Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales
Article I: On the Cessation of Law from Within
Things to be noted beforehand. 1. The adequate end of law is that which is the total end of the law or precept. This end can be either unique, for example, if prayers are prescribed only for obtaining peace; or it can coalesce from several, as in the law of the prohibition of books: whose end is both that the damage of harmful reading be avoided, and that obedience be offered to the Church in such pernicious matters, and especially lest an occasion be given to depraved writers of disseminating novelties and harmful doctrines (H. Ap., II, 70).
- The end of law can cease in a twofold way, either for the community or for such a subject: a) contrarily, namely when the law, circumstances having changed, is rendered harmful, unjust, or at least very difficult; b) privatively, when it becomes useless, for example, because the good which the legislator intended has either already been perfectly obtained, or can no longer be obtained thereafter.
- PRINCIPLES. I. When the end of the law ceases contrariwise and in common, the law also ceases by the fact itself. The reason is clear from the things said concerning the nature of law: because as soon as law in common, that is, with respect to the whole or at least the greater part of the community, becomes harmful, inequitable, or morally impossible, it is no longer an ordinance of reason unto the common good, and therefore it is not law.
If the law becomes truly harmful or very difficult, not for the community but for a private person, place is given to epikeia. Yet the law does not cease in those circumstances, but only its obligation is suspended. Thus he who on a fast day has nothing except meats for eating is not held to abstinence. See the things said concerning the reading of a prohibited book in an urgent case (n. 192). Cf. what St. Alph. teaches, VI, 613; ed. G., III, p. 639, where the discourse is concerning a pastor who discovers an impediment when all things are already prepared for the nuptials.
- II. When the adequate end of the law ceases privatively, in common, the law likewise ceases by the fact itself. Thus, if someone vowed not to enter some house on account of danger of fornication, when this danger ceases, the vow also ceases. The reason, because since the law is useless, it loses the force of obliging. Thus St. Thomas and the Salmanticenses with the common opinion (I, 199).
We have said 1. When the adequate end ceases; for if only a partial end ceases, the law by no means ceases. For then the final cause remains in the remaining part, and therefore the law itself remains: it is understood, provided that the cause which remains is still sufficient. Thus, for example, an imposed prayer for obtaining peace and warding off plague does not cease if, peace having been obtained, the epidemic continues to rage.
But if in a particular case, for some brief time, the law becomes useless to the community, the same conclusion stands as in the preceding number (cf. also n. 173); the obligation is suspended.
In common, that is, with respect to the whole or at least the greater part of the community; because if the end of the law ceases only in a particular case and as regards a private person, the law itself does not therefore cease for the community.
The law ceases by the fact itself, that is, the declaration of the legislator or a contrary custom is not to be awaited, as all with the Salmanticenses (de Leg., c. 4, n. 4), against a few, affirm, and indeed rightly; for where the essentials of law are lacking, the law collapses of itself. It suffices, therefore, that it be clear to me in particular, or probable, namely through reasons truly or readily probable, that the adequate end of the law has ceased in common. But it is otherwise if I doubt through slight or equiprobable reasons, as has been demonstrated several times.
- III. When, in a particular case, the adequate end of the law ceases privatively, the law does not cease.
The reason: it conduces to the common good that all be bound by laws, even if they believe them to be useless for themselves. Add that in these things there will ordinarily be great danger of hallucination (St. Thom., 2.2, q. 154, a. 2).
This reason especially urges when the matter concerns laws founded on a presumption of right. Thus, for example, spouses are not exempted from the proclamation of banns, although they prudently judge that no impediment of matrimony exists (I, 199; VII, 237; Istruz., II, 74; Conf. dir., II, 23; 2 El. q. reform., n. 5).
Note. Nevertheless St. Alphonsus adds (I, 199): "If sometime a case occurred in which someone was altogether certain and secure that every danger of hallucination was absent; then I would not dare to disapprove the opinion of those saying that then, in the particular case, the law ceases."
Yet in circumstances of this kind a dispensation of the law is easily conceded (Suarez, l. 6, c. 18, n. 24).