§ 1. On Authentic Interpretation

168. DEFINITION. Authentic or juridical interpretation is that which is made by the legislator himself, or by his successor, or Superior. It is called authentic, or brought forth with authority, because, in making it, the Superior uses the power of jurisdiction. It is also called the declaration of the legislator (H. Ap., II, n. 73).

Hence it is inferred: 1. Interpretation is not authentic, but doctrinal, if the Superior only declares his mind as a private person.

2. Interpretation can be made by the legislator both through himself and through others to whom this office is committed. The Sacred Congregations of Cardinals, by delegation and mandate of the Supreme Pontiffs, exercise such an office of interpretation.

169. PRINCIPLE. Authentic interpretation has binding force, without new promulgation, if it is comprehensive and restrictive; after new promulgation, if it is extensive.

The reason of the first: Such interpretation is not a new law, but has been imbibed in the law from the beginning: therefore in order that it oblige, it suffices that the declaration be divulged.

The reason of the second: It is not clearly present in the previous law; from the argument it could indeed be drawn from the law, but it was not drawn firmly. Therefore the law remained doubtful. Hence new promulgation is necessary. See St. Alphonsus, III, n. 1027; ed. G., II, p. 408; H. Ap., II, 74.

Note. Nevertheless authentic divulgation, in the case of comprehensive and restrictive interpretation, is always required: namely so that judges can safely either protect the exempt or proceed against those resisting.

What therefore must be thought concerning the various decrees, sentences, or decisions of the Roman Congregations?

Resp. 1. Decrees edited for the universal Church and rightly promulgated obtain the force of law; for they are not promulgated unless the Pontiff commands.

But particular decrees are at least a norm of how one may act fittingly, for the whole Church. They found a truly probable opinion.

2. Sentences, of whatever nature they may be, bind those to whom they are directed. But judicial sentences, of themselves, are not to be extended to similar cases: for they are various according to the variety of circumstances, nor is it always easy to know what circumstances impelled the sentence; whence a transfer to similar cases could be fallacious.

Nevertheless, uniformity of decisions in similar cases induces the style and practice of the Curia. But the practice of the Curia is held as a very strong argument in law.

3. Extensive declarations or decisions, which establish new right, need promulgation in order that they have the force of law: for they follow the nature of law. But as to merely comprehensive declarations of some universal law, the opinion today common holds that the force of law is present in those declarations, provided there is certain evidence concerning their authenticity. The reason is that new laws need promulgation, but not declarations concerning laws already promulgated. "Declarations of this kind," says St. Alphonsus (2 El. q. reform., n. 2; Istruz. prat., II, 39), "which have already been universally divulged in the Church and thus promulgated in fact, by the use of many years or by the report of authors commonly referring to them, these sufficiently bind all the faithful." And thus is the practice of the Roman Curia (cf. Bouix, de Cur. Rom., P. III, c. 7; Palaus, tr. 3, disp. 5, punct. 3, § 1, n. 2).

Those authors think less rightly who suppose that declarations, even comprehensive ones, of some universal law of themselves need promulgation, led by this reason, that while controversy stands among doctors, the universal law is not perspicuous, and therefore declarations of the Roman Congregations truly establish new right. Cf. Genicot, I, n. 137, and D'Annibale, I, n. 184, note 5. They indeed admit our opinion in the case in which Roman declarations have already been universally divulged in the Church and received by use.

4. Restrictive declarations do not need promulgation: for by them, far from a new right being established, there is derogated from a statute whose partial obligation is removed; but any obligation whatever ceases as soon as there is evidence concerning the will of the legislator.

Note. The decrees both of the Congregation of the Holy Office (or Universal Inquisition) and of the Congregation of Sacred Rites have special force. For:

1. The president of the Holy Office is not some certain Cardinal, as in the other Congregations, but the Roman Pontiff himself. Hence those things which are done through the Inquisition can more easily vindicate for themselves the authority of the Pontiff than those things which are done through the other Congregations. Nevertheless, they are not marked by the prerogative of infallibility through the mere presence of the Roman Pontiff as President of the Inquisition, or even through the approval itself; but only then when, approving in specific form, he has ordered some decree, which for the rest treats a matter to be infallibly decided, to be directed to the universal Church in his own name, and has taken care that it be promulgated. For infallibility is an altogether personal prerogative of the Roman Pontiff.

2. The Congregation of Sacred Rites, as we said n. 140, probably even when the Roman Pontiff has not been consulted nor approving, has the power of issuing decrees and interpreting laws. Yet from this do not infer that all responses of the same Congregation are laws, nor that all decrees are universal (cf. Collect. Gardell. 3, n. 5465).

But particular decrees which regard Rubrics pertaining to the universal Church obtain the force of a general decree or of City and World, so that they oblige everywhere, notwithstanding any custom to the contrary even immemorial (S. R. C., January 8, 1914; A. S. S., vol. 36, p. 428). See what is said below n. 1638.

3. Pius IV had devolved the office of authentically interpreting the laws of Trent to the Sacred Congregation of the Council alone. But now any Roman Congregation can interpret it in competent matter; indeed also the Tribunal of the Sacred Rota and the Apostolic Signatura, but these only in a particular case (A. A. S., III, p. 99).