Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales
Article I: On the Advertence of the Intellect
- DEFINITION. Advertence is consideration or thought of the malice and prohibition of the act, or at least some doubt or suspicion of sin, or of the danger of sinning.
DIVISION. By reason of the existence of the act, advertence is usually distinguished as threefold: 1. actual or direct or express, which is had here and now while acting; 2. virtual or indirect (interpretative in a certain respect), which was had when the cause of the sinful act was voluntarily posited; 3. merely interpretative, which exists neither in itself nor in another preceding thing, but consists only in this, that someone could and ought, by physical and remote power alone, to advert to the malice.
By reason of accidental quality, advertence is further distinguished: 1. into full advertence, if nothing impedes the mind from acting perfectly, as in one perfectly awake; 2. into protracted, which lasts as long as the sinful act lasts; 3. into clear and distinct, by which the respective species and grades of malice are known; 4. into reflex, by which the one sinning reflects upon his advertence. Cf. n. 336.
- PRINCIPLE. For formal sin virtual advertence is required and suffices (V, l. c.; H. Ap., III, 25).
It is required: for the opinion of those who say that merely interpretative advertence suffices cannot in any way be sustained. For the axiom remains unshaken: Nothing is willed unless it is foreknown, either in itself or in the cause; "because where there is no knowledge, there is no liberty; and where there is no liberty, there is no sin" (VI, 610). Whence the evil which man commits and to which he in no way, not even confusedly, attends cannot be imputed to him, and is only material evil. "Otherwise," says St. Alphonsus (V, 4, v. Hinc), "it would follow that very many men would find themselves burdened with many mortal faults, although, concerning them, they had never had any knowledge," which is absurd. Hence, "if ignorance was in no way voluntary, and the man had no actual advertence to the malice or danger of that thing, neither directly nor indirectly, neither in itself nor in the cause, then in no way are the errors which he does not advert to imputed to him"... Likewise, "in order that the effects of some cause be imputed to someone, there must necessarily precede, at least in the beginning, actual and express advertence to the malice of the object" (V, 4, v. Contra). Cf. n. 314 and 315, note.
It suffices: for equally false is the opinion of those who assert that, here and now, for every sin, actual and express advertence is required. The Psalmist prays: The offenses of my youth, and my ignorances, remember not, O Lord (Ps. 24:7). Among the offenses of youth, many certainly were committed from virtual advertence. Now he calls all these just as much sins, as when he was entirely ignorant of God, most gravely offending him. Add that if actual advertence to the malice of an act were absolutely necessary, men, the more wicked they are, would be the more excusable; for the more wicked they are, the graver are the evils they perpetrate, noticing little or nothing of the malice of their acts. Indeed, there are not lacking those who, while sinning, think that they act rightly, led by their culpable ignorance, as again is gathered from Sacred Scripture: The hour comes, that everyone who kills you will think that he offers service to God (John 16:2). Cf. I, 170.
- Corollaries. 1. Hence St. Alphonsus says: "It can happen in many ways that several evils, although they are not actually and expressly adverted to, nevertheless are well imputed to fault to those committing them, if their ignorance (or inadvertence) is in some way voluntary" (V, 4, v. His positis).
Ignorance, however, becomes voluntary and imputable to sinners in a fourfold way (V, 4, v. Primo):
a) Through NEGLIGENCE in learning those things which can and ought to be known. "Ignorance," says St. Thomas, "is voluntary either directly, as when someone studiously wills not to know some things, so that he may sin more freely; or indirectly, as when someone, on account of labor, or on account of other occupations, neglects to learn that by which he would be drawn back from sin. For such negligence makes the ignorance itself to be voluntary and sin, provided it is of those things which someone is bound and able to know" (1.2, q. 6, a. 3).
b) Through PASSION, which someone deliberately wills to follow. "For one willing to fulfill some passion, for example, vengeance, consequently admits, at least confusedly, whatever perverse means conduce to fulfilling the passion. Whence the effects proceeding from it, although they are not voluntary in themselves, are nevertheless voluntary in their cause, namely in adhering to the passion. Thus also St. Thomas teaches, who calls the ignorance of one operating through passion ignorance of bad choice" (ibid., a. 8).
c) Through a DEPRAVED HABIT, if someone, namely, omits efficaciously to amend the depraved habit. "In this case, the evil acts which proceed from a bad habit are likewise voluntary, either in their cause, namely when in its beginning the depraved custom is contracted voluntarily; or rather... because such badly habituated sinners, although they have a less ready knowledge than others, nevertheless always have some actual knowledge of their crimes, sufficient to render the acts deliberate, and (if the matter is grave) also mortal. For since they make little of sin, there is not made in their souls that sensible and memorable impression which is made in another having a less depraved conscience. And hence it happens that there does not remain in their memory a trace of that actual knowledge which they sufficiently had before concerning the sin; or the trace is so slight that, when questioned, they easily respond that they did not advert. But a cautious confessor ought not to give faith to them" (cf. n. 293).
d) Through INCONSIDERATION, "if, namely, a man in acting knowingly neglects to apply the consideration which the matter to be done deserves. For to him who already adverts that something must be considered further, and nevertheless wills to operate precipitately, all the errors which he commits are deservedly imputed." Thus all those to whom some OFFICE of great moment has been committed are admonished and stirred by their conscience that, with greater diligence applied, they fulfill the parts of their office: from which it happens that they at least advert that they ought to advert; which already suffices, so that the evils commonly resulting from negligence are deservedly imputed to them (cf. n. 125, 974).
- It is not required for formal sin that the sinner expressly think of the offense of God.
For, just as implicit thought of God suffices for worshiping him, so also for offending him. "He who operates against right reason, even if he does not think that he wounds God, already in reality wounds him; for by offending rational nature, he at the same time offends the author of that nature" (V, 4, Opp. 3 and 11).
- Vain is the distinction between theological and philosophical sin, which some attempted to introduce. "Philosophical, or moral, sin," they said, "is a human act disagreeing with rational nature and right reason. But theological and mortal sin is the free transgression of the divine law. Philosophical sin, however grave, in him who either is ignorant of God, or does not actually think of God, is grave sin, but is not an offense of God, nor mortal sin dissolving the friendship of God, nor worthy of eternal punishment." This proposition indeed was condemned by Alexander VIII as scandalous, rash, offensive to pious ears, and erroneous (Decr. 24 Aug. 1690). Cf. Viva, on the second proposition.