Part First: On the First Principles of Moral Theology

9. I. On the ultimate end of man. It belongs to dogmatic theology to institute the question concerning the ultimate end of man; and in truth, among the authors versed in that science, it is possible to find arguments on this matter at once splendid and profound. We wish to note the following for remembrance.

1. The end of God the Creator is His intrinsic glory, that is, His perfection. For the Lord has wrought all things for Himself (Prov. 16:4). In other words, God created all things, not that from this He might obtain usefulness, but that He might manifest His perfection, His goodness, through goods communicated to creatures. So the Vatican Council (Sess. 3, c. 1).

2. The ultimate end of man is primarily the extrinsic glory of God; secondarily, however, perfect beatitude in God. The reason is clear: for that must be the primary ultimate end of man which God Himself intends in creating him and all other things. But on account of His extrinsic glory (that is, that He may be known, praised, loved), God has wrought all things, as Sacred Scripture often testifies. But in procuring this extrinsic glory, man finds perfect beatitude. For the attempts of man are vain when he seeks beatitude among created things, which are not of themselves desirable, nor stable, nor open to all. Man attains true beatitude when especially those faculties which are proper to him are perfected, namely intellect and will. But since intellect and will are capable of universal truth and good, it follows that man will attain perfect beatitude only in the knowledge and love of God. So all theologians. Cf. Palmieri, Mazzella, Satolli, Van Noort, Herrmann, in the Treatise On God the Creator, article on the end of creation. This is the ultimate end of man. It is the noble office of moral theology to indicate both the means apt for the end, and the dangers and snares by which man is surrounded, and which attempt to turn him away from attaining the end.

II. Means to the end; order of things to be said. The means to the end are human acts, by which the knowledge and love of God, in which beatitude consists, are exercised or prepared. Concerning these in the body of the work.

The first principles of moral theology regard the morality of these human acts in general. Since this morality is the relation of a human act to its rule, it is expedient that in this general part each term of the relation be weighed separately: namely the rule, and the thing ruled.

And first, as regards the RULE, it is necessarily twofold, namely proximate and remote. The proximate rule is the law of God subjectively taken, that is, conscience, which immediately and universally directs the act of any man whatever. But the remote rule is the divine law considered objectively, or in itself; and this is what must direct conscience itself. For conscience, that it may be a right and perfect rule of human acts, must itself also be directed according to the norm of the various laws which God prescribes to the human will, whether directly or indirectly.

Then as regards the THING RULED, that is, human acts, we shall consider these under a twofold aspect: 1. insofar as they are human, that is, insofar as they proceed deliberately from the will of man and are imputable to him; 2. insofar as they are good or evil, that is, conformable to the rule or discrepant from it.

10. With St. Alphonsus and most of the older theologians, we shall assign the first place to the treatise on Conscience, which is the subjective norm of acting; there will follow the treatise on Laws, or on the objective norm which must inform conscience itself. In the third place we shall speak of the matter to be ruled, or of Human Acts; to this treatise we shall subject the treatise on Sins, because the one is intimately connected with the other, and the former is, as it were, an introduction to the latter.

Finally we shall assign the last place, as though to an appendix, to the treatise on Virtues in general; this treatise is useful, indeed in a certain way necessary, that the matter of human acts and of the laws of the Decalogue may be known more deeply.

Surely logical order seems to demand this for itself: that the treatise on Virtues be placed before the treatise on Vices and Sins, since logically good is prior to evil; but since those things are chiefly to be considered by the moral theologian which are opposed to the ultimate end, namely sins, there is sufficient reason why the aforesaid order should be inverted. Besides, it is fitting that the two treatises on Human Acts and on Sins not be separated, and that the generic notions concerning virtues immediately precede the treatment of the Decalogue, which is wholly concerned with virtues and with the offices of virtues prescribed by the law of God.

Therefore the general treatises will follow in this order:

Treatise I. On Conscience.

Treatise II. On Laws.

Treatise III. On Human Acts.

Treatise IV. On Sins.

Treatise V. On Virtues in General.