Article — Marc, Institutiones Morales

ARTICLE II: On Lust and Immodesty

¶767.
  1. Definition. Lust is the inordinate appetite or use of venereal pleasure (III, 412). It is said: inordinate, i.e. outside matrimony and its laws.

Venereal pleasure (libidinous, lustful, carnal) is that which arises (in each sex) from the movement of fluids serving generation and is felt in the genital parts. It differs specifically from sensitive pleasure (natural, sensible), which is had from the conformity of a sensible object with the sense, for example from the contact of a smooth thing (III, 415; Vind. Alph., P. III, q. 13, a. 1).

Sensitive pleasure can be perceived: a) From the sight or embrace of him whom you pursue with tender but honorable love, insofar as that love (which resides in the will) overflows into the sensitive appetite and becomes a cause of movement in the heart and blood. It is called spiritual-sensitive, and if honorable ends are preserved, such pleasure is not to be condemned. b) From an object not of itself apt to move lust (although by accident it sometimes arises), as from hearing music; then by some it is called purely sensitive. c) From a carnal object, but not a shameful one, of itself apt to move lust (although by accident it does not move to it), as from the touch or kiss of a woman's hand; then it is called sensual. Cf. Sporer, Theol. mor., P. IV, n. 680; Ballerini-Palmieri, de 6 Praec., n. 70; Noldin, n. 7.

Immodesty is a vice, repugnant to human shame, in the use of venereal things and of things ordered to them: for example in carnal copulation, and in looks, touches, kisses, embraces, and other things ordered to it. Akin to these is lasciviousness, which is an indecent motion of the body, proceeding from dissolution of the soul.

Immodesty, of itself, differs from lust, because it is not necessarily joined with venereal pleasure; yet it easily leads to this, and on account of the proximate danger of this sort it is ordinarily gravely evil, and therefore, in practice, sins of immodesty are scarcely distinguished from sins of imperfect lust, or of lust indirectly willed (cf. n. 769).

Division. Lust is divided in several ways:

  1. By reason of the intended end, one kind is directly willed, namely when pleasure is intended in itself by deliberate plan; another is indirectly willed, when something else is intended, from which pleasure arises. 2. By reason of the effect that follows, one is consummated (or perfect), in which effusion of semen or fluid intervenes; another is unconsummated (or imperfect), in which that terminus of venereal things does not intervene. Both differ specifically among themselves (cf. n. 791, 792). 3. By reason of the act, one is internal, another external.

Lust is subdivided, by reason of circumstances, into various species, as will be explained below n. 771 ff.

Causes of lust. The occasions and causes that lead man to acts of lust are innumerable: a) External causes are given, such as: bad examples, idleness, imprudent questions (sometimes in the sacred tribunal), solitude, certain times of the year, dances, visits of lovers, etc. Cf. n. 824. b) Internal causes are given, namely those that are observed in the subject: not having care of the genitals, sitting for a long time, lying supine in bed, wearing garments too tight, using exciting foods or narcotic substances, etc. All these things either irritate the genital parts, or first bring congestions in the spinal marrow.

Certain diseases are to be numbered among internal causes, especially those that affect the nervous system or the spinal marrow. The more important are: pulmonary phthisis, arthritis, chlorosis, neurosis of the genitals, epilepsy, progressive paralysis of the demented, and especially hysteria. Therefore it is no wonder that there are many who labor under hypersexuality or sexual perversion, that is, who incline excessively to sexual things or to perverse things. There are those who do not feel pleasure unless they act cruelly against themselves (masochism) or against others (sadism). There are those who are insanely drawn to the unspeakable crimes of sodomy. Let the prudent confessor see to what Christian physician he should commend such penitents; because hygienic remedies contribute much to relieving them. Let him also remember that among these, imputability is often diminished, indeed sometimes taken away. Cf. Antonelli, II, n. 160, where all things are given copiously.

¶768.
  1. Principles. I. Lust directly willed is a grave sin from its whole genus. It is said: 1. It is a grave sin; the reason is taken from the frustration of the natural end of this pleasure. For it is a grave sin, or grave inordination, to usurp for a merely private good the highest pleasure that nature constituted and ordered to the common good, namely the conservation and propagation of the human race. But lust directly willed does this. St. Thomas, 2.2, q. 153, a. 3.

It is confirmed from the reason of the common good. That indeed is gravely illicit which, unless it were prohibited, would yield to the grave harm of the whole man, indeed also of the human race. But if venereal pleasure were licit outside matrimony, man without restraint, with the greatest detriment of himself, would give himself to it; because it is proper to carnal pleasure to corrupt the whole rational nature, and indeed in each sex. For we are much affected by those things in which we take pleasure; and therefore reason is either entirely taken away, or greatly weakened concerning other things, in him who hands himself over to pleasures of this sort. Add that the body itself is weakened by lust and a mass of diseases is frequently generated. There accedes a most grave argument from the harm that would come to the human race itself; for men would care little about entering marriage and generating offspring, if pleasure were licit without such a burden. Finally it is evident from the Apostle declaring the lustful to be excluded from the kingdom of God (Gal., 5, 19).

  1. From its whole genus; so that every venereal pleasure, even light, taken with full advertence and consent, outside matrimony, is a mortal sin. The reason is that any carnal pleasure, even light, on account of man's highest propensity to venereal things, either implies the aforesaid inordination, or exposes man to a proximate danger of progressing even to complete and certainly grave pleasure. But that which generates danger of gravely sinning, even if in itself it were venial, becomes grave by reason of the danger joined to it (Billuart, de Temper., D. V, a. 2).

Therefore the natural law prohibiting directly willed lust is as it were the law of the Creator of the human race, founded on the presumption of common danger, or on the presumption of law. Cf. the things said on the obligation of a law of this kind, n. 191-192.

It is confirmed from proposition 40, condemned by Alexander VII, with which, as Viva says, the contrary opinion can scarcely be reconciled: "The opinion is probable which says that a kiss had on account of carnal and sensible pleasure, which arises from the kiss, with danger of further consent and pollution excluded, is only venial" (III, 415; H. Ap., IX, 2).

¶769.
  1. II. Lust indirectly willed (and likewise immodesty) admits smallness of matter, i.e. it is reputed grave or light according as the act from which carnal pleasure is foreseen as about to follow influences it, by its force and nature, either proximately and gravely, or only remotely and lightly. The reason is that the evil effect, which follows from an action beyond the intention, must be held evil to that degree to which the cause itself was evil. Recall the things said concerning the indirect voluntary (n. 313-315).

Corollaries. To know the gravity of indirect lust, one must attend to the end on account of which acts are exercised, and besides to the danger that they bring. Acts can, outside matrimony, be exercised from a fourfold end: 1. from the intention of venereal pleasure; 2. from the intention of sensible pleasure; 3. from levity of soul, petulance, and curiosity; 4. from necessity, or from some other just cause.

a) If the aforesaid acts are exercised on account of carnal pleasure, they are mortal sins, even if they are not in themselves greatly dishonorable. Reason: because the intended end is gravely evil; from which end the act of immodesty falls back into lust directly willed. Hence, to touch the hand of a woman on account of carnal pleasure is a mortal sin (III, 415).

b) If they are exercised, with venereal affection excluded, from the sole intention of sensible pleasure, several authors indeed deny that they exceed venial fault; because, they say, it is not more inordinate to take pleasure from the contact of a woman's hand than from the contact of a smooth thing, for example a rose, a silk cloth, and the like. - But, with attention given to the circumstances of manner and time, this opinion, especially if the touches are done with full advertence and consent, is not practically probable,1 since studiously to seek that pleasure, for the most part, on account of our corrupted nature, carries with it the danger of falling into and consenting to carnal pleasure, especially in persons apt for copulation and especially if those acts are had with some affection and delay.

c) If they are exercised from levity, jest, curiosity, they are not, of themselves, except venial sins; provided they are not in themselves very dishonorable, nor are done with delay and proximate danger of lust, or with the scandal of others, as would be the case if they were done by ecclesiastics (III, 418). - The same must be said if the acts are done from irritation of the nerves.

d) If they are exercised on account of necessity or a just cause, for example touches by a surgeon for healing, they are not sins, even if venereal pleasure arises: provided the will turns away from it and the danger of consenting to it is absent.2 This is evident from the things said concerning the indirect voluntary (n. 315).

Note. The danger of indirect lust can arise not only from acts that of themselves hold themselves in the matter of lust (touches, looks, etc.), but also from acts that wander outside the matter of lust, and only by accident influence lust, for example from drunkenness, from the sight of the killing of animals, etc. - Each kind of actions can have proximate or remote influence. See what is to be said n. 795, where at length.

(1) Cf. III, 416, 418; H. Ap., IX, 3; Lehmkuhl, I, 1027. These words "is not practically probable" mean: let the confessor not permit it, as father and as physician; because the action concerning which there is question is to be reprehended, on account of the certain danger that it contains. See below n. 837. (2) If the cause is not indeed just, yet has something of utility, for example a non-necessary study of the medical art, it is probable that the sin will not be mortal (Lessius, de Just., l. 4, c. 3, n. 118).

¶770.
  1. It is asked. Whether invincible ignorance can be given concerning sins of lust?

Resp. With experience as witness, it can be given concerning the grave malice of certain sins of lust, whether non-consummated, or even consummated: 1. in adolescents, for a short time, especially when deep silence has been preserved before them about these matters; 2. in the uneducated (indeed perhaps also in others for a short time), when a special circumstance apparently rendering the act honorable intervenes. Thus, for example, there can be ignorance of the grave malice of dishonorable kisses or touches between betrothed persons, of the malice of internal acts, of the malice of onanism among spouses who are already burdened by numerous offspring. Cf. the things said n. 125; Gopfert, II, 320.

Let the confessor beware lest he admonish penitents accustomed to a vice, whose gravity indeed they know, but whose special malice they are ignorant of, concerning this special malice. For such an admonition seems to be of little profit, and from it formal sins would be multiplied. Otherwise one must speak if the penitent thinks that some lustful act that he exercises is not a sin, or is not mortal; because amendment of frequently committed lust will scarcely be possible thereafter, and ignorance, in such a case, cannot be anything except exceedingly harmful to the penitent (Praxis, n. 39; Scavini, I, 391).