The Probable Conscience and Probabilism

233. Probabilism teaches: where there is question of the honesty alone of an action, it is lawful to follow an opinion truly and certainly probable, even if the opposite opinion for the law is more probable. This principle the more recent authors now commonly hold, such as Gury, Ballerini, Lehmkuhl, Sabetti, Bucceroni, Bouquillon, Delama, Rappenhoner, Gopfert, Van der Velden, Raphael a St. Joseph, Waffelaert, Haine, Genicot, Schindler, and others.

Where there is question of the licit or illicit alone. By these words the ambit of probabilism is determined.

1. There are actions or omissions in which there is question of their honesty or liceity alone, and there are actions or omissions in which there is question not only of their liceity, but besides this of an end or effect necessarily to be obtained through them, or of an evil necessarily to be avoided. Therefore doubts concerning actions to be placed or omitted are of two kinds: some regard actions in which there is question of the liceity of the action alone; others regard actions in which there is also question of an effect necessarily to be obtained through them, or of an evil necessarily to be avoided.

If it is doubtful whether that food is meat, and therefore whether on a prohibited day it is lawful to eat it, there is question of the liceity alone of this action. If it is doubtful whether this matter is water, and therefore whether it is lawful to baptize in it, there is question not only of the liceity of this action, but at the same time it is asked whether it can produce the effect which must necessarily be obtained through baptism, and whether through it the evil which must necessarily be avoided is guarded against, namely damage to the soul which arises from the frustration of the sacrament. If you do not know whether that which lies hidden in a thicket is a man or a beast, and therefore whether it is lawful to fire at it, there is question not of the liceity alone of this action, but at the same time it is asked whether through it the evil necessarily to be avoided, namely the killing of a man, is guarded against. In doubts of the latter kind, it is not so much asked whether the action is licit, but rather whether the action is a suitable means of obtaining a necessary effect, whether by its placing the evil necessarily to be avoided is sufficiently guarded against.

2. The principle of probabilism can be employed in doubts concerning actions of the first kind, but not in doubts concerning actions of the latter kind: for in the former the law or obligation is doubtful; but in the latter the law or obligation is not doubtful, but altogether certain, and therefore the action or omission is certainly illicit or certainly prescribed. Therefore only in those doubts in which there is question of the honesty of the action is it lawful to follow a probable opinion, because in these alone the law and obligation are doubtful. Since in other doubts the obligation is certain, they wander outside the ambit of probabilism, which by its own nature is concerned with doubtful laws. Therefore in all doubts in which there is question of an end necessarily to be obtained, the safer part is to be chosen, so that the necessary end may certainly be obtained.

Thus in the examples given, certainly it is not lawful to baptize so long as it is doubtful whether the matter is water, because baptism must be certainly valid; and certainly it is not lawful to fire so long as it is doubtful whether the shot falls upon a man, because it is not lawful to introduce the danger of killing. And certainly: he who is bound to the end is also bound to employ means through which the end is certainly obtained, and he who must absolutely guard against an evil must also guard against the action by which the danger of the evil is introduced.

234. When the safer part is to be chosen. In a twofold case one must act according to the principle: in doubt the safer part is to be chosen: a. in practical doubt, if someone cannot form for himself a certain conscience concerning an action to be placed here and now (n. 222, 3); b. in all those cases in which the law, beyond the honesty of the action, enjoins the obligation of obtaining some effect or avoiding some evil. But the cases in which there is question of an end absolutely to be obtained or of an evil necessarily to be avoided can be reduced to three heads:

a. Where there is question of a means necessary for salvation: for by the precept of charity eternal salvation must necessarily be obtained, eternal damnation necessarily avoided; therefore where there is question of a condition upon which eternal salvation depends, that condition must be employed in such a way that eternal salvation is not brought into danger.

b. Where there is question of the value of a sacrament: for from the virtue of religion and charity, and indeed also of justice, the minister must administer the sacraments validly, lest injury be inflicted on God or damage on man; therefore where there is question of a thing upon which the value of a sacrament depends, a certain means must be chosen, unless necessity is present, or unless the Church supplies the defect; concerning this twofold exception it will be said in the treatise on the sacraments.

c. Where there is question of the certain right of another: for from justice the right of one's neighbor must be preserved unharmed; therefore any action by which the certain right of one's neighbor is brought into danger must be omitted. Wherefore a physician is bound to employ safer and more certain means, so long as they can be had, both so that the effect necessarily to be obtained may be obtained and so that the evil necessarily to be avoided may be guarded against. The same must be said in similar cases, as concerning a hunter, to whom it is not lawful to fire where he judges only probably that a beast and not a man will be killed.

There are some who less aptly call these cases, in which the safer part must be chosen, exceptions from the principle of probabilism: for the principle does not suffer exceptions; and in reality they are not exceptions, since they do not pertain to the proper matter of probabilism, but are placed altogether outside its ambit. Certainly the principle of probabilism is referred to those cases in which a doubtful law occurs; but where there is question of an end necessarily to be obtained, the doubt is concerned with the efficacy of the means for obtaining the end, and in no way with obligation.

235. Declaration of the principle. 1. In order that someone may follow a probable opinion with a safe conscience, it is required: a. that it be truly and solidly probable, and indeed for the very one who follows it: for otherwise the law is not truly doubtful and uncertain for him; b. that the opinion be certainly probable: for doubtful probability is not true probability; besides, an opinion which is not certainly probable cannot serve for forming a practically certain conscience concerning the honesty of the action.

Therefore by the fact that the opinion must be truly probable, the use of an opinion tenuously probable is excluded; by the fact that it must be certainly probable, the use of an opinion doubtfully probable is excluded.

2. In order that some opinion can be called truly and solidly probable, these three things are required: a. that it rest upon a truly grave motive of reason or authority; b. that neither a definition of the Church nor certain reason is opposed to it; c. that it be relatively probable, i.e. that its motives, compared with the motives of the opposite sentence, retain their probability; but it is not required that the degree of probability of one be compared with the degree of probability of the other.

Whether an opinion probably probable must be held as truly and solidly probable depends upon the sense which is subjected to the term probably probable: for if an opinion is called probably probable which is affirmed on account of a reason truly grave and prudent, it is certainly truly and solidly probable; but if that opinion is called probably probable which is affirmed on account of a reason which is not certainly, but only doubtfully and probably, truly grave and prudent, it cannot be called truly (certainly) and solidly probable.¹

3. Even if the opposite is truly more probable: for the more probable opinion for the law can be neglected so long as it itself is within the bounds of true probability and is not morally certain.

a. I have thought one must abstain from the affirmation "even if the opposite is certainly more probable," because some authors equate an opinion certainly more probable with an opinion notably more probable, whose opposite is not truly and certainly probable, although the term certainly more probable by its force in no way signifies an opinion notably more probable. Wherefore to an opinion certainly more probable for the law, of itself there can be opposed an opinion truly and certainly probable for liberty. Indeed, from the rules of logic, of itself nothing prevents even an opinion much or notably more probable from being opposed on the other side by an opinion truly and certainly probable; nevertheless in moral matters it can scarcely happen that an opinion is known as truly and certainly probable whose opposite is certainly demonstrated to be much or notably more probable.

b. Against this affirmation the probabiliorists object: the greater probability of one opinion eliminates or destroys the lesser probability of the opposite; therefore the less probable in the concurrence of the more probable is not probable. - Greater probability eliminates the lesser can signify two things: either the greater force of arguments on one side by that very fact brings it about that the force of the arguments of the other part becomes lesser; or the greater force of arguments on one side altogether destroys the probability of the other part. Now if the probability of each opinion is taken from the same principle, the increase of one by that very fact depresses the probability of the other; but if the probability is taken from diverse principles, the greater probability of one does not by that very fact diminish the lesser of the other, but the latter retains its force, even if the opposite is greater, because it deduces its arguments from other principles, "just as," says St. Alphonsus, "a weight of ten pounds by no means brings it about that a weight of eight pounds placed in the other pan ceases to be, and to be truly called, heavy."² But indeed in either case, whether probability is taken from the same or from diverse principles, the greater probability destroys the opposite if its excess is so notable that it approaches closely to moral certitude: for then the opposite becomes doubtfully or tenuously probable.

¹ Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri I. n. 190.

² Scholastic-moral dissertation for the moderate use of probable opinion in concurrence with the more probable, from the year 1755. n. 13.

236. On external probability. There is no doubt that external probability can constitute an opinion truly and certainly probable: for if several authors, and those grave, say that an opinion is probable, ordinarily it cannot happen that it is not supported by probable internal reasons. Therefore of itself it is lawful to follow external probability which truly militates for some opinion, even if its internal motives are not known.

a. Not only a sentence which is called probable by most theologians, but also a sentence which five or six theologians distinguished for probity, science, and prudence hold as true or probable must be judged truly and certainly probable, unless their authority is weakened either by a declaration of the Church or by manifest reason.

b. One author ordinarily does not suffice to constitute a sentence truly probable against the authority of others; therefore proposition 27 was condemned by Alexander VII.¹ Nevertheless it cannot be denied that it can happen that even one author renders an opinion truly probable: namely, if an author grave and of great name treats some question seriously and diligently ex professo, confirms his sentence by grave reasons which others have not brought forward, and sufficiently solves the contrary reasons of others, his authority suffices for procuring true probability for the sentence. Today this can be affirmed with the more confidence because the holy see expressly declared that a confessor who follows the doctrine of St. Alphonsus only on account of his authority is not to be disturbed, even if he has not weighed his reasons.

c. Since external probability is essentially founded upon internal probability, it is not lawful to appeal to external probability when the sentence is known to be false and therefore destitute of probable reason, even if authors of great name hold that sentence. External probability with precision from internal probability can be invoked only when there is question of an obscure matter entangled with difficulties which has not yet been sufficiently explained by authors.

d. Concerning internal probability, only learned men and those very versed in moral matters can judge; to these that is probable which, after all things have been diligently considered, appears to rest upon grave reasons. Concerning external probability, learned and unlearned can judge. To the latter that is probable, indeed practically certain, which is said to them by a learned and upright man (parish priest, confessor), if there is no serious reason for doubting his authority. But if there is reason for doubting, they are bound to inquire further. From these things it now follows: a. if a theologian furnished with sufficient doctrine diligently and without disordered affection considers a sentence and finds it resting upon a grave reason, he can follow it as probable for himself; b. an uneducated man can stand by the sentence of a confessor or parish priest whom he knows to be upright and prudent; c. a confessor or parish priest in practical questions can follow the authority of approved theologians, indeed even of one truly grave and approved doctor, especially St. Alphonsus.

¹ "If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion ought to be judged probable, provided it is not established that it has been rejected by the apostolic see as improbable." This proposition is false, because it affirms that for the probability of an opinion it suffices that it be called probable by a modern author and has not been rejected by the Church.

237. The principle is demonstrated. 1. From reason:

a. A doubtful law does not oblige; but a law against which true and solid probability is had is truly doubtful; therefore a law against which true probability is had does not oblige.

To the major. Only a known law can induce obligation: for law cannot oblige the will immediately and of itself, but in order that the will remain obligated, the law must be exhibited and applied to it through knowledge; therefore only a known law can oblige the will, which St. Thomas teaches in these words: no one is bound by some precept except through knowledge of that precept;¹ but so long as the intellect doubts concerning the existence of the law, it does not know the law: for only certain knowledge is true knowledge; he who doubts concerning some truth knows the doubt concerning it and the obligation of inquiring into its existence, but he does not know the truth itself; therefore a doubtful law cannot oblige the will.

To the minor. Certitude and an opposed probability concerning the same truth mutually exclude one another; therefore so long as the opinion for liberty is probable, the opinion for the law cannot be certain. But it makes no difference whether this opinion is less, equally, or more probable, provided the opinion for liberty is probable.

Others demonstrate the major proposition in this way: a law which is not sufficiently promulgated does not oblige; for promulgation is necessary so that a law may obtain the force of obliging; but a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. But it is better to take the argument from knowledge of the law, so that it may be effective from every side.

b. An uncertain law cannot induce true obligation; but a law against which a truly and solidly probable opinion militates is truly uncertain; therefore a law against which a probable opinion militates cannot impose certain obligation.

To the major. The right of liberty, and indeed certain and innate liberty, precedes the right of law and its obligation. Certainly, if the rights of law and the rights of human liberty are compared with one another, it must be said that according to the order of nature the right of liberty precedes and the right of law and obligation follows, even if not in time, at least in nature and reason: for obligation supposes a free will which is bound; but a certain right cannot be restricted except by a certain obligation: for the effect cannot be greater than its cause; therefore an uncertain law cannot produce certain obligation.

a. This argument is taken from the relation which exists between liberty and law. As regards positive law, both divine and human, liberty is anterior to law in time, since those things which are prohibited by positive law are licit of themselves and become illicit only through a law enacted in time. But where there is question of the law of nature, which is eternal law, liberty is anterior to law by reason. And certainly by the very fact that man has been created by God, according to his whole essence he depends on God and is subject to Him. From this dependence follows the debt of contracting obligations which God shall have willed to enjoin upon him, and the obligation of investigating and knowing laws if He is going to give any to him. In this sense man is not born free but subject to God: for this debt of subjecting oneself to all divine laws precedes liberty or rather coexists with liberty. But if there is question of a determinate law to which a particular rational creature is subject, liberty precedes law by reason. For God by reason first conceives the essence of the creature and its liberty, and by reason afterward the law to which it is subject: since law by its own nature is a means by which the creature is directed to its proper end, first of all the nature must be known, so that the law suitable to it, by which it is directed to the end, can be determined. Therefore sacred Scripture says: God from the beginning constituted man and left him in the hand of his own counsel; He added His commandments and precepts;² and St. Thomas says: that is called licit which is prohibited by no law.³

b. From these arguments it is established that of itself only certain knowledge of law obliges the human will; yet if the opinion for the law is most probable or notably more probable than the opposite, we are bound to observe the law. For although an opinion of this kind does not attain true certitude, nevertheless practically it is equivalent to a certain sentence, because its opposite is not truly and certainly but only doubtfully or tenuously probable, and therefore cannot supply a norm of acting, since it does not suffice for informing a practically certain conscience. Hence it happens that an opinion of this kind is called quasi morally certain or practically certain.

¹ De verit. q. 17. a. 3.

² Eccli. 15, 14. 15.

³ In 4. dist. 15, q. 2. a. 4. ad 2.

238. 2. From authority. A moral system cannot be false which in any time whatever is explained, vindicated, and employed in particular questions as a rule of morals by the greater part of theologians; of this kind is the probabilistic system.

To the major St. Alphonsus notes: if the principle of probabilism were false, so many doctors would not have admitted it, nor would the Church have tolerated it: for the Church can tolerate by prudent silence particular erroneous opinions, but not others "which contain a general doctrine, as is the benign sentence, which imports the direction of all consciences concerning all particular cases; whence, if it were false, the deception of the whole Christian people would have been brought in."¹

The minor will be confirmed by the following historical survey. a. In the first centuries of the Church this question is not explicitly proposed, namely by what reason doubts concerning the obligation of a law are to be solved; therefore neither is any principle conceived in a determinate formula found, by which the question is resolved. Nevertheless in the practice of the Church several indications of the probabilistic principle are had: for in particular questions doubts are resolved according to the probabilistic principle.²

b. In the Middle Ages not only does the use of this principle occur in particular questions, but the principle itself occurs implicitly and virtually: for truths are handed down from which the principle of probabilism is deduced by necessary inference; indeed formulas occur which exhibit it equivalently. Yet it is not denied that at the same time formulas are also found which rather favor probabiliorism and tutiorism.

c. Bartholomew Medina was the first of all to propose explicitly and demonstrate by arguments the principle of probabilism (1577). This principle so pleased theologians of every order that by common consent they accepted it and for almost an entire century, with scarcely anyone protesting, explained it in published books and applied it to particular cases.

d. Around the middle of the 17th century the attacks against probabilism began. Besides one or another theologian, the Jansenists rose against it with more bitter anger; in attacking the system, the Dominicans by common consent joined them (1656). Thence it happened that theologians, as regards the moral system, were split into two parts: some from any school defended probabiliorism; others likewise from any order held and vindicated probabilism. With great contention and keen zeal the battle was fought on each side; nevertheless the greater part of doctors always adhered to probabilism.

Three principal reasons can be assigned on account of which several authors, having left probabilism, embraced probabiliorism: a. The license of opining of many authors, who, led by a slight reason, sold opinions scarcely probable as probable and practically licit. Now they thought they could remedy this evil effectively only by leaving the system of probabilism itself. b. The attacks of the Jansenists, who, carried away by hatred against the Society of Jesus, were denouncing the moral system to which most theologians of the Society were devoted as the source of laxism and the corruption of morals. c. The condemnation of proposition 3 of Innocent XI (n. 231); for several theologians thought that by this proposition not only the use of a tenuously probable sentence, but the system itself of probabilism as the source of laxism, was condemned.

e. In the midst of these disturbances, by the wonderful counsel of providence, God sent St. Alphonsus to His Church, who by his works brought it about that disputes were ended and Jansenian rigor and the system of probabiliorism went into exile from the borders of the Church.³

¹ St. Alphonsus, Scholastic-moral dissertation for the moderate use of probable opinion in concurrence with the more probable, year 1755, apud Ballerini-Palmieri I. p. 194.

² Cf. Christianus Lupus, De antiquitate et legitimo usu sententiae probabilis.

³ Cf. Bouquillon, Theolog. mor. fundam. n. 304 ss. Kirchenlexikon, Moralsysteme.

239. 3. From the approval of the Church. a. The Church has indeed never explicitly approved probabilism; but implicitly it clearly and indubitably manifests its mind by that peculiar approval by which it marked the moral works of St. Alphonsus, namely by which his opinions are declared practically safe. But it is impossible to approve the opinions which are contained in the works of the holy doctor without indirectly and implicitly approving the moral system by whose use and application the individual sentences were deduced and established; but the system which St. Alphonsus used in writing moral theology is simple probabilism.

It cannot be denied that the (negative) approval of the Church is referred to all the writings of the holy doctor and therefore also to the dissertations in which he first maintains probabilism and then either truly or apparently equiprobabilism. But likewise it cannot be denied that the positive and peculiar approval by which his writings are celebrated with great praises, because he fortified for moderators of souls a safe way between laxer and more rigid sentences,¹ is attributed especially to his moral theology. For he did not bring it about by his dissertations concerning the moral system that he paved a middle way between laxism and rigorism, but chiefly by the solution of particular questions, whereby by prudent judgment among lax and rigid opinions he chose safe ones. But in choosing opinions, employing the principle of probabilism, he investigates this one thing: whether the opinion is probable; and the opinion which he judges still probable, he proposes and commends to the reader as a norm of acting.

b. The equiprobabilists contend that the Church has openly turned away from the system of probabilism and has tried to extinguish it. To prove this they call the principal document the decree of Innocent XI or of the Holy Office, 26 June 1680, whose first part is directed to Fr. Thyrsus Gonzalez, the other to the general of the Society of Jesus, Fr. Oliva. The authentic form of the decree is this:

When the relation had been made by Father Laurea concerning the contents in the letters of Fr. Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., directed to Our Most Holy Lord, the most eminent lords said that it should be written by the secretary of state to the apostolic nuncio of Spain, that he signify to the said Thyrsus that His Holiness, his letters having been benignly accepted and read not without praise, commanded that he himself freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the sentence of those who assert that in the concurrence of the less probable opinion with the more probable so known and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable, and that he make him certain that whatever he shall have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness, that he not only permit the Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and to attack the sentence of those asserting that in the concurrence of the less probable opinion with the more probable so known and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable; but also that he write to all the universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that anyone, as it shall please him, freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary one, and that he command them to submit altogether to the mandate of His Holiness.

a. Thyrsus Gonzalez, then professor at Salamanca, had given repeated letters to the supreme pontiff and at the same time had sent a little work against probabilism, in which he sets forth that all theologians of the Society are devoted to probabilism and that no one dares to attack that doctrine and defend the opposite, lest he incur the offense of superiors. In these few things the occasion of the decree is contained.

b. Innocent XI turned away from probabilism and desired that it be extinguished, but by his supreme authority he neither extinguished it nor did anything else against it. But from the fact that the supreme pontiff in his private sentence turned away from probabilism, the system is shown to be neither false nor damnable.

c. Therefore it is wrongly asserted by adversaries that this decree is a solemn and authentic testimony of supreme ecclesiastical authority against probabilism: for the decree is not doctrinal but disciplinary, and that particular, from which nothing against the system of probabilism can be drawn. Indeed from the fact that it is lawful for theologians of the Society to defend it, far from being rejected, it is admitted by the holy see equally as probabiliorism is.

¹ Pius IX in apostolic letters concerning the confirmation of the title of doctor, 7 July 1871.

240. On the use of probable opinion. 1. In order that it be lawful to follow a truly probable opinion, it is required above all that a practically certain conscience concerning the honesty of the action be formed explicitly or at least implicitly; this indeed can be done in this way: that action against the law is certainly licit for which a truly probable opinion militates: for a doubtful law does not oblige; but for this action a truly probable opinion certainly militates; therefore this action is certainly licit.

From this argumentation two things are rendered manifest which we hinted above (n. 235): a. that the opinion which someone follows must be certainly probable: for if it were not certainly probable, the conclusion of the syllogism and therefore the dictate of conscience, from the rules of logic, would not be certain; and b. that the opinion must be probable for that very one who follows it: for there is question of informing the conscience of the one operating himself.

2. It is lawful to follow a probable opinion against any law whatever, whether natural, divine, or human: for concerning all laws the principle is equally valid: A doubtful law does not oblige, since it is demonstrated from the very nature of obligation.

There are some who have denied this affirmation as regards the law of nature, judging that concerning the law of nature an insoluble doubt or invincible ignorance cannot be admitted. But although invincible ignorance is not had concerning first principles and proximate conclusions, nevertheless concerning deduced truths, especially the more remote, insoluble doubt can have place (n. 114).

3. It is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion for liberty in all cases of doubtful law, whether the opposite for the law is less, equally, or more probable: for since the arguments by which the principle is demonstrated, A doubtful law does not oblige, are taken from the very nature of obligation, it follows spontaneously that neither probable nor more probable knowledge, but only certain (broadly, morally) knowledge of the law can oblige the human will, and therefore that the use of probable opinion is lawful where the law is truly doubtful.

a. Therefore the probabilistic principle, altogether universal, extends not only to doubt concerning the existence of a law but also to doubt concerning a law ceasing. For doubt concerning a law can be concerned either a. with the existence of the law, namely if it is doubted whether a law was issued or promulgated, whether the time of obligation has already arrived, whether it extends to this case or to these persons; or b. with the cessation of the law, namely if the existence of the law was certain and it is doubted whether it has ceased, either because it has been abrogated, or because someone is excused or dispensed from its observance, or because he has already fulfilled the law, etc. But in each case the principle of probabilism can be employed. Therefore neither he who probably judges that he did not emit a vow, nor he who certainly emitted a vow but probably judges that he has already satisfied it, is held to anything by strict obligation: for by the very fact that the law has probably ceased, the existence of the law becomes doubtful; but a doubtful law does not oblige.

b. Therefore in doubt concerning the cessation of a law, the principle of probabilism can licitly be employed even in the matter of justice, unless the debtor's culpable negligence is the cause why doubt concerning the payment made exists, and unless the doubt is merely negative, i.e. unless there is no reason or only a slight reason for doubting concerning the payment made. They indeed object that justice differs from other virtues in this, that it must preserve equality; hence, so long as the matter is doubtful, restitution must be made at least in proportion to the doubt. But justice requires that equality be preserved by the fact that each one is rendered his own right when the right of the other is certainly established; when the right of the other is doubtful, justice does not require that one rather than another, especially since he is a possessor in good faith, be despoiled of his own thing.¹ Besides, perfect equality in this case on account of invincible ignorance of the payment made cannot be restored, even if payment is made anew: for if the payment has already been made, the other has more than is owed to him; but since equality cannot certainly be restored, there is no reason why in doubt the creditor should receive more rather than the debtor, unless fault of the debtor is the cause on account of which equality cannot be restored.

¹ Cf. Bucceroni, Casus conscient. (Typogr. augustin. 1903) n. 12, 5.

241. Whether it is lawful for the same person concerning the same matter to follow now one, now another of two probable opinions.

a. Nothing prevents someone in diverse cases concerning the same matter from using at will now one, now another probable opinion: for each renders conscience equally safe. Thus the same person can for one testament use the opinion by which a testament lacking the formalities of law is valid, and for another testament the contrary opinion.

b. But in the same case he cannot concerning the same matter follow one probable opinion insofar as it brings advantage, and then another contrary one insofar as this brings advantage. Thus it is not lawful to hold the same testament lacking the formalities of law as valid, so that the inheritance can be entered upon, and as invalid, lest the legacies which are contained in it must be paid, because it cannot at the same time be valid and invalid.¹

It is not lawful voluntarily to introduce a state of insoluble doubt concerning a law, although afterward it is lawful to use a probable opinion against the law. Thus if someone doubts whether the twelfth hour of night has already elapsed or not, it is not lawful for him to drink, lest he expose himself to the danger of at least materially violating the law of the Church. But if nevertheless he had drunk, he can celebrate or communicate, because it is not established that he broke the fast; yet by drinking he sinned (venially), unless a reasonable cause, e.g. great thirst and the impossibility of ascertaining the hour of night, excused him. Likewise it is not lawful for a priest to consume a doubtfully consecrated host before the reception of the precious blood, lest he deliberately induce a state of doubt concerning the natural fast with danger of violating the law. To expose oneself often in this way voluntarily to the danger of materially violating the law would be mortal.²

¹ Cf. Lugo, De eucharist. disp. 15. n. 47 ss., where several examples of this kind are brought forward and judged.

² Cf. Bucceroni l. c. n. 13.

242. Very many difficulties by which probabilism is customarily attacked are solved without difficulty from the theory set forth above; others will have to be untangled below; therefore in this place these few things will suffice.

1. From the law of nature we must sincerely tend toward agreement with objective morality or with the objective ordination of the eternal law; but he who follows the less probable opinion against the law does not sincerely tend toward agreement with objective morality; therefore he who follows the less probable opinion against the law offends against the eternal law and therefore places a morally evil action.¹

This difficulty can be turned back upon equiprobabilism. For if the sanctity and necessity of agreement between human actions and the eternal law is so great that man must tend toward it as much as he can according to his knowledge, he must establish that agreement not only where he judges the law to exist more probably, but also where he judges the law to exist probably. But if God permits an exception from the necessity of establishing that agreement in favor of liberty, there is no reason for failing from agreement when the opinion for liberty is equally probable, but not likewise when it is simply probable.

To the major. This principle contains two things which are very true. Namely, on account of our essential and absolute dependence on God the creator, we are bound habitually to bear a sincere will of observing all particular laws which God is going to give us; and since we cannot observe laws unknown to us, we are bound with the same sincere will to tend toward knowledge of laws issued by God and actually to observe those that are known. Whether our dependence on God and the habitual obligation resulting from it of tending toward agreement with objective morality obliges us only to observing particular laws sufficiently known, or also to observing those whose knowledge we cannot acquire and which probably objectively do not exist, is a question controverted among theologians, which probabilists demonstrate by invincible arguments must be resolved in the negative part. Therefore those who contend that by force of this principle we must observe opinions which in our judgment agree more probably with the objective ordination of the eternal law than they disagree affirm the very thing which is to be proved and which from the arguments of the probabilists is shown to be false. But if thereafter they contend that the law which in our judgment more probably exists is known, they again affirm what is false. If finally they concede that the obligation of a law more probably existing does not arise directly from the law itself more probably existing, as being not sufficiently known nor sufficiently promulgated, but indirectly from this higher principle: we must tend toward agreement with objective morality, they commit the same begging of the question. For antecedently to a known law there exists no other obligation except that of inquiring with moral diligence into the existence of the law, which, if it is not sufficiently known, leaves to the will its natural liberty.

The minor must be altogether denied: for that a sincere tendency of the will toward agreement with the eternal law always strictly requires (not only sometimes counsels and inclines, which all concede) that in a conflict of opinions the more probable opinion be chosen, is an invention which is demonstrated by no reason. Therefore he who affirms that by force of the aforesaid principle we are bound not only to investigating the existence of the law and to observing laws sufficiently known, but also to observing laws more probably or more plausibly existing, commits a begging of the question and besides affirms what is false. Hence he who follows the less probable for liberty, far from placing a morally evil action, rather directs his actions according to the principle of probabilism, uniquely true and demonstrated by certain arguments.

2. He who follows probabilism exposes himself to the danger of sinning. - The danger of formally sinning is excluded by the fact that he who follows probabilism acts with a practically certain conscience, namely with certain persuasion that the action which he places is licit. But the danger of materially sinning is present, because the law against which probability militates can in reality exist, since probable reasons can be false; yet it is not necessary that this danger be avoided. For if it is established that the use of probable opinion against the law is lawful, by that very fact it is established that God does not impose upon us the obligation of avoiding this danger of materially sinning: for an intolerable burden would be imposed upon us if, for avoiding this danger of materially sinning, we were bound to observe all uncertain laws; for very often we would have to observe a law which does not exist.

3. Probabilism in practice leads to a lax life. - The fear of laxism is empty where a certain and unshaken moral principle is applied for directing morals: for truth cannot beget a lax life. Moreover, in this matter two things must be distinguished, namely what must be done for fulfilling the strict law, and what must be done for attaining Christian perfection. If a Christian man in the service of God did nothing other than what strict law postulates from the principles of probabilism, he would certainly live a life little worthy of a Christian man; but the practice of probabilists is this: where there is question of imposing obligation and of judging sins, they are benign for avoiding the dangers of formally sinning; but where there is question of attaining perfection and of the exercise of virtues, they strive toward the highest things, measuring the service owed to God not from the obligation of law, but from love and gratitude toward the divine majesty.

§ 6. On equiprobabilism.²

¹ Cf. Der kath. Seelsorger (Paderborn, Schoningh. 1900) S. 495 ff. Lehmkuhl, Probabilismus vindicatus (Friburgi. Herder. 1907).

² Gaude, C. SS. R., De morali systemate s. Alphonsi etc. (Romae. Cuggiani. 1894). Ter Haar, C. SS. R., De systemate morali antiquorum probabilistarum (Paderbornae. Schoningh. 1894). Aertnys, C. SS. R., Probabilismus oder Aequiprobabilismus? (Paderborn. Schoningh. 1896). Hippert, Probabilismus oder Aequiprobabilismus? (Zeitschrift f. k. Theol. 1895) S. 467 ff. Noldin, Aequiprobabilistische Beweisführung. (Zeitschrift f. k. Theol. 1896) S. 670 ff. De Caigny, De genuino probabilismo licito (Brugis. Desclee. 1901. Idem, De genuino morali systemate s. Alphonsi (Brugis. Desclee 1901).

243. 1. Equiprobabilism teaches: in doubt concerning the existence of a law it is lawful to follow an opinion equally or almost equally probable for liberty, but not a less probable one in the concurrence of one certainly more probable.

a. There are two points in which equiprobabilism theoretically differs from probabilism: the one indeed refers to the very principle of the system, the other to its use. For it contends a. that a probable opinion which stands for liberty is lawful to follow only when it is equally or almost equally probable as that which stands for the law; therefore if the opinion favoring the law is, in comparison with the opposite, certainly or certainly and notably more probable, the law must be observed; it contends b. that the system can be applied only if the doubt turns about the existence of a law, but not if the doubt concerns the cessation of a law; in this case the law must always be observed.

b. Practically the equiprobabilists differ from the probabilists in this, that they do not apply their system in doubts concerning the cessation of a law. They therefore oblige him who positively doubts whether he has fulfilled a vow certainly emitted to fulfill it again, and him who positively doubts whether he has already confessed a sin certainly committed to confess it again. But in the selection of opinions they scarcely differ from the probabilists: for above all they embrace all opinions which St. Alphonsus calls probable, even if they are less probable; but if there is question of a new question which St. Alphonsus did not treat, they follow in practice the opinion for liberty when they understand it to be supported by a solid reason. Indeed even in the manner of speaking they do not depart from the probabilists: for the opinions which we can licitly follow they scarcely ever call equally probable, but, after the example of St. Alphonsus, simply probable.

2. Equiprobabilism is defended especially by the theologians of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, Haringer, Marc, Aertnys, Konings, Vindiciae alphonsianae, etc., being persuaded that St. Alphonsus was an equiprobabilist. In this question several other theologians follow them: Gousset, Del Vecchio, Ninzati, Scavini, Pruner, E. Muller, Simar, P. Hilarius, etc.

Nevertheless, not all defend equiprobabilism in the same sense; and that this may be well understood, it must be noted that there are two formulas which equiprobabilism excludes: a. it is lawful to follow a probable opinion, even if the opposite is certainly more probable, and b. it is lawful to follow a probable opinion, even if the opposite is certainly and notably more probable. Equiprobabilists who understand their system so that they exclude only the second formula differ from probabilists only in words; those who understand equiprobabilism so that they exclude both formulas differ from probabilism not only in words, but in the matter itself.

244. The arguments by which equiprobabilists demonstrate the system in general are the very same arguments of the probabilists; then the arguments by which they demonstrate that part in which they differ from probabilists are these:

1. The law which is sufficiently promulgated must be observed; but the law to which an opinion certainly or certainly and notably more probable is favorable is sufficiently promulgated; therefore the law to which an opinion certainly or certainly and notably more probable is favorable must be observed.

a. Some demonstrate the minor proposition in one way, others in another: for some affirm that the law for which an opinion certainly, or certainly and notably, more probable militates is sufficiently promulgated, because an opinion certainly, or certainly and notably, more probable is morally or quasi-morally certain. Others, however, contend that an opinion certainly more probable does not exceed the limits of probability, and nevertheless that the law to which an opinion of this kind is favorable is sufficiently promulgated and to be followed: for an opinion certainly more probable approaches more closely to the truth; but we are bound to embrace, by assent and as the norm of acting, the opinion which approaches more closely to the truth.¹

b. To these things it must be observed: a. an opinion certainly and notably more probable practically is equivalent to a morally certain opinion: for if the excess of probability of one opinion is notable, and this is known certainly, the opposite opinion will be only doubtfully probable; but it is not lawful to follow a doubtfully probable opinion. But an opinion certainly more probable of itself neither theoretically nor practically is equivalent to a morally certain opinion, but is an opinion simply, although more, probable. b. It indeed cannot be affirmed that the more probable opinion approaches more closely to the truth, but nevertheless the more probable opinion has a greater likeness and appearance of truth than the opposite; therefore it is conceded that, as regards the assent of the mind, it must be preferred; but it must be denied that it constitutes a norm of acting which must necessarily be followed: for he who adheres by assent to the more probable with fear of erring knows that the law is uncertain; but we are not bound to observe a law unless its existence is certain (broadly, morally).

2. For acting licitly moral certainty concerning the honesty of the action is required; but such certainty cannot be had if the opinion for liberty is certainly less probable: for an opinion certainly less probable is not truly and certainly probable.

To this affirmation, that an opinion certainly less probable cannot be truly probable, this must be answered: it is not lawful to follow an opinion which is not truly and certainly probable; therefore if an opinion whose opposite is certainly more probable is no longer truly and certainly probable, it is not lawful to follow it; but whether an opinion whose opposite is certainly more probable can still be truly and certainly probable is not a moral question, but a logical question; and logicians teach that an opinion can be truly probable whose opposite is not morally certain. But if it is conceded that the less probable opinion is truly probable, from the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige, it is lawful to follow it.

3. A law does not oblige if it is truly doubtful; but it is truly doubtful only when concerning it there is a strict doubt, i.e. if the mind suspends assent because of equal reasons from either side; therefore the law does not oblige only if from either side, for the law and for liberty, there are equal or almost equal reasons.

A law does not oblige if it is truly doubtful; but from the arguments by which the probabilistic principle is demonstrated, it is clear that a law is truly doubtful if it is simply uncertain, whether the doubt existing about it is strict or broad; therefore a law does not oblige whenever it is simply uncertain, whether the reasons for the law are equally or more probable.

¹ Very recently in time the equiprobabilists do indeed bring forth diverse other arguments (cf. Commer, Jahrbuch XVII, S. 106 ff.), which nevertheless, more accurately inspected, are only variations of this argument invented by the ancient probabiliorists (n. 230, 2).

245. Refutation of the system itself. 1. Equiprobabilists, in order to establish their system, use no other arguments than probabilists, namely: a doubtful law does not oblige and an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; but from these arguments not equiprobabilism, but by necessary inference the formula of probabilism follows; therefore equiprobabilists deduce not the whole, but only a halved conclusion from their own principles.

2. A moral system which for its use necessarily requires that on each side not only the force and moments but also the degrees of reasons be weighed, and that it be determined whether the opposed opinions are equally or less or more probable, is a system practically unfit: for almost always it is impossible to determine when on each side there stand reasons equally or almost equally probable; and authors who think that they can accomplish that without difficulty deceive themselves and others.

3. An opinion certainly more probable either is quasi-morally certain or is simply probable; if the first, it must be conceded that it is not lawful to follow the opposite, because this is not truly probable; if the second, by no right are we prohibited from following the opposite, since to a probable opinion there is opposed one likewise probable.

246. On the use of probabilism, where there is question of the cessation of a law.

1. Already long ago among theologians there was agitated the controversy whether the principle of probabilism can be extended also to doubt concerning the cessation of a law. Authors of great name, such as Suarez, de Lugo, Bonacina, the Salmanticenses, Lacroix, Billuart himself the probabiliorist, and others, employ probabilism also in doubt concerning the cessation of a law.

2. St. Alphonsus in the first periods likewise extended his probabilistic system even to questions in which there is question of the cessation of a law; afterward, however, he retracted this opinion and changed several particular questions of his moral theology according to this reformed doctrine.

But if nevertheless in the work of moral theology there occur resolutions which do not agree with this doctrine,¹ this must either be attributed to inadvertence, or it must be said that the holy doctor in certain particular questions did not wish to urge the reformed opinion.

3. Besides the authority of St. Alphonsus, they bring forward especially two arguments by which the equiprobabilists demonstrate this part of their system: a. In doubt the condition of the possessor is better; but in this case the law possesses; therefore the law must be observed. b. Since doubt concerning the cessation of a law very often arises from the fact that someone has probably already satisfied the law, they say: a certain obligation is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment; therefore it must be satisfied again.

4. But these two arguments do not prove the matter. Concerning the principle of possession there will be discussion below; concerning the other argument, thus: a certain obligation is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment, it must be distinguished: by a negatively doubtful fulfillment, I concede; but by a probable fulfillment it is not satisfied certainly, yet it is satisfied probably; but an obligation which has probably already been satisfied ceases to be certain, and an uncertain obligation is none.²

Note. These things having been set down beforehand, we can now settle the matter itself in this way: the opinion which extends the principle of probabilism also to cases of the cessation of a law is defended by many and approved authors, is validly confirmed by reasons taken from the nature of the matter itself, and the arguments of the contrary opinion are aptly solved; for which reason the principle of probabilism can safely be employed also in the case of the cessation of a law.

¹ Cf. l. 1. n. 99; l. 4. n. 150; l. 6. n. 505; l. 3. n. 290. n. 112.

² Cf. Lugo, De eucharistia disp. 19. n. 249.

A SUBJECTIVELY certain conscience that the proposed action is lawful is required before performing any action, as we have already seen. A great difficulty—a difficulty which has to be faced by all moralists—arises from this principle in consequence of the uncertainty as to whether many actions in the concrete are lawful. One need not consult the works of moralists to find out what difference of opinion there is among experts on many practical questions of morals. It will be sufficient to consult one’s own experience. In the conflict of rights and duties, and in the obscurity which exists as to the application of moral principles to concrete cases, we are frequently at a loss as to what course duty prescribes. The cases which are constantly submitted to the decision of courts of law, but which also belong to morality, illustrate the familiar truth that opinion and not certainty is very often alone attainable in the field of conduct. But if this be the case, what is a conscientious man to do? He finds himself in a difficulty; what the right thing to do under the circumstances may be is not clear. A young man has promised to marry a girl somewhat his inferior in social position; they are both satisfied that the union would be a happy one for both, but the young man’s parents will not hear of the thing, and strictly forbid him to see the girl again. Must he obey his parents, or may he follow his inclinations and keep his promise? He consults those whose knowledge and judgement he respects, and they give him contrary decisions. He goes to recognized authorities on morals, and finds the same difference of opinion.

This example is but a type of innumerable questions which constantly arise in everyday life. Is it possible to lay down any universal principle for the solution of such doubtful cases, so as to be able to act with a certain conscience ?

Catholic theologians answer this question in the affirmative, but they are not agreed as to what the principle is. A probabiliorist would tell the young man that he must obey his parents and break off the engagement unless the opinion that he may marry the girl in spite of the prohibition is distinctly ae more probable than the opposite. An equiprobabilist would say that he may marry the girl if the weight of opinion is fairly equal on either side. A probabilist would maintain that he may marry her if there is a solidly probable opinion which favours that course. The terms are technical, and their meaning should be carefully studied. - An opinion, as we have already gathered from St Thomas, is an adhesion of the mind to one proposition, but with a consciousness that the opposite may be true.

A probable opinion is one which rests on good and solid grounds, such as would incline a man of prudence and judgement to embrace it. If the intrinsic reasons of the opinion are the grounds for embracing it, we have an intrinsic probability; if authority is the ground, we have an extrinsic probability.

A more probable opinion is one which rests on weightier reasons than the opposite, but which leaves the opposite still probable.

A very probable opinion rests on such solid grounds that the opposite is not considered solidly probable.

A morally certain opinion excludes even slight probability in the opposite; it is an adhesion of the mind to a truth without any fear of mistake.

In this difficult question, the Catholic Church so far has been content to condemn extreme views, and allows her children to follow any of the moderate systems mentioned above. Alexander VIII¹ condemned rigorism, which required direct moral certainty in all cases about the lawfulness of an action, and denied that it is ever lawful to follow an opinion which is very probable among several. Laxism was condemned by Innocent XI, since it taught that one might lawfully act on a slight probability.² The systems which are known as Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, and Probabilism all have their adherents; the Catholic moralist is free to follow whichever he wishes.

To us it seems that probabilism is the true system, and if it be rightly understood, as it is taught by its moderate supporters, and not as it is misinterpreted by its opponents, we are convinced that it will recommend itself to practical common sense.

Its maxim may be formulated thus: When there is only question of committing sin or not, it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion, even though the opposite may be more probable.

The wording of the formula should be carefully weighed. The words “ when there is only question of committing sin or not ” limit the application of the principle to cases where the only question is whether by following such a course sin will be committed because a certain law, human or divine, will be broken. Probabilism, then, cannot be applied to cases where the validity of an act is in question, where some end must be obtained, or where there is question of the certain right of some other person which must be respected. In all these cases we are bound to safeguard the end by taking means that are sure and not merely probable. These are not so many exceptions to the use of probabilism; there is a certain obligation to use secure means to obtain the end in view in such cases, and so there can be no question as to whether probabilism is applicable or not. This will explain why Innocent XI condemned a proposition which asserted that it is not unlawful for a minister of the sacraments to follow a probable opinion about their validity when administering them; and another, which taught that a judge might use probabilism in giving sentence in a court of law; and a third, which excused an infidel who followed a probable opinion and remained in infidelity. In all these cases there is not merely question of sin, but the certain rights of others are at stake, or there is question of an end which cannot lawfully be exposed to risk.

Again, the words “ it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion ” should be noted. It is not a question as to what is more perfect, what the noble and generous thing to do may be. The rule merely asserts that there is no obligation under pain of sin to follow the more perfect course, if in the case there be one.

Finally, the words are added “ even though the opposite may be more probable.” For the greater probability of the other view does not make it certain, nor is the supposed greater probability a sure guarantee that the more probable view is the more true. It very frequently happens that an opinion which is considered more probable at one time is thought less probable or altogether improbable at another. Moreover, degrees of probability are very difficult to determine. What seems more probable to one theologian seems less so to another, or even to the same at a different time. And even if it be granted that one opinion is certainly and absolutely more probable, the opposite may for all that remain solidly probable.³ With these provisos the proof of the thesis is not very difficult.

¹ Prop. 3, condemned December 7, 1690.

² Prop. 3, condemned March 2, 1679.

³ Decree of March 2, 1679, props. 1, 2, 4.

Whenever there is a solidly probable opinion that a particular action is lawful, there is no certain law forbidding one to perform it. But it is lawful to do what no certain law forbids. Therefore when there is only question of committing sin or not, it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion even though the opposite may be more probable.

The major premise of this syllogism is obvious. No opinion can be probable which has a certain law against it. The certain law imposes a certain obligation. On the other hand, if an opinion is probable and acknowledged as such by five or six experts, good, prudent, and learned men, it is impossible that there should be a law contrary to the probable opinion. Or if there is such a law, the law cannot be sufficiently promulgated, or else it would be known to the experts. But a law which is not sufficiently promulgated does not bind; ignorance excuses from its transgression. The minor premise, too, is clear. We are at liberty to do what no certain law prohibits. If indeed I doubt whether an action is forbidden, I am bound to inquire and satisfy my conscience on the point. But whenever there is a probable opinion, this inquiry has been already made by experts, and with the result that no law forbidding the action can be discovered, otherwise the opinion will not be probable. The conclusion then is certain.

Therefore in cases where there is a probable opinion, or a positively doubtful conscience, I may arrive at a certain conscience required for lawful action by reasoning implicitly somewhat as follows: The opinion is probable that this action which I am contemplating is lawful—for example, marrying according to my promise a good and suitable person in spite of the prohibition of my parents which indeed does not seem to be reasonable. But if this is so, there is no law forbidding me to do it; I violate no obligation in marrying her. Therefore J may marry her.

The proof of probabilism from what we must call at least the toleration of the Church for some centuries will perhaps appeal still more strongly to Catholic minds, The guardianship of faith and morals has been committed to the Church by her divine Founder. He has promised that she shall not fail in the task committed to her even to the end of time. But if a false doctrine is widely held and publicly taught for some centuries in the Church, and she does not condemn it, does not protest against it, the promise of Christ ’ fails to be effective, which is impossible. So that probabilism, which has been widely held and publicly taught for some centuries as a theory of morals without being condemned by the Church, cannot be a false system¹ A third argument may be drawn from the approbation of the works of St Alphonsus Liguori by the Holy See. The decree of May 18, 1803, on the revision and approbation of the works of St Alphonsus with a view to his beatification, gives a list of his works and expressly states that after careful examination nothing reprehensible was found in them. Among the works mentioned is a dissertation on the moderate use of a probable opinion when it conflicts with a more probable opinion on the other side, published in 1755. In this dissertation St Alphonsus clearly and ably defends and proves probabilism; he never withdrew or corrected this dissertation, though to save his Congregation and the doctrine he afterwards modified the statement of his views. He followed probabilism in his choice of opinions while writing his great work on moral theology which subsequently, though he admitted corrections in details, remained substantially the same.

¹ St Alphonsus, Dissertation, anno 1755, n. 10.

It has been already pointed out that, although we may lawfully adopt and follow a probable opinion, there is no obligation of doing so, and it will frequently be more perfect to follow an opposite opinion. It is not intended to propose probabilism as the ideal of Christian conduct; we go to ascetical writers and elsewhere for that.¹ Probabilism is especially an instrument of moral theology, to be wisely and prudently used by the confessor in the confessional, as the doctor uses his medicines in the sick room.

¹ Cf. Rodriguez, On the Practice of Christian and Religious Perfection, i, c. 8.

Theologians warn us that only experts can judge of the intrinsic probability of an opinion. Others must be content to be able to discover extrinsic probable opinions. They can do this by consulting approved authors. If they find that an opinion is held as probable by five or six authors of repute, and it has not become obsolete by new legislation, by decrees of the Holy See, or by the progress of theological opinion, they may act upon it as solidly probable. The Sacred Penitentiary, July 5, 1831, declared that a professor of theology or a confessor might follow in practice the opinions of St Alphonsus.

In thus adopting extrinsically probable opinions with regard to conduct, the priest or the layman only does what anyone not skilled in law would do in a difficult legal case—he would consult an expert whom he could trust.

A limitation to the use of probabilism is mentioned by theologians. When one has decided on any course of conduct, he must loyally adhere to the consequences which the decision involves. He must not use a probable opinion to gain an advantage, and then in the same matter adopt the contrary opinion in order to shake off a burden. And so when a probable opinion has been adopted in favour of the validity of a will in my behalf, I cannot also adopt a contrary opinion that the will is invalid and refuse to pay the legacies,

Except in case of necessity the minister of a sacrament may not use probable opinions with reference to what belongs to the validity of the sacrament. As we saw when treating of the matter and form, it would be against the reverence due to the sacraments, against justice, and against charity, if the minister exposed the sacraments to the danger of nullity through following a merely probable opinion. He is bound to follow the safer opinion when he can do so in what relates to the validity of the sacraments. In questions, however, which only touch the lawfulness or the integrity of the sacraments, and when the Church supplies what is wanting in order that the sacrament may be valid, which she sometimes does, as we shall see later, there is no reason why the minister should not use probable opinions. The same doctrine applies also to the recipient of the sacraments.

We speak about him who lacks the conscience required for acting licitly, that is, about him who is not certain of the honesty of the action to be placed. Moreover:

I. One who is not certain of the honesty of some action, unless he wishes to abstain from it, is held before all else to inquire into the truth, that is, to investigate what the morality of the action is; in other words, what the ordinance of the eternal law concerning it is. And indeed one who neglects the aforesaid inquiry holds the divine ordinance itself cheap, since he rashly exposes himself to the danger of violating it. Hence St. Thomas: "But in doubtful and uncertain matters, reason does not give judgment without a preceding inquiry; and therefore inquiry of reason before judgment about things to be chosen is necessary; and this inquiry is called counsel" (I-II, q. 14, a. 1). And St. Alphonsus: "For acting licitly in doubtful matters we must inquire into the truth" (I, 54).

II. Concerning the manner of inquiring into the truth, hold these things:

1. The arguments, intrinsic and extrinsic, or authorities, of each opinion mutually opposed to the other, must be investigated and compared. For in doubts one part must be chosen before the other. But "choice imports a certain preceding comparison" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 13, a. 1).

2. The inquiry must be made with moral diligence proportionate both to the person inquiring and to the gravity of the matter of which there is question, and to the time that can be spent on the inquiry. The less learned should try to reach the truth by consulting the more learned, for example a pastor or confessor; the more learned, by their own inquiry. "It will be enough," says Benedict XIV in the encyclical De Praeparatione ad Annum Universalis Iubilaei (26 Jun. 1749), "to have admonished confessors that in a doubtful matter they not rely on their own opinion; but before they decide the cause, they should consult very many books, especially those whose doctrine is more solid; and then they should descend to that opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Nor indeed did we teach anything else in our encyclical on usuries." Besides this, greater diligence is needed if there is question of a matter of great importance, say of notable restitution, than if the discussion concerns a small matter.

If someone, after the truth has been inquired into, continues to doubt, or is not certain of the honesty of the action, it is disputed to what extent one who thus doubts theoretically can come to practical certainty and place the action. Moreover, the diverse responses to this question constitute the diverse moral systems, about which we must now speak. But it is clear that this controversy is of the greatest importance: since a moral system governs the whole of moral doctrine and opens the way for solving for practice the innumerable doubts that occur in it. About to speak of this very grave matter, we shall set forth first the notion of a moral system, the state of the controversial question, and the diverse systems; then the proof of the system which seems true to us. Finally we shall add some points concerning certain sayings akin to the moral system, concerning the importance of the controversy between equiprobabilists and probabilists, and concerning the use of the moral system.

III. Diverse systems. Seven are enumerated, namely: absolute Tutiorism, mitigated Tutiorism, Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism, Laxism, and the System of Compensation.

Absolute Tutiorism states: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is certain to me; or: The law obliges me unless I am certain that it does not exist.

Mitigated Tutiorism teaches: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is most probable to me; or: The law obliges me unless I hold it as most probable that the law does not exist.

Probabiliorism states: It is not licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless this is more probable to me; or: The law obliges me unless I hold it as more probable that the law does not exist.

Equiprobabilism professes: In doubt about the making of a law, it is licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty, provided this is equally or almost equally probable to me as the opposite opinion favoring the law. But in strict doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, the law is to be observed.

Probabilism contends: It is licit for me to follow an opinion favoring liberty, provided this is truly probable to me, and this even if the contrary opinion is certainly more probable to me; or: The law does not oblige me provided I hold it as truly probable that it does not exist, and this even if I hold it as more probable that it does exist. And these things hold even if the law certainly existed, provided it has probably ceased or has been fulfilled.

Laxism admits the use even of a thinly probable opinion.

The System of Compensation teaches that in doubts the safer thing is to be followed unless a relatively grave inconvenience excuses.¹

Absolute Tutiorism,² mitigated Tutiorism, and Laxism³ are commonly rejected; Probabiliorism, Equiprobabilism, Probabilism, and the System of Compensation are sustained. We admit Equiprobabilism, which system indeed we now undertake to prove and to vindicate from objections.

¹ Thus Laloux, De actibus humanis; Potton, De theoria probabilitatis; Boisdron, Theorie et systemes des probabilites; Prummer, Manuale Theol. Mor., t. I, n. 351; McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, p. 254. The system of Cardinal d'Annibale deserves special mention; in his Summula Theologiae moralis (I, nn. 262 and 264), relying only on the principle of possession, he gives his vote, with respect to doubt about the existence of a law, rather to Probabilism; and with respect to doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, to Equiprobabilism. That system could be called the System of Possession, or Possessionism.

² Alexander VIII struck down the thesis: "It is not licit to follow an opinion, or among probable opinions the most probable one."

³ Innocent XI condemned this proposition, the third: "Generally, while, relying on probability either intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not go beyond the limits of probability, we do something, we always act prudently."

One who strictly doubts about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, in other words, one who holds it as equally or almost equally probable that the law has not ceased or has not been fulfilled, is held to observe it.

It is said "one who strictly doubts," or "one who holds it as equally or almost equally probable"; since it is commonly admitted that the obligation of observing the law is absent in broad doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, in other words, where it is more probable that the law has ceased or has been fulfilled. Besides, in doubt about the fulfillment of a law several principles are at hand, in view of which the fact of fulfillment can commonly be held as more probable. Principles of this sort are: What regularly, what ordinarily happens, is judged to have happened; from things commonly occurring a prudent presumption is made.¹ Likewise: In doubt every fact is presumed to have been done rightly;² or: In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act³ (St. Alphonsus, I, 26). With these points noted, the thesis is proved:

I. From the authority of St. Alphonsus. Although I would not wish to deny that this thesis is not to be valued as much as the first and third theses are to be valued, nevertheless it cannot be denied that it extends very widely and pertains to the whole system, so that what we said above (nn. 214, 225) about the authority of St. Alphonsus is also to be applied to this thesis. But the holy Doctor, who had previously adhered to the more benign opinion, after considering the matter better, revoked it (I, 29) and defended the stricter opinion (I, 26-34); which in any case is now commonly admitted even by the adversaries themselves.⁴

II. From the authority of theologians. Our opinion was formerly commonly admitted, even by those authors who adhered to Probabilism. The witnesses of this assertion are Suarez⁵ and Laymann.⁶ The fact that afterward several withdrew from this opinion does not prevent the consensus of ancient theologians from supplying us some argument.

III. From reason. First, in strict doubt the condition of the possessor is better; or, to abstain from the ambiguous word "possessor," in strict doubt the condition of that which is prior seems to be better than the condition of that which is posterior.⁷ But the law itself is prior to its cessation and fulfillment. Therefore, in strict doubt about the cessation or fulfillment of a law, the condition of the law seems to be better (St. Alphonsus, I, 29-34).

The major is established by these arguments: first, our principle of its own accord pleases reason more than the contrary principle, which would have to be admitted by the adversaries, namely: in strict doubt the condition of that which is prior seems to be worse than the condition of that which is posterior. This spontaneous inclination of reason indeed seems to supply an argument for our doctrine. Second, a principle which favors stability, or a stable manner of acting, seems to be preferred to a principle which fosters mutability, or a changeable manner of acting. But our principle favors stability, while the contrary favors mutability. Third, there is added that the principle stated by us has force for the external forum. Why, precisely, would the contrary principle have to be admitted for the internal forum?

Then our thesis is proved from the fact that the thesis of the Probabilists is at least doubtful: namely, a law which has doubtfully ceased or has doubtfully been fulfilled obliges unless it is demonstrated, or certain, that it does not oblige. But no one who hears prudently will contend that that is certain.

The major is evinced from a principle admitted by all: in a practical doubt not entirely solved, the safer part is to be followed.

To prove the minor, it will be enough to advert to these things: first, the arguments of the adversaries, as we shall soon see, either involve a begging of the question, or are such that they themselves require further proof. Second, add that always very many, and those grave and distinguished, theologians supported the contrary opinion. Third, finally, our arguments seem to be of such a kind that not even the adversaries will deny them all probability. Once all these things have been attended to and well weighed, no one will have affirmed that the opinion of the Probabilists has been placed beyond doubt.

¹ Suppose someone, while praying Sext, doubts whether he has said Terce. In the case he can commonly hold it as more probable that Terce has been said, since from things commonly occurring a prudent presumption is made. But it commonly happens that Sext is not begun before Terce has been said.

² Suppose someone doubts whether he has confessed with true sorrow. In the case he can commonly hold it as more probable that true sorrow was present.

³ Yet this principle, which canonists and moralists commonly use, is very ambiguous; namely, it has force only insofar as it rests on another principle of presumption. But this happens when there is doubt about the manner in which an act has been placed; in which case it can be held as more probable that all those things required for validity were done. It is otherwise if the manner in which the act was placed is known, but it is disputed whether the act so placed is valid.

⁴ Cf. De Minusprobabilismo, pp. 133-139, where those things which some formerly objected are refuted.

⁵ Suarez, treating the question whether one who has doubtfully fulfilled an oath is still held to fulfill it, responds: "It is beyond controversy that he is held," because "in doubt the condition of the possessor is better" (De Relig., tr. 5, bk. 2, cap. 33, n. 7); this solution is a mere application of our thesis to a particular case.

⁶ Laymann speaks thus: "But the latter part of the assertion is common" (Theol. mor., bk. 1, tr. 1, c. 5, § 3, n. 31), namely, that one who doubts whether he has fulfilled a vow or promise, or satisfied any other debt whatsoever, is held by the obligation.

⁷ In this sense St. Alphonsus and others take the principle of possession, insofar as it regards matter distinct from the matter of justice; but since others explain it otherwise, we have abstained from that designation, mindful of this: "It belongs to the wise man not to care about names" (St. Thomas, In II Sent., dist. 3, q. 1). With these points noted, those things which several theologians object concerning the nature of the principle of possession do not harm our argument.

Practical Conclusions.—An instrument is called good when it produces with sufficient exactness the effects for which it was intended; it is bad, if it fails to produce those effects. Thus, a timepiece, a compass, or a thermometer is good if it indicates accurately, and bad if it indicates inaccurately. But, as it would be harmful to guide oneself by an unreliable instrument (e.g., by a watch with a defective mainspring, or which runs fast or slow), one naturally corrects the defects and regulates the working of the mechanism. Now, from what has been said above in this article, we see that conscience can be a deceptive indicator, and that its accuracy can be improved. Hence, the need of correcting a bad conscience and of cultivating a good conscience.

Remedies for a bad conscience and means for cultivating a good conscience are as follows:

(a) The remote causes of a bad conscience are in the will itself. A person judges wrongly often because he is wrong in himself, wrong in his intentions and purposes with regard to life as a whole, wrong in his attitude towards a particular line of duty, wrong in his lack of sincerity with himself. Hence, the correctives needed are a sincere love of God and of virtue, courage to wish the truth, and an honest examination of motives and actions: “The sensual man perceiveth not the things that are of the Spirit of God, but the spiritual man judgeth all things” (I Cor., ii. 14, 15).

(b) The immediate causes of a bad conscience are in the intellect. One judges wrongly because one clings in time of doubt to erroneous ideas or principles. The remedy, therefore, is to seek diligently for light through prayer, to study the lives and conduct of those who are models, to consult with the prudent and the conscientious. The bad conscience says to God: “Depart from us, we desire not the knowledge of Thy ways” (Job, xxi. 14); but the good one says: “Teach me Thy justifications. Thy testimonies are my delight, and Thy justifications my counsel” (Ps. cxviii. 12, 24).

Signs of a Good Conscience.—(a) Extraordinary holiness is not necessary before one may consider one’s conscience good, for there are degrees of goodness. If, therefore, a person’s external life is directed by the duties of his state, and his internal life, as far as he can judge, is free from serious guilt and guided by love of God and hatred of sin, he may safely regard his will as good. If sometimes he sins venially, this is not because he lacks a good conscience, but because he does not always follow it.

(b) Extraordinary diligence in studying one’s duties is not necessary before one may regard one’s conscience as good, for otherwise a heavier burden would be imposed than we can suppose God to intend. A person who is using all the means for obtaining religious instruction that are used by others in his position and who are conscientious, may safely regard himself as free from voluntary error. If sometimes he judges wrongly, the mistake will be involuntary and not due to a bad conscience. Of course, one whose conscience is not in vincible error may sin even mortally, not because his conscience is bad, but because he does not follow it.

The following are means for preserving and maintaining a good conscience: (a) we should judge our motives frequently with the severity with which we judge the motives of another (Rom., ii. 1), and as before God (I Cor., ii. 10); (b) we should measure our actions, not by the standards of the world, its maxims and examples, but by those of Christ (I John, ii. 15-17; III John, 11).

Opinion.—The duty of one whose state of mind is opinion is as follows:

(a) If he is able to remove every objection against his judgment or to make unimportant such objection or objections as remain, his opinion has become moral certainty (see above, 644 Sqq.), and he may follow it as a safe guide. Example: Caius promises to marry Sempronia, but his parents forbid the marriage. Caius opines that he should keep his promise, but to be sure he consults his pastor. The latter shows him that the opposition to his marriage is unreasonable, and thus sets at rest the difficulties of Caius.

(b) If a person is not able to remove one or more important objections against his judgment, his opinion has not become moral certitude, and he may not follow it as a safe guide. Example: If Caius’ pastor holds that the parents are right and Caius wrong in the question of marriage with Scmpronia, so that Caius, while still thinking he should keep his promise, has serious fears that it would be a wrong step, the young man should not follow his own view.

Those who act when their state of mind is doubt, suspicion, or uncertain opinion are: (a) guilty of sin, for they do not act in good faith (Rom, xiv. 22, 23), and they are imprudent and lovers of danger (Ecclus., iii. 27); (b) guilty of the species and gravity of sin which they fear may be in their act; for they interpretatively wish that to which they expose themselves. Example: If Titus takes an oath, fearing that his act is perjury, he is guilty of perjury before God, even though what he says is true.

Fears or objections against an opinion are unimportant as follows: (a) if they have only a slight probability (e.g., Titus opines that he is not obliged to say the second lessons, because he knows that he began them, and therefore must have said them; but he fears he may be obliged to say them, because he cannot remember the details of the lessons, and hence has probably not said them); (b) if they are improbable (e.g., Caius fears that he may have omitted Sext, although he recalls going to choir to chant at the regular times.)

Fears against an opinion are important, when they are not merely possible, but have such an appearance of truth that even a prudent man would consider them as worthy of support.

(a) Intrinsic signs of this solid probability are the good arguments by which the fear, or contrary of an opinion, is supported. Example: Titus after careful examination of conscience decides that he is not obliged to mention a theft in confession, because it happened just before his last confession; yet, he fears that he is obliged, because he does not remember having thought of restitution.

(b) Extrinsic signs of solid probability are the good authorities by whom the contrary of the opinion is defended. Example: Caius opines that he is not obliged to confess a calumny, because he is not certain that it is unconfessed; he fears that he is obliged, because St. Alphonsus, whose authority is great in Moral Theology, teaches that a grave sin must be confessed unless it is certain that it has been confessed already.

He who is moved by unimportant fears or difficulties is scrupulous, but not so he who hesitates in the face of an important difficulty. Examples: Balbus fears he may be guilty of murder, because he left a sick person for a moment and the latter unexpectedly died in his absence (scrupulous conscience). Sempronius fears he may be bound to restitution, because by his ridicule he made Titus lose his means of livelihood (disturbed conscience).

What is to be done by one who holds an opinion as to what he may or may not do here and now, but who has a serious fear that his opinion is wrong?

(a) If the fear persists as serious, when the means to remove it (such as consideration and consultation) have been duly resorted to, he should delay, if this is possible, or follow the safer course, if delay is not possible. Example: Titus must go to confession now, but he cannot recall whether or not a past theft was ever confessed; he thinks he is not obliged to mention it now, but is far from feeling certain about this, because of a serious doubt which he cannot resolve. The thing for him to do is to resolve to confess the theft as one that was perhaps unconfessed before.

(b) If the fear is removed or made unimportant, by direct means (such as theological argument from moral principles) or by indirect means (such as consultation or the use of reflex principles), the opinion may be followed. Example: If Titus, mentioned above, learns from his confessor or deduces from reliable reflex principles that he is not obliged to confess the theft, he may act with a safe conscience in following this decision.

The authority that may be safely followed by a lay person who holds an opinion, but fears that the opposite may be true, is that of anyone whom he knows to be pious, instructed and prudent; for, as it is impossible for him either to settle the question for himself or to remain in perpetual uncertainty, he must acquire certainty here as in other important affairs by consulting those who are expert and reliable. Hence, if the conscience is merely opinionative, a dependable adviser should be conferred with to make it certain.

(a) In the case of an accusing or excusing conscience, it is at least advisable that the doubtful sin be mentioned in confession, and especially by those who are not strict in their lives and who are inclined to judge their own acts and motives with leniency.

(b) In case of a forbidding or permitting conscience, it is necessary that one seek reliable information where it can be had, as from parents or teachers, and if these cannot give it, from a pastor or confessor or other priest. Example: Sempronius thinks he has a right to drink a glass of wine now and then to be sociable; but he fears he has no right to do so, as the drink occasions excitement or foolish remarks, and sometimes makes it difficult for him to get to his home safely.

The authority that may be safely followed by confessors and other priests in resolving important doubts against a moral judgment is as follows:

(a) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by all or nearly all of the approved text-books on moral teaching, it may be followed; for surely there would not be such unanimity, if the objections were really formidable.

(b) If the opinion is supported as morally certain by a goodly number (say, six or seven) of those who are considered as preeminent in Moral Theology, and who independently arrived at the same conclusion, it may be followed; for the judgment of many is better than that of one, and the certainty of authorities should prevail over the doubt of one who has not the same authority.

(c) If the opinion has the support as certain of only one theologian, it may be followed without further investigation, if he has received special mention from the Church as an authority and a safe guide. Thus, the Holy See has expressly declared that the doctrine of St. Alphonsus may be safely followed by confessors, and the approbation given to St. Thomas Aquinas as Universal Doctor makes his word more convincing than a contrary argument based on one’s own reasoning. Of course, this does not mean that these or any other private Doctors are infallible in their judgments, or that one should not depart from their teaching in a point where the Church has decided against them, or where there is a manifest reason for doing so; it simply means that they are so conspicuous among moralists for the correctness of their teaching that one who is in doubt may safely follow them unless the contrary is known to him.

But one may be unable to settle one’s difficulty by appeal to authority, as such, as in the following instances: (a) when the particular case to be decided is not considered at all in text-books, or is not considered under the circumstances that exist; (b) when the authorities speak hesitatingly about the question, and say that the opinion in question is at most probable, etc.; (c) when the authorities are about equally divided, as when a few great names are opposed to many names of inferior rank, or when those who are equal in knowledge so disagree that half are on one side, half on the other. In counting authorities, however, it is not always easy to decide who should be included, as a writer may himself be arguing from the authority of an individual or of a school, and thus he is not a distinct witness in favor of what he holds.

When a priest or other person sufficiently instructed in theology is not able to change through recourse to authority an opinionative or doubtful conscience into a certain conscience, he can still obtain certitude: (a) directly, by reexamining the question diligently and with entire impartiality, until he has discovered reasons strong enough to settle it convincingly one way or the other; (b) indirectly, by submitting the question to the arbitrament of a reflex principle that really appears true to him, and permitting it to decide between the opinion and the objection, or between the contending doubts.

The Moral Systems.—There are two general systems regarding reflex moral principles:

(a) Tutiorism, which teaches that the only principle which can change uncertainty into certainty is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, he must always choose the safer,” because only what is safer excludes the uncertainty of sinning;

(b) Anti-tutiorism, which teaches that the principle given above is true in a few exceptional cases on account of special reasons, but untrue as a rule. The general principle which it substitutes for that of Tutiorism is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe if it is morally certain.”

Of two moral judgments that are compared, it must be noted:

(a) that one is safer which departs more from the danger of sin by deciding for the stricter side. Example: In doubt whether a law exists, whether it obliges in a present case, whether its obligation is grave, the safer opinion is that which holds for the affirmative;

(b) that moral judgment is more likely which is supported by stronger arguments. Example: That a law has ceased, or does not apply in a certain case, or does not oblige under sin, is a more likely opinion if the arguments in its favor outweigh those against it.

Thus, it may happen that an opinion which is safer is less likely. Example: The opinion that the precept of repentance obliges under pain of new sin from the moment a sin is committed is safer, but less likely than the opposite opinion.

Danger of sin is twofold. (a) Danger of formal sin (see 249, 258) is a risk taken which involves, not only that an act may be unlawful, but that the doing of it may be unlawful. Example: Caius eats meat, doubting whether the day is one of abstinence and whether he is obliged to abstain or not. (b) Danger of material sin (see 249, 258) is the danger that an act may be unlawful, not in the concrete or as to its performance, but in the abstract as to itself. Example: Titus is unable to discover whether this is a day of abstinence, but he is of the opinion that it is not. Hence, he takes meat, arguing that, while this may be a violation of the law, he himself is not guilty of sin, since he feels that he has a right to eat meat under the circumstances.

Tutiorism.—This system has been condemned by the Church, and with good reason, for the following motives:

(a) If by that which is safer, Tutiorism intends that which is better, it contradicts the Gospel, which distinguishes between counsel and precept (see 364 sqq.), commanding what is good, but only recommending what is better.

(b) If by that which is safer Tutiorism means that which favors law against liberty, it imposes an intolerable yoke on the consciences of men; for, while law obliges only in so far as it is promulgated and known, Tutiorism would bind one to observe, not only what was not known to be obligatory, but what was held to be most probably not obligatory.

A modified form of Tutiorism taught: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one must choose the safer, unless the less safe is most probable.” This system has not been censured by the Church, but Catholic theologians with hardly an exception have rejected it, for the following reasons:

(a) Most probable, as understood by the defenders of this system, is that which has such likelihood and such appearance of truth as to remove every probable danger of even material sin. Thus, in reality this system requires absolute certitude and agrees with the rigorous tenet of Tutiorism that even a most probable opinion against the law may not be followed.

(b) Most probable, as commonly understood, is that side of a question which so far excels the other side that no answer can be given to any of its arguments, while all the arguments of the other side can be answered. To require this in moral difficulties is to require the impossible, for even the greatest theologians have to be content at times with less.

We are obliged always to follow a safe course, that is, not to expose ourselves to the danger of formal sin (see 249, 258); but Tutiorism errs when it teaches that we are also obliged always to follow the safer or safest course, that is, never to expose ourselves even to the danger of material sin. There are cases, however, when we are obliged (because some law requires it) to follow a safer course, that is, not to expose ourselves or others to some great harm. Thus, we must follow the safer side in the following cases:

(a) when there is question concerning something essential for the salvation of ourselves or of others, for the law of charity forbids that any risk be taken in this supremely important matter. Example: Titus instructs the dying Caius only concerning the existence of God and of the future life. He should also instruct him about the Trinity and the Incarnation, which is the safer course, since it is more probable that an explicit faith in these two mysteries is a condition of salvation;

(b) when there is question of some great spiritual loss or gain for ourselves or others, for justice or charity forbids that we take chances in such affairs. Examples: Sempronia doubts whether she is excused from the law of abstinence, and whether she will be guilty of sin if she eats meat. Caius doubts whether attendance at a certain school will do harm to the religion of his son. Balba doubts whether she is bound to inquire about the truth of her sect. As long as their serious doubts remain, these persons should follow the safer course;

(c) when there is question of the validity or invalidity of a Sacrament, for the virtue of religion requires that the Sacraments be administered with fidelity, and be not exposed to the peril of nullity. Example: It is not lawful to consecrate matter that has probably been substantially adulterated;

(d) when there is question of some temporal good or evil to oneself or another, and one is certainly obliged to promote the former or prevent the latter. Examples: Caius suspects that a drink before him is deadly poison; Titus suspects that an object at which he is preparing to shoot is a human being. Neither may disregard his suspicion, even if its contrary is more probable, because the safer side must here be taken. The Fifth Commandment forbids one needlessly to imperil one’s own or another’s life.

In emergency one may expose a Sacrament to nullity by taking a course that is less safe for the Sacrament, but safer for the subject, relying on the axiom that the Sacraments are for men, and not men for the Sacraments. Example: Titus is called to baptize the dying Caius. No water can be procured except rose water, whose sufficiency is doubtful. Titus not only may, but should, use the doubtful matter, since no other can be had.

Laxism.—The extreme opposite of Tutiorism is Laxism, whose principle is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe, if it is only slightly or uncertainly probable,” because whatever seems at all probable may be prudently followed, and so forms a certain conscience. Example: According to Laxism, one would be justified in following an opinion, because it was defended by one theologian, even though he was of little authority.

This system has been condemned by the Church for the following reasons:

(a) It is contrary to the teaching of the Gospels and of the Fathers, which requires one to observe the laws of God with understanding and diligence;

(b) It leads to corruption of morals. The Laxists of the seventeenth century were called in derision those “who take away the sins of the world,” and it was against their loose teachings that Pascal inveighed;

(c) Its argument is of no value, for no prudent person would feel that he should follow what was only slightly above the improbable, or that a law should be deemed uncertain because an opinion of uncertain probability could be quoted against it.

The true system of reflex principles will lie between the extremes of Tutiorism and Laxism. As already said, these two doctrines have been censured by the Church; but there are other systems that are moderate, and that are permitted by the Church and defended by theologians. These systems are:

(a) Probabiliorism, whose principle is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safc only when it is more probable”;

(b) Equiprobabilism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe only when it affirms the non-existence of the law, and is at least equally probable with the opposite”;

(c) Probabilism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it is certainly and solidly probable”;

(d) Compensationism, whose doctrine is: “When one is undecided between the safer and the less safe, one may choose the less safe whenever it is certainly and solidly probable, and there is a proportionate reason to compensate for the risk taken.”

Probabiliorism.—The arguments in favor of Probabiliorism are as follows:

(a) extrinsic or from authority. This system is more ancient, and, when the controversy over systems began in the seventeenth century, this was the one that was most favored by the Church and theologians;

(b) intrinsic and direct. An essential note of certitude is that it should exclude all doubt, for as long as doubt remains there is only opinion. But one who is undecided cannot exclude all doubt, unless the arguments against the doubts not only balance, but outweigh the latter (i.e., unless one has greater probability on one’s side). Hence, he who acts against the safer, which is always certain enough, when his own opinion is not more probable, acts with an uncertain conscience;

(c) intrinsic and indirect. In all other matters a man is not prudent if he assents to that which is less safe and less probable. Thus, in things speculative no scholar would think of accepting a theory which to his knowledge was further removed from the truth; in things practical no man of common sense would prefer a road that seemed less likely to lead to his destination. But we should not be less prudent about the good than we are about the true and the useful. Hence, in doubt we should always decide in favor of the law, unless the arguments for liberty are more convincing.

The answers given to the above arguments are:

(a) Probabiliorism is not more ancient as a system, since none of the moral systems were formulated before the sixteenth century; if Patristic and medieval authorities can be quoted who decided cases probabilioristically, others who were contemporary can be named who decided according to milder principles. Moreover, the passages cited are frequently obscure, and do not necessarily bear a Probabilioristic sense. That Probabiliorism enjoyed more favor at the beginning of the controversy is not wonderful, since other systems were more or less identified with Laxism, and the question at issue had not been studied thoroughly. Today Probabiliorism has few defenders.

(b) That which is more probable by far, or most probable, does overcome all doubt, and is even speculatively certain; but he who would require the more probable in this sense does not differ from the Tutiorists spoken of above. That which is more probable, but not to a notable extent, does not exclude all doubt, for the very definition of the more probable is “that judgment which appears more likely to be true than another, but which does not exclude all fear that the other may be true.” Hence, if Probabiliorism calls for the notably more probable, it does not differ from Tutiorism; if it calls for the moderately more probable, it wrongly claims that there is no probability on the opposite side.

(c) The true is that which is in harmony with facts, the useful that which conduces to the obtaining of an end, the good that which is in conformity with law. Certainly, a man is not a prudent seeker of truth if he arbitrarily prefers the less to the more true-seeming, nor a prudent seeker of the useful if he chooses the less safe way of obtaining what is a necessary end; but a man can be a prudent seeker of the good, even though he prefers the less safe and less probable, when the law itself, the norm of good, does not demand more from him. Hence, one who makes a judgment according to the anti-Probabiliorist systems does not feel that he is yielding assent to what is speculatively less probable; but that he is making a decision that is practically certain; not that he is choosing a perilous way, but one that is absolutely safe.

Arguments against Probabiliorism.—(a) Theoretical Objection.—The principle of Probabiliorism that it is lawful to act against the safer side when the less safe side is more probable, cannot be justified except on the ground that invincible ignorance of obligation exists, and hence that the law does not oblige. But the same argument can be used in favor of milder systems; for even if the less safe side is only probable, it makes one invincibly ignorant that one is obliged. Hence, the basis of Probabiliorism is fatal to its own claims.

(b) Practical Objection.—A system for the direction of conscience should be so simple that it can be easily applied in the everyday affairs of life. Abstract questions may receive attention from moralists for days and months, but concrete cases have to be decided as a rule without delay. But Probabiliorism is such a complicated system that it is unsuited to everyday life. St. Alphonsus declares that he found by the experience of many years that this system cannot be profitably used in the guidance of souls, for it imposes an intolerable burden on both confessors and penitents. And how few are so skilled as to be able to decide quickly, without scruples, and correctly about the relative degrees of probability in opposite opinions!

Answers of the Probabiliorists.—(a) A probable opinion against the existence of obligation does not create invincible ignorance, but only doubt; nor does a more probable opinion against obligation create invincible ignorance, since it excludes the less probable opinion for obligation, and makes one assent unwaveringly and in good faith, even though erroneously, to the judgment that one is not bound.

(b) It is no more difficult to decide what is more probable than to decide what is equally probable, or truly and solidly probable; nor is the same skill and attention expected in all persons and cases, but each person must judge according to the best light he has, and each case must receive the measure of attention its importance calls for. If Probabiliorists may become scrupulous, may not Probabilists become lax?

The debate between Probabiliorism and its adversaries is not often heard today, as most modern moralists give their allegiance either to Equiprobabilism (a modified Probabiliorism) or to Probabilism.

Equiprobabilism.—The doctrine of Equiprobabilism is a middle way between Probabiliorism and Probabilism. Thus: (a) it agrees with Probabiliorism in holding that it is not lawful to follow the less safe, if the safer is more probable, or if the safer is equally probable, and the question is about the cessation of the law; (b) it agrees with Probabilism in holding that it is lawful to follow the less safe, if the safer is only equally probable, and the question is about the existence of the law.

The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe, if the safer is equally probable and the question is about the cessation of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In real doubt we should decide in favor of that side which is possession. But, when doubt is about the cessation of a law, the law is in possession; for there is no question that it was made. Therefore, in such a doubt we should decide for the safer side, that is, that the law has not ceased.

(b) A certain obligation is not complied with by a doubtful fulfillment. But doubts about the cessation of the obligation of law usually arise from a probability that one has already fulfilled the law. Therefore in such cases we should decide that the law has not been fulfilled—that is, that its obligation has not ceased.

The Probabilists reply that: (a) it is not true that, in equiprobability about the cessation of law, the law is in possession; for liberty is naturally prior to law, and hence has possession in doubt; (b) nor is it true that an obligation that has probably been complied with or removed is certain.

The Equiprobabilists answer: (a) liberty was in possession, until it was dispossessed by the making of the law; (b) an obligation that certainly existed must be held as certainly in existence, until the contrary is proved; whereas a fact, such as dispensation, abrogation, or fulfillment, is not proved if it is only probable.

The principle that “it is lawful to follow the less safe side, if the safer is only equally probable and the question is about the existence of the law,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In real doubt we should favor the side that is in possession. But when doubt is about the existence of a law, liberty is in possession; for liberty is prior to law. Therefore, in such doubt we may decide that there is no obligation.

(b) An uncertain law does not oblige, if one is invincibly ignorant of its existence. But, when there are equiprobable reasons against the existence of a law, one is invincibly ignorant of its existence. Therefore, in such cases one is not obliged.

The principle that “it is not lawful to follow the less safe side if the safer side is more probable,” is defended as follows by Equiprobabilists:

(a) In doubt improperly so called—that is, in that condition of mind in which there is no fluctuation between equal arguments, but only some indecision between the more and the less probable—we should decide in favor of the more probable, as being morally certain. Hence, it is not lawful to follow what is less safe and less probable.

(b) A law sufficiently promulgated obliges. But, when it is more probable that a law was made or is in force, such law is sufficiently promulgated to the conscience. Hence, the safer side must be followed, if it is more probable.

Probabilist Criticism of the Foregoing Arguments.

(a) If the excess of the more probable over the less probable is so great that the latter is only slightly or doubtfully probable, the more probable is equivalent to certitude; for certitude is assent without fear of the opposite, and the fear of the opposite in such a case would be so slight that it may be considered as non-existent. If the excess is not so great, the less probable remains solidly and certainly probable, and the more probable is not certitude, but opinion (that is, assent with fear of the opposite). The Equiprobabilists are speaking of greater probability in the second sense, and hence they are wrong when they identify it with certitude (see above, 654).

(b) A law must be so promulgated to the conscience that one knows the law or could know it with sufficient diligence; it does not suffice that one can get no further than opinion. It would be unreasonable to oblige one to observe not only what is the law, but also what seems to be the law. Now, he who has only more probable opinion that he is bound by some law, does not know that such obligation exists; he only knows that it seems to exist.

Reply of the Equiprobabilists.-(a) The more probable always removes the appearance of truth from the less probable. Hence, he who recognizes an opinion as more probable can assent to it without any fear of error.

(b) One who holds it as more probable that he is obliged by a certain law, does not know for certain that he is obliged by reason of that law; but he does know for certain that he is obliged by reason of a higher law. Superior to every particular law is the general law that nothing may be done that will deprive law of its efficacy. But law loses its efficacy if each one is free to decide that he is not bound even when the greater weight of probability is to the contrary.

General Arguments in Favor of Equiprobabilism.—(a) From Authority.—St. Alphonsus Liguori, who holds a unique place in the Church as a moralist, preferred Equiprobabilism to every other moral system; and his views are followed not only by his own Congregation, the Redemptorists, but by many others.

(b) From Comparison with Other Systems.—Truth lies midway between extremes; for truth is lost either by exaggeration or by defect. But Equiprobabilism is a happy medium between Probabiliorism inclining to Rigorism, and Probabilism inclining towards Laxism. Hence, the relation of Equiprobabilism to other systems is in its favor.

(c) From the Character of Its Teaching.—According to principles of justice universally admitted as true, a judge should pronounce sentence in favor of the more probable when there is evidence of unequal weight and in favor of that which is in possession when there is evidence of equal weight. But these principles ought to be of universal application. Therefore, Equiprobabilism does right in making these the guiding principles for the court of conscience.

Probabilist Criticism of these Arguments.—(a) St. Alphonsus is one of the greatest moral theologians of the Church. Whether in his later years (1762-1787) he taught Equiprobabilism, is a matter of dispute among those who are familiar with his writings. But there is no doubt that in his mature age (1749-1762), when he wrote his Moral Theology, he was a Probabilist.

(b) Probabilism can likewise claim that it stands midway between the extremes of Rigorism (represented by Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism), on the one side, and of Laxism, on the other side.

(c) The principle of possession invoked by Equiprobabilism applies to matters of justice, because there is a presumption that he who holds property has a right to it, and also because human laws must favor him who is in possession, lest property rights be left uncertain and disputes be multiplied. The principle of possession does not apply, however, to other matters; if the law obliged one yesterday, how can that create a presumption that it obliges one today, if one has good reasons for thinking the obligation has ceased? And as for human ordinances, while they have jurisdiction over external goods and may award them in case of doubt to the possessor, they have not, and have never claimed, the right to make the principle of possession a rule for solving all difficulties about duty.

The principle of Probabiliorism for which the Equiprobabilists claim the authority of judicial practice certainly does not apply to criminal cases, for in these preponderance of evidence against an accused is not to be followed if there is a reasonable doubt. In civil cases judges apply the principle of probabiliorism, but it does not follow that conscience should do the same, for the circumstances are different. The judge is seeking to decide which of two litigants has the more likely claim, and hence he is bound to declare for the side that has stronger evidence. Conscience is seeking to decide whether an obligation is certain or uncertain, and hence it is not obliged to decide for obligation when this is more probable, but still not certain.

What have been the vicissitudes of Moral Theology? - There have been various vicissitudes of Moral Theology, both as regards its didactic development and as regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases.

As regards its methodical form, various ages can be distinguished in it, and they are the following six.

The first age, from the beginning, in the time of the Apostles, was when moral doubts were resolved by the decisions of the Supreme Pontiffs, by the decrees of Councils, and by the opinions of the Fathers, who especially in their homilies and sermons to the people explained those things which are necessary for rightly informing morals and for salvation.

The second age succeeds a little later, when in the first centuries of the Church the use of canonical penance became established, and Penitential Books were employed. Special treatises on moral matters were gradually multiplied in this age, either together with speculative doctrines or separately, up to the twelfth century, when, after St. Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, who died in the year 1033, and after St. Bernard, first Abbot of Clairvaux, who died in 1153, Peter Lombard, called the Master by antonomasia, wrote the books of the Sentences, in the third of which he treats of the virtues and of vices; he died in 1164. Benedict XIV, de Syn., l. 11, c. 11; Decree of Gratian, at the end.

The third age extends from the thirteenth century to the fourteenth. In this age sacred practical doctrine made great progress, especially through the work of William of Paris, who died in 1249, St. Bonaventure, O. Min., who died in the year 1274, St. Thomas Aquinas, O.P., who died in the year 1274, called the Angelic Doctor, St. Raymond of Pennafort, of the Order of Preachers, who died in the year 1275, and Peter Paludanus, O.P., who died in the year 1342, who for St. Alphonsus is a doctor of perfect knowledge.

The fourth age embraces the two following centuries, the fifteenth and the sixteenth; and it is distinguished by the notable saints who flourished in this age. Among others are celebrated St. John of Capistrano, O. Min., who died in the year 1440, St. Bernardine of Siena, O.S. Fr., who died in the year 1444, St. Lawrence Justinian, who died in the year 1455, St. Antoninus, Archbishop of Florence, who died in the year 1459, Thomas Cardinal Cajetan, O.P., who died in the year 1534, a man of most subtle genius, Francis de Vitoria, O.P., who died in the year 1546, Dominic Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1560, Peter Soto, O.P., who died in the year 1563, Bartholomew Medina, O.P., who died in the year 1581, St. Charles Borromeo, who died in the year 1584, Martin Azpilcueta, called Navarrus, who died in the year 1590, Cardinal Francis Toletus, S.J., who died in the year 1596, and Louis Molina, S.J., who died in the year 1600.

The fifth age embraces the seventeenth and eighteenth century up to St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, and it is distinguished by many learned scholastic theologians who expressly expounded and illustrated moral questions in copious treatises. Among many others there excel Thomas Sanchez, S.J., who died in the year 1610, Francis Suarez, S.J., who died in the year 1617, Leonard Lessius, S.J., who died in the year 1623, Basil Pontius, O.S. Aug., who died in the year 1629, the Salmanticenses, O. Carm. Disc., from 1631 to 1722, Martin Bonacina, who died in the year 1631, Giles Coninck, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Ferdinand De Castro Palao, S.J., who died in the year 1633, Paul Laymann, S.J., who died in the year 1635, Francis Sylvius, who died in the year 1649, Augustine Barbosa, who died in the year 1649, Cardinal John De Lugo, who died in the year 1660, Peter Marchant, O. Min., who died in the year 1661, Antoninus Diana, Cleric Regular Theatine, who died in the year 1663, Zacharias Pasqualigo, Cler. Reg., who died in the year 1664, Hermann Busembaum, S.J., who died in the year 1668, Henry Pirhing, S.J., who died in the year 1670, Thomas Tamburinus, S.J., who died in the year 1675, Anacletus Reiffenstuel, O.S. Franc., who died in the year 1703, Claude La-Croix, S.J., who died in the year 1714, Patrick Sporer, O. Min., who died in the year 1714, Prosper Lambertini, Benedict XIV, who died in the year 1758, and Lucius Ferraris, Ord. Min., who died in the year 1760.

The sixth age takes its beginning from St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori, who died in the year 1787, and extends down to our own times. St. Alphonsus, most outstanding in genius and doctrine as well as in sanctity of life, and divinely given for exterminating Jansenist errors and severities, wrote a Moral Theology in which he treats all questions learnedly, eruditely, and with the highest prudence, recounting almost all that had been handed down before him; hence he was deservedly adorned by the Church with the title of Doctor. Hence it happened that in more recent times Moral Theologians followed St. Alphonsus as leader and master. In our age very many compendia of Moral Theology have been published.

The name indeed is modest, but the works are certainly of notable merit. For in these compendia the whole doctrine of Moral Theology is handed down briefly and in order, and in them is contained, accurately set forth, not only the doctrine of the old theologians accumulated in the course of time, but also that which has been acquired for Moral Theology either from the more recent Acts of the Holy See and of the Sacred Roman Congregations, or also from the progress of the natural sciences. Nor indeed have more expansive treatments been lacking in this age, as can be seen in the treatises On Justice and Law and On Contracts of D. Carriere, and in the scholia, annotations, and dissertations of Fr. Anthony Ballerini, S.J. Zitelli, Enchirid.;

Hurter, Nomenclat.; D'Annibale, Summ., 4th ed., p. 1, n. 2 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction V.

As regards the development of the general rule of morals in doubtful cases, for several centuries each one defended his own opinion, according to the varying weight of the reasons, as seemed better to him. In the year 1572 Antonius Cordubensis first began to contend on behalf of law, because of the authoritative and obligatory prerogative of law, and accordingly he established that in doubt the safer part must always be held. But in the year 1577 Bartholomew Medina, professor at Salamanca, began, on the contrary, to contend on behalf of liberty because of the prerogative of its natural right, and accordingly he established that in doubtful matters he acts prudently and licitly who follows an opinion truly probable and favoring liberty, even after leaving aside the more probable opinion in favor of law. He was the first who reduced the doctrine concerning probable opinions into a system. From this Tutiorism and Probabilism arose.

In the following seventeenth century Synnichius, who died in the year 1666, brought Tutiorism down into Rigorism, while Caramuel brought Probabilism into Laxism: for the former denied that we can follow an opinion favoring liberty, even if it is most probable, which was condemned by Alexander VIII in the year 1690; the latter, on the opposite side, affirmed that we can follow an opinion even slightly probable, which was proscribed by Innocent XI in the year 1679. Hence in that same century Probabilism was widely diffused, and became a very common and very received doctrine in every school: of almost all the disciples of St. Thomas, of almost all the disciples of Scotus, of almost all the Fathers of the Society of Jesus, and of other theologians, with few exceptions.

But since many of these probabilists favored liberty too much, asserting that it was lawful to follow even an opinion that was probably and doubtfully probable, the Probabilists were divided among themselves, and there arose moderate Probabilism, standing in an opinion truly and gravely probable, and broad Probabilism, proceeding even to doubtful probability. Hence, while the Fathers of the Society of Jesus commonly remained in Probabilism, the Thomists passed over to Probabiliorism, requiring for liberty an opinion more probable than the opinion favoring law. Zitelli, in his Enchiridion, mentions as the head of the probabiliorists Francis Genet, who died in the year 1702.

In the eighteenth century, to overthrow broad Probabilism and Probabiliorism at the same time, St. Alphonsus M. de Liguori undertook to defend moderate Probabilism, establishing that it is lawful to use a probable opinion even in competition with one more probable for law, whenever the former has a certain and grave foundation. And for that reason the Holy Doctor called his system moderate Probabilism, against rigid Probabiliorists and lax Probabilists, Equiprobabilism, with aeque taken according to the nature of true probability, not according to equality of degree.

But since the word nevertheless was not free from ambiguity in itself, hence after St. Alphonsus another system arose, which the Redemptorist Fathers defend, namely the system of Equiprobabilism, by which it is established that it is lawful to follow an opinion favoring liberty when it is equally or a little less probable than the opinion favoring law; but that it is not lawful when the latter is much more probable than the former, which in truth falls back into Probabiliorism. La-Croix, vol. 1, prodromal book, Franc. Ant. Zachariae and Quaest. facti of Stephen De Champs; Zitelli, Enchir.; D'Annibale, p. 1, n. 8 ff.; Bouquillon, Inst. Theol. Mor. Fundam., Introduction II; E. E. M. n. 114, 119.

What is probable conscience; and what is its directive force? - "Probable conscience is that by which someone, relying on some probable opinion, forms for himself a practical dictate of reason from certain reflex, or concomitant, principles for acting licitly." L. 1. 1. n. 40. Thus, for example, Titius, a confessor, relying on a probable opinion, judges that he probably has jurisdiction. Then, however, he says, and this is the reflex principle: But while jurisdiction is truly probable, the Church certainly supplies it. Therefore, he concludes, and this is the practical dictate of conscience: I can validly and licitly absolve in this case; and he absolves. Its directive force is declared by the following propositions.

Note: 1. "That diverse species of probabilities are given.... A tenuously probable opinion is one which rests on some foundation, but not such as avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.... Probable is that which rests on a grave moment, either of intrinsic reason or extrinsic authority, which avails to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite. More probable is that which rests on a graver foundation, but still with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary is also judged probable. Most probable is that which rests on a most grave foundation, and for this reason the opposite is judged either tenuously or doubtfully probable.... An opinion or sentence morally certain is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable. Finally a safe opinion is one which withdraws from every danger of sinning; but the safer is one which withdraws more from such danger, although it may not rest on stronger reasons." L. l. c. But S. D. speaks more exactly about a most probable opinion, H. A. tr. 1. n. 65: "Unless we wish to confuse a most probable opinion with an absolutely certain opinion, it is necessary to say that the opinion contrary to the most probable is not tenuously probable, but doubtfully probable." The reason is that a most probable opinion "is within the limits of probability," and therefore "does not exclude every prudent fear." "But tenuous probability is not true probability, and therefore does not bring with it a prudent reason. But doubtful probability brings some prudent reason, although not altogether certain and stable." Cf. also Op. Mor. l. 1. n. 85. But lest there be quibbling about words, as far as concerns us, we recognize no opinions, as regards doctrine, within the limits of true probability except the probable opinion, the more probable, and the most probable. Below the probable there is only the non-probable, the improbable, of which there can indeed be various grades; above the most probable there is only the certain. The probable is immediately opposed, by an opposition of comparison, to the more probable; but mediately to the most probable; and likewise the most probable is immediately opposed to the more probable, but mediately to the probable, unless someone wishes really to confuse the most probable with the certain.

2. Various moral systems: Tutiorism: A moral system which establishes that in doubt the safer part is to be followed practically. One kind is absolute, and is Rigorism, which establishes that the safer part must always be followed. Another is mitigated, which establishes that the safer part must be followed unless the other part favoring liberty is most probable. Probabiliorism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion favoring liberty only when it is more probable than the opposite favoring the law. Therefore according to this system a doubtful law obliges, against the most common opinion and against reason. Equiprobabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion unless it is equally or almost equally probable as the opposite. It is indeed a right norm of acting, but not to the exclusion of probabilism, which is a moral system containing an altogether right norm of acting, embracing all the cases of a true probable opinion favoring liberty, when the question concerns merely the subjective honorableness of an action. Probabilism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion favoring liberty, although the opposite in favor of the law is more probable, whether a little or much more probable, where nevertheless the question concerns only the liceity of a human action. The reason is that when there is a truly probable opinion against a law, the law is doubtful, and a doubtful law does not oblige. Laxism: It is a moral system which establishes that it is licit to follow an opinion even doubtfully and tenuously probable against the law. It was condemned by Innocent XI, proposition 3, condemned March 2, 1679.

With a practically probable conscience, which proximately directs the action really to be placed here and now, it is altogether unlawful to operate. - For only a subjectively certain conscience is the rule of morals. And in this sense that saying is consequently false: He who acts probably, acts prudently. L. 1. 1. n. 58. 69. 80. Therefore the whole question here concerns a speculatively probable conscience, which only remotely directs the action, stating the probable existence of a law: namely whether by means of some reasoning we can lawfully make the step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience, or, what is the same, whether, while a probable opinion stands concerning the honorableness of some action in general, we can form for ourselves a certain conscience concerning the honorableness of such an action in a particular and individual case, and thus licitly follow in practice a speculatively probable opinion. To resolve this question we establish the following propositions.

It is not licit practically to follow a tenuously probable opinion, the safer one being left aside. - The proposition is against lax probabilists. This is clear first from proposition 3 condemned by Innocent XI. Moreover, a tenuously probable opinion is an opinion resting on a slight motive; but a slight motive is a motive by no means sufficient to move a serious or prudent man to assent, and therefore it is not truly probable. Indeed that opinion is called truly probable which rests on such a motive that it is sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But if such an opinion is insufficient to move a prudent man to judgment about the non-existence of the law, it is impossible to form for oneself a conscience concerning the liceity of the action. L. 1. 1. n. 40; E. M.

You will resolve: From the cited proposition condemned by Innocent XI, both because it deals with even tenuous probability, and because it asserts too generally that we always act prudently when, trusting in probability, we do something, nothing can be drawn against probabilism. For tenuous probability is not true probability. Nor indeed is probabilism extended to a case where the question concerns the truth of a thing and an end to be obtained absolutely. Nor indeed is it licit practically to follow a doubtfully probable opinion. For a doubtfully probable opinion is an opinion resting on a doubtful motive, namely one about which it can prudently be doubted whether it is sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But it is an evident thing that a prudent man in matters of grave moment does not rely on a motive of this kind; whence, if the matter does not in fact turn out well, all would rightly and deservedly accuse him of imprudence.

But the moral goodness or malice of human acts is a graver matter than any other temporal business. Moreover, while this doubtful probability stands, it is impossible to form for oneself a morally certain practical dictate concerning the liceity of the action. Therefore to an opinion tenuously probable is opposed an opinion gravely probable, or simply probable; to an opinion doubtfully probable is opposed an opinion certainly probable, or simply probable. There are not lacking those who confuse a doubtfully probable and a tenuously probable opinion with each other. Practically indeed they are often confused; but speculatively, given the nature of the thing, they are altogether distinguished from each other. Cf. 112; La-Croix l. 1. n. 126.

It is not licit to follow a probable opinion concerning the objective truth itself of the thing, where the question concerns an end to be obtained absolutely, the safer one being left aside. Proof. He who is absolutely bound to the end is bound to choose those means which in no way bring into danger the end to be obtained. But a probable opinion, since it can be false, brings the danger of frustrating the end to be obtained absolutely. For the objective truth or existence of the thing will certainly not be had if the opinion concerning it is probable but false. Therefore. L. 1. 1. n. 42. To be obtained absolutely, "namely when someone is bound from justice or charity to avoid damage which is present in the thing itself," Suarez apud S. Alph. Op. Mor. ed. Rome, 1757, l. c. n. 33, or the danger of it. Then indeed "in doubt the safer way is to be chosen." C. Illud 5 de Cler. exc. The case must likewise be added in which someone is bound to the safer thing from some special positive law or precept, or contract, or vow. Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. n. 8, s. 6. n. 10; L. 1. 2. n. 10, l. 6. n. 918 p. ult.

You will resolve: It is not licit to follow a probable opinion, but we must altogether choose the safer one in all those things which are necessary with the necessity of means for salvation, where the fact itself, or the truth of the thing, alone is attended to. Hence we must embrace the safer religion. Prop. 4 condemned by Innocent XI; L. 1. 1. n. 43. In the conferral of the sacraments, the minister is bound to follow the safer opinion, unless necessity is present or the Church supplies; for here again the question concerns the truth of the thing. For sacraments would not be had unless those things were really placed which Christ instituted for their validity. Prop. 1 condemned by Innocent XI.

Unless necessity is present; "for in extreme necessity we can well use any opinion, not only probable, but even tenuously probable, for the value of the sacrament... provided the sacrament is conferred conditionally: because the condition sufficiently repairs the injury of the sacrament, if perhaps it is conferred invalidly, and on the other hand necessity is a sufficient and just cause for conferring the sacraments conditionally." L. 1. 1. n. 49. Unless the Church supplies; for "we can licitly use a probable opinion where the Church is presumed to supply, as can happen in the sacrament of matrimony to validate a contract only probably valid, if perhaps that contract is null because of an impediment which the Church removes by supplying, and in the sacrament of penance to supply the jurisdiction of the confessor, if perhaps it is lacking."

L. 1. 1. n. 50. A physician is bound to apply the safer medicines which can be had in the case; for here the question concerns the objective effect itself, that is, the health of the sick person, to be obtained absolutely. And certainly the physician is bound not only from charity, but also from justice, by reason of his office and tacit contract, to provide in the better way for the health of the sick person, from whom he receives a stipend. L. 1. 1. n. 44. A judge cannot judge according to the less probable opinion; for he is bound by divine and human precept to render to each his right. Prop. 2 condemned by Innocent XI; L. 1. 1. n. 47.

A hunter who probably judges that an object hidden in the woods is a man cannot strike, although he judges more probably that it is a beast. For on the one hand the neighbor has a certain right to his life; on the other hand greater probability does not make it so that, if it really is a man, he will not perish by the blow. L. 1. 1. n. 52, H. A. tr. 1. n. 33. When scandals and more grave evils threaten, the safer part is to be chosen, by which they may be avoided, so that the utility of all may be consulted. C. Illud 5 de Cler. exc. - Generally the safer things are to be chosen when, as regards charity, the danger of sinning formally must be avoided, and as regards justice, the damage must be avoided of him who is in certain possession of his certain right. E. M.

It is licit to follow the most probable opinion, and even the more probable, the safer being left aside, where the question concerns only the honorableness of the action. - The proposition is against rigid and mitigated tutiorists. The honorableness of the action, about which the question here concerns, is quite diverse from the effect itself of the action, or from the truth of the thing, about which in the preceding proposition. The honorableness of a human action depends on the dictate of conscience, which is the proximate rule of human acts; the effect of the action, or the truth of the thing, depends on the very fact of the action. The former is subjective, the latter objective. Proof of the 1st part from proposition 3 condemned by Alexander VIII in 1690: "It is not licit to follow an opinion even the most probable among probables"; the author of this proposition was John Sinnich (+ Oct. 8, 1666), a Louvain doctor and defender of Cornelius Jansen, whom other Jansenists followed. Hence it is clear that the rigid tutiorism of the Jansenists had already been reproved by the Church. And certainly no obligation is given of doing what is safer; for it suffices to do what is safe. Likewise no obligation is given always to forestall the danger of materially sinning, nor can it be given, for this would be morally impossible; only the obligation is present to avoid the danger of formally sinning.

Proof of the 2nd part. If it were not licit practically to follow an opinion in favor of liberty unless it is most probable, then either this most probable opinion is taken as morally certain, or, as the word sounds, as probable in the highest degree indeed, but not certain. In the first case mitigated tutiorism would fall back into condemned rigid tutiorism; in the other case it would fall into false doctrine against the Apostle saying that all that is not from faith, that is, from a certain persuasion of honorableness, is sin, Rom. 14:23. Thus among the milder rigorists are counted Antoine, De Consc. c. 4. q. 4, Gazzaniga, De Consc. prob. n. 140. 141, requiring for operating direct truth, or an opinion certainly and very probable, and much more probable, or more probable by many degrees, and far excelling. Proof of the 2nd part by the same reasons as the following proposition. - L. 1. 1. n. 40. 54; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 6. n. 8; E. M.

It is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer being left aside, whether equally probable or even truly more probable, where the question concerns only the honorableness of the action, by forming for oneself a conscience not directly, but from reflex principles.

The proposition is against probabiliorists and equiprobabilists. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted.

Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For it is very difficult even for the doctors themselves to establish which opinion is more probable, which notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, what to one and the same person previously appeared more probable, far more probable, afterwards, the matter having been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable.

Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is licit to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable opinion; or they say that it is licit to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not produce a certain obligation; the will without knowledge of the law cannot be bound by its obligation. The first cannot be said, for although the opinion is more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without a certain conscience it is not licit to act. But the other, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where there is true probability against the law, the law is already doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had.

Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more closely to truth. But this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more closely to truth, and a sentence can be false which bore before itself a certain greater appearance of truth. Moreover, here the question does not concern speculative truth but practical truth; the question does not concern adhesion of the intellect simply to truth, but the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of the law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

The second part is proved. Simple probabilism is proved.

Proof 1. The proposition established is clear from the authority of very many and very grave theologians, who not only hand it down, but also affirm it as common doctrine, such as Suarez, Lugo, Struggl, La-Croix, Pignatelli, Vasquez, Elbel, Castropalaus, Sporer, etc. Cf. these Instit. Mor. ed. 4. Hence S. Alph. in Dissert. de usu moderato opinionis probabilis in concursu probabilioris, 2nd ed., Naples 1755: "We undertake to prove the last, more benign, and most common opinion, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in concurrence with a more probable one in favor of the law, whenever that opinion has a certain and grave foundation." And certainly, although many after the Jansenists defended probabiliorism, nevertheless by far the greater part of theologians embraced probabilism. But he who in practice follows a doctrine which very many and very grave theologians teach, and which the doctors commonly hand down, acts prudently; but he who acts prudently acts honorably. For this reason, in the Dissertation just cited, S. D. immediately adds: "Add to these especially the argument, namely that if the benign opinion had been false, it certainly would by no means have been commonly received everywhere by doctors as it truly was received; or at least the Church would not have tolerated it, permitting souls commonly to walk by this way of perdition, as the adversaries cry out, deceived by such blind guides." And, as the same S. Alph. has it l. 6. n. 460, par. Haec autem, "nor is it an obstacle that several opinions which are circulated are not condemned by the Church, and yet by others more commonly are reputed lax; for the Church does not condemn all opinions which regard particular cases, although it does not approve them; but opinions which regard the universality of consciences, the Church does not approve nor keep silent about, as S. Aug. said, Epist. 119: The Church of God tolerates many things, and yet those things which concern faith or good life, it neither approves nor keeps silent about." Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 669 toward the end, Hoc unum, etc.; Bouquillon Theol. Fund. de Consc. c. 2. a. 1. § 2.

Proof 2. He who in practice follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence acts prudently, and consequently honorably. But he who in practice follows a truly probable opinion, the more probable and safer being left aside, follows an opinion which stands within the bounds of right reason and prudence. Therefore. - The major is clear of itself. For what is more honorable than to follow right reason and prudence, which is right reason concerning things to be done? And Benedict XIV, C. Apostolica Constitutio § 21, indeed hands down this rule of acting, namely that we should follow the opinion which reason persuades and authority confirms. Moreover, it is by no means consonant with right reason, and especially with divine goodness, to wish to oblige man to perform somehow that which remains prudently uncertain to man himself after diligent inquiry, whether it is required by the order or not; especially since doubts of this kind are very frequent because of the weakness of the human intellect itself. This would be to impose unbearable burdens. L. 58. 86; S. Th. 1. 2. q. 19. a. 10 ad 1. But the minor is clear from the very nature and definition of a truly probable opinion, which is not changed by the concurrence of another opinion, although more probable and safer. And this S. Alph. himself openly affirms in the definition of the more probable opinion; for he says that its contrary is judged probable. Cf. 112. Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.; L. 1. 1. n. 79.

Proof 3. S. Alph. says this in his Op. Mor. Theol., 6th ed., Rome 1767: "There are two principles on which, relying, I defend the licit use of a probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to liberty, with which man has been endowed by God." Each of these principles is explained and proved at length by S. D. l. 1. n. 66 seq., H. A. tr. 1. n. 37 seq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer one, each principle is still verified, namely that the law is uncertain if the question concerns its existence, or that it is doubtful if the question concerns its interpretation, because it is obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated," L. 1. 1. n. 70, Turin ed. 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself despoiled of it because of an uncertain law: for antecedently to every law, each possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed on man. Therefore. L. 54 seq.

Now, that the law in that hypothesis is really doubtful or uncertain, so that it may prudently be regarded as such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability. For where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy the lesser; and this philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and S. Alph. expressly hands down, H. A. tr. 1. n. 29 and l. 1. n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same S. D. explains this in this way in the Dissertation ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has in its favor so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. But otherwise it must be said if the excess is not notable, and the opposed probability receives force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means deprived of its grave probability." Indeed the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other; but it is a worthiness of meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are already outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since then one opinion will be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence S. D. l. 6. n. 604, raising the question: "Whether a penitent can be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds," responds: "The common and to-be-followed opinion teaches that the confessor not only can, but is also bound under grave sin (where the question concerns grave matter, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118), to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor.... This common opinion standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how a confessor can with a safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly at least reflexively, as probabilist authors commonly think, who by following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one judge that they embrace an opinion reflexively more probable, as being confirmed by graver foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." S. D. has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A. tr. 16. n. 118; and to this opinion he adds no limits except the following: namely that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not repute it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1. n. 87, where S. D. after Gerson says: "Theological doctors ought not to be quick to assert that some things are mortal sins where they are not most certain about the matter: Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 3; Pignatelli Cons. Can. tom. 8. cons. 15.

Proof 4. In order that law certainly oblige, it must be sufficiently promulgated, S. Th. 1. 2. q. 90. a. 4. But sufficient promulgation of law is not had if the law is not certain and manifest. Hence in canon law it is generally established: "In these things, concerning which the law is not found expressed, proceed, equity being preserved, always inclining toward the more humane part, according as you will see persons and causes, places and times, to require." C. Ex parte tua 11 de Transact. And in civil law it is decreed: "Whenever the interpretation of liberty is doubtful, response must be made according to liberty." L. 20 de R. I. "In a doubtful matter, to follow the more benign interpretation is no less just than safe." L. 192 de R. I. But the reason is that law imposes moral necessity, and therefore must necessarily bind the will. But it cannot necessarily bind the will except through knowledge. Therefore, knowledge of the law being excluded, the will remains morally free. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Now if a most probable opinion is present against the law, it is evidently clear that knowledge of the law is lacking. For certainty and evidence cannot be had with the greatest opposite probability; indeed not even with simple probability. Hence S. Alph. says: "To constitute a doubtful law, true probability to the contrary suffices." L. 1. n. 57, ed. 1762. 1763.

Confirmation 5. By the authority of S. Thomas. Law is a certain rule and measure. In order that a rule direct and a measure measure, it must be applied to the thing which must be directed and measured. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 30. a. 4. Therefore law must reach the subjects whom it directs; but it reaches them through knowledge. S. Th. De Verit. q. 17. a. 3. Accordingly law must be certain and evident. Therefore, if the law is uncertain, namely if its existence is not established, if the law is doubtful, namely if the meaning of the law is obscure, the obligation of the law ceases; a precept does not bind except through knowledge. S. Th. l. c. Hence those axioms: An uncertain law cannot introduce a certain obligation; A doubtful law does not oblige. For the effect cannot surpass the cause. These things S. Thomas says altogether generally, nor does he distinguish between a law having against it a less probable, or equally probable, or more probable opinion. Therefore the whole question from the Angelic Doctor is this: whether a law having against it a more probable, equally probable, or less probable opinion can be said to reach man through knowledge, to bind him by means of knowledge, through knowledge, through the power of knowledge. But knowledge is not given if true probability is against it. Hence every question about mortal sin is determined dangerously unless the truth is had expressly. S. Th. Quodl. 9. a. 15. And S. Alph. l. 3 after n. 139, Epist. Resp.: "But in order that some action be affirmed absolutely to be a mortal sin, a probable opinion is not enough, nor even a more probable one; for the more probable does not exclude rational fear of erring; whence it does not bring about that the law does not remain doubtful, and that the opposite cannot be true, if it is truly probable."

Confirmation 6. Innocent III allowed a spouse suffering from impotence a three-year trial, C. Laudabilem 5 de Frig., and did not prescribe that it must first be seen whether potency was more probable, or at least equally probable. In the eighteenth century, when certain Indians in the Kingdom of Paraguay who had been converted to the faith had several wives, and questions arose concerning the validity of their marriages, Urban VIII responded to John de Lugo, afterwards Cardinal: "Where the opinions of doctors concur as probable on each side, those opinions are to be followed which, for the condition of places and barbarian men, are more favorable." Urban did not say that the more probable opinions were to be followed, nor did he say where equally probable opinions concur, but absolutely where probable opinions concur. Carden. Cris. Theol. Diss. 2. § 553. E. M. 119.

Nor indeed is it of any force, in order to overturn all the aforesaid things in almost one word, to object against them that probabilism has already been condemned by Innocent XI. For Innocent XI only commanded that liberty be given to the Fathers of the Society to defend probabiliorism and to refute probabilism, if they wished. Cf. E. M.; Wirceburg. De Actib. hum. c. 4.

Is the proposition established above, n. 116, some exception to probabilism, as though a true case of probabilism? - R. Negatively. For if probabilism is true, it must always be true, and must be verified in every case. And certainly probabilism regards the formal or subjective honorableness or shamefulness itself of an action; by no means the objective or real existence or non-existence of the effect of such an action. Now that thesis precisely regards this objective effect to be obtained or not obtained.

Therefore if someone in that case, in which the effect must be obtained absolutely, uses a probable opinion, he will certainly sin; but he will not sin precisely because he uses a probable opinion concerning the liceity of the action, but because he uses a probable opinion concerning the validity of the act, exposing himself to the danger of frustrating the effect to be obtained absolutely.

Then this would be a case of probabilism, when there were a probable opinion that it is licit by one's action to expose to danger an effect to be obtained absolutely; but that is not a probable opinion, but a false and erroneous one. And thus, for example, a minister of the sacraments who follows in their administration a probable opinion as regards their value indeed sins, certainly not because he follows a probable opinion as regards the liceity of the action; rather on the contrary, because he follows an altogether improbable opinion as regards the liceity of the action; because, since the effect of the sacrament certainly to be obtained, namely remission of sins and infusion of grace, depends on true matter and true form, someone using doubtful matter or form exposes it to the danger of lacking such effect, and therefore inflicts harm on his neighbor, and consequently sins. - L. Op. Mor. ed. Rome, 1757, l. 1. n. 33; Laymann l. 1. tr. 1. c. 5. § 2. 3; Lugo De Iust. et Iure d. 16. n. 97; D'Annib. ed. 4. p. 1. n. 266.

Note: An exception, and a true and illogical exception of probabilism, is the limitation which some probabilists and equiprobabilists add to probabilism from the principle of possession: In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. Therefore, they say, a doubtful law, in doubt about the existence of the law, does not indeed oblige, because liberty possesses. But a doubtful law in doubt about its cessation obliges, because the law possesses. Hence if it is probable that you did not emit a vow, you are not bound by the vow. If you certainly emitted a vow, and it is probable that you satisfied it, you are still bound to satisfaction.

But thus to admit probabilism halfway concerning the existence of the law, and not concerning the cessation of the law, is to admit the principles and deny the conclusions. If a doubtful law does not oblige, precisely because it is doubtful, whenever it is doubtful it will not oblige. Now the law is as doubtful in doubt about its existence, namely about its first existence, as it is doubtful in doubt about its cessation; for if its cessation is probable, by that very fact the existence itself of the law becomes doubtful. But the law obliging is not a law which existed, but one which exists; nor is it the law which exists in the abstract, but one which binds us in the present by its certain obligation.

But if a probable opinion is had concerning the cessation of the law, however that may be understood, its obligation becomes doubtful, and its existence likewise becomes doubtful; namely again, not the very existence itself of the law in the abstract, but its force of obliging in the concrete, in the particular case, here and now. L. 1. 1. n. 63. 78. And thus, although it is certain that a vow was emitted and at some time existed, if you probably satisfied it, that certain vow, insofar as it once existed, becomes doubtful insofar as it binds you here and now; and that saying has force: A doubtful law does not oblige.

Possession indeed constitutes a prevailing right insofar as he who possesses is shown by possession itself, or at least is presumed, to be the owner of the thing which he possesses. But how can that be either demonstrated or reasonably presumed when the opposite is established by true or grave probability? For then it is established by true and grave probability that the possession is not legitimate, which alone can constitute a prevailing right. For if the fact alone of possession, without legitimate title, at least reasonably presumed, constituted that prevailing right, then all thieves and robbers could retain another's property by the prevailing right of possession. Cf. 157. 4; Troplong, Della Prescrizione c. 2 del Possesso a. 2228; D'Annib. ed. 4. p. 1. n. 260. 268.

The material fact itself of possession by no means constitutes a prevailing right in the internal forum, as regards the very right of dominion and ownership of the thing, but only as regards proof in the external forum, which must be instituted by the plaintiff against the possessor, because of the aforesaid presumption of dominion. But presumption yields to truth. Hence if someone has possessed in bad faith, even for a very long time, he must restore the thing even spontaneously and without proof or petition by the plaintiff. D'Annibale himself, who ed. 4. p. 1. n. 264 seq. follows the rule of possession, asserts n. 256 note 5: "Justice forbids giving damage to him who is in certain possession of his right....

I said, who is in certain possession of his right; for if the right of another is uncertain, either the condition of the possessor will be better, or at least because no certain right of another is violated, there will be no obligation of restitution." Behold how D'Annib. himself requires certain and legitimate possession, so that it really constitutes a prevailing right. And the same D'Annib. l. c. n. 259 note 18 also asserts: "Namely, certainty against true probability is not given." How therefore will the obligation of the law be certain, if it is probable that that obligation already ceased long ago?

See also ibid. n. 169. 181. 203. - Cf. 143. S. Alph. l. 3. n. 112 par. Secundo says: "When it is probable that the obligation of the law never began, or that it has been abolished, then the presumption in favor of the law ceases, and liberty possesses." Behold, the limitation of probabilism through the principle of possession is finished; and from S. D. also, it has no value except from presumption. S. D. joins indifferently the two cases, that the law never began, or that it has been abolished, and when each is probable, from S. D. the obligation of the law is not present. - Likewise n. 290 he says that probable custom suffices for excusing from the law. Behold again, no account is taken by S. D. of possession of the law.

And then, distinguishing well altogether between doubt and probability, he says: "that in doubt about custom the precept possesses, whence a dispensation must be sought; otherwise, if it is probable that custom is present." Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 325, par. Infirmi, n. 483, l. 4. n. 47. Besides, D'Annibale asserts the law of possession in a threefold case, namely in doubt 1. whether it receives a restrictive interpretation, 2. whether it is just, 3. whether it has ceased. P. 1. n. 262. And in the preceding n. 261 note 30 and n. 263 note 1, he affirms that S. Alphonsus perpetually used this rule of possession. - Now D'Annibale himself, cited n. 262 note 35, says: "except the 2nd case, in which all agree, Cf. here 157, in the others even those who seem to profess it depart from our rule."

And among these he expressly cites and reports only S. Alphonsus! And while the praised author notes this against Probabilism, that it must use exceptions which his rule of possession does not need, l. c. n. 266, he then candidly admits that his rule is not perpetual, and that it fails in several cases which he enumerates, l. c. n. 269 note 30. - But the alleged exceptions of Probabilism, namely when the question concerns not only the honorableness of an action, but an end to be obtained absolutely and the objective truth of the thing, l. c. n. 266, 256 note 5, are not really exceptions.

Cf. here 120. What he likewise says, l. c. n. 267, that the probabilist is forced to give contradictory responses, is in no way true. Cf. here 128. And it is certainly surprising that the learned theologian found a contradiction, cited n. 267, as regards that same case in which he himself had expressly affirmed a little before, namely n. 263, that it is licit to follow each of two contrary probable opinions. - Finally he asserts n. 264 that that rule of possession enjoys a better right, and n. 269 that it is better than the others not only as to the truth of the thing, but also as to practice; but in the following n. 270, immediately afterward, he affirms that it is licit to follow opinions truly and gravely probable; and n. 263, after he has set forth the various systems and also established his own rule n. 262, he says, let it be licit for each one to choose what pleases him more.

Perhaps to avert contradiction it can be said that the illustrious D'Annibale regarded that rule of possession not for the case of true probability, but for the case of doubt, which he seems sufficiently to suggest n. 269; and thus it is altogether true that theologians most commonly teach that rule, n. 268, and in this sense we also admit it and diligently explain it. Cf. here 143 seq. And certainly that rule is stated in doubt.

What is the force of extrinsic probability? - There is no doubt that extrinsic probability constitutes an opinion truly and sufficiently gravely probable. "Someone of small knowledge," says S. Th. 2. 2. q. 4. a. 3, "is made more certain about that which he hears from some learned person than about that which seems to him according to his own reason." This probability therefore has force, because someone is not judged to speak without grave foundation. L. 1. 1. n. 79. Hence, if someone does not rest in authority alone, but weighs this foundation, then extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic. But sometimes this extrinsic probability itself constitutes intrinsic probability, namely when the question concerns a matter which greatly depends on the estimation of the wise, L. 1. 3. n. 1032, namely a matter rather of fact than of law, for example, what is grave matter in the canonical hours, in fasting, etc.

An extrinsically probable opinion is usually designated by common, more common, most common opinion. Concerning these Sanchez, De Matr. l. 3. d. 44. n. 3, has these things, from which one can make a judgment about a common, more common opinion, etc.: "That opinion is not called common which has many doctors asserting it, with no preceding discussion, but superficially, and as they say, following it in passing....

Therefore Navarrus very well says that he regards as more common an opinion approved by six doctors treating the matter professedly, than by fifty who are led almost by the authority alone of the former. To these add Ioannes Lupus... saying that doctors are not to be believed, however much they excel in doctrine, when they lack foundation." - La-Croix l. 1. n. 164. 165; Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1806, p. 21 seq.; E. M. 122. 131.

Note: From the common opinion of theologians "one must not easily depart in a practical matter." Lugo De Iust. et Iur. d. 16. n. 106. Yet this must not be taken too scrupulously, and much less extended. Hence S. Alph. does not hesitate to affirm that he "departed from the opinions of many grave authors," l. 3. n. 547, and ibid. below he says: "Where reason convinced me, I did not refuse to go against several authors." Cf. also l. 6. n. 257. 427, where S. D. departs even from the most common opinion. Indeed an opinion is not therefore probable because it is taught by several authors, if they do not bring to it a grave reason. La-Croix n. 136 seq.; L. 1. 6. n. 657.

You will resolve: Therefore we make the step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience by the following reasoning. What is forbidden by no certain law is licit. But such or such an action, which truly probably is prohibited by no law, is by that very fact forbidden by no certain law. Therefore such an action is licit. Since the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion too will be certain. And hence again it is clear that an opinion both tenuously and doubtfully probable is altogether excluded from probabilism. But the conclusion contains the judgment or dictate of conscience. The same transition can be made by force of another reasoning. He who acts according as prudence dictates, acts honorably. But he who acts according to this or that probable opinion acts according to the dictate of prudence. Therefore, he who acts according to this or that probable opinion acts honorably. Since again the major and minor of this syllogism are certain, the conclusion will also be certain. L. 1. 1. n. 67. 68. 69. 84; Muzzarelli Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome 1807, p. 30 seq.

Does the authority of one doctor suffice for the probability of some opinion? - R. Negatively, ordinarily speaking. The reason is that if it is of some ancient author and has been deserted by all, by this very fact it ordinarily lacks a sufficient foundation. But if it is of some more recent author, either he brings a grave reason, or not. If the first, his opinion is ordinarily handed down also by others. If the second, he cannot render his opinion probable to others, since he brings no sufficient reason for this. Ordinarily speaking: for if some grave author treats some question which others have not treated, and brings a grave reason, or if he sustains an opinion against the common opinion, but sustains it by some new reason unknown to others, nothing prevents him, even alone, from rendering his opinion probable; but soon several others will adhere to it, if that doctrine is publicly spread. And thus "the Salmanticenses, etc., note that the statement of an excellent doctor, even a modern one, asserting that a law has been abrogated, suffices so that we are disobliged from the law." L. 1. 1. n. 107. And certainly the Holy See expressly declared that a confessor is not to be disturbed who follows the doctrine of S. Alphonsus on account of his authority alone, without having weighed his reasons. S. Poenit. July 5, 1831; E. M. 131.

Note: Proposition 27 condemned by Alexander VII: "If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion ought to be judged probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable," was altogether rightly condemned, because the proposition is general, and can be understood of any author whatever, even of humble reputation, and affirms an opinion to be probable by the very fact that it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable. E. M.

Is there an opinion speculatively, but not practically, probable? - R. Negatively, speaking per se; for the reasoning established above, n. 124, can always be made if the opinion in itself, or speculatively, is truly probable, by which we may advance to practical conscience itself. - R. Affirmatively, accidentally, namely if, when that opinion is brought into use, there is always or almost always some extrinsic circumstance which renders the use of such an opinion illicit, for example, danger of fall, scandal, hallucination, etc. - Pignat. Cons. Can. t. 8. cons. 15; Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 3, De Iust. et Iur. d. 10. n. 165. 189.

Can someone licitly follow in practice diverse probable opinions favorable to himself, although those opinions are opposed to each other? - No one is prohibited from using now one probable opinion, now the contrary also probable one. For if it is licit for you to follow one, and for me the other, it will also be licit for each of us to follow each; for by no means does the fact that someone has used one make the other cease to be probable and safe. In one and the same matter it is not licit to follow the probable opinion where it benefits; but where it harms, not that one, but the contrary. For, as is clear, it is an open contradiction. And thus, for example, since some affirm that a testament lacking legal formalities is valid, and others deny it, he would act illicitly who, on account of this twofold opinion, wished to acquire an inheritance for himself from a less solemn testament, and did not wish from the same testament to provide the legacies. It is not licit to use at the same time a twofold probability of the non-existence of a twofold precept, when the transgression of either one is certain. And thus, for example, the law of abstinence urges today; I wish tomorrow to approach communion; but it is probable that midnight has already elapsed, and the opposite is also probable; certainly it is not licit to eat meat and at the same time to approach holy communion. - Elbel De Act. hum. 190 seq.

Is it expedient to prefer stricter opinions to more benign ones? - "Where the question concerns removing the penitent from danger of formal sin, the confessor ought, generally speaking, and insofar as Christian prudence suggests, to use benign opinions; but where benign opinions render nearer the danger of formal sin, as are some opinions of authors, for example, as regards avoiding proximate occasions, and others of this kind, then it is always expedient that the confessor use, indeed I say that he, as a physician of souls, is bound to use the safer opinions which conduce to preserving penitents in the state of grace." L. 1. 1. n. 87, l. 3. n. 547.

Where the penitent is prepared to follow the dictate of the confessor, whatever it may be, then "it belongs to the prudence of the confessor to weigh whether the use of the safer or less safe opinion will be profitable to his penitent... because although that is of itself safer and more perfect, nevertheless it will be more dangerous to impose on many the obligation of always acting according to the stricter opinions." L. 1. 6. n. 605. - Generally in practice, as far as can be done, the confessor ought rather to be benign than rigid with penitents. L. l. c. The same is clear by the authority of the Fathers and theologians, whom you have cited apud S. Alph. l. c. and l. 1. n. 86 par. Ego, and n. 89 toward the end, Praeterea res, H. A. tr. 1. n. 79.

Must a confessor know all probable opinions? - "A confessor is not to be obliged to knowledge of all probable opinions, but to that knowledge which the moderately learned commonly have; just as an advocate, judge, physician, or artisans also are not obliged to the highest and exquisite knowledge and skill in their profession, but to moderate knowledge according to the degree of their office and condition... thus a penitent ought not to require from an ordinary confessor anything except common knowledge about common sins and common opinions also; but if he desires subtler remedies, let him approach a more learned confessor." Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 1. d. 26. n. 2.

Since the authority of S. Alphonsus is very great in moral matters, and several more recent authors deny that S. D. stands for probabilism simply so called, but affirm that he teaches equiprobabilism, and rejects probabilism as lax doctrine; hence here especially we raise the question about the mind of the holy Doctor, although in the preceding article we have almost constantly used his opinions and even his words to establish the doctrine of probabilism.

E. M. Lest there be doubt in this matter, and that we may faithfully set forth the mind of S. D., we take his doctrine from the tract on Conscience in his work H. A., which he himself there, n. 79, declares that he wrote when near death. Now these things are had in n. 33. 77: "The third opinion, which is ours, says that when the opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as the opinion which favors the law, without doubt it can be followed licitly.... Here it is necessary that I warn something concerning my system, which must altogether be warned, and it is this: that when it is doubted whether the opinion favoring the law is equally probable or a little more probable, then the same principle has place, that a doubtful law does not oblige; for in such a case, the law itself does not cease to be strictly doubtful. For then, although some greater probability for the law might be present, since it is doubted whether this greater probability is present or not, the preponderance will be so slight and minimal that it must be counted for nothing before that saying commonly admitted by the adversaries themselves, that a little is reputed as nothing. But it would be otherwise when the excess were evident and certain, because then the opinion favoring the law will be certainly and much more probable; and therefore then, as was said from the beginning, the law is already morally promulgated, and therefore obliges, and is without doubt to be observed."

If you doubt whether you have already satisfied some obligation, are you still bound to satisfy? - R. Affirmatively, if the doubt is merely negative. For in such a doubt no prudent reason of satisfaction is present, and therefore it is impossible by some reflex principle to form for oneself a conscience concerning non-satisfaction, since the law altogether certainly perseveres. Cf. Ithur. Cas. 44. n. 15.

But if the doubt is positive, it is controverted. The first opinion, which S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 26-29, 1. 3. n. 700 par. ult., 1. 6. n. 477, quaest. reform., recent retract. q. 1 and 18, etc., altogether holds and thinks must be held, and several others hold, affirms. The reason is 1. because a certain obligation is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment; 2. because since in doubt the condition of the possessor is better, and the law certainly existing possesses against liberty, it prevails over liberty, and will always have it obligated to itself until the law has certainly been fulfilled. Cf. besides L. 1. 1. n. 20. 39. 99, 1. 3. n. 112. 290.

The second opinion, which we judge most probable both intrinsically and extrinsically, denies that such an obligation is present. The reason is the very fundamental reason of probabilism, which the holy Doctor cited above explains most learnedly and most expertly, namely: a doubtful law does not oblige. For law does not oblige in the abstract and universal, but in the concrete and particular case, L. 1. 1. n. 78. But although the existence of the law according to itself is certain, nevertheless the same law as obliging in such a concrete and particular case is uncertain, and is altogether prudently pronounced uncertain, if it is truly probable that satisfaction has already been made to it. Therefore either it must be said that the obligation of satisfying the law again in the aforesaid case is null, or it must be said that the aforesaid principle, a doubtful law does not oblige, is not universally true but suffers an exception; which would not be fittingly said. For what is true is always true, and for every particular contained in the universal. But from this reason it appears that the obligation really is not certain, which is assumed in the first reason of the opposite opinion, if it is probable that the law has already been satisfied. For against certainty there cannot be probability. As regards the second reason, as is clear from what has already been said, possession prevails in merely negative doubt; but for it certainly to prevail even in positive doubt, it must be certain and certainly legitimate possession. Now when in a particular case it is truly probably established that the law has been fulfilled, the possession of the law for that concrete and particular case becomes prudently doubtful; for if you really satisfied it, liberty in fact possesses. Besides, it is certainly not legitimate, since probably the just title of obligation is lacking; for you can probably believe that you have already satisfied, and therefore the just title, at least presumed, probably is not present. Moreover, several and very grave theologians hold this opinion. Indeed the same S. Alph. 1. 1. n. 99 has these things: "What in doubt whether you have fulfilled the law? In negative doubt you are bound to fulfill; otherwise in positive." Cf. also 1. 4. n. 150. And thus indeed S. Alph. himself thought, 1. 1. n. 76, edition of the year 1757; and S. D. called this opinion common, and himself deduced it from the very principles of probabilism. Finally S. D. 1. 6. n. 505 says, "it must be carefully noted that penitents are not to be compelled to repeat confessions unless it is morally certain that they were invalid, as La-Croix, etc., rightly say." - D'Annib. ed. 4. p. 1. n. 169.

You will resolve: Therefore that axiom, a doubtful law does not oblige, is to be understood of a law doubtful by positive doubt, or truly probably doubtful. Now law can be positively doubtful in many ways concerning its existence and concerning its cessation; concerning existence, whether it has been enacted, whether promulgated, whether the time of obligation has arrived, whether it extends to such a case; concerning cessation, whether it has been abrogated, whether its excuse or dispensation is present, whether it has already been fulfilled. And in all these cases we say that the aforesaid axiom has place, unless we wish to admit the truth of the general proposition and at the same time deny the truth of the proposition contained in the general.

Therefore law can be doubtful: 1. As regards its very existence and promulgation, concerning which S. Alph. says: "In order that law oblige, it must not only be promulgated, but also promulgated as certain. And this point must firmly be established here," 1. 1. n. 63 seq. and 97. And, to pass over others, these things are from the distinguished Doctor apud S. Alph. 1. 1. 66: "As long as there is a probable judgment that there is no law prohibiting the action, such a law is not sufficiently proposed to man; whence since the obligation of law is of itself burdensome, it does not urge until it is more certainly established." C. 31 de Off. iud. deleg.

2. As regards its understanding and obvious interpretation, and whether it is obscure or ambiguous. For since law must be sufficiently proposed in order to oblige, the legislator is not judged to wish to oblige beyond that which is clearly and determinately expressed in the law. R. I. 30. 57 in 6; L. 9 C. de Leg. et Const.; Suarez in 1. 2. tr. d. 12. s. 5. n. 7. Obscure: for example, whether regular prelates, since they too have their own sheep, ought to apply Mass for them on feast days. This question, twice proposed before the Holy See, has not yet been solved. Giraldi Expos. I. P. p. 2. s. 85. t. 3. Ambiguous: it is provided that a beneficed cleric not reciting the canonical hours after six months from obtaining the benefice does not make the fruits his own; nevertheless the fruits are to be understood not of the earlier and later time, but only of the later.

3. Whether it has an extensive or restrictive interpretation, concerning which S. Alph. 1. 3. n. 1036 says: "When it is doubted whether a law comprehends some case or subject, it is the same as if it is doubted whether a law exists for that case or subject, and therefore liberty possesses." Cf. also 1. 1. n. 27. 97; Lugo De Poenit. d. 16. n. 59, De Iust. et Iur. d. 23. n. 110.

4. Whether it has ceased, either immediately when it was enacted, because it was never received, or with the progress of time through desuetude; concerning which S. D. 1. 3. n. 112 says: "Nor is the first opinion an obstacle, which we followed 1. 1. n. 97, namely that in doubt whether a law has been received, the law rightly obliges; for here we are not involved in doubt, but in probable opinion.... For in doubt the presumption stands for the law, since a crime in not receiving a just law is not presumed. But when it is probable that the obligation of the law never began, or has been abolished, then the presumption for the law ceases and liberty possesses." The same S. D. has this, 1. 1. n. 107 par. An vero, 1. 4. n. 47. The same must consequently be said when it is probable that the end of the law has ceased adequately, L. 1. 1. n. 199, or that the law has been abrogated by custom, L. 1. 3. n. 290, or that in a particular case there is no need of dispensation, L. 1. 1. n. 192, 1. 3. n. 304. Certainly as soon as the obligation of the law is doubtful, its possession consequently becomes doubtful; and therefore in the case the argument taken from the Rule of possession has no force.

5. Whether the law is just or unjust; and here a threefold case can occur. The first is that the justice of the law is doubted because the legislator himself is doubted, whether he is a legitimate superior. Now in this case, if the doubt about the legitimacy of the superior is positive, about which we are treating, namely it is truly probable that he is not a legitimate superior, by that very fact the non-existence of the law becomes truly probable, and therefore it does not oblige. Cf. L. 1. 1. n. 98. 121. - But if the doubt is merely negative, the law must be obeyed, "whenever the superior is in peaceful possession of his power; for then his condition, as already possessing the right of commanding, is better." L. 1. 1. n. 98, 1. 4. n. 47. The other case is that the justice of the law is doubted because it is doubted whether the superior exceeds his power. In positive doubt, or true probability concerning excess of power, the same must be said as in the preceding case. For by the very fact that it is truly and manifestly probable that the superior exceeds his power, the non-existence of the law becomes truly probable, and therefore it does not oblige. Cf. L. 1. 3. n. 617. - But if the doubt is merely negative, presumption, speaking per se, always stands for the superior.

The third case is because the liceity of the thing commanded itself is doubted. In positive doubt or true probability, the law is not doubtful, and therefore obliges. For the superior then commands a thing probably licit, indeed certainly licit; for he commands that the subject embrace some probable opinion in practice, which is certainly licit. Therefore he commands licitly and by right. Therefore the subject is bound to obey. Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3. d. 19; L. 90, l. 1. n. 93. 99. 124, l. 4. n. 47; Wirceburg. De Legib. c. 1. a. 1. "But the doctors commonly limit the aforesaid opinion, and say that the subject is not bound to obey, 1. if the thing is very difficult and troublesome.... They limit it 2. when by obeying the subject would expose himself or another to the danger of undergoing grave inconvenience in life, reputation, honor, or goods." L. 1. 4. n. 47, l. 3. n. 617, l. 1. n. 31. "The reason is that the subjection and obedience due to the superior does not take away your right and possession, or that of another, concerning the good of honor, reputation, body, or fortune. Therefore you are not bound to deprive yourself of this certain possession in a matter of such great moment; rather it seems consonant with equity that greater account be taken of your certain possession, and that this be preferred to the right or possession, in some way doubtful, of the superior." Elbel 173; Laymann c. 5. n. 12; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5. Moreover, because then in the case of a very difficult or harmful thing it can deservedly be doubted whether the superior exceeds the limits of his power, and therefore the existence of the law becomes doubtful; or legitimate epikeia can then also have place, according to the various circumstances of the particular case. But if the doubt is merely negative, presumption, as has already been said, Cf. 146, always stands for the superior. Cf. Suarez De Relig. t. 4. l. 4. c. 12 seq.; Lugo Resp. Mor. l. 3. d. 19. Besides, as regards practice more, "the opinion of all theologians, both recent and ancient, is common: they teach that in obscure matters the superior must be obeyed where sin is not certain; and thus all have taught who have treated this matter. Thus also all the masters of mystical theology with S. Ignatius of Loyola in the Letter on the Virtue of Obedience." L. 1. 1. n. 100. 194; Lugo l. c. n. 3; Suarez tr. 3. d. 12. s. 5.

What is fortitude, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Fortitude is the virtue which moderates and strengthens the soul against grave dangers, especially of death. - No precept per se of this virtue is given, but only by reason of some special precept to be fulfilled, e.g., even martyrdom to be undergone, lest faith be denied. But whether and when there is an obligation of observing the law even with danger to life was said in the treatise on Laws, and is explained in the individual treatises, when it is asked whether it is licit to do something at least to avoid death. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 140.

There is a twofold act of fortitude, to attack and to sustain: to attack distinguished and arduous things; to sustain adversities. For the act of attacking two things are required. The first is preparation of soul, namely that someone have a prompt soul for undertaking great things, which magnanimity provides. The other regards execution of the work, namely that someone not fall short in the execution of those things which he began magnanimously, which magnificence provides. For the act of sustaining two things also are required. The first is that by the difficulty of imminent evils the soul not be broken through sadness, and fall away from its greatness; and for this patience is posited, by which someone bears evils with an even soul, without disturbance of sadness. The other is that from long-lasting suffering of difficult things man not be wearied up to the point that he desists; and for this perseverance is posited.

R. To the second. These four virtues, magnanimity, magnificence, patience, perseverance, are integral parts of fortitude if they are concerned with dangers of death; but they are potential parts of fortitude if they are concerned with lesser dangers. But fortitude does not have subjective parts, because it is not divided into many virtues differing in species, since it concerns a very special matter, namely dangers of death, which are all of the same genus, although some are greater than others.

R. To the third. Timidity, fearlessness, and audacity are opposed to fortitude. Timidity is a vice exceeding in fearing; for it fears what one ought not, when one ought not, or more than one ought, whence one does not dare to attack when reason dictates, or as it dictates. If it stands in itself, it is a light sin; but if it impels to sin, it will be grave or light according to the condition of that to which it impels. - Fearlessness is a vice deficient in fearing; for one does not fear when he ought to fear, or the things that ought to be feared. It is not a sin distinct from that to whose danger someone exposes himself; for it is a sin only insofar as it is the cause of that, tacitly containing consent to that danger.

Audacity is that which rashly casts itself into dangers. Rashly, namely without just reason. It is a sin according to the account of the evil and danger to which one exposes himself.

Presumption, ambition, vainglory, pusillanimity are opposed to magnanimity. - Presumption is excessive confidence in one's own powers, by which it happens that someone undertakes something, or is prepared to undertake something, above his powers. It is a deadly sin when it occurs with danger or injury of another, as the presumption of a physician, judge, confessor; or when it proceeds from error against the faith, as the presumption of heretics. Outside these cases it is almost always a venial sin. Ambition is an inordinate appetite of honor, by desiring more honor than is fitting. It is a light sin, unless honor is desired either with injury and harm of another, or from a gravely illicit thing, or in a gravely illicit mode or end. Vainglory is desire of vain glory. Vain, if glory is sought from simulated excellence or reputation, if greater than is fitting, or from an illicit thing, or among those who cannot judge rightly about things, or by referring it to an undue end. Per se it is a venial sin, nor does it become a mortal sin except by reason of another sin, which is sometimes involved in its effect. Pusillanimity is a sin by which someone from smallness of soul does not attempt those things which are commensurate with his natural virtue. It is grave or light according to the goods from which he recedes.

Small-magnificence and consumption or excessive profusion are opposed to magnificence. - Small-magnificence is the vice by which man falls short of the proportion which ought to be between expense and work. Consumption or excessive profusion is the vice by which someone exceeds the said proportion, namely so that he spends more than is proportioned to the work. Each is per se a light sin; it can be grave by reason of scandal, or notable harm then following to others, or by another extrinsic reason, e.g., of a vow, testament, etc., by which someone is bound to that magnificent work and ought to be contained within due expenses.

Insensibility and impatience are opposed to patience, but softness and pertinacity to perseverance. - Insensibility is had when someone is touched by no evils, neither his own nor those of neighbors. It is a sign either of brutish stupidity or of inhuman hardness. Insensibility or hardness is rarely a mortal sin; certainly per se it is only venial. - Impatience is had when someone grieves too much, or even from grief departs from the right. Impatience per se is only a venial sin, because it is only an excess in grief, or in a movement of anger, expressed by an external sign; nevertheless it can be deadly by reason of scandal or of the evil which someone does from impatience. - Softness is if someone easily recedes from good because of certain difficulties which he cannot sustain; for that is called soft which easily yields to one touching it. But it is manifest that fear of dangers impels more gravely than desire of pleasures; and the desire itself of pleasures moves more strongly than sadness concerning the lack of pleasure withdraws, because lack of pleasure is a pure defect. And therefore he is properly called soft who recedes from good because of sadness caused by the defect of delights, as if yielding to a weak mover. This is a grave sin in a venereal matter or in another matter of great moment, to which someone is bound by law, precept, vow, or oath; but it is light in a light matter. Pertinacity is perseverance in one's own opinion more than one ought; and it is venial or mortal according to the gravity of the matter, e.g., if someone is unwilling to embrace the Catholic religion lest he seem inconstant; if a Prince is unwilling to revoke pernicious laws. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 123 seqq.; Theol. Wirceb., de Virt. Card. de Fortit.

Is it permitted to swear with probability of truth? - "For swearing rightly absolute and altogether infallible certitude is not required, but some moral certitude suffices, or a certain probability which reaches a certain moral certitude. Thus Tamburini. Indeed Sanchez, Suarez, the Salmanticenses, Lessius, Bonacina, Azor, with the common opinion, say more expressly that in an oath, whether assertory or promissory, probability of the truth asserted or of the fulfillment of the promised thing to be executed suffices, provided that there is not a probable reason to the opposite. Hence they say that what has been heard from a person so worthy of faith that he makes us morally certain can indeed be affirmed with oath. Yet this does not run in judgment," L. 148, where the oath which is required is to be emitted from one's own certitude. Struggl 6. Therefore he sins gravely who swears in mere doubt of truth, because God, infallible truth, cannot be invoked except in testimony of a thing which seems at least morally certain. Struggl 6; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 89, a. 7 ad 1.

You will resolve: The Prince can indeed, if at some time this is required for the common good, take a thing from a subject, because right to the end necessarily imports right to the means without which the end cannot be obtained. But the public good sometimes requires that someone be deprived of his own thing, for example of a field for the construction of a public road, etc. But then the Prince, in so far as can be done, is bound to just compensation, because it is not equitable that one person be despoiled while others remain untouched, as is clear from natural and positive law. C. I. 438; C. G. 545; C. H. 349; C. A. 365; C. L. 2360.

But in no way can he, without a grave cause of the public good, but for his own convenience, take away by law from a subject some notable thing of his, or an acquired right, because he has no power over the goods of private persons unless the reason of the common good altogether demands it. Therefore he is then bound to restitution. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 66. a. 8.

Equity is distinguished from justice. First, equity is justice itself. And thus in L. 14. de Condict. indeb. it is said: "It is equitable by nature that no one be enriched with the loss of another." But equity proceeds further, by constituting a certain fitting measure in justice itself, and generally in all laws, namely by tempering according to various circumstances the rigor and subtlety of right and laws. Rigor, for example: "It is of the highest equity that one who has promised money, or something else, by reason of donation, should not owe interest because of delay in payment of the money." L. 22. de Donat. Subtlety, for example: "If a surety, though freed by lapse of time alone, nevertheless pays the creditor, he will rightly have an action of mandate against the principal debtor; for although he paid when already freed, nevertheless he fulfilled his pledge and freed the debtor. Therefore, if he is prepared to defend the principal debtor against the creditor, it is most equitable that by the judgment of mandate he recover what he paid." L. 29. section 6. Mandati. Cf. also L. 17. de Iniu. rupto irr. f. testam.; L. 85. de R. I.

Equity, taken in this way, is the same as epicheia, which is a part of justice commonly so called, and is a subjective part of justice; and justice is said of it prior to legal justice, for legal justice is directed according to epicheia. For legal justice follows the words of the law; equity or epicheia follows the intention of the legislator. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 120. a. 2. Equity is to be observed in interpreting laws and acts, and also in onerous contracts.

It is altogether unlawful to exercise one's right when an exercise of this sort has no other end than to inflict damage on another. Likewise it is unlawful to exercise that right against the prescription of the laws. C. B. 226, 826, 907, 908, 909, 912. Likewise it is unlawful to exercise one's right excessively, with damage to others. C. He. 679, 684. But it is not unlawful to violate the property of another in order to avoid one's own greater damage, compensation afterward being made to the other for the damage inflicted on him. C. He. 701.

What must the judge do when the law is not clear, but obscure, and on both sides there are opposed probable opinions? In criminal matters the defendant is to be favored, both as regards the existence of the crime and as regards the infliction of penalties. The reason is that according to the rules of Law: In doubt no one is presumed evil unless it is proved; when the rights of the parties are obscure, the defendant is to be favored rather than the plaintiff; hates should be restricted and favors should be expanded; in obscure things the minimum is to be followed; in penalties the more benign interpretation is to be made; it is more satisfactory that the crime of the guilty be left unpunished than that an innocent man be condemned. R. 49 de Reg. Iur. in the Sixth; L. Absentem 5 de Poenis; L. 25 de Probat.; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 60. a. 4; Elbel, de Actib. human., 197 ff.; C. L. 2515.

In civil cases, probability of fact and probability of law must be distinguished. A doubt of fact, for example, is: whether the man was master of himself when he made the testament; whether Titius committed such a delict, falsified writings, etc. In such a doubt sentence must be rendered according to the Rules of natural and positive Law: In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated; in doubt the deed is presumed, or presumed to have been rightly done, which had to be done by law; in doubt one must stand for the validity of the act; in doubt one must stand for him for whom presumption stands; once evil, always presumed evil; ignorance of fact, not of law, excuses; in obscure things we inspect what is more likely, or what is usually accustomed to happen, etc., de Reg. Iur. in the Sixth.

A doubt of law is when it is doubted what the law commands in such a case, whether the law is extended or not extended to it, etc.; and on both sides there are probable opinions. In such a doubt of law, either no one possesses the thing, or someone is possessor of the thing.

In the first case, that no one possesses the thing, if it is doubtful to which of the parties the law favors more, or if, without doubt, the law equally favors the parties, there is a twofold opinion. The first opinion holds that the thing must be divided. The reason is that the judge is not the master of things, but the declarer of law in a particular case, and consequently the distributor of things not according to his pleasure, but according to the rights of the parties; and therefore, if the rights are equal, he must divide the thing equally between them. The other opinion holds that "the judge indeed does better by trying to reduce the parties to concord, yet absolutely he can choose one from among them (equally more probable opinions)... because the judge by the debt of his office is bound only to investigate the truth diligently, so that he may judge according to it; but in our case he judges most probably that this is the truth, and that this man has right: therefore he can judge for him with that equal probability." Lugo d. 37, s. 10, n. 115. And indeed, since each party then has, according to a probable opinion, an entire right to the thing, the judge will well be able to conform himself to one of these opinions, and he inflicts no injury on the other party. Nor is it valid to object that by judging the truth to be for one party the judge exposes himself to the danger of deviating from the truth and of depriving the other party of his right. For the judge cannot avoid this danger. For the danger is equal if he judges for the other party. But if he divides the thing, "then the danger will be more certain; for then it will be not only probable but most certain that the true owner is deprived of his thing as to the half part: therefore it is better to undergo that probable danger with a probable judgment concerning the justice of him for whom sentence is rendered, than most certainly to deprive the owner of his thing as to the half part." Lugo l. c. n. 118. This latter opinion is consonant with present laws and practice, and is confirmed by canon law and Roman law, so that in equal right the causes of marriage, dowries of widows, wards, and other pious causes always prevailed. L. 1. 4, n. 410.

But if, in the same case, that no one possesses the thing, a truly more probable opinion in a question of law favors one party, and a less probable opinion favors the other party, the common opinion holds that the judge must render sentence for that party for whom the more probable opinion stands. The reason is taken, first, from proposition 2 condemned by Innocent XI: "I probably judge that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable." But from this condemned proposition it follows only that the judge cannot render sentence for the less probable opinion, but by no means that he must render sentence for the more probable opinion and cannot divide the thing among the parties according to the proportion of probability. The reason is taken, secondly, from this, that the judge is constituted by the republic so that he may define the matter according to the merits of the case and according to the opinion which seems to him more conformable to law; for otherwise he would be an accepter of persons. But neither does this reason truly prove the assertion.

For if he must judge according to the merits of the case, he must divide the thing according to the proportion of greater or lesser probability. But that he is constituted by society so that he may render sentence for the more probable opinion, by ascribing the whole right to that party, is indeed asserted, but it is not established. Only this can be asserted, and is established in itself: namely, if the thing cannot be divided according to the proportion of greater or lesser probability, but the whole is ascribed to one party, because this is, for example, the practice of tribunals, then surely it is to be attributed to him who has the greater probability. But this practice of tribunals could be rendered honorable under a twofold head: 1. if it concerns a far greater probability, because then moral certitude is almost had, which often is difficult to distinguish from great probability; 2. if, while the judge ascribes the whole thing to one party, he frees the other from all expenses of the judgment and from reparations of damages, because then an equitable compensation is had. Therefore the better reason seems to be that which was just brought forward for the case of equal probability, namely because there is less danger of injustice, and the judge, as interpreter of justice, is bound to choose an opinion at least less dangerous, since a certain one cannot be had.

And this opinion again corresponds to present laws and practice.

In the other case, that someone possesses the thing, while equal probability of right stands on each side, the thing is to be adjudged to the legitimate possessor; for by reason of possession his right prevails absolutely. This is confirmed from R. 65 of Law in the Sixth: "In equal delict or cause, the condition of the possessor is the stronger." But if unequal probability is had, the first opinion holds that the judge is bound to adjudge the thing to him who has the greater probability for himself, although he is not the possessor. For first, possession in itself does not bestow a right of property, but only detention of the thing, until someone is legitimately despoiled; but the right of property is greater for the other party. Moreover, the dispute is about the property itself, not about the simple detention of the thing, which is extrinsic to it. Therefore, as in the case of greater probability, with no one possessing, greater probability prevails, so also it prevails in the case of possession. For that presumption of property which arises from possession is destroyed by greater probability of right. Besides, R. I. 65 in the Sixth evidently has force in an equal case, not in an unequal case. The other opinion holds that the judge cannot despoil the possessor. The reason is that legitimate possession, with human morals considered, speaking in itself, argues a morally certain right, even of property itself; for men are not accustomed to be negligent in guarding their own things. And upon this reason the law of prescription is founded, which is had by the very possession of the thing. Legitimate possession; for it would be otherwise if the possession itself were not certain, or not certainly legitimate. Moreover, legitimate possession, besides the very fact of possession, requires two things: title and good faith. Title is donation, inheritance, purchase, and similar things, through which ownership of some thing is customarily acquired. This title must be at least reasonably presumed. But good faith is the judgment by which, on account of such a title, someone prudently believes the thing to be his own. "And therefore judges commonly adjudge things to those having the more probable right, because in the external forum the good faith of the possessor can be proved only with difficulty." L. 210; l. 1, n. 47. Lugo d. 37, s. 10; Ithur. Cas. 34; Viva on proposition 2 condemned by Innocent XI; E. M.

Can advocates defend cases, even less probable ones, both of defendants and of plaintiffs? - R. Affirmatively in civil cases; because, as matters of this kind are litigious, there can reasonably be hope that the truth may shine forth. Besides, since the judge can divide the thing according to the proportion of greater or lesser probability, it is lawful for advocates to urge the probable reasons of clients, so that he may decree what is just according to the things alleged and proved. Cf. 18. Nevertheless the client must be warned of the doubtful outcome, lest perhaps he make the expenses of the lawsuit uselessly.

In criminal cases the defendant can always be defended, even if his culpability is established. The reason is that an advocate defending a defendant inflicts injury on no one, and from his office he protects the right of the defendant, lest he be condemned before the crime has juridically been fully proved, and at least so that the Prince may be moved to mercy. "In a doubtful criminal case it is not lawful to protect the parts of the plaintiff, who in such a case sins gravely against the defendant, therefore also the advocate; nor when the plaintiff acting against the possessor knows that he can prove nothing, but that the matter will always remain doubtful, because then the possessor is unjustly vexed, for whom the judge at last will have to judge." L. 220. Hence, if he patronizes the defendant, it suffices that the exception be just in the exterior forum; but if he patronizes the plaintiff, the case must be just also in the forum of conscience. Kenrick 145 judges otherwise, namely that he can defend the plaintiff if the matter is doubtful; but with no reason brought forward.

33. "Probable conscience is that by which someone, relying upon a probable opinion, forms for himself a practical dictate of reason from certain reflex or concomitant principles, for acting licitly." L. I, n. 40. Thus, for example, Titius the confessor, relying upon a probable opinion, judges that he probably has jurisdiction. Then indeed he says, and this is the reflex principle: But, with jurisdiction truly probable standing, the Church certainly supplies it. Therefore, he concludes, and this is the practical dictate of conscience, I can validly and licitly absolve in the case; and he absolves.

34. "Various species of probabilities are given... An opinion slightly probable is one which rests upon some foundation, but not such as has power to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man... Probable is one which rests upon a grave moment, either of intrinsic reason or of extrinsic authority, which has power to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite. More probable is one which rests upon a weightier foundation, but still with prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contrary also is judged probable. Most probable is one which rests upon a most weighty foundation, on account of which the opposite is judged either slightly or doubtfully probable... An opinion or sentence morally certain is one which excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite is reputed altogether improbable. Finally, a safe opinion is one which withdraws from every danger of sinning. Safer, however, is one which withdraws more from such danger, although it may not rest upon firmer reasons." L. loc. cit.

35. But St. Alphonsus speaks more exactly of a most probable opinion, H. A., tr. I, n. 65: "Unless we wish to confuse a most probable opinion with an absolutely certain opinion, it is necessary to say that the opinion contrary to the most probable is not slightly probable, but doubtfully probable." The reason is that a most probable opinion "is within the limits of probability," and therefore "does not exclude every prudent fear." "But slight probability is not true probability, and therefore does not bring with itself a prudent reason. But doubtful probability brings some prudent reason, although not one wholly certain and stable." Cf. Sporer, Op. Mor., I, n. 185.

"Truth known without fear is called certainty. But truth probably known is called opinion. The adversaries wish that a truly probable opinion be only that which, after all things have been weighed on both sides, is known to be true, so that the opposite seems certainly false. But they err in terms; for this must be said of science, or of moral certainty, but not of probable opinion, which of itself carries with it that it be fallible, and that its contrary also be probable, that is, probably true"; St. Alphonsus, Scholastico-moral Dissertation, year 1749.

36. Now from probable conscience which is to be followed practically, probabilism arises. Probabilism is reduced to one proposition applied to human action, as regards its licitness, in a case of doubt: A doubtful law does not oblige. Behold what probabilism is, and it is nothing else except this. It is called probabilism because whenever there is against the law a truly probable opinion, the law is doubtful, and consequently does not oblige. Hence probabilism is also called the moral system by which, in doubtful matters, it is simply lawful, as regards the licitness of acting, from some reflex principle, to follow a truly probable opinion against the law.

37. It differs altogether from the other moral systems. It differs from rigid and mitigated tutiorism, because the former states: It is not lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty unless it is morally certain; otherwise the safer part must always be held in practice. The latter states: it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion unless it is most probable.

38. It differs from laxism, which is also called broad or lax probabilism, because lax probabilists say: it is licit to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable. Probabilism simply so called, or moderate probabilism, wholly excludes an opinion slightly probable and doubtfully probable, because these opinions are not truly probable. A truly probable opinion is only one which is gravely and certainly probable. For this alone is able prudently to move a prudent man to assent, in the doubt of some grave matter; and this alone truly rests upon a grave motive.

39. It differs from probabiliorism, because probabiliorists say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion probable for liberty when the other opinion for the law is more probable. - It differs from equiprobabilism, because equiprobabilists affirm that it is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion favoring liberty when the contrary opinion for the law is equally probable or a little more probable; but not at all when the contrary opinion for the law is certainly and notably more probable.

40. But from what has been said it is clear that probabilism is called minus-probabilism by its adversaries without any truth. For probabilists do not say that it is not lawful to follow any opinion except the less probable, as probabiliorists say that it is not lawful to follow any except the more probable, and equiprobabilists the equally probable; rather, they say that it is lawful simply to follow a probable opinion; not at all that it is not lawful to follow any opinion except the less probable.

41. These things having been set down, we must now speak of the directive force of probable conscience, and consequently of the truth of probabilism. And this will be declared and proved step by step in the following propositions.

42. Lest there be a cavil about words, as far as we are concerned we recognize no other opinions, as regards doctrine, within the limits of true probability, except the probable, the more probable, and the most probable opinion. Below the probable there is only the non-probable, the improbable, of which there can indeed be various grades; above the most probable there is only the certain. The probable is immediately opposed, by an opposition of comparison, to the more probable; mediately, however, to the most probable. Likewise the most probable is immediately opposed to the more probable, but mediately to the probable; unless someone should wish in fact to confuse the most probable with the certain.

43. But a twofold probability must be distinguished: intrinsic and extrinsic. The former is founded upon reasons taken from the thing itself; the latter upon the authority of doctors, and presupposes intrinsic probability, or at least causes it to be presumed. As intrinsic probability can be greater or lesser from the weight of reasons, so also extrinsic probability can be greater or lesser from the number and learning of authors.

44. It is wholly unlawful to operate with a practically probable conscience, which proximately directs an action really to be placed here and now. - For only subjectively certain conscience is the rule of morals. And consequently in this sense that saying is false: He who acts probably acts prudently. L. I, n. 58, 69, 80. Wherefore the whole question here is about speculatively probable conscience, which directs the action only remotely, by declaring the probable existence of a law; namely, whether by means of some reasoning we can by right make a step from a speculatively probable conscience to a practically certain conscience; or, what is the same, whether, with a probable opinion standing concerning the honesty of some action in general, we can form for ourselves a certain conscience concerning the honesty of such an action in a particular and individual case, and so licitly follow in practice an opinion speculatively probable. To resolve this question the following propositions are established.

45. It is not lawful practically to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable, the safer having been left aside. - This proposition is against the lax probabilists, according to whom it is licit to follow an opinion slightly or doubtfully probable. - Proof of the first part. This first is established from proposition 3 condemned by Innocent XI: "Generally, when we do something relying upon probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the limits of probability, we always act prudently." - Besides, a slightly probable opinion is an opinion resting upon a slight motive; but a slight motive is a motive by no means sufficient to move a grave or prudent man to assent, and therefore it is not truly probable. Indeed, a truly probable opinion is called that which rests upon such a motive that it is sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But if such an opinion is insufficient to move a prudent man to a judgment concerning the non-existence of the law, it is impossible to form for oneself a conscience concerning the licitness of the action. - Proof of the second part. Nor indeed is it lawful practically to follow a doubtfully probable opinion. For a doubtfully probable opinion is an opinion resting upon a doubtful motive, concerning which, namely, one can prudently doubt whether it is truly grave and prudent, or sufficient to move a prudent man to assent. But it is evident that a prudent man, in matters of grave moment, does not rely upon a motive of this kind; hence, if the matter in fact does not turn out well, all would justly and deservedly charge him with imprudence. But the moral goodness or malice of human acts is a graver matter than any temporal business whatever. - Besides, with slight or doubtful probability standing, it is impossible to form for oneself a practical dictate morally certain concerning the licitness of the action. For a slight or doubtful reason for liberty does not remove, nor can it remove, the certainty of the law. Wherefore, the law remaining morally certain, it must wholly be observed. - L. I, n. 40.

46. From the cited proposition condemned by Innocent XI nothing can be drawn against probabilism, both because in it there is question also of slight probability, and because it asserts too generally that we always act prudently when we do something relying upon probability. For slight probability is not true probability. Nor indeed is probabilism extended to the case where there is question of the truth of a thing and an end to be absolutely obtained. - To an opinion slightly probable there is opposed an opinion gravely probable; to an opinion doubtfully probable there is opposed an opinion certainly probable. But gravely probable and certainly probable is nothing other than probable, which, unless it rests upon a grave and certain foundation, is not truly probable. Wherefore the slightly probable and the doubtfully probable are wholly excluded from probabilism. - There are not lacking those who confuse an opinion doubtfully probable and an opinion slightly probable with one another. Practically, indeed, they are often confused; but speculatively, with attention to the nature of the thing, they are altogether distinguished from one another. La Croix, l. 1, n. 126.

47. It is not lawful to follow a probable opinion, concerning the very objective truth of a thing, where there is question of an end to be absolutely obtained, the safer having been left aside. - Proof. He who is absolutely bound to an end is bound to choose those means which least of all bring into danger the end to be obtained. But a probable opinion, since it can be false, brings the danger of frustrating the end which must be absolutely obtained. For the objective truth or existence of the thing will certainly not be had if the opinion about it is probable but false. Therefore. L. I, n. 42. To be absolutely obtained, "when, namely, from justice or charity someone is bound to avoid a harm which is present in the thing itself," Suarez apud St. Alphonsus, Op. Mor., Roman ed., year 1757, loc. cit., n. 33, or the danger of it. Then certainly "in doubt the safer way is to be chosen." C. Illud 5, De Cler. Exc. The case must also be added in which someone is bound to the safer course by some special positive law or precept, or by contract, or by vow. - Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 5, n. 8; s. 6, n. 10; De Censuris, d. 40, s. 6, n. 8, 9; L. l. 2, n. 10; l. 6, n. 918, p. ult.; L. l. 3, n. 700, p. 167, note, ed. P. Gaude.

48. Therefore it is not lawful to follow a probable opinion, but we must wholly choose the safer in all those things which are necessary, by necessity of means, to salvation, where the fact itself, or the truth of the thing, alone is considered. Hence we must embrace the safer religion. Proposition 4 condemned by Innocent XI; L. I, n. 43. - In the conferral of the sacraments the minister is bound to follow the safer sentence, unless necessity is present or the Church supplies; for again there is question of the truth of the thing. But the sacraments would not be had unless those things were really placed which Christ instituted for their validity. Proposition 1 condemned by Innocent XI. Unless necessity is present: "for in extreme necessity we can well use any opinion whatever, not only probable but even slightly probable, for the validity of the sacrament... provided the sacrament is conferred under condition; because the condition sufficiently repairs the injury to the sacrament if perhaps it is conferred invalidly; and, on the contrary, necessity is a sufficient and just cause for conferring the sacraments conditionally." L. I, n. 49. Unless the Church supplies: for "we can licitly use a probable opinion where the Church is presumed to supply, as can happen in the sacrament of matrimony for convalidating a contract only probably valid, if perhaps that contract is null because of an impediment which the Church removes by supplying, and in the sacrament of penance for supplying the jurisdiction of the confessor, if perhaps it is lacking." L. I, n. 50.

49. A physician is bound to apply the safer remedies which can be had in the case; for here there is question of the objective effect itself, that is, of the health of the sick person, to be absolutely obtained. And indeed a physician is bound not only from charity, but also from justice, by reason of his office and tacit contract, to provide in the better way for the health of the sick person from whom he receives a stipend. L. I, n. 44. - A judge cannot judge according to the less probable sentence; for he is bound by divine and human precept to render to each his own right. Proposition 2 condemned by Innocent XI; L. I, n. 47. - A hunter who probably judges that the object hidden in the forest is a man cannot shoot, although he more probably judges that it is a wild animal. For on the one hand the neighbor has a certain right to his own life; on the other hand the greater probability does not bring it about that, if in truth it is a man, he will not perish by the shot. L. I, n. 52; H. A., tr. 1, n. 33.

50. When scandals and graver evils are imminent, the safer part is to be chosen, by which they may be avoided, so that the utility of all may be consulted. C. Illud 5, De Cler. Exc. - Generally safer things are to be chosen, when as regards charity a danger of formally sinning is to be avoided, and as regards justice a harm is to be avoided to one who is in certain possession of his certain right.

"We cannot use a probable opinion with danger of spiritual or temporal harm to the neighbor whenever the neighbor is in certain possession of his right," St. Alphonsus, H. A., tr. 1, 33; Apology, year 1769, n. 4.

51. It is lawful to follow a truly most probable opinion, and even a more probable one, the safer having been left aside, where there is question of the honesty of the action alone. - This proposition is against rigid and mitigated tutiorists. The former say: It is not lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty unless it is morally certain; otherwise the safer part must always be held in practice. The latter say: It is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion unless it is most probable. - The honesty of an action, about which there is question here, is quite diverse from the effect of the action itself or from the truth of the thing, about which there was question in the preceding proposition. The honesty of a human action depends upon the dictate of conscience, which is the proximate rule of human acts; the effect of the action, or the truth of the thing, depends upon the very fact of the action. The former is subjective; the latter objective. - Proof of the first part from the third proposition condemned by Alexander VIII in the year 1690: "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions"; the author of this proposition was John Sinnigh, October 8, 1666, a Louvain doctor and defender of Cornelius Jansen, whom other Jansenists followed. Hence it is clear that the rigid tutiorism of the Jansenists has already been reproved by the Church. And indeed no obligation is given of doing what is safer; for it suffices to do what is safe. Likewise no obligation is given, nor can one be given, always to guard against the danger of materially sinning, for this would be morally impossible; there is only an obligation to avoid the danger of formally sinning. - Proof of the second part. The first part of this proposition is against rigid tutiorists, namely Jansenists; this second part is against mitigated tutiorists, favoring Jansen and his followers. Now, if it is not lawful practically to follow an opinion for liberty unless it is most probable, then either this most probable opinion is taken for morally certain, or, as the word sounds, for probable in the highest degree indeed, but not certain. In the first case mitigated tutiorism would fall back into condemned rigid tutiorism; in the other case it would fall into a false doctrine against the Apostle, saying, "all that is not of faith," that is, from a certain persuasion of honesty, "is sin," Rom. 14:23, unless recourse is had to a reflex principle, as is explained in the following proposition; and then it is lawful to follow any probable opinion whatever. Cf. following n. 52. - L. I, n. 40, 54; Suarez, tr. 3, d. 12, s. 6, n. 8; Antoine, De Consc., c. 4, q. 4.

52. It is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion, the safer having been left aside, equally probable, or even truly more probable, where there is question of the honesty of the action alone, by forming for oneself a certain conscience not directly, but from reflex principles. - This proposition is against probabiliorists, who say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion for liberty unless it is more probable. It is also against equiprobabilists, who say that it is not lawful to follow an opinion probable for liberty when the other opinion for the law is certainly or notably more probable. - There is again question of the honesty of the human action alone, that is, whether the human action is licit and consequently can be placed without sin. There is not question of objective truth, whether, for example, in conferring baptism the water is true water; nor is there question of an objective effect, whether grace is conferred by such a baptism; nor of a harm to be guarded against, whether, in hunting, for example, the harm necessarily to be guarded against and avoided, namely the killing of a man, is sufficiently guarded against by such a shot. In the former case the doubt and question is only about the licitness of the subjective action; in the others the doubt and question is about the suitability of the objective action for verifying the truth of the thing, for producing the effect, for guarding against harm. - It is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion, not directly by forming a conscience for oneself by the force of the opinion itself. "For for acting licitly probability alone does not suffice, but moral certainty concerning the honesty of the action is required." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 55, p. 25, ed. P. Gaude. But it is lawful to follow a truly probable opinion by forming for oneself a certain conscience by means of a reflex principle, by which "in practice the ultimate judgment morally certain is formed from that certain principle." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 36, p. 36, ed. P. Gaude. And thus an action which speculatively is only probably honest becomes in practice certainly morally honest. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit. But the fundamental principle of all is that of St. Thomas and St. Alphonsus: "No one is bound by any precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept." Hence an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; and a doubtful law does not oblige, "because it is not sufficiently promulgated." St. Alphonsus, I, n. 61, p. 31, ed. P. Gaude. - Billuart, De Act. hum., diss. 6.

53. The first part is proved. Probabiliorism and equiprobabilism are refuted. - Proof 1. The system of the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists is not practical. For even for these doctors it is very difficult to establish which sentence is more probable, which is notably more probable. What appears to one more probable or notably more probable appears to another less probable and notably less probable. Indeed, even what before appeared to one and the same person more probable, and much more probable, afterwards, when the matter has been weighed better, seems less probable and much less probable. - Proof 2. For either the probabiliorists and equiprobabilists say that it is lawful to act from the immediate judgment of the more probable or notably more probable sentence; or they say that it is lawful to act from a mediate judgment, namely by force of the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige; an uncertain law does not beget a certain obligation; since the will cannot be bound by its obligation without knowledge of the law. The first cannot be said, for although the sentence may be more probable or notably more probable, nevertheless it is not certain; and without certain conscience it is not lawful to act. But the second, as is clear, leads not into probabiliorism or into equiprobabilism, but into simple probabilism. For where true probability is had against the law, the law is now doubtful and uncertain, and knowledge of the law cannot be had. - Proof 3. For we would be bound to follow the more probable or notably more probable opinion insofar as these approach more nearly to truth. But now this is false; for an opinion simply probable can approach more to truth, and the sentence which bore before itself some greater appearance of truth can be false. Besides, here there is no question of speculative but of practical truth; there is no question of the adherence of the intellect simply to truth, but of the obligation of the will, which is not bound by the obligation of a law unless the law is certain and knowledge of the law is had.

54. Proof of the second part. Simple probabilism is proved. - Proof 1. The proposition established is clear from the authority of very many and very grave theologians, who not only hand it down, but even affirm it as common doctrine, such as Suarez, Lugo, Struggl, La Croix, Pignatelli, Vasquez, Elbel, Castropalaus, Sporer, etc. Hence St. Alphonsus in the Dissertation on the moderate use of probable opinion in the concurrence of a more probable one, second edition, Naples, 1755: "We undertake to prove the last, more benign, and most common sentence, namely that it is licit to use a probable opinion even in the concurrence of a more probable one for the law, whenever it has a certain and grave foundation." And indeed, although several after the Jansenists defended probabiliorism, nevertheless by far the greater part of theologians embraced probabilism. But he who follows in practice a doctrine which many and very grave theologians teach, and which doctors commonly hand down, acts prudently; but he who acts prudently acts honestly. For this reason, in the Dissertation just cited, the Holy Doctor immediately adds: "Add to these things the most powerful argument, namely, that if the benign sentence had been false, it certainly would least of all have been received commonly by doctors everywhere, as it truly was received, or at least the Church would not have tolerated it, permitting souls commonly to go along this path of perdition, as the adversaries cry out, deceived by such blind guides." And, as the same St. Alphonsus has, l. 6, n. 460, par. Haec autem: "Nor does it hinder that several opinions which are passed around are not condemned by the Church, and nevertheless by others are more commonly reputed lax; for the Church does not condemn all opinions which regard particular cases, although it does not approve them; but sentences which regard the universality of consciences the Church does not approve nor pass over in silence, as St. Augustine said, Epistle 119: The Church of God tolerates many things, and yet those things which concern faith or good life it neither approves nor passes over in silence." Cf. L. l. 3, n. 669, toward the end, Hoc unum, etc.

55. Proof 2. He who follows in practice an opinion which remains within the terms of right reason and prudence acts prudently, and consequently honestly. But he who follows in practice a truly probable opinion, the more probable and safer having been left aside, follows an opinion which remains within the terms of right reason and prudence. Therefore. - The major is clear of itself. For what is more honest than to follow right reason and prudence, which is right reason of things to be done? And Benedict XIV, C. Apostolica Constitutio, Sect. 21, indeed hands down this rule of acting: namely, that we should follow the sentence which reason persuades and authority confirms. Besides, it is by no means agreeable to right reason, and especially to divine goodness, to will to oblige a man to perform at all costs that which, after diligent inquiry, remains prudently uncertain to the man himself, whether it is required by order or not; especially since doubts of this kind are most frequent because of the weakness of the human intellect itself. This would be to impose unbearable burdens. L. 58, 86; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 19, a. 16 ad 1. But the minor is clear from the very nature and definition of a truly probable opinion, which is not changed by the concurrence of another opinion, although more probable and safer. And St. Alphonsus himself openly affirms this in the definition of a more probable opinion; for he says that its contrary is to be judged probable. Muzzarelli, Dissert. de Regul. mor. opin., Rome, 1807, p. 30 seq.; L. I, n. 79, p. 58, 59, ed. P. Gaude.

56. The Rev. Father Wouters replies, in De Minusprobabilismo, 2nd ed., Amsterdam, 1908, p. 128: "Let the major pass. I deny the minor. And indeed, an opinion which is more probably false than true, or an opinion to which as true not even a weak assent can prudently be given, indeed which is to be held by opinative assent as false, an opinion of this kind does not remain within the terms of right reason. But of this kind is an opinion certainly less probable." - But, once a confusion of words has been made, surely all things can be proved according to anyone's whim. For an opinion which does not include prudent assent, or which by opinative assent is simply to be held as false, is not a probable opinion, nor consequently is it a less probable opinion. Wouters himself, recognizing the weakness of his Reply, immediately adds: "I reply II: Granted, not conceded, that an opinion truly, but less, probable remains within the terms of right reason and prudence - since these words are ambiguous - relying upon the arguments brought forward in Chapter II, I deny that every opinion of this kind can be brought into practice." Wonderful! Are these words, right reason and prudence, ambiguous? But there is no time to refute that whole Chapter II, since this has already been done more than enough by others; indeed the whole work of Wouters has already been most abundantly refuted by others. But let Wouters hear St. Alphonsus: the Holy Doctor explicitly teaches: "For acting honestly it suffices to act prudently, and we are not bound to act more prudently. For that axiom is common and commonly received: He who acts probably acts prudently." Schol.-Mor. Dissertation for the moderate use of probable opinion, Sect. 1. And Theol. Mor., ed. P. Gaude, l. 1, n. 79, p. 59: "He who acts probably, etc., can be taken in two ways. If it is taken as resting upon other reflex principles, it is truly prudent and certain. But if it is taken as a direct principle, with reflection of judgment excluded, it is false." And was not the aforesaid principle used in the first way, reflection and reasoning having been made?

57. Proof 3. St. Alphonsus has this in his Moral Theological Work, 6th ed., Rome, 1767, in which the Holy Doctor explained more fully his sentence concerning probabilism and never afterwards changed it, Theol. Mor., ed. P. Gaude, p. XIX: "There are two principles upon which, relying, I defend the licit use of probable opinion. The first, that a doubtful law, in the conflict of two equally probable opinions, does not oblige, because a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated. The other, that an uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation, because the obligation of law is posterior to the liberty with which man has been endowed by God." Both these principles are explained fully and proved by the Holy Doctor, l. 1, n. 66 seqq.; H. A., tr. 1, n. 37 seqq. But when a truly probable opinion is present, although it is in concurrence with another more probable and safer opinion, both principles are still verified, namely that the law is uncertain, if there is question of its existence, or that it is doubtful, if there is question of its interpretation, because obscure; and therefore neither does the law have the power of actually obliging, since it has not been sufficiently or certainly promulgated; "for then the doubt whether the law exists has been sufficiently promulgated, but the law has not been promulgated," L. I, n. 70, Turin ed., 1846; nor is man, having certain possession of his liberty, bound to reckon himself stripped of it because of an uncertain law; for prior to every law each one possesses his own liberty, since man must first be conceived as free, and then the law which is imposed upon man. Therefore. - L. 54 seqq.

Now, that in that hypothesis the law is in fact doubtful or uncertain, so that it is prudently judged such, whence that twofold axiom flows, is clear from the very nature of probability; for where true probability is present, greater probability does not of itself destroy lesser probability; and this both philosophers and theologians commonly affirm, and St. Alphonsus expressly hands down, H. A., tr. 1, n. 29, and l. 1, n. 40, where he says that the contrary of the more probable is also judged probable. The same Holy Doctor explains it in this way in the Dissertation, ed. 1755, n. 13: Greater probability does not destroy the lesser, "unless that lesser probability is drawn from the same principle, or unless the more probable opinion has for itself so convincing an argument that the contrary seems truly improbable, or no longer gravely and certainly probable. Otherwise, however, one must speak if the excess is not notable, and the opposite probability receives its force from diverse principles, as almost always happens in the concurrence of opinions; for then the less probable opinion is by no means destitute of its grave probability." Indeed, the probability or improbability of some opinion is not the same as its truth or falsity, so that one excludes the other, but is a suitability for meriting prudent assent, arising from grave motives, which, although greater or lesser, do not contradict one another if they are taken from diverse principles. But if they exhibit an argument so convincing that the opposite is judged improbable, we are now outside the case of greater or lesser probability, since one opinion will then be certain or probable, the other false or improbable.

Hence St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 604, raising the question: "Can a penitent be absolved who wishes to follow an opinion contrary to that which the confessor holds?" replies: "The common and to-be-followed sentence teaches that the confessor not only can but is also bound under grave obligation, where namely there is question of grave matter, H. A., tr. 16, n. 118, to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow a probable opinion, although the opposite seems more probable to the confessor... With this common sentence standing, strengthened by so many authorities and reasons, I do not see how the confessor can with safe conscience deny absolution to one wishing to follow an opinion which appears probable to the penitent himself, indeed perhaps more probable, if not directly, at least reflexively, as the probabilist authors commonly think, who, in following a probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one, judge that they embrace a sentence reflexively more probable, as one confirmed by weightier foundations and by the most common authority of doctors." The same Holy Doctor has the same doctrine in his last work, H. A., tr. 16, n. 118, to which sentence he adds no other limits than the following: namely, that "the opinion of the penitent have some probability, so that the confessor, although he does not hold it as solidly probable, nevertheless does not reckon it altogether false... evidently erroneous." Cf. also l. 1, n. 87, where the Holy Doctor, after Gerson, says: "Theologian doctors must not be easy in asserting that some things are mortal sins, where they are not most certain about the matter. Note, WHERE THEY ARE NOT MOST CERTAIN." - Lugo, Resp. Mor., l. 1, d. 26, n. 3; Pignatelli, Cons. Can., tom. 8, cons. 15.

58. Proof 4. That a law may indeed oblige, it must be sufficiently promulgated, St. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 4. But sufficient promulgation of law is not had if the law is not certain and manifest. Hence in Canon Law it is generally established: "In those things about which an express law is not found, proceed, equity having been observed, always by declining toward the more humane part, according as you shall see persons and causes, places and times to demand." C. Ex parte tua 11, De Transact. And in Civil Law it is decreed: "As often as there is a doubtful interpretation of liberty, the response must be made according to liberty." L. 20, De R. I. "In a doubtful matter, to follow the more benign interpretation is no less just than safe." L. 192, De R. I. But the reason is that law imposes a moral necessity, and therefore must necessarily bind the will. But it cannot necessarily bind the will except through knowledge. Wherefore, knowledge of the law being excluded, the will remains morally free. St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 3. Now, if a most probable sentence against the law is present, it is evidently clear that knowledge of the law is lacking. For certainty and evidence cannot be had with the opposite maximum probability; indeed not even with simple probability. Hence St. Alphonsus says: "For constituting a law doubtful, true probability to the contrary suffices." L. I, n. 57, ed. years 1762, 1763.

59. Confirmation 5 by the authority of St. Thomas. Law is a certain rule and measure. In order that a rule may direct and a measure may measure, it must be applied to the thing which must be directed and measured. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 90, a. 4. Therefore law must reach the subjects whom it directs; but it reaches them through knowledge. St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 17, a. 3. Therefore law must be certain and evident. Wherefore, if the law is uncertain, namely if its existence is not established; if the law is doubtful, namely if the sentence of the law is obscure, the obligation of the law ceases; a precept does not bind except through knowledge. St. Thomas, loc. cit. Hence those axioms: An uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; A doubtful law does not oblige. For an effect cannot surpass the cause. These things are altogether generally in St. Thomas, and he does not distinguish between a law having against itself a less probable, or equally probable, or more probable sentence. Wherefore from the Angelic Doctor the whole question is this: whether a law, having against itself a more probable, equally probable, or less probable sentence, can be said to reach man through knowledge, to bind him through the mediation of knowledge, through knowledge, through the virtue of knowledge. But knowledge is not given if true probability is opposed. Hence every question about mortal sin is determined dangerously unless truth is expressly had. St. Thomas, Quodl. 9, a. 15. And St. Alphonsus, l. 3, after n. 139, Epist. Resp.: "But that it may be affirmed absolutely that some action is a mortal sin, a probable opinion does not suffice, nor even a more probable one; for the more probable does not exclude the rational fear of erring; whence it does not bring about that the law does not remain doubtful, and that the opposite cannot be true, if it is truly probable."

60. Confirmation 6. Innocent III granted a three-year trial to a spouse laboring under impotence, C. Laudabilem 5, De Frig., and did not prescribe that one must first see whether the potency was more probable or at least equally probable. - In the seventeenth century, when certain Indians in the Kingdom of Paraguay had been converted to the faith, who had several wives, and questions arose concerning the validity of their marriages, Urban VIII responded to John de Lugo, later Cardinal: "Where opinions of doctors concur on both sides as probable, the opinions more favorable to the condition of the places and of barbarous men are to be followed." Urban did not say that the more probable opinions were to be followed, nor did he say where equally probable opinions concur, but absolutely where probable opinions concur. Carden., Cris. Theol., diss. 2, Sect. 553.

61. As regards the first: the Rev. Father Wouters replies, p. 101: "I retort the argument. But neither did Innocent III prescribe that one must first see whether the potency was probable and remained probable. Therefore - thus one may reason, if the argumentation of our adversary coheres aptly - it is not necessary that the sentence be truly probable in order that it can be brought into practice; which is admitted by no one." - If Wouters' retortion has force, it has force against St. Alphonsus, whose aforesaid argument it is. - Behold what St. Alphonsus has, l. 1, n. 78, p. 57, ed. P. Gaude: "In cap. Laudabilem, De Frigidit. et mal., it is had that the Pontiff granted to a certain spouse, who was doubtful about potency for intercourse, that he should try it for three years. If a doubtful law must always be observed, as the adversaries wish, and then the doubt was turning on whether the woman was another's, how could the Pontiff permit the man, while she was living, to approach her and try intercourse for three years?" Evidently therefore the Holy Pontiff supposed a doubtful potency, and consequently one probable at least in some way; but certainly not one certainly, notably more probable, or equally probable. - The Rev. Father Wouters replies secondly: "The decree of Innocent III, of which Bucceroni speaks, does nothing for our matter. For we are inquiring what it is right to do in a doubt which regards the honesty or dishonesty of an action, whereas the doubt intended by Innocent turns immediately around the validity of marriage." But was there not consequently question of the licitness of conjugal intercourse? Does not the Pontifical response regard this? And does not St. Alphonsus speak of this? Hence the Holy Doctor concludes that a doubtful law does not oblige. - Because there was immediate question of the validity of marriage, can the argument perhaps be weakened, because the Supreme Pontiff could by his authority make valid a marriage invalid because of impotence? - Wouters replies, p. 102, as to the second: "What Bucceroni narrates about the response given by Urban VIII to Cardinal de Lugo, when those things which Thyrsus Gonzalez discussed concerning that matter have been seen (Fundam. Theol. Mor., pp. 429-437), will be urged by no theologian." Nevertheless it is urged also by Cardinal D'Annibale, Summ., P. 1, n. 263, note 5, ed. 4.

62. Is the proposition established above, n. 47 seqq., some exception to probabilism, as though a true case of probabilism? - Reply. Negatively. For, if probabilism is true, it must always be true, and must be verified in every case. And indeed probabilism regards the very formal or subjective honesty or turpitude of an action; by no means the objective or real existence or non-existence of the effect of such an action. But that thesis precisely regards this objective effect to be obtained or not obtained. Therefore, if someone in that case, where the effect is to be absolutely obtained, should use a probable opinion, he will certainly sin; but he will not sin precisely because he uses a probable opinion about the licitness of the action, but because he uses a probable opinion about the validity of the act, exposing himself to the danger of frustrating an effect to be absolutely obtained. Then this would be a case of probabilism: when a probable opinion were that it is lawful by one's action to expose to danger an effect absolutely to be obtained; which is not a probable opinion, but a false and erroneous one. For he who is bound to the end is also bound to the means, and he who must guard against evil is also bound to guard against its danger. And thus, for example, a minister of the sacraments following in their administration a probable opinion as regards their validity certainly sins, not at all because he follows a probable opinion as regards the licitness of the action; indeed on the contrary, because he follows an altogether improbable opinion as regards the licitness of the action; because, since the effect of the sacrament certainly to be obtained, namely the remission of sins and infusion of grace, depends upon true matter and true form, someone applying doubtful matter or form exposes it to the danger of lacking such an effect, and therefore inflicts proximate harm, and consequently sins. - L. Op. Mor., Roman ed., year 1757, l. 1, n. 33; Laymann, l. 1, tr. 1, c. 5, Sect. 2, 3; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 1, n. 266.

63. An exception, and a true and illogical exception to probabilism, is the limitation which some probabilists and equiprobabilists add to probabilism from the principle of possession: In doubt, the condition of the possessor is better. Wherefore, they say, a doubtful law, indeed, in doubt about the existence of the law, does not oblige, because liberty possesses. But a doubtful law in doubt about its cessation obliges, because the law possesses. Hence, if it is probable that you did not emit a vow, you are not bound by the vow. If you certainly emitted a vow, and it is probable that you satisfied it, you are still bound to satisfaction. But thus to admit probabilism by halves around the existence of law, but not the cessation of law, is to admit the principles and deny the conclusions. If a doubtful law does not oblige, precisely because it is doubtful, whenever it is doubtful it will not oblige. But the law is as doubtful in the doubt about its existence, namely about its first existence, as it is doubtful in the doubt about its cessation; for if its cessation is probable, by that very fact the very existence of the law becomes doubtful. But an obliging law is not a law which existed, but one which exists; nor is it a law which exists in the abstract, but one which in its present certain obligation binds us. But if a probable opinion is had about the cessation of a law, however this is understood, its obligation becomes doubtful, and its existence likewise becomes doubtful; namely, again, not the very existence of the law in the abstract, but its force of obliging in the concrete, in the particular case, here and now. L. I, n. 63, 78. And thus, although it is certain that a vow was emitted and once existed, if probably you have satisfied it, that certain vow, insofar as once existing, becomes doubtful insofar as obliging you here and now; and that saying has force: A doubtful law does not oblige. Possession indeed constitutes a prevailing right insofar as he who possesses, by possession itself, is shown, or at least presumed, to be lord of the thing which he possesses. But how can this be either shown or reasonably presumed when the opposite is established by true or grave probability? For then it is established by true and grave probability that the possession is not legitimate, which is the only one that can constitute a prevailing right. For if the bare fact of possession, without legitimate title, at least reasonably presumed, constituted that prevailing right, then all thieves and robbers could retain another's thing by a prevailing right of possession. - Troplong, Della Prescrizione, c. 2, del Possesso, a. 2228; D'Annib., ed. 4, p. 1, n. 260, 268.

64. St. Alphonsus, l. 3, n. 112, par. Secunda vero, says: "When it is probable that the obligation of a law never began, or that it has been abolished, then the presumption for the law ceases, and liberty possesses." Behold, the limitation of probabilism by the principle of possession has been dealt with, which, from St. Alphonsus, has no force except from presumption. The Holy Doctor joins indifferently two cases, that the law never began, or that it has been abolished; and when either is probable, from the Holy Doctor, the obligation of the law is not present. - Likewise in n. 290 he says that a probable custom suffices for excusing from the law. Behold, again, no account is taken by the Holy Doctor of possession of the law. And then, distinguishing between doubt and probability, he very well says: "that in doubt about custom the precept possesses, whence a dispensation is to be sought; otherwise, if it is probable that the custom is present."

65. The very material fact of possession by no means constitutes a prevailing right in the internal forum, as regards the very right of dominion and ownership of the thing, but only as regards proof in the external forum, which must be instituted by the plaintiff against the possessor because of the aforesaid presumption of dominion. But presumption yields to truth. Hence, if someone has possessed in bad faith, even for a very long time, he must restore the thing even spontaneously and without proof and petition from the plaintiff. D'Annibale himself, who in ed. 4, p. 1, n. 264 seqq., follows the rule of possession, asserts in n. 256, note 5: "Justice forbids giving harm to him who is in certain possession of his right... I said, who is in certain possession of his right; for if the right of another is uncertain, either the condition of the possessor will be better, or at least, because no certain right of another is injured, there will be no obligation of restoring." Behold how D'Annibale himself requires certain and legitimate possession in order that it really constitute a prevailing right. And D'Annibale himself, loc. cit., n. 259, note 18, furthermore asserts: "Namely, certainty against true probability is not given." How, therefore, will the obligation of a law be certain if it is probable that that obligation has long since ceased? See also ibid., n. 169, 181. - L. l. 3, n. 212, par. Secunda, n. 290, 325, par. Infirmi, n. 483; l. 4, n. 47.

66. For the rest, D'Annibale asserts the law of possession in a threefold case, namely in a doubt: 1. whether it receives a restrictive interpretation; 2. whether it is just; 3. whether it has ceased. P. 1, n. 262. And in the preceding n. 261, note 30, and n. 263, note 1, he affirms that St. Alphonsus used this rule of possession perpetually. - But D'Annibale himself, cited n. 262, note 35, says: "except for the second case, in which all agree, in the others even those who seem to profess it depart from our rule." And among these he expressly cites and reports only St. Alphonsus! - And while the praised author notes this against Probabilism, that it must use exceptions of which his rule of possession does not stand in need, loc. cit., n. 266, he then frankly admits that his own rule is not perpetual, and fails in several cases which he enumerates, loc. cit., n. 269, note 30. - But the alleged exceptions of Probabilism, namely when there is question not of the honesty of the action alone, but of an end to be absolutely obtained and of the objective truth of the thing, loc. cit., n. 266, 256, note 5, are not truly exceptions. - Likewise what he says, loc. cit., n. 267, that a probabilist is compelled to answer contradictories, is by no means true. And it is certainly strange that a learned theologian found a contradiction in cited n. 267 regarding that very same case in which he himself had expressly affirmed a little before, namely n. 263, that it is lawful to follow either probable contrary opinion. - Finally he asserts, n. 264, that this rule of possession enjoys better right; in n. 269, that it is better than the others not only as regards the truth of the thing alone but also as regards practice; but immediately after, in the following n. 270, he affirms that it is lawful to follow truly and gravely probable opinions; and in n. 263, after he has expounded the various systems and has also established his own rule in n. 262, he says that it is lawful for each one to choose what pleases him more. - To avert contradiction, perhaps it can be said that the illustrious D'Annibale considered this rule of possession not for the case of true probability, but for the case of doubt, which he seems sufficiently to insinuate in n. 269; and thus it is wholly true that the theologians most commonly teach that rule, n. 268, and in this sense we also admit it, and explain it diligently below. And indeed that rule is enunciated in doubt.

67. Does probabilism truly provide a safe norm for forming a certain conscience for oneself? - The norm which probabilism provides for forming a certain conscience for oneself in doubtful matters is most safe. For probabilism in fact is nothing other than this principle: A doubtful law does not oblige, applied practically, with a probable sentence standing against the law in a practical case.

68. The principle itself, considered in itself, is most safe. St. Alphonsus himself sustains his whole moral system by nothing other than this principle. And if someone asks, says the Holy Doctor, "why a doubtful law does not oblige, we shall answer with this concise argument: a law not sufficiently promulgated does not oblige; a doubtful law is not sufficiently promulgated; because while the law is doubtful, the doubt or question is sufficiently promulgated, but the law is not promulgated; therefore a doubtful law does not oblige. Whoever should wish to deny this argument," the same Holy Doctor continues, "would have to prove either that a law even not promulgated obliges, or that a doubtful law is truly promulgated, against that which St. Thomas and others commonly expressly teach; but he will never prove either of these propositions for all eternity," l. 1, n. 61, par. Posito igitur, p. 32, ed. P. Gaude.

1. Clemens, a learned theologian, thinks that the Probabilists favor liberty too much. Therefore he says that, when there is a concurrence of an opinion certainly more probable for the law, it is not licit to follow a less probable opinion for liberty. For this is clear, first, from the authority of Clement III, c. Capellanus, De Feriis, where he declares that the opinion is to be followed "which rests upon the better and more subtle reason." But where the probability is certainly greater, there without doubt the reason is better and more subtle. Therefore. Rule 45 of Law in the Sixth agrees: "In obscure matters we look to what is more likely." The same is clear, secondly, from the authority of the Probabiliorists, and of all the Probabilists of better note, who defend equiprobabilism in substantial matters. Before the rest let Suarez be heard, De Legibus, l. 8, c. 3, n. 19: "Greater probability is a certain moral certitude, if the excess of probability is certain." Muzzarelli says the same, Opusc. de Regul. moral. opin., in Migne, Cursus Theologicus XI, 1309: "Some excess of reasons for one side against the other, unless it is notable, does not remove doubt. But when it has been notable, the weight already preponderates for one side, we are already determined to one, and in it we stand." The same is clear, thirdly, from the authority of St. Alphonsus, l. 1, n. 56: "Whenever," he says, "it certainly appears to the intellect that truth stands much more for the law than for liberty, then the will cannot prudently and without fault adhere to the less safe part; since in that case the man would not act relying on his own judgment, or on his own belief, but rather by a certain effort which by his will he would bring upon the intellect, so that he might be removed from the part which appears to him far more likely, and be bent toward the part which does not appear true to him, indeed which seems not even to have a certain foundation by which it could be true. And to this pertains that saying of the Apostle to Rom. 14:23: Everything that is not from faith is sin." Ioannes-Petrus and Antonius, themselves also learned theologians but probabilists, hear these things incredulously. Cf. Marc. Instit. Moral. Alphons., n. 100, 101, second ed. 1886.

Q. 1. What is Probabilism? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first: the whole doctrine of Probabilism can be reduced in few words to two assertions.

The first is the certain principle, admitted by all, especially by St. Alphonsus: an uncertain law cannot beget a certain obligation; a doubtful law does not oblige. It is a certain principle, because law does not bind the will except through knowledge of itself. The other is that when against the law there is a truly probable opinion, the law becomes uncertain and doubtful. Likewise a certain principle, because certitude is incompatible with opposite probability. Therefore it matters little for the true doctrine of Probabilism whether the opinion for the law is equally probable, or a little more probable, or much more probable, or simply more probable. For the question is this and no other: namely, whether the opinion against the law is truly probable; for then, whatever may be the case concerning the opinion for the law, it is impossible that the law be certain and evident, binding the will through knowledge. I. M. 111 seqq.

To the second: the reasons brought forward for holding Probabiliorism prove nothing indeed. For first, in c. Capellanus 4, De Fer., Clement III defines by his authority a particular question in which there were two opinions, choosing one among them. The matter is of the three weeks during which the canon forbids marriages to be made before the feast of St. John the Baptist; and "some," says the Pontiff, "understand those weeks without interruption. But others, wishing to make an interval between the feast and the weeks themselves, understand that it was established out of reverence for the festivity of Pentecost, which is sometimes accustomed to intervene in those weeks; and thus, beginning from the three days of Rogations before the Ascension of the Lord up to the eighth day after Pentecost, those weeks being counted, they do not permit marriages to be celebrated in that space of time alone, in no way forbidding their celebration from that point." The question having been so proposed, the Holy Pontiff, thus interpreting the canon authentically, resolved it by his own authority: "Therefore, since we were consulted as to which of these opinions might seem stronger, it appeared to us and to our brothers that, although it is the custom of the Roman Church that, at whatever time marriage may be contracted, legitimate consent intervening in the present; yet because marriages are not permitted to be celebrated from Septuagesima until the seventh day after Pentecost, and afterwards they are also celebrated for three weeks or more before the festivity of St. John without distinction, the latter opinion rests upon the better and more subtle reason; and whether according to the canons marriages are suspended from Septuagesima until after the octaves of Easter, or according to the custom of the Roman Church until after seven days of the feast of Pentecost, which lacks octaves, on the Sunday which follows, and thereafter, they can be licitly celebrated." Therefore Clement III by no means defines that where there are two probable opinions, of which one is probable and the other more probable, or certainly much more probable, the latter is altogether and always to be held; but he says only that of the two proposed opinions the second is better and more subtle. Whence certainly nothing is drawn out for Probabiliorism. Indeed, what is the chief point, Clement III defines the matter not relying on a certainly much more probable opinion, but relying on a certain canon and a certain custom.

2. Rule 45 of Law in the Sixth does not properly regard probability, but doubt, which is quite different. Cf. I. M. 137, 138. Whence probability is almost excluded by that Rule, since it is said that we look to what is more likely, which properly bears before itself not probability but presumption. Indeed, the whole Rule is of the following tenor: We look in obscure matters to what is more likely; or to what for the most part is accustomed to happen. Namely, in obscure matters, that is, in those in which the truth does not even probably appear, which certainly is not the same as in probable matters. What is more likely, that is to say, what, with all the circumstances of the matter itself having been attended to, has a presumption founded in likelihood. Or what for the most part is accustomed to happen, that is, when the aforesaid presumption is lacking, that must be held which commonly and ordinarily is accustomed to happen, for then presumption stands for that. It is moreover useless to advert that this Rule, like other similar Rules, pertains rather to forensic judgments and to judicial sentences. Cf. Reiffenst. in Reg. cit. But now, from the fact that in those matters in which probability is even lacking, that is to be held, and indeed in judgments and in matters of justice, for it is a question of a Rule of Law, which, all the circumstances of the matter weighed, appears more likely; or which, this presumption lacking, is rather presumed from things commonly and ordinarily occurring; or finally, if not even this can be had, the least is to be followed and held, as Rule 30 in the Sixth has it; from this it certainly does not follow that, probable and more probable opinions standing against the law and for the law, the law certainly obliges. And indeed Canon Law does not contradict itself. Moreover, the remaining things now being passed over, in c. Cum iure 31, De Off. et Pot. Iud. Deleg., it is said: "Unless you have become certain of the mandate, you are not compelled to execute what is commanded." The same is had in c. Sicut quaedam, d. 14, where St. Leo writes these things: "In those matters which have been doubtful or obscure, let us know that this is to be followed, which is found neither contrary to the evangelical precepts, nor opposed to the decrees of the holy Fathers." And St. Alphonsus, l. 3, after n. 130, Epist. Resp., part Adversarius in Dissertat., adds this commentary: "This has place insofar as it can be asserted that some action is not gravely illicit. But, in order that it be affirmed absolutely that some action is a mortal sin, a probable opinion does not suffice; nor even a more probable one."

3. Suarez certainly was not a probabiliorist, nor is it necessary to demonstrate this, since it is conceded by the adversaries themselves. Cf. Marc. l. c. 92. Therefore his saying only has to be explained, and it is easily explained. It certainly happens sometimes that for some truth a greater absolute probability is had, and the excess of probability is so certain that the opposite opinion is scarcely probable, or enjoys only a certain slender probability, so that the probability of that opposite opinion is uncertain and doubtful. In such a case that greater probability, with such a certain excess of probability, is equivalent to a certain moral certitude. But in such a case, as is clear, it is no longer a matter of two truly probable opinions, although one is more probable than the other. Therefore nothing is drawn from the saying of Suarez for Probabiliorism.

4. The same must be said of Muzzarelli's affirmation. For he is treating of such a notable excess of probability that the doubt of the opposite side is removed, we are determined to one, and in it we stand. But in such a case we are already outside the limits of true probability, and we are found at least in moral certitude. Muzzarelli has these words in the cited Opusc., Roman edition, 1807, page 19: "If the excess is of great or notable moment, then I say that in practice ordinarily there does not subsist before the intellect a persuasion of reasons for the contrary opinion; and therefore that case has always seemed to me very rare in practice. For a great or notable preponderance of reasons for one opinion removes before the intellect the weight for the other, and makes it before the intellect not only less weighty, but even LIGHT and IMPROBABLE." But that Muzzarelli is not a probabiliorist but in reality simply a probabilist is clear from the Rule of acting which, after Benedict XIV, he established in the aforesaid little work. For this generally is it, namely that in obscure and more difficult matters we embrace that opinion which reason advises and authority confirms. "Which reason advises," that is, which reason proposes as true or likely in such a way that it induces a prudent man to give assent to it. For in this stands the force of reasonable persuasion; whence an opinion in which the reason of a prudent man cannot rest, although sometimes it bears before itself some apparent truth or likelihood, is nevertheless altogether to be refuted. It follows: "and authority confirms." For the authority of learned men is the greatest hinge by which the weakness of the human intellect is ruled, so that for the ignorant and unlearned authority of this sort almost always stands in place of reason.... God does not require from us that we always act with metaphysical or physical evidence concerning the material honesty of our action: for this is above the powers of human nature for this state of life; but he requires from us only that we never act without a firm and prudent persuasion that our action here and now to be posited is not sinful, but licit.... But he who in obscure and disputable matters finally executes that which, all things having been seriously weighed, reason advises him and authority confirms, follows that which prudently appears to him true and honest.... As soon as in controversial matters, after diligent examination and all things seriously weighed, I find an opinion which right reason advises to me, and several classical authors confirm, now I have no need to inquire further, and to search out all the doctors, to compare each of their reasons and authorities, and to judge concerning their inequality and preponderance, which would be a morally intolerable burden, as entangled in innumerable scruples and liable to dangers of erring." And hence it is more than sufficiently clear, not only that Muzzarelli in reality simply defends probabilism, but also that he excludes equiprobabilism and probabiliorism; whence below he asserts still more clearly: "But if it should sometimes happen that there is at the same time a greater notable persuasion for the respectively contradictory opinion, I would not indeed dare to add anything to the rule of Benedict XIV, who simply counsels following that which reason advises, not that which advises more....

Most prudently Pontiff Benedict XIV abstained from these comparative preeminences, and prescribed only that we descend to the opinion which reason advises and authority confirms." And this opinion indeed, in obscure and disputed matters, is indeed an opinion which is truly probable, whatever may be the degree of its probability, concerning which it is so difficult a matter to judge that, as the same Muzzarelli says, "it is not to be presumed that God willed, when it is a question of the observance of law necessary for salvation, to cast us into so many difficulties and ambages, from which we cannot extricate ourselves, and by which we are almost driven into despair."

5. The mind of St. Alphonsus is also the same; since the holy Doctor openly says that, when an opinion certainly much more probable for the law stands, the will cannot prudently adhere to the less safe part. Therefore this part, if it is such that the will cannot prudently adhere to it, is already not truly probable, and the opposite is already morally certain. And indeed the holy Doctor established this in order to retain Probabilism within the limits of true probability, and consequently to remove from it slender and doubtful probability. Hence in the text brought forward in the case, the holy Doctor does not speak of any probability whatever, but of that which plainly appears to the intellect of the one judging; who consequently, if he departed from this probability, would depart from his own judgment by a certain effort of the will, and would act against his conscience, to which therefore he applies that saying of the Apostle, Rom. 14:23: What is not from faith is sin. Hence the holy Doctor taught most constantly: "That there be no grave sin, it suffices that true probability be had; I understand that which rests on a foundation NOT SLENDER, so that safely, according to the common opinion, the question of the more probable and the less probable being set aside, it can be held and taught." Op. Mor. l. 3, after n. 130, Epist. Resp., part Adversarius in Dissertat. And the holy Doctor indeed opposes and calls lax that opinion which defends even the less probable for liberty WITHOUT ANY DISTINCTION between grave and slender, between certain and doubtful probability. Apol. cont. il P. Patuzzi, year 1765. Cf. I. M. 131 seqq. And l. 3, n. 547, St. Alphonsus establishes and develops this assertion: "Precepts are not to be imposed under grave fault unless evident reason advises it." And this, as far as pertains to us, is truly the Probabilism which we defend, with every question set aside concerning the more probable and less probable, concerning the much more and the little more probable, and the equally probable. Probabiliorists simply assert that one must stand for the more probable, the less probable being left. Equiprobabilists affirm that one must stand for the much more probable, the much less probable being left; but they concede that someone can hold the probable, the other equally probable or a little more probable being left. Probabilists say that it is licit to follow an opinion simply probable, provided it is truly probable, the other being left although it is more probable and much more probable. Therefore we defend this system with St. Alphonsus and with St. Thomas, and no other: "Precepts are not to be imposed under grave fault unless evident reason advises it," l. 3, n. 547; "No one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept," Quodl. 14, De Verit., a. 3. - G. 46, 47, 56-64.

2. Probus the theologian does not approve Probabilism, but Probabiliorism; because, he says, the intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible. What concerning Probus?

R. That which Probus affirms, that our intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible, can be taken in two ways. First indeed for the objective truth of the thing, or for the effect of some action of ours, to be obtained absolutely. But in this sense the reason of Probus proves nothing against Probabilism. For when it is a question of that objective truth and objective effect to be obtained absolutely, the probabilists themselves say that it is neither probable nor licit to follow the less probable and less safe opinion. Therefore in such a case it is not licit to follow that probable opinion about the thing itself, not because it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, but because it is not licit to follow a false opinion. For it is not probable, but false, that it is licit to follow a probable opinion about the thing itself when the thing itself must be obtained absolutely. In the other sense, however, the assertion of Probus can be taken for the merely subjective truth of the liceity of some action, in the speculative order, which ought to be, in the practical order, that from which the practical dictate of conscience would be taken for acting, so that our action would become licit and honest. And in this other sense the assertion of Probus is altogether false.

For then the question is not whether the intellect ought to adhere to the more probable opinion, because it is, or rather appears, nearer to the truth. But the question is whether the will ought to adhere to the more probable opinion, because it is then bound by law. But it is not only not nearer to the truth, but altogether alien from the truth, that the will is then bound by the law; for then the law, if it has against itself a truly probable opinion, although it has for itself a more probable one, is doubtful, and it is an axiom that a doubtful law does not oblige.

Only then could the obligation of the will from the probability of the greater opinion have place, when, where there stood, for example, a more probable opinion for the law, the law would thereby become certain, and knowledge of the law would then be had. For the will is not bound except by a certain law, and by a certain law through knowledge of the law itself. But an opinion, although more probable, exhibits neither certitude nor knowledge. Therefore from the reason of Probus the contrary follows, namely, that if the intellect strives to attain truth as nearly as possible, the intellect cannot impose on the will the obligation of a law while its doubt stands; which Probabilism declares. Therefore from the fact that the intellect embraces what appears more probable, it does not follow that the will ought to follow what the intellect has judged more probable. For it is altogether one thing that this or that is speculatively more probable; another thing that consequently it is more probable that, that greater probability standing, notwithstanding the opposite probability, the law is certain and certainly obliges. This is not only not more probable, but not even probable, since the principles are admitted by all: Probability excludes certitude; a doubtful law does not oblige.

3. Titius, a confessor and probabilist, says: either Probabilism is true, and it is true in every case; or, if it is false even in one case, it is always false. Hence he does not hesitate to assert that Probabilism ought consequently to be extended even to the sacramental seal. But Titius adds: what is true speculatively is also true practically. Therefore without any scruple he is accustomed to speak in a rather free manner about things heard in confession. And if at any time others wonder at this manner of speaking, he says: they are ignorant; so much the worse for them.

Q. What as to the case?

R. It is true what Titius affirms: either Probabilism is true, and it is true in every case; or, if it is false even in one case, it is always false. The reason is, first, because the truth of a universal proposition must be verified in every other particular proposition contained under it; secondly, because in every true case of probabilism the axiom holds on which probabilism rests: a doubtful law does not oblige. Therefore if this axiom is once false, the foundation of all Probabilism is destroyed. - But the conclusion of Titius concerning the extension of probabilism to the sacramental seal of confession is not legitimate. The reason is that probability here does not regard the subjective liceity or illicitness of the action, which probabilism alone touches, but regards the very objective truth of the matter: whether the sacramental seal is manifested. For if it is probable that by speaking or acting in this or that way the sacramental seal is manifested, now it is not probable that it is licit to speak or act in this or that way, but it is certain that it is not licit. The reason is that the sacrament of penance is certainly rendered odious, and the faithful are removed from it; and moreover that probability does not make it so that, if in reality by that speech or by that action the sacramental seal is violated, the penitent is not thereby defamed, to which he has a certain right in whatever case, as much as is by force of the sacramental seal. And he has a certain right not to be exposed, by force of sacramental confession, even to a probable danger of infamy. Each has place, as is clear, both in probability of fact and in probability of law, which many wrongly distinguish in this matter. G. Comp. v. 2, 650; Cas. v. 2, 749; I. M. 116, 117, 120, 121. But what Titius adds, that what is true speculatively is also true practically, contains truth in the abstract, not in the concrete. For in the concrete, extrinsic circumstances can be superadded which render a matter licit in itself, although accidentally, illicit in practice. But in the case of Titius speaking in a freer manner about things heard in confession, according to his doctrine about probabilism, the matter is illicit not only extrinsically because of the wonder and scandal of others, but also intrinsically. Therefore not the others, but Titius himself, is ignorant, and for him the matter stands altogether badly.

4. Antoninus remembers that long ago, to avoid very frequent relapses against chastity, he most firmly brought into his mind that henceforth he wished to abstain from every sin against the angelic virtue, and that he had indeed often promised this to the confessor before receiving sacramental absolution, and that he had often renewed the same will immediately after receiving Communion. Hence Antoninus is anxious whether, by reason of a vow made, he ought to abstain from entering marriage. But he remembers that, in order to fulfill in deed what he had resolved in mind, on the feast day of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus he vowed several fasts to be performed, and several rosaries to be recited. But he does not now know whether he ought to do this on each Friday and Saturday, or only on the first Friday and Saturday of each month. He doubts besides whether he ought to do both on Friday and Saturday, or to fast on Friday and say the rosary on Saturday, and whether the whole rosary, or only a chaplet or third part of the rosary, since he himself did not distinguish sufficiently between the one and the other.

Q. Whether and how is Antoninus bound by the aforesaid vows?

R. Antoninus is not held by a vow of chastity; for a purpose of chastity, although most firm, which he most firmly brought into his mind to be observed, is not a vow. Nor is a promise often made to the confessor in confession and before sacramental absolution a vow. For a vow is a promise made to God alone. Nor likewise does that renewal of purpose and promise immediately after Communion have the value of a vow; for renewal is of the same will, which contained no vow. And, if Antoninus had truly emitted a vow of chastity, as he now well remembers that he vowed fasts and rosaries, so certainly he would also well remember that he vowed chastity. But as far as fasts and rosaries are concerned, after the matter has been weighed and the doubt remains, he is obliged only to the minimum. Therefore he must fast only and recite the rosary on the first day of Friday and Saturday each month; namely, fast on the first day of Friday, and recite the rosary on the first Saturday day, which seems more likely. And if there is also serious doubt about reciting the whole rosary, it suffices that he recite the chaplet, namely if, not sufficiently distinguishing between rosary and chaplet, he had in mind and vowed the rosary as he was accustomed to recite it in his family, and as it is also commonly accustomed to be recited. - I. M. 570, 572, 577, 586, 592, 593; Elbel 156 seqq.; G. 44.

5. Leofridus the confessor, following a probable opinion, imposed on his penitent an obligation of restitution from which he had already been freed by another confessor, who had also embraced a probable opinion in favor of his penitent. Hence, when the penitent refused to restore, Leofridus says: it is a matter of justice, in which probability has no place. For it belongs to justice to preserve equality; therefore, when doubt and probability stand, restitution must be made at least according to the proportion of the doubt and probability. - But although he himself was certainly persuaded about the reality of fire in hell, and he himself certainly held the contrary opinion as false and erroneous, nevertheless he did not hesitate to absolve a certain noble man who, on the contrary, thought the fire of hell to be metaphorical. For there are not lacking, he said, theologians, both old and also more recent, who think the matter doubtful, and the Church has as yet defined nothing about this matter. But a confessor does not have the right of imposing his own opinions on a penitent, since there are others who think the contrary.

Q. 1. Can the confessor impose on the penitent, at least a rude and ignorant one, his own opinion? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 119. To the second: first, Leofridus, in itself, is held to restitution toward his penitent. For since the penitent had for himself a truly probable opinion, Leofridus unjustly obliged the penitent to restitution, and so was an efficacious and unjust cause of the penitent's damage. But his general doctrine is false, that probability has no place in justice, as is seen everywhere among the doctors, and especially in St. Alphonsus. Likewise his reason is false, for it indeed belongs to justice to preserve equality and to restore it when injured; but restitution is to be made, from the same justice, by rendering to each one his own right, where it is certain concerning such a right. But where the right of another is doubtful, the very equality of justice to be preserved requires that the right of the possessor prevail, and that the possessor in good faith not then be despoiled of his own thing. G. 62, 70; L. 1, 6, n. 547.

Secondly, since Leofridus was certainly persuaded concerning the reality of fire in hell, and he himself certainly held the contrary opinion as false and erroneous, he could not give absolution to the noble man thinking otherwise. Nor indeed does his reason avail, namely that no definition of the Church has yet come forth on that matter, nor are there lacking some theologians who do not admit real fire of hell, but metaphorical fire. For first, if these things did not destroy the certitude of his intellect concerning the truth of the fire of hell, he could not form a conscience for himself by some reflex principle for absolving; for it is impossible that someone be directly certain concerning some truth, but reflexively doubt concerning the same. Then, in fact, it is not a matter here of something disputed among Catholic doctors, but of the common opinion of Catholic doctors, which Suarez affirms to be certain and Catholic. Cf. Suarez, De Angelis, l. 8, c. 12, n. 9; Petavius, De Angelis, l. 3, c. 5, n. 7; Toletus on I p., q. 64, a. 3, etc.; G. 71. But what Leofridus asserts in excuse of himself by no means excuses him. For from the fact that the Church has defined nothing, it does not follow that therefore the opposite opinion can be held as probable, or at least not improbable. Likewise from the fact that theologians are not lacking who hold the contrary opinion, this opinion cannot therefore be held as extrinsically probable, or at least not improbable. Extrinsic probability cannot be invoked if no probable reason is brought forward by the theologians; for extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic. And only then can extrinsic probability be invoked, abstracting from intrinsic, when it is a question of some matter entangled, obscure, involved in difficulties, not in reality sufficiently clear among doctors. Lastly, it is true that a confessor cannot impose his own opinions on his penitents when the opinion of the penitent is probable, or at least does not appear certainly improbable; but he cannot approve that the penitent follow false and erroneous opinions in a practical matter which pertains to faith and morals. L. 1, 6, n. 604; G. 69, 71-74. The present resolution is confirmed from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, 30 April 1890.

6. Sigismundus admits a testament made in his favor, but destitute of legal formalities, because, he says, it probably avails. But he refuses to pay certain pious and profane legacies inscribed in it, because, he says, they are probably null. The same Sigismundus juridically asks that another testament made in favor of Caius his blood-relative be annulled, since it is destitute of due formalities. He obtains the annulment of this testament. Likewise he refuses to pay certain profane legacies inscribed in it, because, he says again, they are null, as having been inscribed in a null testament.

Q. 1. Can one change a probable opinion once accepted, by acting according to the opposite probable opinion? 2. What as to the case?

R. To the first, cf. I. M. 128. To the second: Sigismundus, first admitting the testament, follows a truly probable opinion, and cannot be disturbed. Cf. I. M. 1029. But he cannot not pay the pious and profane legacies inscribed in it; since, accepting the testament as valid from a probable opinion, by that very fact he both acquires the right as to the advantage of the testament and at the same time contracts the obligation of the burden of the legacies, according to Rule 55 of Law in the Sixth: "He who feels the advantage ought also to feel the burden."

But if a testament lacking formalities is for a pious cause, it is certainly valid indeed, if from elsewhere the will of the testator is certainly established. I. M. 1030, 1031. But whether profane legacies contained in it are also valid is disputed. The reason for denying is that a testament of this sort does not avail except from the will of the Supreme Pontiff and from Canon Law, which does not involve itself in profane causes; and so profane legacies do not avail, but consequently by right of accretion they will pertain to the pious cause itself. The reason for affirming is that, since the pious cause suffers no damage from the defect of solemnities, equity at least requires that from the same defect, against the will of the deceased, it not take an advantage. But, on the contrary, since the heir is the pious cause itself, because the will of the deceased is certainly established by natural law alone, when by the same natural law the will of the deceased is certainly established as to the legacies, it is necessary that the pious cause execute this certain will of the testator. - Lugo d. 22, n. 274; L. 1, 3, n. 922.

Sigismundus, having recourse to the judge concerning the other testament, relying on a probable opinion concerning its invalidity, acts licitly, and uses his right, which a just law concedes to any citizen. But once the nullity of the testament has been declared by the sentence of the judge, consequently the profane legacies inscribed in it are null. For the law renders such testaments destitute of due formalities simply liable to nullity, no distinction being made between the testamentary disposition itself and the legacy. C. I. 804; C. G. 1001. - G. 75-78; I. M. 936.

One must treat of three things, namely 1. the nature, 2. the efficacy, 3. the use of probability.

51. • Opinion in general is assent to one or the other with fear of the opposite; or it is adherence to one of two contradictories with fear of the other.

But probable opinion, or probable sentence, is a judgment resting on a grave motive, though with fear concerning the opposite. - But improbable opinion is a judgment which is destitute of a solid motive.

52. • Division of probability. Probability is distinguished:

1. Intrinsic, or extrinsic, according as it rests either on reasons drawn from the nature of the thing, or on authority ¹. Each can be greater or lesser.

¹ Extrinsic probability supposes intrinsic; namely the authority of Doctors has force insofar as it can or must be judged that they were moved to holding some sentence by some grave reason. Wherefore if perhaps you detect that they have asserted something while relying on a weak or even altogether false foundation, their authority certainly adds no moment to the assertions.

2. Of law, or of fact, according as it is concerned with the existence of law, or its application, or with some fact.

3. Speculative, or practical, according as it regards a thing in general, abstracting from circumstances, or an act proximately to be posited ².

² Perhaps you would more clearly call opinion or sentence speculative or practical according as it is or is not ordered to directing an action which here and now in reality must be posited.

4. Absolute, or relative, according as it appears such to all or to most, or only to one or a few.

5. Solitary, or comparative, according as it appears such considered in itself alone, or by comparison instituted with the foundations of the contradictory proposition ³.

³ More commonly the Doctors call that absolute which the Author calls solitary; but they are accustomed to call the other relative.

6. Certain, or doubtful or slight, according as it rests on motives either certainly solid, or only doubtfully solid.

Comparative probability is divided by degrees into three kinds, namely 1. into greater probability, 2. lesser, 3. equal. For any proposition can be more probable, or equally, or less probable than the opposite, according as it rests on more solid, or equally, or less solid motives. - But the more probable opinion itself also admits various degrees: for it is a little or notably more probable, according as its motives are a little or notably graver than the motives of the opposite. It is also called most probable if it enjoys a most grave motive. Most probable, says St. Lig., no. 40, is that which rests on a most grave foundation: wherefore the opposite is considered SLIGHTLY or DOUBTFULLY probable.

Besides, an opinion is safe, or safer, or less safe, according as it simply favors the law, or favors it more or less. Therefore a more probable opinion is not always safer, since greater probability can also stand for liberty.

Various systems concerning probability.

63.^† - 1. Absolute tutiorism, or rigorism, according to which the safer part, that is, the part favoring the law, must always be followed ⁴.

⁴ Namely, these hold that the safer part must be followed unless it is certain that nothing favors the law against liberty; whence according to them it is not licit to act according to the most probable opinion favoring liberty. This doctrine was condemned in the third of the thirty propositions proscribed by Alexander VIII.

2. Mitigated tutiorism, according to which it is licit only to follow the most probable part favoring liberty.

3. Probabiliorism, according to which the opinion favoring the law must always be held, unless the opposite is notably more probable ⁵.

⁵ Since according to St. Alphonsus a notably more probable proposition has against itself only a slightly or doubtfully probable one, here rather mitigated tutiorism is being described.

4. Equiprobabilism, according to which it is not licit to follow the less safe opinion unless it is as probable as the opposite, or nearly as probable ⁶.

⁶ Some have called St. Alphonsus de Ligorio the author of this system. But this neither ought nor can be so understood, as though the holy man at some time receded from the common system of probabilism, which he himself also defended most keenly. See the Dissertation On the Moral System of St. Alphonsus, which was delivered at the Roman College in the solemn restoration of studies in the year 1863, and is available at Rome from Io. Bencivenga.

5. Probabilism, according to which it is licit to follow a less safe and also less probable opinion, provided that it enjoys true and solid probability.

6. Laxism, from which it is always lawful to follow opinions even slightly probable; but this system too was condemned, as will be clear below.

Hence, according to the various opinions concerning the value of probability, theologians have obtained various names, so that they are called either rigorists, or mitigated tutiorists, - probabiliorists, - equiprobabilists, - probabilists, - laxists.

54. Conclusions From What Has Been Said. - 1. Probability from its nature necessarily requires that it exclude certitude, even merely moral certitude; for by this alone can it differ from certitude ⁷.

⁷ Probability cannot be joined at the same time with certitude, both because it differs far from certitude, and because probability which has certitude against itself wholly vanishes.

2. Hence every probability, however great it may have been, is altogether destroyed when certitude of the contradictory proposition supervenes.

3. An opinion must certainly be held probable which, the Church tolerating, is common among theologians ⁸, or is taught by St. Thomas and his school, or is asserted as probable by most theologians; or even which five or six theologians outstanding in probity, judgment, and knowledge hold absolutely as true, unless a certain reason against that opinion appears.

⁸ When the common opinion of Theologians stands for some doctrine, we have probability of this kind such that (unless a plainly grave reason observed by no one, or a clear authority, stands in the way) it is rash to resist it. See Canus, On Theological Places, book 8, ch. 4.

4. That opinion is certainly probable for a learned and upright man which he himself knows he has diligently examined, and which he experiences himself, without inordinate affection, to detect as true or certainly probable ⁹ on account of grave reasons.

⁹ Namely, it is not necessary that he remain without fear concerning the opposite.

5. Concerning the intrinsic probability of law, commonly only the most learned and those most versed in the moral matter can judge, since they alone can know that nothing certain is opposed to them.

6. A man moderately learned can judge concerning the extrinsic probability of an opinion, if, rightly understanding the state of the question, he finds it asserted by authors greater than every exception, that is, altogether approved among theologians.

7. One author, if he is greater than every exception, and brings a reason which others have not examined or have not sufficiently solved, while he himself suitably solves the reasons of others, can make his own opinion certainly probable, although it is contrary to the common opinion.

8. An uneducated man, hearing from a man whom he himself judges upright, prudent and learned, that some opinion is certainly probable, can hold it as such: for he is not able to weigh the matter per se, nor is any other means at hand for him of knowing extrinsic probability... - Lacroix..., etc.

55. • The efficacy of probability is situated in its force for forming the ultimate dictate of conscience, practically certain. But from those things which we asserted in no. 39, certain conscience alone is the right rule of morals. In what way, then, can it happen that from even greater probability it is sometimes licit to act? Certainly this is not licit by force of probability alone. Therefore recourse must be had to some morally certain principle, so that certitude may be had. Therefore one must now discuss what probability avails for this end; namely, whether sometimes, with solid reasons favoring both the law and liberty, we can consider ourselves free from the very bond of the law.

That we may discuss and resolve these questions, we establish the following theses.

It is not licit to follow a probable opinion, nor a more probable one, with the safer one left aside, as often as there is an absolute obligation of obtaining some determinate end, which the use of a means probably unfit would bring into danger; then therefore the safer part must be followed.

56. • It is proved. Whoever is compelled to obtain an end absolutely and more certainly, is held to choose those means by which he is certainly going to attain the end. But the end can be obtained certainly only through the safer part: for by hypothesis the means, only probably apt, brings into danger the end which I am held absolutely to attain. Therefore it is not licit to use a means only probably apt, but more apt and the same safer means must be chosen ¹. Therefore the safer part must be followed.

¹ It must be denied that in these circumstances any probability remains for the opinion. For from what has been said above, no probability remains for liberty where a certain law militates against it. But thus the matter stands in the case. It is certainly a law that I cannot inflict injury on another; and therefore it is certainly a law that I am held to guard against a probable danger of another's harm, since it is injurious to bring a probable danger of harm to another. Therefore as often as from my action a probable danger threatens another, the action is manifestly illicit, as being opposed to a certain law.

52.^† Hence You Will Resolve. - 1. In those things which are necessary for salvation by necessity of means, you are held to follow the safer; for a most grave obligation urges everyone certainly to care for the eternal salvation of his own soul; therefore means absolutely safe and certain must be applied ². Therefore in matters pertaining to the Faith or to the true Religion, the safer opinion must necessarily be followed, opposite probability being set aside ³. Hence the following proposition was condemned by Innocent XI under no. 4: An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief ⁴. - St. Lig., no. 43.

² Hence if you are uncertain whether you were baptized, or if you prudently doubt whether your grave sins were duly expiated through confession, you are held to seek the grace of justification by suitable means.

³ This most grave obligation of natural law is violated by all those who, perhaps thinking themselves unfit for another examination, nevertheless confess that salvation can be obtained in the Catholic Church; but in the meantime neglect to embrace it, because they think they can be saved also in their own sect. For at least this can and ought to cast grave doubt upon them, that against the opinion of their own salvation they have the opinion of all Catholics; and therefore the obligation either of inquiring more diligently into the matter, or certainly of choosing the safer part, cannot be hidden from them.

⁴ Beware, nevertheless, lest you conclude from this that anyone, when faith is at issue, is obliged to adhere to an opinion, even a more probable one. For by the same Innocent XI the sentence was proscribed (prop. 21) that supernatural assent of faith, useful for salvation, stands with only probable knowledge of revelation, and with fear by which someone fears that God has not spoken. Therefore from that fourth condemned proposition you will conclude this one thing: that that unbeliever is not excused if, led by a probable opinion, he remains tranquilly in his sect; for he would fail in a grave obligation of solicitously applying those means by which he may reach the truth.

2. A hunter fearing lest by discharging shot at a wild animal he perhaps injure some man cannot fire, even if he judged more probably that the danger is absent; for this danger, if perhaps it is present, cannot be removed by a contrary probability, even a greater one.

3. A physician and surgeon are held to apply the safer medicines and remedies which can be had here and now; because by a tacit contract they have obliged themselves to obtaining the end more securely, insofar as it can be done. The same must likewise be said of all others who have contracted some obligation of this kind toward the neighbor ⁵. - St. Lig., no. 44.

⁵ Thus a judge is held to render a sentence according to the more probable reasons. On this matter you have proposition 2 condemned by Innocent XI: I think probably that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable.

4. The minister of a Sacrament, where its validity is at issue, unless the defect is supplied by the Church, or a case of necessity urges, is held, insofar as he can, to follow the safer part, with the less safe probable, or even more probable, one left aside; the reason is that otherwise he would expose the Sacrament to danger of nullity, and his neighbor to danger of spiritual harm. Hence deservedly the proposition was condemned by Innocent XI under no. 1: It is not illicit in conferring Sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the Sacrament, with the safer one left aside. - St. Lig., no. 48.

I said 1. unless the defect is supplied by the Church; for sometimes the Church can and is considered to supply that which is lacking for the validity of a Sacrament: and this indeed can happen in two sacraments, namely in the sacrament of Penance, if for a grave reason it is conferred with doubtful jurisdiction, or with probable jurisdiction, and in the sacrament of Matrimony, when it is celebrated with a doubtful impediment of ecclesiastical law, or even if the delegation of the assisting Priest is doubtful, as will be said in its own place. - St. Lig., no. 50.

I said 2. unless a case of necessity urges: because since the Sacraments are for men, they must be ministered to a man constituted in grave danger of life in the best way in which it can be done, even with mere probability, indeed with slight and very slight probability concerning their value. - St. Lig., no. 49, and others commonly.

It is not licit to follow an opinion slightly probable, with the safer one left aside ⁶.

⁶ ** However manifestly Father Gury opens his mind in this thesis; however Father Ballerini in the attached note said that the opposite doctrine is condemnable; indeed however the same Father Ballerini in the little Dissertation already reprinted several times On the Moral System of St. Alphonsus clearly professed that no one of sound mind could have adhered to this condemnable doctrine, namely with these words (final proposition): Certainly no one of sound mind, to speak with Dominicus Viva, taught or could teach that men act prudently and licitly if they rest on an opinion in no way probable, of which sort the adversaries whom the thesis of St. Alphonsus attacks are...; nevertheless both VV. (page 38) and their French Confrere (see Univers, May 8, 1873) do not hesitate to accuse both Gury and Ballerini, as though they profess this condemnable and foolish doctrine, on which account (ibid.) they furthermore traduce them as supporters of laxism, liberalism, and rationalism. Perhaps you will wonder, friendly reader, at these monstrosities; but you will be more stupefied that, although in the preceding words Father Ballerini proclaims that that condemnable doctrine which St. Alphonsus attacks could not have been defended except by those who lacked a sound mind, VV. accuse Ballerini not once, but again and again (see Additional Summary, cols. 499 and 507; and V., page 112), because he made a blasphemous jest against St. Alphonsus and in the alleged words traduced him as a man not of sound mind. And in these few things you have some specimen, candid reader, of what sort is the method by which VV. undertook to attack both Gury's Compendium and the added notes.

58. • It is proved. For a slightly probable opinion, as has been said, rests on light motives, which cannot attract the assent of a prudent man; whence from them it cannot be persuaded that the existence of the law is uncertain. But it is illicit to follow some opinion, with the safer one left aside, unless the law can be said to be invincibly unknown; but the law cannot be considered unknown unless by solid reasons it is proved to be uncertain. Therefore....

"1. It is not illicit, in conferring sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, leaving aside the safer opinion, unless a law, an agreement, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbids it. Hence an opinion that is only probable is not to be used in conferring baptism, priestly ordination, or episcopal ordination. - 2. I think it probable that a judge can judge according to an opinion that is even less probable. - 3. Generally, when, trusting in probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic and however slight, provided that the limits of probability are not exceeded, we do something, we always act prudently. - 4. An unbeliever who does not believe, being led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from infidelity. - 21. The assent of supernatural faith which is useful for salvation is compatible with the fear by which someone fears that God may not have spoken." Propositions condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679.

"26. When litigants have equally probable opinions in their favor, a judge can accept money for rendering judgment in favor of one rather than the other." Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

"3. It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions." Proposition condemned by Alexander VIII, 7 Dec. 1690.

"27. If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion must be considered probable so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable." Proposition condemned by Alexander VII, 24 Sept. 1665.

"Rome, 19 April 1902. - A petition having been referred to this Supreme Congregation... in order to obtain official communication of the true text of the decree of the Holy Office on probabilism, directed to Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., the undersigned Assessor... has the honor to transmit herewith the authentic copy of the said decree, with an express declaration that this is the only true text; that consequently all the others, published in whatever manner and at whatever time, must be considered apocryphal; and that if any of these latter should happen to bear signs, even undoubted ones, of authenticity, it must be held that this occurred through mere mistake.... GIAMBATTISTA LUGARI, Assessor of the Holy Office."

"A report having been made by Father Laurea concerning the contents of the letters of Father Thyrsus Gonzalez of the Society of Jesus directed to Our Most Holy Lord, the Most Eminent Lords said that it should be written by the Secretary of State to the Apostolic Nuncio of Spain, that he signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having graciously accepted and read his letters not without praise, commanded that he freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with his pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the position of those who assert that, when a less probable opinion concurs with a more probable one so recognized and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion; and that he assure him that whatever he shall have done and written in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness.

Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness that he not only permit the Fathers of the same Society to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to attack the position of those asserting that, when a less probable opinion concurs with a more probable one so recognized and judged, it is lawful to follow the less probable opinion; but also that he write to all the Universities of the Society that it is the mind of His Holiness that each one, as he pleases, may freely write in favor of the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary opinion; and let him command them to submit themselves wholly to the mandate of His Holiness.

On 8 July 1680, when the aforesaid Order of His Holiness was reported by the Assessor to the Father General of the Society of Jesus, he responded that he would comply in all things as quickly as possible, although it had never been forbidden either by him or by his predecessors to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to teach it."

"I, the undersigned Notary of the Holy Office, testify that the above-written copy of the decree issued on Wednesday, 26 June 1680, was taken from the original acts of the same Sacred Congregation, and that it agrees with them exactly, as is established from a word-for-word collation.

Given at Rome, from the offices of the Holy Office, on 21 April 1902. Canon MANCINI, Notary of the Holy Roman and Universal Inquisition."

"1. Whether a professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which St. Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology? - 2. Whether a confessor is to be disquieted who follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus de Liguori in the practice of the sacred tribunal of Penance, for this reason alone, that by the Holy Apostolic See nothing worthy of censure has been found in his works, with the note, namely, that this confessor reads the works of the blessed Doctor only in order to know his doctrine accurately, not weighing the arguments and reasons on which the various opinions rest; but judging that he acts safely from the very fact that he can prudently judge a doctrine which contains nothing worthy of censure to be sound and safe, and in no way contrary to Evangelical holiness? - Resp. To the 1st, in the affirmative, yet without this being taken to mean that those are to be censured who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors. But to the 2nd, in the negative, having regard to the mind of the Holy See concerning the approval of the writings of the Servants of God for the purpose of canonization." S. Poenit. 5 July 1831; Acta S. Sed. vol. 1, p. 497 ff.; Benedict XIV, On the Canonization of Saints, bk. 2, d. 28, nn. 5, 7.

"Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord. The undersigned suppliant, appointed by his Bishop to the office of Prefect of public Moral Conferences, on account of his own devotion and reverence toward St. Alphonsus de Liguori, greatly desires to hold, hand down, and defend in all things the doctrine of the same so great Saint, and to make this openly known in the diocesan calendar shortly to be published, as also pleases his aforementioned Bishop, who is very favorably disposed toward St. Alphonsus, by adhering to and observing the Decision issued on this matter under the date of 5 July 1831 by this Sacred Penitentiary. But with regard to this he is held back by some scruple, because when he formerly obtained academic degrees he swore the oath set forth below, that he would retain the doctrine of that same University, which follows probabiliorism and the opinions of the probabiliorists. Since these things are so, and since moreover the very distinguished Scavini, who took the same oath, in his Moral Theology dedicated to Our Most Holy Lord Pius IX, had the same St. Alphonsus especially as his guide, hence for the quiet of his conscience he most humbly has recourse to Your Eminence, and earnestly begs:

"1. That he be taught whether the aforesaid oath prevents him from following in all things and publicly handing down the doctrine of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, as is set forth above? Or 2. that he be dispensed from observing the same oath. - Resp. To the 1st, in the negative. To the 2nd, provided for in the first." S. Poenit. 19 Dec. 1855. But what doctrine the professors of Theology ought to hand down of the aforesaid University is clear from these words of the Constitutions: "The professors of Theology, both scholastic-dogmatic and moral, must adhere to the principles and to the system of St. Thomas according to his letter and his school." Cf. Scavini, Milan, 1874, bk. 3, n. 492.

"1. Whether a Professor of Sacred Theology can safely follow and profess the opinions which St. Alphonsus de Liguori professes in his Moral Theology? 2. Whether a Confessor is to be disquieted who follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus de Liguori in the practice of the sacred Tribunal of Penance, for this reason alone, that by the Holy Apostolic See nothing worthy of censure has been found in his works, with the note, namely, that this Confessor reads the works of the blessed Doctor only in order to know his doctrine accurately, not weighing the arguments and reasons on which the various opinions rest; but judging that he acts safely from the very fact that he can prudently judge a doctrine which contains nothing worthy of censure to be sound and safe, and in no way contrary to Evangelical holiness? - Resp. To the 1st, in the affirmative, yet without this being taken to mean that those are to be censured who follow opinions handed down by other approved authors. But to the 2nd, in the negative, having regard to the mind of the Holy See concerning the approval of the writings of the Servants of God for the purpose of canonization." S. Poenit. 5 July 1831. Cf. Acta S. Sed. Vol. 1, p. 497 ff.

"Most Eminent and Most Reverend Lord. The undersigned suppliant, appointed by his Bishop to the office of Prefect of public Moral Conferences, on account of his own devotion and reverence toward St. Alphonsus de Liguori, greatly desires to hold, hand down, and defend in all things the doctrine of the same so great Saint, and to make this openly known in the diocesan calendar shortly to be published, as also pleases his aforementioned Bishop, who is very favorably disposed toward St. Alphonsus, by adhering to and observing the Decision issued on this matter under the date of 5 July 1831 by this Sacred Penitentiary. But with regard to this he is held back by some scruple, because when he formerly obtained academic degrees he swore the oath set forth below, that he would retain the doctrine of that same University, which follows probabiliorism and the opinions of the probabiliorists. Since these things are so, and since moreover the very distinguished Scavini, who took the same oath, in his Moral Theology dedicated to Our Most Holy Lord Pius IX, had the same St. Alphonsus especially as his guide, hence for the quiet of his conscience he most humbly has recourse to Your Eminence, and earnestly begs:

1. That he be taught whether the aforesaid oath prevents him from following in all things and publicly handing down the doctrine of St. Alphonsus de Liguori, as is set forth above? Or 2. that he be dispensed from observing the same oath. - Resp. To the 1st, in the negative. To the 2nd, provided for in the first." S. Poenit. 19 Dec. 1855. But what doctrine the Professors of Theology of the aforesaid University ought to hand down is clear from these words of the Constitutions: "The professors of Theology, both scholastic-dogmatic and moral, must adhere to the principles and to the system of St. Thomas, according to his letter and his school." Cf. Scavini, Milan, 1874, bk. 3, n. 492.

408. (A) The system is set forth:¹ In every doubt, where the matter concerns only the licit, it is licit to follow an opinion certainly and solidly probable, even if the contrary opinion is truly more probable. It is said:

¹ We chiefly borrow the exposition and arguments of probabilism from Lehmkuhl, n. 79-118, and from Noldin, n. 209-216; cf. Ball. P., n. 175-198.

(a) In every doubt, namely whether of law or of fact, - whether the matter concerns human law or divine or natural law, - and indeed concerning the existence of the law or the cessation of the law.

(b) Where the matter concerns only the licit, for even probabilists admit the restrictions enumerated above where the matter concerns the valid, etc., n. 388-390.

(c) It is licit to follow an opinion certainly and solidly probable, but not one doubtfully or slenderly probable. Now, for an opinion truly and solidly probable three things are required: that it rest on a truly grave motive of reason or authority; - that neither a definition of the Church nor a certain reason be opposed to it; - that its motives, compared with the motives of the opposed opinion, retain their probability. These things being posited, the more probable opinion on behalf of the law can be neglected, as long as it itself remains within the terms of probability, and is not morally certain. - But it is required that the opinion be certainly and solidly probable to the very one who follows it; otherwise the law is not truly doubtful and uncertain to him.

This certain and solid probability can be constituted by arguments not only internal, but also external, or taken from the authority of theologians: "For if several authors, and grave ones, call an opinion probable, ordinarily it cannot happen that it is not supported by probable internal reasons... Not only an opinion which is called probable by most theologians, but also an opinion which five or six theologians distinguished for probity, knowledge, and prudence hold as true or probable, ought to be considered truly and certainly probable, unless their authority is weakened either by a declaration of the Church or by manifest reason."²

² Noldin, n. 212.

409. (B) Arguments favoring probabilism are proposed. Two especially are brought forward: (a) A doubtful law does not oblige; but a law against which there is certain and solid probability is truly doubtful; therefore. - The major is declared: a law cannot oblige unless it is sufficiently known: "No one," says St. Thomas,¹ "is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept"; but only certain cognition is true cognition: for he who doubts concerning some law indeed knows the doubt concerning it and the obligation of inquiring, but he does not know the law itself; therefore a doubtful law cannot oblige. - The minor is proved: certitude and opposite probability concerning the same truth mutually exclude one another; therefore as long as the opinion on behalf of liberty is probable, the opposite on behalf of the law cannot be certain, even if it certainly appears truly more probable; therefore the law against which there is certain probability is truly doubtful, and therefore does not oblige.

¹ St. Thomas, De verit., q. 17, a. 3.

(b) An uncertain law cannot induce a certain obligation; for the right of liberty precedes the right of law, even if not in time, at least in nature and reason, since obligation supposes a free will which is bound; and therefore the certain and prior right of liberty cannot be restricted except by a certain law; but a law against which an opinion certainly and solidly probable fights is truly uncertain, as is clear from the things already said; therefore an uncertain law cannot beget a certain obligation.

Yet Noldin adds, n. 213, with moderate probabilists: "If, however, the opinion on behalf of the law is most probable or notably more probable than the opposite one, we are held to observe the law. For although an opinion of this kind does not attain true certitude, nevertheless practically it is equivalent to a certain opinion, because its opposite is not truly and certainly probable and therefore cannot furnish a norm of acting, since it does not suffice for informing a practically certain conscience." From this head, moderate probabilists come near to equiprobabilists.²

² This St. Alphonsus repeats again and again in all works published from the year 1762; cf. Gaude, n. 38-62.

410. (C) The arguments against Probabilism are set forth. Besides those which have already been proposed by the probabiliorists, above, n. 403, the equiprobabilists and compensationists urge others. (a) The principle "a doubtful law does not oblige" is not valid where the law is certainly more probable than liberty; for a law certainly more probably existing is sufficiently known so that it obliges indirectly, by force of the general principle that we ought sincerely to tend toward truth, and therefore to follow the opinion which approaches truth more closely.³ - Nor can it be said that a certainly more probable law is invincibly unknown: in strict doubt alone, because of the equality of reasons, is the law inculpably unknown; but where the objective obligation is certainly more probable, it is no longer licit to suspend judgment, but the mind ought to adhere to the opinion which is held as more verisimilar. - Nor can it be added that a certain right of liberty cannot be taken away by an uncertain law; for the right of liberty does not remain certain when there is opposed to it an office certainly more probable, but becomes truly doubtful, and indeed less probable than the duty itself.

³ D. N. de Caigny recently tried a conciliation between each system, De Gemino probabilismo licito.

411. (b) Probabilism easily opens the way to laxism; for once the right of following opinions even certainly and notably less probable has been granted to all, easily to each one the opinion which pleases more will appear probable; likewise, once it has been granted that the authority of five or six grave authors suffices for recognizing the probability of some opinion, who is there who, in the long series of probabilist theologians, would not find five or six, otherwise grave, approving an opinion more or less lax? Already in his own time St. Alphonsus wrote:¹ "And truly in the past century very many abuses occurred in opining in order to prove many lax opinions as probable; and therefore the Church proscribed several opinions, because they were undeservedly called probable, such as propositions 27 and 40 proscribed by Alexander VII, and 1, 3, 6, 35, 44 and 57 proscribed by Innocent XI. All these were condemned because in them it was said: it is probable, etc." A little afterward he adds that he too was deceived by the authority of many:² "It is true, in the first printings of my moral theology, led by the authority of several authors, I admitted as probable many opinions not sufficiently firm; but when the matter had been better weighed, I revoked or reformed them."

¹ St. Alphonsus, Homo apost., Tr. I, n. 73.

² Ibid., n. 78.

412. (D) The responses of the probabilists are handed down. Nevertheless the probabilists try to solve these difficulties.³ (a) They observe indeed that an opinion solidly, although less, probable, even when compared with the more probable, retains its probability, nor is its force entirely broken: otherwise the contrary opinion would no longer be more probable, but morally certain. Now, while an opinion certainly and solidly probable stands, the law remains truly and strictly doubtful, and therefore the principle can legitimately be applied: a doubtful law does not oblige. Nor is there present an obligation practically to follow the more verisimilar opinion; for otherwise this would have to be done even when the opinion favoring the law is slenderly more probable, and thus we would fall into probabiliorism. - Wherefore an obligation, even certainly more probable, remains uncertain, as long as the opinion favoring liberty is certainly and solidly probable; nor therefore is it to be strictly imposed under penalty of sin, lest perchance a yoke too burdensome be imposed upon human infirmity and men still weak in virtue be kept away from religion.

³ Lehmk., n. 94-106; Ball. P., n. 198; Noldin, n. 216.

(b) Nor is laxism seriously to be feared, provided that probabilism is prudently applied, that is, only when the opinion favoring liberty, even when compared with the contrary opinion, remains solidly probable, - and from another side with this caution, that a probable opinion is not held as something perfect, but as something strictly speaking licit. Therefore let these words of the probabilist Noldin (n. 216) be attended to: "If a Christian man in the service of God were to do nothing other than what the law strictly demands from the principles of probabilism, he would certainly lead a life little worthy of a Christian; but the practice of probabilists is this: where the question concerns imposing an obligation and judging sins, they are benign in order to avoid the dangers of formally sinning; but where the matter concerns pursuing perfection and the exercise of virtues, they strive toward the highest things, measuring the service owed to God not from the obligation of law, but from love and gratitude toward the divine majesty."

413. Conclusion. These things being posited, we admit probabilism, not indeed as a norm of perfection or of Christian life, but as a system from which there can be discerned the minimum which is required for avoiding sin. For when the matter concerns canonical laws, the Church herself, whose office it is to interpret her laws authentically, equivalently declares that it is licit to follow an opinion certainly probable and favoring liberty; thus, among the Rules of Law in the Sixth, one reads: "It is fitting that odious things be restricted, and favors enlarged" (reg. 15); "In obscure matters the minimum is to be followed" (reg. 30); "In penalties the more benign interpretation is to be made" (reg. 49); "Interpretation is to be made against him who could have stated the law more openly" (reg. 57). - Now what is said of ecclesiastical laws can be said of all others by equal reason; for if God had willed to bind us strictly, under penalty of sin and eternal damnation, He would have manifested His mind clearly to us; therefore where the divine law, whether positive or natural, is uncertain because of a grave doubt concerning its existence, who will dare to say that man is strictly held to observe it, under penalty of damnation?

414. Nevertheless, in order that an opinion be certainly and solidly probable, we do not admit that the authority of five or six grave theologians suffices of itself, when namely a most grave reason, which they have not solved, fights against them.¹ For it can happen that these men, although grave, were deceived, and held as probable an opinion which, all things diligently weighed, is not truly probable; hence their arguments must be seriously weighed, as we warned above, n. 384, and, if they appear weak either in themselves or because of changed circumstances, their opinion must be rejected. - Besides, we make more of the universal sense of the faithful, resting on solid reason, than of the authority of five or six grave theologians, which in a particular case is opposed to the same; wherefore, if an opinion which the common sense of the faithful reproves is called probable by some theologians,¹ we reject it as improbable. - With regard to intrinsic reasons, in a moral matter those are of greater weight which appeal to moral sense than those which are too subtle and deduced from metaphysical principles; for any science has its own genus of proofs: now moral science rests not so much on metaphysical arguments as on moral principles which the practical reason of prudent and honorable men perceives. But those who wish not only to abstain from sin, but to cultivate Christian virtues, will seek rules of perfection not among casuists, but among ascetics, and especially among the sacred authors and the Fathers, who have discussed the virtues.

¹ That this is the mind of St. Alphonsus is clear from the things which he says, l. I, Tr. I, n. 82: "The confessor, before he embraces some opinion, is certainly held to weigh the intrinsic reasons; and when some convincing reason for the safer opinion occurs to him, to which he does not see that an adequate response is available, then he cannot embrace the opposite less safe opinion, although the authority of very many doctors favors it: provided the authority is not of such weight that it seems to him that he must defer to it rather than to the apparent reason."

¹ You have an example in the Treatise concerning the Virtue of Justice, n. 483, where the question concerns error about the person injured, when someone, for example intending to kill Caius, kills Titius.

We now come to a consideration of the systems that have been devised for the purpose of insuring practical certainty in cases of speculative doubt, or, if we may express the same thought somewhat differently, to satisfy oneself whether an act, the morality of which is speculatively uncertain, is practically allowed or forbidden. 1. STATE OF THE QUESTION. —In all cases where a definite decision has to be made under conditions which do not admit of full certainty regarding the existence of a law or obligation, a man may act safely with what is called a probable conscience (conscientia probabilis ). Such doubtful cases owe their existence to the fact that law cannot regulate the actions of men in every detail, nor adequately express the will of the lawgiver, and hence a sphere is left open in which man may use his own judgment.

In every "case of conscience" there are two opposing opinions: one in favor of the law (opinio pro lege), the other in favor of liberty (opinio pro libertate). Neither is certain, but both are more or less probable (probabiles). Note that the discussion of such cases by Catholic moralists never turns on the question, which is the more perfect course to pursue? but merely, what is licit or not? In other words, in trying to solve so-called cases of conscience, theologians do not ask: "Which of the two actions is the more perfect?" but "Which of the two is one obliged to perform under pain of sin?" For example: I am uncertain whether or not to-day is a day of fasting. I have reasons for thinking that it is. But these reasons are merely probable. What am I to do if I cannot obtain reliable information? Am I obliged to fast? Or may I, on the strength of the reasons I have for thinking it is not a fast-day, absolve myself from the duty of keeping the fast? The question at issue is plainly one of licitness, not of greater perfection, for no one disputes that to fast would be the more perfect act.

2. GENERAL PRINCIPLE. —Aside from Laxism, it is a general principle that in case of doubt the pars tutior must be chosen, i. e., that course of action must be followed which most effectively excludes the danger of sin. Abstractly and objectively considered, the opinion in favor of the law (opinio pro lege) is the safer (opinio tutior scil. a periculo peccandi) for the reason that by following it one can best avoid the risk of sin. That the pars tutior must be followed in all cases is the teaching of Rigorism. The so-called Probabilistic systems, on the contrary, contend that the opinio pro lege does not always furnish moral certainty, that such certainty may also be afforded by the opinio pro libertate, and that in case of doubt one may, for good reasons (probabilitas), safely follow the latter.

The controversy thus narrows itself down to the question which of the two opposing opinions, —that favoring the law or that favoring liberty, —is safer to follow in case of doubt.

is not permitted to act upon a mere opinion, but when direct certitude is unattainable, should try to reach reflex certitude by earnest consideration and careful comparison. The conscience or dictate of conscience based upon such an opinion is called probabilis. The relation of the different conflicting opinions is determined according to the degrees of intrinsic or extrinsic probability which each can claim.

The difference between intrinsic and extrinsic probability is that intrinsic probability rests upon reasons contained within the opinion itself, whereas extrinsic probability is based on authority.

A probable opinion (opinio probabilis) may be based either on intrinsic or extrinsic grounds, provided these are good and solid.

If two contrary opinions have the same degree of probability they are called aequiprobabiles.

A more probable opinion (opinio probabilior) is one that rests on weightier reasons than its opposite, which in that case is still probable, but less so (minus probabilis, or simply probabilis).

When a probable opinion rests on such solid grounds that it is almost a certainty, it is called most probable (probabilissima). Its opposite can not, of course, be solidly probable, but, in the language of the schools, may be parum vel tenuiter probabilis.

From what we have said it follows that the probability of an opinion is measured by the weight of the intrinsic and extrinsic arguments on which it rests. The authority which creates extrinsic probability is that of theological experts or confessors.

4. THE SCOPE OF PROBABILISM. —Though, as we have seen, the claims of liberty may in all cases be asserted against those of the law, the sphere of liberty in Moral Theology is nevertheless greatly restricted, for the reason that the safer side (pars tutior) must always be chosen where it is absolutely necessary to attain a definite end, and where following an opinio probabilis or even probabilior would involve danger of frustration.¹ This is the case whenever faith or religion are involved, especially in the administration of the Sacraments,² in medical and surgical prescriptions, and when there is an obligation to protect the interests of one's fellowmen.³

¹ Cfr. J. P. Gury, Compendium Theologiae Moralis, Lyons and Paris, 1850, Vol. I, n. 55-56: saria "It is not lawful to follow a probable, or even a more probable, opinion after abandoning the safer one whenever there is an absolute obligation to attain some determinate end which the use of a probably unsuitable means would place in danger; therefore the safer course must then be followed."

² Cfr. Gury, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 57, 1 and 4: "In those things which are necessary for salvation by necessity of means, you are compelled to act more safely; for so great an end must be attained absolutely before all others, entirely by necessity, and therefore safe and certain means must be employed. Accordingly, in matters pertaining to that end or to religion, probability being rejected, the safer opinion must necessarily be followed. Hence the following proposition, under no. 4, was condemned by Innocent XI: 'An unbeliever who does not believe will be excused from unbelief when led by a less probable opinion.' [See Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1154]. Indeed, in such a case it would not be lawful to use even a more probable opinion after setting aside the safer one. A minister of a sacrament, where its validity is at issue, unless a defect is supplied or a case of necessity presses, is bound to follow the safer course insofar as he morally can, abandoning the less safe course, whether probable or even more probable, because otherwise he would expose the sacrament to the danger of nullity and his neighbor to the danger of spiritual harm. Hence the following proposition was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI under no. 1: 'It is not unlawful in conferring sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, abandoning the safer opinion.' " (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1151).

³ Gury, op. cit., Vol. I, n. 57, 2-3: "A hunter who fears that by firing a bullet at a wild animal he may perhaps injure some man cannot fire it, even if he judges it more probable that the danger is absent; for if the danger is perhaps present, it cannot be removed by the contrary probability, even though greater. A physician and a surgeon are bound to employ the safer medicines and means which can be had here and now, because by an implicit contract they have bound themselves to attain the end insofar as this can be done. The same must likewise be said of all others who have contracted an obligation toward their neighbor." —Cfr. the Propositiones Damnat. sub Innocentio XI., n. 2: "I judge it probable that a judge can render judgment according to an opinion that is even less probable." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1152).

Hence Probabilism may be applied only when there is question of the mere morality, i. e., the licitness or illicitness, of an act or omission (sola actionis honestas). In all other cases the pars tutior must be chosen. This is no argument in favor of Tutiorism, however, nor an exception to the general rule of Probabilism, because in such cases there is always present a direct speculative certitude, whereas Probabilism was expressly devised for cases in which no speculative certitude can be attained.

Absolute Tutiorism or Rigorism (tutiorismus absolutus sive rigidus) is based on the principle that the opinion which favors the law must be followed always, and that it is never lawful to follow a probable opinion, even though it be probabilissima, in favor of liberty.⁴ This system is untenable because it misconceives the problem at issue, ⁵ and has been formally condemned by the Church.⁶

⁴ Tutiorism was adopted by the Jansenists. Its foremost defender was the Irish theologian Joan Sinnichius (+ 1666).

⁵ Cfr. 1 Macc. II, 31 sqq.; IX, 44; 2 Mace. V, 25; VI, 11; Matth. XXIV, 20.

⁶ See the Prop. damn, ab Alexandro VIII. (Dec. 7, 1690), n. 3: "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, even the most probable among probable opinions." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1293).

In order to escape ecclesiastical condemnation a certain school of Rigorist theologians modified the fundamental tenet of Tutiorism by saying that one may decide in favor of liberty only if the opinion favoring that side is most probable (probabilissima). This system does not differ substantially from absolute Tutiorism and is useless for the solution of difficult cases of conscience. Its principal representatives are the Jansenists M. Steyaert († 1701) and J. Obstraet († 1720), Henry a Sancto Ignatio († 1719), and Cardinal H. S. Gerdil († 1802). ⁷ 6. LAX PROBABILISM OR LAXISM (probabilismus absolutus sive excessivus). —This system maintains that the opinion which favors liberty may be followed always, even when it enjoys but a slight or doubtful degree of probability (tenuiter vel dubie). The Church rejects Laxism for the reason that this system is incompatible with the dignity of the moral law.⁸

⁷ A sketch of Card. Gerdil's life will be found in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 471.

⁸ Cfr. the Prop. Damnat. sub Innocentio XI, n. 3: "Generally, whenever, relying upon either intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided the bounds of probability are not exceeded, we do something, we always act prudently." (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1153).

Excessively lax propositions were taught by J. Sanchez († about 1620), ⁹ F. Amicus, S.J. (+ 165 1),¹⁰ St. Bauny, SJ. († 1649),¹¹ Thos. Tamburini, S.J. († 1675),¹² J. Caramuel, Ord. Cist. († 1682),¹³ J. Cardenas, SJ. († 1684),¹⁴ A. Diana, Ord. Theat. († 1663),¹⁵ Z. Pasqualigo, Ord. Theat. († 1664), ¹⁶ A. Escobar y Mendoza, S.J. († 1669), ¹⁷ M. de Moya, S.J. († 1684), ¹⁸ and others.

⁹ John Sanchez must not be confounded with Thomas Sanchez, S.J. (+ 1610). Cfr. Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. III, 3rd ed., pp. 592, 893.

¹⁰ See the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p. 429.

¹¹ V. supra, p. 63.

¹² On Tamburini see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XIV, p. 441.

¹³ Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 329 sq.

¹⁴ Ibid., Vol. III, pp. 332 sq.

¹⁵ Ibid., Vol. IV, p. 773.

¹⁶ Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. IV, 3rd ed., col. 298 sqq.

¹⁷ V. supra, p. 62.

¹⁸ Father Matthew de Moya was professor of Moral Theology in Murcia, Alcala, and Madrid. Under the nom de plume "Amadaeus Guimenius" he wrote a book entitled Adversus Quorundam Expostulationes contra Nonnullas Jesuitarum Opiniones Morales (Palermo 1657), in which he showed that the lax doctrines attributed to the Jesuits in a libelous pamphlet, Teatro Jesuitico, Apologetico Discurso con Saludables y Seguras Doctrinas Necessarias a los Principes y Senores de la Tierra, by Francisco de la Piedad (also a pseudonym), were taught long before by other writers. Both the Teatro and Moya's reply were put on the Index, where they remain even after the Leonine revision.

7. PROBABILIORISM. —This theory contends that if a man is in doubt regarding the existence of a law, he must nevertheless obey the same and may follow the opinion in favor of liberty only if that opinion is certainly more probable (certe probabilior) than its opposite. Hence the axiom, "In dubio stricto seu aequali pars tutior sequenda est," i. e., as long as the conscience is strictly in doubt, that is to say, while it suspends judgment without inclining either way, the law must be obeyed.

This principle is theoretically incontrovertible but useless for practical purposes, and therefore no longer has any followers. While all Catholic moralists admit that a man may safely follow Probabiliorism, most of them maintain that this system is of no value in the solving of doubtful cases precisely for the reason that in such cases no opinio probabilior is attainable. In practice Probabiliorism leads to Tutiorism, and "solves" only those cases of conscience which in reality are no "cases" at all, because the greater probability in favor of one side or the other can be easily perceived.

The most eminent defenders of this system are: Cardinal Cajetan († 1534),¹⁹ Alexander Natalis († 1724), ²⁰ Vincent Baronius († 1674),²¹ C. R. Billuart († 1757),²² D. Concina († 1756),²³ V. Contenson († 1674),²⁴ P. M. Gazzaniga († 1799),²⁵ J. B. Gonet († 1681),²⁶ J. V. Patuzzi († 1769), ²⁷ —all Dominicans —and the Jesuits Thyrsus Gonzalez de Santalla († 1705),²⁸ M. de Elizalde († 1678),²⁹ P. G. Antoine († 1743),³⁰ and P. Collet († 1770).³¹

¹⁹ On Cardinal Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio Gaetani) see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. III, pp. 145 sqq.

²⁰ On Alexander Natalis (Noel Alexandre), ibid., Vol. I, pp. 296 sq.

²¹ Not to be confounded with the famous Jesuit Cardinal Cesare Baronius. Brief sketches of both in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. II, pp. 304 sq.

²² V. supra, p. 57.

²³ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁴ V. Cath. Encyc., IV, 330.

²⁵ V. Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, p. 401.

²⁶ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁷ V. supra, p. 60.

²⁸ Gonzales was the thirteenth general of the Society of Jesus, and while holding that office, published his famous Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis, i. e. Tractatus Theologicus de Recto Usu Opinionum (Rome 1694). It is reproduced in Migne's Cursus Theologiae, Vol. XI. —Cfr. J. Salsmans, S.J., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VI, pp. 635 sq.; Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten in der römisch-kath. Kirche, Nördlingen 1889, Vol. I, pp. 120 sqq. —For an account of the controversies that raged about the decree of Innocent XI on Probabilism see J. Brucker S.J., in the Paris Études Religieuses, 1901-02, and F. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz XI. über den Probabilismus, Paderborn 1904. —Latin text of the decree given by the latter, pp. 29 sqq. and by Lehmkuhl, Prob. Vind., pp. 81 sqq. For an English translation see p. 230, note 40, infra.

²⁹ V. Hurter, Nomenclator Lit. Theol. Cath., Vol. IV, 3rd ed., col. 286 sq.

³⁰ V. supra, p. 58.

³¹ Cfr. Buchberger, Kirchl. Handlexikon, I, 964.

8. SIMPLE OR COMMON PROBABILISM (probabilismus simplex sive benignus, communis sive latus). —This system teaches that whenever there is doubt concerning the mere lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act, it is permissible to follow a solidly probable opinion in favor of liberty, even though the opposing view be more probable (probabilior). But why may a more probable opinion be relinquished in favor of a less probable one? To this Probabilism answers as follows: If the opinion favoring liberty is truly and solidly probable (vere et solide probabilis), it must be because the law is doubtful or insufficiently promulgated (lex dubia aut non sufficienter pr omul gat a). Now a doubtful law is not binding (lex dubia non obligat), and therefore one is at liberty.

But this statement of the Probabilist position does not remove the logical and moral objection that Probabilism permits men to follow a less probable opinion (sententia minus probabilis sic cognita et iudicata) even though its opposite is perceived to be more probable.

"The wise practicians who established the moral system of the Jesuits," says a Protestant ethicist, "correctly perceived that probability plays a part in moral conduct, and that to reject Probabilism absolutely, would betray a hasty judgment. Were man permitted to follow the axiom, 'Quod dubitas, ne feceris' and to act only when he knows for certain and without doubt that he is right, he would frequently be unable to act at all; nor would abstention from action help him out of the difficulty, for the mere omission of an act also entails consequences and is equivalent to a definite decision of the will, which may be either right or wrong That a certain mode of procedure is absolutely right in all circumstances, and its opposite absolutely wrong, can be asserted only from the standpoint of an omniscient intelligence. Man is a short-sighted creature and can act only if he has the courage to make a false move and to do something which may prove objectively wrong, and which he would not do were he better informed. Nevertheless, his conscience absolves him from guilt if he has acted to the best of his knowledge and understanding in accordance with the most probable opinion. The only thing we reject in the teaching of the Jesuits is that they base probability preferably on authority and allow a man to follow an opinion which he himself must admit to be less probable." ³²

³² Ch. Sigwart, Vorfragen der Ethik, 2nd ed., Tübingen 1907, pp. 40 sq. —Cfr. Mandonnet, Le Decret d'Innocent XI. contre le Probabilisme, Paris 1903, pp. 79 sqq., 99 sqq.

"There can be no doubt," says St. Alphonsus, "that the Tutiorists in their excessive rigorism do much damage; but on the other hand the Probabilists, who follow an opinion which they recognize as less probable (but which I no longer regard as probable because the law in its moral sense is sufficiently promulgated), are also to blame for the loss of many souls." ³³ Neither the Fathers nor the early Schoolmen give any general rule for determining moral obligation in doubtful cases. But from the way in which they decided controversies it is evident that they were guided by the principle that a doubtful law does not bind. Thus St. Gregory of Nazianzus addressed the following challenge to a Novatian writer who had denounced second marriage as illicit: "Either prove that you are right, or if you are unable to bring proof, do not pass judgment. If the matter is in doubt, let humanity and convenience prevail." ³⁴ The first theologian who reduced Probabilism to a formula and attempted to demonstrate it systematically was Bartholomew de Medina, O. P. († 1581). In his commentaries on the Second and Third Parts of the Summa of St. Thomas, this learned writer, who is usually called "the Father of Probabilism," defends the proposition: "We are permitted to follow a probable opinion even if its opposite is more probable." ³⁵ This thesis was favorably received by the majority of Catholic moralists and met with no ex professo opposition until Father Andrew Bianchi, S.J., attacked it in his treatise De Opinionum Praxi Disputatio, published at Genoa in 1642.³⁶ The bitterest opponents of simple Probabilism were the Jansenists, especially Blaise Pascal, who, in his famous Lettres a un Provincial (1656), attacked Probabilism with vigor and grace of style. The result was that many theologians adopted Probabiliorism. In the ensuing conflict, which lasted nearly two centuries, Probabilism received its hardest blows from the Dominicans. Alexander VII (1665), Innocent XI (1679), and Alexander VIII (1690) censured a series of propositions which were mostly taken from the writings of Probabilistic authors.³⁷ At the instance of the last-mentioned Pope, a general chapter of the Dominicans, held at Rome in 1656, advised all members of that Order to espouse Probabiliorism.³⁸ Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, General of the Jesuits, tried to banish Probabilism from the Society by publishing an anti-Probabilistic work, Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis.³⁹ The so-called decree of Innocent XI, of June 26, 1680 (which in reality was merely a protocol of the Holy Office), strongly approved of his action.⁴⁰

³³ Letters, III, 355.

³⁴ Orat., 39, n. 19 (Migne, P.G., XXXVI, 358): "Either prove that the matter is so, or, if you cannot do this, do not condemn. But if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and mildness prevail." —Cfr. Chr. Lupus, Dissertatio de Antiquitate, Auctoritate et Legitimo Usu Sententiae Probabilis (Opera Omnia, Venice 1729, Vol. XI, pp. 1 sqq.).

³⁵ "If an opinion is probable, it is lawful to follow it, even though the opposite opinion is more probable." (Expositio s. Scholastica Commentaria in D. Thomae S. Theol., 1a 2ae, qu. 19, art. 6, Salamanca 1577. For a sketch of B. de Medina's life see D. J. Kennedy, O. P., in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, pp. 143 sq. Modern writers are divided as to Medina's teaching on Probabilism. Echard (followed by Billuart) maintains that Medina's system differed greatly from Probabilism as expounded by its later defenders. H. Hurter, S.J., says of him: "He was numbered among the leading cultivators of Scholastic and moral theology of his age, and from this also gained a certain renown; he is said to have anticipated the system of Probabilism." (Nomenclator Literarius Theologiae Catholicae, Vol. III, 3rd ed., Innsbruck 1907, col. 144). Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 28 sqq.; Ter Haar, De Systemate Mor., pp. 17 sqq.; A. Schmitt, Zur Geschichte des Probabilismus, Innsbruck 1904, pp. 43 sqq.

³⁶ Andrea Bianchi, S.J., is perhaps better known by his Latin name, Blancus. He died at Genoa, March 29, 1657. His treatise De Opinionum Praxi Disputatio was published under the pseudonym "Candidus Philalethes." It is Tutioristic in tendency. —Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 31 sqq., 51 sqq.; Ter Haar, De Syst. Mor., pp. 18 sqq.

³⁷ For a list of these condemned propositions see Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1101, 1151, 1289, 1291; A. Rohling, Medulla Theol. Mor., pp. 479 sqq., St. Louis 1875.

³⁸ Cfr. Döllinger-Reusch, Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Vol. I, pp. 42 sqq.

³⁹ V '. supra, p. 225, n. 10. —Cfr. A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Prob. Vind., pp. 83 sqq.; A. Koch, "Neue Dokumente zu dem Thyrsus Gonsalez'- Streit," in the Theol. Quartalschrift of Tübingen, 1905, pp. 95 sqq.

⁴⁰ Cfr. Mandonnet, Decret d' Innocent XL, pp. 73 sqq.; T er Haar, Das Dekret Innozenz' XI, pp. 29 sqq.; G. Arendt, S.J., De Conciliationis Tentamine nuper Iterate Aequiprobabilistas inter et Probabilistas, Rome 1902 (cfr. the Civiltà Cattolica, 1902, quad. 1253, pp. 574 sqq.). The "decree," the authentic text of which was published Apr. 19, 1902, by the Secretary of the Holy Office, reads: "A report having been made by Father Laurea of a letter directed by Father Thyrsus Gonzalez, S.J., to Our Most Holy Lord; the Most Eminent Lords said that the Secretary of State must write to the Apostolic nuncio of the Spains [directing him] to signify to the said Father Thyrsus that His Holiness, having received his letter favorably, and having read it with approval, has commanded that he [Thyrsus] shall freely and fearlessly preach, teach, and defend with his pen the more probable opinion, and also manfully attack the opinion of those who assert that in a conflict of a less probable opinion with a more probable, known and estimated as such, it is allowed to follow the less probable; and to inform him that whatever he does and writes on behalf of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness. Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus, as by order (de ordine) of His Holiness, not only to permit the Fathers of the Society to write in favor of the more probable opinion and to attack the opinion of those who assert that in a conflict of a less probable opinion with a more probable, known and estimated as such, it is allowed to follow the less probable; but also to write to all the universities of the Society, [informing them] that it is the mind of His Holiness that whosoever chooses may freely write in favor of the more probable opinion, and may attack the aforesaid contrary [opinion]; and to order them to submit entirely to the command of His Holiness." (Cfr. J. M. Harty in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, p. 445).

The present status of Probabilism may be described as It has never been either officially approved or officially censured by the Church, but was and is tolerated ⁴¹ and upheld by the majority of Jesuit theologians, though it is not the official teaching of the Society.⁴²

⁴¹ Cfr. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz XL, pp. 177 sqq.

⁴² For some of the leading arguments for and against Probabilism see J. M. Harty in the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 444 sq.

Lately J. de Caigny, C.SS.R., published several books ⁴³ for the purpose of reconciling Probabilism with Æquiprobabilism. His arguments were met by G. Arendt, S.J.⁴⁴ 9. ÆQUIPROBABILISM (probabilismus moderatus). —Æquiprobabilism takes middle ground between Probabiliorism and simple Probabilism. It teaches that unless the opinions for and against the existence of a law have equal or nearly equal probability, it is not permissible to choose in favor of liberty. The leading principle of this system, which it shares with Probabiliorism, is this:

⁴³ Apologetica, etc. (see p. 235, infra); De Gemino Probabilismo Licito Dissertatio Exarata Conciliationis Gratia; De Genuino Morali Systemate S. Alphonsi Dissertatio Irenico-Critica.

⁴⁴ Apologeticae de Aequiprobabilismo Alphonsiano Historico-Philosophicae Dissertationis a R. P. J. Caigny, C.SS.R., Exaratae Crisis iuxta Principia Angelici Doctoris Instituta. Freiburg i. B. (Herder). —Fr. Lehmkuhl says towards the conclusion of his little book, Probabilismus Vindicatus (p. 126): "What I have said more often I now repeat: I recognize only a slight theoretical difference, and either no practical difference or scarcely any, between moderate or equiprobabilism and probabilism."

"In obscure matters the certainly more likely side, or the more probable side known and judged as such, is to be followed in favor of the law." However, if the opinions for and against the existence of a law have equal or nearly equal probability, and there is consequently a state of real doubt, it is permissible to follow the less safe opinion. Hence the axiom, "Lex stricte dubia non obligat. In other words, when there is doubt as to the existence of a law, liberty is in possession. When there is doubt in regard to the cessation of a law, the law remains in possession. Consequently, whereas simple Probabilism teaches that a man may always follow the opinion favoring liberty, if that opinion is based on good and solid grounds (opinio vere ac solide probabilis), even though he knows that the opposite opinion is more probable, Æquiprobabilism maintains that the less safe opinion may be followed only when it is quite or nearly as probable (aeque aut fere aeque probabilis) as its opposite, and only when there is question of an obligation arising, not ceasing.

/Equiprobabilism is regarded by some as an advance over simple Probabilism, in so far as it sets up a practical instead of a purely logical probability. ⁴⁵ The extrinsic reasons in favor of Æquiprobabilism are summed up by Archbishop Simar as follows: "This theory is the fruit of long scientific debates and has in its favor the presumption that, by dint of logical development, it is the golden mean between the two conflicting extremes of absolute Probabilism and Tutiorism. The followers of St. Alphonsus may point to the official declaration of the Church that, unlike Tutiorism and several forms of Probabilism, his teaching has never been censured. To these advantages must be added the great personal authority of the Saint, which deserves to be the more highly regarded because the problem in question was for him a vital one, which he investigated with the utmost conscientiousness and zeal, and also for the further reason that the conviction at which he finally arrived has stood the test of pastoral experience and triumphantly resisted innumerable attacks." ⁴⁶ The most prominent representatives of Æquiprobabilism are the Jesuits Christopher Rassler (+ about 1730) and Antony Mayr († 1749), Eusebius Amort of the Canons Regular of St. Augustine († 1775),⁴⁷ St. Alphonsus de' Liguori, founder of the Redemptorist Order,⁴⁸ Bishop Martin of Paderborn, Archbishop Simar of Cologne, and the moral theologians of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer.48a

It is unjust to charge that Probabilism and the allied systems permit man to act on the strength of a mere opinion and thus dispense him from the duty of regulating his life in accordance with the dictates of conscience, which must be the highest rule and measure of all morality. Probabilism, Probabiliorism, and Æquiprobabilism were all devised for the express purpose of enabling man to follow the voice of conscience in doubtful cases.⁴⁹ So far from undermining morality, these systems, as a whole, deserve great credit for having safeguarded the important principle of liberty against the attacks and snares of the Jansenists, Rigorists, and Talmudists.

⁴⁵ Cfr. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., I, n. 58: "For acting lawfully probability alone does not suffice, but moral certainty concerning the uprightness of the action is required." —Cfr. op. cit., I, 54: "If the opinion which stands for the law appears certainly more probable, we are bound altogether to follow it and cannot then embrace the opposite opinion which stands for liberty. The reason is that, in order to act lawfully, we must seek and follow the truth in doubtful matters; but where the truth cannot be clearly found, we are bound to embrace at least that opinion which approaches nearer to the truth, such as the more probable opinion." (Ed. Gaude, I, 25). —Cfr. Ter Haar, Das Decret Innocenz' XI, pp. 8 sqq.

⁴⁶ Th. H. Simar, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, 3rd ed., p. 143. — The translator of this work thinks it but fair to note, however, that Lehmkuhl and others hold that St. Alphonsus never held Aequiprobabilistic principles. Lehmkuhl (Theol. Mor., ed. 11a, Vol. I, p. 118) illustrates the difference between the Saint's teaching and that of the Aequiprobabilists as follows: EQUIPROBABILISM says: With probability alone that a law exists, an obligation does not exist. With probability alone that a law has ceased, the obligation has not ceased. ST. ALPHONSUS says: With probability alone that a law exists, an obligation does not exist; with probability alone that a law has ceased, the obligation has ceased. —For an able defense of the Probabilist position see the same author's Probabilismus Vindicatus, Freiburg 1906.

⁴⁷ Cfr. Ter Haar, De Systemate Mor., pp. 20 sqq., 52 sqq. —On Amort, see the Cath. Encyclopedia, Vol. I, pp. 434 sq. He was one of the foremost theologians of the 18th century. (Thos. J. Shahan, Cath. Encycl., Vol. I, p. 434). 48a See L. Wouters, C.SS.R., De Systemate Morali Dissertatio, new edition, "ad novum ius accommodata," Wittem (Holland), 1918.

⁴⁸ Æquiprobabilism "gained vigor and persistence from the teaching of St. Alphonsus, who began his theological career as a Probabiliorist, subsequently defended Probabilism, ... and finally, about 1762, embraced Æquiprobabilism. In a new dissertation he laid down the two propositions that it is lawful to act on the less safe opinion, when it is equally probable with the safe opinion, and that it is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion when the safe opinion is notably and certainly more probable. In the sixth edition (1767) of his 'Moral Theology' he again expressed these views, and indeed towards the end of his life frequently declared that he was not a Probabilist." (Cath. Encyc., Vol. XII, pp. 442 sq.; cfr. Irish Theol. Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 24). —On the systema compensationis seu rationis sufficientis, which d'Annibale ascribes to Potton, O. P., and which has been latterly espoused by Prummer and some French moralists, see Vermeersch, Theol. Mor., I, pp. 306 and 313; K. Neuner, O. Cap., in the Kath. Kirchenstg. of Salzburg, 1924, No. 26.

⁴⁹ Cfr. Joseph Mausbach, Catholic Moral Teaching and its Antagonists, pp. 69 sqq.; A. Meyenberg, Die kath. Moral, 2nd ed., pp. 161 sqq.; Ter Haar, Vcn. Innoc. XL de Probabilismo Decrcti Histona, Rome 1904, pp. 126 sqq.

READINGS. —On the moral systems in general: K. Werner, System der Ethik, Vol. I, pp. 430 sqq. —W. Wilmers, S.J., Lehrbuch der Religion (ed. Lehmkuhl), 6th ed., pp. 537 sqq. —F. X. Linsenmann, Lehrbuch der Moraltheologie, pp. 114 sqq. —F. A. Göpfert, Moraltheologie, Vol. I, 6th ed., pp. 168 sqq. —Thos. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology, Vol. I, pp. 68 sqq. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 441 sqq. —M. Cronin, The Science of Ethics, Vol. I, pp. 478 sq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, Tournai 1905, pp. 213 sqq. —C. Gaudé, C.SS.R., De Morali Systemate S. Alphonsi, Rome 1894.

On Probabilism: F. Ter Haar, De Systemate Morali Antiquerum Probabilistarum Dissertatio Historic o-Critica, Paderborn 1894, pp. 77 sqq. —P. F. Mandonnet, O.P., Le Décret d' Innocent XI contre le Probabilisme, Paris 1903, pp. 99 sqq. —A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Probabilismus Vindicatus, Freiburg 1906, pp. 16 sqq. —L. Wouters, C.SS.R., De Minus probabilismo, Amsterdam, 2nd ed., 1908, pp. 17 sqq. —J. L. Jansen, Geschichte und Kritik im Dienste der "Minus probabilis," Paderborn 1906, pp. 14 sqq. —F. Mentré, Courot et la Renaissance du Probabilisme au XIXe Siècle, Paris 1908. —Chr. Lupus, Dissertatio de Antiquitate, Auctoritate et Legitimo Usu Sententiae Probabilis (Opera Omnia, XI, Venice 1729). —Dinneen, De Probabilismo Dissertatio, Dublin 1898. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 443 sqq. —Jos. Rickaby, Moral Philosophy, pp. 152 sqq. —W. McDonald, The Principles of Moral Science, Dublin 1904, pp. 215 sqq. —A. Vermeersch, S.J., Theol. Mor., Vol. I, pp. 303 sqq.

On Probabiliorism: Thyrsus Gonzalez, Fundamentum Theologiae Moralis, i. e. Tractatus Theologicus de Recto Usu Opinionum, Rome 1694. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, pp. 442 sq. —J. Biederlack, S.J., in the Innsbruck Zeitschrift für kath. Theologie, 1890, pp. 186 sqq. —L. Wedff, "S. Alphonse est-il Probabilioriste?" in the Revue Thomiste, Paris 1904, pp. 129 sqq., 477 sqq. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, pp. 220 sqq.

On Æquiprobabilism: Vindiciae Alphonsianae seu Doctoris Ecclesiae S. Alphonsi de Ligorio Doctrina Moralis Vindicata a Plurimis Oppugnatoribus A. P. Ballerini cura et studio quorundam Theologorum e Congregatione SS. Redemptoris, 2 vols., 2nd ed., Bruxelles 1874. —J. De Caigny, C.SS.R., Apologetica de Æquiprobabilismo Alphonsiano, Tournai 1894. —G. Arendt, S.J., Apologeticae de Æquiprobabilismo Alphonsiano Historico-Philosophicae Dissertationis a R. P. J. de Caigny Exaratae Crisis iuxta Principia Angelici Doctoris, Freiburg 1897, pp. 65 sqq. —IDEM, Æquiprobabilismus ab Ultimo Fundamento Discussus, Rome 1909. —Vindiciae Ballerinianae seu Gustus Recognitionis Vindiciarum Alphonsianarum. Insunt Dissertationes Ballerini de Systemate S. Alphonsi et Altera Dissertatio de Probabilismo et Æquiprobabilismo eiusdem, Bruges 1873. —A. Ballerini, S.J., Opus Theologiae Moralis (ed. Palmieri), Vol. I, 3rd ed., pp. 606 sqq. —Le Bachelet, La Question Ligorienne, Paris 1899, pp. 25 sqq. —J. M. Harty in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, p. 445. —Berthe-Castle, C.SS.R., Life of St. Alphonsus de' Liguori, Dublin 1905. —A. Tanquerey, S.S., Synopsis Theologiae Moralis, Vol. II, pp. 223 sqq. —Sabetti-Barrett, S.J., Compendium Theologiae Moralis, 27th ed., New York 1919, pp. 163 sqq.

Order of speaking. In order that we may procure for ourselves a distinct knowledge of a matter which, both on account of many applications and on account of controversies, has become sufficiently encumbered and confused, greater care must be taken for the due order in our exposition. Wherefore we shall divide this chapter first into two articles, of which the former will be assigned to positively doubtful conscience, the latter to negatively doubtful conscience. But in the former article, in various paragraphs, we shall successively hand down notions; systems or opinions; the demonstration of the true doctrine; the right use of the demonstrated doctrine; the question concerning the probability of fact. Finally in the other article we shall treat of negatively doubtful conscience.

— I. On moral certainty. Certainty in general is defined as the assent of the mind without fear of the opposite. As metaphysical certainty is founded in the immutability of a metaphysical principle, and physical certainty in the constancy of the physical order, so moral certainty rests upon the constancy of the inclinations and morals of men. An exception, indeed, in a particular application is not demonstrated to be impossible; but where there is no reason for suspecting it, to fear an exception is alien equally from reason and from the custom of prudent men. It is alien from reason, because the possibility of error does not create a danger of error, which danger would give a legitimate cause of fear ¹. It is alien from the morals of men. With Aristotle ² and St. Thomas (3) all easily understand this: "Certainty is not to be sought in the same way in every matter." And they call morally certain that which, although it is not strictly demonstrated, nevertheless is assailed by no serious reason and is supported by reasons persuasive in a human way, under which, nevertheless, in some case, falsity can lie hidden. Thus we are certain concerning the baptism which the priest, the minister, testifies that he conferred upon us.

Hence, under another respect, moral certainty can be called that with which men are accustomed to be content in acting. St. Thomas, in the place cited, calls that certainty probable, i.e., such "as for the most part attains truth, although in fewer cases it falls short of the truth" ¹.

But if it is established, in a particular application, that an exception is excluded by a certain argument (v.g., in the demonstration of the Catholic religion, or in certain points historically proved by several witnesses), there will be moral certainty more strictly than when simply the reason of exception does not appear.

Moral certainty excludes not every fear, but only prudent fear.

But by an extended name, a judgment is called morally certain which, although in itself it is only probable, so that it can found only opinion, nevertheless practically permits the application of a certain moral principle, such as this one is: in doubts one must answer in favor of liberty (cf. Schiffini, Princ. n. 34, obj. 4).

Certainty then, in this latter case, is only practical, while that which is properly called morally certain is speculatively certain.

To this also belongs the case of a proposition which is urged only by a probable argument, to which nevertheless no positive argument is opposed. That opinion will be called morally certain insofar as it is certainly permitted to act according to it.

Therefore that is called morally certain equivocally which is demonstrated by convincing reasons from the morals of men, and that which merely rests upon a probable reason to which there is no contradiction. The former certainty also has a place in the logical part of philosophy; the latter is proper to the moral discipline.

Finally, by a different use, all certainty which is to be attributed to the command of the will is called moral.

¹ Schiffini, Principia philosophica, n. 232.

² Ethic. Nicom. L. I, c. 1 and c. 3. - (3) 2, 2, q. 70, art. 2.

¹ For this reason Aristotle was able to define (I Top., c. 12) a probable opinion: "that which seems true to all, or to most, or to the wise, and either to all, or to most, or to the most notable."

— II. On doubt and probability. 1. Even after the diligent inquiry which is prescribed has been made, according to the merit of the cause and the abundance of investigation, we do not always arrive at certainty, even moral certainty; but, after the reasons for and against have been weighed, the intellect of itself remains doubtful, or, at the command of the will, assents to one part with a reasonable fear of the opposite: "it indeed accepts one part, yet always doubts concerning the opposite" ¹. Then it is found in the state of one opining ².

When assent is suspended, the state of mind is called strict doubt. Strict doubt is also had when reasons appear for neither side (v.g., whether the stars are even in number). Yet this much differs between the two cases: when reason is lacking, the state of strict doubt is incurable; while, when there are positive reasons, the very suspension of mind can be removed by bringing in the state of opinion or of an opinative judgment. This state is called broad doubt. In it, nevertheless, as we noted above, n. 340, no greater truth is perceived than in strict doubt.

2. Moreover, "a probable opinion is generally considered to be that which rests upon a grave foundation, although not altogether certain, and at the same time has against itself no convincing reason" ³. But a grave motive is that which, not only simply or separately, but also comparatively, or with the opposing reasons looked through, inclines a prudent man to assent, although it does not determine assent ⁴:

a) From the object, probability of law and probability of fact are distinguished, in the same way in which, n. 55, we separated ignorance of law from ignorance of fact;

b) From the source whence it is drawn, intrinsic or extrinsic probability is distinguished, according as the motive of assent is taken from intrinsic reasons or from the authority of doctors. It would be better to say probability known from within or from without;

c) From the varying degree of probability, two opinions which are compared with each other can be equally probable, on behalf of which motives of equal or almost equal weight contend; one can be more probable, the other less probable, when one rests upon motives which are not moderately stronger than the motives of the other, although they do not remove the hesitation of the mind.

¹ St. Th., De veritate, q. 11, art. 1.

² Schiffini opportunely notes, Princ. n. 221, that fear of the opposite can nevertheless be excluded because the mind does not advert to the danger of falsity: which is often the case of the unlearned. He calls this the state of "unperturbed opinion."

³ Reiffenstuel, Theolog. mor. tr. I, q. 4, n. 41.

⁴ We think that what is often written must be explained or corrected thus: that a probable opinion is that which rests upon a motive which moves a prudent man to assent. For since a motive does not move the intellect except by its evidence, it would follow that no opinion could be probable unless it were estimated by learned men to be certain.

— Which opinions are to be judged probable?

Preliminary warning. 1. As those things teach us which we weighed in n. 350 concerning the moral certainty with which practically we can and ought to be content, a law or obligation cannot be called doubtful on account of any reason whatever that has been thought up or alleged; rather it is necessary that, all things having been sufficiently looked through, this reason be grave and solid and remain.

Remain, I say. For since probability implies obscurity (insofar as it denies certainty looked through), this obscurity can be expelled, not only by decrees given authoritatively, but also by the approved studies of doctors. Moral science does not ignore progress. And many things which formerly, for some time, were probably put forward, would today be affirmed only rashly.

Thus St. Alphonsus ¹ was able probably to assert that excommunication is not incurred by a priest who feigns that he absolves an accomplice: which today, even before the Code, has been wholly exploded by responses of the Holy Office. Thus also that opinion which, because of error, exempts from restitution him who voluntarily applies fire to another's house but which he thought to be that of Caius, while it was that of Titius, seems to us exploded by the very protests of common sense; yet C. de Lugo ² defended it, and St. Alphonsus (3) judged it probable. Nor do we any longer hold as intrinsically probable the opinion which exempts from injustice a priest who secretly retains for himself part of the stipends of manual Masses whose burden he transfers from himself to others. For the reason for doubting, already well solved by St. Alphonsus (4), is shown to be clearly vain by the excellent and ample dissertation of Fr. Arendt, S.J., "On the Injury to Commutative Justice in the Stipend of a Manual Mass Diminished for Another Celebrant."

Wherefore the present state of the controversy must be attended to.

2. Confusion must be avoided. Once this preliminary warning has been made, lest the answer to be given to the question be wrongly understood, a judgment concerning the probability of opinions must be accurately separated from a probable judgment concerning a thing or action. Concerning many things even the unlearned probably judge; concerning the honesty of an action all can and ought to have at least a probable judgment, although it is obtained in one way in one person and case, and in another way in another. Cf. what is to be said below. But here the matter is about the opinion itself by which, v.g., a certain action is predicated as probably honest.

3. The estimation concerning the intrinsic probability of an opinion requires an examination of the reasons and difficulties: which examination belongs only to experts in theology or in the science upon which the solution depends. Wherefore not even for every priest or confessor is that judgment accessible. Cf. Ballerini-Palmieri ¹. And if the doubt turns upon the interpretation of law, the theologian will not rarely be compelled to borrow light from the jurist.

An opinion is called extrinsically probable to which five or six authors of good name adhere, who have examined the matter and have not merely copied one another without examination. Concerning this probability even the moderately learned can judge, who, once the state of the question has been understood, find probability admitted among several expert and prudent authors who have considered the matter from within.

Indeed, from the authority of one man an opinion can be estimated as probable, although he departs from the common opinion, "whenever, namely, the author is beyond every exception, that is, very skilled in law both natural and positive, who besides has been accustomed to strengthen his conclusions by firm and valid reasons, who is judged a lover of truth rather than of novelty, and finally who has plainly discussed and weakened the arguments of others" (2). Here therefore, as often, probability coalesces from reasons partly intrinsic, partly extrinsic. Cf. B.P. I, n. 185. The more the matter is estimated as doubtful or difficult, and therefore the less there is in that matter a certain common opinion, as, v.g., the question concerning the grave violation of the vow of poverty, the more easily the authority of a prudent and learned man will suffice for the opinion to be judged probable.

But observe this: since authors are not legislators, the whole force of extrinsic probability must be derived from a presumed intrinsic reason.

Yet a distinction must here be observed between an immutable law, such as the divine law is, and laws which can be changed by human authority. Since the Church herself recommends that we follow approved authors, even he for whom the falsity of some interpretation which grave authors defend has been looked through is not prohibited from acting according to their opinion. And after some time received opinions found a usual interpretation concerning which this holds: "Custom is the best interpreter of laws" (c. 29). And in vain then, from monuments, you will have demonstrated another signification of the law, since according to those received opinions the law must be judged to have been tempered. Thus the Code itself, c. 6, 2°, wills that canons which reproduce the old law in full be estimated from the interpretations received among approved authors. Thus, even if you should prove, with attention paid to the first decrees, that all jurisdiction over an accomplice, also in order to other sins, has been taken away from the confessor, nevertheless, since the contrary opinion is that of many approved authors, jurisdiction over the other sins remains probable and therefore practically certain.

¹ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 556. - (2) De iustitia et iure, d. 17, nn. 75. 76. - (3) Op. c. l. 3, n. 628. - (4) L. 6, n. 322.

¹ Op. theol. I, tr. 2, n. 191.

² Ball.-Palm. I, tr. 2, n. 186.

— Probable judgment concerning the honesty of an action to be done. 1. In order that he may obtain for himself a probable judgment concerning the honesty of his action, an unlearned man who doubts or hesitates usually must be led by another's authority; and commonly he can also stand by the judgment of one man whom he rightly holds to be instructed. Thus those unskilled in theology can acquiesce in the parish priest or confessor, unless they have a positive cause for suspecting their ignorance or rashness in certain matters; or unless they themselves, in certain arguments, for example in knowledge of law, are more versed.

2. Nor are they prohibited from approaching several upright confessors or doctors, if perhaps the first one questioned has answered too severely. But if they have obtained truly contrary responses from expert men, they will be able of themselves to estimate the matter as positively uncertain, so that they preserve free option.

3. Theologians themselves who are not so learned can trust the authority of a prudent writer who reports an opinion as extrinsically probable. Yet they will have to dissolve a positive suspicion of error according to the merit of the cause and according to the abundance which they have. Indeed, concerning an author of the gravest and most approved authority, such as St. Alphonsus, it has been answered that it is permitted for a priest confessor to follow his opinions simply, with no other selection made. This, as is clear, must be taken insofar as either a decree of the Holy See or a changed law has not clearly taken away the probability of the opinion. Cf. resp. S. Paenitentiariae, 5 July 1831. A.S.S. I, 497, or Bucceroni, Enchiridion, 4, p. 9.

3. Nor is a learned theologian obliged to examine all things by himself; but he himself can work according to an opinion which learned men defend as probable and safe. And it belongs to a prudent man not so to trust, at least in graver matters, his own judgment, that he neglects to confirm his own persuasion or opinion by consultation with or questioning of others.

— On a safe and a safer opinion. This must carefully be observed: an opinion is called safe and safer under a diverse respect. An opinion is called safe with respect to formal sin, which you can follow without fault; while it is called safer with respect to material sin. That opinion is safer which, whether it is more or less probable, nevertheless removes more every danger of material sin. Therefore it is the opinion for the law, for the obligation. Hence Titius can embrace the safe parts even when he follows the less safe opinion.

St. Alphonsus, I, 40; ed. G., I, p. 21; H. Ap., tr. I, n. 21; Beaudouin, de Consc., q. IV, 1; Gaude, de system. S. Alph., c. II; Ter Haar, de system. mor. antiq. Probab.; Valensise, super system. Theol. mor.... disquisitio, p. 35; Lehmkuhl, I, n. 156; Noldin, I, n. 222; Genicot, I, n. 63.

57. Notion. Probable conscience is defined by St. Alphonsus (I, 40): "Conscience by which someone, relying on some probable opinion, forms for himself a practical dictate of reason, from certain reflex or concomitant principles, for acting licitly."

Thus defined, probable conscience is a right rule of morals, since it furnishes a practical and indeed certain dictate concerning the honesty of the action.

Order of things to be said. In probable conscience two things are distinguished: namely the probable opinion itself, on which we rely, and the formation of the practical dictate, which is made through reflex principles by which the use of the opinion is determined. Wherefore there must be treated: 1. the nature of probability; 2. the use of probability.

58. Definition. Opinion is an assent of the mind toward one part of a contradiction with fear of the other (St. Thomas, I, q. 79, a. 9, ad 4). Insofar as it is assent, opinion differs from doubt, which is a suspension of judgment assenting to neither part. Insofar as it is with fear of the opposite part, it does not signify a departure from the part to which it assents, but a defect of the firmness of science, and thus it differs from science strictly so called, and from certitude, which is an assent excluding founded fear. See what was said n. 33.

Probable, by force of etymology, signifies the same as what can be proved by reasons. But probability is an appearance of truth, which can arise from various causes and admits various grades.

A probable opinion can be considered both subjectively and objectively. Considered subjectively, it is the assent of the mind given to one part on account of a suitable motive persuading of its truth, yet fallible, and therefore with fear of the opposite part. Considered objectively, it is a proposition which rests on a grave foundation, either intrinsic, of reason, or extrinsic, of authority, which is able to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of the opposite. The things which the doctors commonly dispute concerning probable opinion regard opinion taken objectively.

59. Division. 1. By reason of the object, probability is of fact or of law, according as it is concerned with the truth of the thing or with the honesty of the action, as was explained above (n. 32, 2).

2. By reason of the foundation, probability is distinguished as intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic is that which rests on the weight of reasons drawn from the nature itself of the thing; extrinsic is that which rests on the testimony and authority of doctors.

3. By reason of use, it is divided into speculative and practical (III, 700, note). Speculative (or remote) probability is the verisimilitude of an opinion considered in itself, insofar as it is an object of knowledge, without any application to work. Practical (or proximate) probability is the verisimilitude of an opinion considered with respect to work, insofar as namely, with all things weighed, it can serve for a certain and practical dictate of conscience (cf. n. 80, 2).

60. These things concerning the notion of probability having been premised, it must carefully be noted that probable opinions can be considered both in themselves and relatively or comparatively to the opposite opinions. But since this matter is of great moment, it must be set forth somewhat more fully.

61. I. Intrinsic, absolute probability is the appearance of truth which an opinion bears before itself in itself, considered in its motives, and independently of any opposite opinion. From this it is clear that an opinion, considered in itself, is more or less probable according as the weight of the reasons on which it rests is greater or lesser. Hence various GRADES of probability are distinguished, which nevertheless all can be reduced in practice to three, namely to a solidly probable opinion, to a most probable opinion, and finally to a slightly probable opinion.

1. A TRULY AND SOLIDLY PROBABLE opinion is that which indeed rests on a fallible foundation, but on a foundation so firm that it can draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of error.

But that such probability be present in an opinion, it is required: a) that it rest on a motive not of just any sort, but grave relative to the matter to be decided; b) that it be opposed neither to Sacred Scripture, nor to tradition, nor to the definition of the Church, otherwise its falsity would already be established; c) that there not be opposed to it a convincing reason to which no adequate response seems available (I, 79 and 82).

To the genus of opinions truly and solidly probable belongs a sufficiently probable opinion. For although the motive on which it rests is not of the same firmness as in an opinion which is called truly probable, nevertheless it is sufficient for moving the mind of a prudent man.

2. A MOST PROBABLE opinion (taken in itself and absolutely) is that "which rests on a very grave foundation, wherefore the opposite is judged slightly or doubtfully probable" (I, 40, 81). See what is to be said n. 71.

3. A SLIGHTLY PROBABLE opinion is that which rests on some foundation, but not such that it can draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.

Scarcely different from it is an opinion doubtfully, or even probably probable, which, although it is not wholly lacking a prudent motive that it is true, nevertheless does not have a foundation either certain or sufficiently grave, such as is required to constitute true probability (I, 81; Vind. Alph., I, p. 8).

The reason why a probably probable opinion is not to be called absolutely probable is thus set forth by Viva: For just as certitude or evidence concerning the probability of an opinion does not pour certitude or evidence into the opinion itself, so probability concerning the probability of an opinion does not pour probability into the opinion itself (Thes. de opin. probab.).

Outside the limits of probability is an IMPROBABLE opinion which, as being opposed to a morally certain opinion, is judged destitute of every element of probability, and therefore deprived of every hope of truth (I, 40). Frequently, however, some opinion is called improbable, namely practically, although in itself it is not destitute of every probability (cf. n. 73).

62. Note. 1. Only learned men and those versed in moral matters can judge concerning the intrinsic probability of opinions, since they alone can know that nothing certain is opposed to them. For many times to men talented, but little instructed in moral science, that seems evident which the skilled judge false. As regards particular cases not discussed by theologians, that opinion is sufficiently probable for a learned and timorous man which, after a serious weighing of reasons and consultation of doctors, without disordered affection, he shall have judged to be such.¹

2. The unlettered can with a safe conscience follow the opinion or counsel of a pastor or confessor, or of another prudent and learned man.

63. II. As regards EXTRINSIC probability, the following rules must be held:

1. An opinion which, while the Church tolerates it, is common among theologians must be held probable.

But the common opinion of theologians must by no means be confused with the unanimous opinion of theologians. Their unanimous opinion is no longer opinion, but a morally certain truth. For since all preachers, catechists, and confessors hand down that which is unanimously taught, if they erred, the Church, by dissembling a common error, would tacitly approve the false and would lead the Christian faithful into error, and therefore she herself would err. On the contrary, a common opinion is not a certain truth, but is only an opinion which approved authors generally hold, and to which therefore the greatest authority belongs.² An opinion is called more common when notably more authors stand for it than for the opposite (therefore of itself it does not equal a common opinion); most common, when the consensus of authors is almost unanimous. Cf. Beaudouin, q. IV, dub. IV.

2. A proposition which several (at least five or six) theologians, distinguished in probity and judgment, hand down must also generally be judged probable.

We said generally: for only the Supreme Pontiff teaching from the Chair enjoys the prerogative of infallibility. And therefore, when there appears for some proposition a certain convincing reason or authority, to which no adequate response seems available, then the contrary opinion cannot be held as probable.³

3. One author does not suffice for some opinion to be called truly and sufficiently probable, if indeed the question is of an author of whatever note, since this proposition was condemned by Alexander VII under n. 27: "If a book is of some younger and modern author, the opinion ought to be judged probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable."⁴

Yet if the matter concerns an author grave and of great name in the Church, and greater than every exception, we can, provided he teaches nothing against Scripture or the common sense of the Church, follow his opinion as probable.

4. Sometimes also, although rarely, the authority of one doctor can constitute an opinion probable, and even more probable against the common opinion of others; namely if that author is very learned, upright, and prudent, not a lover of novelties, and brings forward a valid reason which has not been sufficiently solved by others.⁵

5. Lastly, a proposition must be judged probable which some great theologian testifies to be probable, although he himself hands down the contrary as more probable.⁶ But a great theologian is esteemed to be one who has great authority among theologians because of his excellent doctrine, prudence, and probity.

Such, according to St. Alphonsus, are: Suarez, Soto, Azor, Canus, Sylvius, Cajetan, Banez, Navarrus, Paludanus, Toletus, Sylvester, Lessius, Molina, Sanchez, Angelus, Vasquez, Armilla, Valentia, Laymann, de Lugo, Castropalaus, Bonacina, Emmanuel Sa, Pontius, Cabassutius, Collet, Roncaglia, the Salmanticenses, Petrocorensis, Abelly, Cardenas, Coninck, Gamachaeus, Isambert, etc., besides St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, St. Antoninus, and Scotus, whose authority certainly ought to be preferred to others.⁷ Finally, to these most learned men St. Alphonsus comes to be numbered, whose authority we already know to be so great (cf. preface).

64. It is asked. Whether extrinsic probability constitutes true probability.

Resp. 1. There are those who wholly reject extrinsic probability; there are those who extol it too much. That extrinsic authority sometimes, with the things to be observed being observed, constitutes true probability is clear from Scripture (Prov. 22:17), where it is said: Incline your ear, and hear the words of the wise; and elsewhere (Prov. 3:5): Do not lean on your own prudence. But he is denied to lean on his own prudence who so obeys the authority of the wise that, on account of it, his own proper opinion sometimes being left aside, he girds himself for work (cited Dissertation, n. 80).

It is clear also from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary, issued in the year 1831 and confirmed by Gregory XVI: "that the confessor who in the tribunal of penance follows the doctrine of ST. ALPHONSUS DE LIGORIO is not to be disturbed, even if he does not weigh the arguments and reasons on which his various opinions rest, but on account of this reason alone, that in his works nothing worthy of censure was found." For unless extrinsic probability sometimes constituted grave, true, and firm probability, it is certain that this solemn declaration would never have been issued.

We said: with the things to be observed being observed, because for the practical use of extrinsic probability the rules of the moral system must be observed.

2. For the rest, if the matter is weighed well, it is clear that extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic probability. For from the fact that distinguished doctors hand down some opinion, there arises a valid presumption that that opinion is supported by grave reasons.

Whence St. Thomas (2.2, q. 4, a. 8, ad 2): "Someone of little knowledge is more certified concerning what he hears from someone scientific than concerning what seems to him according to his own reason." "And in truth," adds St. Alphonsus (l. c., n. 83), "if I, less learned, were to follow the opinion of St. Thomas against the reason which seems more probable to me, who would deny that I would act more prudently if, my own opinion being suspended, I deferred to so great an authority?"

65. Concerning the authority of writers (lest it be extolled too much), these things are to be noted:

1. The authority of writers is to be estimated not from their multitude, but from their gravity, and from the reasons on which they rest. Moreover, among grave authors themselves, those are to be preferred: a) who have treated the matter expressly;¹ b) who have confirmed by experience the doctrine which they hand down, for example, by hearing the confessions of many: for experience is the best mistress; c) finally, those who, led by love of truth alone (such as the saints are), devoted themselves to writing (cited Dissertation, n. 87). Cf. Ami du Cl., 1900, p. 613.

2. As regards casuists, the more recent are to be preferred to the older, who wrote after the condemned opinions, namely concerning those questions which regard the condemned propositions, or which are related to them. Recall what was said n. 4.

66. As regards the opinions of St. Alphonsus himself, it can most truly be affirmed: they generally enjoy the highest authority, or extrinsic probability. For: 1. All those things which conciliate the highest authority are fully present in the Blessed Doctor, namely holiness of life, singular love of truth, study and untiring investigation through many years, long experience, outstanding knowledge, and the highest obedience toward the Holy See. 2. His opinions, even those which depart from the common opinion of the older theologians, have now today become, at least for the most part, common or more common. 3. These opinions are taught universally, not only while the Church tolerates them, but while she truly approves them: approving them indeed not in a definitive sense, but in a sense both permissive and also elective; so that several times they have been commended by the Holy See itself to professors and confessors as sound, safe, and most salutary (Vind. Alph., Preliminary Dissertation, § 2).

67. Comparative probability is the appearance of truth which an opinion retains after comparison has been made with the opposite (cf. n. 58, 60, 61).

There are many opinions which, if they are considered in themselves alone and apart from opposite motives, strongly incline the intellect even of a prudent man to assent. Yet this does not happen if they are compared also with the reasons of the opposite opinion. Cf. IV, 72. Thus, for example, the testimony of a grave man, considered in itself alone, furnishes a probability of such a kind that a prudent man can rely upon it. But if to this testimony there are opposed the testimonies of two men equally grave, it is now evident that the first assertion no longer retains the same verisimilitude which it had, nor is a solid foundation any longer found in it.

Hence Viva rightly says: From the things said it is clear that an opinion is of slight probability if, for example, the foundation is grave of itself absolutely, but not grave comparatively to the arguments of the opposite part (Thes. damn. on prop. 3 of Alexander VIII, n. 10).

Wherefore, when knowledge or prudent doubt of some opposite probability arises, the obligation also arises of examining this opposite probability, and comparing it with the former (V, 4): otherwise an occasion would voluntarily be given to error (n. 40, 22). Indeed, by a general principle, prudence dictates that inquiry and comparison must be made, so that, with all things weighed, the right way may be found.

68. But once the comparison of opinions has been made, it comes to be defined in a general way: 1. by what notes they are distinguished among themselves; 2. what sort of doubt arises from their opposition.

69. A comparison of opinions is instituted under a twofold respect: namely under the respect of security, and under the respect of probability in order to certitude.

I. By reason of security, an opinion is called safe, safer, or less safe.

Simply safe is that which removes the danger of sinning formally, whether it favors law or liberty. Such is an opinion morally certain, or one favored by reflex principles. Safer (with respect to the less safe) is that which favors the law; for he who, in a conflict of opinions, embraces the parts of the law, avoids even the danger itself of sinning materially, and therefore acts more safely. Finally, less safe is that which favors liberty, and brings with it at least some danger of material transgression (I, 40).

And hence it is clear that the more probable opinion is not always the safer opinion, since greater probability can be in favor of liberty. Thus, for example, for him who has fallen into mortal sin, it is safer to confess at once (the opinion of St. Bonaventure); yet he is not bound to this, according to the opinion of St. Thomas, which is less safe but more probable (Billuart, de Consc., Diss. VI, a. 1). Cf. n. 1647.

70. II. By reason of probability, opinions are either equiprobable, or one is more probable than the other.

1. Opinions are called EQUIPROBABLE when the reasons for either part are equally or almost equally grave. We say almost equally grave; "because (as all probabilists and antiprobabilists agree), when between either opinion there is a slight preponderance, so that the excess is very slight and doubtful, then both opinions are judged equally probable, according to that common axiom: A little is reputed as nothing." So I, 55 (ed. 6 and 7); H. Ap., I, 77.

2. An opinion is called MORE PROBABLE for which graver reasons stand. But this is either a little or doubtfully more probable (to which, namely, a solidly or sufficiently probable opinion is accustomed to be opposed, as passim in the work of St. Alphonsus), and then it is reduced to an almost equiprobable opinion;² or it is certainly more probable, and then it goes out from the limits of equiprobability.

Therefore a certainly more probable opinion is that which, after a weighing has been instituted of the reasons fighting for each opinion, is judged by the agent himself, without any hesitation, certainly preponderant (Vind. Alph., P. 1, c. 1, § 1, a. 1). Such is, for example, an opinion which many more grave authors embrace, or which they with one voice call more probable.³ But when some opinion "is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, then that opinion cannot be anything except notably more probable." For such is the nature of moral matters that ordinarily a small excess cannot be perceived in a certain way, and a little is reputed as nothing (I, 55, X, in ed. 6 and 7).

71. For practice, a most probable opinion is equated with a certainly more probable opinion; it rests on a very grave foundation, so that the contrary is judged only doubtfully probable (cf. n. 31; n. 61, 2; n. 77).

To the matter Gaude (Dissertation de moral. syst. S. Alph., p. 82): At most, the certainly more probable can be equated with the most probable; but neither always nor necessarily does it ascend to this grade. Between the doubtfully more probable and the certainly more probable no intermediate grade is found; but many can and must be thought out between the doubtfully more probable and the most probable.

Note. The word most probable (which, for the rest, St. Alphonsus uses very rarely) can be taken in a twofold sense. For it can signify: 1. the most probable of all the opinions which are subjected to examination; 2. the most probable in itself, or taken absolutely, that is, very or exceedingly probable. The Holy Doctor seems to take the word rather in this latter sense, as is clear from various examples.⁴

72. Sometimes there occurs an opinion which is called UNIQUELY or SOLITARILY PROBABLE, that is, an opinion which is truly probable without any known probability to the contrary: whence it also has the force of a certainly more probable opinion. It can be defined: An opinion which rests on grave reasons, and on the adverse side is not shaken or weakened by other reasons or conjectures. For example, if an upright man seriously promises something, his promise is a grave motive which demands for itself the confidence of a prudent man, until from a certain argument, for example from a past violation of faith, the probability of infidelity appears.⁵

73. These things having been thus defined, it is useful to propose a SCHEMA, from which it can clearly be seen at one glance how opinions are mutually opposed:

I.

True opinion / morally certain opinion (properly so called)

opposed to

Improbable opinion (absolutely and speculatively).

Truer opinion / most probable (very grave) / more probable (notably, certainly, truly, absolutely)

opposed to

Slightly, doubtfully, not solidly probable; improbable (practically).

More probable opinion (a little, doubtfully) / probable opinion (certainly, gravely, solidly)

opposed to

Probable opinion (equally, almost equally, sufficiently).

Note. Besides the three aforesaid grades of comparison, other intermediate grades are not to be attended to, because they cannot be discerned in a certain way. Therefore the various words which express the same grade in the proposed schema either express entirely the same thing, or only imply something of inclination toward a grade, whether higher or lower. And hence it is why St. Alphonsus teaches⁶ that an opinion, even by a preponderance of one grade, is placed outside the limits of equiprobability, if indeed the grade is notable. "It suffices," he says, "that an opinion be more probable by one single grade; but let this be understood rightly: this grade must be such that it renders me certain that the opinion is more probable." Such will be, for example, a grave reason to which we do not see an adequate response to be available, or also the authority of some great doctor.

Therefore, in judging the comparative probability of opinions, the safer method is to inquire whether the excess by which one surpasses the other is certain or not. It suffices if it is held as certain, since this is a sign that it is notable. Behold the words of the Blessed Doctor: "When an opinion is certainly more probable even by one single grade, then it is also notably more probable, because this certitude of greater probability proves this probability to be so preponderant that it suffices to bend the scale (namely, of the mind); and therefore I assert that a certainly more probable opinion is the same as a notably more probable opinion." Then, meeting the difficulty which could easily be opposed, he continues thus: "Someone will say that a weight of 10 ounces is certainly greater than a weight of 9 ounces, although the excess is not notable. I respond that this holds in physical matter; but in metaphysical matter, insofar as the matter concerns judgments of the intellect, I say that when the excess is certain, it is also notable; because, if it were not notable, neither would it be certain, but ambiguous and doubtful." So to Father Blasucci (Letters, III, 219). So especially in the cited Monitum, 1773. Cf. Letters, III, n. 185, 188, 217. See the Dissertation dell'Uso moder., 1765 and 1767.

74. From the opposition of opinions some doubt necessarily arises. But it is of very great importance to know whether that doubt is strict or broad.

I. If the opinions are EQUIPROBABLE, they mutually elide each other in order to obtaining prudent assent of the mind, and in this case there is strict doubt.

Behold the words of St. Alphonsus, which are, as it were, the hinge of his system: "When there is present from the other side," he says, "an equiprobable opinion for liberty, then from neither side can any probability remain, or probable reason apt to draw to itself the prudent assent of man; for from these equal probabilities nothing results except mere doubt whether the law exists or does not exist... St. Thomas clearly teaches this (de Verit., q. 14, a. 1)... For just as a balance is in equilibrium both when no weight is placed upon it and when equal weights are placed upon it; in the same way, when two probabilities or probable opinions occur, they so suspend the judgment as if no probability existed on either side." "All probabilists and probabiliorists commonly say the same."⁷

Note. Elision is either the removal of probability, or the prevention of only its effect, that is, of the power of moving the intellect to prudent assent (Aertnys, l. 1, n. 70). Contradiction between opinions can exist either in the reasons and conclusions together, or in the conclusions alone. With these things posited, an opinion can be ELIDED by an equiprobable opinion in a twofold way: 1. absolutely and speculatively, when the motives of each opinion are equal and at the same time contradictory, for example when two grave witnesses affirm some fact, and two others of equal faith deny it; then by the negation of these the affirmation of those is entirely destroyed (this case rarely occurs in moral controversies); 2. relatively and practically, when the motives are equal and disparate, and the opinions themselves, or rather the conclusions, contradict one another (when, for example, one says: It is lawful to paint on a feast day, and the other: It is not lawful); then the equal motives, although dissimilar, move the intellect equally for each part of the contradiction, and therefore prevent it from prudently adhering to one rather than to the other.

Indeed, the intellect can adhere to one rather than to the other; yet it will not adhere prudently and moved by the object, but only moved by the will. "In another way," says St. Thomas (2.2, q. 1, a. 4), "the intellect assents to something, not because it is sufficiently moved by its proper object, but by a certain election, voluntarily declining to one part more than to the other." But an election which is not led by reason cannot be free from imprudence and temerity.

From this it is easily understood in what way St. Alphonsus, speaking of equally probable opinions, could say: "Each is probable" (passim in the Moral Work), and "neither is probable, but only remains doubtful" (book I, 76, Sed instat). The sense of the words is: each opinion is probable, viewed in the force of its own reasons, by which hope of truth is begotten. But neither remains probable (namely, expeditely), but each becomes doubtful, viewed in the force of the opposite reasons, by which fear of error is introduced (Vind. Alph., Apologetic Dissertation, n. 88).

75. II. If one opinion is CERTAINLY MORE PROBABLE, the opposite, less probable opinion is elided, at least practically; that is, the mind cannot prudently assent to it as true, not even lightly; nor does it matter whether the motives on which the less probable rests are contradictory or disparate. The reason is that, the more someone opines on account of strong motives, the more he approaches the perfection of science and truth, and the more he recedes from the imperfection of ignorance and error (Beaudouin, l. c., p. 127). Therefore in the concurrence of unequal opinions, only the excess of weight has the force of attracting the assent of the mind; whence it happens that the certainly more probable opinion alone retains a firm foundation, or remains expeditely probable; and therefore in this case there is only broad doubt.

"When the safer opinion is certainly more probable," says the Blessed Doctor,¹ "in that case, although the law is not entirely certain, nevertheless on account of that greater probability, the opinion for the law seems morally truer, and consequently (the law) appears morally and sufficiently promulgated, and therefore then it cannot be called entirely doubtful with a strict doubt: in that case there remains only some broad doubt, which does not permit one to depart from the safer opinion." Hence "it happens that the less safe opinion, which lacks a certain foundation, remains either slightly, or at least doubtfully probable, with respect to the safer."² And elsewhere for practice: "A truly probable opinion is that alone which has intrinsic and extrinsic foundations equally or almost equally valid as the opposite for the law, so that the law appears strictly doubtful."³

76. If an opinion is UNIQUELY PROBABLE or not impugned, we are similarly involved in broad doubt. For since nothing appears to the contrary, an opinion of this kind already has a foundation morally certain, in a certain sense, that it is true.

Whence St. Alphonsus equates such an opinion, in the practical order, with a morally certain opinion, saying:⁴ "In the case in which there were probable knowledge only for the law, then a certain moral certitude would assist the law." And elsewhere: "A man remains bound by the law when he knows the law, but not when he doubts concerning the law. But does probable knowledge not suffice? By no means. It would suffice if probability were present only for the part of the law." And in another place: "The word probably, if it is on one side, signifies a morally certain persuasion," namely in a broad sense.

The same has force for practice if someone, relying on a grave motive, invincibly does not advert to the arguments of the opposite part. To the matter thus Viva:⁵ "Therefore, if someone adverts only to a foundation of this kind grave in itself, and invincibly does not advert to the arguments of the opposite part, by reason of which that foundation is simply light and that opinion is of slight probability, he will not sin by bringing an opinion of this kind into practice, and this per accidens, not per se."

77. Note. A certainly more probable opinion (or even a most probable one) must not be confused with a morally certain opinion properly so called: for probability, as such, always includes fear of error, and therefore excludes moral certitude strictly so called.⁶ Nevertheless, if an opinion, after comparison has been instituted, appears preponderant and certainly more probable, it furnishes a sufficient foundation for forming conscience; since the opposite becomes doubtfully probable, that is, it introduces doubt whether in these circumstances it is such that a prudent man can assent to it. And therefore although a certainly more probable opinion, speaking speculatively, is not morally certain, nor excludes prudent fear of error, nevertheless practically it must be held like a morally certain opinion, or it is morally certain, speaking broadly.⁷ And similarly, a certainly less probable opinion, although perhaps in itself and speculatively not lacking a grave foundation, nevertheless in practice must be equated with a slightly probable one (cf. n. 103).

78. From the things said up to this point, this twofold rule must be established for determining the state of any controversy:

1. As often as opinions occur in which there is either equal probability, or almost equal probability (because namely one is solidly probable, the other doubtfully or a little more probable), so often we are involved in strict doubt.

2. But as often as on either side there occurs an opinion certainly more probable (or most probable, or uniquely probable), so often there is moral certitude broadly taken, with broad doubt. But if finally some opinion is demonstrated absolutely improbable, every doubt is so overcome that there is now, for the proposition contradictory to this opinion, moral certitude properly so called (Vind. Alph., Apologetic Dissertation, n. 96). See the schema under n. 73.

The nature of probability having been known, its use must now be discussed.

79. The argument of great moment, whose treatment we undertake, can be stated in these words:

How a certain dictate of conscience can be formed when, on account of diverse opinions, one of which stands for the law and the other for liberty, direct certitude cannot be had. Here a solution concerning the particular case is not sought, but a certain and universal norm by which it may safely be discerned both when it is lawful to follow an opinion favoring liberty and when we are bound to follow an opinion favoring the law.

To solve this question a twofold case must be distinguished: according as the question is moved concerning only the honesty of the action, or there intervenes the danger of some evil absolutely to be avoided, which does not depend on the dictate of conscience. In the latter case, the use of probability is entirely unlawful; but in the former case, it can be lawful.

80. All theologians, at least the more recent, teach that the use of probability is not lawful in any matter whatever; for there are circumstances in which, antecedently to every doubt, the law of choosing safer things possesses (cf. n. 42 and 54).

For easier understanding of the question, a threefold danger in the use of a probable opinion must be distinguished, namely danger of error, of sin, and of an evil effect (Vind. Alph., P. I, c. 1, § 1, a. 1, n. 3).

1. The danger or fear of error, with which the danger of materially violating the law is necessarily connected, is always present in the use of a probable opinion, as is clear from the very notion of probability. But such a danger, when moral diligence for finding the truth has been made, we neither can nor are bound to avoid, because the error, if it is present, is invincible (cf. n. 95).

2. The danger of sinning formally is wholly removed in doubt of mere law by reflex principles. For conscience, relying on these principles, drives away practical fear and forms for itself a certain and prudent dictate concerning the honesty of its action, as was shown above (n. 38-39) and will be confirmed below.

3. Another danger, diverse from formal transgression of the law, can intervene in doubts of fact, namely the danger of some damage or evil, temporal or spiritual, on the part of the thing. Thus, for example, homicide embraces both moral evil, or sin, and physical evil, or grave damage, which is inflicted on the neighbor by deprivation of life. Here the matter concerns this last danger.

81. Principle. Whenever in doubts of fact there intervenes danger of damage or evil which does not depend on conscience and which we are certainly bound to avoid, the use of any probability whatever is unlawful, and the safer part is to be followed. So commonly, against certain laxists.

Proof. It is not lawful to expose an end absolutely to be pursued (such as that concerning which the matter here is) to the danger of frustration. But, the safer part being left aside, a danger of that sort (in the case) is not avoided; for, whatever may be true concerning the probability of the opinion, that danger perseveres in the thing itself; nor can it be removed by reflex principles, since it does not depend on the conscience or persuasion of the agent, but on the fact itself.

Thus an opinion, however probable, cannot make what is not a sacrament be a sacrament, or make what is rather poison be medicine.⁸ Namely, in cases of this kind, the matter is not about a doubtful law, but about a certain law, which forbids us to incur the danger of disturbing another from the certain possession of his right. Wherefore St. Alphonsus: "If," he says, "an arrow is shot in probable doubt whether that object is a man or a beast, one does not act against a doubtful law, but against a certain law: for in such a case the law is certain, that the life of one's neighbor, who has a certain right not to be injured, not be cast into probable danger" (H. Ap., I, 68).

We said: Danger of evil which we are bound to avoid; for sometimes there are just causes of permitting evil, indeed of creating the danger itself from which evil may arise: either because between two evils the lesser must be chosen, or because the safer part is judged morally impossible, or because the neighbor is not in certain possession of his right. In cases of this kind, it is lawful, the safer opinion being left aside, to choose the less safe (cf. n. 315).

82. But the necessity of an end absolutely to be pursued can arise from the law, whether of religion, justice, or charity, either toward oneself or toward one's neighbor. Whence the following flow:

Corollaries. I. In the conferral of the sacraments the minister cannot, concerning their value, use an opinion either probable or even more probable; but he is bound to follow a safe opinion, such as one which is either safer or morally certain. This is clear from the first proposition proscribed by Innocent XI: "It is not unlawful in conferring sacraments to follow a probable opinion concerning the value of the sacrament, the safer being left aside."⁹ The reason for the condemnation is that to confer a sacrament with only a probable opinion is contrary not only to charity, on account of the danger of grave harm, but also to religion and the reverence owed to the Author of the sacraments.

Except 1. If necessity urges, and by the use of an opinion even slightly probable concerning the value of the sacrament, the salvation of the neighbor is better consulted. For since men are not for the sacraments, but the sacraments for men, it is lawful to expose them to the danger of frustration, so that in this way, in the best way possible, help may be given to the salvation of a man certainly in danger. Hence, when certain matter is lacking, an infant who is in danger of death must be baptized with doubtful matter. Yet he is to be baptized under condition, lest injury be inflicted on the sacrament if perhaps it is made invalidly.¹⁰

2. Unless the Church can and is reasonably presumed to supply: which indeed can be done either in the sacrament of penance, if from a just cause it is administered with jurisdiction probable by probability of law; or in the sacrament of marriage, if there is present an impediment introduced by ecclesiastical discipline, also probable by probability of law.¹¹ But when the Church supplies, there is practically moral certitude, and therefore the sacrament is to be conferred not under condition, but absolutely. See more in the Treatise on Penance and on Matrimony.

Note. The question is whether in the reception of the sacraments it is lawful to use a probable opinion. Some affirm; but others not undeservedly deny, both because it is against the reverence due to the sacraments to expose them to danger of frustration, and because the opposite opinion can almost never be brought into practice without detriment to one's own soul (I, 51).

83. II. It is not lawful to use a probable opinion in danger of one's own damage, whether spiritual or temporal, necessarily to be avoided.

Hence: 1. In things necessary for salvation by necessity of means, for example in the matter of faith, the safer religion must be followed, which, without doubt, is our Catholic religion. The reason is that in things absolutely necessary for salvation, persuasion of conscience does not remove the danger of damnation. Therefore in these things the axiom has force: No security is too great where eternity is in danger. And the following fourth proposition was deservedly condemned by Innocent XI: "An infidel not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from infidelity."¹²

2. In a proximate occasion of sin, and generally in every probable danger of sinning formally, the safer thing must similarly be chosen, as will be explained more fully in its place (n. 373 ff.). Hence it is unlawful to follow several opinions which are indeed speculatively probable, but which, with attention to the common or special fragility of the one acting, are in practice certainly joined with probable danger of a fall into formal sin. Opinions of this kind are concerned with reading prohibited books, with kisses, touches, dances, comedies, the matter of simony, etc.

3. In danger of life it is not lawful, without necessity, to expose oneself to probable death, for example, by taking food probably harmless and probably poisonous.¹³

84. III. It is not lawful to follow a probable opinion in danger of spiritual or temporal harm to the neighbor, whenever the neighbor is in certain possession of his right.

Wherefore: 1. on account of the scandal of the neighbor, we are sometimes bound to observe a law which probably or even certainly does not exist.¹ Hence St. Paul (1 Cor. 8:13): "Wherefore," he says, "if food scandalizes my brother, I will not eat flesh forever, lest I scandalize my brother."

2. In healing, the physician is bound to apply the safer remedies. But if the case were desperate, it is sufficiently probable that it is lawful to use a doubtful remedy, that is, one probably going to help and probably going to harm; because, in a case of this kind, some hope of life is to be preferred to the danger of hastening death. But for the sake of experiment alone it is not lawful to apply wholly uncertain and untried remedies to the sick, even to the desperate, with danger of gravely harming them (I, 44 ff.).

3. In the direction and care of souls, the confessor is bound, regularly, to follow benign opinions, which commonly remove penitents more from the danger of formal sin. "But where benign opinions render proximate the danger of formal sin, as are some opinions of authors, for example, as to avoiding proximate occasions, and others of that kind; then it is always expedient that the confessor use, indeed I say that he himself, as a physician of souls, is bound to use the safer opinions, which conduce to preserving penitents in the state of grace" (I, 83; VI, 456).

4. In civil judgment, if neither party possesses, the judge is bound to render sentence in favor of that party for whom the more probable opinion stands. The reason is that the judge, by divine and human precept, must render to each his right, according to the greater weight of reasons which favor each one. Hence proposition 2 was condemned by Innocent XI: "I think it probable that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable."² But if the cause of each litigant seems equally probable, he must divide the contested thing, or its price, equally. The reason is that he himself is not the master of the things, but the distributor according to the rights of the parties. Hence proposition 26 was condemned by Alexander VII: "When litigants have for themselves equally probable opinions, the judge can accept money for rendering sentence in favor of one rather than the other"³ (I, 47).

Note. It was said: a) In civil judgment; because in criminal cases, where the matter concerns inflicting a penalty, especially a capital one, among opposed probable sentences the sentence favoring the accused must always be followed, even if it is less probable; otherwise the judge would expose himself to the danger of condemning an innocent man, which is intrinsically evil. b) If neither party possesses; because if one of the litigants possesses the thing in good faith, and has for himself a probable reason, he cannot be despoiled, even if the other adduces more probable reasons for himself. For legitimate possession gives the possessor a certain right of retaining the thing, until the right of the other is evident (I, l. c.; IV, 210). Cf. above n. 45.

5. In hunting, the hunter who doubts whether that which he sees in the forest is a wild beast or a man cannot strike it, even if he thinks it more probable that it is a wild beast.

The same must be said in similar cases (I, 52).

The theologians, for whom there is morally one and the same sense concerning the use of probability where the matter concerns the danger of an evil absolutely to be avoided, by no means concur in the same opinion in the treatment of the present question; but different men devise different systems, which more or less favor either law or liberty. These systems must now be set forth briefly, so that afterward the system of St. Alphonsus may be better understood, and both the truth and the security of that system may become more clearly known.

85. STATE OF THE QUESTION. 1. By a moral system is understood a complex of rules by which moral controversies, arising from probable opinions, are settled in practice.

2. The end of a moral system is to indicate how, in practice, one arrives at a morally certain conscience, so that each one may act safely.

3. The matter of a moral system is only those doubts in which the matter concerns the honesty of an action, as we said above.

4. Five moral systems chiefly are numbered, devised by authors, namely: 1. rigorism (or tutiorism); 2. probabiliorism; 3. equiprobabilism; 4. probabilism; 5. laxism. To these in our times has been added the system of compensation.⁴

86. 1. Rigorists are called those who admit reflex principles in no way, or only in a merely secondary way. They are also called anti-probabilists, because they reject every use of probability properly so called in a moral matter; and tutiorists, because they teach that in doubt the safer part is always to be followed.⁵ But they are divided, according to the grades of direct certitude which they require in order to act lawfully, into strict rigorists and mild rigorists.

a) The stricter rigorists require direct absolute certitude in order to act lawfully. Their dictum is: safer or certain.

Thus Sinnichius, Wendrochius, etc. This system was condemned through the following proposition proscribed by Alexander VII (the 3rd): "It is not lawful to follow an opinion, or even the most probable among probable opinions." Therefore at least a most probable opinion in favor of liberty is lawful, even if, by its nature, it does not go out from the limits of probability. The reason is that the opposite opinion rests on only a slight moment, on account of which natural right forbids liberty to be despoiled of its own right (cf. n. 40, rule 3).

Add that rigorism is: 1. alien to the evangelical spirit: for how could the yoke of Christ be called sweet, and his burden light, if we were bound always to follow the safer things? 2. contrary to the doctrine of the holy Fathers, as is clear from their testimonies, which St. Alphonsus reports; 3. very pernicious in practice: for it imposes an intolerable burden, increases sins, ensnares consciences, generates desperation, and builds unto gehenna (I, 60, 66, 82 ff.).

b) The milder rigorists teach that direct certitude is required in order to act lawfully, not indeed absolute certitude, but broad or moral certitude. These indeed permit the use of the most probable opinion, not because it is lawful to use a probable opinion, but because, in moral matters, a most probable opinion furnishes some broad certitude (H. Ap., I, 33). Their dictum is: safer or most probable.

Thus Fagnanus, Habert, etc. This system indeed has not been condemned, but we do not admit it. Cf. below the first Thesis (n. 91).

2. Probabiliorists teach that the safer opinion must be held, unless the opinion for liberty is manifestly and solidly more probable. Their dictum is: Safer or more probable.

Thus Billuart, Wigandt, and, among more recent authors, Pegues and others from the Order of St. Dominic. And the reason is that it is not lawful, they say, to incur a grave and founded danger of transgressing the law; which danger, they say, always threatens unless the opinion which stands for liberty is at least more probable than the other. But if the opinion which stands for liberty is truly more probable, they contend that there is only a slight danger of acting against the law, which danger can prudently be disregarded (Billuart, de act. hum., Diss. VI). Against them likewise Thesis 1 will be established.

3. Equiprobabilists teach that in the concurrence of two opinions equally or almost equally probable (of which one favors liberty, the other law), while the doubt stands concerning the existence of the law, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty; but while the doubt stands concerning the cessation of the law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed. Outside the limits of this broad equiprobability, the uniquely probable or certainly more probable opinion prevails, whether this opinion supports the law or liberty. Their dictum is: The opinion for which possession stands, provided that it is equally or almost equally probable.

Thus, after several older authors, St. Alphonsus and his disciples, Aertnys, Konings, and others from diverse schools, such as Gousset, Scavini, Del Vecchio, Muller, Martin, Pruner, Simar, Berardi, Sweens, Farges, Beaudouin, Beijsens, Valensise, Koch, etc. Their reason is that in the concurrence of equiprobable opinions we are involved in strict doubt; but a strictly doubtful law does not oblige, and in an equal cause the condition of the possessor is better. More concerning this system at n. 88 ff.

4. Probabilists (in general) teach that in the concurrence of a probable or more probable opinion which stands for the law, it is permitted to follow a probable opinion favoring liberty, provided that this opinion is truly probable. The dictum of the probabilists is: The more benign, provided that it is truly probable. Their reason is that it is not lawful to impose an obligation concerning which there is no certain evidence; now, there is no certain evidence concerning the law where the opinion for liberty is truly probable; therefore.

Bartholomew Medina, O.P. (1.2, q. 19, a. 6, Commentary on St. Thomas), was the first who, in the year 1577, published this opinion: "If an opinion is probable, it is lawful to follow it, although the opposite is more probable."⁶

This system is not sufficiently defined, nor is it circumscribed by certain limits. For, as it is commonly circulated: 1. it does not define whether an opinion favoring liberty ought to be relatively probable, or whether it suffices that it be absolutely probable; 2. while it grants the use of a less probable opinion, with the safer and even more probable one left aside, it does not define whether this has force concerning one a little more probable, or concerning one notably more probable. And this obscurity indeed is the cause why probabilists have entered upon a diverse way.

Some, teaching that it is lawful to follow a solidly probable opinion which favors liberty, understand solidly probable relatively, and therefore with only a probable, or a little more probable, opinion which stands for the law left aside. These agree in substantial matters with the equiprobabilists, and can be called moderate probabilists. Such are Suarez,⁷ Vasquez, Lugo, Lessius, Laymann, Sylvius, Palaus, Viva, Abelly, Reuter, Voit, etc. We shall not act against these when we are about to attack probabilism. Yet we note that this moderate probabilism, since it carries before itself some ambiguity, by not determining sufficiently the less probable opinion, does not sufficiently guard against abuses, as St. Alphonsus has already complained.⁸

But there are others, probabilists, who hold as sufficiently probable every opinion absolutely and in itself probable, without caring at all about relative probability; they also deny that the use of a probable opinion is to be confined within the limits of equiprobabilism, and therefore that an opinion becomes unlawful to which another certainly or evidently more probable opinion is opposed. Thus expressly Lacroix,⁹ Illsung,¹⁰ etc., whose doctrine comes under the name of absolute or common or pure, broad probabilism.

Finally, among probabilists, some reject the principle of possession, or do not admit it in the same circumstances as St. Alphonsus.¹¹

Now, just as probabiliorism is more rigid than is just, so absolute probabilism seems to be more benign than is right. The disadvantages under which it labors will be indicated below, where its refutation is treated (Theses II and III).

Note. Ter Haar treats at length the various kinds of the older probabilists (op. cit., p. 20-85). If we consider the mind of more recent probabilists, some (for example, Lehmkuhl) are to be numbered with the moderate probabilists, others (for example, Raphael a St. Joseph, Meffert, Ballerini) rather with the broad probabilists. It is especially to be lamented that several recent authors sometimes use more general and even rather obscure words, by which they seem now to approach absolute probabilism, now to recede from it. See examples in Vind. Alph., I, p. 480 ff.

5. Laxists taught that it is permitted to follow any opinions whatever, even slightly probable ones. Their dictum is: The more benign, provided that it is probable in some way. Thus Caramuel, the prince of the laxists, Diana, and others.¹²

This other extreme was condemned by Innocent XI in the 3rd proposition, which said: "Generally, while relying on probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided that one does not go outside the limits of probability, we always act prudently when we do something." This proposition was excerpted to the letter from Tamburini (Dec., I, c. 3, § 3, n. 3). But deservedly was it condemned: for slight probability cannot be called true probability, just as slight fortitude or slight skill cannot be called true fortitude and true skill, but ought rather to be called weakness and lack of skill (H. Ap., I, 30).

To these things is added that "that lax manner of opining is alien to the evangelical simplicity and the doctrine of the holy Fathers; if the faithful were to follow it in practice as a right rule, an immense corruption of Christian life would creep in." Thus Pope Alexander VII, in the decree issued on September 24, 1665.

6. The system of compensation, which certain more recent authors defend (Manier, Lehu, Potton, Boisdron), states the general principle: Every law always obliges to some extent; but its force of obliging increases or decreases according to the degree of knowledge which we have concerning it. A law perfectly known obliges fully; wholly unknown, it does not bind; but imperfectly known, it binds imperfectly. But in order that, while a law imperfectly known stands, we may enjoy liberty, there is required on our part, as an excusing reason, a relatively grave inconvenience, by which the wound is compensated that we, by using our liberty, probably inflict on the law and on the moral order. The reason for this system is that the merely material transgression of a law is already a certain evil; for through this we inflict a wound on the law or moral order, because the law is frustrated in its end intended by the Legislator.

This system is not pleasing. The reasons are: a) because, as we shall say below (n. 91), it supposes that law obliges antecedently to promulgation: which smells of probabiliorism, indeed even of tutiorism. b) Moreover, the rule handed down by those theologians seems very difficult, and in practice there will scarcely be place for it. For the inconvenience attached to the observance of the law will often be different for individual persons, indeed also for individual cases. Thus, for example, the gravity of the inconvenience in confessing a doubtful sin will be different both according to the different character of each penitent, and according to the nature of the sin to be accused, and often also according to the different character of the confessor before whom the accusation must be made. Hence that rule, on the one hand, furnishes occasion for many anxieties; but on the other hand, frequently exposes one to the illusions of self-love; and therefore it cannot be a prudent practical norm in resolving doubts. c) Finally, the foundation of this system is also preserved in our system of equiprobabilism, insofar as the number of laws which are prescribed to be observed in practice is most closely equated with the number of materially existing laws, and therefore the end of all laws in the universe is attained in the best way in which it can be attained.

Note. Cardinal D'Annibale (Summ., I, 270) judged that the rule for the solution of doubts was to be drawn solely from possession. If this system is well understood and accommodated to practice, it rather approaches the system of St. Alphonsus. For the Holy Doctor (cf. Gaude's Dissertation de mor. syst. S. Alph., n. 26) calls the principle of possession supreme, most universal.

87. Therefore, with the stricter rigorism and laxism excepted, the remaining systems can be sustained without the condemnation of the Church. Among these, equiprobabilism holds the middle way, of which St. Alphonsus is the distinguished defender (Vind. Alph., P. I, c. 3, Apologetic Dissertation, 143).

Historical question. That equiprobabilism is the genuine system of St. Alphonsus, which he definitively embraced at least from the year 1762, the Vindiciae Alphonsianae (I, p. 1-150), Gaude (de mor. syst. S. Alph.), Wouters (de Minusprobab., ed. 2, p. 49), and many others clearly prove.

1. Before the year 1762, in two dissertations which he inscribed FOR THE MODERATE USE OF PROBABLE OPINION IN THE CONCURRENCE OF A MORE PROBABLE ONE, and of which he published one in the year 1749 and the other in 1755, he supported simple probabilism. But truly, as is evident from his various writings, these dissertations, published without the name of the Holy Author, were nothing except certain trials, certain preludes, or preliminary contests concerning a most grave question. For before the year 1762 (let this be well noted), in all and each of the editions of his Moral Theology, indeed also in other works of lesser moment which he brought into the light under his own name, he constantly asserted that he was prescinding from that thesis: Whether it is lawful to follow the less probable, with the more probable left aside. Indeed, in various works of this time there appears so much the constant inquiry of the Holy Doctor into the safe way, that it is not difficult (so the Collationes Brugenses) to find support in them for various systems.

2. After the year 1762, once the brief Dissertation, in the Italian language, de usu moderato opin. probab., had been published, St. Alphonsus cast away his former hesitation, and constantly held those opinions which we shall set forth below. Much erudition and usefulness are brought, in relation to this question, by a comparison of the propositions of each edition of the Moral Work. Cf., on this matter, the preface of Father Gaude (I, p. xix), and especially the cited little work of the same author.

3. Although the system established by the Holy Doctor was received everywhere with great praise (cf. Berthe, Vita di S. Alfonso, II, p. 165), nevertheless the Saint himself never had an end of perfecting his work, so that he receded ever more from absolute probabilism, and found the middle way between probabilism and probabiliorism. Thence it came about that he made public his celebrated Monitum (1773) and the golden little work, Dichiarazione del sistema (1774). When these had been added to the eighth edition of the Moral Work, and the probabilistic dissertation of Father Zacharia, S.J. (cf. n. 6), had also been expunged, St. Alphonsus could exclaim: "Joyful now I shall die, because this last edition, the work complete in all respects, has come into the light" (cf. Gaude, de mor. syst., p. 38).

All these things, after the letters of the Holy Doctor were published and the excellent works of Father Gaude, lie open so clearly to theologians (even if, by reason of the controversy occasioned by Father Ballerini's dissertation on the moral system of St. Alphonsus, held in the Roman College in 1863, they remained doubtful for a while), that now "they think it must be acknowledged, nor can it be denied, that St. Alphonsus, at least from the year 1762, was an equiprobabilist and rejected common probabilism." "In vain," they say, "do the very writers of the Collationes Brugenses (1906, p. 400) assert that the older St. Alphonsus taught equiprobabilism... whence the genuine and definitive opinion of the Holy Doctor is not to be sought in writings from 1762 and earlier, as the new probabilists did and do. Thus Lehmkuhl is not free from this error in the little work Probabilismus vindicatus." To these sayings consent, besides the alumni of the Congregation of the Most Holy Redeemer, very many distinguished theologians, such as Bellesheim (Katholik, 1891, II, p. 245), who thus speaks: "The texts are thus clearer than the midday light, so weighty, that an opponent must be silent: St. Alphonsus truly taught equiprobabilism." The same testify Schneider (Liter. Rundschau, 1895, col. 202), Koch (Tubing. Quart. Schr., 1897, p. 70-126), Mausbach (Die kath. Moral, p. 181), Berardi (Theol. fund., 1905, I, n. 55), Tanquerey (I, n. 405), Sweens (Theol. mor., 688).

Finally let Genicot-Salsmans be heard, who in the last edition of Theol. mor. (1912) has these things: "In reality St. Alphonsus seems in his last works to have openly taught equiprobabilism, at least if we attribute to the words which he uses their native sense" (de Consc., n. 81-72). Cf. Wouters, de Minusprobab., p. 56.

Since these things are so, with the Collationes Brugenses we note that several probabilists do not always act critically when they at once recur to the probabilistic dissertations of the years 1749 and 1755. For in his letters the Holy Doctor clearly acknowledges that he made a retraction concerning common probabilism, which he previously professed, and this indeed, as he says, not for the sake of avoiding difficulty or persecution, but for the sake of conviction and conscience. Corresp. gen., n. 818 and Corresp. spec., n. 315.

Hence the defender of St. Alphonsus for the Concession of the title Doctor asserts without hesitation: "The Holy Author, from the year 1762, defended the system of EQUIPROBABILISM so openly, clearly, and constantly, that every reasonable doubt about this matter is excluded: which also the most ample Censor (that is, the Promoter of the Faith) concedes" (Act. Doct. animad., § 25, Resp. n. 239).

But this is not the place to dwell longer on the question of fact. It is better to approach the question of right, and to demonstrate that the rules handed down by St. Alphonsus concerning the manner of resolving practical doubt are true.

St. Thomas, Quodl. VIII, q. 6, a. 13; St. Alphonsus, I, n. 54; ed. G., I, p. 25; Monitum from ed. 7; little work Dichiaraz., etc.; Vind. Alph. (ed. 2); Gaude, de mor. system. S. Alph.; De Caigny, Apologetic Dissertation; Wouters, de Minusprobab. (ed. 2); Ter Haar, de syst. mor. antiq. Probab.; the history of Innocent XI's decree on Probabilism; Ballerini, op. mor., ed. 2; Arendt, Crisis; Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fund., ed. 3; Sweens, Theol. mor. fund.; Beaudouin, de Consc.; Lehmkuhl, Probab. vindicatus. Besides these, the authors of moral theology, treatise on Conscience.

So that the system may be better understood, three things will be explained:

1. The exposition of the system;
2. The demonstration of the system;
3. The excellent merit of the system.

Two things are essential to this system: the method and the principles which it employs (Vind. Alph., Apologetic Dissertation, n. 68).

88. A. The METHOD is expressed by the following rules:

1. Truth is to be sought with moral diligence, which is proportioned to the matter and to the gravity of the doubt (n. 40, rule 2).

2. Where truth cannot be found, a comparison of opinions must necessarily be instituted, and their value must be estimated not only absolutely, but also relatively (n. 67).

3. From the comparison and opposition of opinions one must see what sort of doubt arises, whether strict or broad. When opinions occur equally or almost equally probable, we are involved in strict doubt (n. 74). When one opinion is certainly more probable, or most probable, or uniquely probable, we are involved in broad doubt, with moral certitude broadly taken (n. 75, 77).

4. Once the nature of the doubt has been defined, the principles are immediately applied.

89. B. The PRINCIPLES on which St. Alphonsus's system rests are of a twofold kind, according to the twofold kind of doubt, strict or broad.

I. In STRICT doubt these two principles have force: A doubtful law does not oblige, and In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. From these principles flows this DOUBLE RULE: 1. In doubt concerning the existence (or extension) of a law or right, when there concur two opinions equally or almost equally probable, of which one stands for law, the other for liberty, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty; because in strict doubt concerning the existence of a law, liberty certainly possesses (n. 44, 55). 2. In doubt concerning the cessation of a law or right certainly previously existing, when there concur two equiprobable opinions or assertions of fact, the opinion or assertion which favors the law is to be held, because in strict doubt concerning the cessation of a law, the previously certain law possesses (ibid.).

II. In BROAD doubt the following principle comes in: In obscure things the more verisimilar is to be chosen. "Where truth cannot be clearly found," says St. Alphonsus (I, 54, 88), "we are bound to embrace at least that opinion which comes nearer to the truth." From this general principle flow two COROLLARIES: 1. A law that is only broadly doubtful, regularly speaking, obliges, because concerning it there is moral, and therefore sufficient, evidence. 2. Liberty or liberation that is only broadly doubtful, regularly speaking, truly de-obliges, because concerning it there is moral, and therefore sufficient, evidence.

52. • An opinion is called probable which rests upon a grave foundation, whether intrinsic, of reason, or extrinsic, of authority, so that it is able to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man, although with fear of error.

Probability, therefore, 1° adds something to opinion, namely a solid motive, but does not take away fear, and that a prudent fear, lest the contradictory be true. - 2° Between a probable and a certain opinion this distinction intervenes, that the latter excludes every prudent fear of falsity, so that the opposite sentence is reputed altogether improbable.²

Various species of probability. Probability is distinguished in various ways:

1° By reason of the object, one probability is speculative or of fact, which is concerned with the truth of an opinion, for example, whether to paint on a feast day is a servile or liberal work; whether a contract entered upon with such a condition is usurious or not; whether a sacrament conferred with such matter is valid or null. - Another is practical or of law, which is concerned with the licit use of a probable opinion, or with the formal honesty of an action, for example, whether it is licit to paint on a feast day; whether to enter into a contract with such a condition; whether to confer a sacrament with such matter. Cf. n. 48, 3.

Therefore, as we have already said above, the true must be carefully distinguished from the licit; for a speculative doubt, although mediately and consequently it regards the licit, as is clear from the examples brought forward, nevertheless immediately and principally regards the true; but a practical doubt entirely regards the licit.¹

2° By reason of the foundation: a) one probability is intrinsic, which rests upon a grave reason sought from the very nature of the thing; another is extrinsic, which rests upon the authority of grave Doctors; b) an opinion is certainly probable when it rests upon a certainly grave motive; doubtfully probable, when upon a doubtfully grave one; slightly probable, when upon a slight one, namely one of such a kind that it is not able to draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.²

Slight probability is not true probability, as is clear from the definition itself; just as slight fortitude or slight skill cannot be called true fortitude and true skill, but rather must be called weakness and lack of skill. Therefore it is nearly equivalent to possibility, which is not to be esteemed, because little is reputed as nothing, and consequently the slightly probable is equated with the improbable.³

3° By reason of degree, it is distinguished as solitary, sole, or not impeded, to which no probable opinion or reason is opposed; and comparative, to which an equally, less, or more probable opinion is opposed, according as this latter rests upon reasons equally, less, or more solid than the opposite.

Moreover, a more probable opinion is one thing when it is a little more probable, and this is called by St. Alphonsus that which rests upon a foundation a little graver than the contradictory, but at the same time with a prudent fear of the opposite, so that the contradictory also is judged probable. Therefore two opinions of this kind are almost equally probable; but little is reputed as nothing, since a small excess is fallacious. Another is evidently and notably more probable, whose foundations are certainly graver; or most probable, whose foundations are most grave, so that the sentence opposed to these is judged doubtfully or slightly probable. The notably more probable and the most probable are practically equated, because they differ little from each other.¹

Note. - The word most probable can be used in a threefold sense; for it signifies either 1° the most probable of all opinions in general; or 2° the most probable of the opinions which in a particular question are subjected to examination; or 3° the most probable in itself and absolutely taken (very probable). In this third sense it is regularly employed by St. Alphonsus; but the Holy Doctor very rarely uses this ambiguous word in weighing sentences.

53. Comparison of the probability of opposed opinions, according to the mind of St. Alphonsus. - After we have reviewed the various grades of probability, it will not be beside the matter to append a schema by which the reader will perceive at one glance how, according to St. Alphonsus, diverse opinions are opposed to one another. They are opposed thus:

1° To a true sentence, - morally certain: -

An improbable opinion (altogether).

2° To an opinion more true, - most probable, most grave, - more probable (notably, certainly, truly, absolutely): -

Not solidly probable (slightly, doubtfully).

3° To an opinion more probable (a little, doubtfully), - very probable, - probable (truly, certainly, gravely, solidly, absolutely): -

Probable (equally, almost equally, sufficiently).²

54. • It must be noted in this place that probability and the safety of opinions differ greatly. Probability is sought from the appearance of truth; safety, however, from the removal of the danger of sinning; but according as it removes that danger either altogether or more or less, the opinion is called safe, safer, or less safe. Moreover, the danger of material sin and the danger of formal sin can be considered here; and by this reason an opinion less safe with respect to the danger of material sin (as is generally considered in this question) can be altogether safe with respect to the danger of formal sin, which alone is imputed unto fault, as we shall prove below. Finally, although the opinion which stands for the law is safer, but that which stands for liberty less safe, it is clear that the more probable opinion is not always the safer; since the greater probability can be in favor of liberty.

55. • Reason alone constitutes the probability of opinions. Nevertheless, the authority of Doctors is of such great strength that it is sometimes equated with intrinsic probability, insofar as the Doctors are presumed to have diligently weighed the opinion which they hold and to have taught it on account of good reasons. Hence extrinsic probability is to be esteemed more from the merit and erudition of the Doctors, and also from their study and diligence in investigating the truth of the matter, than from their number.¹

Wherefore, for judging the probability of opinions, the following rules should be attended to.

56. • Who can judge concerning the probability of opinions.

1° Concerning intrinsic probability, only learned men and those versed in moral matters can judge; for many times to men indeed talented, but little instructed in moral science, that will seem evident which experts judge false.²

2° Concerning extrinsic probability, a moderately learned man can judge, if, rightly understanding the state of the question, he finds the asserted opinion as probable from Doctors greater than every exception, that is, entirely approved among theologians.

3° The unlearned, who are not able of themselves to consult Doctors, can stand by the testimony of preachers and confessors whom they judge upright, prudent, and learned.³

57. • When an opinion is to be held as probable.

1° Unless a certain and convincing reason militates against some opinion, certainly probable is to be held both that which, the Church tolerating it, is commonly asserted as probable by theologians generally or by most theologians; and that which five Doctors strong in authority simply teach, or which some Doctor of the Church holds; and then finally that which some great theologian testifies to be probable. Now he is esteemed a great theologian who possesses the greatest authority among theologians on account of his distinguished doctrine, prudence, and probity. Such are: Suarez, Soto, Azor, Cano, Sylvius, Cajetan, Bannez, Navarrus, Paludanus, Toletus, Sylvester, Lessius, Sanchez, Angelus, Vasquez, Armilla, Valentia, Laymann, Molina, de Lugo, Castropalaus, Bonacina, Emmanuel Sa, Pontius, Cabassutius, Collet, Roncaglia, the Salmanticenses, Petrocorensis, Abelly, Cardenas, Coninck, Gamachaeus, Isambert, and others, whose learning, how great it is, is known everywhere; besides St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, St. Antoninus, or Scotus, whose authority indeed must be preferred to others.¹ To these, mentioned in the last place, St. Alphonsus must be added, whose authority alone is so great that an opinion which he holds as probable must be held as extrinsically such.

2° The authority of a few Doctors who discuss some question expressly is to be preferred to the sayings of many others who write about it in passing. Indeed, sometimes, although rarely, the authority of one Doctor will be able to constitute an opinion probable, and even more probable, against the common opinion of others, if that author is very learned, upright, prudent, free from party zeal, and not a lover of novelties, and if he brings forward a valid reason which the others have not considered or have not sufficiently solved, while he himself conveniently solves the opposed reasons.

3° "Of Casuists who wrote after the condemned propositions, greater account is to be had than of the more ancient, in those things which regard the very opinions branded, or which are akin to them."²

4° Concerning particular cases not discussed by theologians, for a learned and God-fearing man that opinion is sufficiently probable which he knows that he himself has diligently examined, both by carefully weighing the reasons and by consulting the learned, and which he judges, without inordinate affection, to be such; for probability is not to be restricted to public doubts.

For the rules for discerning the judgment of St. Alphonsus concerning the value of sentences, see p. LXXXVIII sq.

58. • The controversy of theologians concerning the licit use of a probable opinion can be moved only when the question is about the honesty of the action alone, but by no means where there intervenes the danger of some evil that will follow, distinct from the honesty of the action. For all theologians, at least the more recent, agree that it is illicit to follow a probable opinion whenever from its use some evil is feared to be going to follow, which cannot be averted by the dictate of conscience and which we are bound to avoid.

For the understanding of this saying, it must be observed that the evil which is feared to be going to follow from some action can be either one only or manifold, namely either the lesion of honesty alone, or sin, or besides this some other temporal or spiritual evil distinct from the former. Thus, for example, homicide comprises both moral evil, or sin, and physical evil, or grave harm of the neighbor through privation of life.

Therefore, before we expound the systems of theologians concerning the choice of opinions which we can licitly follow, we must set aside the matter which is not their object.

59. Proposition. - Where there is present danger of an evil which does not depend upon conscience and which we are bound to avoid, the safer part must always be followed in doubt.

It is proved. When a man is bound to avoid some evil, he is also bound to avoid its danger; for in morals this is equivalent. But in speculative doubt concerning the honesty of the action alone, the danger of sin can indeed be removed; while in a doubt of this kind concerning an evil distinct from the morality of the action, the danger of this evil cannot be removed. Therefore in the former case, the danger having been removed, it is lawful to act with speculative doubt, but not in the latter.

The minor is proved. For in the former case conscience is the proximate and formal principle of the honesty of the act; but in doubt the reflex principles of Probabilism form the ultimate certain dictate of conscience concerning the honesty of the action, as we shall prove below: therefore the danger of formal sin is then altogether taken away. But the contrary obtains in the latter case. For an evil of this kind depends in no way upon the dictate of conscience, but upon what is true on the part of the thing. Therefore it can equally happen, whatever the conscience of the agent may be. Therefore unless we follow the certain or safer way, we do not avoid the danger.

It has been said: which we are bound to avoid; for sometimes there is a just cause for permitting an evil, and therefore its danger, either because between two evils the lesser must be chosen, or because the safer way is judged morally impossible. Therefore in a case of this kind it will be lawful to leave the safer way and to choose the less safe.

60. Corollaries. - From the proposition proved it follows that the use of an opinion, however probable, is prohibited by the precept both of religion and of charity and justice; but that the safer, or morally certain, sentence is to be followed where the question is about the validity of a sacrament, about danger to one's own soul, or about the spiritual or temporal harm of the neighbor.

And so the use of a probable opinion will be illicit:

I. In the administration and (practically) reception of the Sacraments, with regard to essentials; for the virtue of religion prohibits that they be exposed to the danger of frustration. - But that danger is not to be feared if either 1° the necessity of administering the Sacrament urges, provided that then it is conferred under condition; or 2° the Church can and is reasonably presumed to supply, in which case it must be conferred absolutely: this indeed can be presumed in two Sacraments, namely a) in the Sacrament of Penance, if from a just cause it is conferred with jurisdiction probable in law; b) in the Sacrament of Matrimony, if there is present an ecclesiastical impediment doubtful by a doubt of law.¹ See proposition 1 among those condemned by Innocent XI, p. XV.

Note. - With regard to the matter of each Sacrament, the same degree of certainty is not required. LL. VI. 57, 461.

II. In danger of one's own harm (at least spiritual) or of the neighbor:

1° In things necessary for salvation by necessity of means; therefore, for example, in the matter of faith the safer religion must be followed. For in things absolutely necessary for salvation, the dictate of conscience does not take away the danger of damnation; therefore in these the axiom must be followed: "No security is excessive where eternity is endangered." Add that here the truth will most certainly offer itself to the one inquiring. For this reason proposition 4 was condemned by Innocent XI: "An infidel, not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from infidelity."

Similarly, it is wrong to follow several opinions which are indeed speculatively probable, but which, translated into practice, taking account of the common or special fragility of the operator, are certainly joined with probable danger of lapse into sin, as we shall say more broadly later.

Likewise, on account of scandal of the neighbor, a law must sometimes be observed which probably does not exist.¹

2° Physicians, surgeons, etc., from a pact even tacit, are bound to the safer means. Nevertheless, when the health of the sick person is despaired of, it is lawful to apply a dangerous means probably going to be useful, but also probably going to be harmful; because in that desperation of affairs some hope of life is to be preferred to the danger of hastening death. But it is not lawful, for the sake of experiment only, to apply remedies altogether uncertain and unexplored to the sick, even the desperate, with danger of gravely harming; for this is, as someone says, to seek medicines through deaths.²

The same holds in other similar cases. Therefore, for example, offensive war is illicit in doubt of law; the discharge of a gun is illicit in doubt of fact whether that at which one aims is a beast or a man, etc.³

3° A judge, from a pact with the republic, in a civil cause where neither party possesses in good faith, is bound to follow the more probable opinion, by rendering judgment in favor of that party for whom the more probable opinion stands. The reason is that justice obliges the judge to render to each one his own right according to the merits of the cause and the weight of the reasons which favor each one. Hence proposition 2 was condemned by Innocent XI: "I probably judge that a judge can judge according to the less probable opinion."

But if the cause of each litigating party is equally probable, the judge is bound to reconcile the parties through a settlement (what a settlement is, see n. 1051), by dividing the controverted thing, if it is divisible, or, if it is not divisible, its price between the parties. The reason is that in judgments there must be no respect of persons, which would be had if in such a case he favored one rather than the other. Hence the opposed doctrine was condemned by Alexander VII, proposition 26, p. XIV.

I have said: 1° where neither party possesses in good faith; because possession makes the reasons preponderate for the possessor, so that his condition becomes the better; 2° in a civil cause; because in criminal causes, where the question is about inflicting punishment, especially capital punishment, between opposed probable sentences the opinion favoring the accused must always be followed, even if it is less probable, according to the rule of Canon Law 11 in Sexto: "When the rights of the parties are obscure, the accused is to be favored rather than the accuser."

The same holds in other similar cases, whenever the neighbor is in certain possession of his right. For this reason, for example, hidden compensation is illicit unless the debt is certain.¹

61. • Since in practical doubt concerning the honesty of an action we cannot act honestly, and since that doubt very often cannot be directly overcome by reasons proper to individual cases, there must certainly be given from elsewhere some means of laying aside the doubt, so that, resting upon a certain conscience, we can act rightly. Now it is manifest that this means cannot consist except in some certain principle.² Therefore the state of the question here is:

In the concurrence of two opinions concerning the honesty of an action, of which one, the less safe, favors liberty, while the other, the safer, favors the law, what in this doubt is the certain universal rule to be followed for acting rightly?

This question is of such great moment that upon its solution depends the whole system of Moral Theology, whatever system may be chosen. For doubts of this kind occur many times in the individual matters of Moral Theology, since in it especially the application of laws to particular cases is treated, which is often uncertain.

But now, to solve this celebrated question, theologians have entered upon various ways. Some, namely, of excessive rigor in favor of the law; others, of excessive benignity in favor of liberty; and others finally have held the middle way between each extreme. Hence several systems have come forth, which we here briefly review:

62. Systems. - I. Rigorism or strict Tutiorism, according to which it is not lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty unless it is morally certain; otherwise the safer part must always be followed. This is a condemned system.

II. Mitigated Tutiorism, according to which it is not lawful to follow the less safe sentence unless it is most probable.

III. Probabiliorism (another mitigated Tutiorism), according to which it is prohibited to follow an opinion favoring liberty unless it is more probable than the opposite one for the law.

IV. Equi-probabilism, according to which, in the concurrence of two opinions equally or almost equally probable, while doubt stands concerning the existence of the law, it is lawful to follow the opinion favoring liberty; but in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed. This is the system of St. Alphonsus.

Since the followers also of simple Probabilism in our age are accustomed to distinguish their system by the title of Moderate Probabilism, and thus, by the celebrated name of Alphonsus, cover a doctrine altogether diverse from the doctrine of the Holy Doctor, for the sake of greater clarity we have preferred in this edition to call the Alphonsian system by the name Equi-probabilism; the more so because authors today commonly use that term, and the Saint himself (for example, H. A. Tr. I. 75) calls his system "my system of the equally probable opinion."

V. Simple Probabilism, according to which it is right to follow an opinion less probable and favoring liberty in the concurrence even of a notably more probable one for the law; and it is lawful promiscuously to follow a probable opinion that is less safe, even in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law.

The followers of simple Probabilism are divided into two classes; for some, although they favor liberty, nevertheless say that in doubt both concerning the cessation and concerning the existence of a law, the law must be followed when the opinion favoring liberty is certainly less probable. Thus Martinet and certain more recent authors. Others teach that it is lawful to follow an opinion less probable and favoring liberty, even if it is evident that the opposite one is more probable. Thus Lacroix and other Probabilist authors of the eighteenth century almost commonly, and also Gury in the later editions of his Compendium, and Ballerini.

VI. Laxism, according to which it is lawful to follow a sentence favoring liberty, even if it is only doubtfully or slightly probable. This system also is condemned.

Therefore, excepting I and VI, the remaining systems can be maintained without the Church's condemnation. Yet among them we judge that only Equi-probabilism, which claims St. Alphonsus for itself as its principal author and as a second quasi-parent (Vind. P. I, p. 74. - Ed. 2a, T. I, p. 509), holds the middle way and for this reason is true.

63. • For a clearer understanding of the matters to be treated in this article, it will help to premise certain notions. And indeed:

I. Concerning liberty and law.

1° A twofold liberty is distinguished: one physical, and it is the force of choosing one's actions, concerning which we treated in nn. 4, 8, and 9; the other moral, involving the right and power of licitly doing or omitting something. Hence physical liberty, or liberty of choice, is also called liberty from necessity; but moral liberty is called liberty from law. In this place, as is clear, the dispute is about moral liberty.

2° Law is the bond of liberty, obliging it to certain acts and prohibiting it from certain others.

64. • II. Concerning doubtful law.

Law can be doubtful in two ways: 1° Simply, that is, with respect to existence, namely when it is doubted whether it has been enacted; whether promulgated; whether the time of obligation has already begun; whether it comprehends such a case or such a burden; whether it extends itself to such persons; whether it commands something or only counsels it.

2° In a qualified sense, that is, with respect to cessation, when the existence of the law is certain, and a doubt only supervenes whether its obligation has ceased; whether someone has an excusing cause; whether he has been dispensed; whether he has fulfilled the law, and so forth.¹

65. • III. Concerning the possession of law and of liberty.

Since St. Alphonsus applies to liberty and to law the known principle of law: "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better," we must explain what that possession of liberty and of law means for itself.

This possession signifies here, the due proportion being observed, exactly the same thing as in the matter of justice; for by analogy it is extended from the matter of this virtue to the matter of the other virtues. For the understanding of this matter, the principle of presumption must be explained by us: "In doubt one must stand for that part for which presumption stands," as that from which the principle of possession draws its force. Presumption is defined by jurists: an anticipated proof of a doubtful thing, drawn from valid arguments and indications. It is called anticipated because presumption, before every legitimate proof (that is, a proof held by law as sufficient), takes something as true; namely, as long as the contrary is not proved, that which is presumed is held as true.

These indications are distinguished in various ways according to the diverse nature of things. One of them, which pertains to the present matter, it helps to unfold in this way: as often as something is known to exist which of its own nature perseveres until it is removed by some contrary fact, it is judged to persevere in its own condition as long as the contrary is not established, so that this judgment yields only to sufficient proof, the burden of which rests upon the other part which impugns it. But it does not yield to an arising doubt; indeed, neither does the doubt effect that even the presumed certainty itself be brought into doubt. Wherefore that which was known to exist, even while the doubt has arisen, is judged to continue and to remain entire. Thus, for example, boundary markers are presumed to be where they were before, unless they are proved to have been changed. Finally, the principle of presumption is plainly general and is accommodated to very many particular cases, the chief of which it helps to enumerate:

1° When suspicion is had concerning someone's crime, his antecedent probity, while the doubt stands, is judged to persevere as long as wickedness is not established; whence the adage: "Everyone is presumed good until he is proved evil."

2° If someone possesses an estate which another contends to be his by doubtful right, the possessor remains in possession until the competitor proves his right; because possession gives birth to a presumption of dominion; whence the axiom: "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better."

3° A law or precept concerning which it is doubted whether it is just is held as just until injustice is proved; whence the principle: "In doubt one must obey the Superior."

These things having been premised, it is permitted to hand down the following notion of possession. Just as in the matter of justice possession is called - a pre-existing exercise of dominion in a certain thing on the part of someone, with respect to another contending concerning dominion, from which possession the thing is presumed to be the possessor's until the contrary is demonstrated - so in like manner, in the matter of honesty, possession of liberty is nothing other than its antecedent certain right with respect to a doubtful law; but possession of law is its antecedent certain obligation with respect to doubtful liberation. This priority effects that, when a doubt supervenes, that which was certain first has for itself a presumption of law, and therefore transfers the burden of proving to the other part. Therefore possession in this matter is taken analogically for any certain right preceding a doubt; whence it follows that the force and sense of the principle of possession can be rendered in this way: "A preceding certain right is not taken away by a supervening doubt, but perseveres until the cessation of the same is proved."

From the given notion we conclude in the following way: just as in the matter of justice, where two dispute about the property of some thing, he who, when the doubt has arisen, possesses the thing is presumed to be its owner, and therefore preserves the right in the thing until the contrary is proved; so in the matter of honesty, as often as there is a doubt between man's liberty and the obligation of law, that which was certain first is said to remain in possession until the contrary is proved.¹

66. • IV. Concerning reflex principles.

Some are for doubts of law, others for doubts of fact. The chief ones are those which follow.

For doubts of law. 1° In doubt the condition of the possessor is better. Moreover, that which was first certain possesses and is presumed. Hence, where liberty was first certain, but an obligation arises as doubtful, there liberty possesses; where, on the contrary, obligation was first certain, but liberation is doubtful, there the law possesses, according to the things just said. To this pertains that other principle of law: "In doubt one must stand for that part for which presumption stands"; for presumption begets moral certainty, at least broad or imperfect certainty. Cf. n. 47.

2° A doubtful law does not oblige. This is understood of a law simply doubtful, that is, with respect to existence, not however doubtful with respect to the cessation of a law certainly existing; for then the law continues to oblige, because, just as certain liberty is not taken away by a supervening doubt, so neither is a certain law. Therefore in this case the principle must be converted, and one must say: "Doubtful liberty does not liberate."¹

Hence, for example, in doubt whether sins doubtfully mortal, or mortal sins doubtfully committed, must be confessed; whether notably aggravating circumstances must be explained, there is no obligation. On the contrary, he who, certain that a mortal sin was committed, doubts whether he has already confessed it, must confess it. In like manner, one who doubts whether he has a sufficient excuse from the observance of the fast, when he cannot conveniently approach the Superior for a dispensation, is bound to observe the law, unless he prudently judges that in the case an excusing cause is probably present, while no probability stands to the contrary; for then there is imperfect moral certainty.²

As to the principle: "In doubt the safer part is to be chosen," applied to a speculative doubt concerning only the honesty of the action, it is proper to the rigorists and altogether false, as will be proved clearly below. It is true in this case alone, when practical doubt is not laid aside or cannot be laid aside, as we showed above in Article III.

67. • For doubts of fact. 1° In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. That principle proceeds when doubt concerns the principal fact, for example whether you emitted a vow, whether you confessed, etc.

Hence a doubt of law resulting from a doubt of fact must be resolved according to the diversity of the fact to be proved, according to the following rules.

a) In doubt of a fact founding the law, that is, upon which being posited the law or obligation is born, liberty possesses. Hence, for example, in doubt whether the time is present at which the law begins to oblige, you are not held by the law; whether someone is fasting, he can receive Communion; whether or not he sinned mortally, he can receive Communion without having confessed (practically [n. 60, I] contrite). Likewise, in doubt whether counsel given was directed to harm, or, if indeed this is established, whether it is doubted whether harm followed from it, no restitution is to be made after the due inquiry, of course.¹

b) In doubt of a fact supposing the law, that is, upon which being posited the law ceases or has been fulfilled, the law possesses. Hence, for example, in doubt whether the time during which the law obliges has elapsed, you are held by the law.² Likewise, if you doubt whether you have fulfilled the law, for instance whether you have recited the Hours or fulfilled penance, you are obliged, unless from a prudent reason, to which another is not opposed, you can probably judge that you have fulfilled it; for then there arises probable certainty, which, where a legal debt is concerned, suffices so that you are excused. In this way those things must be understood which St. Alphonsus says in L. I, 29-99 at the end, L. IV, 112, q. 3, Second sentence.² It is confirmed from Question I recently reformed, from which it is clear that the reformed doctrine must be restricted to the case in which probability is present for and against. As to L. I, n. 99 at the end, the passage according to the mind of St. Alphonsus seems to have to be reformed according to the cited Question I recently reformed, inasmuch as it was not corrected by the Holy Doctor through forgetfulness.

Likewise, when the debt is certain, but the fact of payment is doubtful, the debtor is bound to pay, or a composition must be made between the parties according to the proportion of the doubt.³

c) In doubt of a fact inducing a conflict of laws or rights, the stronger law prevails. By this reason, for example, a sexagenarian is excused from fasting, because the natural right of preserving life preponderates over an ecclesiastical precept. Likewise, he who prudently doubts whether the hearing of Mass in church on a feast day, or the recitation of the Office, or fasting, is not perhaps going to harm his health gravely, if he cannot conveniently seek counsel or a dispensation, is excused.⁴

2° In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act, or: In doubt every fact is presumed to have been rightly done. This principle holds when the principal fact is established and only some accessory fact is doubted, for instance concerning some circumstance or necessary condition, or concerning the due manner, whether it was present. Then, namely, this kind of accessory fact, due by law or customarily done, is presumed to have been present; its defect, on the contrary, must be demonstrated. This is customarily enunciated by the following axioms: In doubt the fact is presumed which had to be done by law, or which ordinarily is customarily done; and this other one: Delict or defect is not presumed, but must be demonstrated.¹

It is useful to clarify these axioms by some examples, so that it may appear to which cases they can be accommodated, and to which they cannot.

If, for example, someone truly vowed, but doubts whether in vowing he knew or adverted to the obligation of the vow, or whether full deliberation was not lacking, whether he did not vow compelled by fear, whether that fear was grave - one must stand for the validity of the act. But it is otherwise if doubt concerns the very emission of the vow, or whether that which someone vowed is matter capable of a vow, or whether it was not a simple proposal. Likewise in doubt whether a sacramental confession was valid: if it is doubted whether some one of the conditions required for validity was lacking, one must stand for the validity of the act, because then the fact is presumed which by law had to be done. On the contrary, if it is certain that something was lacking, even if required only probably for the validity of the sacrament, for instance knowledge of the mysteries of the Most Holy Trinity and of the Redemption, or an explicit purpose, one must not stand for the validity of the act, but the confession must be repeated. For then it is certain that the fact was not done which by law had to be done; namely, the sacrament had to be received with all things required for validity, even only probably required. Hence from the reflex principles themselves it is clear that St. Alphonsus by no means fights with himself in Theol. Mor. L. III, 2 at the end, L. VI, 450 compared with n. 505.²

3° From things commonly occurring a prudent presumption is made. Hence in doubt whether boys, who before the seventh year certainly arrived at the use of reason, are held by merely ecclesiastical laws, they are not held; because the Church is presumed not to oblige except according to things commonly occurring. But after the seventh year, in doubt whether reason has been attained, they are held; because then from things commonly occurring the obligation is presumed. - In doubt concerning voluntary adherence in venereal delight, if a pious and timorous person who is not accustomed to consent doubts, he must be presumed not to have consented, at least not fully; but if he doubts who is accustomed easily to fall into mortal sins, he is presumed to have consented. - In doubt concerning the validity of the confessions of recidivists, if the recidivist after his confessions has for the most part relapsed quickly and without any resistance, he must be presumed to have had no sorrow or a too slight sorrow and purpose. But it must be said otherwise if he persevered for some time, or before the fall offered at least some resistance.¹

68. • In the concurrence of two opinions equally or almost equally probable, of which one favors liberty and the other the law, while the doubt stands concerning the existence of the law, it is permitted to follow the opinion favoring liberty; but in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed.²

Conditions to be observed. The use of a probable opinion favoring liberty must be moderated by the following conditions.

1° At least ordinary diligence must be employed so that the truth may be discovered; for this investigation is necessary so that ignorance may be invincible and possession of liberty may be preserved in good faith.

2° The opinion must be truly probable, that is, founded in a reason grave in itself and comparatively, even if it is a little less probable than its opposite. Wherefore an opinion is not solidly probable whenever the opposite is notably or certainly more probable. For a certain excess of probability takes away the suspension of the intellect, and consequently begets probable certainty, as we shall prove below. But in moral matters, since they must be estimated morally, strict certainty and evidence cannot be demanded, but probable certainty (that is, broad or imperfect) must suffice, as St. Thomas teaches. Therefore notable greater probability elides the comparative probability of the opposite sentence, so that this is only slightly or doubtfully probable; consequently an opinion much more probable is now not strictly doubtful, but morally or almost morally certain.³

Therefore the System of St. Alphonsus must always be kept before the eyes as proceeding only in a case of true doubt, or in the conflict of equal or almost equal probability; for an equilibrium of this kind produces a true suspension of the intellect between both parts, and therefore a true doubt, to be resolved only through reflex principles, according to the doctrine of St. Thomas:¹ "Our intellect . . . sometimes is not inclined more to one thing than to another, either because of a defect of things moving it, as in those problems concerning which we do not have reasons, or because of the apparent equality of those things which move it to each part: and this is the disposition of one doubting, who fluctuates between the two parts of a contradiction." But the System does not proceed when either one opinion is notably more probable than the other, or there is a single probable opinion. For in that case there is not strict doubt, but a sufficient motive, in moral matters determining the intellect to give assent to such an opinion and to follow it as sufficiently certain.

Then, when one opinion is certainly and without any hesitation more probable, it can only be notably more probable.² Therefore no one is bound to embrace an opinion as long as he does not in the least doubt concerning its greater probability.

3° Liberty must be in possession against the law, that is, according to what was said above in n. 65, the certain right of liberty must precede the doubtful law.

69. • It helps in this place to clarify two locutions of St. Alphonsus.

1° The Holy Doctor sometimes says that a law, in order to oblige, must be certain and manifest;³ but sometimes he says that it obliges, although it is not altogether certain, provided it is notably more probable.⁴ Yet in no way does he contradict himself. For a twofold moral certainty, of which the Holy Doctor speaks here, must be distinguished, namely one strictly so called, or perfect, which is evidently deduced from certain principles of morals; and one broadly so called, or imperfect, whose arguments, even if they do not beget evidence, nevertheless so convince that the opposite remains only doubtfully or slightly probable. The former is not required in moral matters, but the latter suffices. Hence the sense of his words is that the law, in order to oblige, must indeed be certain and manifest, but that broad certainty suffices, without need of strict certainty. In the same way we say that an opinion notably more probable is morally certain.

2° Sometimes he distinguishes doubt from probability, and says that in doubt concerning the cessation of the law the law must be observed, but otherwise if probability is present. This ambiguity vanishes if it is attended to that the Holy Doctor understands in the former case strict doubt, namely when there are two opinions almost equally probable according to the doctrine of St. Thomas already related in n. 68; but in the latter case an opinion which alone is probable, or whose opposite rests on no reason.

That the system expounded is the genuine system of St. Alphonsus is luminously proved by Vind. p. 1-125. 2nd ed., T. I, p. 453 sq.

For the sake of clarity and order, we divide the subject matter into three parts, demonstrating the System 1° by parts, by intrinsic and extrinsic arguments; 2° as a whole at once, from the approbation of the Church; 3° by refuting the opposite systems.

70. • The Equi-probabilism of St. Alphonsus, as is clear from its explanation, is opposed on one side to Probabiliorism, insofar as it teaches that, in the concurrence of opinions equally or almost equally probable, it is lawful to follow the less safe one, as often as the doubt is turned, as most often happens, to the existence of the law. On the other side, however, and indeed by the twin part of itself, it excludes simple and common Probabilism, insofar as it teaches that it is illicit to follow the less safe opinion in the concurrence of the safer, when 1° the latter is notably more probable, or 2° the doubt concerns the cessation of a certain law. We complete the whole matter in three propositions.

71. • It is not permitted to follow the less probable opinion for liberty in concurrence with a notably more probable one for the law.

Proof I. From reason. - For in the case posited, on one side the opinion for liberty does not appear truly probable; and on the other side the law is not truly doubtful. Hence it follows that the reflex principles of Probabilism cannot be applied here, since they proceed only in doubt; for they are: "A doubtful law does not oblige. - In doubt the condition of the possessor is better."

I say: 1° The opinion for liberty does not appear truly probable. - That opinion is truly and readily, that is, notwithstanding the opposite, probable, whose motives are such that they suffice to obtain the assent of a prudent man. But the motives of the less probable sentence in concurrence with one much more probable do not suffice to obtain the assent of a prudent man, but only to introduce some fear of the opposite. Therefore a sentence of this kind is not truly and readily probable.

Proof of the minor. For 1° the force and efficacy of those motives is weakened and elided by much stronger motives, since, as St. Alphonsus says,¹ the certainly or notably more probable sentence has for itself a certain foundation that it is true, which foundation the opposite lacks.

2° No prudent person can assent to an opinion which he judges to be much more probably false than true. For assent is an act of the mind by which we judge something true or likely to be true; but the more one opinion is much more likely to be true, the more we necessarily judge this one much more probably true, but the opposite not only not probably true, but on the contrary much more probably false. Therefore we cannot prudently assent to the latter.

Therefore, although a less probable opinion considered apart can appear probable, nevertheless, compared with the opposite much more probable opinion, it certainly ceases to be probable. Wherefore St. Alphonsus writes suitably:² "A truly probable opinion is only that which has intrinsic and extrinsic foundations equally or almost equally valid as the opposite for the law, so that the law appears certainly and strictly doubtful."

I say: 2° The law is not truly doubtful. - For doubt is a suspension of assent between opposites. But in the case of the proposition assent for the law cannot be suspended. Therefore the law is not truly doubtful.

Proof of the minor. Then alone does the intellect fluctuate between two opposed parts, when motives for each part are either absent or appear equal. This is the doctrine of St. Thomas, which we related in n. 68. But in the case the motives are by no means equal, but appear much stronger for the law than for liberty. Therefore the intellect cannot deny assent to the law, though with some fear of the opposite part.¹

72. • Proof II. From the authority of St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor altogether favors the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, since on one side he teaches that doubt then occurs when reasons move equally or almost equally to each part, as we noted in n. 68, 2°; whence it follows spontaneously that, if reasons move much more strongly to one part, we are outside the state of doubting; and on the other side he affirms that in human acts strict certainty is not demanded, but probable certainty suffices, as we showed in n. 68 under 2. These two things agree perfectly with the thesis of St. Alphonsus.

73. • From the things said above we conclude: if, notwithstanding these things, the will should choose the part favoring liberty, it will choose from affection alone toward that part, not from the dictate of reason; therefore it will choose rashly and imprudently, because an election which is not led by reason cannot be free from imprudence and temerity.²

Deservedly, therefore, the Holy Doctor affirms: "This sentence" (that someone can licitly follow an opinion even less probable for liberty, although the opinion for the law is certainly more probable) "the authors of the past century almost commonly held; but we say that it is lax and cannot licitly be embraced."³

74. • When opinions almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the existence of the law, it is permitted to follow the opinion favoring liberty.

I. It is proved from reason.

The obligation of pursuing the safer part, if any were present, would come either from the part of liberty destitute of its right, or from the part of the law endowed with the force of obliging. But from neither of the aforesaid parts can the obligation arise. Therefore no obligation of pursuing the safer part is given.

Proof of the minor by parts. I. Not from the part of liberty as though destitute of its right.

This is drawn from the principle of possession: "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better," which in other words signifies: A certain right cannot be taken away by a supervening uncertain opposed right. Hence I reason thus: in doubt the possessor conquers; but liberty is in possession against every doubtful law (understand: doubtful as to existence); therefore in doubt concerning the existence of the law, liberty conquers. - The same reasoning can be proposed thus: in doubt no one is to be deprived of his own thing or his own right, which he legitimately possesses; but liberty is a legitimately possessed right; therefore on account of a doubtful law a man is not deprived of his liberty.

Proof of the major assumption. In doubt the possessor conquers. - Natural reason proclaims the truth of this axiom. For whoever certainly and in good faith possesses some thing cannot be deprived of that thing except on account of certain reasons which prove that there is no longer a right of possessing for him, since everyone who possesses is presumed to possess by right until the contrary is shown, just as no one is presumed evil unless he is proved so. Therefore until this has been proved by certain reasons, the presumption arising from possession gives a certain right to the possessor according to the principle of law: "In doubt one must stand for that part for which presumption stands." Besides, that principle has always been admitted by all in the matter of justice before all tribunals, both civil and ecclesiastical.

Proof of the minor assumption. Liberty is in possession against every doubtfully existing law. The minor assumption will stand if we have proved the following two things: 1° that the principle of possession also holds in the matter of simple honesty; 2° that man possesses liberty against a doubtful law.

As to the 1st. Both the principle of presumption, "In doubt one must stand for that part for which presumption stands," and that one, "Against a preceding certain right a doubt which has arisen cannot prevail," are plainly universal principles and of natural right. But the principle of possession taken analogically is exactly the same, as we explained above in n. 65. Therefore the principle of possession holds in any matter of simple honesty.

Besides, St. Alphonsus suitably notes: "Possession," says Sanchez,¹ "is a universal title for all the virtues, in that way in which another potential part of justice, such as obedience to God, transcends all virtues. For since the essence of justice is to render to each one his own right, this belongs to every virtue; insofar as religion renders his right to God, charity to the neighbor, temperance to oneself, and so of the others; and therefore it is deservedly said that the notion of justice is a potential, or generic, part of all the virtues, in which the other virtues agree among themselves. Wherefore, if it were against justice to deprive a possessor in doubt of his own right, it is likewise against justice in doubt of law to despoil man of his possessed liberty."¹

Notes to preceding text - note sequence 1.

1 Dec. L. I, c. 10, n. 11.

Add that the force of this principle in the matter of simple honesty is commonly admitted by Probabilists, chief among whom besides St. Alphonsus are Suarez,² Lugo,³ Sanchez,⁴ Croix, Salmanticenses,⁶ Roncaglia,⁷ Bonacina,⁸ Sporer,⁹ etc.

It will help to have noted in this place that the principle of possession admits a stricter application in the matter of justice than in the matter of the other virtues, because justice is more rigid than the other virtues. For unlike the other virtues, the mean of justice is the mean of the thing, that is, of equality of thing to thing; and the right which justice regards is a strict or rigorous right. Hence it happens that disputes concerning justice demand stricter proofs.¹⁰

As to the 2nd. God from his good pleasure created man free and afterwards imposed precepts upon him by which his liberty is restricted, according to that of Eccli.¹¹ "God from the beginning established man and left him in the hand of his own counsel. He added his commandments and precepts."

Notes to preceding text - note sequence 2.

1 Dissert. a. 1763, n. 19. 2 In 1. 2. D. Thom. tr. 3, de bonit. et malit. act. human. Disput. 12, Sect. 5, n. 7, 8. - De Relig. tr. 6, l. 4, c. 5, n. 7 et seqq. - De Censur. Disp. 40, Sect. 5, n. 14, 15. 3 De Justit. Disp. 17, n. 87. Disp. 23, n. 110. | 4 Decal. L. I, c. 10, n. 10, 11. | 5 Lib. I, n. 502. | 6 Tr. 20, c. 6, n. 7. | 7 Tr. 1, q. 1, c. 3, q. 3. 8 De Peccat. q. 4, p. 7, n. 13. | 9 Tr. 1, n. 75. | 10 Cf. S. Alph. L. I, 36. L. VI, 905. | 11 15, v. 14, 15.

From this, in doubt concerning the existence of some law, the following argumentation can be used. The certain divine will must be preferred to the uncertain; but that God endowed man with liberty and does not will that he be deprived of his liberty insofar as some precept does not require its restriction (for that is called licit, from St. Thomas, which is prohibited by no law), is a certain divine disposition. But whether God wills that in the case of a doubtful law man renounce his own liberty is uncertain. Therefore with a safe conscience he persists in possession of the liberty with which God endowed him, until his contrary will becomes known to him.¹

Conclusion. - From the things proved there follows: 1° Since liberty is certain and prior to the law, man is presumed free in every case where the law is not established. Hence this rule flows spontaneously: "What is not certainly prohibited is licit."

2° The rule of the Anti-Probabilists is false: "Nothing is licit unless it is morally established that it was permitted by God." For if this were true, God should not have had to promulgate a law, but those things which he permits us to do.²

75. • II. No obligation is given from the part of the law, as though endowed with the force of obliging. - In order that the assertion may appear, the principle must be established: "A doubtful law does not oblige."

But it must be warned beforehand that the enunciated principle, taken in a too general sense, is false. For from the things proved and still to be proved in Proposition III, it is established that it must be understood of a law simply doubtful, that is, doubtfully existing. In the same way St. Alphonsus understands the principle; for he always uses it to prove that a doubtful law, as insufficiently promulgated, and therefore doubtfully existing, does not oblige.

That principle is proved: 1° From defect of promulgation and invincible ignorance. The promulgation of law in subjects is required essentially, so that the law may have the force of obliging. But where the law is doubtful, true promulgation of it is lacking. Therefore a doubtful law does not oblige.

Proof of the major. Law cannot be a rule of acting for a free being unless it becomes known to him; but it is brought to his notice through promulgation; therefore promulgation is of the essence of law.³

Proof of the minor. A law invincibly unknown to subjects is not sufficiently promulgated; but doubt of law, invincible by human study, is invincible ignorance; therefore a doubtful law is a non-promulgated law.

Proof of the minor assumption. We are said invincibly to be ignorant of those things concerning which we do not have sufficient foundation for affirming rather than denying. But such a sufficient foundation is equally lacking where the reasons for law and liberty are almost equal on each side, and where there are none, since in either case the intellect remains equally suspended. Therefore.

Note. - 1° In the argument brought forward, the Holy Doctor does not expressly distinguish the promulgation of the law made to the community from the knowledge of it in the subject. He considers the matter practically; for practically a law not becoming sufficiently known to the subject returns to the same point as a law not sufficiently promulgated.

2° You would wrongly turn back upon him the argument which he seeks from invincible ignorance, by inferring from it that even a certainly more probable law, as not certainly known, is invincibly unknown. For he holds that this law, as sufficiently known, that is, from the rules of prudence, which is a virtue of the practical intellect,¹ obliges.

2° From the principle of causality. A doubtful law obliges either certainly, or doubtfully, or in no way. But the first is impossible, because an effect cannot be greater than its cause. The second is absurd; for the will follows the intellect, and therefore unless the intellect is convinced, the will is not bound. But no doubtful knowledge necessitates the intellect to assent; therefore no doubtful law binds the will to obey. Therefore the third remains.

3° From the presumed will of the Divine Legislator. God is legitimately presumed not to will to oblige by a doubtful law when the end of creation is obtained equally. But thus the matter stands. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. The end of creation is the glory of God and the salvation of men. But each is obtained even when doubtful laws are not observed. Therefore.

Proof of the minor assumption. The glory of God as well as the salvation of men exists from the perfect obedience of men given to the divine laws. But while certain laws are observed, doubtful laws, which are believed not to oblige, even not being observed, an equally perfect submission is given to God by men. Therefore, without the observance of those laws, the end of creation is obtained equally.

Proof of this minor. Although the law exists objectively, nevertheless God does not will it to oblige proximately and subjectively unless it also exists subjectively in conscience, sufficiently known by moral diligence. But when doubtful laws are believed by the conscience of men not to oblige, men perfectly obey God from the observance of certain laws alone.¹

76. • It pleases us to note in this place that it is illicit to use two probable opinions at the same time in the same act, if from this one law is certainly violated. For example, a testament lacking legal form is probably valid; it also more probably is not valid. Therefore it is not permitted, by following the former sentence, to enter upon the inheritance, and at the same time, by following the latter, not to pay the legacies contained in the same testament. By this deed the observance of one or the other law is necessarily evaded, and the agent contradicts himself in the same act.²

77. • Historical notice. Disputations about the choice of opinions in practice arose after the middle of the sixteenth century. Then first came forth the System of Probabilism, whose author is reputed to be Bartholomaeus Medina, of the Order of Preachers; this System was immediately received very commonly, as the adversaries themselves confess. (Therefore if, St. Alphonsus observes, the rigid sentence, as its followers assert gratuitously, had from the beginning of the Church up to that time been in possession, how could it have happened that so quickly it was commonly rejected by the Doctors, and the benign sentence received?) In the time of Cornelius Jansenius various Systems of Anti-Probabilism came forth, among which Probabiliorism, from the influence of Jansenistic fraud, was more commonly received up to our century. But, as usually happens in controversies of this kind, extremes were avoided by neither part. For just as certain Probabilists slipped into too lax doctrines, which the Supreme Pontiffs proscribed, so also their adversaries struck upon extreme rigor, which was likewise reproved by the Holy See. For the rest, that the use of probable opinion in the matter of honesty alone has always flourished in the Church can be proved against the Anti-Probabilists by many testimonies, some of which we shall bring forward, and by no certain testimony can it be refuted. Besides, Probabilism numbers among its patrons theologians of great name. Finally, today it is received everywhere in the Church.

78. • I. From the testimony of the Holy Fathers. From them it is evidently shown that in doubt the safer part is not always to be followed. Thus St. Augustine: "For what is proved to be neither against faith nor against good morals must be held indifferently."¹ St. Gregory Nazianzen: "Either prove that the matter is thus, or if you cannot do that, do not condemn; but if the matter is doubtful, let humanity and ease conquer."² St. Leo the Great: "In those things which are doubtful or obscure, let us know that this must be followed which is found neither contrary to the evangelical precepts nor opposed to the decrees of the Holy Fathers."³ St. Bernard: "Indeed there each one abounds safely in his own sense, where that which is thought by him does not stand opposed either to certain reason or to an authority not to be despised."⁴

That the force of the argument sought from the Fathers may be clearer to you, go, if you please, to the cited passages of the Fathers, where, from the occasion on which the words adduced were written, you will discover that cases really probabilistic are dealt with in them. The cited words of St. Leo the Great and Bernard are general. The praised epistle of St. Augustine is wholly occupied in admonishing Januarius that he should not condemn customs observed in various regions or churches, unless they are certainly opposed to the Faith or good morals. The passage from St. Gregory Nazianzen regards the question whether it is lawful for widows after Baptism to proceed to second marriages.

79. • II. From the consent of the Doctors. The prince of theologians, St. Thomas, speaks thus: "The command of one governing is related to binding in voluntary matters by that mode of binding which can happen to the will, as bodily action is related to binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never introduces necessity into another thing except through the contact of the coercion itself with the thing in which it acts; hence neither is anyone bound from the command of any lord unless the command reaches him to whom it is commanded. But it reaches him through knowledge. Hence no one is bound by some precept except through the mediation of knowledge of that precept. . . . As in bodily things a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge."¹ St. Isidore: "But the law will be manifest."² To these are added most excellent theologians who are Probabilists, as Suarez, Lugo, Sanchez, Sylvius, Toletus, Lessius, Laymann, Bonacina, the Salmanticenses, Amort, and many others.³

80. • From the approbation of the Works of St. Alphonsus. Recall what was said on p. lxxix, and notice that by the judgment of the Holy See itself the System of St. Alphonsus is safe, and that any other system, for example that of simple and common Probabilism, lacks a testimony of this kind.

81. • When opinions almost equally probable concur, in doubt concerning the cessation of a certain law, the opinion favoring the law must be followed.

It is a logical corollary of the preceding proposition. For: 1° If a doubtful law, supervening upon certain liberty, does not bind the latter, by the same reason, conversely, doubtful liberty, supervening upon a certain law, does not dissolve the latter. 2° As invincible ignorance concerning the existence of a law excludes obligation, so the same ignorance concerning the cessation of the law excludes disobligation. 3° If in invincible doubt concerning the existence of a law liberty is presumed, likewise in invincible doubt concerning the cessation of a law obligation is presumed; for the rights of law and of liberty, in an equal cause, must be equal. On these causes especially the Probabilism of St. Alphonsus merits the name of Equi-probabilism, namely because it not only indicates most rightly the limits of true probability, but also favors law and liberty with an equal balance, attributing equal rights to each in the same circumstances, not using weight and weight.⁴

82. • I. Strict Rigorism. This System was condemned, proposition 3 having been condemned by Alexander VIII: "It is not permitted to follow an opinion, either among probable opinions the most probable, or among probable opinions the most probable of all." This proposition is openly false; for if the opinion for liberty is most probable of all, the opinion for the law will be only slightly or doubtfully probable; but on account of a weak motive to despoil liberty of its own certain right is openly against natural right. Therefore the System is false.

83. • II. Laxism. It was condemned, proposition 3 having been condemned by Innocent XI: "Generally, when relying on probability either intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability, we do something, we always act prudently"; and proposition 27, condemned by Alexander VII: "If a book is by some younger and modern author, the opinion must be judged probable, as long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable." Deservedly also was this doctrine condemned; for a law cannot be judged truly doubtful which is founded on so grave a reason that against it no solid reason can be brought forward, but only a slight reason or authority.

84. • III. Mitigated Tutiorism. As such it did not live long. It is refuted by this argumentation. If the less safe opinion is notably more probable, the opposite for the law becomes slightly or doubtfully probable; but on account of a motive only slightly or doubtfully probable to despoil liberty of its own right is certainly against natural right; therefore . . . Besides, notable greater probability for some opinion founds probable certainty of it; but in human acts probable certainty must suffice; therefore . . . Recall what was said in n. 68 under 2.

95. Notions and certain principles placed outside controversy. - Opinative or probable conscience, properly, is that which, on account of reasons absolutely grave and relatively graver, judges, although not firmly but with grave fear of the opposite, that some action here and now to be placed is licit or illicit. It can arise either because the conclusion is deduced by means of an uncertain but probable principle, or because the application of a certain principle to this particular case is uncertain, but only probable. In either case a certain conscience is lacking.

Such a conscience, of itself, is not the rule of acting prudently, because it is not a certain conscience; and therefore it must be laid aside either by further inquiry and the acquisition of direct certitude, or, if that cannot be had by moral diligence, by the acquisition of indirect certitude by force of a reflex principle. And indeed:

1. in practically practical probabilities, if in the given circumstances a practically certain conscience cannot in any way be had, man is held to choose the part of the law and to do what is safer, even if the law more probably does not exist, lest, namely, he expose himself to the danger of sinning, as was said in n. 89;

2. likewise in speculatively practical probabilities concerning the validity of an act, if there is question of an end absolutely to be obtained and of the value of an act perhaps necessary for the imposed end, man is held to do what is safer, lest he incur the danger of not obtaining the end, according to what was said in n. 90;

3. on the contrary, in speculatively practical probabilities concerning the mere honesty of an action, a certain conscience must be formed by force of some reflex principle. But concerning the reflex principle to be employed moralists do not agree altogether perfectly, since they dispute whether the less safe can be chosen even if it is more probable that the obligation is present.

333. 1. A doubtful law does not oblige. From the rise of Probabilism this principle caused very sharp controversies. Some, namely the more rigid Probabiliorists (Concina,⁷⁸ Patuzzi, etc.), reject it altogether, teaching that in doubt the safer part must be chosen. Others, namely the laxer Probabilists (Caramuel, Diana, Tamburini, Moya, etc.), on the contrary proclaim this principle as the philosopher's stone and apply it without any exception, whether there is question of the validity of the act or of its licitness, whether of strict doubt or broad doubt. But since the Holy See condemned this exaggerated application of the principle in some matters, hence moderate Probabilists indeed admit the principle, but do not extend it to the four following cases:

a) If there is question of the validity of the sacraments. For from the virtue of religion and charity, indeed sometimes also from the virtue of justice, the minister ought to administer the sacraments validly, because otherwise great irreverence is caused to God and great harm to the man receiving. Hence, unless grave necessity urges or unless the Church supplies the defect, it is a grave sin to administer a doubtfully valid sacrament. For this reason Innocent XI also proscribed proposition (1): "It is not illicit, in conferring the sacraments, to follow a probable opinion concerning the validity of the sacrament, the safer one having been abandoned, unless law, agreement, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbids this. Hence an opinion only probable is not to be used in the conferral of baptism, priestly order, or episcopal order."⁷⁹

b) If there is question of things necessary for salvation, for example, of truths to be believed by necessity of means, of baptism to be received when someone doubts whether he was validly baptized, of the proximate danger of sinning, etc. For eternal salvation must be obtained and eternal damnation necessarily avoided; hence if there is question of danger to eternal life, the safer part must be chosen. Right love of self manifestly demands this. Even the "prince of the laxists" himself, Caramuel, teaches this.⁸⁰ Hence likewise proposition (4) was condemned by Innocent XI: "An unbeliever not believing, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused from unbelief."⁸¹

c) If there is question of a certain right of a third person. Hence in a civil case the judge is bound to render judgment according to the more probable opinion. The reason is that the judge is obliged from justice to settle the litigation according to objective truth without any acceptance of persons. But there would be manifest acceptance of persons if the judge, abandoning the certainly more probable opinion, judged according to the less probable opinion.⁸²

But if the case of each litigant is equally probable, the judge is bound either to divide the controverted matter between them or to persuade them to an amicable settlement. Hence it is easily understood why the following propositions were condemned: "I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable."⁸³ "When litigants have opinions equally probable for themselves, the judge can receive money for rendering a sentence in favor of one rather than the other."⁸⁴ - When one part of the litigants already possesses the thing in good faith, then the adage must be applied: "The condition of the possessor is better." And so the thing is not to be adjudged away from the possessor unless the other party proves his right. - In a criminal case favor is to be shown to the accused as long as his crime has not been proved. Hence Rule of Law 11 in VI: "When the rights of the parties are obscure, favor is to be shown to the accused rather than to the plaintiff," and the Code of Canon Law, c. 1748, § 2, establishes: "If the plaintiff does not prove, the defendant is absolved."

d) If there is question of grave danger of spiritual or temporal harm (whether one's own or another's), which we ought to prevent from charity or from justice. Therefore a physician is bound to employ more certain and safer remedies (when they can be had) and sins if without urgent necessity he employs doubtful remedies, so that the life of the sick person is endangered. Likewise it is illicit to take a drink that is doubtfully gravely poisonous.

These four exceptions, which, even the Probabilists themselves admitting it,⁸⁵ must be added to the famous principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," show enough and more than enough that it is not so precious a philosopher's stone as certain Probabilists advertise it. But if that principle is understood with the clauses added, and if there is question of a true and serious doubt concerning the existence of a law, nothing prevents it from being applied to eliminate practical doubt.⁸⁶

⁷⁸ De probabilismo diss. 8, c. 3.

⁷⁹ Denz. n. 1151. John Lugo taught a similar proposition, De sacr. in genere, disput. VIII, n. 139 and 141.

⁸⁰ Theol. fund. n. 533.

⁸¹ Denz. n. 1154.

⁸² Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 63, a. 4.

⁸³ Innocent XI (Denz. n. 1152).

⁸⁴ Alexander VII (Denz. n. 1126).

⁸⁵ Cf. Noldin-Schmitt, De consc. n. 236. The author nevertheless thinks that those four cases are not exceptions from the principle of probabilism. It is a quarrel about words.

⁸⁶ So also St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 64). The difficulty nevertheless remains, when the law is truly doubtful.

On The Various Moral Systems.⁹³

⁹³ Almost innumerable books have been written on this matter from three centuries ago. Among authors of our time there seem to stand out Lehmkuhl, Probabilismus vindicatus (1906), Wouters, De Minusprobabilismo 3 (1918), Mandonnet, Le Decret d'Innocent XI contre le probabilisme (1903); Thom. Bouquillon, Theol. mor. fundamentalis (ed. 3, 1903) n. 296-317.

337. Notion. By the name of moral system is understood a method of indirectly obtaining practical moral certitude in practical doubt. For since in human life so many diverse cases occur, and since very often a man remains uncertain what must be done by him, lest he commit sin, hence from about the end of the sixteenth century diverse norms were devised for solving practical doubts. Thence were invented, or rather proclaimed, those reflex principles about which there was discussion in n. 332 sqq. Both the Holy Fathers and the older Scholastics defended no fixed moral system, but solved individual practical questions according to the maxim adduced above: "In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands"; or: "In doubts the safer part is to be chosen." Worthy of special mention is St. Thomas, who did not solve the controversy, then much agitated, whether one cleric can have several benefices, by recurring to the principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," but to the conscience of each benefice-holder and to the particular circumstances. Hence the Angelic Doctor concludes that it is licit to have several prebends, if the benefice-holder has a right intention and sufficiently satisfies the diverse offices.⁹⁴ - The first who thought out some moral system, and indeed the system of Probabilism, was Barth. Medina, O. Pr., a Spaniard, who in the year 1577, against the arguments brought forward by Soto, Cajetan, etc., writes these things: "It seems to me that, if an opinion is probable, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable."⁹⁵ He himself acknowledges, however, that the ancient doctors taught otherwise. Behold his words: "The most learned Soto explains this rather difficult question (De iustitia l. 3, q. 6) in this way: for he says that, although in speculative matters and in the academy it is sometimes licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, nevertheless in moral matters and in things which pertain to the right of a third party, it is not licit to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside. Sylvester thinks the same (under the word 'Opinion,' c. 2), Conrad (in the book De contract. q. ult.), and, what moves more, Lord Cajetan in his Summa (under the word 'Opinion')." - But the words of Cajetan in the cited place are these: "In things to be done, unless by choosing the safer part, it is not licit to take the opinion of anyone as the rule of action, since by the very fact that the operation to be regulated is committed to opinion, it is committed to an ambiguous rule, because every opinion is ambiguous, as being with fear of the other part. And because it is presupposed that the safer part is not chosen, it follows that the operation is committed to an ambiguous rule with respect to the case of sin, and by this very fact is exposed to the danger of sinning, which it is clear is illicit. And if there is question of mortal sin, it is clear that it is a mortal sin: knowingly to do an operation doubtful whether it is mortal; since such a one acting prefers to fulfill his will in such a work, even if it is mortal, rather than to abstain from it." From these words it follows that Medina thought, and indeed rightly, that Probabilism had not previously been expressly defended, but that theologians had rather taught that in doubt the safer part must be chosen. - The following moral systems are explained as being the better known:

⁹⁴ Cf. Quodl. 8, a. 13, and 9, a. 15.

⁹⁵ In 1, 2, q. 19, a. 6 (Venice 1580, p. 178 sq.).

338. 1. Rigorism or rigid Tutiorism teaches that the safer part must always be chosen, although the opinion favoring liberty is most probable. Thus Ioan. Sinnichius, a Louvain doctor (+ 1666), in his book Saul exrex lib. 1, c. 95, n. 357, and the Jansenists. - This system was condemned by Alexander VIII, who on 7 Dec. 1690 proscribed the proposition which Sinnichius seems to defend in the cited place: "It is not licit to follow an opinion, even the most probable among the probable."⁹⁶ - And deservedly! For if certitude strictly so called were always required in order to act licitly, and it were not licit to follow a most probable opinion, human life would become truly intolerable. Against these Rigorists the words of St. Peter could be brought forward: "Now therefore why do you tempt God, to impose a yoke upon the necks of the disciples, which neither our fathers nor we have been able to bear?"⁹⁷ The system of absolute Rigorism is now altogether obsolete and is now held by no one.

⁹⁶ Denz. n. 1293.

⁹⁷ Acts 15, 10.

339. 2. Mitigated Tutiorism teaches that it is licit to follow the less safe opinion favoring liberty, provided, however, that it is most probable. Thus some Louvain doctors, for example Steyart (+ 1701), Opstraet (+ 1720), and certain others, for example Henry of St. Ignatius (+ 1719), Cardinal Gerdil (+ 1802). - This system indeed has not been proscribed by the Church, but in our days it is deservedly rejected by all. For even according to it human life is made too hard, and unbearable burdens are bound upon the shoulders of the faithful, because, if a man is always bound to follow the safe opinion unless the other opinion is most probable, a way is opened to many anxieties. Besides, according to the opinion of St. Thomas and of almost all theologians, probable certitude, or certitude so called in the broad sense,⁹⁸ suffices for acting licitly. Moreover, if some opinion is manifestly more probable, it is now also morally certain, because then the reasons opposed to it are slight and therefore not to be attended to. For if truly grave reasons were opposed to this opinion, it would no longer remain manifestly more probable. Hence an opinion most probable is not always required for acting licitly.

⁹⁸ Cf. above n. 326.

340. 3. Probabiliorism teaches that it is licit to follow the less safe opinion favoring liberty, provided that it is manifestly more probable than the opinion favoring law. This system was very commonly admitted before Medina (cf. above), and was not obscurely commended by the Supreme Pontiffs Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Clement XI, Benedict XIV, as will be clear below in n. 345.

341. 4. Equiprobabilism is contained in this proposition: "In the concurrence of opposed opinions equally or almost equally probable, it is licit to follow the opinion favoring liberty whenever the doubt is about the existence of the law; but in a doubt of fact about the cessation of the law, the law continues to oblige."⁹⁹ The principal defender of this system is St. Alphonsus, who adopted it after the year 1761, although previously he taught pure Probabilism. Before St. Alphonsus this system was held by Eusebius Amort,¹⁰⁰ Rassler, Antonius Mayr, and certain others;¹⁰¹ Billuart, O. Pr. (+ 1757), already attempts to solve the arguments of the Equiprobabilists. - Besides the Redemptorists, Konings, Marc, Ter Haar, Aertnys, Wouters, and also several others adopted this system, for example Scavini, Gousset, Pruner, Muller, Simar, etc., and from the Order of Preachers Moran,¹⁰² Saralegui,¹⁰³ Beaudouin, etc.¹⁰⁴ It agrees with Probabiliorism in this, that 1. a man ought to follow an opinion certainly more probable and favoring law, and that 2. he can follow an opinion certainly more probable and favoring liberty. But it differs from Probabiliorism with respect to opinions equally or almost equally probable, in which according to Probabiliorism the law must be observed; but according to Equiprobabilism a distinction is necessary by applying the principle of possession: if there is question of a doubt about the cessation of law, the law possesses, and therefore is to be observed (so also Probabiliorism teaches); but if there is question of the existence of law, then liberty possesses, and a man is not bound to observe such a law (Probabiliorism does not admit this). The matter becomes clearer by examples: On the night of Friday someone doubts what hour it is. It is equally probable that midnight has already passed and that it has not yet arrived. According to Equiprobabilism, then it is not licit to eat meats, because the doubt is about the cessation of law and therefore the law possesses. If entirely the same case with the same circumstances occurred on the night of Thursday, it would be licit to eat meats, because then liberty possesses. Another example: He who thinks that he has probably fulfilled the obligation of a vow he has made is not freed from the obligation. The reason is that a vow certainly made is not fulfilled by a doubtful fulfillment; therefore the vow possesses. Other examples: He who probably recited the Breviary, or paid the sacramental penance, or confessed his mortal sins, is again bound to perform those acts. The reason is the same: the law possesses, and a certain law is not satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment. Especially with respect to the confession of sins, Equiprobabilism differs from Probabilism, which does not oblige to confession if sins are: a) doubtfully grave; b) doubtfully committed; c) doubtfully confessed. Equiprobabilism, however, demands confession if mortal sins were doubtfully confessed, because then the law of confession possesses. On the contrary, he who with equal probability thinks that he made or did not make a vow is bound to nothing; he who with equal probability thinks that he did not commit some sin, or that the sin committed was not grave, according to the strict principle of Equiprobabilism is not bound to confession, because liberty possesses. In the two last cases, however, confession is counseled.

⁹⁹ Cf. Aertnys-Damen, Theol. mor. I, n. 85.

¹⁰⁰ St. Alphonsus himself cites Eusebius Amort for his system (Breve dissertazione dell' uso moderato dell' opinione probabile 1762, apud Wouters, de Minusprobabilismo p. 50). But that St. Alphonsus taught Equiprobabilism and not pure Probabilism, at least from the year 1762, is historically certain and is manifestly drawn from the letters of the Holy Doctor; cf. below n. 347.

¹⁰¹ Cf. E. Muller, Theol. mor. l. 1, § 81; Ter Haar, De systemate morali antiquorum Probabilistarum p. 21 sqq. (Paderborn 1894).

¹⁰² Theol. mor. I, n. 128 sqq.

¹⁰³ Comm. al P. Laraga n. 96.

¹⁰⁴ Tract. de consc. (1911) p. 99, 138.

342. 5. Pure Probabilism teaches: Whenever there is present an opinion truly and certainly probable concerning the licitness of some act, it is licit to follow it, even if the opposite opinion is truly and certainly more probable and safer. But the probability of some opinion or sentence is that property of it by which, on account of the motives by which it is supported, it merits the assent of a prudent man, although with fear concerning the opposite.¹⁰⁵ This probability is divided in several ways:

a) Into internal and external. Internal probability is founded upon the very nature of the thing, its properties, causes, effects, and also upon the inconveniences of the opposite part. - External probability is taken from the authority of Doctors who hold this opinion. But such external probability is present not only if some opinion, with the Church tolerating it, is commonly or by most theologians held as probable, but also alpha) if five or six grave theologians think that opinion probable; beta) if even one Doctor of the Holy Church, such as St. Thomas, St. Alphonsus, or another altogether eminent author, such as St. Antoninus, holds it as probable. - Concerning intrinsic probability none can judge except men very learned and versed in moral matters. For often to other men not so learned in Moral Theology something seems intrinsically probable and licit which nevertheless in reality is not so; as is clear, for example, concerning craniotomy, which several held to be licit if otherwise it is not possible to come to the aid of the life of the mother. - But concerning extrinsic probability a moderately learned man can judge, if he rightly understands the state of the question and has diligently inspected the authors treating of this question.¹⁰⁶ Extrinsic probability sometimes suffices for forming a right conscience and for acting licitly. For extrinsic probability is resolved into intrinsic probability, since grave authors would not consider some opinion probable except on account of grave motives. Hence the Angelic Doctor says that a man of little knowledge is made more certain concerning that which he hears from some learned man than concerning that which seems to him according to his own reason.¹⁰⁷ The same is clear from the response of the Sacred Penitentiary approved by Gregory XVI on 22 July 1831: "Whether a confessor is to be disturbed who follows all the opinions of St. Alphonsus in the practice of the sacred tribunal of penance for the sole reason that by the Holy Apostolic See nothing worthy of censure has been found in his works? In the negative." - Nevertheless, the authority of one author, who is not greater than every exception, does not suffice for gaining probability for some opinion. This is clear from the proposition condemned by Alexander VII: "If a book is by some junior and modern author, the opinion ought to be considered probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable."¹⁰⁸

b) Into solid, doubtful, and slight. An opinion is called solidly or certainly probable when it rests upon a firm and grave motive; it is called doubtfully probable or even probably probable when one rightly doubts concerning the solidity of its motive; it is called slightly probable when it rests upon a light consideration, and therefore cannot draw to itself the assent of a prudent man.

c) Into absolute and comparative, or relative. Some opinion is called absolutely probable when its arguments, considered separately and in themselves, that is, independently from the opposite opinion, appear grave; but it is called comparatively probable when its arguments, compared together with the arguments of the opposite opinion, retain their gravity.¹⁰⁹

Probabilism therefore teaches that it is licit to follow a truly probable opinion, which retains its probability even after a comparison has been made with the opposite opinion. It is necessary to acknowledge that this system is very simple and very clear. For whenever it is established that some opinion is probable, either intrinsically or extrinsically, it is licit to follow it in practice, taking no further care about another opinion more probable or safer. Probabilism as a system was first introduced by Bartholomaeus Medina, O. Pr.¹¹⁰ Very many theologians favor Probabilism, both ancient and especially modern, whom it would be long to cite here all together. Thus, for example, from the Order of Preachers are cited: Ludovicus Lopez (+ 1596), Dominicus Bannez (+ 1604), Ioannes a S. Thoma (+ 1644), Bartholomaeus Ledesma (+ 1604), etc.; from the Order of Franciscans: Reiffenstuel (+ 1703), Sporer (+ 1714), Elbel (+ 1756), etc.; from the Order of Carmelites: the Salmanticenses. Almost all theologians of the Society of Jesus adhere to Probabilism, for example Toletus, Suarez, Lugo, Laymann, Lacroix, Gury, Ballerini, Lehmkuhl, Noldin, Genicot, etc., and very many theologians from the secular clergy, for example Gopfert, Bouquillon, Schindler, Tanquerey, etc. The principal argument for Probabilism is the principle: "A doubtful law does not oblige."¹¹¹

¹⁰⁵ Thus Noldin, De consc. n. 223.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Aertnys-Damen l. c. I, n. 78.

¹⁰⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 4, a. 8 ad 2.

¹⁰⁸ Denz. n. 1127.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Aertnys-Damen l. c. I, n. 75.

¹¹⁰ In his commentaries on S. theol. 1, 2, q. 19, a. 6. Medina poses the question: "Whether we are bound to follow the more probable opinion, the probable one having been set aside, or whether it is enough to follow a probable opinion?" - First he brings forward arguments for Probabiliorism and then responds: "Certainly the arguments seem excellent, but it seems that if there is a probable opinion, it is licit to follow it, although the opposite is more probable. ... An opinion is called probable from the fact that we can follow it without reproach and blame. Therefore it implies a contradiction that it be probable and that we cannot follow it licitly. For an opinion is not called probable from the fact that apparent reasons are adduced in its favor, and that it has assertors and defenders; for in that way all errors would be probable opinions; but that opinion is probable which wise men assert and the best arguments confirm, which to follow is nothing improbable." - Cf. also the work of the same author: Breve instruccion de como se ha de administrar el sacramento de la penitencia, Salamanca 1580. Sometimes already St. Antoninus is cited by authors as a Probabilist, but altogether falsely. Rather, St. Antoninus favors Probabiliorism, saying: "With a good conscience someone can hold one part of some opinion and operate according to it, which namely has notably equal doctors for itself ... when ... he forms for himself a good conscience and credulity concerning that which he believes as concerning the more probable part" (S. theol. P. 1, tit. 3, c. 10, § 10).

¹¹¹ Cf. below n. 349.

343. 6. Lax Probabilism, or simply Laxism, teaches that it is licit to follow not only an opinion truly and certainly probable, but also an opinion probably or slightly probable. This system indeed seems to have been taught by Thomas Tamburinus (+ 1675), who explained his opinion in this naked and crude manner: "Absolutely I think, with Salas, Vasquez, Sanchez, Merolla apud Bardi (de consc. dist. 1, c. 6, to whom add Pasq. dec. 18), that it is enough in all cases that it be established probably that an opinion is probable; for then that truth, morally certain, will be sufficiently strengthened, directing me in about this manner: I here and now act prudently, because while I probably think that this is probable, I follow that judgment in practice prudently enough. For the fact that the opposite is evidently more probable does not cast down my opinion from its probability."¹¹² Ioannes Caramuel (+ 1682), who was called by St. Alphonsus "the prince of the laxists," expressed the same opinion under these words: "If opinions are now probable which previously were not, now men do not sin, although previously they sinned, since every probable thing excuses from sin."¹¹³ Contemporary with Caramuel was another Probabilist indulging somewhat in Laxism, namely Antonius Diana, a Theatine (+ 1663), concerning whom St. Alphonsus writes:¹¹⁴ "Diana, in selecting opinions, for the most part inclines toward the benign part, and not rarely inclines more than is fitting." - Diana is a pure Casuist (he was called "the Atlas of the casuistic world"); he brings forward the opinions of almost innumerable authors and then solves individual cases in a casuistic manner. Although in other matters he is found not rarely too benign, nevertheless concerning sins of lust he sometimes defends rather rigid opinions. - Besides the authors cited, Ioannes Sanchez (+ 1624), Stephanus Bauny (+ 1649), Matthaeus Moya (+ 1684), whose work Quaestiones selectae was placed on the Index on 26 Feb. 1704, favored Laxism. Indeed, a work of the same author, which he published under the pseudonym "Amadaeus Guimenius" and whose title is Opusculum singularia universae fere theologiae moralis complectens adversus quorundam expostulationes contra nonnullas Iesuitarum opiniones morales (Lyons 1664), was proscribed by a special Brief of Innocent XI on 16 Sept. 1680 and therefore prohibited under pain of excommunication. - Among the Laxists Escobar y Mendoza (+ 1669) also is sometimes named, and in reality he defended some opinions too indulgent; nevertheless he did not merit the too vehement attacks made by Blaise Pascal in the Lettres Provinciales. - In present times no Catholic theologian favors Laxism. Besides, this system has been proscribed by the Church; for Innocent XI condemned proposition (3): "Generally, while trusting in intrinsic or extrinsic probability, however slight, provided one does not go outside the limits of probability, we always act prudently."¹¹⁵ But Alexander VII, in the decree issued on 24 Sept. 1665, proclaimed: "That lax mode of opining is altogether foreign to evangelical simplicity and to the doctrine of the Holy Fathers; and if the faithful were to follow it in practice as a right rule, a great corruption of Christian life would creep in." Hence, as St. Augustine says very well, "it is better to love with severity than to deceive with leniency."

¹¹² Explicatio decal. l. 1, c. 3, § 3, n. 8.

¹¹³ Cf. E. Muller, Theol. mor. I, § 78, where this citation is found. This Caramuel taught several opinions which, while he was still living, were proscribed by the Church; for example: "It seems so clear that fornication according to itself involves no malice and is evil only because it is forbidden, that the contrary seems altogether dissonant from reason." Innocent XI condemned this proposition on 2 March 1679 (Denz. n. 1198).

¹¹⁴ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 257. In mockery Diana was called "the lamb who took away the sins of the world" (so Concina, Apparatus ad Theol. christ. l. 3, diss. 1, c. 2, de Probabilismo).

¹¹⁵ Denz. n. 1153.

344. 7. The system of compensation or of sufficient reason. Since all the systems explained up to this point suffer no small difficulties, certain authors¹¹⁶ devised a new system, which they called the system of compensation or of sufficient reason. The hinge of every difficulty in all the systems is the question whether and how far a doubtful law obliges. Pure Probabilists say simply: a doubtful law in no way obliges, at least if there is question of the mere licitness of an act. But all other theologians do not admit this, conceding some obligation to a doubtful law, although they do not hold concordant opinions concerning the degree of that obligation. Probabiliorists assert: a doubtful law obliges unless the contrary opinion is truly more probable. Equiprobabilists contend for this same thing, yet at the same time admitting that a doubtful law then does not oblige, when the doubt turns upon the existence, not however upon the cessation, of the law, and the opinion is almost equally probable. The new system of compensation or sufficient reason wishes to define otherwise the limits of an obliging doubtful law. Against Probabilism it vigorously defends that a doubtful law obliges in some way, although imperfectly. But against the Probabiliorists it does not vindicate for a doubtful law as much obligation as a certainly known law has. For the obligation of a law must be measured from the degree of knowledge, and therefore a certainly known law obliges in a perfect manner; a law wholly unknown obliges in no way; but a law known in an imperfect manner obliges imperfectly. Therefore of itself it is not licit to act against a law imperfectly known, such as a doubtful law is. Nevertheless cases can easily occur in which there are grave motives for acting against a doubtful law, for example, a penitent favoring pure Probabilism absolutely wishes to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, or if a benign probable opinion is more advantageous for the spiritual salvation of the penitent than the more probable opinion, all the circumstances having been considered. In cases of this sort there remains the danger of transgressing the law at least materially. But since even a material transgression of law is something evil, it is not licit to expose oneself to such a danger without a sufficient reason. Hence in such a case the principles concerning cooperation in evil, or rather concerning the indirect voluntary, must be applied. For a cause is placed, from which a double effect follows: one good, namely liberty in action; the other evil, namely the danger of transgressing the law at least materially. But among the conditions required for cooperation or for the indirect voluntary there is required a grave and proportionate cause. The greater the evil effect foreseen is, the greater an excusing cause is required. Therefore, in order to know whether it is licit in a particular case to act against some doubtful law by following the less probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, the gravity of the law and the probability of the opposed opinion must be weighed. The graver the law is, and the more probable its obligation is in the actual case, the greater an excusing cause is required.¹¹⁷

This system of compensation or sufficient reason has been devised rather ingeniously, nor does it in any way lead to Tutiorism, as Gury¹¹⁸ and other Probabilists wish; on the contrary, this system certainly does not lead more to Tutiorism than pure Probabilism draws toward Laxism. For, as Tanquerey deservedly notes:¹¹⁹ "For just as the Probabilists avoid Laxism by rejecting the sufficiency of an opinion slightly probable, so likewise the Compensationists escape Tutiorism by asserting that a doubtful and uncertain law does not oblige except when a sufficient reason for transgressing it is altogether lacking, and that an altogether slight cause excuses from a very doubtful law." - Indeed, the Probabilists themselves of better reputation in practice never permit the violation of some doubtful but truly probable law without some sufficient reason. For it would be too absurd, without any motive, to care nothing at all about some truly probable law, indeed about one more probable.

¹¹⁶ Potton, De theoria probabilitatis, Paris 1874. L. Lehu also favors this system (Philos. mor. et soc. I [Paris 1914] 287). In addition Laloux, De actibus humanis; Boisdron, Theorie et systemes des probabilites; Mc Donald, The principles of moral science.

¹¹⁷ Cf. Potton l. c. 30.

¹¹⁸ Casus conscientiae I 61.

¹¹⁹ Synopsis Theol. mor. de conscientia n. 416.

Judgment Concerning The Individual Systems.

Absolute Rigorism and Laxism have been condemned by the Church, as is clear from what was said above. Mitigated Tutiorism also must be rejected, since it is a) too hard; b) not sufficiently proved; c) impossible in practice, at least for simple faithful. For this reason this system has today become altogether obsolete. - Hence concerning the four remaining systems alone does judgment remain to be made here. With the greatest sincerity with which we can, we set forth the reasons and difficulties of each system.

345. Reasons for Probabiliorism. a) From authority. There is no other system which is supported so strongly from authority as Probabiliorism. For before the controversies about Probabilism arose, several Supreme Pontiffs seem to have given decisions according to the principles of Probabiliorism. Thus, for example, Innocent III,¹²⁰ treating of a violated censure, says: "Although in this he does not seem to have been altogether culpable, nevertheless, because in doubts the safer way is to be chosen, he ought rather to have abstained than to handle the ecclesiastical sacraments." Therefore the Pontiff does not say: a doubtful law does not oblige, but rather the contrary. Eugenius I,¹²¹ Clement III,¹²² and Clement V have similar things, the last of whom says: "We, attending to the fact that in those things which regard the salvation of the soul, in order to avoid grave remorse of conscience, the safer part is to be held."¹²³ After Bartholomaeus Medina introduced the system of Probabilism and obtained very many followers, the Supreme Pontiffs did not cease to put forward salutary warnings against it. Alexander VII in the Decrees of 24 Sept. 1665 and 18 March 1666 proscribed 45 propositions excerpted from books of the Probabilists.¹²⁴ But Innocent XI manifestly favored Probabiliorism, who in the celebrated Decree of 26 June 1680 commanded Thyrsus Gonzalez, Praepositus General of the Society of Jesus, "that he himself freely and intrepidly preach, teach, and defend with the pen the more probable opinion, and also vigorously attack the opinion of those who assert that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable, and let him be made certain that whatever he does and writes in favor of the more probable opinion will be pleasing to His Holiness. Let it be enjoined upon the Father General of the Society of Jesus by order of His Holiness that he not only permit the Fathers of the Society to write for the more probable opinion and attack the opinion of those asserting that, in the concurrence of a less probable opinion with a more probable one so known and judged, it is licit to follow the less probable; but also that he write to all the Universities of the Society that the mind of His Holiness is that each one, as it shall please him, freely write for the more probable opinion and attack the aforesaid contrary one; and let him command them that they submit themselves altogether to the mandate of His Holiness."¹²⁵ And when Matthaeus Moya, under the pseudonym "Amadeus Guimenius," had written a little work for defending the opinions of the Probabilists, this little work, already previously placed on the Index, was again condemned, and indeed by a special Brief of Innocent XI on 16 Sept. 1680.¹²⁶ - Clement XI in the year 1702 wrote to Thyrsus Gonzalez: "The Superiors of the Society will do a thing most pleasing to His Holiness if they see to it that the Jesuits abstain from teaching and defending the opinion which asserts that the use of an opinion less probable and less safe is licit, since it has been ascertained by His Holiness that this is altogether expedient for the safety and honor of the Society."¹²⁷ Likewise Benedict XIV favored Probabiliorism, who warned the confessor "that he embrace that opinion which he shall have known to be more supported by reason and favored by authority."¹²⁸ Besides, the same Pontiff ordered that the theology of Fr. Antoine, S.J., a vigorous Probabiliorist, be expounded in the Seminary of Propaganda Fide. Clement XIII on 26 Feb. 1761, through a Decree of the Holy Office, condemned a sheet containing several theses favoring the system of Probabilism; indeed, the proposition, "Probabilism was supremely familiar to Christ the Lord," he specially condemned as erroneous and proximate to heresy.¹²⁹ - From all these things it clearly appears how rightly Thyrsus Gonzalez wrote in the supplicatory little book offered to Clement XI in the year 1702: "It is certain that the Apostolic See has always inclined more toward the opinion contrary to Probabilism." The same is thought by Mausbach, Sawicki, Koch, Schmuckenschlager, Liese, Vinati, and very many others among the moderns.¹³⁰ Hence it is also manifestly evident - which I would wish to be noted in passing - how undeservedly and calumniously Dollinger-Reusch,¹³¹ Harnack,¹³² Hoensbroech,¹³³ and several others reproach the Catholic Church with having fostered lax moral doctrines. - Bartholomaeus Medina himself candidly confessed that his doctrine concerning Probabilism differed from the doctrine of the old authors; and in reality, up to this point no author could be adduced who clearly taught Probabilism before the sixteenth century. For the old authors, who are sometimes alleged as favorers of Probabilism, such as Lactantius, Basil, Gregory Naz., Augustine, Antoninus, Ioannes Nider, etc., when inspected more diligently rather favor Probabiliorism.¹³⁴ This is especially true of St. Antoninus and of Ioannes Nider.¹³⁵ - The first who seems to have expounded the principle of Probabiliorism clearly enough is Guilielmus Antisiodorensis, who flourished around the year 1230. He writes in the treatise on pollution: "That masterly rule, that one doubting about something whether it is illicit, and doing it while the doubt stands, sins because he commits himself to danger, must be understood of such a doubt as is vehement, and leads the mind more, or at least equally, to believe that it is mortally illicit, as that it is licit. It is otherwise where the mind inclines more and judges that it is licit than that it is illicit, although it does not have evident or fixed certitude in every way, because even this itself is not required." - For Probabiliorism among the old authors are cited: Alexander Halensis, Petrus de Tarantasia, Durandus, Petrus de Palude, Silvester Prierias, Cajetan, Franciscus de Victoria, and almost all theologians from the Order of Preachers, to which, assembled in General Chapter, Alexander VII in the year 1656 very much commended that its members fight for Probabiliorism.¹³⁶

b) From reason. 1. In doubts the safer part must be chosen, at least if this is morally possible. For so teach not only great authors, but also many texts of the Decretals.¹³⁷ But Probabiliorism is much safer and always chooses the safer part insofar as this is morally possible and necessary. Therefore Probabiliorism is the system to be preferred. The minor is proved: it is safer to follow the law than, the equally and truly probable law having been set aside, to follow liberty, as all admit. But Probabiliorism teaches that the law must always be followed, unless the opinion favoring liberty is certainly more probable; for if the opinion favoring liberty is certainly more probable, there exists a very small danger of violating the law. But a little is accounted as nothing, as the common adage says. - Nor should anyone say that Tutiorism is still safer than Probabiliorism and therefore that it must be followed; for, granted that Tutiorism is safer, it is impossible in practice, all admitting it. But no one is bound to the impossible.

2. Where the truth cannot clearly be found, we are bound at least to embrace that opinion which approaches nearer to the truth. Hence Rule of Law 45 in VI says: "In obscure matters we look at what is more like the truth." But Probabiliorism approaches nearer to the truth, since it follows either the safe opinion or the manifestly more probable opinion. Therefore Probabiliorism is to be preferred among the diverse systems. See several other arguments apud Billuart.¹³⁸

¹²⁰ c. 5, X 5, 27.

¹²¹ c. 3, X 4, 1.

¹²² c. 12, X 5, 12.

¹²³ c. 1, V 11 in Clem.

¹²⁴ Denz. n. 1101-1145.

¹²⁵ On the history of that Decree see Mandonnet, O. Pr., Le Decret d'Innocent XI contre le Probabilisme; Wouters, C.SS.R., De Minusprobabilismo 2, 41; Brucker, S.J., in Etudes t. 86, 778 and t. 91, 831.

¹²⁶ Cf. Index libr. proh., word "Guimenius," and Hurter, S.J., Nomencl. lit. Theol. cath. IV 611.

¹²⁷ Apud Wouters l. c. 36.

¹²⁸ Lettera circolare a tutti i Patriarchi ... sopra la preparazione all' anno santo, d. 26 June 1749, n. 20.

¹²⁹ This whole Decree is alleged by St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 84, ed. Gaude. It is strange that it is not found in Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion.

¹³⁰ See the individual testimonies apud Wouters l. c. 41. Thus, for example, the Tubingen Professor Ant. Koch writes: "Rome did not condemn Probabilism, but visibly favored the doctrine of the more probable opinion" (Deutsche Literaturzeitung, 3 Sept. 1904).

¹³¹ Geschichte der Moralstreitigkeiten, Nordlingen 1889.

¹³² Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte.

¹³³ Die ultramontane Moral.

¹³⁴ Cf. Billuart, De consc. diss. 6, a. 1.

¹³⁵ Ioannes Nider, O. Pr., in his excellent book, whose title is Consolatorium timoratae conscientiae (P. 3, c. 1), expressly adopts the opinion of Blessed Albert and relies on almost the same words as St. Antoninus, who certainly favors Probabiliorism. Behold his words: "When, therefore, in some moral matter there are various and contrary opinions, he who would adhere to the opinion of the broader way seems to expose himself to the danger of mortal sin, because in doubt, since that opinion can be false and the contrary true." Then St. Antoninus responds that he who acts in strict doubt really sins. "But by acting against such a [slight] doubt one does not sin, while he adheres to the opinion of some doctor and has more probable reasons for it than for the opposite opinion" (S. theol. P. 1, tit. 3, c. 10, § 10). - What can be said more clearly?

¹³⁶ Acta capitulorum Gen. O. P. ed. Reichert vol. VII, p. 403. For the testimonies of individual authors see Concina, De Probabilismo diss. 1 and 2.

¹³⁷ Cf. above. - The Decretals have it thus at least seven times: c. 3 X 3, 43; c. 3 X 4, 1; c. 12 X 5, 12; ib. c. 18 and c. 24; c. 5 X 5, 27; Clem. l. 5, tit. 11, c. 2.

¹³⁸ L. c.

346. Difficulties. 1. The fundamental rule itself of Probabiliorism is not so certain. For this rule establishes: In doubt it is licit to follow the more probable opinion, the less probable opinion for the law having been set aside. But this rule cannot be proved certainly except by an argument taken from invincible ignorance of the law. Yet this same argument seems almost equally to prove the principle of Probabilism: a doubtful law does not oblige; which nevertheless the Probabiliorists reject.

2. Probabiliorism is almost impossible in practice. For a) it can cause conflicts between the confessor and the penitent; because, if the penitent wishes to follow a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside, the confessor is bound to absolve him. Thus the opinion which St. Alphonsus calls common and to be followed, citing more than thirty authors for it.¹³⁹ But the reason is that the confessor is not the competent judge of opinions, but only of the disposition of his penitent. But the disposition of the penitent consists in true contrition for sins committed and in the sincere purpose of not sinning in the future. Therefore a Probabiliorist confessor is sometimes compelled to act against his own system. - b) Sometimes a benign probable opinion is much more useful for the spiritual salvation of the penitent than a rigid more probable opinion. For not rarely, on account of a rigid opinion imposed on him by the confessor, a penitent is altogether deterred from receiving the sacraments and thus grows foul in sins. Hence today perhaps there is no confessor who applies all the logical consequences of Probabiliorism in the practice of the penitential tribunal, or who follows the opinion of Billuart saying: "If the opinion of the penitent is certainly less probable and the penitent recognizes it as such and wishes to follow it, the confessor ought to deny him absolution as indisposed, even if he says that he is a probabilist."¹⁴⁰

¹³⁹ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 604. The Holy Doctor leads the opposite opinion to absurdity in this way: "Two confessors have two contrary opinions, each of which appears more probable to itself; if one wished to confess to the other, this one would have to lay aside his opinion, taking his intellect captive, so that he might obey his confessor constituted as his judge. Conversely, however, if afterward the other were to confess to this one, this second confessor would have to resume his opinion, which appears to him more probable; for then he would have to judge according to his own proper judgment and would have to oblige him to lay aside the opinion which he had previously imposed on him as to be followed. And behold a comedy worthy of laughter, which would occur daily among confessors. Who has thought that Christ the Lord wished to oblige confessors and penitents to these burdens in the sacrament of Penance?" Cf. nevertheless Lugo, Respons. mor. l. 1, dub. 26 (Paris edition 1869, tom. 8, p. 40).

¹⁴⁰ De consc. diss. 6, a. 4.

347. Arguments for Equiprobabilism. a) From the authority of St. Alphonsus. Without any prudent doubt St. Alphonsus de Ligorio, Doctor of the Church, defended this system, and before him already certain other theologians, and after him several theologians, and those most noble, both Redemptorists and outsiders, as was said above. But those modern theologians who by right and wrong contend that St. Alphonsus was a pure Probabilist waste oil and labor.¹⁴¹ For the Holy Doctor himself in express words affirms not once but several times that he is not a Probabilist, but reproves Probabilism.¹⁴² But whether St. Alphonsus was always an Equiprobabilist, or only from the year 1762, theologians are not agreed.¹⁴³ In moral matters, however, the authority of St. Alphonsus is very great, as is clear from what was said above in n. 7.

b) From reason. Equiprobabilism differs little from Probabiliorism. The only difference consists in this: that it admits liberty of acting and excuse from the observance of law when a strict doubt is present concerning the existence of a law, against which equally probable reasons militate. Probabiliorism indeed does not admit this. But since this difference is of little moment, almost all the arguments which are brought from reason for Probabiliorism are valid also for Equiprobabilism. In addition, the following argument is added: If there is question of equally or almost equally probable opinions, a doubt strictly so called is present, in which the mind remains uncertain and properly assents to neither contradictory part. But the law in that case is so doubtful that it merits no assent and produces no obligation. The same argument is proposed in this way by Wouters:¹⁴⁴ "Since an opinion which favors liberty is equally probable as the opinion which favors law, directly there is given no reason on account of which one rather than the other ought to be assumed as the norm of acting, nor can an indirect reason be assigned on account of which the preceptive ordering, or duty, should be favored rather than the permissive ordering, or right. But where the matter stands thus, it is licit, with attention given to the benignity of God Almighty, to suppose that the more benign opinion, that is, the one which favors liberty, is to be held as the norm."

¹⁴¹ Almost all authors who are attached to no school candidly testify that St. Alphonsus taught Equiprobabilism at least from the year 1762. Hence Bellesheim deservedly says: "Since the letters of the Saint have been available, it should no longer be disputed that from 1762 until his death he continuously presented and steadfastly defended Equiprobabilism as his doctrine, and indeed not out of mere caution, but from conviction and impulse of conscience." Ant. Koch says: "Liguori was generally regarded as an Equiprobabilist until in the year 1863 A. Ballerini, S.J., first attempted to prove that the Saint had been a simple Probabilist. The fact ... can be misunderstood and denied only by one who works in the interest of a party" (apud Wouters, De Minusprobabilismo 56). - Francois de Paul Blachere says: "The probabilists have taken the habit of placing themselves under his patronage, but how wrongly!" (Revue Augustinienne 1905, 484.)

¹⁴² Thus St. Alphonsus writes in the letter to Remondini on 30 June 1768: "I reject the opinion that it is licit to follow a known less probable opinion, as Busembaum, Lacroix, and almost all the Jesuits say, who admit the less probable opinion." And in the letter of 9 December 1759 he writes: "The Jesuits commonly defend that we can follow a less probable opinion; but I defend that when the opinion favoring the law is known to be more probable, we ought to follow this and it is not licit for us to follow the less probable; concerning which matter the Jesuits have complained to me." (See several other similar places apud Wouters l. c. 53 sqq.)

¹⁴³ "St. Alphonsus never firmly adhered to Probabilism, and he followed that system from obedience rather than from his soul; and this is so true that, when the Holy Doctor was in the greatest danger of life in the year 1756, that one thing cast fear into him, that he had patronized Probabilism. In the year 1756 - so Melchionna narrates, who had seen and heard the matter in person - our Blessed Father had fallen mortally ill within Holy Week. When he had recovered a little from the illness, our whole Nocera family came to him rejoicing. Then Alphonsus spoke thus: In this supreme danger of life into which I was brought there was nothing that held me disturbed and anxious. This alone cast fear into me, namely that I followed the probable opinion; but the obedience which had to be given to the director required that" (apud Wouters l. c. 49-50).

¹⁴⁴ L. c. 147.

348. Difficulties against Equiprobabilism. Since, as appears from what was said above, there is so small a difference between Probabiliorism and Equiprobabilism, all the difficulties by which the former labors press upon the latter. Besides, the fundamental principle of Equiprobabilism, "In doubt the condition of the possessor is better," is indeed true in the matter of justice, and perhaps can also be applied in other matters, as is clear from what was said above; but the application which Equiprobabilism makes of it does not seem always to be right. For if a law is strictly doubtful, that is, if equally grave reasons persuade its obligation or disobligation, liberty always possesses, which by nature and reason seems to precede law. Hence in that case to distinguish between the cessation and the existence of the law is superfluous. For in strict doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands. But the presumption stands for liberty until the obligation of the law has at least been made probable. - Finally, he seems to commit an inconsistency who teaches that the confessor ought to absolve a penitent who wishes to follow an opinion less probable and less safe, and yet on the other hand establishes that it is not licit to follow a less probable opinion in concurrence with a more probable one. But thus teach St. Alphonsus¹⁴⁵ and all the Equiprobabilists after him.¹⁴⁶ Hence the Probabiliorists, such as Billuart, proceed more logically, who reprove this mode of acting on the part of the confessor.

¹⁴⁵ Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 604.

¹⁴⁶ Cf. above n. 346.

349. Reasons for pure Probabilism. Since among modern Probabilists Noldin, S.J., stands out, we give here his arguments, which otherwise do not differ from the argumentation of other Probabilists.¹⁴⁷

1. From reason. A doubtful law does not oblige. But a law against which there is true and solid probability is truly doubtful. Therefore a law against which there is true and solid probability does not oblige. To prove the major, the worn arguments are applied, namely, a doubtful law is a law not sufficiently known, is uncertain, and the right of liberty precedes the right of law and its obligation. - But the minor is proved in this way: as long as the opinion for liberty is probable, the opinion for law cannot be certain. But it makes no difference whether this opinion for law is less, equally, or more probable, provided the opinion for liberty is probable.¹⁴⁸

2. From authority. "A moral system cannot be false which in every time (!) is expounded, vindicated, and applied in particular questions as a rule of morals by the greater part of theologians, of which sort is the Probabilistic system" (l. c. n. 240).

3. From the approbation of the Church. Explicitly indeed the Church has never approved Probabilism; but implicitly she has manifested her mind clearly and without doubt by that special approbation with which she distinguished the works of St. Alphonsus (who several times explicitly and in express words said that he was not a Probabilist, and who explicitly rejects the system teaching that it is licit to follow a known less probable opinion, "as Busembaum, Lacroix, and almost all the Jesuits say"¹⁴⁹). Nevertheless Noldin says:¹⁵⁰ "The system which St. Alphonsus used in composing moral theology is pure and simple Probabilism." And he confidently concludes:¹⁵¹ "It is licit to follow an opinion truly probable for liberty in all cases of doubtful law, whether the opposite opinion for law is less or equally or more probable.... The probabilistic principle, altogether universal, extends itself not only to the doubt of an existing law, but also of a ceasing law... [and] can also licitly be applied in the matter of justice.... Nothing prevents someone from using, in diverse cases concerning the same matter, according to pleasure, now one, now another probable opinion.... Thus the same person can, for one testament, use the opinion by which a testament lacking the formalities of law is valid, and for another testament the contrary opinion."

¹⁴⁷ Summa theol. mor. de principiis n. 237 sqq.

¹⁴⁸ St. Alphonsus expressly denies this last point; cf. Theol. mor. l. 1, n. 65.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. above n. 347.

¹⁵⁰ L. c. n. 239.

¹⁵¹ L. c. n. 241 and 242.

350. Difficulties against pure Probabilism. 1. The whole of Probabilism is founded upon the principle, "A doubtful law does not oblige," even if there is question of doubt broadly so called. But this foundation is by no means solid, nor is it sufficiently proved from reason or from authority. Not from reason: for the Probabilists attempt to prove this principle by no other arguments than the following: such a law is not sufficiently known, or is uncertain, or is invincibly unknown, and therefore it does not oblige. "But this argumentation is not pleasing: both because it involves a begging of the question, and because it can be turned back against the authors thus: an ordering permitting, not sufficiently known or uncertain or invincibly unknown, confers no right; or: moral liberty not sufficiently known or uncertain or unknown is to be reckoned as nothing."¹⁵² Not from authority: for the old authors, when they assert, "In doubts liberty," speak of doubt strictly so called, where the mind is inclined to neither part of the contradiction, but not of doubt broadly so called, where, on the contrary, they teach that that which is safer must be chosen.¹⁵³ Besides, not even the new Code of Canon Law admits without limit the principle: a doubtful law does not oblige. For c. 15 establishes: "Even invalidating and incapacitating laws do not urge in a doubt of law; but in a doubt of fact the Ordinary can dispense in them, provided there is question of laws in which the Roman Pontiff is accustomed to dispense." But for what is a dispensation of the Ordinary still required, if according to the Probabilists no doubtful law obliges?

2. Noldin asserts too boldly that Probabilism has been approved by the Church. If anyone considers without party zeal the testimonies brought forward above, especially from Alexander VII, Innocent XI, Clement XI, Clement XIII, he will rather be convinced of the contrary, thinking with Professor Koch and many others that the Church never favored Probabilism. Nor can it truly be said that the Church approved Probabilism by approving the moral works of St. Alphonsus, for that Holy Doctor expressly rejects pure Probabilism. Therefore at most it can be said that the Church tolerates Probabilism.

3. Pure Probabilism was unknown before Medina.¹⁵⁴ Moreover, it is dangerous to apply some system which through sixteen centuries in the Church was neither known nor applied. For it is altogether incredible that all the so-called ancient Summists, who wrote Manuals for the practical use of confessors, erred concerning the right solution of practical doubt; or also that all confessors, as many as there were in the world, did not act rightly in this matter until Bartholomaeus Medina most happily discovered Probabilism.

4. Pure Probabilism leads to Laxism. This proposition is proved: a) from history. For no one can deny that several Probabilists, and those excellent in talent, such as Tamburinus, Moya, Caramuel, Diana, etc., in reality taught lax opinions and afterward were proscribed by the Supreme Pontiffs. - b) from reason and the nature of the thing. For if the mere external or internal probability of some opinion now suffices for it to be licitly brought into practice, disastrous errors are almost inevitable. For how easily someone, not to say a layman, but even a cleric theologian, persuades himself that some opinion is truly probable! Did not only Catholic physicians, but also celebrated theologians in our times think that craniotomy was probably licit, if otherwise the mother and infant would have to die? - If in a matter of such great moment an error crept in, can the same not happen in other matters not so momentous? Therefore if someone always in his actions followed the principles of Probabilism, that is, if he left behind the opinion known as certainly more probable and followed the opinion favoring liberty certainly less probable and safe, he would gradually slide into Laxism. Hence Noldin himself, a Probabilist, acknowledges:¹⁵⁵ "If a Christian man in the service of God did nothing other than what the law strictly demands from the principles of Probabilism, certainly he would live a life little worthy of a Christian man." Moreover, a system which, its own patron admitting it, leads, although gradually, to a life little worthy of a Christian man has already been judged. The system of Christian prudence, about which presently, avoids the dangerous rocks of Probabilism.

¹⁵² Cf. Wouters, De Minusprobabilismo 2, 147.

¹⁵³ Cf. the arguments brought forward above (n. 345) for Probabiliorism.

¹⁵⁴ There is no leisure to refute the trifles and ineptitudes of Caramuel, who at length and breadth attempts to prove that Probabilism had already been applied by Adam and Eve, and that it excused them from many grave sins before the fall. Likewise that St. Thomas merited from Christ the words, "Thomas, you have written well of me," because he wrote probable things in the matter of faith and morals. (Apologema pro antiquissima et universalissima doctrina de probabilitate p. 127, n. 223, Lyons 1663.)

¹⁵⁵ L. c. n. 242.

351. Arguments for the system of compensation. No system from those mentioned above avoids grave difficulties; indeed, each one, deduced all the way to its last consequences, impedes the profitable practice of the confessor. Probabiliorism excels both Equiprobabilism and pure Probabilism, and each one should strive to practice Probabiliorism in his own life. And in reality any sincere lover of truth embraces that which is certainly more like the truth, if he cannot obtain every kind of certitude. Indeed, this sincere and ardent love of truth can scarcely be commended enough, especially in our times, since so many men are deceived by the devil, the father of falsehood, who by his falsehood already deceived our first parents and thus induced them to go into exile from paradise. - But the confessor in the direction of souls is compelled not rarely to embrace, the more probable opinion having been set aside, an opinion less probable indeed, but truly probable, in order to avoid a greater evil. Just as he also sometimes ought to permit material sins in order to avoid formal sins. Hence also the Sacred Penitentiary often prescribes that the penitent is to be left in good faith, even if there is question of things materially certainly evil. For example, it is permitted that putative spouses existing in good faith live together maritally. Therefore according to the now universal practice it is sometimes licit for the confessor to permit material sins and to follow an opinion less safe and less probable. Nevertheless, it is never licit to act thus without a grave and proportionate cause, since even a material transgression of the law or material sin is something evil.¹⁵⁶ Generally in these cases one must act according to the rules established for the indirect voluntary. But if those rules are observed, on the one hand the dangers of Laxism, which are joined with pure Probabilism, are avoided; on the other hand the spiritual salvation of the penitent is procured in the better manner in which it can be done. Hence in practice this system of compensation or of sufficient reason, which is better called the system of Christian prudence, seems to be preferred to all others. But in order to know whether in a particular case it is licit to follow an opinion truly and certainly probable for liberty, the more probable one for law having been set aside, the individual circumstances must prudently be attended to: the holier and graver the law is, and the more probable its obligation, the greater the sufficient reason ought to be for acting according to the opinion favoring liberty; but the greater the utility hoped for the penitent, the more easily can the probable opinion favoring liberty be permitted. - Nor should anyone say that this system of sufficient reason is morally impossible in practice, since the confessor can scarcely, indeed not even scarcely, judge rightly whether there are sufficient reasons for following a probable opinion, the more probable one having been set aside. To this objection it is easily responded that such impossibility is no more an obstacle here than in six hundred other cases of the indirect voluntary, in which nevertheless every confessor ought to judge concerning the sufficient reason rendering the act honorable.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. St. Alph., Theol. mor. l. 2, n. 36.

352. Practical conclusion. We have sincerely set forth the reasons which are brought forward for the individual systems. If you prescind from absolute Rigorism and from Laxism, each system from those declared is tolerated by the Church, and therefore can freely be assumed, so that the confessor has no right to force some system upon his penitent, and a fortiori he cannot strictly demand that the penitent fulfill some obligation to which according to the principles of another system he is not bound. For the confessor is not the judge of opinions, but of the disposition of conscience.¹⁵⁷ Hence the confessor can indeed prudently counsel safer and more probable opinions, but cannot impose a strict burden to which the penitent probably is not bound. In practice it is to be counseled that the confessor act according to the system of Christian prudence, because a) thus he avoids the rocks of Probabilism, Equiprobabilism, and Probabiliorism; b) thus he proceeds according to Christian prudence, which is the mover and charioteer of all moral virtues and which is most necessary for living well.¹⁵⁸ Up to Bartholomaeus Medina none of these three systems was certainly known. And yet most holy and most prudent confessors with great fruit administered the sacrament of penance. Are today's confessors wiser than they? Are other sins committed today than at that time? The confessor who prudently explores the condition of the penitent and the circumstances of the act will judge rightly, 1. if he attends especially to the principle: "In doubt one must stand for that for which presumption stands"; 2. if he attentively consults good authors; and 3. if he does not trust too much in his own judgment. For then he applies the system which is best and which can rightly be called: the system of Christian prudence. Concerning this Christian prudence it is said: "Her ways are beautiful ways, and all her paths are peaceful."¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ Ib. l. 3, n. 669.

¹⁵⁸ St. Thom., S. theol. 1, 2, q. 57, a. 5.

¹⁵⁹ Prov. 3, 17.

Probable conscience, or, as others prefer, a probable opinion, properly and through itself, is that act of the intellect by which we adhere to some proposition, yet not without fear concerning the opposite. Therefore it differs from doubtful conscience, not indeed on the part of the motives, which exist in each case and can be of the same weight, but from the diverse mode by which the intellect holds itself toward them: for if it adheres to them, it is called probable; otherwise it will remain doubtful. I said properly and through itself, because often by the name of probable opinion or even probable sentence, among many authors, there comes the very complex of motives or reasons by which the intellect could prudently be supported, if it wished to adhere to one part rather than another. But this complex of motives is indeed better accustomed to be designated by the name of probability, and concerning this alone we shall have to speak here. Cf. Lacroix, n. 387.

Probability is nothing other than that motive, one or multiple, which, all the circumstances having been inspected, is capable of extorting the assent of a prudent man, yet not in such a way that no fear of error remains with him. Wherefore, when we say this or that proposition is probable, we understand two things, one positive, the other negative. The first is that a proposition of this sort is supported by so great a motive that a prudent man can safely assent to it; but the other is that that motive is not so great that it must necessarily and without any fear of error extort the assent of a prudent man. If the first is lacking, the proposition will be improbable; if the other, it must be called certain.

Probability is divided in many ways, but four divisions are chiefly considered here. Therefore it is:

1st. Intrinsic or extrinsic, according as it rests proximately either upon reasons deduced from the nature of the thing, or upon authority. It is called proximately, because extrinsic probability necessarily supposes intrinsic probability; namely so far does the authority of Doctors have force, insofar as it can or ought to be judged that they were moved to hold some opinion by some grave reason.

2nd. Speculative or practical, according as it regards the action considered in itself, namely without attending to those concrete circumstances which are commonly joined to it, or rather according as these circumstances are well weighed in each particular case.

3rd. Of law or of fact, according as it is concerned with the law itself, or rather some fact.

4th. Greater, equal, or lesser, according as the foundations upon which some probable proposition rests, comparison having been made with its contradictory, appear more solid, equally solid, or less solid. Cf. Lehmkuhl, n. 79.

Things To Be Noted. I. Probability which is everywhere among authors called slight or doubtful is understood as that which is so light that he who assents to it is judged imprudent; for St. Alphonsus says: "Slight probability is not probability, but only a certain false appearance, or empty apprehension of probability." Therefore some authors rightly observe that those two terms, slight probability, are as it were opposite and fighting with one another. Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 82. - Lacroix, n. 126. - Bouquillon, n. 308.

II. A proposition or sentence which in St. Alphonsus is called most probable is, according to him, that "which rests upon a most grave foundation; wherefore the opposite is judged slightly or doubtfully probable." The same, in the holy Doctor, is the sense of the word more probable, when one of these four adverbs is added to it: notably, certainly, truly, absolutely. Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 40 and 54.

III. Some proposition can be more probable and at the same time less safe, and vice versa safer and less probable. The reason is that probability is measured from the weight of the motives, and safety from the absence of danger of harming the law.

IV. An opinion is to be held certainly probable which is asserted by most theologians to be probable; or even which five or six theologians outstanding in probity, judgment, and knowledge absolutely hold as true, unless a certain reason is brought against that opinion; for every probability, however great it may have been, when certainty of the contradictory proposition arrives, is altogether destroyed.

V. That opinion is certainly probable for a learned and upright man which he himself knows he has diligently examined, and experiences himself, without inordinate affection, on account of grave reasons, to find as true or certainly probable.

VI. Concerning the intrinsic probability of law, commonly only the learned and those versed in moral matters can judge, since only they can know that nothing certain is opposed to them. But concerning the extrinsic probability of some opinion, a moderately learned man can well judge, if, rightly understanding the state of the question, he finds this opinion asserted by authors greater than every exception, that is, altogether approved among theologians.

VII. A single author, if he is greater than every exception, and brings forward a reason which others have not examined or have not sufficiently solved, while he himself conveniently solves the reasons of others, can make his opinion certainly probable, although this is contrary to the common opinion.

Besides the general principles by which the theory of probabilism has been established above, namely: an obligation is not to be imposed unless it is certain concerning it, or, a doubtful law does not oblige, there are also recounted some special rules by which those principles are confirmed, or are applied in particular cases. They are the following:

I. In doubt one must stand for him for whom presumption stands. The reason is that presumption produces moral certainty, at least broad certainty; and in this sense alone the cited principle or rule ought to be understood. Hence if you are accustomed at such a time diligently to recite the whole Breviary, and you doubt whether you have recited some part, the presumption favors you, and exempts you from the obligation of reciting or repeating it. Likewise, if you doubt whether a superior justly commands or dispenses, presumption stands for him; because he can be led by reasons unknown to you, or is judged to judge prudently concerning those known. Besides, right order and the common good require that in such a case deference be shown to him.

II. In doubt one must judge from things ordinarily occurring. This rule nearly falls back into the preceding one, since in each presumption is the reason for judging thus. But the former extends more broadly; since presumption can be drawn not only from things ordinarily occurring, but also from particular circumstances.

III. In doubt one must stand for the validity of the act. It is a rule of civil law; but also commonly applied to theological matters. It is applied if the principal fact is certain, and there is doubt concerning some necessary circumstance or condition, or concerning the due mode; for example, if you doubt whether you confessed a sin with sufficient sorrow, or if you doubt, without being able to drive away the doubt, whether you contracted matrimony duly, which certainly and in good faith was entered into, you are not bound to repeat the confession, and the matrimony must be held as valid.

IV. In doubt favors are to be enlarged and burdens restricted. It is rule 15 of canon law in the Sixth, and signifies that in doubt the more benign things are to be preferred. Whence, according to this principle and the more common interpretation, these things seem to be established: 1st. As often as burdens and favors can be separated, burdens are to be restricted and favors enlarged, as much as can be done without force being brought upon the sense of the words. 2nd. If burdens and favors are indivisible, then one must judge concerning the intention of the legislator from his words, from the subject matter, or from the connected circumstances. 3rd. If the intention of the legislator cannot clearly be determined, one must attend more to the favor than to the burden. But here burdensome is understood as whatever tends to penalty, or harms the right of a third party, or is opposed to common law. But favor, or favorable, is whatever indulges liberty, or grants grace without detriment to private persons, or to the community, or to the law itself.

V. In obscure matters that which is least is to be held. It is rule 30 of canon law in the Sixth, and it is to be understood thus: where it is not certain concerning the true sense of a law or statute, and, inquiry having been premised, it cannot be determined either from the nature of the thing, or from the context of the words, or from the custom of the place, or from another circumstance, the less burdensome interpretation, or one more benign to liberty, is to be admitted. The reason is that the legislator is not judged to will to oblige beyond that which is clearly expressed in the law. Hence in doubt concerning the quantity of penalty to be inflicted, the minimum is to be chosen. Likewise, if it is not certainly clear concerning the delict, the accused must be absolved.

VI. In a doubt of fact the following axioms have force, or rules of civil law received among all, namely: 1st. In doubt a fact is not presumed, but must be demonstrated. But this is to be understood concerning doubt about the principal act, for example, if it is doubtful whether someone struck another, this fact ought not to be presumed, but he who affirms must prove it positively. 2nd. In doubt it is presumed rightly done, what had to be done by law. This is to be understood concerning doubt about an accessory act, the certainty of the principal act being supposed; for if something had to be done by law, or if it is ordinarily accustomed to be done, or is favorable to the one doing it, it is presumed to have been done. 3rd. In doubt no one is presumed bad unless he is proved. This has force as often as there is question of the doubt of some delict, which ought not to be imputed unless it is certainly clear concerning it. Therefore, since delicts are not presumed, no one is presumed bad, but must be proved.

VII. In doubt the safer part is to be followed. It is a rule of canon law, which is had in cap. Illud Dominus, de sent. excomm., and in cap. Ad audientiam, de homic. But this rule must be restricted to cases of practical doubt, or to those in which an end must necessarily be obtained, namely where probability would not remove the danger which the law commands altogether to be avoided, as, for example, in confecting the sacraments, according to the things said above, and as is ascertained from all things thus far set forth. But if it is extended to speculative doubts, it ceases to be a rule or precept, but is a mere counsel. Cf. St. Alphonsus, throughout, but especially lib. 1, nn. 26 and 99; Systema Mor., Obj. 4; and lib. 6, n. 505. - Voit, nn. 38 and seq.

to follow a probable or more probable opinion concerning the objective honesty of an act.

A probable opinion is an assent of the mind given to one side on account of a fitting motive persuading its truth, yet a fallible assent, and therefore accompanied with fear of the opposite side. Hence the probability is greater or lesser according as the motive is more or less fitting and weighty.

The motive or foundation of probability is twofold, intrinsic and extrinsic; hence also a twofold probability, intrinsic and extrinsic. The intrinsic foundation consists of reasons drawn from the very nature, properties, causes and effects of the thing, and even from the inconveniences of the opposite side. The extrinsic foundation is the authority of doctors who hold or have held this opinion; which authority, however, moves only insofar as those doctors are presumed to teach or to have taught this opinion for good reasons. Whence extrinsic probability is rather to be estimated from the merit and erudition of the doctors, and from their study and diligence in examining the matter, than from their number. That the authority of one young and modern theologian does not suffice to found an extrinsic probability is clear from this proposition condemned by Alexander VII: « If a book be that of some young and modern author, the opinion must be judged probable, provided it does not stand established that it has been rejected by the Apostolic See as improbable. »

A probable opinion can be considered in two ways, separately and comparatively with the opposite, which may be equally, less, or more probable; and according to this last consideration the present question proceeds. For we do not deny that an opinion solidly probable, considered separately, if nothing appears against it, or nothing that has not been evidently solved, can safely be chosen; because man cannot always have entire certainty in morals, and he acts prudently who acts according to weighty reasons which nothing solid overthrows.

While a probable opinion is considered in conflict with the opposite, the more the probability of the one grows, the more the probability of the opposite is diminished; and when one becomes more probable and more like the truth, the other becomes less probable and more like falsehood, so that then it ceases to be solidly and expediently probable, as being incapable of persuading the truth; because the stronger motives of the one crush out the efficacy of the motives of the opposite.

The security of an opinion consists in removal from the danger of sinning, and thus it is safer by how much it removes further from the danger of sinning: whence that opinion which stands for the law is safer; that which stands for liberty is less safe. Security and probability of opinions, therefore, differ, as you see. Probability is drawn from the appearance of truth, security from removal of the danger of sinning: whence there can be given an opinion safer though less probable, and an opinion more probable though less safe. It is plain in the common example. The opinion of St. Bonaventure, which teaches that a sinner is held to repentance immediately after his fall, is safer but less probable; the opinion of St. Thomas, who teaches the opposite, is less safe, but more probable.

I say: In the conflict of two opinions concerning the objective honesty of an action, it is not lawful to follow the less probable and less safe, leaving aside the more probable and safer^{1 1} This proposition the probabilists admit and hold, explaining it thus. When the question concerns only the objective honesty of an action, it is not lawful to follow the opinion less probable and less safe, favoring liberty, leaving aside the more probable and safer, which favors the law, when the probability of the latter so exceeds the probability of the former that this appears only lightly probable; because from it a prudent man cannot frame for himself, by virtue of any certain reflex principle, a conscience morally certain of the licitness of the action. The whole system of rightly understood probabilism is contained in the following proposition: « It is licit to follow an opinion truly and solidly probable, leaving aside the safer, where the question is only of what is licit or illicit »; for although some inequality be detected in the degree of probability between the opposing opinions, this difference is often merely subjective, and the probability which is less to one may be greater to another. Besides, in such matter the trite principle must be recalled: « In morals, little is reputed as nothing. » If therefore the difference is not so great that one opinion seems notably more probable, and consequently the other lightly probable, on either side there is true and solid probability: whence one acts prudently, whether one acts according to or against the doubtful law. — Of these things more fully below.

Omitting many proofs from Scripture, the Fathers, the Supreme Pontiffs and theologians of every school, which may be seen in our former work,

It is proved 1° from St. Thomas, who in Quodlibet VII, a. 13, says: « If he who holds several benefices falls into some doubt from the contrariety of opinions, and thus, if, while such doubt remains, he holds several benefices, he exposes himself to danger, and without doubt sins, as loving temporal gain more than his own salvation¹. » Which words seemed so open to Amedaeus Guimenius, author of the Apologica Casuistarum, that in his Tract. de Opin. probab., n. 6, he exclaimed: « If these things are true, woe to those who act from probable opinion! » ¹ To anyone reading attentively it is plain that this text is not aptly alleged in this question. For the Angelic Doctor treats, not of probability, whether greater or lesser, but of a practically practical doubt, and he rightly pronounces him who acts « while such doubt remains » to sin « without doubt. » This authority could have been more fitly invoked in art. 6 of the preceding dissertation.

It is proved by many reasons: 1° He who in the conflict of opinions concerning the objective honesty of an act follows the less probable standing against the law, leaving aside the more probable standing for the law, cannot frame for himself a conscience morally certain of the honesty and formal licitness of his act, neither from direct principles nor from reflex principles. Therefore he sins. The consequence is plain from what we said above, that only a morally certain conscience is the rule of our actions; because otherwise it is to act imprudently and expose oneself to the danger of sinning formally, and consequently to sin. And thus it is commonly admitted by probabilists. — The antecedent holds also for its first part; for from a less probable principle there cannot be deduced directly and immediately a morally certain conclusion: this too the adversaries concede. The whole difficulty, therefore, lies in the second part of the antecedent. Wherefore it is proved, the second part of the antecedent: 1° The reflex principles from which the probabilists contend they can immediately frame a conscience morally certain of the formal honesty of their action, by following the opinion less probable and less safe, that is, standing for liberty against the law, are: « He who acts probably acts prudently and safely. » — « The law which is probably judged not to exist is insufficiently promulgated and invincibly unknown, and therefore does not bind in act. » — « In doubt, better is the condition of the possessor of his liberty »; and certain others of less moment, for these are the principal ones. But these principles are uncertain and at most probable. Therefore from them there cannot be drawn a certain conclusion, or framed a conscience morally certain in practice of the formal honesty of the action. — The consequence is plain; for the conclusion cannot be more certain than its principles. — Proof of the minor: All anti-probabilists deny these principles as absolutely false, and without doubt their denial is probable; for they are authors most weighty in number and authority, nor are their reasons improbable: which two things found a probable opinion. Therefore these principles are uncertain and at most probable; for if they are probably false, they are only probably true. Wherefore, if the probabilists wish their reflex principles to be certain, such that from them a morally certain conscience can be framed, they must before all else prove that all the arguments we bring against them are not only not certain, but not even probable: which when they have done, we shall gladly associate ourselves with them.

2° Everyone is bound, in controversies and difficulties arising daily, especially in matters of faith and morals, sincerely to seek the truth while it lies hidden, and to strive toward it as much as he can. This principle is most certain and is proved in many ways: 1° From that of Ecclus., XXXVII, 20: Before all works let the word of truth precede thee. 2° Because the religion of Christ is a school of truth; for he himself is the way, the truth and the life, and he testifies that he came into the world to give testimony to the truth, and that he wished to institute a religion in which true adorers would adore the Father in spirit and in truth. 3° The office of an upright man requires that he not knowingly depart from the truth of the law, which all nations seek and intend. 4° Finally, right reason dictates it, whose object is truth. — I subjoin. But he who follows what he judges more probably false and contrary to the truth of the law, most certainly neither loves nor sincerely seeks the truth, nor strives toward it as much as he can. Therefore it is not lawful to follow the less probable opinion against the law, leaving aside the more probable for the law.

3° It is not lawful to follow the less safe opinion if it is not properly, solidly and expediently probable. But the less probable opinion, in conflict with the more probable, is not properly, solidly and expediently probable. — The major the probabilists now admit. — The minor is proved: That opinion is properly, solidly and expediently probable whose motives are so weighty and solid as to suffice for obtaining the assent of a prudent and learned man: thus the probabilists define it. But the motives of the less probable opinion, in conflict with the more probable, do not suffice for obtaining the assent of a prudent and learned man, but only for instilling some fear of the opposite. Therefore. — Proof of the minor: 1° The force and efficacy of those motives is overcome and crushed by stronger motives. Therefore. 2° A prudent man cannot assent to an opinion which he judges more probably false than true; for assent is an act of the mind by which we judge something true or more like the truth. Therefore. And so, although the less probable opinion in itself, or respectively in regard to him to whom its opposite does not appear more probable, can be called properly, solidly and expediently probable, yet otherwise comparatively in regard to him to whom the opposite is more probable.

4° He who acts according to the less probable and less safe opinion, in conflict with one more probable and safer, acts imprudently. Therefore he sins. — The antecedent is proved: Either he doubts of the honesty of his act, or he does not. If he doubts, he acts imprudently while that doubt stands, as he would act imprudently who took food which he doubted was poisoned; if he does not doubt, he is far more imprudent, since he does not doubt where there is so great reason for doubting, as he would be most imprudent who did not doubt food to be poisoned, while stronger motives dictated it to be poisoned.

5° According to the most celebrated rule of law, « in doubts the safer part is to be chosen¹. » But he who judges the action more probably illicit more than doubts of its honesty, as is plain from the terms. Therefore. And by this argument alone the whole controversy is absolutely decided; but this cardinal rule, which the probabilists keenly impugn, we shall establish with all its supports in the following article, and we shall shut off all the evasions of the probabilists. ¹ If the question is of acting while a practically practical doubt stands, because then the agent is not morally certain of the honesty of his action.

Finally attend to the following propositions condemned by Innocent XI, March 2, 1679: « Speaking generally, while the question is of probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not pass beyond the bounds of probability, confident we do something, we always act prudently. » It is no. 3. — Likewise: « An infidel will be excused from infidelity, not believing, led by a probable opinion. » It is no. 4. From the condemnation of which propositions these common principles of the probabilists seem condemned: « He who acts probably acts prudently² »; What is probable: therefore licit³; and the like. ² Below it will be said that this principle, taken nakedly, is not admitted by the true probabilists, because probability of itself is not a sufficient motive for acting licitly, unless the conscience be duly framed from some reflex principle. ³ The same must be said as of the preceding.

Obj.: The probabilist can frame for himself a morally certain conscience from this syllogism: He who acts as he probably judges to be licit acts prudently; for a probable opinion is that which rests upon a weighty motive, and to which a prudent man can assent. But he who follows the less probable opinion acts as he probably judges to be licit. Therefore he acts prudently.

I answer. I distinguish the major: He who acts as he probably judges to be licit acts prudently — if he does not judge it more probably illicit, pass the major; if he judges it more probably illicit, I deny the major. And in this sense distinguish the minor; I deny the consequence. For he truly is imprudent who does what he judges more probably illicit.

You will insist 1°: He who acts according to an opinion truly and solidly probable acts prudently, because he acts from a weighty and solid motive to which a prudent man can assent. But the opinion, even though less probable, in conflict with its more probable opposite, is truly and solidly probable; for it rests upon a weighty motive, nor is it contrary to Scripture, councils, or the Fathers, or evident reason. Therefore.

I answer. The major being granted, I distinguish the minor. For the less probable opinion, in conflict with its more probable opposite, is truly and solidly probable respectively in regard to him to whom the opposite does not appear more probable — grant the minor; respectively in regard to him to whom the opposite appears more probable — I deny it. For since its motives are crushed by the stronger motives of the more probable, it is not sufficient to obtain the assent of him to whom the opposite appears more probable; but that opinion only is truly, solidly and expediently probable which suffices to obtain assent, according to the probabilists themselves. See the third proof by reason.

You will insist 2°: The comparative supposes the positive. Therefore, if of two opinions one is more probable, the other is truly probable.

I answer. If probable be taken strictly and properly for that which is capable of obtaining the assent of a prudent man, I deny the supposition of the antecedent; for then the more probable is not taken comparatively but adversatively, so that the sense is: One is probable, the other is not. In which sense the Apostle spoke, I Cor., VII, 9: It is better to marry than to burn. And Susanna, Dan., XIII, 23: It is better to fall into your hands without wrongdoing than to sin in the sight of God — not that it is good to burn or to die; but because it is good not to marry and not to sin, evil to burn and to die. But if probable be taken less strictly and less properly for that which instills some fear of the opposite, then the more probable can indeed be taken comparatively, but nothing thence against us.

You will insist 3°: The less safe remains truly safe in the presence of the safer; e.g., the married state is truly safe, although religion is safer. Therefore similarly the less probable remains truly probable in the presence of the more probable.

I answer. I deny the consequence. The disparity is that greater and lesser security, especially in things pertaining to counsels and not to precepts, do not arise from contrary reasons which destroy one another, as greater and lesser probability do. Thus security in religion arises from the possibility of the commandments, likewise in the married state. But, on the contrary, the probability, e.g., of the triple contract as licit arises from the fact that society is not destroyed; the probability of the same as illicit arises from the fact that society is destroyed.

You will insist 4°: From what has been said, the less safe remains safe in the presence of the safer. But the less probable opinion is less safe. Therefore it remains safe in the presence of the more probable and safer. Therefore it is lawful to follow it.

I answer. I deny the minor. For the less probable opinion standing against the law is called less safe not comparatively but adversatively, that is, it is not safe, and the other is safe, as we said above of the less probable and the more probable.

You will insist 5°: The opinion absolutely and singly probable favoring liberty against the law is safe. But, from what has been said, safety is not destroyed by another safety. Therefore.

I answer. The antecedent being set aside, I distinguish the minor. Safety is not destroyed by another safety when security arises from elsewhere than from probability — grant the minor; if it arises from probability itself, I deny the minor and the consequence.

Other and indeed more urgent arguments drawn from the insufficient promulgation and invincible ignorance of the law, from possession of liberty, from the right of following the more benign side, etc., we shall propose and solve in the following article. Whence be it

Many probabilists, conquered by the arguments brought forward for the assertion of the preceding conclusion, in order that vague probabilism may have some worth, acknowledge at length that it is not licit to follow the less probable and less safe opinion, when a solidly more probable and safer one concurs; but they contend that it is at least licit to follow one equally or almost equally probable but less safe, leaving aside the equally probable safer one. Against whom

I say: In the conflict of two opinions equally probable concerning the objective honesty of an act, we are held to follow the safer.

It is proved. 1° by almost all the arguments whereby we proved the prior conclusion. Reread that. I only renew the third reason.

When both parts of a contradiction are equally probable, neither is properly and expediently probable. Therefore all the principles of the probabilists collapse. — Proof. of the antecedent. That is properly and expediently probable which is prudently approvable, or which is worthy that it be approved and assent be rendered unto it as true, although with fear of the opposite part. But when both parts of a contradiction, all things weighed, appear to anyone equally probable, he cannot prudently approve either as true in these circumstances ¹, or neither is sufficient for obtaining his prudent assent. Therefore. — The major is the adversaries'. — Proof of the minor. When both parts of a contradiction are equally probable, the motives of each mutually elide themselves and weigh equally, so that as much as these strive to obtain assent, so much do those strive toward the opposite; whence the intellect remains suspended and truly doubtful between the two ¹: just as a balance remains suspended in equilibrium while in either scale there are equal weights, or as a stone drawn toward opposite parts by a twofold equal force rests unmoved. Therefore. ¹ As certainly true, I concede; as truly probable, I deny. ¹ Indeed, if both propositions be looked upon in themselves or speculatively. But it does not follow from this that the equilibrium of the mind cannot be resolved practically by the weight of some reflected principle placed into the balance on this side or that. And this the probabiliorists themselves do, who affirm that the equilibrium must be resolved by the apposition of their reflected principle: « In doubt the safer part is to be followed. »

The probabilists say: The will can command assent to one part, as, e.g., in doubt concerning someone's probity, the will commands that he be judged good ². ² If anyone once instilled such an argument, he knew not, or had forgotten, that judgment of intellect necessarily precedes determination of will, and that will, as St. Thomas teaches and proves, is a blind power which follows the lead of intellect, and not intellect the lead of will.

I answer. according to some, impossible that the will efficaciously command the intellect assent to one part where the moments are equal. But, granted this to be absolutely possible, at least certainly it cannot come about prudently and rationally, but at most according to a mind preoccupied by passion or affection, not moved by reason: which suffices us. The reason is, because to judge prudently and rationally is to judge according to the merits of the cause and the moments of reasons; but he judges not according to the merits of the cause and the moments of reasons who judges for one part rather than for another when the moments are equal on both sides. Thus no one will reckon prudent and rational that empire of the will saying to the intellect: « Although no reason move thee to opine this contract licit rather than to opine it illicit, I will nevertheless that thou opine it licit rather than illicit. » Nay, on the contrary, there is none who does not disapprove such empire as imprudent and rash.

If thou say: From affection toward one part, that part which before appeared equal will appear more probable, I answer. 1° This granted, one already runs outside the thesis. 2° From affection one part cannot appear more probable, except insofar as affection obscures the intellect, and the obscuration inclines and makes him attend less lightly or not at all to the reasons for the safer part, more or solely to the reasons for the less safe part; and this is to act imprudently and irrationally.

To the example of him who from empire of will judges his neighbor probus in doubt concerning his malice, I answer: in this case there is present a certain rectifying principle of that empire, namely the law of charity and justice forbidding that one judge his neighbor evil unless it stand certain that he be such. But the probabilists have nothing similar.

It is proved. 2° most invincibly. This is the constant and undoubted rule of law: « In doubts the safer part is to be chosen. » But he who moves among two equally probable opinions is doubtful ¹, as is manifest from what was said. Therefore. ¹ He is doubtful with speculative practical doubt regarding the intrinsic truth of the opposed propositions: I concede; and if, such doubt not shaken off, he act with practical practical doubt about the honesty of the action, he sins formally, again I concede. If truly by help of some certain reflected principle he could discuss the practical practical doubt, so that he be certain that he acts honestly, even while the speculative practical doubt remains, I deny that he sins. Of this more fully below.

Proof. of the major. 1° Cap. Significasti, de homicid., lib. V Decretal., tit. 12, c. 18: in doubt whether a priest killed a man, he must be judged a homicide and irregular; because, as Innocent III says, « in this case it is safer to abstain than rashly to celebrate, for the reason that in the one no danger, in the other indeed great danger is feared. » Cap. Petitio tua, same tit., c. 24: when a cleric fighting against enemies of the Catholic faith struck some, and thence doubted whether he had killed anyone and incurred irregularity, Honorius III answers thus: « We command that, if thy conscience bite thee concerning the killing of anyone in that conflict, thou reverently abstain from the ministry of the altar: since it is more advisable in such doubt to abstain than rashly to celebrate. » And cap. Ad audientiam, same tit. ², when a certain priest, wishing to correct one of his household, wounded him with a knife slipping by chance from its sheath, it was doubted whether he had died from the occasion of the wound. Clement III responds thus: « We have judged that answer should be given to your discretion that, since in doubts we ought choose the safer path, it befits you to enjoin upon the aforesaid priest that he minister not in holy orders » ¹. ² Regarding the chapter Ad audientiam..., first it must be noted that the truth of the fact was not yet then explored, namely whether death had occurred from such a wound; for which cause the text subjoins: « If he die of another infirmity, he can minister divine things. » Therefore wisely did the Pontiff decree that meanwhile the priest not celebrate; for he said that in such doubt the safer way was to be chosen. It must be noted secondly, with Navarro and Suarez, that in that case there was no question of observing any precept, but only of a certain convenience, that, if it afterwards stood certain that the priest had been a homicide, there should be no scandal for the people to see him celebrating. The same was decreed in a similar case of doubtful homicide in cap. Petitio tua, 24 de homicid., where it was said: « Since it is more advisable in such doubt to abstain than rashly to celebrate. » Who sees not that in these cases, to put scandal to flight, it was necessary that the safer way be chosen, abstaining from celebration? ¹ Since in these cases there is question of factual and practical doubt, aptly says St. Ligorius, Morale systema, n. 79: « I concede that [these canons] are generally to be taken regarding all practical doubts and doubts of fact, such certainly were those which occurred with respect to the cases of the aforesaid canons, but not regarding all speculative doubts and doubts of law, as say St. Antoninus, Christianus Lupus, Joannes Nyder, Dominicus Soto, Suarez, Tabiena, Sylvester, Angelus, Henriquez, Angles, St. Bonaventure, Gerson, Pelbartus, and others almost commonly; for they say the aforesaid rule of the canons regarding speculative doubts is of counsel, not of precept. »

2° Cap. Illud, de clerico excommunicato, lib. V Decretal., tit. 27, c. 5. When the bishop of Hildesheim doubted whether the excommunication lata sent against him by the bishop of Magdeburg, Legate of the Holy See, to be borne without premised monition and without signification of the lata censura, bound him, and in this doubt had celebrated divine offices, Innocent III wrote back to the Chapter of Herbipolis in these words: « Although however he seem not to have stood wholly culpable in this, because nevertheless in doubts the safer way is to be chosen, even if he doubted of the sentence lata against him, he ought nevertheless rather to abstain than handle the ecclesiastical sacraments... While making mercy toward him, we have not judged the punishment which canon threatens those who after excommunication have presumed to celebrate divine offices... to be inflicted upon him » ¹. ¹ On cap. Illud the same Doctor says: « There the case was that a certain bishop, notwithstanding public fame of excommunication sent against him, chose rather to celebrate rashly. Wherefore by right we say he was punished with deposition by Innocent III; for, the doubt of excommunication persisting, he was held to employ diligence that he be made more certain of the truth, and in the meantime he ought to abstain from celebration. Therefore deservedly said the Pontiff: « Because in doubts the safer way is to be chosen, even if he doubted of the sentence lata against him, he ought nevertheless rather to abstain than handle the ecclesiastical sacraments. » Add that his jurisdiction had already become doubtful, and knowingly nullily and invalidly he committed himself to the danger of exercising many acts of his ministry and office. He stood therefore in practical doubt, which previously of necessity had to be discussed.

3° The Clementina Exivi, de verborum significatione, the Friars Minor asking the Apostolic Seat whether under mortal sin they were held to those things expressed in the rule of St. Francis in words of imperative mode, Clement V responds thus: « We therefore, since we delight in sincere consciences, attending that in those things which regard the salvation of the soul, to avoid grave remorse of conscience, the securer part must be held, etc. » ^{2 2} St. Ligorius to the Clementina Exivi answers thus: « The case was, as is read in the same text: Antecedently it had been doubted by the Brothers whether the rule obliged only to the vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. But Nicholas III pope had already declared it to oblige also to those evangelical counsels which were expressed in the rule in obligatory words of precept or equivalent to precept. Then the Brothers supplicated Clement V, that he declare to them « what things must be judged equivalent to precepts. » Therefore Clement, before he had expounded those things which seemed equivalent to precepts by force of the words and by reason of the grave matter treated, premised those words: « Ad Therefore in that case there was no question of two equally probable parts, but only whether there were obligation to follow that part which, according to the rigor of the rule and according to what Nicholas III had already declared, was not only safer, but was uniquely safe: since it already stood that the rule by force of the words and gravity of the matter obliged to observances, as precepts, not only the three principal vows of religion, but also the evangelical counsels which were set forth in the rule, and therefore these themselves could not be passed over without grave remorse of conscience. Hence said Clement, to avoid such remorses, that the securer part must be held, which in very fact was uniquely true and uniquely secure, and on the other side no reasons supplied which could excuse the transgression of those counsels from grave fault. »

Probabilism runs through the whole of Theology. It is a leaven which infects the whole mass of doctrine. Whether it corrupts that mass, or renders it more useful to souls, is called into dispute. To my weakness it appears so evident that Probabilism corrupts the whole doctrine of morals, and perverts all the rules of Christian doctrine, and undermines them from their deepest foundations, that words fail me to express it as its importance deserves. But lest the Probabilists be able in any way to carp at this sincere and ingenuous manner of writing of mine, I recall to their memory what the most learned Jesuit Fr. Ignacio de Camargo writes in the Preface to his Rule of Morals, § 12. Let no one, he says, justly reprehend me, that in disputing against the benign opinion I have drawn from it very many consequences which he may affirm, or prove, to be by far most horrendous, or heretical, or blasphemous ... Otherwise the argument from the absurd, as they call it, or from the impossible — than which none is more frequent in Theology — will have to be done away with. And this most celebrated Jesuit adds in the same place: But I see that there are many Probabilists truly most delicate, who, while they themselves most audaciously say and write whatever they please, not only about our opinion, but even about its Patrons, yet cannot bear their own benign opinion to be even lightly touched. But whether they will or not, they must needs endure and patiently bear that we, according to our small measure, despising all human respect, vindicate the evangelical doctrine of morals from vain inventions and pernicious opinions.

I. In this whole work I shall first of all recall before the readers' eyes the theses condemned by the Church, that they may be able in advance to guard themselves from the danger of erring. The following, in the controversy of Probabilism, the Roman See proscribed under Alexander VII and the Venerable Innocent XI, Supreme Pontiff:

1. If a Book be that of some more recent and modern author, its opinion ought to be considered probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the apostolic See as improbable. — Proposition 27 of Alexander VII.

2. It is not illicit, in conferring the Sacraments, to follow a probable opinion regarding the validity of the Sacrament, leaving aside the safer one, unless law, convention, or the danger of incurring grave harm forbid it. Hence it is only in the conferring of Baptism, of priestly or episcopal Orders, that a merely probable opinion must not be used. — Proposition 1 of Innocent XI.

3. I probably think that a judge can judge according to an opinion even less probable. — Proposition 2 of the same.

4. In general, when we do anything relying upon probability, whether intrinsic or extrinsic, however slight, provided one does not depart from the bounds of probability, we always act prudently. — Proposition 3 of the same.

5. An infidel who does not believe, led by a less probable opinion, will be excused of infidelity. — Proposition 4 of the same.

6. It is probable that the precept of charity towards God does not, of itself, rigorously oblige even once in every five years. — Proposition 6 of the same.

I. The true definition of a probable opinion is this: An assent of the intellect to one part, with fear of the opposite part, on account of a probable motive, as St. Thomas with the other Theologians teaches, I, q. 79, art. 9, ad 4. "Probable" is taken by relation to truth. If this truth lies open to the mind by evident and certain reasons, then the mind elicits a certain and evident assent, and has concerning such truth a certitude free of all fear of the opposite part. If this truth offers itself to the mind by probable reasons only, then the mind forms an opinative assent, that is, a probable opinion. Wherefore probability is the same as verisimilitude.

II. One opinion is called more verisimilar, or more probable, than another, when more solid weights of reason occur for the former than for the latter. Wherefore that is more probable which approaches nearer to the truth. That opinion is named less probable which approaches the truth less, and stands farther from it than the more probable. Before the rise of Probabilism, the more probable opinion alone was held for a probable opinion. For the less probable opinion, in view of the more probable, was not probable to all the ancients — and in very deed is not, as will become plain below. However the matter may stand, our position does not depend upon this distinction.

III. The probable opinion is divided into speculative and practical. This division, taken absolutely, is true. For some sciences are speculative, which halt in speculation and meditation alone; others extend themselves to the work, and are called practical. This distinction many abuse, who call that opinion speculatively probable which regards the action prescinded from its peculiar circumstances, and practically probable that which considers the object, or the action, clothed with its circumstances. Hence they gather that an opinion which was speculatively probable becomes practically improbable on account of the variation of the circumstances. This division, explained in this fashion, Fr. Vasquez rightly impugns, tome I on the I-II, disputation 62, chapter 4, and disputation 65, chapter 1. For when the circumstances are varied in the genus of morals, the opinion does not remain the same, but becomes another. For the same opinion is called speculative inasmuch as it meditates the object with all its circumstances, and halts in speculation alone; but it becomes practical insofar as it directs and commands the execution of the work. For from speculative probability the practical arises; that is, speculative probability itself, by extension, becomes practical, without the variation or diversity of any circumstance.

IV. Again, that opinion is probable from within [ab intrinseco] which rests upon a solid and grave foundation of reason; and it is probable from without [ab extrinseco] when it rests upon the authority of Theologians. This authority must be measured not so much by their number as by their merit, doctrine, and sanctity. Furthermore, one opinion is objectively probable, which is such in itself, inasmuch as it has for itself grave weights of reasons, whether drawn from reason or from authority; and another is called subjectively probable, which so appears to a serious man maturely considering its reasons and foundations. If these reasons be in very truth solid and grave, then the opinion is probable both objectively and subjectively.

V. Finally, one opinion is safe, another safer. The lay and the matrimonial state is safe; the religious state is safer; yet each state is safe. And because Fr. Medina uses this example, on the I-II, question 19, article 6, in explaining the probable and the more probable, he is therefore commonly excused by many from the Probabilism of the Moderns. The use of this distinction, then, has place only when both opinions are certain, but one is more removed from the danger of sinning even materially. Contrition formed by imperfect charity suffices, in the opinion of all, for the Sacrament of penance. This opinion is safe. But if the charity be perfect, the opinion becomes surely safer.

VI. Very many of the unskilled confound the safer opinion with the more probable, and the safe with the less probable. Hence the Probabiliorists are called by the unskilled crowd Tutiorists and Rigorists. But this is a putrid calumny, born of ignorance — and that a supine ignorance. An opinion standing for the law is safer, but not on that account more probable. For that opinion is called safer which more removes a man from the danger of sinning. If, however, it be sometimes asserted that such an opinion binds a man to its execution, it will be false and improbable. More safely, surely, will a man keep chastity if he never look upon or address women; and more safely will he abstain from usury if he enter into no contracts. But if you would absolutely bind men to abstain from converse with all women, and from every contract, the opinion is utterly improbable and false. For the safer opinion and the more probable opinion flow from diverse principles: the latter from a greater approach to the truth, and from graver weights of reasons; the former from a greater withdrawal from the danger of sinning.

VII. Lastly, probability is divided into the probability of conscience and the probability of impunity. The probability of conscience is that of which we have spoken hitherto. The probability of impunity is that which books enjoy that are published with the approbation of the Revisers or Censors — which probability by no means suffices for forming a probable conscience. Wherefore the following opinion was proscribed by Alexander VII: If a Book be that of some more recent and modern author, its opinion ought to be considered probable, so long as it is not established that it has been rejected by the apostolic See as improbable. Hence it is plain under how great an ignorance they labor who blurt out: The Book is approved; therefore its opinion enjoys probability. This mere probability of impunity is enjoyed by many constitutions of the Regular Orders, which have been approved in common form, but not in specific form. By this latter approbation, with solemn rite, all the opinions and laws contained in the book are discussed and approved one by one. Whether by this approbation in specific form, as they say, any constitutions of Orders have been approved, I do not know. Commonly they have been approved in common form; and then they enjoy only the probability of impunity. Wherefore, just as in other books approved in common form, so also in these constitutions improbable opinions can occur. And then the pontifical approbations are ineptly alleged, that such improbable opinions may be maintained as probable with the probability of conscience, when they are only probable with the probability of impunity.

VIII. The argument about which the disputation is instituted, and which runs through the whole of Theology, is of this kind. Someone doubts whether some action be morally evil, that is, prohibited by the divine law. He recognizes that grave and pious Theologians fight with one another on both sides, and contradict each other. All things having been maturely weighed, by proofs drawn both from reason and from authority, he finds and judges it more verisimilar that such an action is vicious: he sees that the foundations which prove the malice and prohibition of the action are the graver, and outweigh the foundations of the opposite opinion, which stands for the honesty of that same action. It is asked whether he can, rejecting the more probable, embrace the less probable opinion, and freely execute the aforesaid action.

IX. The Antiprobabilists deny it. The Probabilists on the contrary affirm it, and defend the position that the use of either opinion is licit, so that the Christian can choose whichever he prefers: the more probable, indeed, by the counsel of greater perfection; but the less probable by the liberty of election, since no precept urges to the former.

I. There is no need of many words, O Ministers of Christ, to persuade you to withdraw from the kingdom of Probabilism — in which, as Bishop Palanco, a man most celebrated not for doctrine only but also for sanctity of morals, says, it is not God who reigns, but the inventions of men and their vain cogitations. But Christ your Master, Matthew 15, cries out: In vain do they worship me, teaching doctrines and commandments of men. And they are doctrines of men, not of God, which I have hitherto studied to refute.

II. Seriously, I pray you, weigh the security and tranquillity which the Probabilists promise you at that very time at which you repel the more splendid light — by the force of a human reflection which men have devised. Against them cry the divine Scriptures. Hear Paul, 1 Corinthians 4: For I am not conscious to myself of any thing; yet am I not hereby justified. Would the Probabilists have replied to the Apostle that he should form for himself a reflex syllogism, by which to shake off his fear? But Paul straightway adds: But he that judgeth me is the Lord. And he judges, not according to the reflex doctrines which men have devised, but according to his own law — eternal, immutable, and true. Wherefore Paul exhorts, Philippians chapter 2, that with fear and trembling you work out your salvation. This holy fear and dread the divine Scriptures continually urge and command. Serve ye the Lord with fear, and rejoice unto him with trembling: Psalm 2. Who can understand sins? From my secret ones cleanse me: Psalm 18.

III. To whom, then, must we hearken? To the divine Scriptures, or to the Probabilists? The Scriptures cry: There is a way which seemeth just to a man; but the ends thereof lead to death. Probabilism, on the contrary, contends that that becomes right which appears distorted and erroneous, by the help of a single reflex proposition. But why do I prolong further the most manifest opposition between the holy Scriptures and the probabilistic axioms? You yourselves, O Ministers of Christ, already perceive that nothing is so hostile to the accomplishing of the business of eternal salvation as the security introduced by this new manner of opining, which equals error itself — covered over by the artifice of subtle reflections and by the darkness of ignorance — to truth. But Ecclesiasticus, chapter 2 [recte 11], says: Error and darkness are created with sinners; and David adds: The Lord knoweth the thoughts of men, that they are vain: Psalm 93.

IV. But let this remain fixed more deeply in your souls, O Ministers of God, which St. Paul commends to you: Preach the word: be instant in season, out of season: reprove, entreat, rebuke in all patience and doctrine: 2 Timothy 4. The word, not of men, but of God, is to be preached by you — not from the pulpit only, but above all from the very tribunal of penance. A double doctrine — one for the chair, another for the tribunal of loosing and binding — the Scribes and Pharisees devised. One, and that a simple one, is the doctrine of Christ, which, adds St. Paul, men refuse to endure, because it is an enemy to the flesh and to the appetites; and therefore they busy themselves to corrupt it with cavils, paradoxes, and unheard-of inventions. For there shall be a time, when they will not endure sound doctrine; but, according to their own desires, they will heap to themselves teachers, having itching ears; and will indeed turn away their hearing from the truth, but will be turned unto fables.

V. That doctrine is corrupt, says St. Thomas with all the Fathers on this place, which has falsity mingled with it. Probabilism has falsity mingled with it, since it defends the licit use of contrary opinions about the same action. Whether the things which we have hitherto refuted be fables, judge you yourselves. The doctrines which I have confuted itch in the ears, indulge the desires of men, favor human liberty against the law of God. What clearer sign do you await? What excuse can you offer, if you allow yourselves to be deceived? Nay, that the Apostle might shut every crack of escape, he foretold that this corruption of doctrine, these fables, these masters with itching ears, would come in the last days. Know also this, that, in the last days, shall come dangerous times. He describes the endowments of these men, that we may be able to be on our guard: Men shall be lovers of themselves, covetous, haughty, proud ... having an appearance indeed of godliness, but denying the power thereof ... For of these sort are they who creep into houses, and lead captive silly women laden with sins, who are led away with divers desires: ever learning, and never attaining to the knowledge of the truth. They always confess; they always, or frequently, eat the body of Christ; they attend sermons and discourses; they have frequent and familiar converse with the ministers of God: yet they never dismiss the pomps, the luxury, and the ambition of the world; but, laden with the burdens of sins, and puffed up with divers desires, they flee from and reject the knowledge of the truth.

VI. But know this: that you can by no means announce this doctrine of divine truth, and openly inculcate it in season and out of season, without sustaining reproaches, derisions, and persecutions — and those grave ones. For Paul adds in the same place, chapter 3: And all that will live godly in Christ Jesus shall suffer persecution.

XVI. Would you have things better? Probabilism teaches that it is free to select either of two probable opinions. When two contradictory probable opinions occur, a judge can pass sentence according to that which shall have pleased him more. Further, that he select this rather than the other is appraisable at a price. Therefore he can by right sell this preference of one opinion over another. Therefore probabilism is matter of selling and buying. What wonder then, if a ware so precious be defended with so great a heat of disputation? See how true is the oracle of Alexander VII, that this manner of opining is the head of all evils.

IX. Two things here I would have you weigh carefully. The first is that, by the adversaries' own admission, our discussion concerns a doubt not light, empty, founded on scruples and inept conjectures, but resting on grave reasons on either side. The second is that, in the aforesaid doctrine, the whole deadly poison of Probabilism lies hidden. Even when stronger reasons press in favor of the vow's having been made, the one in doubt will still be free of the vow! Without doubt. Why? Because the certain possession of liberty can be dislodged from its place not by stronger, and weightier, reasons, but only by the most evident, and most invincible ones. But tell me, first of all: do these stronger reasons render the doubt merely speculative, and not practical? They incline the intellect, at least, more strongly in favor of the vow. The doubt, then, will be direct and practical, not merely reflex. Nothing could be clearer, or more significant, for the integrity of evangelical morals. Then, on what foundation do you assert that human liberty, in a doubtful contest, takes precedence over natural or divine right? For natural and divine right are, in fact, prior to the liberty of the one vowing; indeed, the liberty of the one vowing is born subject to natural and divine right, from which the vow shines forth in the obligation of payment. It is so, you say, when this divine right is really given. But when I doubt whether the vow was made, I doubt whether this divine right exists or not; and, on the other hand, I am certain that I was free from this right before making the vow. This is precisely what we are asking. Why do they wish, when contending at the tribunal of reason between divine right against liberty, and liberty against divine right, that the judgment ought to be given in favor of liberty, even when stronger reasons press in favor of divine right? Human laws, indeed, have established a rule to remove quarrels, lawsuits, and countless other evils — that, in the possession of estates, the condition of the possessor be the better one. But what book of the sacred Scriptures, what Council, what ecclesiastical decree has issued any canon establishing that, in matters pertaining to the business of eternal salvation, the condition of human liberty in possession takes precedence over divine right, when doubts, or disputes, occur on either side — indeed, even when stronger reasons press in favor of the vow, or of divine right? Let them produce a single Scripture, or a single Council, or some Father, or some Doctor of eminent name and authority, who, before the fifteenth century, taught that, in doubts where mortal sin is at issue, the condition of human liberty in possession is the better one. We, on the contrary, establish from Scripture, the canons, and the Fathers, that in doubtful ways the safer is to be chosen, and uncertainties abandoned, when certainties present themselves. But, to drive our adversaries to the wall, let me reduce that rule — "the condition of the possessor is the better one" — to our own case, so that it may be seen to be true even here: natural, or divine, law is itself the will of God, or God himself. God is the first possessor. The will, or liberty, [of man] is born subject to God. Whenever, then, there is doubt about possession, possession stands for God. Better, then, is the condition of him who possesses God, through his own law. See our History of Probabilism and Rigorism, Vol. II, diss. 3, where we have explained this argument at length. But more on this in its proper place.

According to a certain recent author,¹ the question whether workmen may lawfully act according to a trade-union rule which is probably unjust can be resolved by comparing the injuries which would follow for the workmen if they did not act in that way with the injuries to the employers which would follow if they did act in that way. For it is lawful to choose the lesser of two evils.

1 Dr. W. McDonald, Principles of Moral Science, p. 213.

Accordingly, a certain workmen’s association forbids bricklayers to lay more than five hundred bricks daily, although they could easily lay seven hundred. If we suppose that the rule is probably unjust, and that a greater injury would come to the workmen than to the employers unless they obey the association, Titius, a priest, would like to know whether it is lawful for them to act according to the given rule recently established. Hence it is asked:

1. Is it always lawful to follow a probable opinion?

2. If it is not always lawful, how can probabilism be called a universal norm?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. Is it always allowed to follow a probable opinion?

No, it is only allowed to follow a probable opinion when the only question is whether the action be sinful or not. If there is also question of an end which must be gained, or a probability of infringing the certain right of another, or if reverence for a sacrament forbids one to expose it to the danger of being null and void by using a probable opinion, the use of a probable opinion in these circumstances is not lawful.

2. How, then, can probabilism be called a universal rule?

Probabilism is a universal rule for forming a certain conscience in cases where there is no certain law which forbids the action contemplated. But there is a certain law which forbids one to jeopardize the attainment of an end which must be gained. The law which makes the attainment of the end obligatory makes it also obligatory to use safe means, not merely probable means, to attain it. And so an Anglican who thinks that Anglicanism is probably the true form of Christianity is not justified in exposing his salvation to risk by remaining an Anglican. The certain - law of justice forbids me to do anything which will probably injure the undoubted right of another. Reverence for God and for sacred things forbids me to expose a sacrament to the probable danger of nullity without necessity, and then necessity does away with the irreverence.

3. What is to be said to the case?

The rule that we may choose the less of two evils is applicable where we are under the necessity of choosing one of them, as in perplexities of conscience. Thus if a priest remembers at the Canon when saying Mass that he is not fasting, he may think that he will commit sin if he goes on by violating the law of the Church about fasting celebration, and also that he will sin if he breaks off the Mass to the scandal of the faithful and against the rubrics. He must either go on or stop. In such a perplexity sound morality teaches that he must choose the lesser evil. But if two courses of action are proposed to me, both wrong, and there is no necessity for me to adopt either, I must avoid both. Not only greater evil, but less evil also is to be avoided. The maxim that of two evils we must choose the less is inapplicable here. And so I must not violate the right of another in order to save myself from ruin. I could not lawfully steal five pounds from a millionaire even though it would save me from bankruptcy, while the loss would not be felt by him. The doctrine proposed in the case appears to offend against these principles of sound morality.

A bricklayers’ union makes a new rule that no member must lay more than 500 bricks daily, though 700 could be laid easily. This rule is supposed here to be probably unjust, because by contract the bricklayers bind themselves to do a fair day’s work. The employer has a certain right to a fair day’s work; 500 bricks a day is probably not a fair day’s work; and so the bricklayers do not fulfil the terms of their contract entered into before the new rule was made, and sin against justice. It is as if I paid a debt of five pounds with a bank-note which is probably forged. It will be no defence for the bricklayers to say that they will suffer more than the employer if they do not obey the rule laid down by the union. Even if this were conceded, it would not be lawful to injure the employer in order to save themselves from loss.

Caius confessed to Titius, a new confessor, that he had paid a debt of five pounds sterling with doubtful money. Titius remembered that a similar case gives theologians occasion for dispute, but, since he did not retain the certain solution in his memory, he asked Caius to return to him the following week. Meanwhile, he proposed the question for solution to two fellow priests. The first replied that a certain obligation cannot be fulfilled by an uncertain payment, and therefore the whole debt must be paid again. The other, however, replied that, since payment was probably made, nothing remained to be done. Titius, therefore, still doubtful about the answer to be given to Caius, asks:

1. In what does the principal difference between probabilism and equiprobabilism consist?

2. Is it lawful to use probabilism where there is question of probable injury to another?

3. How can probabilism be called a universal rule for forming conscience when it cannot be applied to many cases?

4. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. What is the chief difference between probabilism and equiprobabilism? In spite of theoretical differences on the question of the chief formula employed to form a conscience in case of uncertain and conflicting opinions about the lawfulness of an action, in practice there is virtual agreement between moderate probabilists and equiprobabilists on the main point. This is seen in the doctrine and practical solutions which are common to both schools. However, there is a difference of some importance between them on a subsidiary rule. When it is solidly probable that a law has ceased to bind, either because it is probably abrogated or because it has probably been complied with, probabilists deny that any obligation remains in such circumstances. On the other hand equiprobabilists affirm that the obligation remains until it has been complied with for certain, or at least until it is certainly more probable that it has been complied with. They admit that St. Alphonsus followed other probabilists in this question in the earlier editions of his “Moral Theology,” but they assert that he afterward changed his opinion. The chief reason alleged for their doctrine by equiprobabilists is the principle of possession — in doubt the condition of him who is in possession is the stronger. Therefore, they conclude, when it is not practically certain that the law has been complied with, inasmuch as it is in possession, the obligation still remains. Probabilists deny that the law can be said to be in possession when there is a solidly probable opinion that it has been complied with or has ceased to exist. In order that the principle of possession may be applied the possession must be a certain fact, and it is not a certain fact if it has probably ceased. Furthermore, the principle is applicable in its proper sense to a case of negative doubt, and when there is a probable opinion against the obligation, it is not a case of merely negative doubt.

2. See the answer to this question, p. 54.

3. See the answer to this question, p. 55.

4. The case. Caius confesses to Titius his confessor that he has paid a debt of five pounds with money which was probably false. In doing this he committed a sin against justice, and he should repent of it. As there was a probability that the money paid was false, it was not worth five pounds, and so Caius did not pay his debt in full. But now, on the other hand, it is probable that the debt has been paid; has Caius any further obligation of making restitution? The creditor has not any certain right to further payment; he has by hypothesis probably received payment in full, and thus no certain obligation rests on Caius of making further restitution. He committed sin in exposing himself to the probable danger of injuring his neighbor, but as it is not certain that any injury was in fact inflicted on his neighbor, Caius is not now bound to make restitution.¹

1 St. Alphonsus, book iii, p. 562.

Cecilia confesses to Titius, her confessor, various grave sins against the sixth commandment. After making inquiries, he finds that she is in a proximate occasion of sinning against that commandment. When Titius asks whether she can leave that occasion, Cecilia replies that another confessor said that she was not bound to do so, since it is a necessary occasion. After further inquiries, Titius judges this opinion to be altogether false, and that Cecilia can leave that occasion with some inconvenience indeed, but not with grave inconvenience. Nevertheless, he does not know whether he ought to impose the obligation of leaving it, since there is a contrary judgment of another confessor. Hence he asks:

1. Can a penitent with a safe conscience follow the judgment of a confessor?

2. Can a confessor permit a penitent to follow an opinion which the penitent believes probable, but which the confessor judges false?

3. What is to be said concerning the case?

1. May a penitent follow the opinion and direction of his confessor with a safe conscience?

Yes; in general in a case of doubt the penitent may follow the advice of his confessor whom he has reason to believe is a good and prudent man. By consulting his confessor where he can not form his conscience for himself he takes the ordinary means to resolve his doubts. Just as a man consults his lawyer on a point of law and abides usually by his decision, so on a point of morals a penitent is justified in abiding by the advice of his confessor who is presumed to be an expert in matters of Christian morality. Of course exceptions may occur. The penitent may be a well-instructed Catholic and the confessor may be a poorly instructed priest, and it may be that the penitent sees good ground for distrusting the confessor’s opinion on some point; in that case the penitent must follow his own conscience, for his own conscience is his guide in conduct, not that of his confessor.

2. May a confessor permit a penitent to follow an opinion which the penitent thinks probable, but which the confessor thinks is false?

Here we must distinguish. If the opinion in question is recognized as probable by theologians of note, and the penitent wishes to follow their opinion, he has a perfect right to do so, and the confessor has no authority to prevent him. The confessor is a judge of sins and of the dispositions of his penitent, not of theological opinions. If, however, the opinion in question is not recognized as probable by theologians, but is only thought to be so by another confessor and the penitent; and the confessor whose absolution the penitent desires holds it as certain that the opinion is false, the confessor who thinks this can not allow the penitent to follow the opinion in question. For although the confessor is not a judge of theological opinions, yet he is a judge as to whether his penitent is being deceived or not by a false and dangerous delusion.¹

1 St. Alphonsus, book vi, no. 604.

3. The case. Titius finds out from her confession that his penitent Cicily is in a proximate occasion of committing sins against the sixth commandment. Titius asks whether she can avoid the occasion, and she answers that another confessor told her that she was not bound to avoid it as it was necessary. After putting other questions Titius comes to the conclusion that that opinion is altogether false, as in his judgment Cicily can avoid the occasion with some but not great inconvenience. However, he does not know whether he can and should impose this obligation on his penitent. We answer that he should. By hearing Cicily’s confession he accepts the responsibility of directing her, and in his opinion she is under the obligation of avoiding the proximate occasion of sin in which she is placed, and so he should tell her this. He will be justified in refusing absolution if she does not accept his ruling.¹

1 St. Alphonsus, book vi, no. 604.

1. Sometimes conscience returns a clear, positive answer as to the morality of an act contemplated. True or false the answer may be, but the ring of it has no uncertain sound. At other times conscience is perplexed, and her answer is, perhaps, and perhaps not. When the woman hid Achimaas and Jonathan in the well, and said to Absalom's servants, "They passed on in haste" (2 Kings xvii. 17-21), did she do right in speaking thus to save their lives? A point that has perplexed consciences for centuries. A man's hesitation is sometimes subjective and peculiar to himself. It turns on a matter of fact, which others know full well, though he doubts; or on a point of law, dark to him, but clearly ruled by the consent of the learned. In such cases it is his duty to seek information from people about him, taking so much trouble to procure it as the importance of the matter warrants, not consulting ten doctors as to the ownership of one hen. But it may be that all due enquiries fail. The fact remains obscure; or about the law, doctors differ, and arguments conflict indecisively. What is the man to do? Take the safe course: suppose there is an obligation, and act accordingly? This principle, put as a command, would make human life intolerable. It is, moreover, false, when so put, as we shall presently prove. Take the easy course, and leave the obligation out of count? This principle is more nearly correct than the other: but it needs interpretation, else it may prove dangerously lax.

2. To return to Achimaas and Jonathan and their hostess. Some such reckoning as this may have passed through her mind: "Lying lips are an abomination to the Lord: but is it a lie to put murderers off the scent of blood?" To that question finding no answer, she may have made up her mind in this way: "Well, I don't know, but I'll risk it." If that were her procedure, she did not walk by the scientific lines of Probabilism. The probabilist runs no risk, enters upon no uncertainty, and yet he by no means always follows what is technically termed the safe course, that is, the course which supposes the obligation, e.g., in the case in point, to have said simply where the men were. How then does the probabilist contrive to extract certainty out of a case of insoluble doubt? By aid of what is called a reflex principle. A reflex is opposed to a direct principle. A direct principle lays down an obligation, as it would bind one who had a perfect discernment of the law and of the facts of the case, and of the application of the one to the other, and who was perfectly able to keep the law. By a reflex principle, a man judges of his own act, taking account of the imperfection of his knowledge and the limitations of his power. Probabilism steps in, only where a case is practically insoluble to an agent upon direct principles. The probabilist thereupon leaves the direct speculative doubt unsolved. He relinquishes the attempt of determining what a man should do in the case in question, who had a thorough insight into the lie of the law. He leaves that aside, and considers what is his duty, or not his duty, in the deficiency of his knowledge. Then he strikes upon the principle, which is the root of Probabilism, that a doubtful law has no binding power. It will be observed that this is a reflex principle. For objectively nothing is doubtful, but everything is or is not in point of fact. To a mind that had a full grasp of the objective order of things, there would be no doubtful law: such a mind would discern the law in every case as holding or not holding. But no human mind is so perfect. Every man has to take account of his own limitations of vision in judging of his duty. The question for me is, not the law absolutely, but the law as far as I can make it out. Our proposition, then, states that when an individual, using such moral diligence of enquiry as the gravity of the matter calls for, still remains in a state of honest doubt as to whether the law binds, in that mental condition it does not bind him.

3. What the law does not forbid, it leaves open. Aristotle indeed (Eth., V., xi., 1) says the contrary, that what the law does not command (he instances suicide), it forbids. All that he seems to mean is, that if there be an act which at times might appear advantageous, and yet is never commanded, there is a presumption of the legislator being averse to that act. Again, there are special occasions, in view of which the legislator undertakes to regulate the whole outward conduct of a man by positive enactment, as with a soldier on parade: what is not there commanded, is forbidden. But these instances do not derogate from our general proposition, which is proved in this way. The office of law is not to loose, but to bind. It declares, not what the subject may do, but what he must or must not. It does not bring liberty, but restriction. Therefore, if any one wishes to assert a restriction, he must go to a law to prove it. If he can find none, liberty remains. The law is laid on liberty. Liberty is not the outcome of law, but prior to it. Liberty is in possession. The burden of proof rests with those who would abridge liberty and impose an obligation. It is an axiom of law itself, a natural, not an arbitrary axiom, that better is the condition of the possessor: which amounts in this matter to another statement, also axiomatic, that a law binds not till it is promulgated. But a law of which I have serious outstanding doubts whether it exists at all, or, if existent, whether it reaches my case, is for this occasion a law not duly promulgated to me. Therefore it binds me not, and my liberty remains.

4. It remains to consider what constitutes a serious outstanding doubt. The word outstanding has been already explained. It means that we have sought for certain information, and cannot procure it. Now what is a serious doubt? It is a doubt founded on a positive opinion against the existence of the law, or its applicability to the case in point, an opinion fraught with probability, solid, comparative, practical probability. The doubt must not be mere negative doubt, or ignorance that cannot tell why it doubts; not a vague suspicion, or sentimental impression that defies all intellectual analysis; not a mere subjective inability to make up one's mind, but some counter-reason that admits of positive statement, as we say, in black and white. It is true that many minds cannot define their grounds of doubt, even when these are real. Such minds are unfit to apply the doctrine of Probabilism to themselves, but must seek its application from others. The opinion against the law, when explicitly drawn out, must be found to possess a solid probability. It may be either an intrinsic argument from reason and the nature of the case, or an extrinsic argument from the word of some authority: but the reason or the authority must be grave. The opinion is thus said to be intrinsically or extrinsically probable. The probability must also be comparative. There is many an argument, in itself a very good one, that perishes when we come to consider the crushing weight of evidence on the other side. An opinion is comparatively probable, when after hearing all the reasons and all the authorities on the other side, the said opinion still remains not unlikely, which is all that we mean to say of an opinion here, when we call it probable. In ordinary English, the word probable means more likely than otherwise, which is not the signification of the Latin opinio probabilis. Lastly, the probability must be practical: it must take account of all the circumstances of the case. Practical probability is opposed to speculative, which leaves out of count certain circumstances, which are pretty sure to be present, and to make all the difference in the issue. Thus it is speculatively probable that a Catholic might without sin remain years without confession, never having any grievous sins to confess, grievous sin alone being necessary matter for that sacrament. There is no downright cogent reason why a man might not do so. And yet, if he neglected such ordinary means of grace as confession of venial sin, having it within reach, month after month, no one, considering "the sin which surrounds us," would expect that man to go without grievous scathe. In mechanics, there are many machines that work prettily enough in speculation and on paper, where the inventors do not consider the difficulties of imperfect material, careless handling, climate, and other influences, that render the invention of no practical avail.

5. The safest use of Probabilism is in the field of property transactions and of positive law. There is greatest risk of using it amiss in remaining in a false religion. All turns upon the varying amount of trouble involved in moral diligence of enquiry, according as the matter at issue is a point of mere observance or of vital interest.

6. The point on which the probability turns must be the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the action, not any other issue, as that of the physical consequences. Before rolling boulder-stones down a hill to amuse myself, it is not enough to have formed a probable opinion that there is no one coming up. That would be Probabilism misapplied. The correct enquiry is: Does any intrinsic reason or extrinsic authority make the opinion probable, that it is lawful for mere amusement to roll down rocks with any belief short of certainty that no one will be crushed thereby? The probability, thus turned on to the lawfulness of the action, breaks down altogether. This explanation, borne in mind, will save much misapprehension.

Romualdus, a not very conscientious priest, yet inclined to scrupulosity and suffering from it all the more as up to the present he has been unable to determine upon following one certain moral system, turns now to probabilism in order to rid himself of his scruples. He intends to carry it through in such way that he will invariably, in regard to himself and in the guidance of others, follow the less severe, if still probable, opinion. Especially does he believe: 1. That whenever opinions differ whether an obligation is present or not, the opinion favoring freedom from obligation may be accepted; 2. The lenient opinion is to be accepted if doubt prevails whether an obligation (sin) be grievous or slight; 3. If, finally, with regard to the necessary subjective conditions (appreciation and sufficient action of the will) for a grievous offense, there prevails an uncertainty in the penitent, according to the same principles of probabilism he may always decide on a merely slight offense.

What is to be said, I. Of Romualdus’ view in general; II. Of his particular tenets? Of course it is presumed here that probabilism and its application is lawful.

I. According to the lucid explanation of LEHMKUHL (I, n. 82 sq.) probabilism applies only to the intrinsic lawfulness of an action, or its appropriateness for a (certain) end to be attained. In regard to the matter and form of the Sacraments, in so far as their validity is concerned, the system can not be applied. Eternal salvation is the goal of every man, the means necessary for the attainment of this goal must naturally also be available. No mere probability can be of assistance in this respect; there must be, as is self-evident, as far as possible, a moral certainty attempted. Furthermore a great deal that is lawful in itself, may, either in consequence of the general frailty of human nature, or in regard to special circumstances, conceal dangers and therefore be more or less unlawful; lastly, man not only must avoid the evil, but also do the good, and, in proportion to his state and the graces granted him by God, he must strive after perfection; it is the confessor’s duty not merely to prevent, as far as possible, a penitent from sinning, but also to lead him on to the path of virtue. Much as it is to be desired that the penitent should be enlightened to such extent that he would not sin as result of a false conscience, yet it would be wrong to advise, or even command him, under all circumstances to choose the easier way.

From the above it is obvious under what suppositions alone Romualdus’ proceeding might be considered justified, and that for him, who on one hand inclines to scruples, and is not very conscientious on the other hand, as is not infrequently a fact with scrupulous people, there is the danger of entering upon a course which is opposed alike to the nature of probabilism and to the rules for its application.

II. With respect to the particular tenets of Romualdus, the following must be said:

Ad. 1. The tenets here presented—supposing of course the premises suggested under I. prevail—lie in the nature of probabilism; hence the adherer of this system may and will follow it.

2. From the maxim: A doubtful law does not bind there appears at the first glance to follow not only: An obligation is not to be imposed where it is not certainly established; but also: A grave obligation is not to be imposed where, etc.:

Upon this point also—again of course suppositis supponendis— we may agree with Romualdus. Upon closer observation, however, the matter would not seem quite so simple. Of the cases namely in which there is doubt between strict and lesser obligation (grievous and slight sin) two distinct kinds are distinguishable. Firstly, such doubt may arise from the uncertainty, whether in addition to a slight obligation there is not also, different from the first, another more serious obligation. Here, according to the principles of probabilism, one will as a matter of fact decide only on the absence of a serious obligation (in practise). Thus he who recites his breviary voluntarily without interior attention, certainly is at fault on account of lack of reverence toward God, although on this ground as a rule only at a slight fault; whether he also offends on account of transgressing an ecclesiastical precept, that is, whether the latter prescribes the inner attention and this strictly, and sub poena nullitatis recitationis, upon this point there prevail two contradictory probable opinions, Practically, an obligation on account of the ecclesiastical precept will therefore not be acknowledged. For another similar example see LEHMKUHL, I, n. 900.

Secondly, there are cases, which do not deal with two obligations (sins) of which one—the greater—is questionable, in which there is doubt, rather, whether the one present obligation (transgression) is serious or slight. For instance there are various probable opinions as to whether a promise under oath to do something venially sinful is a slight or grave offense. Again, theologians are not unanimous as to what materia of a theft is to be considered gravis, so that also here there are several probable views. If we compare these two sorts of cases, we find without difficulty that they are not quite identical, but a discussion of their difference may here be omitted as it will appear from the following argument. But how does there result from the theoretical probability of a milder opinion at once its practical certainty?

Worthy of note, and an argument against an affirmative answer, is the fact that even probabilists, like BALLERINI and LEHMKUHL, of whom the former for the first time made a thorough application of probabilism, and the latter, after a precise statement of the theoretical aspect of the case, invariably draws practical conclusions according to the system which he represents, do not, for cases of the kind now contemplated, always advance as certain the practical conclusions (Compare Gury-BALLERINI, I, n. 311; n. 313; II, nn. 208 seqq.; LEHMKUHL, I, n. 413^*; II, nn. 232 seqq.).

^* It is said there very significantly: “But this (that the sin is light) must especially be said in practice if the one swearing does not attend to the sinfulness of the action which he promises....”

Furthermore, the principle upon which probabilism is based can hardly be here the furtherance of justice or fairness. For though it may be assumed that the lawgiver does not intend to bind by a precept the existence of which is doubtful, it is not so easy to prove that he must in every case specify the degree of obligation. Furthermore, probabilism, like every other moral system, is only of value as a rule of conduct if brought to the consciousness of the mind; the conscience, however, may be easily trained to distinguish, in the heat of struggle, distinctly enough between the lawful and the unlawful; however, it is much more uncertain that in temptation the magnitude of an offense is judged, when the will has already decided for the evil. If, moreover, in a moral discussion the supernatural may be referred to, it must be remarked that in our cases grace also— already partly rejected—would hardly exert a specially effective force. Therefore the probability of the milder opinion, of which there is mention, will be frequently of no interest in practise, because consciousness of it did not prevail in the act, whence with some certainty a conclusion may be drawn as to whether from the theoretical probability the practical certainty follows. Let me quote an analogism. In order to incur a penalty imposed by a certain law it is usually necessary (at least in the case of ecclesiastical penalties) that the offender know something of the penal law, yet a precise knowledge of the nature and measure of the penalty is not in the least requisite.

From all this follows, that, in this second class of cases, from the theoretical probability of the milder view can not always be concluded with certainty its validity in practise; Romualdus did not judge rightly, as the supposition of a merely slight obligation (sin) is not justified without special reason.

The following may be adduced in elucidation and support: Supposing a grave obligation (offense) is not considered certain, then, 1. The offense can not oblige to anything incurred by a positively grave fault, for example to the reception of the Sacrament of Penance before Holy Communion. 2.. There would, however, be the obligation of awakening perfect contrition before the reception of all Sacraments for which the state of grace is necessary, as here it is a question not of a positive precept, but of something in a certain respect required necessitate medii (above 1). 3. The same may well be held in respect to the state of the soul required for the worthy administration of the Sacraments. 4. Whether this latter result follows in every degree of (still actual) probability of the more severe view, we do not venture to decide for the present. Theoretically considered it appears really to be the case, as there where something in the nature of a means must necessarily be present, any just doubt should be removed. In practise there would be frequent cause for an uneasy conscience, especially in the instance last mentioned.

III. The question of the offense of a penitent with consideration of the perception and action of the will, is a pure question of fact, and must be decided according to fixed rules for ascertaining a fact, and for this reason has no direct connection with probabilism. But if after conscientious inquiry a doubt remained about the gravity of the offense then it would be a contradictio in terminis to decide merely for a slight sin. In regard to the practical consequences (compare LEHMKUHL, I, n. 50) there would apply our remarks ad. II. (1-4).

P. AMBROSE RUNGGALDIER, O.S.F.

103. Thesis XV. When a certain end is absolutely to be secured, we must choose the safer way of securing it.

Explanation. Since the end in this case is absolutely to be secured, I ought, if it were possible, to use means which are absolutely reliable or certain, for the means should be proportionate to the end. But it is here supposed that none of the means available is absolutely reliable, but that each is supported by probability only, one of the means having a higher degree of probability than any other. In this case, we maintain, with all moralists of standing, that the safer way, that, namely, which has the more probable opinion in its favor; must be followed in practice.

Proof. If I choose the less safe way, I freely make less certain the acquisition of an absolutely necessary end. But freely to lessen the certainty of attaining an absolutely necessary end is wrong. Therefore, I may not in this case choose the less safe way; on the contrary, I am bound to follow the safer way.

Thus, on the principle that Baptism is absolutely necessary for salvation, the Church baptizes converts, if their former baptism is doubtful. On this principle, too, physicians are not allowed, if sure remedies are at hand, to experiment with doubtful medicines upon their patients, whose health they are bound by their engagements to secure.

104. But when there is question of the mere liceity of an act, am I bound to adopt the more probable opinion? In other words, when, according to one probable opinion, the law requires a certain act of me, and, according to another probable opinion, such a requirement does not exist, am I bound to observe the law which probably has never been enacted? Or again, am I bound to observe an existing law in circumstances to which the law-giver probably never intended it to be applied?

On various theories various answers are given to this question: 1. Rigorists say: As long as any doubt remains that the law does not exist, the law must be obeyed, though, most probably, the law does not exist. 2. Tutiorists say: The law must be obeyed unless the opinion favoring an easier course be far more probable. 3. Probabiliorists say: Obey the law unless the opinion favoring an easier course be more probable. 4. Probabilists allow a free choice, provided the easier course has solid probability in its favor, even though the other course has greater probability. 5. Laxists permit liberty of choice even when the easier course is only slightly or barely probable. This last view, and that which requires for the liceity of an act certitude that it is not forbidden, have both been condemned by the Church.

105. Thesis XVI. In questions of mere liceity, we may follow the easier course if there is a solidly probable opinion in its favor.

Proof. A doubtful law has no binding force. But that law against whose existence a solidly probable opinion militates is a doubtful law. Therefore I am not bound to follow such a law. The principle, "A doubtful law has no binding force," which is received as an axiom, is apparent from the fact that such a law is wanting in an essential feature required for binding force, viz., full promulgation. If reasonable efforts have been made to remove the doubt, yet without success, we may conclude that the law, if it exists, has not been sufficiently promulgated.

106. Objections: 1. If the thesis is true, I am allowed to do wrong. Answer. We are never allowed to do formal wrong, i. e., what we know to be wrong; but we are not always forbidden to do what is materially wrong, to do that, namely, which we do not know to be wrong. 2. But the law may be certain and only the application of it uncertain; I know, for instance, that I must abstain from meat on Friday, but I do not know whether this is Friday. Answer. The same rule holds for the application of the law as for its doubtful existence. If, after trying in vain to obtain enlightenment on the subject, I have a solidly probable opinion that to-day is not Friday, I may reason that the law of abstinence as affecting this particular case is a doubtful one, and therefore, for this particular application, has no binding force.

This book deserves a welcome as an honest attempt to grapple with the difficulties of moral science. How great those difficulties are is generally recognized, and by none more fully and freely than by those who have tried to overcome them. Modern theories in history and science have directed renewed attention to the fundamental problems of ethics, and it is fitting that readers who are interested in the subject should be able to study the Catholic answer to those problems in the mother tongue. Students of theology, too, will benefit by being able to consult an English author, who goes over the ground rendered so familiar to them by our Latin text-books. There are many such works published in other modern languages, but as yet the English language is singularly deficient in them.

These, however, were not the reasons that induced Dr. McDonald to publish his essay. He tells us in his preface that while it is his main object to explain and defend the traditional system of morals which has been taught for centuries in the Catholic schools, yet he claims to have arrived at some important conclusions which are not to be found elsewhere. “If it were otherwise,” he says, “I should not have thought of writing or publishing.”

In the course of teaching moral theology, he noticed a considerable difference between the general principles formulated in the treatises on Human Acts, Laws, and Conscience, and the special conclusions arrived at afterwards when treating of the particular ’ virtues. These special conclusions he regards as the true rules of moral conduct, and as furnishing the material for that wider synthesis which forms the substance of the earlier and fundamental treatises. Hence these special conclusions should furnish a test for the validity and accuracy of the general principles laid down in the treatises on Human Acts, Law, and Conscience.

I quite agree. A general principle of morals which breaks down when applied to particular cases does not deserve to rank as a principle. It makes a pretense of being a rule of conduct, while in practice it furnishes no guide to conduct at all. If, then, the contention be true, that some of the general principles of the fundamental treatises of moral theology as found in our text-books do not harmonize with the doctrine on special virtues, all moralists will welcome the demonstration of its truth, and will be thankful for an accurate and plain statement of the general principles which should be substituted in place of the old.

No theologian would pretend that the common doctrine found in our text-books on the fundamental treatises of moral theology has reached its final, definitive, and perfect stage. Progress is still possible, and no doubt progress will be made in the method of presenting the doctrine, in the enunciation and ordering of the principles, and in other ways. And if we are to advance, some one must attempt the task, some one must act as pioneer of the way. This is another reason why this book deserves a welcome. But if the advance is to be on secure lines, it is no less necessary that the critic should be on the look out, and should perform his task honestly and fearlessly.

This is what I propose to do in this article. For the great bulk of the book, inasmuch as it presents in a good English dress the common doctrine of the Catholic schools, I have nothing but praise and a sincere welcome to offer. It is with two or three of those special conclusions at which Dr. McDonald has arrived, and which he says are not to be found elsewhere, that I propose to deal. I may say frankly at the outset that I do not agree with them; and so I find my place among those many students of morals, who, as he tells us in his Preface, the author foresaw would question and deny the success of his attempt in the direction of novelty.

In the remarks which I have to make I shall strive to be as impersonal as possible; I shall look at the doctrines criticized from the purely objective point of view, and I am sure Dr. McDonald will not resent the friendly and honest criticism of a fellow-worker in a field of knowledge, as difficult as it is interesting.

A good practical test of the morality of an action is the effect which it produces. Adultery, theft, selfishness, are seen to be morally wrong because of the evil consequences which they produce. What, however, is to be said of the moral quality of an action which produces both good and bad effects? The administration of chloroform renders the subject insensible to pain, but it also deprives him of the use of reason for the time being; craniotomy preserves the mother but it kills the child. How are we to judge of the morality of such actions as these which produce effects of opposite moral quality? Dr. McDonald discusses and rejects the test which is commonly given in our text-books of moral theology. He translates the principle as formulated by Father Lehmkuhl thus : —

It is lawful to perform an action which produces two effects, one good, the other bad,—provided (1) the action, viewed in itself is good or at least indifferent; (2) the agent does not intend the evil effect, but only the good (it is well to add in some cases: and provided there is no danger of subsequent evil consent or intention); (3) the good effect is produced as immediately as—that is, not by means of—the bad; (4) and there is a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect. (Page 149.)

He then proceeds to criticize the principle in this manner : —

There is not one of these four conditions that does not present difficulties to my mind. Let us take them in order :—

(1) ‘‘The action’’—that is, as I understand it, the external action—‘‘viewed in itself, must be good or at least indifferent.’’ But is not the whole question at issue this: how is one to know whether this action is good in itself, when its effects are good as well as evil? You tell me that it is to be considered lawful—which is the same as good— if, among other things, it is good in itself; and I do not see how this makes me a whit the wiser. (Page 149.)

Dr. McDonald misunderstands the principle which he impugns. The whole question at issue is, of course, the morality of the action which produces both good and bad effects. We wish to know whether the administration of chloroform, for instance, is a good action; whether craniotomy is lawful; whether, to take a third example given by Dr. McDonald, it is lawful to walk to the fields in summer time for the sake of exercise and relaxation, in spite of the fact that at each step we crush the life out of many lowly forms of sentient being. The principle tells us that such actions will be morally good if certain conditions are verified. The first is that the action viewed in itself, that is, apart from its effects, must not be bad. This is not the whole question at issue, as Dr. McDonald asserts that it is; the question at issue is, whether the action remains good, even though it produce an evil effect. We can examine the morality of the action apart from its evil effect, and this is what the principle tells us to do. Thus, in the last instance quoted from Dr. McDonald, it is possible to walk in the fields without destroying sentient life at all, or at least we may conceive of its being done; the question is, whether it remains a lawful action in summer time, when it cannot ordinarily be done without destroying animal or insect life. The action of walking in the fields, even in summer time, is ethically good, or at least indifferent, viewed in itself, apart from consequences, and thus it satisfies the first condition laid down in the principle. This is a distinct step towards the solution of the question concerning the morality of walking in the fields in summer time; when we have got thus far, we are something more than a whit the wiser. For, if the question were whether I may tell a lie to save another’s life, or in other words, whether a lie is lawful when it produces a good effect in spite of its also producing a bad one, the question would at once be settled in the negative by the application of our principle; the first condition would not be satisfied, because to lie is bad in itself. Dr. McDonald proceeds : —

(2) ‘‘The agent must not intend the evil effect, but only the good.’’ But, according to the doctrine laid down in the last chapter, the question of intention or subsequent consent does not arise. We want to test whether a certain external action, regarded in itself, is morally good or bad; and I think I have shown that external acts, as such, do not depend for their morality on any concomitant or subsequent act of the will. (Page 149.)

Dr. McDonald misunderstands the second condition as seriously as he misunderstood the first. We are not concerned here with the mere external action regarded in itself. We want to know whether it is lawful to walk in the fields in summer time. The action is regarded as a complete human act, therefore as a voluntary act, as one issuing from free will, therefore as necessarily informed by a certain intention, an intention which may be good or bad. To walk in the fields in order wantonly to destroy sentient life is a bad action, because informed by a vicious intention ; to walk in the fields for recreation, or to till them, is good. With a view to settling whether in a concrete case walking in the fields is a good and lawful action, the principle lays down the condition that the intention must not be bad. This has nothing to do with the disputed question whether the intention can change the nature of the external act.

The third condition is: “The good effect must be produced as immediately as — that is — not by means of the bad.”

Criticizing this condition Dr. McDonald asks: “Is this universally true?” I answer, Yes, if in the circumstances the evil effect remains evil, for we must not do evil that good may come of it. To amputate a diseased leg in order to save life is not evil, and so the example does not show that the condition laid down is false, though the Doctor seems to think that it does. And though he here implies that when chloroform is administered, the good effect is obtained through the evil, he does not prove it; and even if that were proved, he would still have to show that to produce unconsciousness by administering chloroform when there is good reason for it, is evil. Dr. McDonald refers us to another work of his for a criticism of the terminology of the fourth condition, and then briefly subjoins:

The ‘‘weighty reason’’ required is the good effect which must also be produced by the action. . .. Now it is not much addition to one’s sum of knowledge to be told that an action is wrong which does not produce any but an evil effect; nor does it help much to be informed further that the good effect produced must bear some proportion to the evil. (Page 150.)

I shall have something to say to this further on.

After his polemic against the principle of a double effect, Dr. McDonald inquires whether the distinction between direct and indirect causality may not serve as a basis for the test which ought really to be applied in all cases of mixed results. He rejects this suggestion, but in his discussion on this point he falsifiés the meaning of the distinction as commonly used by theologians, and confounds it with the distinction between per se and per accidens. When theologians treat of the lawfulness of direct and indirect killing, the distinction does not merely refer to the direct or indirect causality of the external act; it has special reference to the intention.¹ Dr. McDonald, indeed, rules the question of intention out of court, but such is not the practice of moral theologians when they discuss the questions with which the Doctor is here occupied, and inasmuch as those questions are concerned with human acts, acts necessarily informed by some intention, not with the merely physical external acts of the body, as he seems to suppose, it is difficult to see the reason for abstracting from the intention.

¹

Finally, the Doctor proposes a principle of his own in substitution for the principle of a double effect. He states it thus: —

“That is said to be intended directly in any action which is intended primarily and for its own sake. Its correlative is indirectly, which is said of that which is intended only by reason of another and as it were accidentally. . . . In morals, he directly intends homicide who commands it; indirectly, he who posits some cause of it, such as drunkenness, from which it follows.”—Lexicon Scholasticorum Verborum.

An external action is to be considered morally good, even though it should produce a bad as well as a good effect, provided (1) it does not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated; and (2) the good effect produced is sufficient to compensate for the bad. (Page 158.)

The chief reason why Dr. McDonald wrote his book was, it will be remembered, to remedy a defect in other authors. As he says, just before the statement of his new principle: —

I am convinced that when they come to practical work our theologians retain their sound common sense and forget or neglect the general principle which they were at such pains to establish at an earlier period, when treating of what I may call the metaphysics of moral science. (Page 157.)

Unless I am very much mistaken this procedure will be necessary in the case of Dr. McDonald’s own principle. In fact, he himself virtually acknowledges as much. On two conditions, he says, an external action will be morally good, even though it produces a bad as well as a good effect; first, it must not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated. But which are those beings which by nature are not to be subordinated? Unless this is known, it will not be possible to apply the general principle. It will only be a general rule of conduct in so far as it enables us to decide the morality of particular cases. However, Dr. McDonald confesses that there is no general rule that can be given.

It is reasonable to ask [he says] how one is to decide whether and how far any being is by nature subservient to another. I know of no general rule that may be applied; one has to go through the different essences in nature, examine their circumstances, compare them, and then decide whether and how far they are independent or subservient. (Page 163.)

To go through the different essences in nature, examine their circumstances, and compare them, is the work of a theologian, and not an easy task even for him; so that there will be no slight difficulty in discovering whether the first condition is verified in a particular case.

The second condition is, that the good effect produced should be sufficient to compensate for the bad. Now this seems identical with one of the conditions ordinarily required by theologians in the common statement of the principle of a double effect. “ There must be a sufficiently weighty reason for permitting the evil effect,’ says Father Lehmkuhl, quoted above. Dr. McDonald would seem to have forgotten his criticism of that condition in the former connection: “Nor does it help much,” he wrote, “to be informed that the good effect produced must bear some proportion to the evil” (page 150). If it did not help much there, I cannot see how it can help much here. Furthermore, he confesses that here also no general rule can be given for deciding whether the good effect is sufficient to compensate for the bad (page 165). The circumstances must be balanced in particular cases, certain allowances have to be made; what those allowances are is a question which the writer on ethics has to face when he comes to treat of the separate virtues; in doing this he must draw liberally on the light supplied by other practical sciences. The work, evidently, is not child’s play; in any case the result will not help us much.

I am afraid practical moralists will not find Dr. McDonald’s principle of much use. It is as difficult to decide whether the conditions laid down are verified, as to decide the moral quality of the external action.

Moreover, unless I seriously misunderstand the Doctor’s meaning, the principle is inadequately formulated. As laid down it would allow actions to be done which are certainly wrong. For example: I am in poverty, and I have the opportunity of relieving my wants and those of my family by stealing £5 from a wealthy neighbor. This action produces a good and a bad effect; it relieves my want, though to be sure it also deprives my neighbor of a sum which he will hardly miss. The action will be lawful, according to Dr. McDonald, on condition that it does not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated, and if the good effect is sufficient to compensate for the bad. Both these conditions would seem to be verified by my action. I subordinate money to human wants, as by nature it should be subordinated; the good effect is out of all proportion to the bad. The money in my hands goes to feed my family, in the hands of its owner it would go to feed his dogs.

I must confess I do not see why this is not a legitimate application of Dr. McDonald’s principle; it is with the purpose of excluding such applications of the principle of a double effect that theologians require, as a first condition, that the action in itself should be good, or at least indifferent; but Dr. McDonald rejects that condition as involving the whole question at issue.

Besides the principle of a double effect, Dr. McDonald adversely criticizes the common doctrine about penal laws. However, his chief objections to that doctrine are not new; they appear to me to have been abundantly answered by such classical writers on Law as Suarez and Laymann. Besides, I should very much doubt whether the Doctor’s rather strict views on this point are at all general in the land of potheen. It will be more interesting to pass on to his criticism of the fundamental principle of Probabilism and Equiprobabilism alike, the principle that doubtful laws do not bind the conscience.

This principle is capable of being understood in several ways. All theologians hold that doubtful laws bind in some sense. Thus, in a case of practical doubt as to the existence of a law I am bound to make due inquiry, and I am not at liberty to act until I can, directly or reflexly, form a certain conscience on the question. Dr. McDonald strives to show that there is no general law which obliges one in doubt to acquire certainty as to the rightness of his action before he proceeds to act. (Page 199, sqq.) But surely the law which forbids us to act with a doubtful conscience binds us to do this. Quod non est ex fide peccatum est. If I doubt whether it be a day of abstinence or not, and eat meat without taking any pains to form a certain conscience, I commit a sin, and that whether it be a day of abstinence or not. For the very fact of my eating meat in spite of my being doubtful whether it is not forbidden by the Church shows that I am prepared to break the law of the Church about abstinence, and this is a sinful disposition, which is externated by my eating meat, which act therefore is a sin, whether there be a prohibition to eat meat on that day or not. This explains why it is always a sin to eat meat with a doubtful conscience, even when the doubtful law does not exist. How would Dr. McDonald explain this on his assumption that doubtful laws bind directly and of their own force? A law which does not exist cannot bind. Dr. McDonald’s argument, therefore, seems destitute of force. The fact that the sin committed by one who acts in doubt is of the same species as would be the sin committed against the doubtful law if it existed, does not show that a doubtful law binds the conscience; it only proves that there is a general law which prescribes that we must form a certain conscience before we act.

Moreover, a doubtful law may in a certain sense be said to bind after due inquiry has been made, and the doubt cannot be directly solved. If, after forming my conscience in this case I act against the law which really exists, I commit a material sin, but I am excused from formal guilt. All theologians, I think, also admit this. The doubtful law is said in such cases to bind imperfectly, in actu primo, not perfectly and in actu secundo. Dr. McDonald hardly seems to admit the validity of this distinction as applied to the obligation of law, and almost violently attacks the defenders of probabilism, who use it in the exposition of their system. His remarks, however, show that he has misunderstood its history and meaning.

I do not know [he writes] when or by whom this distinction between first and second act was introduced into treatises on the binding force of laws. St. Alphonsus took it, apparently, from Cardinal Gotti; and the curious in such matters may inquire whether the learned Cardinal is responsible for first transferring the terms in question from the treatises on actuality and activity, where they were found originally and where they serve some purpose, to treatises on law and its obligation, where they are almost without meaning. (Page 206.)

But surely treatises on law and its obligation are treatises on actuality and activity. This appeared so evident to Suarez that he took it for granted at the beginning of his great treatise on Laws.²

² Lib. I., c. iv., n. 3.

There can be no objection, then, to using the distinction, in actu primo and in actu secundo, of the different phases in which we may consider the obligation of laws. Such classical authors as Suarez and Sylvius used it in this sense long before Gotti wrote. The very term obligation is derived from physical activity, as St. Thomas explains in a celebrated passage: —

The command of some ruler stands in relation to binding in voluntary matters by that mode of binding which can befall the will, just as bodily action stands in relation to binding bodily things by the necessity of coercion. But the bodily action of an agent never induces necessity in another thing except through the contact of the coercion itself with the thing upon which it acts; hence no one is bound by the command of any king or lord unless the command reaches the very person to whom it is given; and it reaches him through knowledge. Hence no one is bound by any precept except through knowledge of that precept; and therefore one who is not capable of knowledge is not bound by a precept, nor is anyone ignorant of a precept of God bound to fulfill the precept, except insofar as he is bound to know the precept. But if he is not bound to know it and does not know it, he is in no way bound by the precept. Just as in bodily things a bodily agent does not act except through contact, so in spiritual things a precept does not bind except through knowledge.

It is difficult, then, to see what ground Dr. McDonald has for objecting to a distinction which is in accord with the nature of things, and which has been consecrated by the usage of centuries in the schools. His subsequent remarks, however, show that he has seriously misunderstood the meaning in which the distinction is used.

There is scarcely any subject of which so much has been spoken in the Church as has been spoken, for forty or fifty years, of that of probability. But it has been spoken of so variously, and so many people, either through malice or for want of understanding the matter sufficiently well, have cast so much confusion into it, that most of the world does not have a sufficiently distinct idea of it. This is why, it being fitting to make oneself well understood here and to explain oneself on this article without evasion, it was believed that a clear notion ought to be given of the terms employed in this matter, as well as of the true and principal state of the question. Not only the Jesuit Theologians, but also all the others who have treated this subject with the design of clarifying it, require first that an opinion, in order to be truly probable, have two general conditions. The first, that it have nothing contrary to the dogmas of the faith, nothing opposed to the truths received by the Church, nor to any evident reason. In the second place, it must be supported by good reasons, and one must not rashly undertake to maintain it against the common sentiment of the Doctors. If one of these conditions is lacking in an opinion, it is no longer probable and is not among those of which there is dispute here.

Among probable opinions there are, as it were, two kinds, according to the degree of probability which they have. There are some which are called less probable, and others which are called more probable. The principal question in this matter turns upon the comparison made, touching some point of practice, between two opinions which are both probable, but of which one is less probable and the other more probable; that is to say, of which one is supported by stronger reasons, and the other by reasons less strong, though good. It is asked whether it is permitted, on this point of morals or practice, to follow the opinion which is less probable, abandoning the more probable.

This question has no place when the less probable is the safer. Here that one of the two opinions which, by everyone's admission, may be followed without sin is called the safer opinion. That one which some reasons prove would involve sin if it were followed is called the less safe. For example, upon this question: Whether a man who has committed a mortal sin is obliged to confess it at the first opportunity, and, supposing that he does not do so, whether he commits a new sin; there are two opinions: that of Saint Bonaventure, who says that in this case one is obliged to confess it as soon as possible; and that of Saint Thomas, who says that there is no obligation, under pain of sin, to do so. The first is the safer, because it is certain that in practicing it one does not sin. The second is the less safe, because there are reasons which prove that one sins in following it, although there are also other reasons which prove that one does not sin.

It can therefore happen, and it often happens, that the less probable is the safer; and in this case it is clear that one may follow the less probable. But the question is to know whether, when the less probable is at the same time the less safe, one may follow it. This is properly the capital question on this subject. From it have arisen an infinity of other difficulties in this matter, of which it would be too long to make an enumeration. It is therefore upon this capital question that the Jesuits must explain themselves here, and say what they think of this proposition: In the concurrence of two opposed probable opinions, one may follow that which is the less probable and the less safe. Here is what they have to say upon it.

First, this proposition, taken according to the odious ideas and explanations which the adversaries of the Jesuits are accustomed to give of it in their books and in their discourses, was never the opinion of their Society nor of their Theologians. They condemn it, and have always condemned it, such as it is represented in those false portraits which are made of it. In a word, it was never the sentiment of their Society that one may follow the less probable opinion when it is not truly probable and when it does not have the two conditions marked above, one of which is negative, namely, that it must not be contrary to Scripture, nor to Tradition, nor to the Decisions of the Holy See, nor to an evident reason. The other condition is positive, namely, that it must be supported by good reasons which are even recognized as such by all those, or by most of those themselves, who combat it.

Second, this doctrine, even taken with the two conditions which I have just stated, is not the opinion of their Society in the sense that one is obliged to follow it. In fact, several of their Theologians have combated it and combat it still every day. And it was thus that their thirteenth General Congregation replied when this question was put to it on behalf of the Pope: namely, whether the Society adopted this doctrine as a sentiment to which it attached itself to the exclusion of the opposed doctrine.

Third, the Jesuits will not say absolutely of this doctrine, as they have said of the error of philosophical sin and of what is imputed to them on the article of the love of God, that it has not been the doctrine of the Society. They acknowledge that it has been so in this sense, that a great part of their Theologians have maintained it; and it is of this that they must render a particular account to the public.

This reason is taken from the rule which the Jesuits imposed upon themselves from the birth of their Society, and of which I spoke at the beginning of this writing, which was to teach in Theology the opinions commonly received in the Catholic Schools. Now, that one may follow the less safe opinion, provided that it is truly probable, was not only the doctrine commonly received when the Jesuits began to write on Theology, but it was also almost generally maintained in all the Catholic Schools, so that the contrary had incomparably fewer followers there; and this is what caused the Jesuits to incline to this side much more than to the other. This fact is so important and so essential to their justification that, although it has been demonstrated a thousand times, it is well to report here a part of the proofs.

Pierre Navarre, whose book was printed as early as the year 1597, says that this was in his time the more common doctrine, communiorem Theologorum sententiam. [Lib. 3 de restitut., c. 1, n. 237. Edit. Tolet. 1597.]

As early as the year 1592, Salonius of the Order of Saint Augustine wrote that this doctrine had a greater number of defenders, and defenders of greater authority, and stronger reasons than the opposed doctrine: Cum habeat plures ac graviores authores & firmiora fundamenta quam opposita; and above all from the School of Saint Thomas, ac maxime ex discipulis Sancti Thomae. [De justit. & jure, controv. 2, concl. 4, ad art. 4, quaest. 63.]

This doctrine was therefore upon this footing before any Jesuit had yet written on Moral Theology. The greater number of the Jesuit Doctors followed it, as the greater number of the Doctors of the other Catholic Schools, and above all the School of Saint Thomas, followed it; what can their crime have been in this?

It was so generally followed in the School of Saint Thomas that, from 1570 until 1659, in the space of nearly a hundred years, during which a great number of Thomists wrote on Theology, perhaps not a single one will be found who was not of this sentiment.

In this space of time several Bishops wrote on these matters, and almost all embraced the same sentiment. One may see upon this a little Latin book printed at Paris in 1659 and entitled Quaestio facti, which gives the proof of it in detail. An infinity of Doctors of Louvain, Salamanca, Douai, and all the most celebrated Universities did not hesitate upon it. The only three Doctors of the Sorbonne who printed Courses of Theology were of the same opinion, as was M. Bail, Sub- Penitentiary of Paris. M. Hambert in France says that it was the ordinary doctrine of Theology: Ita communiter Doctores. [a. In 1. 2ae de opinione probabili, art. 4.] Bonacina, who was a Bishop in Italy, wrote the same thing there: Ita communiter Theologi. [b. T. 2, disput. 2, q. 4, l. 3, de restitutione.] Others in Germany and in Spain say the same.

This being so, what could the Jesuits have done more prudently than to conform themselves in their doctrine to the multitude of all the Theologians of whom I have just spoken, among whom are counted several Bishops, a great number of Religious of all the Orders, and above all of that of Saint Dominic, and the most distinguished Doctors of the most famous Universities of Europe?

But that upon which the Jesuits doubtless have a right to ask justice from the public is that, despite facts so evident and so incontestable, despite what is attested by several Doctors who printed before the Jesuits had written on matters of Moral Theology - that from that time the doctrine of probability was the most common among the Theologians - despite all this, it has been undertaken to persuade the whole earth that this doctrine was born in the School of the Jesuits; that it is an invention of their policy, a secret which they found to accommodate the Gospel to the corruption of the heart of man; that it is desired to render them alone responsible for the bad effects which it is claimed to produce; finally, that after this doctrine has been disfigured and rendered infinitely odious, it is spoken of as the doctrine proper and specific, so to speak, of the Jesuits, who nevertheless received it only from others and taught it only with all the others.

It is upon this, I say, that the Jesuits hope that the public will render them justice; but they must still enlighten it upon an important point in this matter. Why is it, it is said, that the Dominican Fathers, for example, having proscribed this doctrine in their Schools, although it had taken birth there and had been universally followed there for nearly a hundred years, why do the Jesuits, who received it from them, not do as much? Here is what they have to answer upon this.

1. Among the Jesuits full liberty is left to combat the doctrine of probability, and there is no obligation to maintain it.

2. Several make use of this liberty every day; and for many years there have been seen in their principal Colleges of France, as at Paris, La Fleche, Lyon, and Toulouse, various Theses maintained against this doctrine; the same thing has been seen at Rome and elsewhere.

3. If one counts the printed Books which have appeared for fifteen or twenty years upon this matter in order to treat it theologically (for I do not speak of satires against the Jesuits), one will find more Books come forth from the Society than from any other Religious Order or any other School which were made to maintain the doctrine opposed to that of probability.

Let us now say why their Society has not until the present judged it fitting authentically to forbid all Professors to teach this doctrine. These reasons are such that there is much likelihood they will be approved.

The first and principal is that the Jesuits do not believe that they can attribute to themselves the authority to condemn a doctrine which has been that of all the Catholic Schools and Universities; which has been maintained in Books by several learned and holy Prelates, and by almost all those of this rank who have treated the matter since it has been disputed in the School.

Second, it in no way befits the Jesuits to proscribe a doctrine which the Holy See has always refused to censure. For it is known that its condemnation was pursued at Rome with all possible vigor, above all during the Pontificate of Innocent XI, and that the Holy See never wished to do so; and this was apparently one of the reasons which prevented the last Assembly of the Clergy of France from placing the proposition which contains this doctrine among the propositions which the Prelates censured, contenting themselves with making at the end a declaration of the sentiment which had prevailed upon this matter in the Assembly. Even if the Jesuits had only this reason, which includes several, there is no person who, weighing it maturely, would not acknowledge that their conduct in this is very prudent; but they have still others.

The second reason for the conduct of the Jesuits in this regard is the manner in which the decline of this doctrine in the School in France came about, for elsewhere it is not upon the same footing. First, those who initially attacked it did so in order by this means to render the Jesuits odious, not knowing, through the little familiarity they had with Scholasticism, that in attacking them on this point they were taking to task all the most celebrated Schools and almost all the Theologians. Second, they began by disfiguring this doctrine and by proposing it in an odious and captious manner, concealing the reasons upon which it is founded, drawing conclusions which are in no way attached to it, and confounding a thousand things in a subject which demands, in order to be well treated, a very exact analysis, because of an infinity of circumstances of which a single one altogether changes the case; attributing to the doctrine itself the abuses which could be made of it, an inconvenience common to almost all questions of Morals. After having thus decried it by the expositions which they made of it according to their fancy, they combated it represented under those ideas under which it was easy to make it appear bizarre, ridiculous, and untenable. This soon produced the universal unleashing of all those who do not take the trouble to examine things thoroughly.

Nothing more was needed to shake many Theologians and entire Schools, who for various reasons made it an honor and a merit to abandon this doctrine. For, moreover, the question having always been problematic, there was nothing which could constrain a Theologian to defend this opinion rather than that which is opposed to it. But after all, this reflection upon the manner in which the face of Theology has changed so greatly in this regard in France is a very strong motive for suspending one's judgment upon the quality of the doctrine itself until the Church or the Holy See have declared themselves. For, finally, without doing wrong to the Doctors who combat it today, one may bring into comparison with them those who formerly defended it so unanimously and those who still defend it in several places of Europe.

The third reason of the Jesuits, which in my opinion ought to appear very strong, is that there are certain very important matters in which ordinary practice, even among the most upright people, seems scarcely capable of being justified except by the doctrine in question. These consequences, which the Jesuits envisage, cause them to go with bridle in hand and prevent them from advancing too far before the Church has spoken.

The plurality of Benefices, even supposing that the Beneficiaries make a good use of them; the determination of what is called in this matter decent maintenance in relation to their estate and quality, furnish great difficulties; and it would not be easy to show that the most regular persons commonly follow in practice, upon all this, the more probable opinion. But whatever may be the case upon this point, here are still some other examples.

Is there an unanswerable demonstration that the common practice in France touching contracts for the constitution of annuities is supported by the more probable opinion? It is not more than three centuries since there was much dispute about the nature of this Contract, and as strongly as there is dispute today upon the question of the Three Contracts. Several learned Doctors maintained that it was usurious, because the sum, having been found to be reimbursed at the end of twenty years by the interest which equals the principal, the same interest continues to be received; and when redemption takes place, the principal is paid anew; so that for twenty thousand francs given, one finds oneself to have received forty thousand francs, and very often much more.

It is also certain that, to justify this Contract, a good direction of intention is necessary, according to which one intends to purchase, by the alienation of the principal, not a certain sum of money payable every year (for one does not purchase money with money), but the right to exact every year a certain sum from the one to whom the principal has been paid. All this, not without reason, appeared delicate to those ancient Doctors, and appeared so much so to the Popes who were consulted upon it that Martin V and Callixtus III consented to permit this Contract only upon several conditions, of which there were two principal ones. The first was that the annuity should be secured by mortgage, and that the right of the one who constitutes it should be established upon a determinate property which was of a nature to produce revenue, for example upon a piece of land or upon a house. The second, that if this property should perish, the annuity should no longer be paid. Pope Pius V, after these two other Popes, and the Council of Bordeaux held in the last century, declared that these two conditions were necessary.

Nevertheless, in France these two conditions are not observed: annuities are often constituted upon all the goods and upon the person of the one who receives the principal. If the goods are lost, the annuity always continues and the person remains obligated. Is it therefore quite certain that the practice of France in this kind of contract is founded upon the more probable opinion, being contrary to the Bulls of three Popes and to the decision of a Council of France; this contract, destitute of the conditions which I have just stated, having appeared usurious to these Popes and to a Council, and having even appeared such by its nature to so many able ancient Theologians, without stronger reasons having since that time been brought forward than those which were produced then? And it is to be observed

that this opinion, upon which there is no hesitation, would scarcely be probable if one held to the definition which the common run of Casuists give of a probable opinion, in which they place a condition that it not be contrary to the decisions of the Holy See and of Councils; for here it is a question of a pure dogma of Morals, and not of those questions in which there is conflict over the bounds of spiritual authority and temporal authority. It is solely a question of knowing whether it is a contract permitted in conscience or not.

What shall I say of the contracts made by Guardians on the occasion of wards' monies, above all in Brittany, and of many others used in commerce among Merchants or among men of business? Some of them were proposed to the last Assembly of the Clergy, upon which it dared decide nothing.

Many other examples could be furnished in various matters in which it would be difficult to show that the rule of practice was the more probable opinion. And if this is not demonstrated, there is no longer any rule of conscience for acting without danger of sinning except the doctrine of the less probable opinion. It even seems that these particular cases ought to be solidly decided before the general principle were touched, for fear of falling into contradiction. All this shows that the Jesuits have reason not to go so quickly, and that they are in no way blameworthy for not yet having made a decree against the doctrine in question, and for having in this imitated the Holy See, which, despite the solicitations made at Rome, has not yet judged it fitting to declare itself. Is it laxity in Moral Theology to await the decision of the Vicar of Jesus Christ, when one is in the disposition in which the Jesuits are to follow it in everything, and when one is, like them, without obstinacy and without interest upon it?

Here, then, in a few words, is the conduct of the Jesuits upon all this. 1. Their Doctors for the most part taught this doctrine because they saw it almost generally followed in all the Catholic Schools. 2. They did not for that reason make it a sentiment of their Society to the exclusion of the other, which several among them have followed and still follow every day. 3. They were neither its authors nor its only defenders, but they maintained it with the multitude of the Theologians and with a great number of Bishops. 4. They await the authority of the Holy See in order to condemn it, because they do not believe they can do so by their own authority and without this perhaps drawing consequences for usages upon which it does not belong to them to decide. It appears that one would have to be very hard to please not to approve this conduct, and very inequitable to render the Jesuits responsible for the doctrine of probability, supposing that it were such as so many people claim.

Although the Popes did not wish to condemn the doctrine of probability, they nevertheless censured some particular propositions which have relation to this matter, and upon which the Jesuits also wish to declare their sentiment to the public. Here are these propositions.

If a Book by a modern Author appears, his opinion must be judged probable, provided that it is not established that it has been rejected as improbable by the Holy See. [Alexander VII, Proposition 28, 1665.]

It is not illicit, in the administration of the Sacraments, to follow a probable opinion touching the validity of the Sacrament, abandoning the safer, unless some law, some pact, or some danger of great harm forbids it. [Innocent XI, 1679.]

I deem it probable that a Judge may judge according to the less probable opinion.

Generally speaking, one acts prudently in following a probable opinion, however slight the probability may be, whether it is extrinsic or intrinsic, and provided that the opinion does not go outside the bounds of probability.

An infidel, relying upon a probable opinion, will be excused from his infidelity in not believing our Mysteries.

It is not permitted to follow a probable opinion, even the most probable among those which are probable. [Alexander VIII, Proposition 3, 1690.]