§ 1. On the Mode of Satisfying a Law

210. In order that satisfaction be made to the obligation of any law whatever, there is required and suffices the placing or omission of that which any law commands or forbids.

PRINCIPLES. I. A negative law is satisfied by the omission, even involuntary, of the prohibited act. The reason is, because a negative law intends only the omission of the act.

Thus a sick man satisfies a precept prohibiting servile works on feast days, although he observes the precept from impotence. It can happen, however, that he violates it affectively through a depraved desire.

211. II. An affirmative law is satisfied by the placing of the work, done in a human manner, at the due time, and with the intention of doing the work which the law commands. Thus commonly.

We say 1. By the placing of the work. But the work can be performed through another, if it is not personal; for example, a donation can be made by another. The prescribed work must be placed whole. If it becomes impossible, apply the distinction which we shall give below, n. 224.

2. Done in a human manner, that is, knowingly and voluntarily.¹ The reason is, because a law which commands men can command only human acts.

Hence he who, on a feast day, while drunk, sleeping, or altogether coerced, is present at Mass, by no means satisfies the precept of hearing Mass, for the reason that he does not operate in a human manner; but it is otherwise if from fear he places the prescribed act (I, 165). Except if the prescribed work is a donation, payment of taxes, because in these things the external performance of the action suffices, although coerced.

3. At the due time. Thus the precept of hearing Mass is affixed to feast days, Communion to the paschal time; and in these cases the circumstance of time pertains to the substance of the precept (VI, 297; ed. G., III, p. 273).

But if the time of fulfilling the law has not been determined, satisfaction must be made to the law as soon as it can conveniently be done; otherwise, fulfillment could always be deferred further, and at last omitted; which is repugnant. Cf. below n. 213.

4. With the intention, etc., that is, the intention ought so to be directed to the work that such a work, as to its specific being, is performed. For according to a different intention the same act can constitute a different work: thus the reading of psalms can be study or prayer.

Hence one reciting the canonical Hours does not satisfy the precept by the sole intention of reading or learning; nor one going to Mass only for this end, that he may feed his eyes and ears, that he may converse with another, that he may await a friend, that he may accompany a friend going or returning (I, 162-165; H. Ap., II, 29).

212. Corollaries. 1. The intention of satisfying the law is not required. The reason is, because precepts do not oblige to formal obedience, that is, that the thing prescribed be done because it is prescribed, but only to material obedience, that is, that what is prescribed be done.

Hence: a) "He who, unmindful of some precept, fulfilled it, for example, not knowing that it was a feast day, nevertheless freely was present at Mass, has satisfied. Nor, as some will, is it necessary that afterwards, understanding that it is a feast day, he then will to satisfy through the Mass heard; because he fulfilled the substance of the prescribed act. - b) He truly fulfills a vow, an oath, and sacramental penance (cf. n. 1724), who executes the works promised or enjoined, even if he does not have the intention of fulfilling; provided, however, that he does not apply them for another thing. The reason is, because vows, etc., are laws as it were particular, which a man imposes on himself or another; whence they oblige only to the substance of the act" (I, 163).

2. The intention of fulfilling the end intended by the legislator is not required, of itself, unless the end precisely in itself is commanded, according to the common axiom: The end of a precept does not fall under the precept.

Thus, for example, he satisfies the precept of the Church who fasts on the appointed days, even if he does not feel, or does not intend, his own mortification. He, however, who acted against this end, for example, by eating again or a third time after he has already culpably broken the fast, would sin venially, according to the more probable opinion; "because to act contrary to the end of the law is a certain disorder, which does not seem to be excused from all fault" (III, 1030). But if the end is imposed in itself, then, as is evident, it falls under the precept. Wherefore, if it is prescribed to someone that he pray for the exaltation of the Church, it does not suffice simply to pray, but it is necessary to intend this determined end, at least implicitly.

3. The state of grace or the motive of charity is not required (H. Ap., II, 28). This is clear from the 16th proposition of Baius condemned by St. Pius V: "That is not true obedience to the law which is done without charity." Except if the state of grace pertains to the substance of the precept, as in paschal communion.

"Meanwhile, it is certain that charity is required in the one operating, so that the fulfillment of the precept may be meritorious, according to that (1 Cor. 13): If I should speak with the tongues of men, etc." (I, 162).

4. Indeed satisfaction can be made to the law through fulfillment of the prescribed work, although the action from another source is vitiated by some sin, for example, if the end of the one operating is corrupted, who acts from vainglory, etc., provided that the substance of the prescribed act is not corrupted, for example, that the confession or communion is sacrilegious, as is drawn from the 14th proposition condemned by Alexander VII.²

Thus, therefore, he satisfies who fasts from avarice, hears Mass in such a church because he will more easily find an occasion of stealing (I, 162). For law requires nothing beyond the substance of the act.

5. Finally, he fulfills the law who places the work and expressly intends that he does not will to satisfy through it, for example, he who hears Mass from mere devotion, intending afterwards that he will satisfy in another Mass. The reason: precepts oblige only to the substance of the work enjoined. Therefore, once that is placed, it is not in the power of the one operating not to satisfy, nor is he held to anything else (I, 164; H. Ap., II, 29).

Thus it is clear how great a difference exists between laws placed by a Superior and those things which each one imposes upon himself after the likeness of law: for example, through a vow, through a promise, donation, etc. For if someone promised a rosary from a vow, he is not freed if he says the rosary with the intention of not fulfilling the vow: here all things depend on the will of the one promising. But in laws made by a Superior, all things must be judged from the will of the legislator, which is not extended beyond the substance of the work. See St. Alph., IV, n. 176; ed. G., II, p. 605, where the question is practically unfolded.

Note. The discourse is concerning human law only, because, as Lehmkuhl rightly notes, I, n. 246, natural law obliges not only to the substance of the work, but also to the mode of virtue. And he cites St. Thomas and Suarez.

213. IT IS ASKED. What if the law has not been fulfilled at the determined time?

Resp. Distinguish. The determination of time was made either for ending, or for soliciting or urging the obligation. In the former case the law, or vow, once the time has elapsed, no longer obliges; thus, for example, he who did not fast on the day of the vigil sinned, but is freed from the law, because the burden is affixed to the day. In the latter case, the law continues to urge: thus he is not freed from the obligation of communicating who did not fulfill the precept in paschal time;³ he who neglected sacramental penance imposed for such a time is not de-obliged (III, 220; VI, 297; H. Ap., XII, 40).