CHAPTER I: On Piety, Observance, and Obedience

St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 101-105; St. Alphonsus, III, 333 seq.; ed. G., I, p. 600; H. Ap., tr. VII; Catech. Rom., de 4 Praec.; Aertnys, I, n. 147; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 922-952; Noldin, II, n. 278; Gury-Ferreres, I, n. 363; Genicot-Salsmans, I, n. 345; and others, as Gopfert, Schindler, in the respective places; Vermeersch, Quaest. de Virt. Relig. et Piet., q. 2, c. 1, n. 178.

687. I. Piety, in the BROAD sense, is taken for an affection of devotion, or even for mercy and kindness, especially toward those needing help.

But in the STRICT sense, piety is defined: The virtue by which due worship is rendered to parents, country, and those joined by blood. - To PARENTS are reduced blood relatives, especially ascendants, grandfather, great-grandfather, etc.; likewise spiritual parents, namely those who, after God, are the authors of spiritual life for us. But to COUNTRY are referred fellow citizens and friends of the country, because of their conjunction with it.

Brothers or sisters are not directly referred to parents, because they are not the principle of being. Nevertheless the virtue of piety redounds to them, because blood is common to the whole family. Besides, brothers are often the principle of education. Whence Lugo concludes (de Poen., disp. 16, n. 299 and 307): Sins against remote blood relatives are not sins against piety; but such are sins against brothers or sisters, at least if a most grave evil is brought upon them.

II. The MATERIAL object of piety is WORSHIP, as it is defined n. 531. Piety recognizes in another the excellence of principle, and subjects itself from love, full of reverence and manifested by obedience. Its FORMAL object is the special honesty which shines forth in such worship, from this namely, that parents and country are, after God, the principle of our being and of our education, and therefore are, after God, especially to be worshiped (Billuart, de cet. Virt. Just. annexis, Diss. 1, a. 1).

688. • From what has been said you will gather: 1. PIETY is a special virtue, different both from charity toward neighbor, which wishes well and does good to men insofar as they are ordered to God; and from legal justice, which indeed regards the good of the country, but insofar as it is the common good to be procured through the observance of laws; and therefore must also be exercised by those who have departed from the country.

2. The debt of piety, especially toward parents, is so great that it can never be satisfied to equality: understand, in the same order of things and through ordinary services; for, through supernatural services, or even extraordinary ones, the benefit received from parents and country can well be compensated, indeed surpassed, as if a son should convert his parents to the true faith, or expose his life for their liberation. Nevertheless, extraordinary services of this kind by no means free the son from the natural obligation by which he is bound to parents, because the son always perseveres in being a son (Lessius, de Just. et Jure, l. 2, c. 46, n. 4).

3. As religion is eminently piety, so piety is eminently observance; and therefore, by a stronger title, it prescribes the same duties as observance, and especially obedience (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 101, a. 1, ad 1).

689. • I. OBSERVANCE is defined: the virtue by which worship is exhibited to persons constituted in dignity or excellence.

II. Observance is twofold: 1. civil, which offers worship to persons increased with civil dignity, for example kings, magistrates, masters, teachers; - 2. religious, which offers worship to those adorned with supernatural excellence.

This is subdivided into simple and sacred, according as it regards either wayfarers, as the Pope, Bishops, priests, etc., or comprehensors, as the Blessed who triumph in the heavens (cf. n. 531).

III. The MATERIAL object of observance is worship. Here it bespeaks excellence of personal dignity in another and proportionate submission on our part. But the FORMAL object of observance is the special aspect of honesty, from the fact that those who are constituted in this dignity have divine authority, and are, or can be, after God, the principle of our governance.

There are two offices or parts of observance: 1. To exhibit due honor to Superiors, by reason of the more sublime grade in which they are placed. By strict debt, honor is owed only to Superiors; but by moral debt, from a certain honesty, it is owed to all those who are constituted in dignity, even if we are not subject to their authority (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 102, a. 2, ad 2). - 2. To furnish obedience, that is, to submit oneself to the command of Superiors, and faithfully to grant to them the service which is owed to them by reason of the office of governance.

Concerning obedience, since it obtains the principal parts in the ordering of inferiors to Superiors, more things must be added.

690. Definition. Obedience is a virtue inclining one to comply with the will of a Superior, that is, of him who participates in the supreme dominion of the divine Governor over a rational creature.

Division. 1. By reason of the order of superiority, there is given civil, ecclesiastical, domestic, or finally monastic obedience. - 2. By reason of the nature of superiority, there is given material or general obedience, and formal or special obedience.

a) Material or general obedience inclines one to observe whatever precept, from whatever honest motive; and thus it is a complex of all the virtues.

For every virtue inclines one to observe a precept in its own matter; and since these can be posited from the special motive of obedience, hence every honest act is called material obedience. Conversely, any violation whatever of law or virtue is disobedience broadly, taken generally. Therefore general disobedience is not a special sin.

b) Formal obedience, if taken strictly, as here, is a virtue inclining one to observe precepts because they are precepts, on account of the special honesty which subjection toward God commanding brings and includes.

But if it is taken a little more broadly, it is a virtue inclining one to comply with the will of a Superior, whether that will is preceptive or of mere good pleasure, because this is honest: for since the will of a superior is a certain rule of the subject, obedience will be the more perfect, according to St. Thomas (2.2, q. 104, a. 2), if it anticipates the precept, after the example of Christ, for whom the will and complacency of the Father was the highest precept, as Albertus Magnus says, c. 3, de Virtutibus.

From these things conclude: 1. Whatever may be the source of authority, obedience or disobedience on the part of subjects will be of the same species (St. Thom., l. c., ad 4).

For it always tends toward divine authority, whether as existing in God, or as participated by man.

2. Disobedience, taken strictly, will formally be present as a special sin only when a true precept issued by a Superior is transgressed, as Lessius says (l. c., n. 22). In this case a special sin against the fourth precept would be committed. Thus clearly Genicot, I, n. 348, 4. Cf. what was said n. 325.

3. If contempt of the Superior, as Superior, accedes, there will always be present a mortal sin, whatever disobedience you have committed. Cf. n. 179.

691. Principles. I. Formal obedience is a special virtue, among the moral virtues most excellent after religion. 1. It is a special virtue, because it has a special aspect of honesty, namely to fulfill the precept of the Superior, tacit or express, precisely because it is the precept of the Superior, that is, of one holding the place of God governing. - 2. Among the moral virtues, for its object is not God, but the thing willed by the Superior. - 3. Most excellent, because it contemns the greatest good, namely one's own will (Lessius, l. c., n. 36). Whence St. Gregory (Moral., l. 35, c. 42, n. 28): "Obedience is rightly preferred to victims: because through victims another's flesh is slain, but through obedience one's own will is slain." Cf. St. Thom., l. c., a. 2 and 3.

It must be noted with Reuter (Theol. mor., P. II, n. 230): "That the precept of obedience may be satisfied, it is not necessary to operate from its special motive, but it is enough that the commanded work be posited, even from the motive of another virtue." See what was said n. 212.

692. II. A subject is held to obey a Superior in all things in which he is subject to him, and in which a Superior of higher grade does not stand opposed. This is established from the necessity of preserving order, and from Sacred Scripture (Hebr., 22): Obey your prelates, etc.; and (Acts Ap., 5, 29): It is necessary to obey God rather than men. God alone must be obeyed in all things simply; but man determinately according to the nature of superiority.

693. Note. a) If there is doubt concerning the legitimacy of the Superior, or concerning the imposition of the precept, the subject is not held of himself to obey, as was said n. 55. b) But if there is doubt whether the thing commanded is licit, whether it exceeds the power of the Superior, the obligation of obedience possesses (cf. n. 52 and 223). See St. Alph., I, 100, Quaer. 3; IV, 47.