may be in him, and we wish him evil, precisely because it is injury to him. Odium abominationis is something quite different from this. It is the strong aversion we feel for some one not personally, but for his vices and excesses. Thus, we hate, or rather abominate, the drunkard, not because of his individual personality, but because of his drunkenness. We hate his drunkenness, and we shun him, not because of himself, but because of his drunkenness. This odium abominationis may be a venial sin sometimes, but it is not a mortal sin.

Now, as regards Robert's hatred for his father, we are inclined to think that it was odium abominationis, and, under the circumstances, that it was not a sin. If Robert ordinarily showed his father the respect due to him, and obeyed him in reasonable things, then the hatred that Robert feels for his father is nothing more than a just loathing and disgust for his father's excesses. He despises and abominates his father's "weak, sick way of vomiting up his existence"; and in this he would seem to be without sin. Of course, there is always present a danger that this odium abominationis may go over into odium inimicitiae, and become mortally sinful, and Robert must be put on his guard against such a contingency.

2. Robert accuses himself of disobedience against his father in leaving home against his father's wishes. It does not appear that Robert sinned in this. Robert's motive in leaving home was just and honorable; namely, to render his existence useful by learning a trade. His father's motive in keeping him at home—namely, that he might have the benefit of his wages for drink—was unreasonable and sinful. No good reason can be advanced why Robert ought to obey his father, when such obedience would entail lifelong detriment to Robert's best interests. Of course, Robert is bound to see to it that his father does not want for food or clothing; but when the father has wherewith to buy food and clothing, but spends it for drink, there is no obligation for Robert to supply him with food and clothing.

3. The third count in Robert's accusation regards his father's funeral, and having Masses said for his soul. In this we think that Robert sinned. That Robert, who had plenty of money, had his father buried in such a niggardly and miserly way, showed a lack of elementary respect for his father, and was really insulting to his father's memory and savored of revenge. Robert was bound to observe the "decencies" of society in burying his father, for these decencies are founded on the reasonable respect and honor which the conscience and feelings of men decree should be shown to others. There was no obligation for Robert to provide a funeral for his father in keeping with his means; but there certainly was an obligation to give his father decent and honorable Christian burial.

Robert commits a mortal sin also in not having Masses said for the repose of his father's soul. His father is, in all likelihood, in grave spiritual need. Robert has plenty of means at his disposal to succor his father without grave inconvenience to himself. Not to do so is to transgress the law of Christ. For all theologians are agreed that for a child, who has the means, to refuse to have any Masses said for the repose of his parent's soul would be the committing of even a mortal sin (St. Thom. 2 Q. q. 101, a. 2; Ball. P. n. 7; Genicot i. 346, ii., etc.).

4. Finally, as regards the fourth count, there is no obligation for Robert to settle any of his father's drink bills, since he has received no inheritance from his father. "Liberi tenentur solvere debita parentum, tantum ratione honorum acceptorum" (S. Alph. n. 333).

General View and Divisions.

Summary : Unlike tolerance in private life, public tolerance is divided according to the matter, according to the reasons for its exercise ; dogmatic and practical tolerance; and according to the authority which tolerates, religious or civil authority.—Range of ecclesiastical tolerance.

The tolerance of private life is practised principally among equals, and is summed up in the respect which one person is bound to pay to the rights of another. This right forbids me to regulate the thoughts and speech of another by my own, or to disturb him in the liberty of opinion or worship which is granted to him by Divine or human law. Undoubtedly, when sanctioned by man, liberties may be wisely or unwisely granted, and they extend to all the circumstances of life ; but one private individual is not allowed to restrict the liberty of another, whatever be its origin or the circumstances to which it extends. So far we have treated of private tolerance, without discussing the merits of the liberties which put it to the test, and have not confined ourselves to tolerance in matters of religion, with which we are chiefly concerned.

The Sovereign, on the other hand, must concern himself with all the titles which every liberty can show to justify its existence. There are superior or necessary liberties, which even he is bound to respect; useful liberties, which he sanctions or restricts according to circumstances ; and dangerous liberties, which he grants reluctantly, because he cannot do otherwise. While the other liberties are granted as rights, the last-named are only impunities, and they alone, strictly speaking, are the object of the laws of tolerance.

Intolerance is twofold in character : it may refuse to recognize an inviolable liberty, or to grant a reasonable indulgence. Oppression or tyranny may be an abuse of power, or only an excess of severity. But tolerance is one : it permits a thing which is disapproved, or is at least looked upon unfavourably. The official grant of any liberty leads naturally to a discussion as to the nature and cause of the concession : is it a right which is intended to be permanent, or is it a necessity of fact to which the authorities think it advisable to bow ? And different questions arise according as the liberty belongs to the political, moral, or religious order.

Hence arise distinctions in respect of the source of the tolerance, its purpose, and its object.

According to its object, public tolerance is divided into as many branches as there are matters for discussion. We shall be concerned only with tolerance in religious matters.

According to the reasons on which it is founded, tolerance is dogmatic or practical. Dogmatic tolerance is a principle ; practical tolerance is an ex-pedient. The one claims liberty of opinions and worship as a right which must be respected ; the other yields to circumstances so far as is required by social conditions or the common good. To the advocates of dogmatic tolerance, the word “ tolerance ” seems improper; they would abolish it, and only use it as consecrated by ancient custom. Religious liberty signifies for them the liberty of profession of individual belief or unbelief, and sometimes also the liberty of organization granted to religious bodies. The professors of practical tolerance give the word its proper value, and, being accustomed to consider liberty as a function of truth, they define religious liberty as the liberty of the true religion.

Lastly, according to the authority which tolerates, toleration is ecclesiastical or civil. Ecclesiastical tolerance is that of religious authority or the Church ; civil tolerance is the act of the civil power or the State. We have already had occasion to state this, and also to draw attention to the following difference in the field of the two kinds of public tolerance :

Many independent States exist simultaneously, and no one questions the lawfulness of their coexistence. From this independence each State derives its sovereign right of internal administration, for which it is not obliged to give an account to any neighbouring State. Civil tolerance, therefore, is only understood as existing within the State, shown by the Sovereign to his subjects. Having no directly religious mission, the State, as such, does not enter into conflict with another State which professes another religion. But the religious society may be one, and obligatory for all : it has therefore a mission of propagation and conquest which puts it in opposition with other religions and false creeds. Hence we have to consider its possible tolerance in a new light, in the attitude which it adopts towards other religions and their adherents.

I. The Fact of Religious Society.

Summary : Social organization of religions.—Hierarchical constitution of the Catholic Church.—The place and mission assigned by Catholic teaching to the Church in the world.

Ecclesiastical tolerance or intolerance presupposes a religious authority. The existence of such an authority is a fact which is necessarily recognizable by the senses. Religions, Divine or human, unlike systems of philosophy, are socially organized ; for it may be said that there is hardly any religious system elaborated by a single individual, and all social organization requires the constitution of a hierarchy.

But if the different religions spread over the globe have a priesthood and principle of authority in common with Christian bodies, nowhere does the hierarchy form such a compact and united assembly, nowhere is authority so strong and active, as in the Catholic Church. We know the famous expression of Guizot: “ The Catholic Church is the great school of reverence ; ” and Proudhon remarks : “ The Catholic Church is the one whose dogmatism, disci-pline, hierarchy, and progress, best realize the theoretical principle and type of religious society —the one, in consequence, which has the best right to the government of souls.”¹

¹ De la Justice dans la Révolution et dans l’Église, Preliminary Discourse, sec. 3, p. 24.

It is with regard to this Church that we have almost exclusively to consider the different aspects of ecclesiastical tolerance.

Now, what place, according to Catholic doctrine, has God assigned to His Church in the world ? What is the mission she has to accomplish ?

If men consent to leave us really free, if they do not wish by an odious ostracism to practise towards the millions of Catholics the same intolerance that they lay to our charge, and so make us victims and accused at the same time, how can they deny us the right to profess this doctrine, and to regulate our judgments and our acts by our own conception of the Church rather than by that of unbelievers ? And is not every impartial judge bound to consider the arguments by which she explains and justifies her action, if he wishes to form a just estimate of her conduct ?

By the side of the States which are formed and prosper or disappear according to political changes, and of those civil societies which the Author of Nature has created and sanctioned in creating the human race—or, rather, above all these—though their independence in their proper sphere is duly recognized, God has instituted, to last as long as the world shall last, a religious society which traces its origin to Jesus Christ. To that society belong the faithful custody, the infallible teaching, and the zealous propagation, of those truths which are the light and salvation of the human race. As guardian of the inviolable deposit of truth, she is bound to preserve it pure and entire at the price of her blood, and to oppose an unchanging [we cannot] to all attempts at corruption.

Constituted as a perfect society,¹ she has subjects, loyal or rebellious, to lead to a common end, and she possesses all the rights and duties necessary for that end. Called by the express will of her Founder to make spiritual conquests, she acts in constant obedience to the command, “ Going therefore, teach ye all nations.”²

¹ Juridically, a society is called “ perfect ” when, being independent of any other of the same order, it is not bound to submit to any other for the attainment of its own end, but possesses in itself, in its resources and its rights, all means necessary for that purpose. A family, a city, a parish, a religious Order, are imperfect societies. The Church and the State are perfect societies.

² St. Matt, xxviii. 19.

The Church, therefore, has an exterior policy towards the religions she wishes to supplant, or the unbelievers she desires to convert; and an interior policy in regard to those who are placed under her rule by faith and baptism. She may show herself tolerant or intolerant in her threefold mission of teaching, administering, and conquering—that is, in her magisterium, her government, and her expansion or apostolate.

II. Doctrinal Intolerance.

Summary : Definition.—The uncompromising attitude of the Church in respect of doctrine.—Why it extends to every point of faith.—What liberty of discussion exists in religious matters.

Doctrinal intolerance consists in the rigour with which a Church imposes upon its members the inward acceptance and outward profession of its Credo, or its dogmatic and moral teaching.

The Catholic Church, from its very foundation, has presented to the world an unprecedented spectacle, on the austere beauty of which Jules Simon has commented in terms of appreciative admiration.¹ In Greece and Rome there had long been an official religion, without dogma and without morality, which required only an external rite of participation. All that was necessary was to offer incense to the gods of the State, and everyone was in consequence at liberty to believe in the gods or despise them. Peace was offered to all on very easy conditions. To all ? Yes, except those who could neither lie nor sell their consciences. Christianity proclaims the inviolable sacredness of the conscience, and offers for its acceptance a positive faith ; that faith creates an uncompromising attitude, which is only a claim of liberty. The outward act of adoration which great and learned men of the world offer without scruple and without conviction is, by the authority of the Church, unlawful for those who follow Christ. The incense is refused, and the victim pays for his refusal with his blood. “ For three centuries the executioners did not cease to strike, nor the victims to suffer ; Christianity received its baptism of blood ; it gave testimony to liberty of conscience : that was its heroic age.” But to what did it owe this heroism and this glory ? To its intolerance, to the intolerance which the Church practises as guardian of the faith, in virtue of which she demands of her subjects a persevering constancy in the faith, admitting no alliance or compromise with error.

¹ See his First Lesson on Liberty of Conscience.

On the same grounds the Church requires the acceptance of all that God has revealed ; the obstinate denial of a single dogma is equivalent to heresy, and produces apostasy. Many persons profess to be astonished at the severity of laws or ecclesiastical decrees which treat the denial of a single point of faith as severely as positive infidelity. This surprise is intelligible in unbelievers, who are excusable because they discuss the faith as they would discuss some system of philosophy ; but how can we account for the same astonishment in certain Catholic writers ? They seem to forget the very nature of the act of faith, and its difference from a simply rational assent. So long as we are concerned with certainties of the same order, springing from the same principles, there may be differences of opinion on every proposition enunciated. But the certainty of reason and the certainty of faith are derived from different sources. By coming to a wrong conclusion on a question of secondary importance, reason does not give up the principles which assist it in the discovery of the more important truths. It is not so with heresy. Without in any way denying the unequal dignity of the truths which God through His Church proposes for our belief, we ought nevertheless to make the value, the merit, the very essence of the act of faith, consist in the fact of believing them all on the Word of God, and in relying more on the Divine truthfulness than on our own lights. We fail to show this confidence if we pick and choose between dogmas, admitting some and refusing to accept others, or if we obstinately reject a single one ; for by so doing we cease to take the Word of God for our guide, and rely simply on our reason. The agreement between my opinions and the dogmas that I accept is only accidental, and almost a matter of chance, like the meeting of two travellers who happen to make part of their journey together, though they are not bound for the same goal; and, because fortuitous, the agreement loses all consistency. The Protestant Churches were scarcely a year old when Bossuet found materials for writing a history of their variations. Strictly speaking, there is no such thing as partial heresy, for faith is not a thing of shreds and patches.

It is only outside defined dogmas that the Church, according to the gravity and delicacy of the matter, the quality of the authors, and the circumstances of time and place, allows on sacred subjects a greater or less discussion, by reason of what might be called her tolerance ; and even then she reserves to herself the right to close the controversy by a final judgment, to which her children always willingly submit. III. Disciplinary Intolerance.

Summary : Excommunication of heretics.—In what spirit is it effected ?—Other penalties incurred by them.— Power of the Church.

The magisterium of the Church condemns all heresy. The government of the Church is concerned with heretics—that is to say, with those who, belonging to her by baptism, openly contradict her teaching ; we say openly because the secrets of the conscience are necessarily beyond the cognizance of an authority entrusted to the hands of men.¹

¹ Thus a Christian may be guilty of heresy in the sight of God without having violated any law of the Church. We do not dwell on another difference which seems to exist between guilt before God and guilt before the forum externum of the Church. Simple abstention—that is, refusal to give assent to any Divine revelation—is enough to constitute an infidelity which is insulting to God. But would a man who simply confesses his want of faith, without judging of dogmas or contradicting the Church, be liable to outward penalties ? According to some modern writers, we ought to answer in the affirmative. But such persons seem to speak of a man who lays down the law for himself, or at least follows those who do so ; we know of no case where proceedings have been taken against mere sceptics or freethinkers, so long as they have refrained from open blasphemy. We shall have occasion later to return to this subject, but we can understand how in the age of faith a heretic was considered inexcusable. By a heretic we mean a man who makes public and obstinate profession of an error contrary to faith, and rejects the teaching of the most imposing hierarchy that has ever existed. If simple doubt may seem excusable, it is the grossest presumption for any private individual to set up his own opinion against the teaching of the Church.

It is the duty of the Church to bring back her erring children first by the gentle ways of persuasion ; but if they are obstinate, she must treat them as rebellious subjects, whom, for their own good and the edification of others, she will endeavour to bring back by all the means in her power. This effort shows us a second aspect of ecclesiastical intolerance. The Church, which is the custodian and dispenser of spiritual blessings, will deprive the obstinate of those blessings, and will, in the end, exclude them from her communion. This deprivation involves spiritual penalties, which, in canonical language, are called “ censures,” and the gravest of all censures is exclusion from the Church, or excommunication, which, when solemnly pronounced, becomes an anathema. What is more natural or legitimate than to refuse the advantages of Christian unity to one who rejects its very principle, to cut off from the vine a branch which refuses to be nourished by the vine ? This expulsion, terrible in itself,¹ must have filled the souls of men with holy horror, when the Church, in the solemn assembly of her pastors, uttered those awful anathemas which defined the truth and denounced error.

¹ We know in what emphatic terms St. Paul described the effects of this penalty when he had occasion to inflict it: “I have already judged ... to deliver such a one to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, that the spirit may be saved in the day of Our Lord Jesus Christ ” (1 Cor. v. 3, 5). For having quoted these words, St. Jerome is accused by Lea (History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages, vol. i., p. 214) of having advocated capital punishment. It is unnecessary to remark how impossible it is for authors like Lea to present in their true light many facts whose real meaning is necessarily not understood by non-Catholics.

There are numerous canonical texts which enjoin that obstinate heretics should be cut off from the Church. The integrity of the faith and the preservation of the faithful require this ; and it is the most effective means of bringing back to his senses an unhappy person who is hurrying to destruction. “ It is said,” says Pope Urban,¹ “ that excommunication is the plucking up of the cockle, in opposition to the parable in the Gospel; but it is not so. The Apostle tells us that the sentence of excommunication is passed in order that the guilty person may have his soul saved in the day of the Lord. Excommunication is not intended for the destruction of the offender, but for his repentance and amendment.”

¹ Or, rather, the unknown author of the Canon Notandum, 37, C. xxiv., Q. 3.

The use of spiritual sanctions, as practised² and enjoined3 by St. Paul, in order to maintain the purity of Christian faith and morals, has found favour even with liberals. “ Religious intolerance,” says Jules Simon, “ is not only reasonable, but necessary ... a religion which did not profess it would be condemned by the very fact.”⁴ And more recently Ruffini writes : “It is impossible to condemn religious intolerance when it employs its purely spiritual weapons to combat and banish all opposition to the fundamental dogmas of a religion, and all persons who contradict them.5 Moreover, in acting in this manner, the Church only does what the State is constantly doing ; she deprives the delinquents of the benefits of religious society, exactly as the State deprives of the privileges of civil life those who offend against its laws.

² In the case of the incestuous Corinthian, mentioned above. 3 Titus iii. 10.

⁴ Op. cit., p. 68. 5 La Libertà Religiosa, p. 8.

But besides these spiritual penalties, we find that heretics incur temporal penalties also, though the Church has been slow in inflicting them; for, although she legalized temporal punishments as early as the seventh century, she waited until the twelfth before inflicting them on heretics.

The twelfth century gives us an instance of a heretic condemned to suffer temporal punishment. The case was that of the notorious Eon de la Stella, who appeared in 1148 before the Council of Rheims, in which 1,600 Bishops, Abbots, and Prelates were assembled. The case was a very grave one, and Eon, a fanatical disturber of the public peace, might have expected to be treated with the utmost rigour ; but, more fortunate than some of his associates, whom the secular arm delivered to the flames, he received the benefit of episcopal clemency. The Bishop who had brought him before the Council interceded for him, and his life and limbs were spared.¹ Thus the first ecclesiastical sentence of temporal punishment inflicted for heresy was the beginning of a series of those effective intercessions which the Church recommends all her judges to make in favour of unhappy persons sentenced to death or mutilation.²

¹ See Harduin’s Concilia, vii. 308.

² Long before this (in 385) St. Martin of Tours had entreated the tyrant Maximus not to shed the blood of the Priscillianists. Unfortunately, his efforts were not successful. See Sulpicius Severus, Chronica, 1. 2, n. 50 (Corpus Scriptorum eccl. latin., t. 1, p. 103).

In the thirteenth century Innocent III. prescribed confiscation of goods as the punishment for heresy, which was denounced as an infamous crime.³ Alexander IV. extended this confiscation to the goods of a deceased heretic.⁴ The penalties pre-scribed by Boniface VIII.¹ were confiscation and legal disability for public office. The Clementine legislation² forbade excessive severity on the part of Inquisitors, and directed that prisoners should be reasonably treated. The Extravagantes Communes provided against other abuses.³ Such has been the penal legislation of the Church in the matter of heresy, and it does not go beyond the penalties we have mentioned. In the next section we shall speak of the condemnations to death and the stake, and we shall define the part of the responsibility which may have been incurred by the Church in these capital executions.

³ Notably at the Fourth Council of the Lateran, from whence comes chap. xiii., De Hæreticis (v. 7).

⁴ Chap. viii., De Hæreticis in 6°.

¹ Chaps. xv. and xix., De Hæreticis in 6°.

² Chaps. i. and ii., De Hæreticis, Clem. V. 3.

³ L. 5, t. 3, c. 1 and 3.

The excommunication of the heretic furnishes a probable explanation of the Church’s slowness in inflicting temporal punishments. As a member cut off from the Church, he ceased to be subject to her, as he ceased to receive life from her. In early times—i.e., during the first three or four centuries— the Church, so to speak, forgot the baptism of those whom she had anathematized ; she did not concern herself with them any more than with pagans.⁴ Even in the time of Bellarmine and Suarez the objection was still made that heretics were outside the Church, and that, therefore, she had no right to punish them.⁵

⁴ See Hinschius, System des Katholischen Kirchenrechts, t. 4, p. 749. St. Augustine found it necessary to show the power of the Church over baptized persons. Ep. 185, n. 23 (M.P.L., t. 33, col. 803).

⁵ Bellarmine, Controv. I., Cont. 2., De Membris Ecclesiæ, l. 3 ; De Laicis, c. 22, Art. 15. Suarez, De Fide, d. 20, s. 3, n. 20.

These temporal punishments inflicted for an offence of a spiritual nature astonish us at the present day, though they appeared very natural at a time when the social power was actually divided, according to causes and persons, between the Church and the Sovereign. And what, in fact, is more logical ? The heretic committed against the Church, to which he belonged, an offence which might lead to disastrous consequences, and the Church applied to this serious offence the penalties then in her power.¹ No one denied her the right to inflict temporal penalties, and these often had the good effect of making the condemned person understand the gravity of the anathema with which he was threatened, and of leading the way to his conversion. This result was always kept in view in the penal legislation of the Church.

¹ As to the coercive power of the Church, see the digression to which a special chapter is devoted. We reserve the discussion of the criminal character of heresy to Part III.

IV. Apostolic Tolerance or Intolerance.

Summary : Nationalism of ancient religions.—Ancient and Modern syncretism.—Lethargy of many religions.— Catholic exclusiveness.—No salvation outside the Church.—Conquest by persuasion.—Respect for the liberty of adults and fathers of families.—Merits of ecclesiastical tolerance.

We have now to consider ecclesiastical tolerance or intolerance in preaching religion and making converts. This missionary propaganda, its energy and its methods, show the attitude which every religion and every Church adopts towards other religions and their adherents.

National gods were known in ancient times, conquering or conquered with the nations whose quarrels they espoused, and there was a time when the Israelites themselves gloried in the possession of Jehovah as a national God, more powerful than the deities to which rival nations paid homage. This conception represents gods as well as nations at war with one another.

3. As soon as we consider men as they really are we are confronted with the greatest possible variety from which necessarily arises a diversity of rights and duties. Some are in helpless infancy or tender youth; others are in the strength of manhood; others again are declining to their graves in decrepit old age. From this variety necessarily follows a diversity of rights and duties. Or should helpless children and decrepit old men and women possess the same rights and duties as men in the prime of life? Should the infirm have the same rights and duties as the healthy, women the same rights as men? We are aware that many socialists advocate such equality, particularly the absolute equality between man and woman. The marriage-union, according to them, is “a private contract without the intervention of a public functionary.” Woman may, according to their tenets, love whom she pleases and as long as she pleases. If she is not satisfied with one alliance, she may loose the knot and bless some one else with her love. Married or unmarried, she is to enjoy perfect equality with the sterner sex.¹

¹ Bebel, Die Frau, p. 192.

Bebel, however, may permit us to ask him: Must, then, men in turn with their wives rock the cradle, cook, knit, and darn, and attend to all womanly household duties? And, again, must women as well as men descend into the mines, perform the duties of coachmen, draymen, sailors, etc.? Must they gird on the sword, take up the knapsack and rifle, and march to the field of battle? In order to effect such equality we would have to go back to the most barbarous times, and even then this equality would be frustrated by the weakness of the female sex. For why did nature bestow on woman so totally different an organization—talents, inclinations, and characteristics so different from those of man? Is not this intellectual, moral, and physical diversity an evident indication that the Creator of both natures has set for them a totally different task in society ?

Bebel, it is true, thinks that the difference of endowments and inclinations in the two sexes is only the result of education—or rather of that “slavery” to which woman has been thus far subjected, and that with the change of education and social standing this difference would altogether disappear. This assertion is untrue. It is sufficiently refuted by the fact that this difference between man and woman confronts us everywhere, among all nations, even of the most diverse customs. It follows also of necessity from the physical organization of woman and from the duties and cares which are inseparably connected with motherhood.

We do not assert that socialism aims at the legal prohibition of marriage or at the compulsory dissolution of the family. Kautsky feigns great indignation at imputations of this sort made against social democracy. “It is a most palpable falsification,’ he says, “to impute to us any such intentions; only a fool can imagine that a family is created or abolished by a legislative enactment.”¹ It has become a real mania with socialist writers to wax wroth at objections which no one thinks of raising. All we maintain is that the dissolution of the family is the necessary consequence of socialist principles and demands. The proof for our assertion is not far to fetch.

¹ Das Erfurter Programm, etc., p. 146.

The destruction of the marriage bond involves the destruction of the family. Marriage is the root and foundation of the entire family. Socialism, however, by its theories of equality loosens the marriage tie, and introduces instead some amorous relation based on mere whims and passing inclinations. The truth of this statement is vouched for by the express testimony of prominent socialists. Already Marx has pointed out that modern industry, by assigning an important part in socially organized production to women, young persons, and children, and thereby removing them from the sphere of domestic life, is creating the economic basis for “a higher form of the family and of the relation of the sexes.” And he adds that it is rather silly to consider the Christian Germanic form of marriage or any other form as absolute and unchangeable.²

² Capital, vol. I. p. 455.

What are we to understand by the higher form of sexual relations? The Erfurt platform calls for the “abolition of all laws which subordinate woman to man in public and private life.” This demand implies at least the destruction of the unity of the family, which necessarily postulates one supreme head. Who is to decide the dispute, if man and wife disagree as to their dwelling-place and similar affairs? But to make us understand more fully what is meant by that higher form of marriage, it will suffice to hear the evidence of a leader, who may be said to represent the almost universal sentiment. Bebel writes of the position of woman in the socialist state as follows:

“In the choice of the object of her love she [woman] is no less free than man: she loves, and is loved, and enters into the marriage alliance with no other regard than that of preference. This alliance is a private agreement, without the intervention of any [public] functionary, just as marriage was a private concern till late in the Middle Ages.”¹ . . . Man should be free to dispose of the strongest instinct of his nature as of every other natural instinct. The gratification of the sexual instinct is not a whit less the personal affair of every individual than is the satisfaction of any other natural appetite. Therefore no one is obliged to render an account of such gratification; nor is any uncalledfor intermeddler permitted to interfere in this matter. Prudence, education, and independence will facilitate and direct the proper choice. If disagreement, disappointment, or disaffection should arise, morality [!] demands a disruption of the unnatural and, consequently, immoral alliance.”²

¹ This is a mistake. The Church never looked upon marriage as a purely private concern, beyond the limit of her jurisdiction. According to Catholic doctrine, marriage is a sacrament instituted by Christ and entrusted to the care of the Church. Therefore marriage laws and marriage impediments were promulgated. Moreover, every marriage not celebrated according to the ecclesiastical rite (in facie ecclesiæ) was declared illicit. If, nevertheless, up to the Council of Trent clandestine marriages were acknowledged as valid (that is to say, if there existed no other impediments), this was done to prevent greater evils. But also, then, the contracting parties were bound forever. What is there in common in this institution with the promiscuity of sexual intercourse advocated by Bebel, who permits the utmost freedom of tying or untying the marital bond without the least interference from any one?

² Die Frau, p. 342. Similar ideas are propounded by Engels in his Origin of the Family, by Stern and Liebknecht. Among American socialists these views on marriage have been popularized by Edward Carpenter's Love's Coming-of-Age. According to Carpenter, marriage relations are raised to a much higher plane by a continual change of partners “until a permanent mate and equal is found.” A man of ordinary common sense, however, will characterize such proceedings as rank promiscuity.

Here we have unvarnished “free-love.” What remains of the bond of marriage if the parties, following every whim and transient disaffection, are free to separate and to enter upon another alliance? However, we do not mean to confine ourselves to such explicit teaching of socialists. We shall endeavor to show that socialism of its very nature demolishes the family, which is the foundation of the social order.

In the first place the atheistic and materialistic tenets of socialism are incompatible with the unity and indissolubility of marriage. If man has no higher aim than to revel in earthly enjoyment, how can he be induced to bear the yoke of indissoluble monogamy? Is he to be tied for life to a partner whom he no longer loves, who is perhaps subject to loathsome diseases, who is guilty of adultery or other crimes? If even many defenders of the existing social order look upon divorce as excusable in many cases, how can socialists, with their striving after enjoyment, be brought to respect the sacredness of the marriage bond? An indissoluble marriage contract is incompatible with Epicurean principles.

The basis upon which the indissolubility of marriage, and consequently the stability of the family, chiefly rests is the education of the children. It is chiefly for this purpose that the lifelong union of man and wife is necessary; for such a lifelong union is generally required for the suitable education of their offspring. Therefore whoever wrests the education of their children from the hands of parents, and makes it a function of the state, thereby undermines the lowest foundation of the family. But socialism puts education and instruction altogether into the hands of the commonwealth. The Gotha platform demands: “Universal and equal education of the people by the state.’ This demand is re-stated somewhat obscurely by the Erfurt platform: “Compulsory attendance at the public schools. Instruction, use of all means of instruction, and board free of charge in all public elementary schools and in the higher institutions of learning for such pupils of both sexes as, on account of their talents, are judged fit for higher studies,” whilst the American Socialist Party platform advocates “education of all children up to the age of eighteen years, and state and municipal aid for books, clothing, and food.”

On this point we may yet insert the words of one of the great apostles of socialism.

“Every child that comes into the world, whether male or female, is a welcome addition to society; for society beholds in every child the continuation of itself and its own further development; it, therefore, perceives from the very outset the duty, according to its power, to provide for the new-born child. And, first of all, the mother who gives birth to and nurses the child is the object of the state’s concern. Comfortable lodging, pleasant surroundings, and accommodations of all kinds suited to this stage of motherhood, careful treatment of herself and of her offspring, are the first requisite. It is self-evident that the mother must be left to nurse the child, as long as this is possible and necessary... .

“When the child waxes stronger his equals await him for common amusement, under public direction. Here again all things are supplied which, according to the perfection of human knowledge and wisdom, for the time being, tend toward the development of soul and body. Then comes the kindergarten with its playrooms; and, at a later period, the child is playfully introduced into the elements of knowledge and human activity. Mental and bodily labor, gymnastic exercises, free movement on the playground and in the gymnasium, on the ice field and in the natatorium; marching, fencing, and other exercises for both sexes, shall succeed and relieve and supplement one another in due order. The introduction to the various kinds of useful labor—to manufacture, gardening, farming, and to the entire mechanism of production—follows in due succession. But the intellectual development, in the meantime, on the various fields of science, is not to be neglected. Corresponding to the high grade of social culture shall be the outfit of the lecture-halls, the educational appliances, and the means of instruction. All means of education and instruction, clothing and food, supplied by the community, will be such as to give no pupil an advantage over another. The number and the ability of the teaching body will be in proportion to the demands.

“Such will be the education of both sexes—equal and common —for the separation of the sexes can be justified only in those cases in which the distinction of sex makes it an imperative duty. And this system of education, strictly organized, under efficient control, continued to that stage of life when society shall declare its youth to be of age, will eminently qualify both sexes for all rights and duties which society grants or imposes on its fullgrown members. Thus society can rest satisfied that it has educated members that are perfectly developed in every direction.”¹

¹ Die Frau, pp. 322-324, 328.

This is one of the midsummer night’s dreams in which Bebel’s “Frau” delights to revel. How grossly immoral such dreams are needs hardly to be stated. The usurpation of education by the state, however, is quite logical according to the principles of socialism. If socialism is to effect absolute equality in the conditions of life, it must first of all remove the universal source of social inequality, i.e., unequal education; and this can be done only by making education a social concern. Such a regulation would, of course, not hinder mothers from suckling their own children and nursing them to a certain age. But mothers and children would be placed under the supervision of the body social; for there would be no servants in those days: physicians, surgeons, midwives, etc., would be in the service of the body politic; those able to work would have to contribute their share to the social production, while the care of those unable to work would devolve upon the community. The care and treatment of mothers in confinement and of their children would, of course, be the concern of the state. For if the care of the children were left to the parents, it might happen that childless husbands and wives who have never been prevented from work would attain to a much higher income than others who would have to provide for the support of a numerous family, and would thus be prevented from taking an active part in production. And if the father or mother should fall sick it might easily happen that an entire family would be exposed to starvation, while another would enjoy all comforts. And how could a mother, without the aid of servants, bring up and educate a large family, say of ten or twelve children? If, therefore, education were left to the parents themselves it would be the duty of the community at least to give an additional allowance from the public produce for their support, and to make provision for them in case of sickness. In brief, parents would have to be relieved by the state of the burden of supporting their children.

Therefore both the nourishment and the education of the children in the socialist state would be a public affair, and would be directed and controlled by the entire body social. Thus the chief duty of parents, for the sake of which marriage has been instituted as an indissoluble union, would cease to exist; for a life-long union and co-operation on the part of parents is not required for the mere propagation of children. And even though in the socialist state the indissolubility of marriage might be sanctioned by law, yet the integrity of the family would receive the death-blow. That which binds husband and wife most closely is not only the actual existence of offspring, but, above all, the consciousness that upon their united efforts and care depends the weal or woe of their children. Parents have to provide for the support and the development of their children; upon their care, in the first place, depend the life, the future position, the social standing, the honor, and the eternal welfare of their children. This consciousness urges them on to untiring activity. What they have been able to accumulate by their toil falls to the advantage of their offspring, in whom they, as it were, continue to live, and who naturally inherit the fruits of their cares and toils.

On the other hand, the consciousness that they owe to their parents, not only their life itself, but also their preservation, education, and position in society—in short, all they possess—binds the children in intimate love to their parents. They know that their own fortune is closely linked together with that of their parents. Hence there exists between them mutual sympathy in joys and sorrows. In socialism all this would cease to exist; for the entire social body would form but one family. What would become of parental authority if children knew that the state provided for their sustenance, or, at least, remunerated parents for the care bestowed upon them? Would not such a system greatly promote rash marriages and facilitate divorces, particularly as in the socialist state marriage would be a purely private concern?

Let us now cast a brief glance at education and instruction in the socialist state. As we have already stated, Bebel promises the most marvellous results in the field of education. But now let us imagine children collected in large numbers, separated from their parents, first in the spacious playrooms of the kindergarten, then in the elementary schools, where they are “playfully” introduced into the elements of knowledge. Will this mass of wholesale education lead to satisfactory results? We might consider this possible if there were question only of a military education for the formation of future soldiers. But the universal application of such a system is simply absurd. Nor can the socialist point to the example of present educational institutions in which children receive not only instruction, but also their board and education, as in the family. For, to say nothing of the fact that the children are generally not confided to such institutions before the age of ten or twelve years, and that the pupils of such institutions form but a small fraction of the entire youth, while socialism would have all children without exception confided to public institutions for care and instruction— the chief difference consists in this, that our present boarding educational institutions presuppose and are based upon the existence of the family and of home training. The teachers of such institutions are the representatives of parents, and are supported by the parents’ authority; and if a pupil of such an institution is incorrigible, he will, to his own disgrace and the shame of his parents, be expelled from the institution. But this would not be the case in the socialist state. Besides, we must bear in mind that the socialist youth would be brought up without religion; that there would be no separation of the sexes. What then, would be the result? Nothing would remain but forcibly to lash the socialist youth into discipline and order. And yet how ineffectual is mere physical force in education!

However, we have not done with the difficulties arising from the socialistic principles of education. It is impossible that all children should be instructed and educated in all branches of knowledge and industry. Bebel repeatedly asserts the contrary; yet it remains simply impossible. Let us suppose that up to a certain grade the instruction and education is the same for all. Beyond this grade, however, a division would have to take place. Not all have talents for arts and sciences, and still fewer there are who have abilities to take up all studies. Not all have sufficient skill for the practice of all trades and industries. If, therefore, the socialists would not be satisfied with a very low and insufficient grade of culture, if they would not make shallowness and superficiality universal attributes of education, they must at a certain stage, say at the age of twelve or thirteen, draw a line, and then allow their pupils to devote themselves to some special branches of knowledge or industry. But who is to determine the studies to be pursued? The simplest system would be to submit the pupils to examinations; for a decision by the children themselves, or by their parents, or by the verdict of a committee, or by the vote of the majority, would be impracticable. The parents manifestly would in most cases present their children for the highest grade of education, as they themselves would not have to bear the expenses and trouble. The children, on the other hand, even the most gifted, if left to themselves, would in most cases be satisfied with little learning. If the decision were left to a committee it would lead to unjust treatment, and consequently to endless complaints on the part of those parents whose children would be slighted.

The promotion to higher studies, therefore, would have to be made dependent on the results of examinations. But even this method would be attended with serious difficulties. For either we suppose that higher grades of education would be connected with certain advantages in regard to income and social standing, or we suppose that they would not. If a higher grade of education has no advantage for future life, very few would be found to aspire to it. If, on the other hand, it should have some influence upon the future social standing of the possessor, it would result in a difference of social position, and thus there would be an end to the socialistic equality of the conditions of life. Moreover, if social position is not made altogether dependent upon the labor performed according to the logical programme of socialism, but upon other conditions, why should talent alone be taken into account? Do not also virtue, diligence, and the descent from parents who have merited well of the commonwealth, deserve consideration? Is it not harsh, nay, unjust, to make the entire future of a man’s life depend upon a school examination to be undergone in his youth?

As the promotion to higher studies, so also the decision what trade or industry each one should embrace would have to depend upon examinations; for as in branches of knowledge, so also in trades and industry an equal education of all is a thing of impossibility. If too many candidates would pass the examination for a certain branch of industry, they would have to be applied by superior authority to different industries. Therefore from the very outset the body social would have to decide the course of education and the future vocation of all and each of its members, lest there should be too great a rush to any profession, or to any particular trade or industry. Socialism and freedom, therefore, are incompatible with each other. The irreconcilable contradiction between freedom and the “universal systematic control” of the national labor is the rock upon which socialism is destined to be shipwrecked.

To Our Venerable Brethren, All Patriarchs, Primates, Archbishops, and Bishops of the Catholic World, in Peace and Communion With the Apostolic See.

Venerable Brethren, Health and Apostolic Benediction.

IT is not surprising that the spirit of revolutionary change, which has so long been predominant in the nations of the world, should have passed beyond politics, and made its influence felt in the cognate field of practical economy. The elements of a conflict are unmistakable: the growth of industry, and the surprising discoveries of science; the changed relations of masters and workmen; the enormous fortunes of individuals, and the poverty of the masses; the increased self-reliance and the closer mutual combination of the working population ; and, finally, a general moral deterioration. The momentous seriousness of the present state of things just now fills every mind with painful apprehension ; wise men discuss it; practical men propose schemes ; popular meetings, legislatures, and sovereign princes,—all are occupied with it, and there is nothing which has a deeper hold on public attention.

Therefore, Venerable Brethren, as on former occasions, when it seemed opportune to refute false teaching, We have addressed you in the interest of the Church and of the common weal, and have issued Letters on Political Power, on Human Liberty, on the Christian Constitution of the State, and on similar subjects, so now We have thought it useful to speak on the CONDITION OF LABOR. It is a matter on which We have touched once or twice already. But in this Letter the responsibility of the Apostolic office urges Us to treat the question expressly and at length, in order that there may be no mistake as to the principles which truth and justice dictate for its settlement. The discussion is not easy, nor is it free from danger. It is not easy to define the relative rights and the mutual duties of the wealthy and of the poor, of capital and of labor. And the danger lies in this, that crafty agitators constantly make use of these disputes to pervert men’s judgments and to stir up the people to sedition.

But all agree, and there can be no question whatever, that some remedy must be found, and quickly found, for the misery and wretchedness which press so heavily at this moment on the large majority of the very poor. The ancient workmen’s Guilds were destroyed in the last century, and no other organization took their place. Public institutions and the laws have repudiated the ancient religion. Hence by degrees it has come to pass that Working Men have been given over, isolated and defenceless, to the callousness of employers and the greed of unrestrained competition. The evil has been increased by rapacious Usury, which, although more than once condemned by the Church, is, nevertheless, under a different form, but with the same guilt, still practised by avaricious and grasping men. And to this must be added the custom of working by contract, and the concentration of so many branches of trade in the hands of a few individuals, so that a small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the masses of the poor a yoke little better than slavery itself.

To remedy these evils the Socialists, working on the poor man’s envy of the rich, endeavor to destroy private property, and maintain that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by municipal bodies. They hold that, by thus transferring property from private persons to the community, the present evil state of things will be set to rights, because each citizen will then have his equal share of whatever there is to enjoy. But their proposals are so clearly futile for all practical purposes, that if they were carried out the working man himself would be among the first to suffer. Moreover they are emphatically unjust, because they would rob the lawful possessor, bring the State into a sphere that is not its own, and cause complete confusion in the community.

It is surely undeniable that, when a man engages in remunerative labor, the very reason and motive of his work is to obtain property, and to hold it as his own private possession. If one man hires out to another his strength or his industry, he does this for the purpose of receiving in return what is necessary for food and living; he thereby expressly proposes to acquire a full and real right, not only to the remuneration, but also to the disposal of that remuneration as he pleases. Thus, if he lives sparingly, saves money, and invests his savings, for greater security, in land, the land in such a case is only his wages in another form; and, consequently, a working man’s little estate thus purchased should be as completely at his own disposal as the wages he receives for his labor. But it is precisely in this power of disposal that ownership consists, whether the property be land or movable goods. The Socialists, therefore, in endeavoring to transfer the possessions of individuals to the community, strike at the interests of every wage-earner, for they deprive him of the liberty of disposing of his wages, and thus of all hope and possibility of increasing his stock and of bettering his condition in life.

What is of still greater importance, however, is that the remedy they propose is manifestly against justice. For every man has by nature the right to possess property as his own. This is one of the chief points of distinction between man and the animal creation. For the brute has no power of selfdirection, but is governed by two chief instincts, which keep his powers alert, move him to use his strength, and determine him to action without the power of choice. These instincts are self-preservation and the propagation of the species. Both can attain their purpose by means of things which are close at hand ; beyond their surroundings the brute creation cannot go, for they are moved to action by sensibility alone, and by the things which sense perceives. But with man it is different indeed. He possesses, on the one hand, the full perfection of animal nature, and therefore he enjoys, at least as much as the rest of the animal race, the fruition of the things of the body. But animality, however perfect, is far from being the whole of humanity, and is, indeed, humanity’s humble handmaid, made to serve and obey. It is the mind, or the reason, which is the chief thing in us who are human beings ; it is this which makes a human being human, and distinguishes him essentially and completely from the brute. And on this account—viz., that man alone among animals possesses reason—it must be within his right to have things not merely for temporary and momentary use, as other living beings have them, but in stable and permanent possession; he must have not only things which perish in the using, but also those which, though used, remain for use in the future.

This becomes still more clearly evident if we consider man’s nature a little more deeply. For man, comprehending by the power of his reason things innumerable, and joining the future with the present—being, moreover, the master of his own acts—governs himself by the foresight of his counsel, under the eternal law and the power of God whose Providence governs all things. Wherefore it is in his power to exercise his choice, not only on things which regard his present welfare, but also on those which will be for his advantage in time to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, but also the earth itself; for of the products of the earth he can make provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied to-day, they demand new supplies to-morrow. Nature, therefore, owes to man a storehouse that shall never fail, the daily supply of his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth.

Nor must we, at this stage, have recourse to the State. Man is older than the State ; and he holds the right of providing for the life of his body prior to the formation of any State. And to say that God has given the earth to the use and enjoyment of the universal human race is not to deny that there can be private property. For God has granted the earth to mankind in general; not in the sense that all without distinction can deal with it as they please, but rather that no part of it has been assigned to any one in particular, and that the limits of private possession have been left to be fixed by man’s own industry and the laws of individual peoples. Moreover, the earth, though divided among private owners, ceases not thereby to minister to the needs of all; for there is no one who does not live on what the land brings forth. Those who do not possess the soil, contribute their labor ; so that it may be truly said that all human subsistence is derived either from labor on one’s own land, or from some laborious industry which is paid for either in the produce of the land itself or in that which is exchanged for what the land brings forth.

Here, again, we have another proof that private ownership is according to nature's law. For that which is required for the preservation of life, and for life’s well-being, is produced in great abundance by the earth, but not until man has brought it into cultivation and lavished upon it his care and skill. Now, when man thus spends the industry of his mind and the strength of his body in procuring the fruits of nature, by that act he makes his own that portion of nature's field which he cultivates—that portion on which he leaves, as it were, the impress of his own personality ; and it cannot but be just that he should possess that portion as his own, and should have a right to keep it without molestation.

These arguments are so strong and convincing that it seems surprising that certain obsolete opinions should now be revived in opposition to what is here laid down. We are told that it is right for private persons to have the use the soil and the fruits of their land, but that it is unjust for any one to possess as owner either the land on which he has built or the estate which he has cultivated. But those who assert this do not perceive that they are robbing man of what his own labor has produced. For the soil which is tilled and cultivated with toil and skill utterly changes its condition; it was wild before, it is now fruitful, it was barren, and now it brings forth in abundance. That which has thus altered and improved it becomes so truly part of itself as to be in great measure indistinguishable and inseparable from it. Is it just that the fruit of a man’s sweat and labor should be enjoyed by another? As effects follow their cause, so it is just and right that the results of labor should belong to him who has labored.

With reason, therefore, the common opinion of mankind, little affected by the few dissentients who have maintained the opposite view, has found in the study of nature, and in the law of Nature herself, the foundations of the division of property, and has consecrated by the practice of all ages the principle of private ownership, as being preëminently in conformity with human nature, and as conducing, in the most unmistakable manner, to the peace and tranquillity of human life. The same principle is confirmed and enforced by the civil laws,—laws which, as long as they are just, derive their binding force from the law of nature. The authority of the Divine Law adds its sanction, forbidding us, in the gravest terms, even to covet that which is another’s: Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife ; nor his house, nor his field, nor his man-servant, nor his maid-servant, nor his ox, nor his ass, nor anything which is his.^*

^* Deuteronomy v. 21.

The rights here spoken of, belonging to each individual man, are seen in a much stronger light if they are considered in relation to man’s social and domestic obligations.

In choosing a state of life, it is indisputable that all are at full liberty either to follow the counsel of Jesus Christ as to virginity, or to enter into the bonds of marriage. No human law can abolish the natural and primitive right of marriage, or in any way limit the chief and principal purpose of marriage, ordained by God's authority from the beginning. Increase and multiply.^† Thus we have the Family; the “society” of a man’s own household; a society limited, indeed, in numbers, but a true “ society,” anterior to every kind of State or nation, with rights and duties of its own, totally independent of the commonwealth.

^† Genesis i. 28.