Section — Marc, Institutiones Morales
§ 1. On the Object
- DEFINITION. Object, in the broader sense, designates everything which is set before the will. In this sense, it can include both end and circumstances. In the stricter sense, as it is taken here, object is that thing, or person, morally considered, concerning which a human act is occupied, and toward which by its nature and of itself it tends. Thus another's thing is the object of theft; God the object of an act of love (V, n. XXXVI).
DIVISION. Object is good, or evil, or indifferent, according as it has a relation of agreement, or disagreement, or no relation to the rule of morals.
- PRINCIPLE. A human act takes morality from the object, and indeed essential, or specific, morality.
The first part is clear: 1. From Scripture: They became abominable, as those things which they loved (Hos. 9:10). The contrary, on account of the same reason, must be said concerning good acts. 2. From St. Augustine (tr. 2, in 1 Ep. St. John, n. 14): "Each one is such as is his love. Do you love earth? you are earth; do you love God? what shall I say? as it were, you are God." 3. By reason: an act takes its morality from that from which it has relation to the rule of morals; but it has this from the object; therefore. Recall the things said n. 294.
The second part is proved: Essential or specific morality of an act is that which is conceived to be in it before every other, without which it cannot be conceived, and which, when other things are changed, remains invariable. Now indeed, such is the morality taken from the object; for to this, by hypothesis, the act by its nature tends, and to this it has itself as to its formal principle. Thus, for example, theft which someone commits in a sacred place in order to intoxicate himself, although it can be conceived without the malice of sacrilege and intemperance, nevertheless cannot be conceived without the malice of injustice.
"Hence, in human actions, before all things one must attend to the object, concerning which they are as concerning their proper term. If the object is agreeable to right reason, the action will be specifically good. If the object disagrees from right reason, the action will be essentially or specifically evil." Zigliara, Ethica, l. 2, c. 1, a. 6.