§ 1. On the Killing of Oneself

753. Principles. I. It is never licit, without divine authority or certain inspiration of God, directly to kill oneself. This is indeed repugnant to charity toward oneself, and is injurious both to God, who alone is the direct and absolute lord of human life (cf. n. 852), and to society, which through suicide is deprived of one of its members. This is positively prohibited by that general precept: Thou shalt not kill. Cf. also Rom., XIV, 7, 8. - There accedes the authority of the ecclesiastical precept by which it is established that suicides, concerning whose crime there is certainty, are deprived of ecclesiastical burial (cf. n. 1387).

We have said: Without divine authority or inspiration; for with this, it is most certainly licit to bring death upon oneself. Thus those holy virgins who in times of persecutions handed themselves over to death are not only excused, but are celebrated by the Church with the highest praises (H. Ap., VIII, 1). - Yet that killing is never praised which is accomplished by one's own motion. If it is accomplished from invincible ignorance, it can and must be excused.

You will ask. Whether one condemned to death can, from the precept of the judge, kill himself by sword, rope, or poison?

Resp. Some affirm, probably, because in such a case the guilty person by legitimate authority, that is, by the judge, and therefore by God, is constituted executioner of himself. - But others, according to the more common opinion, deny it; because such an action is intrinsically evil, which therefore neither can the judge command nor the guilty person execute (III, 369; ed. G., p. 625). Therefore the obligation of obeying will not be present; but to obey would not be illicit.

754. II. Sometimes it is licit to concur indirectly in the killing of oneself or in lethal wounding. The precept of conserving life, as being affirmative, does not always oblige; and besides, it is licit to posit an honest or at least indifferent cause, from which, besides the good effect, an evil effect follows, as we said n. 315. Indeed, sometimes an obligation is given of sacrificing life, if charity or justice requires it (III, 366).

But the JUST CAUSES of permitting one's own death are the following, as St. Alphonsus notes (III, 366-372):

1. The common good. Thus a soldier, even if he knows he is about to die, can, indeed is held to, persist in his station, sink or burn his own ship lest the enemy obtain possession of it, set fire to powder to overthrow a hostile tower, etc. Cf. 1 Macc., VI, 43. Similarly, it is licit to throw oneself before a weapon or blow to preserve the life of a prince, to have care of those infected by disease in time of plague, etc.²

2. Virtue to be exercised. Faith: martyrs of Christ can choose not to flee, and voluntarily undergo death. Justice: a malefactor can choose not to go out of prison, even if a way to flight lies open; one condemned to perish by hunger can abstain from food secretly offered. Chastity: a virgin, lest she be violated, can indeed not kill herself, but can expose herself to the danger of death, both to avoid danger of consent, and also to preserve the sole integrity of the flesh, as the Doctors hold not improbably (III, n. 368). Charity toward oneself: it is licit to undergo a dangerous operation for ending very grave torments, provided it offers a founded hope of a more tranquil life. But it would be illicit to expose oneself to great danger of death so that only deformity of the body be removed. Cf. Genicot, Cas. consc., I, p. 148. Charity toward neighbor: an innocent traveler can permit himself to be killed by an unjust aggressor, lest that assassin die in sin. Likewise, in shipwreck someone can yield a plank not yet occupied by himself, indeed even one occupied by himself, provided he is able to do this without casting himself into the sea while ignorant of the art of swimming.³ Here advert that he who occupied it first is not only not held to admit the other, but can impede him, unless the plank suffices for both (cf. Vind. Alph., P. III, q. 2, fin.). Likewise someone can throw himself before a weapon or blow to conserve the life of a friend. Indeed, if a friend has been unjustly condemned to death, he can offer himself to be killed for him. We say if unjustly; for if justly, he would allure him to repeat sins, or he himself would sin against vindicative justice.

3. A more certain death to be avoided. Thus, with a fire raging, if no other way is at hand by which you may avoid so atrocious a death, you can leap from a window, cast yourself into the sea, with some hope of saving yourself. The same is licit for guilty persons detained in prison, for avoiding a certain sentence of death, or even perpetual imprisonment (Bucceroni, I, n. 718).

4. Difficulty of an extraordinary or too harsh remedy. As we have already indicated, a remedy of this kind is held as morally impossible, nor with such rigor, by the consent of all, does the positive precept concerning conserving life oblige, unless the reason of the common good intervenes. Extraordinary remedies are, for example, very costly medicines, or cutting of members, or change of domicile or fatherland; for a virgin, the examination and touching of a physician or surgeon, if namely this is most grave to her, and she shrinks from it more than from death itself. Nevertheless she could permit herself to be touched, indeed would be held to permit it, so that she might be cared for by another woman (III, 372).

5. Necessity of exercising an art. Whence artisans do not sin who ascend upon the roofs of buildings and expose themselves to various dangers where there is need; nor blacksmiths, who daily lessen life for themselves by handling fire. On the contrary, daring men sin gravely who from rash wager and vain glory cast themselves without cause into grave risks, by ascending on high, letting themselves down, bearing heavier burdens, etc. Likewise tightrope walkers, who play by rope in high places with probable danger of life. But whether they sin gravely who from a cause licit of itself too trustingly are engaged in dangerous occupations cannot be so easily defined. Use, character, caution, etc., can effect that for them the danger is remote or none (Konings, n. 463, 6). According to the norm of these principles let the reader judge those who tame wild beasts, cooperate proximately in bull contests, ascend airships. Ami du Cl., 1913, p. 65.

755. Concerning the shortening of life. Man, since he is not the lord of his own life, also cannot, without sufficient reason, shorten his own life. To intend the acceleration of death would be a mortal sin; to foresee the shortening of life and posit its remote cause, although a shortening of some years is probable, is no sin, indeed sometimes meritorious, if the cause is just; only a venial sin if a just cause were lacking.

From these things conclude: 1. It is an act of virtue to afflict the flesh moderately by vigils and hunger. Say the same of him who afflicts himself with graver mortifications, provided he does this by the counsel of a prudent prelate or confessor.

2. He sins venially who eats, drinks, smokes tobacco, uses morphine or opium inordinately, converses and plays with a syphilitic person, although, admonished by a physician, he is conscious of danger to health and shortening of life. Cf. Genicot, Cas. consc., p. 151 seqq.; Antonelli, II, n. 150, de Corpore castigando.

Concerning desire of death. To desire death from a motive of virtue, for example so that we may be joined with God, sin no more, etc., is an act of virtue, provided there is conformity with the divine will. But to desire death on account of the smallest troubles, provided the required advertence is present, which for the most part is lacking, is of itself a mortal sin. But if death is wished because the hardships are so great that life appears more bitter than death itself (Eccli., 30, 17), no sin would be committed (II, 30).

Concerning the custody of virginity in danger of death. Above we said that a virgin can expose herself to the danger of death, even for preserving the integrity of the flesh. The question is whether a virgin is held rather to permit herself to be killed than to be violated. St. Alphonsus responds (III, 368): Speculatively speaking, a virgin placed in these straits probably can

conduct herself permissively, provided she positively resists by the will, and danger of consent is absent: for she offers only material cooperation, which the danger of death excuses.

In practice, however, positive resistance, and therefore acceptance of death, is to be advised, at least on account of the danger of consent, which can easily be present in that permission. - A fortiori, positive resistance is to be advised, indeed imposed (whatever Genicot says, Cas. consc., I, p. 7), if there is question of preserving virginity in danger only of a grave evil, for example grave beating or wounding; because, practically, on the one side, this positive resistance alone can remove the danger of consent and restrain the boldness of youths; but, on the other side, the excellent good of virginity must be preserved even with grave inconvenience. Cf. n. 736 and 778.