Chapter — Marc, Institutiones Morales

CHAPTER II: On Homicide and Its Species

¶1.

St. Alphonsus, l. c.; Cathrein, Moralphil., II, p. 634; Tanquerey, II, n. 316, where there are many useful things; Willems, III, p. 462; works of Ces. Lombroso and of his disciples; Krauss, Kampf gegen die Verbrecherursachen; Berardi, Theol. mor., II, n. 639; Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene.

¶728.
  1. Definition. Homicide is the violent killing of a man done by a man.

Division. Homicide, by reason of imputability, is one thing if casual, another if voluntary; - by reason of quality, it is called qualified or simple.

  1. Casual homicide happens apart from the intention of the one killing. - Voluntary homicide is committed from the intention itself of the one killing: either directly, when someone with deliberate effort kills another, for example with dagger, fire, suffocation, poison, etc.; or indirectly, when someone posits those things from which he foresees the death of another will follow. - 2. Qualified homicide is that to which special circumstances accede: of this kind is treacherous homicide, which is perpetrated under the appearance of friendship; lying-in-wait, which is from ambushes; assassination, which is by others hired for pay; robbery-slaying, which is for the sake of spoil. - Among qualified homicides the first place is held by the slaying of a parent, offspring, spouse, brother, prince, and sacred person: for crimes of this kind involve special malice in themselves. But other killings are reckoned among simple homicides (cf. Salmant., tr. 25, c. 1).

Note. a) The principles which will be established concerning killing, whether licit or illicit, have force, due proportion being observed, for mutilation, beating, and any harming of the body: for it is always a question of preserving the consistency of one's own person.

b) Vexation, beating, or killing of animals is not prohibited by the fifth precept. For animals do not have rights, since they do not possess personality. Nevertheless, vexation of animals, especially that mode of vexing which they name VIVISECTION, is not always free from every fault. For he who without cause vexes animals acts against right reason, which commands moderation and prohibits that those things which have been created for our utility serve solely for our games. Besides, a man indulging in these things is always more inclined to fierceness and cruelty. Cf. Lessius, de Just., l. 4, c. 4, n. 43; Stimmen aus Maria-Laach, 1881 and 1908; Schindler, II, p. 790; Linz. Quart. Schr., 1911, p. 130.

These things having been premised, we shall treat: 1. of the killing of a malefactor; - 2. of an aggressor; - 3. of an innocent person. - Concerning the shortening of the life of the dying we shall speak n. 761.

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