Treatise — Marc, Institutiones Morales
Treatise III: On Human Acts
Proemium On the Notion of a Human Act
As we have already said, the reason for discussing human acts is this: the primary moral office of man as wayfarer does not consist in this, that he know only the rule of acting, whether proximate or remote, but that he tend to the supernatural end by his own acts, applying his will, with grace assisting, to those things which the supreme Legislator has imposed upon him. "The divine precepts themselves would not profit," says St. Augustine (de Grat. et lib. Arb., c. 2, n. 4), "unless man had free choice, by which, doing them, he would come to the promised rewards."
- DEFINITION. A human act is an act proceeding deliberately from the will of man (V, n. I, II).
Namely, those acts are called human which proceed from man insofar as he is man, and differs from irrational creatures, not only as to substance, but also as to the mode of operating. But man differs, as to the mode of operating, from irrational creatures in this, that he operates freely, or from deliberate will, and thus is master of his acts, so that he places them or does not place them at his pleasure. But we call that will deliberate which, with previous advertence of reason concerning the thing to be done or omitted, chooses one or the other from opposites. Only acts proceeding from such a will are properly called human (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 1, a. 1).
To human acts are opposed ACTS OF MAN, in which either the light of reason does not shine beforehand, or the consent of the will does not accede. These acts can indeed be called acts of man, because they proceed from man, but they are not to be called human acts, because they are not done in a mode proper to man. Of this kind are either first-first motions, so called because they anticipate the judgment of reason; or acts of a man in no way attentive, dreaming, delirious, insane, drunk, or lacking the use of reason in any way whatever (St. Thom., ibid.).
DIVISION. A human act can be divided in many ways:
By reason of principle and term, it is either elicited or commanded. An act is called elicited which is perfected and consummated in the will itself, without the aid of another faculty, as are purely internal volitions and nolitions; commanded, which, with the will commanding, is perfected by another power subject to the will; whether internally, as the act of thinking about some particular thing; or externally, as the act of walking, writing, etc.
By reason of subjection in the soul, it is either internal or external. Internal is that which is perfected only by the internal powers of the soul, such as the act of thinking, loving; external, which the will perfects through the organs of the body, for example, walking, speech, etc.
By reason of proper ordination, it is either good, or evil, or indifferent. Good, or licit, is said of that which is conformable to right reason; evil, or illicit, that which disagrees from right reason; indifferent is that which, considered objectively, does not have relation to goodness or malice, for example, to walk, to speak, etc. Good again is either natural, which is perfected by the powers of nature alone; or supernatural, which can be elicited only by the aid of divine grace, as an act of faith, hope, charity. A supernatural act is either meritorious de condigno, to which reward is owed from justice, or meritorious de congruo, which merits only from fittingness (V, n. III, IV).
- STATE OF THE QUESTION. Human acts can be considered either psychologically, under which respect philosophy subtly disputes various things concerning them; or morally, under which respect Moral Theology weighs them, investigating namely when and how they are TO BE IMPUTED to man, whether unto good or unto evil.
Therefore under the latter respect we shall dispute concerning them, inquiring when and in what measure they are imputable to the one operating in general, as to their proper author; then, when they are imputable unto good or unto evil, or what their morality is, and from where it is had.
Hence: 1. concerning the imputability of human acts; 2. concerning their morality. In other words: 1. concerning human acts in their respects to the principle; 2. concerning human acts in their relations to the moral order.