ARTICLE I: On the Requisites for a Vow

The conditions required for a vow can be referred either to the one vowing himself, or to the matter of the vow.

625. PRINCIPLES. I. For the validity of a vow there are required, on the part of the one vowing, the capacity of vowing and a free or deliberate will of obliging oneself. For a vow is after the likeness of a law which man imposes on himself. But no one can impose a burden on himself who is not his own master; besides, no law is imposed without the mind of obliging, nor is any man considered to assume some obligation without free and full deliberation. But free will and deliberation, whether actual or virtual, are required, namely such as is necessary for the perfect and direct voluntary; because for a good act the thing willed is required in itself, as we said n. 309. See St. Alph., III, 196.

Hence: 1. By defect of CAPACITY, the insane, the half-sleeping, the half-drunk, even if previously they had foreseen that they would emit a vow, and children not yet seven years old, cannot vow validly, unless perhaps they already possess that discretion of good and evil which suffices for sinning mortally. For he who can oblige himself to the demon through sin can also oblige himself to God through vow. - But in doubt whether a child emitted a vow before or after the seventh year, the vow is valid: for every act is presumed to have been done duly (H. Ap., V, 22). As regards a vow of entering Religion, it is not valid unless the various conditions placed by the Church (cf. n. 2137) are fulfilled. - Nor likewise are vows of the impubes valid when emitted against the will of parents, nor vows of religious emitted against the express will of their prelates.

2. By defect of INTENTION, a fictitious vow is not valid, that is, one emitted either without the mind of promising, or without the mind of obliging oneself. Indeed, such a vow regularly is a venial sin, on account of a certain irreverence. But in religious profession and reception of sacred order it would be mortal, because it would be deception in a most grave thing. But if someone had the mind of vowing and obliging himself, but not of fulfilling, the vow would be valid; but he would commit a sin of fraud, grave or light according to the quantity of the matter (III, 201). Recall what was said n. 603.

3. By defect of COGNITION, a vow made with complete ignorance of the obligation which it induces is not valid. - But it is valid if the one vowing is conscious of the obligation of the vow, although he does not reflectively advert to it, or if he adverts to it confusedly, for example if he wished to vow in the ordinary way in which others vow; for then he implicitly wills to contract the obligation (H. Ap., V, 21).

Nor is a vow valid which is emitted FROM ERROR in such a way that the thing is morally diverse from that which someone intended to vow. But this happens when error turns either upon the substance of the thing, for example if you vowed to give your chalice, which you thought was silver, although it is gold; or upon a substantial condition, for example if you vowed a pilgrimage to some sanctuary, thinking that it is distant only a hundred miles, although it is distant three hundred; or upon the final cause, for example you vowed something in thanksgiving for health restored to a parent who in reality was not sick, or is already dead. But the vow is valid if the error turns upon accidental circumstances of lesser moment, so that, these things being known, the vow would still have been emitted (III, 198). Cf. n. 617. But vows of Religion are not void except on account of error concerning the substance alone; and the reason is that, if it were otherwise, the firmness which is essential to the religious state would not be sufficiently provided for. See other things n. 635, 4.

4. By defect of DELIBERATION and LIBERTY, a vow emitted in such a heat of passion or devotion that it impeded the use of reason required for mortal sin is not valid (Billuart, de Relig., Diss. 4, a. 1, n. 3).¹ - Similarly, a vow made from fear is null: a) if the one vowing was not in possession of himself, whatever the cause of the fear may have been (cf. n. 286); b) if the vow was emitted from grave fear unjustly struck into him by another for extorting the vow; because God is not considered to accept a promise extorted by injury from someone by force. And this is certain from canon law if it is a question of a solemn vow, but more probable if of a simple vow. - But otherwise one must speak if the fear was either light, or justly struck, or not struck for extorting the vow (III, 197; H. Ap., V, 23).

626. II. On the part of the matter, it is required that a vow be concerning an honorable, just, possible thing and concerning a better good. That honorable, just, and possible matter is required is evident of itself; for this is required in the matter of any obligation whatsoever. But that matter concerning a better thing is required is proper and peculiar to a vow. Therefore the matter must be:

1. HONORABLE; because the intrinsic end of a vow is to worship God. But God is not worshiped by an indifferent or evil action; for an unfaithful and foolish promise displeases him (Eccl., 5, 3).

Hence a vow concerning an indifferent thing is void, unless the thing becomes good from the end or circumstances; indeed, he who vows an indifferent or vain thing sins venially. A fortiori, a vow concerning an evil thing is void; and one thus vowing sins gravely of itself, although that thing is only venially evil, since of itself it is blasphemy to wish that evil fall to the honor of God. Yet commonly, on account of ignorance, this is only venial (III, 204).

When the thing accidentally becomes evil from a depraved end, the vow is void if the malice of the end holds itself on the part of the thing vowed, namely if the thing promised is directly ordered to the depraved end, for example if someone vows something in thanksgiving for the happy outcome of theft: for this would be virtually blasphemy, as if God promoted sins. But if the malice of the end holds itself rather on the part of the act alone of the one vowing, for instance if the evil end is only connected with or added to the vow, the vow is valid, for example if someone vows a fast and at the same time hopes that he will be praised for this. The vow remains good in itself; only let the evil circumstance which infects the act be put away (III, 206).

2. JUST; that is, something which can be furnished without wounding the rights of anyone.

Thus spouses, without mutual consent, cannot vow perfect chastity, because neither has power over his own body. He who vows separately cannot ask for the debt, but is held to render it (cf. n. 2096).

3. POSSIBLE; for no obligation can be given to the impossible.

Hence a vow of avoiding all venial sins through one's whole life is held as nothing, since this cannot be done without a special privilege. But a vow of avoiding all perfectly deliberate venial sins would be valid; for this is not impossible, and those who love perfection avoid them sufficiently. Likewise, generally a vow of abstaining from venial sins in some determined matter would be valid (III, 203).

When a vow concerns a thing partly possible, partly impossible, let the rules to be established below (n. 634) be observed.

4. CONCERNING A BETTER GOOD; namely concerning a thing not impeditive of a greater good, because a promise which would impede a greater good would detract something from divine worship, and therefore could not be pleasing to God. But a vow can concern a better good in a thing otherwise prescribed; because the new bond of a vow can contribute to greater fidelity and devotion in fulfilling the law (III, 207-209).

Corollaries. CONCERNING CERTAIN VOWS IN PARTICULAR.

1. A vow of marrying, of itself, is not valid, because celibacy is better than marriage. - But it would be valid per accidens, if marriage were necessary for removing scandal or repairing the honor of a girl; likewise, if someone, having experienced his frailty, were unwilling to employ other remedies so that he might become continent: for then marriage is concerning a better good.

2. A vow of not vowing, of itself, is invalid, because it is concerning inept matter; nevertheless per accidens it can concern a better good, if someone, for example, is accustomed to be imprudent in vowing. If therefore a faithful person of this sort vows that he will not emit vows except by permission of the confessor, the vow is valid. If afterward, without consulting the confessor, he emits some vow, he sins; but the vow thus emitted, provided it concerns a possible and honorable object, is valid. - Except, if in eliciting the vow of not vowing without permission of the confessor, he had the intention of making subsequent vows void, and, while he was emitting a new vow, he was forgetful of this clause (III, 210; H. Ap., V, 28).

3. A vow of not asking dispensation from a vow is invalid, if it is emitted in an unlimited sense; for circumstances can be given where asking dispensation will be concerning a better good (III, 208).

4. A vow of always doing what is more perfect, wonderful in certain Saints, does not concern a better good for those whose life has not been proved by special vigor of virtues.

5. A vow of obedience toward a confessor does not concern a better good if through it the penitent promises that he will make confession with no other confessor. But it can concern a better good in determined and rare cases, for example when a secular person, under obedience, wishes to serve God after the manner of religious. Yet a vow of this sort should never be perpetual, always prudently determined (Ami du Cl., 1906, p. 1026). See what is to be said n. 1790.

6. A vow of poverty to be observed in the world, if it is surrounded with certain limits, for example of not making expenses of greater moment without permission of the confessor, etc., can sometimes be permitted. Ami du Cl., 1913, p. 730.

7. A vow of not adhering to created things, of itself, concerns a good and possible thing, after the example of the Apostle (Phil., IV, 12). Cf. St. Alph., Prat. d'amar G. C., c. XI. Nevertheless, since merely internal acts are the matter promised there, that vow will have to be permitted only to few persons (Ami du Cl., ibid.).