Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales
Article I: On Specific Distinction
STATUS OF THE QUESTION. That sins are distinguished into various species is clear. But it is asked whence this specific distinction of them must be taken, in other words, what is the reason why some sin has a special deformity or opposition with respect to the law of God.
In solving this question, the opinions of theologians do not agree. Some, with St. Thomas, think that specific distinction must be taken from objects diverse in species; because, they say, sin does not have species on the part of aversion..., but on the part of conversion, according as it is a certain act. But others, with Scotus, hold that it must be taken from the virtues to which sins are opposed; because sin, taken formally, consists in opposition to the virtue of which it deprives. Each opinion is probable, and practically each in reality coincides in the same thing, as St. Thomas also adverts (1.2, q. 72, a. 1, ad 2).
And indeed, to say, for example, that theft takes its proper species from this, that for its object it has another's good unjustly taken away, or from this, that it is opposed to the virtue of justice, plainly comes back to the same thing. Yet since the method according to which sins are distinguished through oppositions to virtues is plainer and easier, we shall hold this very one (V, 32; H. Ap., III, 55).
- PRINCIPLE. The specific distinction of sins is taken from opposition to several diverse virtues, and from diverse or contrary opposition to one and the same virtue. It helps to resolve that principle into several special rules:
RULE 1. Sins which are opposed to virtues specifically diverse are specifically diverse. The reason is because each virtue has a special distinct goodness, or conformity with the divine law; therefore similarly a sin opposed to some virtue contracts a special and proper deformity, or malice, for itself.
Hence you will resolve: 1. Therefore heresy, despair, hatred of God, perjury, fornication, theft, lying, etc., are specifically diverse, because they are opposed to virtues specifically diverse; namely, heresy to faith, despair to hope, hatred of God to charity, perjury to religion, fornication to chastity, theft to justice, lying to veracity.
- Therefore in one and the same act several sins specifically diverse can be found, because one and the same act can include opposition to diverse virtues. Thus, in the voluntary killing of a cleric, there is found a double sin specifically diverse, one against justice, and the other against religion; and a fourfold sin in the crime of a man bound by a vow of chastity and sinning with a married blood-relative, since diverse virtues are wounded, namely justice, piety, religion, and chastity.
RULE 2. Sins opposed in a diverse way to the same virtue, or which wound goods specifically diverse of the same virtue, are specifically diverse. For one and the same virtue can have for object various goods which, according to moral estimation, are specifically diverse: for example, the virtue of justice has for object goods of fortune, goods of reputation, goods of life, etc. Whence it includes various rectitudes or honesties, and these specifically diverse. Therefore also the sins which are opposed to these diverse rectitudes or honesties have diverse malices, and are distinguished in species (Konings, n. 212).
Hence you will resolve: 1. Therefore theft, robbery, detraction, contumely, homicide are specifically diverse; for although the aforesaid sins are opposed to the same virtue of justice, nevertheless they wound diverse goods of this virtue: theft, namely, goods of fortune; robbery, the good or inviolability of the person; detraction, the good of reputation; contumely, the good of honor; homicide, the good of life.
Local, real, and personal sacrilege are also specifically diverse, although they are opposed to the same virtue of religion; for a sacred thing, a sacred person, and a sacred place are goods specifically diverse according to moral estimation.
The violation of ecclesiastical fast through the use of flesh meat, and the violation of the same fast through multiple refection, are specifically diverse; because the former violation is opposed to the virtue of temperance insofar as it moderates the quality of food; but the latter, insofar as it moderates the quantity of food.
Sins of commission and omission against the same virtue are, for the most part, specifically diverse; for ordinarily they wound diverse goods or offices of the same virtue; and thus heresy and the omission of a prescribed act of faith differ in species; despair and the omission of an act of hope; hatred of God and the omission of an act of charity.
On the contrary, they do not differ in species if they wound the same good of virtue. But this happens when the affirmative and negative precept are reduced to the same thing; because then to commit is the same as to omit. Hence theft and the omission of restitution are not specifically diverse, because it is the same thing to carry off and to retain another's property.
Note. When the diversity of goods of some virtue is sufficient that by reason of it sins be judged specifically diverse must be sought both from the nature of the several goods and from the common judgment of theologians.
RULE 3. Sins which are opposed to the same virtue in a contrary way, that is, through excess or through defect, are specifically diverse (V, 30). The reason is because movement is specified by the term to which. Now excess and defect are terms specifically diverse; therefore the movements also, or acts of the will, which are terminated at them, are specifically diverse (St. Thom., 1.2, q. 72, a. 8; cf. 1.2, q. 23, a. 2).
Hence you will resolve: despair and presumption are specifically diverse sins, which indeed are opposed to the same virtue of hope, but in a contrary way: despair, namely, through defect; but presumption through excess. Likewise avarice and prodigality, which are opposed to the same virtue of liberality, prodigality through excess, avarice through defect. Similarly flattery and excessive harshness, the former of which recedes by excess, the latter by defect, from the same virtue of affability. Likewise sluggishness in learning due knowledge, which by defect, and excessive curiosity, which by excess, are repugnant to the same virtue of studiousness.
Corollary. Sins which are repugnant to several laws or precepts issued from a diverse formal motive, namely toward the special good of a virtue, include several malices diverse in species.
For in such a case diverse virtues, or honesties of virtue, are wounded, which the various laws intend: as if someone broke a fast prescribed by the Church and promised by himself to God through a vow, he would wound both temperance, from which the Church commands fasting, and religion, from which God commands vows to be observed. On the contrary, if laws have been issued from the same formal motive (or from the same intrinsic end of the work), and are distinguished only on the part of legislators (as is the case in theft, which is prohibited by divine and human law), they do not introduce a specific distinction of sins; because diversity of legislators does not make the precept formally diverse, but only materially (V, 33).
Hence the omission of the sacred rite on a feast day which is at the same time Sunday constitutes one species of malice, because the hearing of Mass is prescribed by each law from the same formal motive of religion, and therefore from one intention of the legislator (Reuter, de Leg., n. 147; de Pecc., n. 345).
- Questions. QUAER. 1. How can it be discerned whether laws, several in number, have been issued from the same FORMAL MOTIVE, or from a diverse one?
It is noted beforehand. The difficulty can exist only concerning positive laws. For diverse obligations of the natural law are not given except on account of diverse goods of virtue. Hence it is evident that all obligations of the natural law have a distinct formal motive. Thus, for example, the killing of a priest is prohibited from a double formal motive of justice and religion (V, 33; Salmant., tr. 20, c. 12, n. 9-12).
Resp. 1. Positive laws whose matter is morally diverse have a diverse formal motive: for example, the law prohibiting servile works on feast days, and the law prescribing the hearing of the sacred rite on the same days, indeed have the motive of the worship of God, but in a diverse way. Wherefore he who transgresses this double precept commits two sins, and these diverse in species. On the contrary:
Positive laws whose matter is morally the same are judged to have the same formal motive. Thus, for example, the threefold law of fasting, on account of a vigil, on account of Ember Days, and on account of Lent, has one formal motive, the honesty of temperance. Except if from circumstances, from the context of the law, from the penalties joined to it, the contrary is certainly clear: for example, if a confessor, after hearing sins, imposes on a penitent a fast already prescribed by the Church, this fast is rightly judged to be prescribed from a new formal motive, namely from the motive of penance. Wherefore the penitent violating it commits a double sin, one against temperance, and the other against religion.
A positive law which has the same matter with the natural law has regularly been issued from the same formal motive of the natural law, whose execution it is judged to urge. Thus human laws prohibiting homicide, theft, etc., have been issued from the very motive of the natural law.
QUAER. 2. Whether PRECEPTS strictly so called, not otherwise than positive laws, have a diverse formal motive according to diversity of matter?
Resp. Negatively. Precepts strictly so called, or commands of a Superior, are regularly judged to be imposed not from a diverse, but from the same formal motive of obedience; just as vows of themselves are specified from the virtue of religion, although their matters of themselves look to diverse virtues (cf. III, 335; IV, 38).
Hence: 1. If a Superior gives diverse precepts in free matter, that is, in matter which by no law is here and now prescribed, for example, if he prescribes study, prayer, some act of charity; the inferior who transgresses those various precepts does not commit sins distinct in species, but sins only against obedience. Therefore the matter of disobedience is not to be declared in confession, but only the number of transgressions (2.2, q. 104, a. 2, ad 1). 2. But if the Superior absolutely prescribes a thing already prescribed by some law (for example, a father who, in order to conquer the sloth or levity of his son, with his paternal authority interposed, prescribes to him the hearing of Mass on a feast day), the inferior contumaciously refusing commits two sins distinct in species: one indeed against the law of the Church; the other against obedience owed to one legitimately commanding. Yet otherwise it must be said if the Superior does not strictly prescribe, but only admonishes (cf. n. 690 seqq.).
Note. Sometimes a virtue obliges indirectly, namely from the command of another virtue. In this case, the omission of the commanded act is a sin, not against the virtue from which it was to be elicited, but against the commanding virtue. Thus he who, pressed by a vehement temptation against chastity, omits to pray, sins not indeed against religion, but against chastity; and the reason is because the obligation of the means and of the end is the same.