§ 1. On the Multiplicity of Morally Interrupted Acts

327. Things to be noted beforehand. By moral interruption is understood that circumstance of an act by which it comes about that the act in itself, absolutely, is terminated, and so is disjoined from the following act, that in no way can it be considered as constituting morally something one with it.

A twofold INTERRUPTION OF ACTS is distinguished: one voluntary, the other involuntary.

Voluntary interruption (or interruption from the choice of the agent) is that which occurs either through formal retraction, as if someone truly repents of an evil act; or through free cessation from an act, say, if someone from weariness or fatigue, without the purpose of proceeding further, desists from what has been begun, or also turns himself to other things. In these cases, if he returns to the evil will, the new act will be morally diverse from the first, since it does not proceed from the first, and therefore it will be a new sin (V, 38).

But involuntary interruption (or interruption beyond the choice of the agent) is that which occurs through the natural cessation of an act, for example, on account of distraction, on account of sleep, etc.; likewise on account of a notable delay of time, so that, according to the nature of the action, the act of the will is judged by the judgment of prudent men already to have ceased.

To moral interruption is opposed MORAL UNION, by which it comes about that several acts coalesce into one. It is commonly had from a double cause: 1. if the acts proceed from the same impulse of concupiscence, or from the same affection of the will; 2. if they are ordered by the agent, by nature, or by human institution to some principal act primarily intended.

328. PRINCIPLE. There are as many sins as there are morally interrupted acts of the will concerning the same object. The reason is because through such interruption acts of the will become complete, and each is constituted in its own proper malice, and therefore through a new act of the will new malice is begotten.

But since, among sinful acts, there are distinguished merely internal acts, that is, sins of heart; internal acts to be consummated externally, that is, efficacious desires, purposes which tend efficaciously to external sins of mouth or work; and finally external acts, diverse rules must be established, so that the application of the aforesaid principle to each category can be made more easily.

RULE 1. MERELY INTERNAL acts, unless they proceed from the same impulse of passion, are interrupted through any natural cessation whatsoever.

St. Alphonsus explains the matter thus (V, 37; H. Ap., III, 58): "If they are sins of heart, which are entirely perfected internally, as hatreds, heresies, morose delectations, base desires, etc., these, as soon as they are multiplied, are interrupted; so that there are as many sins as there are acts of the will consenting to them. The reason is because, with respect to such acts, one does not depend on another, and therefore they cannot be morally continued ... And therefore the penitent indeed ought to explain, if he can, how many times he consented in will; but if he cannot, because the depraved disposition of soul was long-lasting, then it suffices to confess the time in which he persevered with such a disposition, explaining, at least in general, whether those interruptions (besides the ordinary interruptions of sleep, etc.) were notably rare or frequent. But if several acts of this kind proceed from the same impulse of concupiscence, they constitute one mortal sin, even if some brief interval intervenes among the acts."

RULE 2. Internal acts TO BE CONSUMMATED EXTERNALLY for the most part are not interrupted by ordinary natural cessation (say, by sleep, common distractions); but they are interrupted by a lengthy interval of time. The reason is because these acts, through a tendency to the external work, are connected, and coalesce into one; but this connection can no longer endure after some interval of time, as is clear.

But what is to be judged a LENGTHY TIME cannot be precisely indicated; for, according to the nature of the thing and the vehemence of the passion, acts of the will endure unequally, so that in some matters they are prolonged little, in others much. But thus St. Alphonsus (V, 38; H. Ap., III, 60): "I think," he says, "that the impulse of one act can with difficulty be prolonged (ordinarily speaking) more than for two, or three days at most. Hence, he who perseveres in an evil will beyond two or three days ought to explain the time; so that thus the number of internal acts concerning external sins may be understood morally."

We said: for the most part; excepted are "acts of the will which proceed from the first depraved purpose and endure in some effect which conduces to perfecting one external sin only; because then, however long a time the depraved will endures, those acts (as ordered to one perverse end) constitute one sin" (V, 40; H. Ap., III, 61).

From this rule it is inferred: 1. "If someone proposes to kill a man, and for this reason prepares arms, takes the road, and kills the enemy, he commits one sin, although for many days he has sought him and has repeated the will several times. Thus the Doctors commonly with St. Thomas (2 Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 1). 2. If someone resolves not to restore another's thing, and always remains in the same will (even for a year), he commits one sin; because in that retention never retracted the first will virtually remains ... Yet it must be adverted that if a thief is rendered impotent to restore, and then, having become able, with opportunity given, does not restore, he commits a new sin. The reason is because in that case, through that time of impotence, the will of not restoring does not persevere in effect" (V, 40).

RULE 3. EXTERNAL acts: a) are morally interrupted, if they are complete in themselves, or if the agent intends to rest in them; b) on the contrary, they are not interrupted, but coalesce into one, if they are ordered to the consummation of the same sin, or proceed from the same impulse of concupiscence, or from the same affection of the will (V, 41; H. Ap., III, 62).

I. These acts therefore ARE INTERRUPTED: 1. When they are complete IN THEMSELVES, that is, consummated in their own species, so that they cannot be ordered to another sin of the same species. Wherefore he commits two sins who twice pollutes himself, twice fornicates with the same woman, twice communicates unworthily, etc., even if he perpetrates these crimes within a brief space of time. They are interrupted 2. when the agent intends to rest in them, that is, if they are not subordinated to some completed principal act: say, if someone has several touches, without intention of copula; or if he strikes several times, without intention of killing; or if he several times steals parts from a heap, without intention of carrying off the whole heap; because then each act has its completed malice. Likewise, if someone having kisses, touches, etc., did not will copula from the beginning, but afterwards, on account of increased lust, perfected copula, it is not enough if he confesses only the copula; for then all the acts ought to be explained as distinct sins, because, since one rests in them, each act has in itself its own consummated malice. Thus commonly the Doctors. And the same must be said of him who had the mind only of wounding an enemy, and then, inflamed by anger, killed him: he commits two sins (V, 43).

II. But external acts ARE UNITED: 1. If they are ordered to the consummation of the same sin. Hence, if someone, for consummating copula, sends before acts, kisses, and speeches, it suffices if he confesses only the obtained copula. And probably the same must be said of touches immediately following, because they are very likely applied as the complement of the obtained copula (V, 41, fin.). Yet there is excepted the case if, even while the physically same purpose remains, so great an interval of time intervenes that, according to common estimation, the acts can no longer be called concatenated, that is, so that the preceding act is no longer the proximate disposition to the following act, or its quasi-beginning, although it tends remotely to it.

From this it is inferred: a) He who, from the intention of stealing a heap of wheat, which he cannot carry off all at one time, by repeated times, on the same night, steals parts of the same heap, commits one sin. But he who, from the same intention, steals parts on several occasions morally interrupted (that is, distant from one another by such an interval that one act cannot be called the continuation of the preceding other), sins as many times as he returns to stealing.¹ b) Similarly, a young man who, from the intention of fornicating, meets a girl with longer spaces interposed, and gradually, through acts less libidinous, induces her to fornication, commits not one, but several sins; because those external acts are no longer morally united, since they were not the proximate disposition to the fornication which afterwards followed, or its quasi-beginning.

2. If they proceed from the same impulse of concupiscence, or from the same affection of the will; say, if someone from the same impulse strikes an enemy several times, dishonestly touches himself several times, blasphemes the same Saint or several holy days several times, several times in the same matter insults someone, or detracts from him (V, 41). But this, as has already been said, does not hold for those sins of work which are complete in themselves: for these cannot coalesce into one.

329. IT IS ASKED. Whether the MEANS employed for sinning must be explained in confession as numerically distinct, if the sin afterwards was not consummated?

Resp. Affirmatively. For then those means are no longer united, and, even if indifferent, they are informed by the internal malice, and therefore must be explained as external sins, or works begun (V, 42; H. Ap., III, 62).

Whence: 1. If these means were indifferent, as to take a road, to carry a ladder for theft, etc., it must be explained in general whether any means of this kind were employed, and how many times with moral interruption. 2. If the means were evil in themselves, as kisses, touches, speeches for seducing a girl, they must be declared in species, at least by reason of scandal, by which both the charity owed to the neighbor is violated, and the virtue which those means induce one to wound.¹