ARTICLE II: On the Obligation of a Vow

627. PRINCIPLES. I. A valid vow obliges from the virtue of religion. It is proved: 1. by Scripture (Deut., 23, 21): That which has once gone forth from thy lips thou shalt observe and do, as thou hast promised to the Lord thy God; likewise Eccl., 5, 3. 2. By reason: every valid promise made to a man obliges by natural law; therefore a fortiori a promise made to God and accepted by him.

Violations of vows are certainly more probably all of the same species. Whence, if someone having a vow of chastity fornicates, he can confess the fornication separately and the violation of the vow separately (III, 34 and 224). Recall what was said n. 581.

628. II. A vow obliges under grave or under light matter, according to the quantity of the matter and according to the intention of the one vowing. For the obligation of a vow is related as the obligation of a law; and therefore it is to be weighed both from the nature of the thing and from the will of the one vowing (III, 211). If therefore the matter is in itself light, the one vowing cannot, even if he intended this, oblige himself under grave matter to it; for the matter is not capable of so great an obligation. Thus a vow under grave matter of not drinking a little drop of unmixed wine cannot be admitted (Ami du Cl., 1905, p. 646).

But if the matter is in itself indeed grave, yet the one vowing intends to oblige himself to it only under venial sin, the vow obliges him only under venial sin.

But if the intention of the one vowing is not established, attention must be given either to the words which he used, or to usual acceptance, or to the matter of the vow. For the one vowing in grave matter is to be considered to have wished to oblige himself under grave matter, unless the contrary is established from elsewhere (III, 211-213).

But matter is judged GRAVE which either of itself or from the adjuncts notably contributes to the glory of God and the utility of the one vowing or of neighbor, and which in the precepts of God or of the Church is held as grave. Hence a vow of fasting, confessing sins, hearing Mass, communicating even once, expending notable money for pious uses, obliges under grave matter. - Otherwise, a vow of expending a modest amount of money, of visiting one's own church once or again, and of reciting brief prayers. Cf. n. 1716, 1.

Note. It was said: a grave thing can be vowed UNDER LIGHT matter. Yet this does not hold as regards the vows of Religion, which from the intention of the Church are absolute, and therefore do not depend upon the intention alone of the one vowing; but the one vowing is held to conform his intention to the intention of the Church; otherwise the vow would be void, as not accepted by the Church (n. 2147).

Corollaries. 1. He who vowed something under light matter, but without the intention of fulfilling it, sins only lightly. - The matter is otherwise in a promissory oath; cf. n. 606. Lehmkuhl, I, n. 593.

2. Light matters owed from the same vow coalesce if they were promised after the manner of one thing, namely if a day is attached for urging the obligation, lest execution be deferred beyond that day. But this, according to the common opinion of the Doctors, is presumed in REAL vows. Wherefore, if you vowed to give a small alms daily as part of a notable sum which you intend to expend, and you omit it more often, the matters coalesce and can arrive at mortal sin. But it is difficult to determine how great a part is required for grave omission, since the thing depends upon the circumstances.

3. But the same things do not coalesce if they were promised after the manner of singular things, so that the fulfillment of the work attached to such a day, for example a light mortification on Friday in honor of the Passion, is a substantial condition; in which case the day is said to be attached for ending the obligation: and this is commonly presumed in PERSONAL vows. Whence, he who had vowed to recite the Angelic Salutation on all the days of his life would sin only lightly by omitting it on individual days (III, 212; H. Ap., V, 29).

629. III. The obligation of a vow binds only the one vowing. For this obligation arises from one's own will and intention, and because no one has the right of promising another's thing or action. Whence if someone vows the deed of another, the sense is that he will take care in every licit way that that deed obtain execution, for example that a son enter Religion, to which the father devoted him. Yet it can happen that someone is held to execute another's vow; but an obligation of this sort arises from another title, for example from justice.

As regards practice, the following RULES must be established:

1. Personal vows are not fulfilled except by the one vowing. - Whence he who vowed, for example, a pilgrimage does not satisfy if he hires another; nor is he held to do this if he himself cannot make the journey.

2. Real vows must be paid from one's own. - Whence he who cannot from his own is not held to beg from another. But if he can from his own, and yet another wishes to pay for him, this is valid; because then what the other gives becomes his own. Indeed, he probably satisfies a vow of alms who afterward ratifies that alms when he knows that it was furnished by another for that end; because then the vow is already fulfilled with the consent of the one vowing (III, 217).

3. Real vows, since they inhere in the thing, pass along with it to heirs; because they are held to pay them, not indeed directly by force of the vow, but from the title of the inheritance accepted, just as other debts; and therefore they must be paid before legacies, but after debts of justice (III, 214).

4. If a community has vowed something, it matters little whether the matter promised regards private acts, as would be the recitation of the rosary, or public acts, as would be a procession to be made; successors are not held from the motive of religion, but they are held from the motive of obedience, pact, or legitimate custom (III, 216). But it must be noted, from the decree of the S. R. C. (n. 834, 932), that new feasts introduced by a Superior from a vow do not oblige successors. For successors to be held, the consent of the Holy See is required. Thus from the Constitution of Urban VIII, Sept. 13, 1642. Cf. Lehmkuhl, I, 590.

630. IV. A vow must be fulfilled at the time prefixed; or, if determination of time is lacking, as soon as it can conveniently be done. For it is said (Deut., 23, 21): When thou hast vowed a vow to the Lord thy God, thou shalt not delay to pay it: because the Lord thy God will require it; and if thou delay, it shall be imputed to thee for a sin.

But time is attached either for ending or for urging the obligation. If the first, the vow comprehends both the matter promised and the circumstance of time after the manner of one thing; and therefore, once this time has elapsed, the vow can no longer be fulfilled, and the obligation ceases. If the second, the circumstance of time is an accessory part; wherefore, once the prefixed time has elapsed, the vow always obliges, and must be fulfilled as soon as it can conveniently be done. Doubt standing, in real vows the day is presumed attached for urging the obligation; in personal vows it is presumed attached for ending the obligation (III, 220).

Hence: 1. He who vowed a fast in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary to be kept on Saturday, if on this day, whether inculpably or culpably, he did not fast, is thenceforth held to nothing; nor is he held to anticipate, if he foresees an impediment that will supervene at that time. 2. But he who vowed a pilgrimage without determination of time is held to perform it as soon as it can conveniently be done; and the obligation, a long delay having intervened, does not cease on that account (III, 220; H. Ap., V, 32).

631. IT IS ASKED. What DELAY, in fulfilling a vow, is to be held grave?

Resp. 1. If a time was attached for ending the obligation, for example in a vow of fasting on this day, any delay of a vow gravely obliging beyond the determined time is grave; because once this has elapsed, the vow can no longer be fulfilled, since it was affixed to the time.

2. But if the time was not determined, or not except for urging the execution of the vow, notable delay in a grave thing is a grave sin. Moreover, delay seems notable to St. Alphonsus if the fulfillment of a vow emitted for temporary service of God, for example of adorning a church, is deferred without just cause for two or three years; and if the fulfillment of a vow made for perpetual service of God, for example of entering a religious Order, is deferred without reasonable cause beyond six months (III, 221). Cf. n. 2140. Much attention must also be given to the age of the one vowing.

It must be noted. "If someone has published some vow, and afterward fulfills the work promised while forgetful of the vow, he is not held to fulfill it again, provided he can always and certainly presume that, if he had been mindful of the vow, he would have applied the fulfilled work for it. And the Doctors commonly teach this, because then the vow is fulfilled through that first will had in the beginning, when the vow was emitted" (H. Ap., X, 120, end). See what was said n. 212.

632. V. A conditioned vow does not oblige unless the condition is fulfilled. For the one vowing did not wish to bind himself otherwise. And this holds even if he himself was the cause why the condition was not fulfilled; indeed, according to the more probable opinion, even if maliciously through fraud, deceit, etc., he had brought an impediment; for even in this case the condition attached is not fulfilled. "But if you impede deceitfully, you sin: for example, you vowed Religion, if your father approves: if you by prayers or reasons impede the consent of your father, you do not sin; otherwise, if you impede by force or fraud. Likewise, you vowed chastity, if God frees you for a year from mortal sin: if from frailty you fall, you do not sin with respect to the vow. Otherwise, if you sin studiously so that you may be released from the vow. And so concerning the rest" (III, 218).

But as regards the CONDITIONS of vows, it must be noted: 1. All shameful or impossible conditions render vows null.¹ 2. For the obligation of a vow, it is not sufficient that the condition be fulfilled equivalently, but it must be fulfilled specifically: for example, you vowed Religion if your sister marries; it does not suffice if she dies (III, 219).

IT IS ASKED. What is to be judged concerning the obligation of a disjunctive or penal vow?

Resp. 1. The essential condition of a DISJUNCTIVE vow, for example of fasting on Saturday or giving alms, is election between apt matters. Hence: a) If either part is not apt matter, the vow is null. b) If before election one part becomes impossible, the vow does not oblige, because election is not possible. But if this happened by fault of the one vowing, he is bound to the other part, as that to which he tacitly consented by his fault. c) If, election having been made, the part elected becomes impossible, the one vowing is held to nothing; but if the other part becomes impossible, he is held to the elected part. d) After election, while each part is still whole, it is probable that the one vowing can always choose that part which he prefers. The reason is that, notwithstanding the election made, the vow still remains disjunctive; nor did the one vowing by his election deprive himself of liberty of choosing the other part (III, 224).

2. A penal vow is either simple, concerning the payment of a penalty, for example if I play cards; in which case it suffices to pay the penalty for the first time; or it is twofold,

concerning not playing and concerning the payment of the penalty: and in this case, as often as the vow is violated, so often the penalty is to be paid, unless this is very grave, as a pilgrimage, the bestowal of a great alms, which is not commonly accustomed to be repeated. Except also if such a one, while playing, was altogether forgetful of the vow (III, 223; H. Ap., V, 30).

633. VI. The interpretation of vows is the same as the interpretation of laws. For a vow is a certain particular and private law.

Hence: 1. A vow indeterminate as regards time, for example concerning the daily rosary, concerning fasting to be kept on individual Saturdays, obliges perpetually, unless something else is gathered from the circumstances. In doubt whether a vow is temporary or perpetual, or for a month or a year, you are held only to the lesser thing.

2. He who vowed something without determination of place, for example entrance into some Order, satisfies by entering any monastery of the same Order in which the substantial things of the rule are observed; nor is he held to seek admission in places situated outside the province if he has not been admitted in a monastery of the province. Cf. n. 2140.

3. He who vowed something without a certain quality, for example a chalice, a church to be built, must fulfill the vow according to common use.

4. He who vowed something without a certain quantity, for example alms, money, wheat, etc., satisfies by giving as much as he wishes, provided he does not give so little that he seems rather to mock God than to fulfill the vow.

5. He who vowed the recitation of the rosary satisfies by reciting the third part, because it is commonly understood thus; and he satisfies by reciting alternately, and similarly by dividing the decades, because such a vow obliges after the likeness of the Divine Office.

6. He who vowed daily hearing of the sacred rite for a month or year probably is not held on feast days to hear two sacred rites. Nor is he held to fast on Sunday who vowed fasting for a month, a year, or the whole life; because the custom of the Church has it thus. Except, if he expressly bound himself to this.

7. He who vowed a fast for the vigil of some Saint, if this falls on a Sunday, can fulfill his vow on Saturday according to the custom of the Church (III, 221-224).

8. A vow of doing that which is more perfect does not of itself extend to sins to be omitted. Cf. Ami du Cl., 1906, p. 59.

For resolving DOUBTS concerning the existence, extension, and cessation of vows, one must stand by the rules established where doubtful and probable conscience is treated (n. 46, 55 and 89).

634. IT IS ASKED. What must be said concerning a vow of a thing partly possible, partly impossible?

Resp. 1. A vow whose matter cannot or is not accustomed to be divided is null. Thus, for example, you vowed to build a temple: if you cannot build the whole, you are not held to a part, unless nevertheless another should wish to complete it.

2. In divisible matter, the one vowing is held to the possible part, even if lesser, provided this is not considered merely accessory in the vow.

Thus, he who vowed to fast for the whole week, if he can only on some days, is held to this. But on the contrary, he who vowed to perform a pilgrimage with bare feet, but is incapable of the pilgrimage, is not held, as is evident, to baring of the feet. Yet he is held to the pilgrimage itself if he is only impeded from walking with bare feet (III, 225).

Finally, this remains to be noted: He who emitted several incompossible vows must keep that one which excels the others in dignity; otherwise the prior is preferred to the later (III, 210, end).